Tranche 1, Phase 2, Day 7

29 April 2021

Summary of evidence:
‘David Hughes’ (HN299/342, 1971-76)

Introduction of associated documents:
‘Ian Cameron’ (HN344, 1971-72)

Evidence from witnesses:
Professor Jonathan Rosenhead
Christabel Gurney OBE

 

The Undercover Policing Inquiry read out summaries of the activities of two spycops, before hearing from two anti-apartheid activists.

‘David Hughes’ (HN299/342, 1971-76)

Summary of evidence

The morning started with a summary of evidence from the undercover ‘David Hughes’ (HN299/342, 1971-76).

He reported on the International Marxist Group (IMG) throughout his deployment, on groups linked to them, as well as Irish support organisations. Though he has provided a witness statement, he is not being called by the Inquiry to give evidence. Instead, someone from the Inquiry summarised it for us.

Hughes joined Special Branch in 1964. He had grown a beard, which lead him to being spotted by a senior officer when visiting Scotland Yard, and was called into his office for a job in early 1968. This was before the foundation of the Special Demonstration Squad (SDS). He was asked to cover the Vietnam Solidarity Campaign (VSC), who were planning demonstrations in London, and a march from Aldermaston atomic research facility.

Hughes agreed, adopting casual clothes and a fake name, and attended VSC meetings in the weekend. According to him, he submitted around six or seven reports, which were well received by management and he received a commendation.

A particular success, according to him, was learning of several activists were planning to throw stones at the Daily Mirror building due to a German sister paper having reported negatively on anti-Vietnam War demonstrations. The protest was met with a ‘substantial police presence’ and the group wondered how they knew. He felt that the success of his reporting contributed to the idea of founding the Special Demonstration Squad.

‘NO IDEA WHAT BEING UNDERCOVER INVOLVED’

Hughes returned to normal Special Branch duties not long after. In 1971, he was approached by the head of the SDS, Chief Inspector Phil Saunders – probably aware of his earlier work on the VSC – to join. Recruitment and training were fairly informal:

‘People who did undercover work either sank or swam’

He thought the unit was still feeling its way at that point. In particular, management without experience in the field did not have much of an idea what being undercover involved. He notes that when one undercover, ‘Ian Cameron’ (HN344, 1971-72), discovered that he was being investigated by his target group, the SDS office did not really know what to do – and Cameron was withdrawn shortly after.

Guidance on a variety of subjects was non-existent, but as Special Branch officers:

‘they knew, or should have known, how appropriately to conduct themselves once deployed.’

Management tried to select people ‘who could be trusted to exercise common sense and good judgment’.

‘My SDS managers were all quite “hands off” and let me conduct my deployment as as I felt more appropriate.’

TRADECRAFT

He made up the name David Hughes for himself and a cover story that he was from Glasgow and had come to London to look for work. Initially he said he was unemployed, but later got a cover job as a van driver. He had a driving licence in his cover name with the approval of management. Once he had a van (a Bedford), he kept rolls of carpet in the back in case it was ever checked.

In unusual tradecraft, he visited prominent Glasgow-based activist Tony Southall, who was involved with the Committee of 100, Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament and the International Marxist Group. He was a labour movement activist in Glasgow at the time Hughes knocked on his door, introducing himself as someone interested in left wing politics who wanted to become more involved.

‘Once I went into the field in London, I told people that I was friends with Tony Southall. Tony would come down to London occasionally to attend meetings or demonstrations and I would see him at those. It was useful to have someone like that who you could speak to and be seen with. It bolstered your cover background. He had no idea I was a Special Branch officer.’

He does not recall this trip being ‘specifically authorised’ by SDS managers.

He had a number of flats during his time undercover, moving around as his target groups changed meeting locations. He would stay there occasionally, but most nights he returned to his family.

REPORTING

Hughes’ first report is on a meeting in November 1971, but he believes he had been reporting back from meetings prior to that, probably August or September. He was not tasked to infiltrate specific groups; however, sometimes he’d be asked if he could go to a particular meeting or demonstration.

In the main, he was left to his own devices and just told to attend meetings which he learned about from the ‘Agit Prop’ section of the then-radical Time Out magazine. Once at public meetings, he met others and became more involved.

As a result, he fell in with people from the International Marxist Group (IMG) and stayed with them for the duration of his deployment. They were the group most likely to have considered him as a member, of all those he reported on. Them, and perhaps the North London Claimants Union, who he was with for several years and attend conferences in London, Oxford and Birmingham.

Hughes was very active while an undercover, saying he attended between one and six meetings a week as well as weekend demonstrations. He notes that his witness pack has fewer than 200 reports attributed to him, when he would have submitted many more.

Also missing were telephone messages, where he would have called in details, something he says he would have done regularly. Among those he singled out as missing were reports on the North London Claimants Union and a Marxist class held in Streatham. After these events he often went to the pub with the groups.

He believes his reporting helped uniformed police effectively deploy numbers at protests, especially where he was able to identify splinter groups. Likewise, they helped the Security Services in their work on subversion.

NATURE OF REPORTS

Hughes reported whatever information he came across, understanding it would feed into a broader assessment of issues by Special Branch. The sort of issues he understood his bosses were interested in was

i) information on upcoming protests, or public order issues;

ii) identities of those going to meetings or protests, particularly individuals who could be be considered ‘active’ in groups;

iii) major changes within groups – people becoming more prominent or if someone was leaving, who was replacing them;

iv) who was organising things within a group, or who decided policy.

The manner in which he had reported in his previous Special Branch work was continued in his SDS reports. For instance, he reported on IMG interest in organising in factories, as he understood both Special Branch and the Security Services had a role in reporting on subversion. (Weirdly enough, this issue and the relating file [UCPI0000015678], have been mentioned in the Opening Statement of Counsel to the Inquiry as well, but the file is nowhere to be found). ‘Hughes’ notes he was not asked specifically to report on subversion, but he always did if he became aware of it.

‘Sometimes my personal views crept into my reporting. The SDS office never told me this was inappropriate or not permitted.’

He included names of new people, in case they came to prominence later. Sometimes he requested files from Special Branch, to get to know more on someone who was active. The file would then be brought to the SDS safehouse.

Hughes regularly went to the SDS flat for meetings and discussed issues with fellow undercovers – sometimes they’d end up going to the same events. Though he had no welfare issues while undercover, if he had he would have spoken to management privately when there.

At the flat, it could be quite sociable and sometimes someone would cook a meal and they’d hang around chatting – mostly about things unrelated to undercover work. Sometimes he would have a drink with another undercover.

DETAILS REPORTED

Details standing out in his reports, including a note that someone in the Spartacus League (an IMG offshoot) had been a bank robber [MPS-0732356], and that people in one meeting had been selected for a ‘special task’ during a protest which involved breaking the law [UCPI0000007940].

Hughes justified reporting on a film showing Italian activists confronting fascists by the group Fight On, because he believed the showing of such films prior to demonstrations stirred up people and meant they were more likely to become violent [UCPI0000016222].

He was asked why, at a Marxist study group [UCPI0000008823], he reports one person saying that in the event of a revolution about two million people would have to be liquidated. Hughes says that this was particularly extreme and not everyone in the class shared that view:

‘The majority of people I encountered during my deployment were not that extreme.’

One point of concern for Hughes was that the IMG had a policy of entryism into the Labour Party [UCPI0000007598], which they thought would bring them national prominence. He believed this was of interest, as it was subversive in nature. The infiltration was unsuccessful, but he added that many people involved did not engage in subversive activity.

He also reported on IMG activities in relation to the Troops Out Movement (TOM), which he says the IMG tried to take over [UCPI0000006903 – a file not yet disclosed to the Inquiry website]. This was of concern, he said, because some TOM members advocated violence – and an IMG-controlled TOM would be a threat to public order.

Hughes focused on Irish support groups as a matter of interest to Special Branch. However, he thought that much of the support offered by groups such as the IMG was limited to public statements, and that over half were opposed to lethal violence.

Among the other groups reported on were the Irish Solidarity Campaign, Palestinian Solidarity Campaign and at least one individual from People’s Democracy – over their decision to resign [UCPI0000008158]).

Hughes knew of Piers Corbyn at the time, but only in passing. He was also involved in a Marxist Study group organised by Richard Chessum (who will be a later witness at these hearings).

TRADE UNION MEMBERSHIP

Hughes joined the Transport and General Workers Union (TGWU) in his false name to bolster his cover identity. He did not become involved in union affairs but would go to big meetings to report back on speakers and discussions.

However, he would not have submitted reports as they would generally have been covered by ordinary Special Branch officers. His main interest was seeing if ‘members of extreme political groups’ were involved or trying to reach a position of prominence – an issue Special Branch were ‘very concerned about’.

OTHER ISSUES

Hughes did not witness or participate in any public disorder.

His exit strategy was to slowly stop going to meetings, saying he was going back to Glasgow.

He recalled that the then-Commission of the Metropolitan Police, Robert Mark, visited the unit:

‘It was obvious to me that he had concerns about the SDS. I remember words to the effect that “you realise that you could cause me tremendous problems under certain circumstances”.’

Full witness statement of ‘David Hughes’ (HN299/342)

‘Ian Cameron’ (HN344, 1971-72)

Introduction of associated documents

The Inquiry announced it was releasing materials relating to ‘Ian Cameron‘ (HN344, 1971-72). He infiltrated or reported on multiple Irish groups, including the Northern Minorities Defence Committee (where he was elected to the executive committee), Anti-Internment League, and London Branches of Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association and Sinn Féin.

This undercover officer lives abroad and has not provided the Inquiry with a witness statement. Some 22 intelligence reports have been attributed to him between September 1970 and June 1972. Information on him comes directly from the Counsel to the Tribunal’s opening statement (page 90).

Those before March 1972 pre-date his time with the SDS and, according to the Inquiry, he engaged in some unspecified ‘Specialist Operations’. In March 1972, Commander Rodger, head of Special Branch, had him transferred to the SDS.

All bar one report relate to Irish political groups, including the Northern Minorities Defence Force (NMDF), Anti-Internment League (AIL), and London branches of Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association and Sinn Fein, and some of the figures therein. His reporting included reporting on criminal proceedings relating to arrests at demonstrations.

From early 1972, he became focused on the Northern Minorities Defence Force, having been invited to join by the group’s chairman. Little is currently known of this group outside of Special Branch reports, who cite it as believing civil war in Northern Ireland was imminent and they were preparing to assist in this. To this end, they organised a ‘military wing’ and sought training. There is no evidence from Cameron of it engaging in violence, though members apparently had ties to the Provisional IRA.

He quickly reached a senior level within the small organisation, including being part of ‘Headquarters Staff’ and part of its National Executive Committee – where his responsibility was for security [MPS-0734416], and commanding the North West Section.

When the NMDF became affiliated with the Anti-Internment League (AIL), Cameron was selected as its delegate to the AIL. However, he was not part of the Officers Committee.

In May 1972 he was invited to travel to Derry with the NMDF, but senior management appears to have blocked this as too dangerous. After this, there is no further reporting on the group.

He also reports on AIL demonstrations, the reports [UCPI0000008651; UCPI0000007970] hyping the intended violent nature of protests, with notes such as:

‘participants will then rampage down Whitehall and the surrounding area, smashing windows’

However, the only report in which actual violence was reported was a Bristol AIL protest against a march of the Gloucester Regiment (which had been deployed to Northern Ireland), which led to AIL protestors being attacked [MPS-0728828].

There was some support within the AIL for the Provisional IRA [MPS-0728841]. His role in the AIL was sufficient that he was able to attend at least one executive meeting [UCPI0000007950].

‘David Hughes’ (HN299/342, 1971-76) recalled in his statement that Cameron ‘faced detailed inquiries by members of the groups he was infiltrating into his background’ and that he left the field shortly afterward as management did not know how to deal with the situation.

Finally, we note something not covered by the Inquiry in its summary of Cameron’s evidence. We leave you to make of it what you will, but note it was put forward when police were initially arguing Cameron’s real name should be restricted:

‘HN344 is now in his 70s and lives abroad… He has told the risk assessor that he remembers his cover name but refuses to disclose it. Nothing reliable is known about his deployment. He does not consider himself at risk of physical attack from members of his target group or groups. He advances no reason in support of the application for a restriction order in respect of his real name, beyond his understanding that his deployment would be kept confidential and his wish not to be the subject of publicity.

‘He resigned from the Metropolitan Police Service in the early 1980s. Subsequently, he was arrested for the unauthorised possession of official documents. He was not prosecuted on the advice of the Director of Public Prosecutions. Thereafter, he undertook work in the private security sector in Asia.’

Professor Jonathan Rosenhead

Jonathan Rosenhead was involved in Stop the Seventy Tour, an anti-apartheid group formed in September 1969 to oppose a British tour by an all-white South African cricket team. It was just one element of isolating apartheid South Africa in an attempt to bring pressure to end apartheid.

Apartheid was a system of institutionalised racial segregation that existed in South Africa and South West Africa (now Namibia) from 1948 until the early 1990s. It categorised people into a hierarchy of racial groups, with whites at the top.

The laws segregated all areas of life, reserving the best for whites. It applied to everything from education, employment and housing to which bench to sit on or beach people could visit. Most of the population was denied the right to vote. Sexual relationships and marriages between people of different racial groups were illegal.

 

Rosenhead explained that they had originally targeted the South African cricket team that planned to come to Britain, but then realised there was a planned rugby team tour as well, so expanded their activities.

He said they drew on the non-violent direct action approach of 1960s anti-nuclear campaigners like the Committee of 100:

‘we had the same philosophy or actually in a sense offering ourselves up as a sacrifice to the law, to demonstrate that there were things we thought were outrageous and this was one way we could do it’.

Rosenhead confirmed that many thousands of people took part in these actions across the UK and Ireland, but he was not central to the planning of these demos. By that stage, he was more involved in ‘what we called the Special Action Group’ of anti-apartheid activists seeking to disrupt matches and sometimes invade pitches during games.

Rosenhead ruefully recalled finally reaching the pitch at a rugby match in the barracks town of Aldershot:

‘I tried several but I’m not very good at climbing fences, but I did succeed in Aldershot. The spectators there were very significantly drawn from the armed forces. So it was not just the people on the pitch who were a bit threatening, so were the spectators’

Rosenhead next explained more about the Special Action Group. He refuted the suggestion of being ‘the covert arm’ of the Stop the Seventy Tour, saying they just wanted the element of surprise. The phrasing of this question from the Inquiry seemed to suggest that there is a justification in covert surveillance if organisers have meetings in private.

The Stop The Seventy Tour campaigners felt that it was important to hold as many demonstrations as possible, at sports grounds all over the country, to show the strength of public feeling and to educate people about the apartheid regime in South Africa.

MIKE BREARLEY, ANTI-RACIST

They held a conference in London on the 7 March 1970, which was reported on [UCPI0000008660] by spycop Mike Ferguson (HN135).

One of the people who made a speech was future England cricket captain Michael Brearley, according to the report warning the delegates for the use of violence for violence sake in their demonstrations.

Once again, the Inquiry picked up on the mention of the idea of violence, as if eager to find a way to use it to discredit protesters. But Rosenhead retorted:

‘Based on that paragraph and on other documents, I think it would be unwise to take these reports as a neutral and objective statement of what was going in the meeting. I think there’s an element of self-justification here for police involvement.’

Brearley was one of the few professional cricketers to vote against playing against a whites-only South African team. It’s also likely that he is the only England cricket captain to appear in a Special Branch report.

Asked about a phrase in this report, ‘a hardcore of militants’, Rosenhead said ‘a small number of committed individuals’ would be a more accurate description. He saw it as another example of the spycops’ hyperbolic language.

In reality, Rosenhead explained:

‘Stop The Seventy Tour was a nice floppy liberal alternative organisation, which many people could join who had maybe different activities outside but agreed on this one thing.’

There was no party line and no ‘militancy’ as such, and the only thing everyone agreed on was the need to end apartheid.

There was something both incongruous as well as slightly offensive in the line of questioning pursued by the inquiry throughout this session, repeatedly pushing for any reason to imply STST activists were violent and attempting to demonise their actions.

This is especially galling given the murderous racist violence of the South African apartheid regime they were protesting against. Adding to this, that within the UK it was STST protesters who were routinely assaulted by the police, stewards and some rugby supporters, as detailed in Rosenhead’s contemporary Ernest Rodker’s statement.

SOUPED-UP

A ‘special planning group’ meeting took place at the London School of Economics on 7 May 1970. According to the report [UCPI0000008607] it was attended by Rosenhead and eight others (whose names are all redacted).

He remembers how small the room was and has serious doubts that a meeting of nine people could have fitted into it.

More seriously, Rosenhead complained about the ‘hyperbolic language’ used in the reports, and said things had been misrepresented and made to sound more serious than they were.

There was a militaristic turn of phrase to the report which says mentions how Lord’s cricket ground is ‘defended’ and how an ‘attack can be launched’ against it:

‘I think it’s been souped-up for the eyes and ears of the senior officers.’

It’s noteworthy that this report was signed-off by Mike Ferguson (HN135), whose daughter, Clare Carson, wrote a trilogy of novels around a character loosely based on her father. Perhaps she inherited her talent for creative writing from her dad.

The report goes on to list a whole range of tactics that demonstrators might use at the demo being planned for 6 June 1970.

Asked what was meant by the advice that demonstrators should ‘do their own thing once they had made it on to the pitch, Rosenhead said that in his one experience of once making it on to a pitch, he did not have anything to do except hang around and wait to be arrested. There was nothing sinister intended by this phrase, despite the insinuations of both Ferguson in 1970 and the Inquiry today.

FIREWORKS

Rosenhead noted that the report only says that things like fireworks were ‘advocated’. It means it was mentioned during a discussion, not that it actually happened. Rosenhead said that this sounded like someone who was ‘a little bit more ardent than us’.

Rosenhead remembers being forced to discuss what to do next, once the campaign had been unusually successful and the cricket tour was cancelled as a result of their actions. A Special Branch report of this meeting [UCPI0000008635] based on Mike Ferguson’s intelligence (and perhaps imagination) says they felt they should remain as ‘a latent power’ in case of future tours.

Another SDS report [MPS-0736368] is about a meeting in May 1970 which discussed taking action at the airport when the sports teams disembarked. The violent terminology recurs, with references to a ‘commando group’ of activists who could throw fireworks.

The report also refers to the idea of smoke bombs being used at ‘some form of ‘happening’, and explicitly says that these would be ‘spectacular’. Other tactics brought up, included releasing ticker tape from a weather balloon, and jamming police radios.

The Inquiry asked if this was the plan, to cause fear among people at the airport.

Rosenhead dismissed it out of hand:

‘The whole thing is littered with wishful thinking and wild speculations’

The fact that there is no record of anything like this happening shows the fanciful nature of the report. It’s risible that the Inquiry persisted in taking it seriously.

PERSONAL SMEARS

There was a bizarre report [MPS-0736399] from June 1970 on something called the ‘Keep Politics Out Of Cricket Committee’. The report says it was a front set up by Rosenhead to gather those who opposed his political position in order to invite them to cricket matches and have a confrontation. An advert for this organisation was placed in the Daily Telegraph.

Rosenhead said it was done by someone who wanted to undermine his credibility, and he is surprised that the secret police took such a weird idea at face value.

The Inquiry Chair, Sir John Mitting, for the second time today, said this is not thought to be an SDS document, suggesting that it comes from Special Branch more widely. However, a cursory glance at the end of the report shows that is signed off by SDS officer Detective Sergeant Mike Ferguson. Another case of the Inquiry not doing its homework properly.

MISCARRIAGE OF JUSTICE AT THE STAR & GARTER HOTEL

On 12 May 1972, protesters blockaded the Star & Garter Hotel, Richmond, in order to prevent the British Lions rugby team leaving for the airport to go on a tour of apartheid South Africa. Fourteen people were arrested and thirteen convicted, including Rosenhead and SDS officer ‘Michael Scott’ (HN298, 1971-76).

The protesters were in the car park, which is on private land. However, the police lied and said they were on the public highway, and so the group was convicted of obstruction of the highway. The evidence of the undercover police officer, Mike Scott, should have been given to the defence and heard in court. A police officer should not have infiltrated the defence in a public prosecution. It all adds up to a miscarriage of justice.

Scott would have been privy to discussions between the defendants and their lawyers and would have known what the defence case would be. Rosenhead is clear:

‘All of that.. seems to be a complete miscarriage of justice and speaks very badly for the police ethics of that time or of that place’

It’s unclear how Scott knew about the protest. Rosenhead strongly refutes the story that the guy was invited to it by the mother of one of the others, Peter Hain. She had come to the UK having been politically active in South Africa and was extremely security-conscious. There is no way that she would have invited some random stranger on the phone to attend a private political meeting.

The Inquiry showed a report [MPS-0526782] dated 17 May 1972 about the arrests of Rosenhead and Rodker. Rosenhead agreed that roles were discussed and decided at a planning meeting at Rodker’s house before the action.

Rodker arranged for a skip to be delivered to the hotel car park at 4pm that day in the hope of blocking the exit:

‘I think it was rather impressive – remember we were doing all this without mobile phones’

The Inquiry persisted in trying to make the non-violent direct action look more dangerous than it was, picking up on a word in the report and asking if it was accurate to call the situation ‘a melee’.

Directly refuting that, Rosenhead said:

‘There were no fisticuffs, and there was nobody was trying to restrain us in any way.’

The report stated:

‘Rosenhead volunteered the use of three flares which he had with him… later, at the car park, he lit and threw a flare’.

Rosenhead thinks this may be a case of mistaken identity – and from his memory said that it was a ‘beautiful sunny day,’ and did not remember any smoke.

For himself, he says:

‘I have no recollection of ever owning a flare in my life.’

LEGAL PRIVILEGE BREACHED

In May, after the first court appearance, there was a meeting attended by 13 defendants, which was also reported on [MPS-0737109]. Spycop ‘Mike Scott’ was present, as were Rodker and Gurney. They agreed to meet with ‘highly-esteemed human rights lawyer’ Ben Birnberg, with a view to him representing them in this case, and to prepare some notes about what had happened.

This document, and most certainly a second one [MPS-0737108] (a report of a second meeting of the defendants held shortly before their second court appearance on 11th June) contains legally privileged information.

That a report by a police officer contains such a great deal of such information should have raised concerns to any senior police officer reading it at the time. Legal privilege is a long-standing concept in English law, this is not a new concept and would have been salient at the time.

The court case took place on 14 June 1972. ‘Mike Scott’ was found guilty and given a conditional discharge, as was Christabel Gurney. Rosenhead has no idea why his case and Ernest as well as five others were adjourned until a later date.

It appears from the documents [MPS-0526782, MPS-0737126] as if these seven pushed for their cases to be heard in a higher court, and so were postponed until that next date.

THE POLICE LIE

Rosenhead then interjected and said that his mother was a magistrate at the time of his unsafe conviction and found it difficult to believe that the police had lied about so blatantly about where Rosenhead was in the car park.

Unfortunately, Sir John Mitting appears to take the same uncritical view of police testimony. At the end of Tuesday’s hearing he thanked ‘Alex Sloan‘ (HN347, 1971) for the ‘honesty’ of his evidence.

Rosenhead ended by speaking about the way his case relates to the CHIS Bill:

‘I am concerned, in terms of the behaviour of my very own undercover officer, about the current legislation changing the legal basis for covert human intelligence sources activities. I hope that this Inquiry will perhaps retrospectively get those powers reconsidered.

‘The general picture that’s going on at the moment of reinforcing police powers is worrying given the evidence that we have in this case. And there is a continuing police culture, if you like, of the abuse of power.’

This culture seems to exist, he explained, just because the Establishment gets uncomfortable with people campaigning, instead of seeing them as people essentially performing the valuable community service of political activism.

Full witness statement of Professor Jonathan Rosenhead

Christabel Gurney OBE

In the afternoon, the Inquiry heard evidence from Christabel Gurney OBE.

Gurney was an activist in the Anti-Apartheid Movement (AAM) from 1969 until 1994.

The AAM supported people in South Africa struggling against its racist apartheid system. As a British organisation, AAM focused on the ways UK companies, banks and Government supported the apartheid regime. The AAM did what they could to discourage or prevent it.

Gurney was a member of the AAM Executive Committee and the editor of its monthly newspaper, Anti-Apartheid News, from 1970 to 1980. As a result of this work she was awarded an OBE ‘for political service, particularly to human rights’ in 2014.

Membership of the AAM was open to anyone. People paid a fee and were issued with a card. The intention was to have as large a membership as possible, with broad support from those in every political party and from those in none.

Special Branch’s remit, and by extension the Special Demonstration Squad (SDS), was subversion (opposition to the UK’s parliamentary democracy), and threats to public order, However, AAM was clearly neither. In fact, Gurney pointed out, the AAM’s sole aim was to extend parliamentary democracy to southern African nations that were subject to rule by white minorities.

It is now clear that both Special Branch and the SDS spycops have always had a broader remit which extended to threats to police credibility, corporate profit, and the convenience of the government of the day.

By opposing British government policy and businesses supporting and arming the apartheid South African government, the AAM became a target despite being open, democratic and law-abiding.

MAINSTREAM METHODS

Central to the AAM’s approach was to try avoidance of doing anything which would distract the press from the real issue – the violence of the South African apartheid regime. As such it eschewed violence or heated confrontation. Rather, it concerned itself with common campaign tactics such as organising petitions, public meetings, pickets, vigils, cultural events, and mass rallies.

The AAM held many demonstrations and marches, which were agreed with the police in advance.

One example was an 8,000-strong rally in Trafalgar Square on 25 October 1970. The 10-page Special Branch report [MPS-0742860] on it records the presence of a broad range of groups including GLC Labour Party Young Socialists, India Workers Association, Catford Young Communist League, and Putney Young Liberals – all of whom are noted in the report as having their own Special Branch files.

The report shows it was an entirely peaceable affair, although the spycops – always on the lookout for the oxymoronic ‘anarchist leaders’ – say they saw:

‘small contingents of anarchists, obviously intent on “trouble” but lacking the necessary leadership’

SUBVERSIVE BISHOPS

The next report shown by the Inquiry [MPS-0742861] covered the AAM’s 1970 Annual General Meeting, held at the National Liberal Club in London.

Though 200 members were present, it was essentially private as part of its internal democracy. Yet the spycops were there. It’s astonishing that the political secret police were spying on a democratic group electing top level of officials of a decidedly establishment bent.

President was the Rt Rev Ambrose Reeves, an Anglican bishop.

Vice presidents were:

• Sir Dingle Foot QC MP
• Rt Rev Trevor Huddleston, another Anglican bishop
• Rt Hon Jeremy Thorpe MP, then-leader of the Liberal Party
• Basil Davidson, a historian who had worked for MI6 behind enemy lines in the Second World War and been awarded the Military Cross

Gurney was elected to the 30-strong National Committee at the meeting.

SOUTH AFRICAN EMBASSY

A report [MPS-0737006] on the AAM’s International Day for the Elimination of Racial Discrimination on 21 March 1972 said:

‘the organisers are anxious that picketing should be peaceful so as to avoid adverse publicity’

Gurney agreed that this was the case with all AAM demos.

The AAM was a frequent visitor to the South African embassy in Trafalgar Square, but usually in the form of small, solemn vigils outside, such as when the regime executed anti-apartheid activists.

The Inquiry then displayed a report [UCPI0000008442] by spycops HN332 and Jill Mosdell (HN346, 1970-73) about a meeting on 8 November 1971 on a planned sit-in at the South African embassy. Fifteen people attended, one of whom was a spycop.

Gurney explained that the meeting came in the immediate aftermath of the South African police’s torture and murder of anti-apartheid activist Ahmed Timol. He had been a good friend of many South African exiles who had made their home in London, so they were extremely distressed about his death.

They wanted to do ‘something more’ than usual, explained Gurney:

‘These were exceptional circumstances.’

The report warned:

‘the sit-in would be quite militant and it would be necessary for the security guards to use force to eject the demonstrators.’

Gurney says ‘militant’ is the officer’s choice of word. She explained that they feared violence from guards and didn’t want to provoke them. They knew knew there was a real possibility of arrest.

On the day, they sat down and refused to move. Staff tipped water on them from a balcony above. The protesters passively resisted, going limp and having to be carried out.

This appears to be about as rowdy an action as the police and Inquiry can pin on Gurney or the AAM. The Inquiry, like the spycop’s report itself, paid little attention to the fact that the reason for the protests was the murder of a man thrown out of a window of a police station.

THE MET: AN EXCESSIVE FORCE

She said that the AAM knew that they, like other groups trying to bring about change in society, were likely to be the subject to police surveillance, they heard clicks on their phone lines that indicated they were being tapped, but they never imagined the other forms it took:

‘I am surprised now at the extent of it.’

The next report [MPS-0737656] was of a fundraising Christmas party at Gurney’s home on 9 December 1972. Around 40 people attended, including an undercover police officer, paying 75p for a ticket, and drinks were 12p.

Gurney was aghast that this purely social event had been attended by a spycop:

‘there was absolutely nothing subversive in any way about it.’

STOP THE SEVENTY TOUR

Gurney was involved with the Stop the Seventy Tour campaign which aimed to prevent or disrupt the planned tour by the all-white South African Springboks rugby team.

A Special Branch report [UCPI0000034318] on the AAM’s 1969 Annual General Meeting records campaigner Paul Hodges explaining to the meeting that:

‘detailed plans had already been made to harass the Springboks Rugby Tour that was due to start at Oxford on November 5. He said he appreciated that the Anti-Apartheid Movement could not be linked officially with the protestors because of the possibility of its leaders being charged with conspiracy to commit a public disorder.’

The chair is recorded as saying it was important that no publicity on the issue came from the meeting. The AAM did not ally itself with non-violent direct action, let alone organise it.

However, many individuals would have been involved with both campaign groups. Gurney said there were some tensions, but it was understood that both organisations were ultimately working towards the same aims.

Her name is listed in the report as part of the ‘core of the coming protest movement’, but she disagreed with the description. She was an activist in the campaign, but not an integral organiser. She did not attend the kind of special planning group meetings that we heard about during Jonathan Rosenhead’s evidence earlier in the day.

The AAM organised protests outside the sports grounds on the day of matches. There were demonstrations at all 24 games in the 1969/70 Springboks tour of Britain and Ireland.

The match intended to be played at Oxford was moved to Twickenham, and on the day Gurney was there trying to get on to pitch.

NOT JUST SOUTH AFRICA

The AAM also supported efforts to end white minority rule in the Portuguese colony of Mozambique, and the British colony of Rhodesia, which bordered both South Africa and Mozambique. Rhodesia had unilaterally declared itself independent under white minority rule in 1965.

United Nations Security Council Resolution 202 asked member states not to recognise Rhodesia as independent, and for the UK to work toward an equitable constitution and for the independence with majority-rule. The AAM sought to encourage this. Again, this is hardly undermining democracy or posing a risk of disorder.

DAMBUSTERS MOBILISING COMMITTEE

Gurney was also asked about the Dambusters Mobilising Committee (DMC), a coalition of groups including the AAM, that opposed the construction of the vast Cabora Bassa dam project in Mozambique.

The dam was a collaboration between South Africa, Rhodesia and Mozambique’s colonial ruler Portugal. It displaced local people without compensation in order to supply electricity to apartheid South Africa, and undermined United Nations sanctions.

The DMC campaigned to dissuade British (and other European) companies from financing or otherwise becoming involved in the Cabora Bassa project.

Reports show DMC meetings were small, attended only by representatives of the organisations in the coalition. Spycop Douglas Edwards (HN326, 1968-70) is among those named, apparently as the delegate from the Action Committee Against NATO.

We’ve been told that spycops often infiltrated a relatively innocuous organisation as a stepping stone to getting into their real target. This appears to be an instance of a spycop infiltrating one organisation that isn’t a threat to public order in order to get in another that is equally unthreatening.

Gurney recounted how they spent a lot of time researching companies involved in the dam. Some campaigners bought shares so they could attend AGMs of companies, such as that of Barclay’s Bank who were guarantors of some of the dam’s financing, and pose pertinent questions to the meeting. These were very successful protests, gaining coverage in the Financial Times, etc.

One report on a December 1970 DMC meeting [UCPI 0000008114] talks of four places suggested as targets for sit-in protests, including Barclay’s Bank and ICI’s offices. The report itself says that they would expect them to be small affairs. Gurney said that she had no memory of this, and was confident she would remember if she had actually taken part in such events.

THE STAR & GARTER INCIDENT

Gurney was one of those arrested at an incident described in detail in yesterday’s evidence from one of the other arrestees, Ernest Rodker. As we heard in Jonathan Rosenhead’s evidence earlier in the day, on 12 May 1972, protesters blockaded the Star & Garter Hotel, Richmond, in order to prevent the British Lions rugby team leaving for the airport to go on a tour of apartheid South Africa. Fourteen people were arrested and convicted, including Gurney and SDS officer ‘Michael Scott’ (HN298, 1971-76).

For years, she had a vague memory of going to court for this, and being fined, and solicitor Ben Birnberg being involved. However, it wasn’t until she conducted some oral history interviews with Ernest Rodker in 2013 that she saw some press clippings with name in that she more clearly remembered being a defendant in this case.

She cannot recall the trial itself. She was convicted of obstruction (of the police and the highway), and was fined £2.

The fact that one of the defendants was a police officer – spying on the defence while working for the prosecution – is only part of the scandal. The prosecution have a duty to give the defence any relevant evidence, but clearly they were told nothing about the secret police reports which may have exonerated them. Either way, it was an unfair trial as not only was legal privilege breached by Scott’s involvement, but it should have been disclosed to the other campaigners that he was a police officer

Gurney says it is a matter of concern that we have seen no documents about whether the prosecutors or court were aware of the undercover officer’s involvement.

Mitting cut in to ask some questions. Does she remember if she was represented by Birnberg, or someone else from his firm? Does she remember if she had to pay for legal representation? Does she remember if they applied for legal aid or not? Gurney drew a blank on them all.

The Inquiry Chair, Sir John Mitting, then indicated that he will be referring the Star & Garter case to a panel with a view to overturning the convictions.

It is also worth noting that Scott was convicted under a false name as well, so lied to the court unless the magistrates were told secretly. It is unknown if he claimed legal aid in that name as well. He will be giving evidence to the Inquiry on 4th May.

ANTI-DEMOCRATIC POLICING

With the questioning over, she made some points of her own:

‘First of all I feel that it was wholly inappropriate for police officers to be spying on members of the Anti Apartheid Movement. Its only rationale was to call for democracy in South Africa, and it was not in any way a subversive organisation’

The AAM’s sole aim was to accelerate the coming of democracy in southern African nations. It was the opposite of subversive. Spying on it was a misuse of time and funds.

More to the point, those who were trying to prevent democracy were active on the streets of London and were very much a threat to public safety. She expressed disappointment that:

‘there has been no investigation into the activities of the undercover operations that were coming out of the SA Embassy.’

This included much more serious criminality, like the ‘burglaries’ suffered by anti-apartheid campaigners. In March 1982, the African National Congress office in Penton Street was bombed while in 1985 the AAM office suffered a serious arson attack.

A former head of the South African security police, General Johann Coetzee, later admitted responsibility for the ANC office bombing at an amnesty hearing of the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission.

Why weren’t the UK police investigating these incidents, rather than wasting time and money spying on the anti-apartheid campaigns?

Mitting says we don’t know why the AAM was first infiltrated because one of the spycops involved, Jill Mosdell, has now died.

WHY THE EXCLUSION?

The Inquiry noted Gurney’s concerns about the wider investigations that needed to be made, but repeated this new assertion that this Inquiry had to limit itself just to ‘the Special Demonstration Squad in its various incarnations’, which is simply not true.

The Inquiry’s Terms of Reference limit is investigations to English and Welsh police forces since 1968, but:

‘The inquiry’s investigation will include, but not be limited to, the undercover operations of the Special Demonstration Squad and the National Public Order Intelligence Unit.’

Watching Gurney give evidence today, another question on people’s lips was why did Mitting refuse her core participant status at the Inquiry? She was a leading figure in many groups the were spied on, is named in numerous spycops’ reports, and was set up for a wrongful conviction by spycops.

Being denied core particpancy prevents her from getting proper disclosure of documents or asking questions of her own, something made all the more unfair now it is clear she is the subject of a miscarriage of justice.

Full witness statement of Christabel Gurney OBE

Chrsitabel Gurney is involved in running the Anti-Apartheid Movement archives.

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Tranche 1, Phase 2, Day 6

28 April 2021

Evidence from witnesses:

Piers Corbyn
Ernest Rodker

The Inquiry hearings of 28 April 2021 heard from witnesses targeted by undercover officers in 1970s London. First up was International Marxist Group (IMG) member and squatting activist Piers Corbyn, followed by anarchist and anti-apartheid activist Ernest Rodker.

Piers Corbyn

Piers Corbyn was an engaged witness, who had the measure of ‘Sir John’, as he referred to the Chair multiple times. There was a sense that he got something out of been taken back to memories of his activities in the 1970s. At times he complimented the Inquiry on bringing so much of the material on him together, calling it a useful diary of his activities.

Corbyn moved to London in 1965 to study and the first demonstration he can remember attending was for the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament. He participated in many other campaigns and movements, and confirmed that he attended both of the anti-Vietnam War demonstrations in 1968.

VIETNAM WAR CAMPAIGNING

Corbyn was not a member of the Vietnam Solidarity Campaign (VSC) as such. However, he did mobilise people and banners for demos, and maybe even did some stewarding. He said that the war in Vietnam was:

‘a formative crisis for tens of thousands of young people at the time and I was one of them.’

He was asked if he remembered seeing any violence at these demos – to which he responded:

‘I wouldn’t say any violence was initiated by demonstrators.’

The Inquiry was interested in the make up of the VSC. Corbyn described the IMG as ‘one of the most influential’ groups involved in the VSC. He said the IMG’s role, historically, was to mobilise people and make them aware of the issues.

SPARTACUS LEAGUE & THE IMG

Corbyn became president of the Imperial College Students Union, and then the editor of a London student newspaper, The Senate, around 1970.

He also joined the Spartacus League, which he confirmed was part of the IMG, though it could be joined without being in the IMG – people would be invited to join the IMG if they ‘proved their worth’.

The Inquiry took him to a report on the Spartacus League, dated January 1972 [MPS-0732360]. As with similar meetings, this took place at Corbyn’s home in Rendle Street. The meeting had been attended by officer HN338 (cover name unknown) who Corbyn was unaware of.

On page two of the report, the author detailed a discussion about the ‘Red Defence Group’, and how the IMG could ‘take over, run and use the organisation’ in order to recruit into the IMG. Corbyn pointed out that this report was authored by a spycop, and most likely reflected his assumptions, and the police’s prejudices, rather than reflecting the IMG’s actual intentions.

Corbyn said that he was ‘always interested in getting people to join in and stay active and make propaganda’.

He said if these reports were less redacted, or he was supplied with photos, he might find it easier to recall the people and events of 50 years ago.

MERGER

A report from June 1972 [UCPI0000015694] covered a conference that took place in May that year to merge the Spartacus League into the IMG. Corbyn was asked which category of attendee he would have fallen into – a delegate, a consultative delegate, an observer, or a visitor? Corbyn thinks he may have been a delegate. The Inquiry noted that ‘visitors’ could not take part in any votes and asked if this meant the conference was open to the public. Corbyn said effectively no, you had to be invited – either via a branch or someone else.

He was then directed to look at section that covered a speech made by ‘Surgitt’ – the party name (see more below) of a female member critical of male chauvinism in the group and which got various reactions. Corbyn was asked if this was an accurate description of the speech and the atmosphere at the time. He said ‘maybe that description is a bit over the top’ but ‘those types of things were said’ – not remarking on the sexist nature of the police’s report which described it as being unconstructive and amounting to an attack on men.

DEFINING REVOLUTION

Elsewhere in the report there was a mention of ‘fraternal greetings’ from a Peruvian member of the Fourth International, a revolutionary socialist international organisation of Trotskyists seeking an international revolution to overthrow global capitalism and establish world socialism. The speaker gave a rousing speech on revolution which included the phrase ‘the Revolution will not be won until Marxist blood is spilled in the street’.

Asked about how much this reflected the IMGs own position, Corbyn replied:

‘the IMG would say – as a not very funny internal joke – “if you care to struggle, we will ‘solidimise’ with you”. This meant that they would support, which is not always the same as endorse, all kinds of people engaged in the anti-capitalist, anti-imperialist struggle.’

Corbyn said that at the time, capitalism was in crisis, so a transition to a more socialist and more democratic society was needed. He pointed out that ‘revolution’ need not mean violence but could also be taken to mean a ‘fundamental change in the way that society was organised’. The IMG was a small group of a few hundred people and knew that they could not make this kind of fundamental change in society without wider support.

Corbyn wondered aloud if he was an ‘armchair socialist’ like many others of the time, but added that he was also very keen on talking to people about all sorts of issues (citing Ireland, workers’ struggles, tenants’ and housing campaigns, etc).

SUPPORT AND SOLIDARITY

He was asked, in reference to report [UCPI000008948] to explain what ‘Red Circles’ were. These were public meetings, held in places like pubs, with a variety of speakers on all sorts of issues, and some ‘lively discussions’.

The IMG did support many groups and campaigns and did not always try to control them, he explained. Sometimes they would set up a ‘Support Committee’. From the same document, Corbyn noted they were supportive of the Claimants Union, which worked to make sure people got the benefits they were entitled to.

The report mentions a ‘perspectives’ document produced by Corbyn, ahead of a discussion about merging branches. The IMG used coded initials in case these internal documents fell into the hands of Special Branch, but the spycop submitting this report included a key to this code as an appendix.

A discussion followed about the IMG’s use of ‘party names’ – ie false names when undertaking political activity. In this context, Corbyn noted that he was under surveillance for a decade, an endeavour which was probably a waste of police time:

‘I didn’t do anything dangerous, nor did anybody to my knowledge in the IMG.’

Corbyn was next asked about the relationship between the IMG and trade unions. He explained that the IMG wanted to develop into a wider field and move away from being student-focused. When asked if the IMG tried to gain control of any trade unions, Corbyn repeated his point about the IMG offering support, rather than seeking to take control of campaigns or other organisations.

One of the common themes running through many Special Branch reports – and other related documents – is the interpretation of any involvement from the ‘extreme left’ in a movement is rarely entirely genuine but in fact was fuelled by ulterior, sinister motives.

The next report [UCPI00007940] returned to the IMG/Spartacus League in 1972 in relation to the miners’ strike. It noted Corbyn was among one of those who advocating a strong militant approach, involving the occupation of the National Coal Board headquarters. He laughed at this, and told us about his part in organising a march from Trafalgar Square to the Coal Board, and had no recollection of trying to occupy the Coal Board.

There was mention in the report of a call-out for ‘three volunteers to take part in a special task during the demonstration which would involve breaking the law’, so he was asked about the IMG’s attitude towards illegality.

Corbyn responded that he still believes that there are just laws and unjust laws, mentioning the CHIS Bill currently going through Parliament which would give yet more powers to the police. In those days, the Government was trying to limit the powers of trade unions and the right to strike, and unjust laws such as these should be challenged and broken, he explained.

NON-COOPERATION

The next document referred to is a June 1972 report and a leaflet attached [UCPI0000008798] on the subject of the Metro Youth demonstration. This was produced by Corbyn, so the Inquiry asked why he had advocated a policy of not engaging with the police in the future.

He said the police did not have demonstrators’ interests at heart, but wanted them to take a route that took them down empty streets. The group had been right, in his opinion, to disregard the police on this occasion and instead go down Portobello Road.

Developing his position, he said there were times when it was necessary to talk to the police such as times when squatting. However, as far as he was concerned, ‘we were running our own show’, they would listen to what the police had to say but we ‘had to maintain that we had the right to protest and demonstrate where we wanted’, subject to not endangering anyone.

ELECTION CAMPAIGN

He was next directed to a report from March 1977 [UCPI000017814] which noted that Corbyn was being put forward as the IMG candidate for Lambeth Central in the forthcoming Greater London Council elections. He replied he was proud to be a candidate, querying why Special Branch were interested in a local election campaign.

A further report from around the same time [UCPI0000017335] included reference to flyposting. Corbyn was asked if this meant illegal fly-posting. He said it depends, and pointed out that there was lots of corrugated iron around, and people would fly-post on it.

Given their focus on flyposting, the Inquiry seem to be considering it amounts to a serious crime, possibly justifying the undercover policing. If that is their view, then it is a transparently desperate and partisan position, especially given that spycops themselves did it while undercover.

THE BATTLE OF WOOD GREEN

There was then a discussion about the IMG’s participation in an anti-fascist demo on 23 April 1977 on Ducketts Common, which became known as ‘The Battle of Wood Green‘. This was a significant counter-Nazi mobilisation which Corbyn did not recall at first, though he subsequently remembered Tariq Ali and others ‘speaking from the back of a truck’ somewhere in Haringey.

FARE FIGHT

The next topic up was the Fare Fight campaign, referring to document [UCPI0000021485] from October 1976.

This was a campaign to not only stop the Greater London Council implementing unjust fare rises on London Transport but to reduce fare prices. It gave Corbyn an opportunity to educate the Inquiry on the campaign, which had wide support among the public.

The campaign was passive in nature and part of its tactic was to jam the legal system around fares. He was incredulous that it had been spied on, given its peaceful nature.

THE IMG ON IRISH REPUBLICANISM

The Inquiry then went back to April 1972 and a report [UCPI0000008129] about a meeting of London IMG members. In relation to this, Corbyn was asked about the IMG stance on the situation in Northern Ireland, in particular their apparent support for the Provisional IRA.

He averred that it depended on what you meant by ‘support’. He said the IMG supported the idea of a united Ireland but there were things the IRA did that they did not support. Then again, there were other things which they did agree with, such as building community groups to help the unemployed:

‘It covered a broad front of activities’.

In this context, support meant solidarity with the IRA, through solidarity with the struggle of Sinn Fein, which was the political angle of the struggle.

He was subsequently asked about his involvement in Irish support groups such as the Irish Solidarity Campaign and Anti-Internment League. Corbyn said he had supported them but not been particularly involved. He noted that republican in those days did not necessarily mean being active in the IRA but referred to people who supported there being a republic of all Ireland in general. The word had to be read in that context.

SQUATTING

We finally moved on to the topic of squatting for which Corbyn was best known for many years. He explained that he rented a place in Rendle Street but ended up taking the landlord to a rent tribunal. After this, he and his older brother Andrew took up squatting in the same area as a solution to their housing needs. Originally he thought of squatting as a hippy thing to do, but had eventually realised that it could be immensely useful. They set up an IMG ‘squatting faction’.

He was then asked about a January 1976 report which contained the Easy 111 news sheet of Maida Hill Squatters and Tenants Association [UCPI0000009509]. This led to a long discussion on the nature of the squatting struggle that Corbyn was involved with, in particular that of the Elgin Avenue squats. The campaigners there were in a struggle with the Greater London Council for housing.

However, Corbyn noted that squatting campaigns at the time often had a successful outcome in that people were rehoused rather than left homeless, particularly when it became clear that there would be resistance to eviction. It is in this sense that the following extract the Inquiry had focused on should be read:

‘Our collective organised strength and support meant that we could physically resist and in a confrontation, human justice would be on our side. So, whatever happened the Greater London Council had to lose and we had to win.’

Corbyn was asked for his views on eviction resistance. He explained that the barricades were both physical and symbolic/ political. The squatters were fighting for housing for everyone, and against properties being left empty.

The Inquiry read more of Corbyn’ comments from the newsletter and asked him about violence. Corbyn went to some lengths to explain the kind of eviction resistance that took place. Many squatters in the area would turn up and join in.

When directed to someone who was threatening to use sand and rubbish to resist and meet ‘violence with violence’, he replied that he was simply recording what people involved were saying, nothing more. It does not necessarily mean the squatters were adopting such tactics as a body.

Corbyn said he was surprised by the strength of feeling in Elgin Avenue, and how many people stayed put through that last weekend, despite the fear of eviction, and as a result they were rehoused.

He noted that he had begun squatting as a self-help housing solution and that the squatters of London were successful in that so many of them were eventually given more secure housing by councils.

ANARCHISTS – GUILT BY ASSOCIATION?

Following on from squatters, Corbyn was next questioned on his association with anarchists.
A report from April 1979 [UCPI0000021215] describes a meeting at Conway Hall on a ‘People’s Commission’.

There was a speaker from the ‘Persons Unknown’ trial (the support group which was spied upon by ‘Graham Coates’ (HN304, 1976-79) who is due to give evidence to the Inquiry all day on Friday 7 May).

Corbyn was asked if he shared aims and objectives with anarchists, to which he replied:

‘I don’t come and go to meetings based on who’s there. I come and go to meetings based on what needs to be said.’

Corbyn regarded the anarchists as part of the myriad other groups which existed at the time, including religious ones:

‘I just regarded them as people who were operating and hoped they would cooperate when we needed numbers to make a make a point, like getting someone’s gas reconnected if the gas company had disconnected them, for example.’

SPYCOP HN80 ‘COLIN CLARK’

Corbyn was questioned about his recollection of undercover officer ‘Colin Clark’ (HN80, 1977-82), who had infiltrated the Socialist Workers Party.

Corbyn admits he might have been confused when he said in his written statement about him selling the IMG publication Red Mole, and given that he did not recognise the photograph he had been shown, it might have been a case of mistaken identity. He did confirm that he remembered the name, however.

Thus, two and half hours in, the Inquiry had finally asked Corbyn about undercover policing, and that was the extent of it.

HUNTLEY STREET SQUAT

Corbyn, unprompted, brought up the issue of undercovers in the 1978 Huntley Street Squat.

In this case, two squatters, ‘Nigel’ and ‘Mary’ had come under scrutiny. During the eviction case the Under-sheriff of London admitted that the pair had worked for him, causing the judge in the case to get angry – not least because police agents had been helping build illegal barricades.

As a result, Corbyn invited ‘Sir John’ to extend the remit of the inquiry to the Under-sheriff of London. Mitting declined the invitation.

FINAL QUESTIONS

After another break, the hearing recommenced with the Inquiry asking Corbyn which other groups operated similarly to the IMG – in trying to ‘take over’ or control other campaigns.

The only example Corbyn gave was the International Socialists (later called the Socialist Workers Party) though added that, in comparison, the IMG was less controlling. He remembered anarchist groups were ‘very self-contained and wouldn’t want anyone interfering with them’ but then again:

‘the anarchist groups, to be fair, would just turn up at meetings and join into anything, so there wouldn’t be a consistent pattern with them.’

Rajiv Menon QC, Corbyn’s barrister, then took his turn, asking he had ever – during his 50 years of activism – taken part in:

‘any political activity that you consider was subversive in that it threatened the safety or well-being of the State and was intended to undermine or overthrow parliamentary by political or industrial means.’

Corbyn was categorical that he had not.

Menon next asked about the accuracy of an August 1976 Special Branch report [UCPI0000010850] into squatting.

Corbyn said in reply that many of the details are correct, but the report over-simplifies things and betrays the bias of its unknown author. Corbyn emphasised that the squatters movement was much more diverse than this document suggests.

Particularly, it implied anarchism was far more prevalent than he thought it was:

‘Although squatters became political, you know, people squatted through desperation.’

The document claimed that 80% of squatters did not want council housing, but Corbyn disagreed with this. He doesn’t know who wrote this, but thought the author had a particular anarchistic perspective. He also disagreed with the report’s statement that:

‘the general attitude towards the police is one of complete non-cooperation.’

Corbyn said it was common for squatters to deal with the police as a practical matter.

Finally, Menon noted that Corbyn is surprised by the dearth of material about the squatting movement from that era among what was provided to him.

Corbyn replied that he thought that undercovers would have visited, or even moved into, the squats. He wondered why there were no reports about these places included?

Corbyn concluded his evidence by questioning why he was spied-on for all these years.

Full witness statement of Piers Corbyn

Ernest Rodker

Ernest Rodker is now 83 years old and in ill health, so an edited version of his full statement was read by his son Oli Rodker.

The Inquiry asked Rodker for evidence concerning his campaigning activities over three decades from 1968, when the Special Demonstration Squad (SDS) was founded.

The Inquiry has told him he was spied on by:

• Mike Ferguson (HN135, late 1960s-early 1970s)
• ‘Michael Scott’ (HN298, 1971-76)
• ‘Jim Pickford’ (HN300, 1974-76)
• ‘Phil Cooper’ (HN155, 1979-83)
• Jim Boyling (‘Jim Sutton’ HN14, 1995-2000)
• Andy Coles (‘Andy Davey’ HN2, 1991-95)

The Inquiry has given Rodker a bundle of about 53 vintage police documents relating to him. His first response is that it isn’t complete. He has been an activist since 1958, and it’s clear that his early arrests and monitoring fed into the SDS’ interest in him.

He has seen other, largely Special Branch, material which is in the public domain, which refers to him and his activism. He wants to see all the secret police files on him.

ANTI-APARTHEID ACTIVISM

Apartheid was a system of institutionalised racial segregation that existed in South Africa and South West Africa (now Namibia) from 1948 until the early 1990s. It categorised people into a hierarchy of racial groups, with whites at the top.

The laws segregated all areas of life, reserving the best for whites. It affected everything from education, employment and housing to which bench to sit on or beach people could visit. Most of the population was denied the right to vote. Sexual relationships and marriages between people of different racial groups were illegal.

Rodker was a committed campaigner against the racist apartheid regime in South Africa. He was active in the Stop The Seventy Tour (STST).

STST’s immediate and principal aim was to stop the white-only South African cricket team from touring in the UK in 1970. More broadly, its aim was to make a very strong political point that people representing apartheid were not welcome in the UK.

He was active in STST throughout its existence, from 1969 until it was disbanded in May 1970 after the cancellation of the tour.

The main tactic of STST and was to run onto cricket and rugby pitches to disrupt play.

He explained:

‘We sought to impress on the South African teams the fact that as an all-white team effectively promoting the apartheid regime they were not welcome. We wanted them to know the level of opposition there was to what they stood for and for them to reflect on whether it was the right thing, practically and ethically, to tour the UK.

‘We used all classic forms of non-violent direct action (NVDA), pitch invasions being the most prominent. We understood and sought to follow the well known principles of NVDA and civil disobedience learned from recent history such as the struggles for Indian independence by Mahatma Ghandi and for Black civil rights by Dr Martin Luther King.’

He refuted spycop Mike Ferguson’s March 1970 SDS report [UCPI0000008660] which describes STST as ‘militant’, especially given the connotations of that word in that era. STST’s campaign was avowedly opposed to committing violence against people, and only in favour of minor damage to property.

Rodker ran on to cricket pitches and sat down. He remembers being carried out by security or police and being kicked by spectators. He painted slogans on the walls outside Lords cricket ground, and even these were things like ‘stop the tour’ and ‘go home’ rather than anything more profane or aggressive.

DIRECT ACTION GROUP

Rodker was also part of a smaller anti-apartheid direct action group. This was not concerned with publicity but was a small, secret group directly inhibiting South African sporting tours. He can no longer remember what name the group had, but was clear about what it did:

‘These activities included things like going to a team hotel to carry out demonstrations there. For example, in the campaign against the white-only South African rugby team in 1969 I booked into a hotel, in an affluent part of central London, overnight where the team were staying. I sat among the players in the lounge eavesdropping on them and getting their room numbers.

‘While they were still in the lounge or having supper, I may myself have glued their door locks and certainly shared the room numbers with other campaigners, who did so…

‘On other occasions we waited outside the team’s hotels, for them to get on their coaches. We then got on the coaches as well and refused to leave. We had to be carried out.’

Rodker stressed the relative restraint of the campaign and, not for the first time at the Inquiry, we heard an activist turn the inquiry’s question about violence around:

‘We were not even carrying out wanton acts like going into the South Africans’ rooms and trashing their belongings. We were doing nothing on the scale of what the South African State regime was doing to its majority black citizenship under apartheid, systematically and repeatedly, under cover of the law…

‘We did not want our principled message to be confused by adverse publicity about violence. One factor in our thinking was that we wanted to set ourselves apart from the extreme of violence which the apartheid South African regime was showing to its Black citizens.’

Campaigning against sports connections with South Africa continued beyond the 1970s, in other forms, and he remained involved in those campaigns.

‘It is worth underlining that we were effective in the sense that, in the short term, the rugby team was, we learned, keen to stop the tour and wanted to go home, as a result of our actions. In the medium term we contributed towards the decision to abandon the 1970 cricket tour plans. And in the long term we contributed to the isolation of apartheid South African from international sport, a factor in its eventual downfall.’

ANTI-NUCLEAR CAMPAIGNING

Before his anti-apartheid campaigning, Rodker had been active in campaigning against nuclear weapons. Although it’s not mentioned in his testimony, Rodker was also a founding member of the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament.

He was involved in publicising, and took part in, the first of the famous Aldermaston marches which, from 1958 onwards, opposed nuclear weapons, particularly those stored at AWE Aldermaston military. He was a member of the Committee of 100, a British anti-nuclear group of the 1960s.

It had come to the attention not only of the media, but also the police, prosecutors and the courts as a result of its high profile campaign and campaigning methods, involving NVDA.

Rodker and many others in the Committee, including the philosopher Bertrand Russell, had been jailed for planning disruptive demonstrations and civil disobedience against US military bases in the UK. Some of the evidence used against them in court had come from covert police surveillance.

As the Inquiry is limited to events from 1968 onwards, it cannot examine anything from this era, no matter how relevant it may be.

MEMORIES OF SPYCOPS

In saying that he can’t remember the spycop Mike Ferguson, Rodker once again highlighted the unforthcoming attitude of the Inquiry. If he were told the name Ferguson used undercover, shown a contemporaneous photo or told about his interactions with him, his memory may well be jogged. But the Inquiry refuses to do any of these things and thus prevents itself from fulfilling its remit of getting to the truth about spycops.

Rodker said the movement was aware that it was likely to be spied on by both British and South African state agents, using infiltrators, phone taps and more, but they would not let this deter them.

Asked about three other officers – Phil Cooper who reported on him in May 1980 [UCPI0000013986], Jim Boyling who reported on him in 1997 [MPS-0742877], and Andy Coles who ‘authored some of these reports’ the Inquiry has released, Rodker drew a blank but once again highlighted that the Inquiry’s reluctance to give him (and other witnesses) photos of officers and other information that might jog his memory.

PAVEMENT COLLECTIVE

The Pavement Collective was a grassroots community initiative, based mainly around its publication ‘Pavement’ in South West London in the 1970s. It supported and encouraged campaigns by local communities on issues like housing, race, and employment. It challenged the council on issues of housing and redevelopment, which brought it into conflict with developers. It held demonstrations at Wandsworth Town Hall on the evenings of council meetings, and asked questions in the meetings.

The Pavement newspaper was sold in local newsagents and on streets. It was a very open group with public support from the likes of Michael Foot MP (former Labour party leader), Donald Trelford (editor of the Observer). It ran for about 20 years, and Rodker was on the editorial committee throughout.

The committee was about ten strong, and not secretive. A couple of members were in the International Marxist Group, who were of particular interest to the SDS, but Rodker says of the IMG as an organisation:

‘we were wary of them and I think it was clear to everyone that our politics and interests were not the same as theirs’

Rodker notes that spycop ‘Jim Pickford’ (HN300, 1974-76) infiltrated the Pavement Collective. He is listed as one of the 13 people present in the minutes of the editorial meeting of 18 November 1976 [UCPI0000033629].

Similarly – again, without mention from the Inquiry – there’s a document [UCPI0000033631], that shows another spycop, ‘Michael Scott’ (HN298, 1971-76), was involved with Pavement sales at the time he was infiltrating the Young Liberals (the youth wing of the Liberal Party, now the Liberal Democrats).

Why were spycops infiltrating the Pavement Collective? What exactly did they do there? Was Scott’s involvement connected with his infiltration of STST and arrest at the hotel demonstration on 12 May 1972?

BATTERSEA REDEVELOPMENT ACTION GROUP

Battersea Redevelopment Action Group (BRAG) was purely concerned with development of Battersea Power Station and surrounding area.

Rodker was active in setting up BRAG in about 1972 and remained active until it disbanded more than ten years later. The core group was no more than 10 in number, and there was no formal structure.

They wanted to ensure that it wasn’t just turned into luxury flats but included affordable housing and community projects. They also opposed the council’s sell-off of social housing, believing that council developments and initiatives should be public and for the community, rather than private and for commercial interests. They leafleted, knocked on doors, and held public meetings.

And yet, for all this community-minded activity, there’s an SDS report on a BRAG meeting in December 1974 [UCPI0000015040], listing five members as extremists, including ‘Ernest Rodker (Anarchist)’, and other reports from 1975-77 [UCPI0000012093, UCPI0000012094, UCPI0000009594, UCPI0000011156] all of which were copied to MI5.

Rodker remembers suspicions in BRAG concerning one person did lead to a confrontation at a committee meeting and that person was excluded. Rodker wants the Inquiry to say if that person was a spycop. The Inquiry says Pickford also infiltrated this group.

Beyond that, he wants the Inquiry to tell him if any other undercover police officer, beyond those already named to him, were in the campaigns he was involved in. What information did spycops get from those campaigns? What was done with that information? Did any spycops attempt to disrupt campaigns? Did any spycops seek to have a genuine campaigner ejected from a campaign? What excuse is there for spycops being involved in the decision-making of small voluntary groups where every voice is significant?

VIOLENCE

Asked about violence in his campaigning, Rodker affirmed that there was a lot of it throughout his activist career, though perhaps not in the way that the Inquiry was driving at:

‘there was police violence against the Committee of 100. When there were demonstrations at the American embassy or a nuclear base, we were knocked about by the police when we were arrested or even moved from the base. Sometimes their physicality was quite severe. They dragged people by the hair, ‘accidentally’ stamping on people when trying to move them.

‘As to STST and the direct action group, I also experienced or witnessed violence. When I was involved in a demonstration in the centre of Lords cricket ground, I remember the stewards (or even members of the public) roughed us up unnecessarily when dragging us off the pitch’.

‘During the anti-nuclear campaign, in the late 1960s onwards, we occupied Grosvenor Square, Trafalgar Square, Whitehall and other sites in central London on various occasions. These were mass demonstrations, peaceful sit-downs with some campaigners linking arms and others using padlocks and chains to attach themselves to each other. It was clear to me that the police, frustrated by the task of having to remove us, lost control and used unnecessary force towards us. They punched, often surreptitiously; dragged people violently out of the way; stamped on people who were in the way of another person they sought to remove. This happened to me…’

Rodker said the police never took action against people who were violent to activists. Undercover officers have confirmed they were assaulted by uniformed police while undercover. They saw violence against genuine activists and yet they didn’t bother to report it or, if they did, nothing was done.

‘Looking back, on the basis of what we know now, it seems logical to conclude that there was a policy of allowing aggressive and violent behaviour towards activists to go unchecked.’

FOR SPYCOPS, THE PERSONAL IS THE POLITICAL

Attention turned to two 1976 Special Branch reports containing very personal information about the birth of his son [UCPI0000012246] and a health condition of his [UCPI0000010719].

Rodker confirmed that, whilst not secret, these details would only have been known to personal friends and family. He said it was not only sinister that the reports were made, but also that we are able to see these reports at the Inquiry because they are still held in MI5’s files nearly 50 years later.

Rodker said that it underlined his desire to have the Inquiry obtain and hand over all information all spycops have recorded and stored about him, at any point in his life. Which officers did this? What did they do to get the information? What was the information used for?

THE STAR & GARTER ARRESTS

On 12 May 1972, Rodker took part in action at the Star & Garter Hotel, Richmond, to prevent the British Lions rugby team leaving for the airport to go on a tour of apartheid South Africa.

Though his memory has faded, Rodker accepts that he was the main organiser, and that the descriptions in the police reports are broadly accurate [MPS-0526782, MPS-0737087, MPS-0737109, MPS-0737108].

Spycop Michael Scott was part of the group, including the planning meeting at Rodker’s house on the day. He disputes Scott’s claim to have found out because Peter Hain’s mother told him on the phone. Rodker knew Mrs Hain well, she was security conscious and highly unlikely to have disclosed such sensitive information. It’s more likely that he found out another way and is lying in his report.

The objective was to make the players miss their flight. Skips were ordered to the hotel, cars were parked in the way, and individuals blocked the coach.

Rodker submitted a letter to the Inquiry that had been written to him a month later by a friend, attached to which was what his friend calls ‘my rather uninformative account of the events at the hotel’ [UCPI0000033628]. However, it is now vital evidence from our perspective as describes the incident, his role in it and he also describes what spycop ‘Mike Scott’ did.

THE TRIAL

Fourteen protesters were arrested and prosecuted for obstruction of the highway – including Scott. They were convicted. Scott had stolen the identity of a living person for his fake identity, so received a conviction for that real person.

It’s almost certain that Scott was party to the defendants’ discussions of how to defend their case, and what their lawyers thought. This breaches lawyer-client privilege.

More to the point, it meant that the trial was unfair. In a criminal case, the prosecution must give the defence all relevant evidence. Not only were Scott’s reports withheld, but the court was not given his testimony. Coming from a police officer, it would have been very credible indeed. It could have cleared up the disputed issue of whether the protest was blocking the public highway as alleged, or whether it was on the hotel’s private land.

Scott’s managers told him to go ahead with the trial under his false identity. Right from the first question in court, when he was asked his name, he was lying.

The police reports show no concern at all about deceiving the court and orchestrating a miscarriage of justice, only for ‘potential embarrassment to police’ if it became known that a spycop was involved.

Rodker sees this as part of a pattern that would repeat:

‘The failure to view activists as individuals with their own legitimate rights and interests and the decision to place those second to the unfettered gathering of information on them may be a precursor to some of the more gross abuses of activists that, I note, happened in later periods of undercover policing of campaigners.’

RELEASE THE FILES

Concluding, Rodker returned to the fact that he was spied on and demonised long before the SDS was founded in 1968, as the SDS themselves describe in a May 1972 report [MPS-0526782]. It describes the 14 people arrested on the Star & Garter action as:

‘anarchist-orientated extremists under the control of Ernest RODKER’. This man has been a thorn in the flesh for several years now, having had no fewer than 14 court appearances prior to 1963 for offences involving public disorder. He was considered to be a menace at the time of the protest demonstrations taking place in this country concerning the Springboks rugby tour in 1969 and the Stop The Seventy Tour in 1970.’

Rodker called for the release of all his secret police files, not only for his own benefit but also to correct false information and allow him to comment and contribute fully to the Inquiry.

The Inquiry Chair, Sir John Mitting, said that the Inquiry had done its best to give Rodker all relevant documents, but it doesn’t cover all of Special Branch, just the SDS. This contradicts the Inquiry’s Terms of Reference which state:

‘The inquiry’s investigation will include, but not be limited to, the undercover operations of the Special Demonstration Squad and the National Public Order Intelligence Unit.’

Mitting then indicated that he would be referring the Star & Garter incident to the Inquiry’s panel that is reviewing likely miscarriages of justice.

Full written statement of Ernest Rodker

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Tranche 1, Phase 2, Day 5

27 April 2021

Evidence from police witnesses:

‘Dave Robertson’ (HN45, 1970-73)
‘Alex Sloan‘ (HN347, 1971)

The Undercover Policing Inquiry‘s current hearings (Tranche 1 Phase 2, covering the Special Demonstration Squad 1973-82) had their first day of police witnesses.

‘Dave Robertson’

(HN45, 1970-73)

‘Dave Robertson‘ (HN45, 1970-73) was questioned by Kate Wilkinson on behalf of the Inquiry.

Robertson told the Inquiry was deployed undercover by the Special Demonstration Squad (SDS) in 1971, infiltrating Maoist groups.

He spied on Diane Langford who gave evidence in yesterday’s hearing. He was ‘compromised’ – ie, his true role revealed to those he spied on, as Langford described – and withdrawn in 1973.

PREPARATION

Asked why did he not steal the identity of a deceased child, he merely said ‘I just didn’t’, and that he was not aware of what other officers chose to do.

As was common with the early spycops, Robertson joined the SDS after working in Special Branch. He hadn’t done undercover work before. He was invited by serving member Detective Helen Crampton but has no idea why she approached him.

He said he didn’t know much about the unit before joining it, but:

‘Special Branch was quite a small knit community and people knew what might have been happening or not happening… everybody in Special Branch knew to some degree what was happening’

Robertson was vague about many points, even one the approximate number of officers in the SDS when he was serving. He admitted being ‘kind of aware’ of the SDS’s mission, and that it had been formed after disorder at a demonstration against the Vietnam War in March 1968.

He said the anti-war protestors ‘created mayhem’ on the day, and this was due to a lack of police intelligence. This is a familiar narrative, repeated by many of the officers who testified in the November 2020 Inquiry hearings, for instance, ‘Doug Edwards’ (HN326, 1968-71). Robertson embellished the tale, adding that he saw some demonstrators running around with scaffold poles.

According to him, Special Branch:

‘was a secret organisation anyway, and everyone in it was “positively vetted” so by definition it was a secret department.’

Pressed on how much chat there was in Special Branch about the SDS, he said ‘you wouldn’t really talk about the specifics’.

He said that he received no training as such, but does remember spending some time in the SDS ‘back office’ (recalling ‘an old police house’ at the back of a police station) before going out in the field.

This was the headquarters, where the admin was done, completely separate from the undercovers’ various ‘safe houses’.

‘Most of the people who went into that job… they just got on with the job and picked it up very quickly.’

DEPLOYED

He says he recalls Jill Mosdell (HN346) but is not sure about ‘Sandra Davies’ (HN348) – even though some reports indicate he attended meetings alongside her, and they appear to have worked so closely together that managers withdrew both women when Robertson’s cover was blown.

Robertson confirmed that he did not type up his reports himself, he would write it up and it was taken away to be typed up by someone else in the SDS ‘back office’. He often saw these reports after they had been typed up, and knew they were routinely copied to the Security Services, aka MI5.

The first document looked at was a report [UCPI0000010254] of a Britain-Vietnam Solidarity Front (BVSF) meeting at the Union Tavern in October 1970. Long-term SDS boss Phil Saunders signed off on it.

At this point in the Inquiry hearing, proceedings came to a halt Robertson mentioned the real name of an officer whose name is restricted by the Inquiry. Those following the Inquiry’s online audio (which has a ten minute time lag precisely to prevent these sort of slips going out publicly) had no clue what was happening and assumed it was a technical glitch.

SUPPLYING INFORMATION

Attention turned to a March 1972 Special Branch report [MPS-0739241] in which MI5 had requested details about someone’s occupation. Robertson confirmed that MI5 asking for such things was ‘obviously pretty routine’.

When he joined the SDS, Robertson said he was given no idea how long his deployment would be. He says he was not in the field for three years because, as things turned out, ‘in my case, it came to an abrupt end very quickly’.

The unit’s meetings took place at its ‘safe houses’. These were described as ‘diary days’ by Robertson. Most of the SDS officers would turn up, clutching their expense claims. He sometimes went there on other days too, but there were few people around then.

He had a cover accommodation, known in the unit as a ‘duff flat’, for which he paid approximately £4 week in cash. He would usually travel to and fro after political meetings and events. He was not trained to do this; it is an example of him using his initiative. As we’d hear later on, his cover accommodation has become a point of some confusion.

He would communicate by phone (from a phone box) with the back officer, but did not have any other, personal numbers or direct lines for the SDS managers.

NO MEMORY

He was asked if his colleagues would have spoken about things like relationships and events that occurred during their time undercover? He does not remember this happening. According to Robertson ‘Special Branch officers are renowned as ‘zip-mouths’.

Mike Ferguson (HN135) was deployed to spy on anti-apartheid activists, reporting back on the Stop The Seventy Tour campaign. Asked if he ever discussed this with Ferguson, Robertson replied ‘not to my knowledge’. By this stage, it was becoming clear that Robertson is certainly very zipped-mouthed himself.

Robertson had ‘cover employment’ as well as a ‘duff flat’ – he knew someone who ran a garage so pretended to work there.

IDENTITY CRISIS

Like many of his colleagues, Robertson let his hair grow long after joining the SDS (the Squad was nicknamed ‘the Hairies’). He was not provided with any fake identity documents, and didn’t know of any other spycops being given any either. He now says that it would have been better ‘more professional’ to have these.

He remembered one occasion when a group of activists questioned him about his identity, describing it as ‘a very personal face-to-face grilling’:

‘They didn’t know who I was, and in those days it wasn’t just the police doing that, there were lots of other organisations doing the same thing… Most of the people that I met were paranoid about infiltrators’.

Asked how he convinced them of his innocence, Robertson, once again, said he couldn’t remember specifics. He clarified that they had fear of infiltration from beyond state agencies, such as rival groups; ‘everyone,’ he said.

CAR TROUBLE

Being ‘the man with a van’ was later a standard tactic of spycops, as it made them useful to the group and offered opportunities to talk to members individually.

Asked if he did anything like that Robertson didn’t remember ever doing it. He said there were no SDS cars at the time. He thinks the office may have had some hire cars but has no idea who drove them and what they were used for.

This contradicts the account of one of the people he spied on, Diane Langford, who wrote in 2015 that her group’s suspicions about Robertson were initially raised by the fact that he kept having different hire cars.

Robertson was adamant that spycops could never ever have gone out in public in a car as, if they were stopped, they would have no proper license and identity documents in their fake name. We know that one of his contemporaries, ‘Peter Fredericks‘ (HN345, 1971) did just that – and was involved in a car accident.

MAOIST STUDIES

Next, Robertson was shown his application form [UCPI0000034339] for ‘Studies in Marxism-Leninism-Mao Tsetung Thought (Spring 1971), in which he listed a number of revolutionary texts that he had supposedly read.

Given his answers up to this point, it surprised nobody that he said he does not remember much about the study group or the form.

Similarly, Robertson also cannot recall any guidance about what might constitute ‘extremism’ or ‘subversion’. He said vaguely ‘it was just part and parcel of the whole’.

‘FAIR GAME’

He confirmed that small attendance was the norm at many of these groups’ meetings. He would include everything that he thought was worth reporting – including details of flowers given to speakers. He said that ‘everything was fair game for reporting’ and it was someone else’s job to decide what to do with the intelligence he collected.

Robertson insisted:

‘I never went to anybody’s home unless I was invited’

He was shown a report he had made on the Revolutionary Marxist-Leninist League in December 1970 and asked why he thinks he was invited to attend. He said he did not know.

Robertson was asked how often he visited this home, where Diane Langford and Abhimanyu Manchanda lived. He claims that, despite Langford’s certain and vehement dismissal of the very idea, he definitely did babysit for the couple’s infant child. He said he was asked to by Manchanda and ‘couldn’t get out of it’ but never saw the baby. However, he said he could not even remember seeing the child and thinks they were in a different room from him, and that the couple was not away for an exceptionally long time.

BANNER BOOKS

Next, a February 1972 memorandum [MPS-0730516] written by an SDS manager, Chief Inspector HN332, concerning London radical bookshop Banner Books. Robertson had infiltrated Maoist groups to such an extent that he was asked to take over running the shop when a enw branch was opened.

The memo specifies the advantages to Special Branch, including access to records and mailing lists, and being able to provide a plan of the shop and a set of keys.

Robertson played all this down, claiming that he was never alone in the shop and had no access to any records (the ostensible reason for this intrusion), and doesn’t think he ever had keys to the shop.

He has no memory of the 1975 fire at Banner bookshop (two years after his employment ended), even though someone died in it.

YOU CAN’T CALL HIM AL

Robertson claimed:

‘I never really went in and analysed things to any great depth’

But it was pointed out that he reported lots of detail about Manchanda, including some very critical comments about the man and his ‘insufferable anecdotes’.

Asked why his reports refer to Abhimanyu Manchanda as ‘Al’ or ‘Albert’ Manchanda, Robertson said that it was the name used by those around him. Langford flatly denies this – he was known as Manu. It is hard to imagine someone whose life was based on opposing to imperialism acquiescing to the practice of taking a common English name in place of their real name.

Yesterday, Diane Langford referred to a long and painful-sounding meeting in which an alleged attempted rape was brought up. She queried why, in Robertson’s report on this meeting, it was misdescribed as a ‘very personal attack on private morals’. Robertson characteristically claimed no recollection of any of this.

The report had ended with his overview ‘that the damage to the RMLL is irreparable’. He said he did not remember any of that either, despite it being a major event in the life of one of the main groups he infiltrated.

WON’T VOTE, CAN’T VOTE

Robertson did speak with certainty on one issue:

‘I didn’t vote on anything.’

Speaking for the Inquiry, Wilkinson patiently questioned him about this comment. How had he managed to never vote on anything, in such small groups? Did he really abstain from absolutely every vote? As with other officers such as Doug Edwards, a straight denial on this subject is issued without any explanation of how he managed to abstain from voting without raising suspicion.

He repeated the line about how he had never really got involved in the groups ‘because it wasn’t my place to do that’, despite his numerous highly detailed reports over a period of years.

Robertson was also questioned about parts of his witness statement.

In paragraph 53 he says:

‘I am not sure that the group posed a threat of subversion or revolution under either xxxxxx or Manchanda’s leadership given how low the membership was, but I suspect this may not have been appreciated at the time.’

Does this mean that he was not entirely convinced that these groups needed to be reported on so much? Did he feel as if he was wasting his time by spying on them? Did he ever go to his managers and suggest that he infiltrate another group instead?

‘I continued doing it until I was told to stop.’

This is inconsistent with an earlier statement that he was using his initiative.

NO PREJUDICE

Racist and sexist attitudes are common in the SDS reports of the era being examined, 1973-82. Robertson’s reports are no exception.

One of the instances was in February 1971 when he reported [MPS-0739236] that it was Manchanda that had decided he would be a stay-at-home Dad and his partner, Diane Langford, should go out to work. Robertson denied that it demonstrates sexist thinking by denying her agency in the decision-making.

Robertson had no recollection of being asked to include details of people’s race or colour in his reports. When shown examples in a report [UCPI0000021998] on a February 1971 meeting of the Communist Party of Britain (Marxist-Leninist), he justified it by saying that he had never come across ‘coloured’ trade unionists at the Post Office before. He then makes the startling observation that:

‘race was not a problem in those days…that is my personal opinion.’

EXPOSURE

Moving on to February 1973, the Inquiry asked Robertson about an incident at a meeting at the London School of Economics which ended his deployment.

His report [UCPI0000016247] appears to be the last one he made. Although it’s dated February 1973, he dates it from memory as December of that year.

According to him, he came face to face with a neighbour, Ethel, who recognised him and said ‘here’s Scotland Yard, come to take us away’.

Robertson said he had only met Ethel once and did not know her surname and cannot remember her being Irish (or otherwise).

This conflicts with the account of Diane Langford, who was sitting with Ethel, and says that she recognised him from living close to her in known police accommodation, and that she already knew him by name.

He said he did not panic but just ‘took steps to ameliorate the situation’, specifically ‘pretended to give her a hug’ and whispered in her ear to say nothing.

‘I turned around, went out, down the stairs, and walked away at high speed for about ten minutes.’

According to Langford’s statement, Robertson was significantly more violent and threatening – grabbing Ethel’s wrist and leading her out, then threatening that ‘something nasty’ would happen to her family in Ireland if she told anyone he was a police officer.

DEPARTURE

It seems that Robertson then phoned one of his bosses, then Chief Superintendent Phil Saunders, at home to report this. (He said earlier that he did not have the managers’ home numbers though). He says he was visited the next day by some very senior officers, including Vic Gilbert, Deputy Assistant Commissioner of the Met and in charge of Special Branch at the time, as well as Rollo Watts.

Robertson’s written statement has more details of this SDS deployment-ending meeting. He says that Phil Saunders was a ‘gentleman and he would have dealt with it appropriately,’ but was not present, and suggests that Gilbert and Watts were only concerned with any damage the incident would do to their own careers.

Robertson knew he could not stay in the SDS after this incident. In all of the annual SDS reports and accompanying letters to the Home Office, the dangers presented by exposure of the work of the unit are repeatedly emphasised.

Although this compromise led to his deployment ending, he says it did not harm his career in the police force. He went to work elsewhere, returning to the SDS to assist with admin in the 1980s.

The Inquiry’s Chair, Sir John Mitting, then appeared on-screen with a question of his own. He asked for more details about Robertson’s ‘duff’ accommodation. This appears to be in reference to inconsistency in his account of his SDS accommodation.

Robertson described it as a room in a ‘filthy’ house in West End Lane, run by a ‘large Irish lady’. He said that no, he was not aware of any other police housing nearby at that time.

Quite how this tallies with Ethel’s account is unclear. He says he never saw Ethel again, not that evening or since.

Mitting then returned to the screen to say that he has not received a copy of Diane Langford’s dissertation (which he only requested from her approximately 21 hours ago). It is unclear what this has to do with anything. This Inquiry has been running for years, has had months to avail themselves of her dissertation, or any other useful evidence.

Phillippa Kaufmann QC, representing victims of spycops, then appeared on screen. She got as far as saying that she sought some clarification from the Chair before Mitting rudely shut her down immediately, saying ‘I am not here to answer your questions’.

This is in accordance with the disrespect that he has shown Non-State Core Participants’ legal representatives on other occasions.

Written witness statement of ‘David Robertson’ HN45

‘Alex Sloan’

(HN347, 1971)

We heard from ‘Alex Sloan‘ (HN347, 1971) in the this afternoon. He infiltrated a number of groups, including the Irish National Liberation Solidarity Front (INLSF) that we heard about yesterday. He also submitted a written witness statement.

Sloan says he has no recollection of being recruited to the Special Demonstration Squad (SDS) spycops unit. His witness statement says that he had no formal training. Asked how he knew what was expected of him, he asked if this was in ‘moral terms’ or otherwise.

Sloan knew, from his time in Special Branch, that they ‘would be interested in anything that was subversive to the State’.  He said that those who joined the Branch were ‘probably politically aware anyway’.

Asked if he understood what was considered ‘subversive’, he came up with an answer that already starts to sound familiar:

‘It wasn’t for me to judge… I would just listen… and relay the facts to my senior officers.’

He thought Special Branch were quite intelligent, and would make well-considered decisions.

Sloan was quick to add that he never committed any criminal offences and this would have been against his nature. He conceded that some officers might have done something ‘minor’ , but never something that was ‘serious and violent’.

He then volunteered his Thought of the Day:

‘You can remember the truth easily but to remember your lies is very difficult sometimes’

This provoked some laughter in the Inquiry’s hearing room.

NO GUIDANCE, NO ADVICE

Sloan was then asked a series of questions that once again underlined how little guidance and preparation the undercovers could expect.

During his deployment he had a rent book in his fake name, but no pay slips or library card. He told everyone he worked as a mechanic, but nobody ever asked to see his driving license. In fact, he doesn’t recall using any documents to back up his cover story. The use of fake identities was something that evolved further after he left the unit.

He was never asked to write an autobiography for ‘Alex Sloan’. He was not given any guidance about what to do if his cover was blown. He was not told about ‘legal professional privilege’, which means that he should not have been present at any legal discussions between lawyers and their clients. He thought that if an undercover was offered a responsible position of a target group (like treasurer or secretary) they should accept it, but admitted that he didn’t receive any instruction on this from his managers.

He also admitted that he didn’t fully consider the risks at the time, but looking back now, he sees that this work could have been ‘pretty dangerous’.

HOUSING

Looking at a memo on the SDS’ expenditure in 1971 [MPS-0730521], Sloan’s cover accommodation – which he describes as a bedsit – cost £20 every 4 weeks.

He then described the flat where the spycops met – he remembers a large lounge but says he doesn’t remember what other rooms it had or even if it had a kitchen. Attendance at the meetings varied – 6-8 undercovers at the most – plus the two senior officers.

There is some confusion about whether the bedsit of ‘David Robertson’ (HN45, 1971-73), which is listed as costing the same amount, and thus could not have been much larger than Sloan’s room, served as an SDS safe house, but Sloan accepted that he may have been confused about this.

We learnt a little more about the spycops unit’s regular meetings. Sloan says he can’t remember writing stuff down, so may have memorised intelligence before passing it on. He can’t remember who typed the reports. He saw the weekly meetings as a social gathering, a chance for the undercovers to get together and relax.

They obviously didn’t have mobile phones, but in many cases didn’t have landlines either, so would use phone boxes.

This weekly meeting was often the main time when they could communicate directly with their managers.
Sloan confirmed that he felt able to vent about issues at these meetings, and seek advice from his colleagues. He said they were ‘very open meetings’.

Asked if these offered an opportunity to speak privately with managers, he responded:

‘If I remember rightly, you could ask to talk to them privately, take them to one side, and perhaps go in the kitchen…’

At this point it seems to have dawned on HN347 that his memory had magically returned so he ended the sentence with ‘….if it was there’.

Sloan said he was ‘not terribly socially close’ to his colleagues:

‘It may come as a surprise, but being a Scotsman, I wasn’t interested in having a drink. So yes, we just sat there and discussed things.’

They sometimes talked about upcoming demonstrations. Like HN45 told us this morning, they also talked about admin stuff and settled their expenses.

ACTIVE UNDERCOVER

He described his weekly routine. The groups he was infiltrating would often meet/ be active until late at night, so Sloan would sometime sleep at their homes, rather than at his bedsit.

The SDS’s weekly meeting was on Monday, and he has said that he usually spent Tuesday and Wednesday at home and then sold newspapers every Thursday and Friday.

Sloan provided a bit more information about this. He said that they would meet up on a Friday night, and then hawk the papers around Irish pubs and dance-halls, on Saturday nights as well, not just in London but in other cities like Birmingham and Coventry. They would travel up there in minibuses, so he spent a lot of time with other members of the group. They generally sold the paper in pairs.

The Irish National Liberation Solidarity Front (INLSF) met every Sunday afternoon, and Sloan confirmed that these meetings lasted 3-4 hours, ‘probably too long’ in his words.

Asked if he ever tried to influence the direction of the groups he spied on, he said ‘you have to be very careful what you do’ and he explained that he would have checked in with his senior managers first.

When he was in Special Branch, before joining the SDS, he would often attend political meetings at places like Speakers Corner and Red Lion Square. However this was just done in plain clothes, not using any sort of undercover identity. According to his Freudian slip, ‘you garnish a lot more information’ from being inside a group in the way that SDS officers were.

PERSONAL WELFARE

Sloan explained that his wife was ‘very, very supportive’. At the time she worked and they had no children. He understood concerns about welfare – he had colleagues who were deep undercover who may have had more difficulties with their work-life balance – however the spycops’ lifestyle suited him OK.

He was then asked about the Stephen McCarthy campaign – set up after the death of this young man in 1969 (after he’d been arrested and injured by the police). According to a March 1971 report from Sloan [MPS 739483], there were a number of demos about this.

Sloan says he doesn’t remember the name Stephen McCarthy and doesn’t remember the demos, even though relatives of Stephen were arrested at them. He also says he has no recollection of meeting these relatives. Whatever, it is clear that this is an early example of spycops reporting on a family justice campaign.

Another report [MPS739317], from May 1971, includes an update on the McCarthy case. Sloan confirmed that he wasn’t given any advice about reporting on justice cases and campaigns like this that involved complaints against the police. However, he said that he felt he had a duty to give a heads up to the uniformed police if he became aware of any potential public order issues.

Sloan said he doesn’t remember all the demonstrations he attended, but would have gone out on a demonstration if Edward – very much ‘the boss’ of the group – told them to do so. Sloan then made the astonishing assertion that Davoren would have joined the National Front if he thought they would make him leader, ‘because that’s all he was interested in’.

Asked if the INLSF cooperated with the police, Sloan said ‘well, I was there’ <#spycops ‘joke’ alert>.

He agreed that the group had ‘revolutionary aspirations’, but considered it unlikely that these would ever be realised, calling them ‘Mickey Mouse’. He said the demonstrations organised by the group were small. They ‘never had the muscle or the manpower or the will’ for disorder/ riotous behaviour.

When asked if the group would have caused any public order problems for the police if he hadn’t infiltrated them, Sloan said the group ‘would have died a death eventually’, and went on to say that the activists involved ‘were never scary at all’:

‘They never gave off the vibes that they would cause aggravation to anyone, or any person or property.’

He realised that this meant there was little justification for infiltrating them, so was quick to add that it was really important that the police kept an eye on such groups ‘just in case’.

Sloan said he didn’t know much about the INLSF’s relationship with the Black Unity and Freedom Party, or about contact with the Chinese Legation. He didn’t take part in the trip to Ireland (detailed by ‘David Robertson’ earlier in the day), and in fact didn’t even know about it until he recently received the documents as evidence from the Undercover Policing Inquiry.

He was clear that he was never part of the group’s ‘inner core’, so wouldn’t have been present at their discussions. He remembered nothing about any controversy over claims of the INLSF enjoying the support of the Provisional IRA. In his estimation, the IRA would have looked at this group and thought ‘you’re of no interest to us whatsoever’.

ACCUSED OF BEING A SPYCOP

There was an ’emergency conference’ of the INLSF at the end of June 1971. Prior to this, two members of the inner circle had been expelled, and a paper had been circulated within the group. At that emergency meeting, more members walked out.

Sloan’s recollection of that meeting is that Davoren stated that another member of the group, O’Neill, had accused Alex Sloan of ‘being a pig’.

He recalls that he was sitting in the circle when this statement was made, that he feigned anger and raised his fist, and threatened O’Neill verbally, saying something along the lines of ‘don’t you ever say that about me again’.

(He made a comment first about not wishing to incriminate himself, and Barr explained that he didn’t need to fear that, due to an ‘undertaking’ from the Attorney General. He made sure to say ‘I didn’t touch him, I just threatened him’ so it is unclear why he was worried about self-incrimination.)

He says that after the meeting, he went out for some food with some of the group. He said Davoren told him, ‘I never once thought you were a pig, Alistair… or Alex’ which sounded like Sloan making a slip of the tongue, accidentally revealing his real first name.

NO INFLUENCE, NO EXPLANATIONS

Sloan strongly refuted any suggestion that he’d ever tried to influence the politics of the group. Referring to Davoren’s headstrong character, he explained:

‘What could I do to destabilise Ed Davoren?’

He says that he didn’t even realise there was a split of some kind between O’Neill and Davoren until that June 1971 meeting.

He had no explanation as to why there was such a delay between his withdrawal (at the end of June) and the report of the emergency conference (dated 16th July), and this report being produced (in August).

Next report was from August 1971 [UCPI0000007824], submitting the complete mailing list of names and addresses of the INLSF. When asked if he was ever given praise for this, he chuckled:

‘I don’t think I ever had any praise in my police service.’

Faced with a query as to whether he ever felt that he was being asked to report on groups when it wasn’t really necessary, Sloan repeated what we expect to become a returning theme in this Inquiry. He said he just tried to provide a clear picture of the groups that he spied on through his reports, and presumed that his managers would make decisions about which groups needed to be targeted.

The evidence from ‘Alex Sloan’ ended there.

The Chair, Sir John Mitting, thanked ‘Alex’ (or ‘Alistair’) for giving evidence, adding:

‘it is fascinating to me listening to honest witnesses describing unusual events 50 years ago from slightly different points of view. It brings them to light in a way that things on paper don’t.’

It is noticeable that Mitting has never thanked any of the non-State witnesses for their honesty.

Written witness statement of ‘Alex Sloan’ HN347

EMERGENCY BREAK OUTS

During the day, there were several ‘emergency break-outs’, with the transcript and the audio of the hearings suddenly grinding to a halt. Each time, it was entirely unclear what was the matter, for people listening at home and for us in the hearing room as well. Even the Inquiry staff present there had to wait until frantic deliberations behind the scenes had been resolved.

Any party can complain to the Chair when something allegedly breaking restriction orders is being said and broadcasted. The first time it happened was the most serious one. ‘David Robertson’ mentioned the name of HN294, the second manager of the SDS.

After a break of some 20 minutes, Mitting issued a brilliantly worded restriction order, specifying the officer by naming the other half of his leadership team; we were forbidden to mention ‘the name of the manager not being Phil Saunders’.

The second time the police hit the red button was when ‘Robertson’ was asked if he remembered fellow spycop Mike Ferguson (HN135). ‘Oh yes,’ he replied, ‘his nickname was Gimli’ – the name of a character who appears in the Hobbit and in Lord of the Rings, a dwarf with a beard so long he wore his belt over it. We‘re guessing the nickname is perhaps beard-related, rather than due to deadly prowess with an axe.

Mitting did not see a reason to keep this detail from us, or the name ‘Alistair’, so didn’t issue any more restriction orders.

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Tranche 1, Phase 2, Day 4

26 April 2021

Evidence from witnesses:

Diane Langford
Dr Norman Temple

After last week’s opening statements in this new round of Undercover Policing Inquiry hearings examining 1973-82, today was the first day of witnesses giving evidence.

Before it started there were protests outside the Inquiry venue, with blacklisted workers and other spied-on activists demanding their secret police files. It was joined by the roving poster van from Police Spies Out of Lives that had visited the Royal Courts of Justice, the men-only Garrick Club where Inquiry Chair is a member, and New Scotland Yard.

Diane Langford

Diane Langford was questioned by Kate Wilkinson by behalf of the Inquiry.

Born in New Zealand, Langford moved to London in 1963 and got involved in political activity in 1965.

By 1968 she was a volunteer at the Campaign Against Racial Discrimination, and had joined NATSOPA, the print union. By the end of that year, she had played an active part in the protests against the Vietnam War. She was part of a group called the Britain-Vietnam Solidarity Front (BVSF).

Langford said that her main focus over the past 50 years has been the liberation of women from all forms of oppression and exploitation. She worked politically with Abhimanyu Manchanda, who she later married.

THE SPYING BEGINS

The Special Demonstration Squad were reporting on her and Manchanda by March 1969 [MPS-0732690]. That early report – a BVSF weekly meeting – calls gives Manchanda’s first name as Al. Other reports call him Albert. He was never known by these names.

As well as personal names, Langford disabused the Inquiry of the name for their politics at the time:

‘We didn’t call ourselves Maoists, we called ourselves Marxist-Leninists.’

Although, with her tongue-in-cheek, she said she was happy with ‘Maoist’ as it was shorter!

She and Manchanda saw a need for (and likelihood of) anti-imperialist revolution elsewhere in the world. They saw the various struggles in different places as the same battle for freedom -from imperialism and oppression. There is a spycop file [MPS-0736447] of a 1969 speech by Manchanda that refers to:

‘the world front of imperialism which must be opposed by a common front of the revolutionary movement in all countries’

Langford said that, while there seems to be some investigation into the propensity for violence for spied-upon groups, it can be seen from the other direction; these are people trying to resist the violence of the State in order to get justice and liberation.

Whilst there were politicians such as Enoch Powell espousing overt racism, they also saw all the parties of the British government as wilfully oppressive, enforcing a racist unjust system that divides the working class and diverts wrath away from the ruling class.

These struggles against injustice continue, as we see in everything from deaths in custody and the campaigns that respond to them, to the continuing struggle for women’s liberation:

‘I still think that the State is a force which is there to act as the enforcer of oppression, yes.’

COLLECTIVE IMPERATIVE

Langford was asked what methods she and her comrades used to achieve these ends. She listed many examples including demonstrations, public meetings, trade union activity, industrial activity, literature, film screenings, rent strikes, boycotts, occupations, street theatre – even parliamentary lobbying.

Recalling the way that her group operated, Langford explained that they believed in taking collective action, not acting as ‘individualist idiots’. They frowned on certain activists’ methods, including ‘anyone who indulged in macho posturing’. She cited one guy taking off his shirt outside the South African embassy and setting fire to it – he was later condemned by the group for this ‘Petit-bourgeois adventurism’.

She explained some of the differences between her group and the Trotskyists, for example the Trotskyists did not see the struggle in Vietnam as sufficiently revolutionary, as these subsistence farmers were technically landowners.

They also rejected the politics of the Soviet Union, which had occupied Czechoslovakia, and appeared to them as another form of imperialist project.

Whilst they subscribed to Lenin’s idea of the dictatorship of the proletariat as the ‘magic weapon’ to guarantee victory, and adhered to the principle of revolution by violence, smashing the old state and seizing power by force, they saw these were very distant possibilities.

By definition, they required mass support before conditions could approach being right and, citing Lenin’s comments on the British aversion to revolutionary ideas, she said there was no UK mass movement ready for revolution. Manchanda was not convinced that sections of the white working class were ready to give up the privileges they had received as a result of colonialism.

WOMEN’S LIBERATION FRONT

She confirmed that her feminism stemmed from this same global anti-imperialist thinking.

In 1970 she founded the Women’s Liberation Front (WLF).

Some of the groups Langford belonged to in were targeted by ‘David Robertson’ (HN45, 1971-73). One of his earliest reports is dated 16 February 1971 [UCPI0000010570], and includes a leaflet detailing the WLF’s main aims.

Many of the aims including equal pay, equal opportunities, childcare facilities, and birth control are now accepted across the political spectrum (if not always implemented).

SPYING ON SMALL INNER-CIRCLE GROUPS

Langford and Manchanda formed the Revolutionary Marxist-Leninist League (RMLL), a group of around ten people with a focus on studying deep political theory. They sought to influence and lead the work of groups such as the WLF, BVSF and Friends of China. They regularly met at Langford’s house.

The Inquiry was shown another report by ‘David Robertson’, this time concerning an RMLL meeting in January 1971 [UCPI0000010567]. For the Inquiry, Wilkinson noted that this meeting lasted three and a half hours and asked if this was a standard length of meeting for this group?

With a weary note in her voice, Langford replied, ‘I’m afraid so, yes’.

This particular meeting was attended by 14 people. Three members were applying for jobs at Fords in Dagenham. The WLF, in the meantime, was planning to send its members to get jobs at the Metal Box Company. This was, Langford explained, a deliberate strategy to work at places where they may be industrial action, although their role was not to impose – again, their overarching principle of collective action came first.

Robertson was said to have attended many such meetings at Langford’s home. She seemed unable to accept he had been invited to these closed meetings despite the level of detail in the reports:

‘I find it very hard to believe that he was actually in the room, as he would not have been a member of that inner group. I should explain that we had a system of candidate membership and so there may have been someone in the room who was a candidate member’

She offers a alternative source for the intelligence – perhaps the room was bugged, or if there were some disgruntled group members (who were being challenged over their misogyny) who might have gossiped to a sympathetic person in the pub.

Robertson filled out a form for Langford [UCPI 00000334339], applying to join group’s Marxist-Leninist Mao Tsetung thought study classes in the spring of 1971.

Robertson was Scottish, and Langford remembers talking with him about the political situation in Scotland and noticing that he seemed quite clueless about past struggles such as the Upper Clyde Shipbuilders.

WOMEN’S GROUP GETS A WOMAN SPYCOP

The SDS sent ‘Sandra Davies’ (HN348) to infiltrate the WLF. She has told the Inquiry:

‘Women’s liberation was viewed as a worrying trend at the time.’

Despite having the same responsibilities as her male colleagues, because Davies was a woman she was only paid 90% of a male wage, in accordance with police policy at the time. Ironically, she received this partial wage in order to undermine a group campaigning for equal pay for women.

Davies reported on the WLF’s study group in March 1971 [UCPI0000026992]. This was a meeting at someone’s home, attended by Davies and just six other women. Langford pronounced this to be:

‘very very strange indeed… she would have had to do a lot of work to ingratiate herself to get invited to a meeting like that… she went from a public meeting to private meetings in a very short while’

OUSTING MANCHANDA

Another Robertson report [UCPI0000011741], from March 1971, details an extraordinary meeting of the RMLL that went on for 9 hours. It’s a very detailed report. The 17 people attending this meeting were expected to prepare, and write a paper in advance.

The meeting had been called in an attempt to resolve differences which had emerged in the group, but which caused its eventual split. In the report, Roberston characterised it with brazen contempt for Manchanda:

‘The object of the meeting was, in fact, to “cut down to size” the organisation’s leading personality A MANCHANDA whose offensive manner, dogmatic attitude, bullying techniques and general inefficiency have become too much even for his admirers to swallow.’

This was not the first sneering disparagement from Robertson, who’d previously reported on Manchanda’s ‘insufferable anecdotes’ about his baby, and criticised him for doing childcare while Langford went out to work.

There are a lot of details of private matters at a private home. Robertson claimed he babysat the couple’s infant child. Langford was aghast:

‘I find it absolutely outrageous that he would even make such a suggestion… we would never have left a young baby with someone we hardly knew – certainly not!’

Langford condemned his report as highly subjective and was baffled that this sort of thing was shared with MI5:

‘It’s not even about our politics, it’s about our personal lives, and it’s so intrusive, so nasty and so petty… How did these things end up in the reports of a supposedly serious operation?’

Langford said one of the reasons for the meeting was that many women on the left were starting to examine and call out ‘various misdemeanours’ by left-wing men. The report mentions a letter one of the group had sent to Manchanda. Robertson described it as:

‘a very personal attack on the private morals of [name redacted] arising from an incident that had taken place some time previously’

Langford said that it was much more serious than that. It was an accusation of attempted rape against a man in the group. She remembers the man denying it and his exact words, ‘she’s too ugly to rape’ are still ‘burned into my memory’.

More to the point, Roberston was a police officer hearing a report of a serious offence, yet his response was to misreport in such vague terms that none of his police colleagues would be aware of the truth.

Langford was asked if anyone else in the group reported it to the police:

‘Very few women would. We all knew we’d be subjected to further humiliation.’

The meeting had heated exchanges and Manchanda was suspended from the RMLL. It means Robertson, or whoever the informer was, must have contributed to the meeting and had a vote. Robertson noted this probably meant that Friends of China and the Britain-Vietnam Solidarity Front would be disbanded too.

DEMOLISHING THE WOMEN’S LIBERATION FRONT

Six-months later, in September 1971, there is a report [UCPI0000027021] from a WLF meeting where an emergency resolution was passed to expel Diane Langford from the group that she had set up. The vote was unanimous – so Sandra Davies approved and voted Langford out as well.

According to one of Davies’ reports [UCPI0000010932], the Black Unity and Freedom Party was planning a children’s Christmas party in 1971, and they asked the WLF to contribute home-made sweets and cakes.

Asked why the intention to bake was worthy of reporting by police charged with preventing disorder, Davies seemed to suggest it was a ruse to indoctrinate kids:

‘They were involving themselves with children and the sweets and cakes were an addition. They wanted to get their philosophy across to as many groups as they could. That was their aim’

Another of Davies’ reports [UCPI0000010907] mentions a jumble sale being organised by the WLF. Again, she defended this because:

‘they would have used it as another opportunity for advertising their aims’

Both of these reports were copied to MI5.

In February 1972, a report [UCPI0000010908] shows that spycop Sandra Davies had been elected WLF treasurer. A month later, Davies reported [UCPI0000010911] on an emergency meeting of the Executive Committee of the Revolutionary Women’s Union – as the WLF was now called – that decided to suspend three members from the wider group for ‘disruptive behaviour’.

Six weeks after that, on 4 May 1972, Davies attended another Women’s Revolutionary Union meeting at a member’s home. According to her report [UCPI0000010913], it opened with comments about a general lack of enthusiasm within the group, older members dropping out and not being replaced by new ones. The organisation was finished.

NIXON PROTEST

In January 1973, a report [UCPI0000010247] concerns a private meeting of the Britain-Vietnam Solidarity Front to organise a protest coinciding with the inauguration of US President Richard Nixon. Although much of the world saw Nixon as improving relations with China, the BVSF were keen to protest against Nixon’s extension of the Vietnam War into Cambodia and Laos.

Robertson and Jill Mosdell (HN346) are both shown as contributing to this report. Langford noticed the name Digby Jacks, NUS president at the time, and believes this meeting was about organising the practicalities of the march they were organising. She made the point that they would communicate with the (uniformed) police to agree the route of any marches.

BURNING BANNER BOOKS

Banner Books is mentioned in a report from 1972. It seems that Robertson was working there. In her opening statement last week, Langford pointed out that this meant the SDS had keys for the shop. She remembered that it was later burned down by fascists. This hadn’t appeared in any of the police reports.

For the Inquiry, Wilkinson promised that Robertson will be asked about this when he gives evidence on the morning of Tuesday 27 April.

Ultimately though, Robertson’s cover identity was compromised in 1973 and his deployment ended. If, as Wilkinson suggested, the fire occurred in 1975, this might be the reason he didn’t mention it.

THE MASK SLIPS

In 2015, Langford said that Robertson had long made them uneasy:

‘A moustachioed Scottish man, Dave Robertson, aroused suspicion because he was always driving a different car. When challenged he claimed to be working for a car rental firm. On another occasion he’d told me he worked at a club called the Tatty Bogle. One of the comrades went down to check it out and found this to be untrue.

‘At Manu [Manchanda]’s suggestion, we didn’t confront Dave, but assigned him the most onerous tasks: collecting heavy banners and placards in his car and carrying them on marches. He was always called upon to buy everyone drinks and asked to memorise long passages from James Maxton, an obscure Scottish Marxist.

‘The funny thing was, I quite liked Dave. He was always good-natured and went along with the aggravation. Then all that changed. The sinister nature of his work revealed itself.’

Langford inadvertently played a key role in the blowing of Robertson’s cover. She was working at the Daily Mirror and brought a co-worker, Ethel, along to a meeting of the Indo-China Solidarity Committee about President Nixon’s bombing of Cambodia.

Robertson walked in and Ethel greeted him brightly. He came over very quickly – acting ‘like overbearing men often do’, said Langford – grabbed Ethel by the wrist and said, ‘I want to talk to you outside.’ They didn’t come back.

For about a week, Ethel was awkward with Langford and wouldn’t talk about it. Eventually, she told Langford that she knew him from living in a nearby flat, and it was well known his flat was a police flat.

Ethel explained:

‘Dave works for the Special Branch. He’s threatened that if I tell you or Manchanda, he’ll cause something nasty to happen to my family in Ireland.’

Robertson was never seen again. He and the two officers deployed alongside him, Jill Mosdell and Sandra Davies, were all withdrawn at the same time.

Despite serving in the Met’s elite subversion and public order unit for two years, Davies said in her witness statement to the Inquiry:

‘I did not witness or participate in any public disorder whilst serving with the SDS. I do not even recall going on any marches or demonstrations. I did not witness nor was I involved in any violence.’

It must have been obvious very early on in her deployment what she was involved with. And yet, she was still there, spying full-time on that group, two years later. Looking back, she continued:

‘I do not think my work really yielded any good intelligence, but I eliminated the Women’s Liberation Front from public order concerns’

LEGACY

Langford says the truth has left her feeling guilty for being unknowingly allowing Robertson into their political groups. She feels anxious about the possibility of State reprisals on Ethel, and outraged that a woman she trusted violated her family space when they were just trying to improve the lives of women.

Langford flatly rejects the police lawyers’ exhortations to make allowances for bigotry in the reports as merely ‘the standards of the time’. She sternly asserted that there was no excuse for such sickening racist, sexist and homophobic language and attitudes. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights had been declared a generation earlier. There were any number of people like Martin Luther King, Claudia Jones, and James Baldwin who were alive and not bigoted and very publicly saying so. Such prejudice and oppression was no more right or acceptable then than it is now.

The Inquiry has uploaded Diane Langford‘s account of her political life, ‘The Manchanda Connection – a political memoir by Diane Langford‘

Witness statement of Diane Langford

Dr Norman Temple

Dr Norman Temple was Zoomed in from Vancouver (where it was 8.30am when he started). He was, as everybody agreed (even Counsel to the Inquiry David Barr QC who we ran into leaving the venue and who did his questioning), ‘quite a character’.

Temple attended university in Liverpool from 1965-67, but didn’t study much. He was a member of the Labour Party. His interest was piqued by a periodical from China and after he moved to London he got involved with Maoists there.

In 1967, the Vietnam war intensified. The civil rights movement, the hippies in San Francisco, the women’s movement, the gay rights movement were all running in parallel. In Britain there was the specific political situation in Northern Ireland, in France there were the événements of 1968.

He pointed out that there was lots of overlap between these different campaigns, and others, including the fight against apartheid.

He saw that these issues were all connected, and that the system was the problem.

He saw three main factions on the Left at the time: those who were pro-Soviet Union, those who were pro-China, and those who were Trotskyists. He was drawn to the pro-China people, the Maoists, and happily described himself as ‘rent a mob’ – ‘a floating revolutionary’ who got involved in lots of things.

Most of the hearing revolved around the politics of the (splinter-)groups he had been involved in, and it turned out Temple still had quite strong opinions about his former comrades.

PALESTINIAN SOLIDARITY CAMPAIGN

Palestine ‘burst on the scene’ in 1969 and became an issue internationally, like apartheid and Vietnam. The Palestine Solidarity Campaign (PSC) was formed at the Egyptian Embassy, near to the old MI5 building in Mayfair. Asked about his membership of the ‘Kensington and Paddington branch of the PSC’, Temple retorted that ‘It would be more accurate to say I was the branch’.

We were shown an SDS report dated 17 June 1970 [MPS-0739227] signed off by a Detective Inspector (HN294, 1968-69), which includes personal details about members of the group, including their addresses, phone numbers, employment, etc.

Temple said he had no idea that the police were taking such an interest in his doings. He guessed that their thinking was ‘we better find out what these people are are up to case they do something a bit naughty’ – a precaution, just like smoke detectors. Which somehow made it sound like he was giving evidence for the police.
There were about 20 branches of the PSC in the UK, and ten affiliated organisations.

These included Arab student groups, the BVSF and CPGML (Maoist), International Socialists (Trotskists), etc. At a joint conference on 6 February 1971, the Maoists tried to take control of the PSC, but weren’t supported by the Arab student groups. The Trots were trying to do much the same thing.

IRISH NATIONAL LIBERATION SOLIDARITY FRONT

Temple then was asked about his involvement in the Irish National Liberation Solidarity Front (INLSF) in September 1970. It was run by an internal organising committee, which Temple was invited to join after 2 or 3 weeks. The group was producing a paper and needed all the help they could get.

Asked how security-conscious the INLSF was, Temple suggested that for a revolutionary organisation, being considered so insignificant by the police that you’re not under surveillance is ‘the ultimate insult’. The main thing the group did was to remove the telephone from the room during meetings, because they assumed all of their phones were tapped.

The principal activity of the INLSF was the production and distribution of the Irish Liberation Press, a newspaper which was sold in Irish pubs and venues around London. The newspaper dominated everything, according to Temple. They spent a lot of time producing it and then distributing it.

Undercover officer ‘Alex Sloan‘ (HN347, 1971), who infiltrated this group, was around for approximately four months at the start of 1971. According to Temple, he would have visited the flat where the paper was made, but he never got to the level of being trusted enough to be invited to meetings of the inner group.

The Inquiry was treated to a picture of an issue of the newspaper, while David Barr QC read the rabble-rousing text out loud.

Temple described the piece in the paper as ‘full of all these cliches’ and ‘very colourful language’, and did not necessarily reflect his views on things: ‘Everything there is written by Davoren’; nobody else was ever invited to write an article, they might be assigned ‘sort of chicken feed’ tasks.

Temple really sounded as if he still had an axe to grind with Davoren. The latter was the ‘Editor’ of the paper, but also ‘the author of everything’, and someone who believed they never made mistakes, says Temple.

Asked to talk about the level of disruption caused by the INLSF, Temple spoke about the Hyde Park demo, which he probably missed (as he and four others had gone to a trip to Ireland over Easter 1971). INLSF demos would attract 200-300 people, and their pickets around ten.

David Barr questioned him about different tactics used by the group – Temple confirmed that these included putting up posters, and what could maybe loosely be classed as ‘political education’. They would focus on the issues pertinent to people in Ireland, rather than providing a traditional Maoist political education.

Davoren, however, had his own personal political ideology. He ‘loved Stalin’ and wrote about him in the paper, but ‘nothing ever on Chairman Mao’, so Temple thinks it would be more accurate to describe him as a ‘Stalinist’ than a ‘Maoist’.

The Black Unity and Freedom Party, a Black organisation based in Finsbury Park and South London, was ‘the only other organisation that we were friendly with’ – there was no ideological disagreement between the two groups as they worked on completely different issues.

A next report [MPS-0739488] mentions a visit that Davoren paid to the ‘Chinese Legation’ in April – Temple was ‘totally unaware of it’ but reckons this is the sort of thing that Davoren may have done.

The trip to Ireland, mentioned above, was aimed at selling lots of papers, but border control noticed the thousands of copies in their van and wouldn’t let them bring their propaganda onto the ferry.

At a meeting of the group afterwards, according to the report that ‘Sloan’ submitted, there was ‘comment and disbelief’ about the statement of support of the Provisional IRA, who allowed the paper to be sold on their territory.

(Before this support was confirmed, there was an incident Belfast, when the INLSF paper-sellers were told ‘you have five minutes to get out’.) The only topic that Temple felt was safe to debate in NI was the Palestinian struggle.

Davoren was very critical of the IRA and its bombing campaign – he denounced them as ‘Catholic nationalists’. He did not think of them as a left-wing organisation, but people with politics different to his. Asked if Temple had met with any Protestant groups, Temple said ‘absolutely not, that would be very bad for the health'(!)

The hearing then moved to details about dates.

The organisation split after that meeting, with roughly half of the group walking out.

Temple stayed on for some time and shortly afterwards, Davoren set up a new organisation: the Communist Workers League. They were sent out in pairs to sell the paper. There must be mistakes in the reports, Temple says, the CWL can’t have been mentioned before the split.

He doesn’t think he was ever paired up with ‘Sloan’ and doesn’t remember having any proper conversation with the guy. He said that there was another member named Jackson who several of them believed to be a spycop. He says there has been nothing from the Inquiry about this man.

Temple said that, in comparison, ‘Jackson’ was a much more talkative figure, whereas Sloan was very quiet, and ‘made no impact on me’. He does not think that Sloan held any positions of responsibility in the group.

EMERGENCY CONFERENCE

The next report [MPS- 0739470] is on an emergency conference that was held during the weekend of 26-27 June 1971. Some members had been expelled from the Communist Workers League (described as the ‘inner caucus of the INLSF’) a few weeks earlier. You couldn’t possibly resign from the group, you were expelled, and more people left at this ’emergency meeting’.

Temple remembers being warned (by Davoren and Joe O’Neill) that ‘Alex Sloan’ was working for the police. However, at a meeting where this was going to be discussed, despite personally believing that Sloan was an undercover, Davoren accused O’Neill of slander for suggesting that Sloan was a ‘pig’.

Being accused made Sloan’s position in the group untenable, so he left. According to Temple, he did so on amicable terms, with no animosity.

Temple doesn’t know where the idea of Sloan being a police spy came from or what evidence there was for this; and after he disappeared, no further research was done either.

He clarified that he continued working alongside Davoren between June and September 1971, but after this he had very little to do with the guy and his new group.

Temple says he was no longer actively or officially involved in much political activity after this; he would occasionally attend events but not organise so much.

Altogether, there was not a lot we learned form Dr Norman Temple. Most of what he said was common knowledge, at least for anyone who had look at some SDS reports on that period.

Witness statement of Dr Norman Temple

INFORMATION ACCESS

Those following proceedings from home, including journalists, found themselves hampered by the continual references to documents that still hadn’t actually been uploaded to the Inquiry website. Some of the exhibits were uploaded earlier on in the day, but not all of them.

The way they were presented on the Inquiry’s pages of the hearing makes it near-impossible to look at them as they’re being discussed. With multiple reports entitled – for example – ‘Special Branch report by HN347 on a private meeting of the INLSF’ there is no way to work out which one is being referred to.

We do need the unique reference number included there, and of course the complete selection of files referred to at the start of the hearing – adding them later on is all too confusing.

ROOFING ROUND-UPS

For those of you who need an even shorter summary of the day and some added comment of your independent experts, have a look at Tom B. Fowler’s roofing round ups, the venerable spycops hearings live tweeter bringing you instant reaction to the hearings given live through the day during the breaks on Facebook.

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Tranche 1, Phase 2, Day 3

23 April 2021

Opening Statements from:

Heather Williams QC, representing Category F Core Participants: Relatives of Deceased Individuals
James Scobie QC, representing Richard Chessum and ‘Mary’
Rajiv Menon QC, representing Piers Corbyn
Kirsten Heaven, representing other Non-Police, Non-State Core Participants
Dave Morris

The current round of Undercover Policing Inquiry hearings covers the years 1973-82. This day was the last one of opening statements, from Monday 26th April there will be three weeks of taking evidence from witnesses of the era.

But first the Chair, Sir John Mitting, said a few words about Blair Peach and there was a minute’s silence.

Peach was a committed teacher, socialist and anti-fascist. Some 42 years ago to the day, on 23 April 1979, he was killed by police at an anti-racist demonstration in London. His partner, Celia Stubbs, has campaigned for justice for him ever since. That campaign was targeted by the Special Demonstration Squad.

We also now know that both Blair and Celia were spied on before that, though the Inquiry has not let them see any of the documents pertaining to the time before Blair’s death.

The Met’s own investigation at the time concluded Peach was killed by police, and identified Inspector Alan Murray as the likely culprit.

Yet Mitting could not bring himself to acknowledge these facts. Instead, he glossed over it, not mentioning the police and merely referring to Peach being killed by ‘a blow to the head’. In doing this, he insulted all victims of spycops and underlined his partisan nature that is draining the Inquiry of its potential to get to the truth.

Heather Williams QC
representing Category F Core Participants: Relatives of Deceased Individuals

Heather Williams QC spoke for relatives of dead people whose identities were stolen by Special Demonstration Squad (SDS) officers as the basis for their fake persona.

She is acting on behalf of:

Frank Bennett and Honor Robson, the bereaved brother and sister of Michael Hartley who died on 4 August 1968 at 18 years of age.

Faith Mason, the bereaved mother of Neil Robin Martin who died on 15 October 1969 at 6 years of age.

Liisa Crossland and Mark Crossland, the bereaved stepmother and brother of Kevin John Crossland who died on 1 September 1966 at 5 years of age.

Mr, Mrs and Ms Lewis, the bereaved father, mother and sister of Anthony Lewis who died on 31 July 1968 at 7 years of age.

Barbara Shaw, the bereaved mother of Rod Richardson who died on 7 January 1973 when he was two days old.

Williams said:

‘each of the clients experienced the death of a child; a life event among the most difficult it is possible to suffer. More recently, the families have also suffered the horror of learning that their loved one’s identity was used by an undercover police officer precisely because of their bereavement, because their son or daughter lost their life when a child. How did it start? At what level was it condoned? Were there no alternatives?’

They’ve been waiting for answers for years – Barbara Shaw found out about the theft of her baby son’s identity in 2013. She is now 80 years old, her health is failing, yet still she waits for answers.

NO SECURITY

Did the theft of identities serve any legitimate purpose? There appears no clear rationale, no justification for this repulsive practice. Earlier SDS officers, from 1968-72, simply made up names and none appeared vulnerable to exposure.

There seemed to be no change in circumstances to have made officers deviate from the practice of simply making-up identities. We have looked through the police documents released and there is no evidence for it.

The SDS annual report 1972 confirmed the advantages of using ‘a fictitious name’ that allows officers to return to their real identity at any time. The 1973 annual report talks of having had no ‘irretrievable exposure of any SDS officer’. There was no need to change the tactic to stealing real identities.

One officer was compromised in 1974 when someone who had known him as a uniformed officer recognised him in a meeting. His choice of fictitious identity, rather than a stolen one, played no part in his exposure.

Apart from ‘Michael Scott‘ (HN298, 1971-76) who stole the identity of a living person, it seems fictional identities were normal until a change of management in 1974. The rpactice continued into the late 1990s – the most recent known being ‘Rod Richardson’ (EN32/HN596, 1999-2003).

The 1990s SDS Tradecraft Manual cruelly talks of ‘finding a suitable ex person’ with a ‘natural or unspectacular death’ and the ‘respiratory status’ of the parents.

But from around 1974, undercovers used the identities of dead children and were instructed and/or expected to do so. Officers who queried this were told it was the usual process. They searched for people who had been born around the same time as the SDS officer, preferably with the same first name.

We have not been provided with any evidence that show why it happened, let alone any consideration of the damage to the families involved, and indeed police and policing. They seemed to assume they would never have to answer for it.

Police lawyers said some former officers were uncomfortable with stealing dead children’s identities but thought the families would never know. There is no evidence to show that it helped the officers in their deployments, even before we consider the ethical issues.

The National Crime Squad says none of the Regional Crime Squads they know of who had undercover officers stole dead people’s identities. So, why did the SDS feel it ‘had to’? The spycops say they were going into ‘more security conscious organisations’.

If that were true, why was there no increase in other measures to protect SDS officer’s security? One officer says his identity ‘was not particularly detailed’ as it was largely left to officers to invent it themselves, with little to no guidance. It hardly sounds like security was intense.

Another officer says ‘I made my legend’ up as I went along’ – and it was not tested by managers.

FACT MEETS FICTION

There was no imperative to steal the identity of a dead child. So where did it come from?

Frederick Forsyth’s novel The Day of the Jackal was published in 1971 and the film released in 1973, showing the practice of stealing dead children’s identities in just this way. So, rather than an official police document, was it instead a work of fiction that in fact inspired this ghoulish practice? Whistleblower SDS officer Peter Francis (1993-97) said that the process was known as ‘the jackal run’ among SDS officers.

In last year’s hearings, police lawyers spoke of the ‘essential operational imperative’ to steal real identities. While suspicious comrades might have doubts assuaged by finding a birth certificate, they would surely be alarmed to discover a matching death certificate.

There are plenty of reasons why a birth certificate might not be found (if someone was born abroad, or adopted). There are no reasons why a living person would have a death certificate.

And this is exactly what happened. Members of Big Flame became suspicious of their member ‘Rick Gibson’ (SDS officer Richard Clark, HN297), and found he was legally dead. They confronted him and he ended his deployment. (More detail on this in James Scobie’s section of this report, below).

Clark was one of the first infiltrators to steal a dead child’s identity, and it blew his cover. So why did the practice continue for over 20 years?

Fictitious identities actually offered better cover to spycops than stealing dead people’s identities. There was no justification to start the practice, and none to continue after Clark was exposed.

If security was so important, why did managers not properly prepare their officers and stop them from behaving in a way that compromised them? Why were they given so little direction and so much latitude to make up their own mission?

Very few former SDS officers seemed to have had any qualms of conscience about stealing dead children’s identities, let alone acting immorally in the dead person’s name, deceiving women into relationships, getting arrested and convicted.

One officer, ‘Colin Clark’ (HN80, 1977-82), said:

‘I knew that it would cause distress for the family if it was discovered’.

Did his managers who knew that stop to think? Did his colleagues discuss it? Were the undercovers given any choice?

Clark changed his identity using his own date of birth and a different forename. He went on to have a five year deployment without being discovered, probing that it was eminently possible to be undercover without a verifiable birth certificate.

NOT JUST THE NAME BUT THE PERSON

Another spycop ‘Michael James’ (HN96, 1978-83) instructed to visit Blackpool where the child whose identity he stole was born. The local Special Branch helped him ascertain if the family still lived there. It is hard to imagine this was a one-off. This obviously goes beyond simply stealing names.

‘Desmond/Barry Loader‘ (HN13, 1975-78) was convicted of public order offences in the name of a dead child. Was there any regard for the besmirching of good names, or the impacts on families who may find out?

The callous interference with bereaved families was consistent with the broader culture and practices of the SDS, with not a hint of consideration as to the proportionality of their actions, nor thoughts of consequences on others, and no review of efficacy or risk.
Stealing identities simply became an embedded practice in a unit that lacked accountability and effective supervision.

At the Undercover Policing Inquiry, we are seeing excessive redaction of the undercovers methods and told it is because it ‘may harm policing’. How can it do that if it is an abandoned practice from decades ago? It is the fact of the theft that harms policing. It looks a lot like yet another example of the police not wanting to admit the full awful truth of what they did to citizens and taking the Inquiry for a ride.

We want the Inquiry to check if the Met’s redactions of the evidence that damns them are actually justified, or if it is concealing for other reasons.

It also appears MI5 had helped with fictitious identities and helped with materials to support them. There is nothing to show why the SDS decided to move away from. The reason remains unexplained.

SHYING AWAY FROM THE TRUTH

Heather Williams finished her statement, but COPS adds a few additional comments about police shying away from the truth on this matter:

In 2013, Pat Gallan – then Deputy Assistant Commissioner of the Met and head of Operation Herne, the Met’s self-investigation into spycops – told the Home Affairs Select Committee they had only found one case of dead child identity theft.

She said the combined efforts of Herne’s 31 staff had failed to find any more in the subsequent five months. She refused repeated requests to give an apology for the practice.

The Home Affairs Select Committee report insisted on the truth being told about SDS infiltrators stealing dead children’s identities and demanded all affected families be told and given an apology by the end of 2013. The Met simply ignored their publications.

Later in 2013, Operation Herne reported that, contrary to Gallan’s claim of it being isolated and unauthorised, identity theft of dead children was pretty much mandatory in the SDS for 20 years.

The Met Commissioner Bernard Hogan-Howe then issued a generalised apology for stealing dead children’s identities, addressed to nobody in particular. That was in 2013. It has fallen to the Inquiry to contact families, years after they had been identified. The Met has still not provided any answers.

It’s also worth asking who else knew about it. Bob Lambert (‘Bob Robinson’ HN10, 1984-89) was a spycop in the 1980s who went on the run the SDS in the 1990s. He told Channel 4 News that the practice of stealing dead children’s identities was ‘well known at the highest levels of the Home Office’.

When the Inquiry was announced, six former Home Secretaries from the period concerned were still alive. The Inquiry has taken so long to get going that only four are still alive, the youngest of whom is now 79 years old. We are not aware of any plans for any of them to be called to give evidence to the Inquiry.

Full opening statement from Heather Williams QC, representing relatives of deceased individuals

James Scobie QC
representing Richard Chessum and ‘Mary’

Scobie did a great job piecing together the career of undercover officer Richard Clark (‘Rick Gibson’ HN297, 1974-76) rising through Troops Out Movement (TOM) seemingly in order to get access to Big Flame – and how he was eventually found out.

Based on SDS reports and the statements of two people he spied on, Richard Chessum and ‘Mary’, Scobie shows that Clark abused his friendship with Chessum and his sexual relationship with ‘Mary’ (and three other women) to reach that goal.

Clark manipulated a democratic organisation to achieve high office and destabilise it. With this, the SDS went far beyond its remit, and the mangers were fully aware of it.

Scobie also explored how Clark’s deployment served to direct subsequent officers to follow his example and take office in organisations they infiltrated.

ANATOMY OF AN INFILTRATION

In December 1974, Richard Chessum and Mary were students at Goldsmiths College in London, studying sociology and teacher training respectively, and they both were in the college’s Socialist Society.

Mary had come from South Africa and campaigned on anti-racist and civil liberties issues. Chessum had been a Methodist lay preacher, and was political officer for his local Labour Party. He protested against war and for civil liberties.

At this time, undercover officer Richard Clark – 29, married with children – was deployed into Goldsmith’s College. He stole the identity of a dead child, Richard Gibson. His target was the Troops Out Movement (TOM).

TOM was advocating self-determination for the people of Ireland and withdrawal of British troops from Ireland. Their methods were lobbying MPs, drafting alternative legislation, and raising awareness with the occasional low-key demonstration, doing talks and film screenings.

TOM had already been infiltrated, as recently as 1974, by ‘Michael Scott‘ (HN298, 1971-76) who concluded that:

‘It had no subversive objectives and as far as I am aware did not employ or approve the use of violence to achieve its objectives.’

So why were they targeted? Richard Clark is dead, so we have no opportunity to question him. But his reports show what he did.

STEP 1 – IDENTIFYING A TARGET ORGANISATION

Clark’s deployment was well planned. He wrote to TOM head office in advance asking for a local branch to join in December 1974, knowing there wasn’t one.

Chessum had been in the Anti-Internment League and so was known to some in the national office of TOM. He had not joined and had no plans to do so, because he was studying hard and had recently been ill. Nonetheless the national office put him in touch with Clark.

By February 1975, using the Socialist Society as a tool, Clark had succeeded in creating an entirely new branch of the Troops Out Movement. There were five founder members of that branch; Mary, Richard Chessum, his partner, another student, and the undercover officer.

Clark had completed Step 1. He was in the Troops Out Movement. But rather than infiltrating a branch, he had actively established one. He generated something to spy on. He encouraged and organised demonstrations, such as the picketing of the local Woolwich barracks and the homes of local MPs.

Neither Mary, Chessum nor his partner had Special Branch files on them until their involvement with Clark. Their lives were then reported to an extent that was both sinister and ridiculous. This information was passed to MI5. Their physical appearances, commentary on their body size, health issues, addresses, theatres visited, holiday destinations, right down to the brand of cigarettes they smoked.

They were no threat to anyone. They were targeted first for their politics, and secondly, because they were useful. And Clark used them.

STEP 2 – DEVELOPING AN IDENTITY & BUILDING TRUST

Clark had no back history. He had just appeared. He needed to develop a place in the social network of political activists. He did that by exploitation. ‘Mary’ is unequivocal: Clark used sexual advances to ingratiate himself.

Clark established a close friendship with Richard Chessum and initiated a sexual relationship with Mary, having been invited into her home. And he had relationships with at least three other activists to gain position and tactical advantage. The other women were Mary’s flatmate, and two activists from the group Big Flame, Clark’s ultimate target. (His story also shows that forming targeted sexual relationships started early in the SDS.)

STEP 3 – TAKING POSITIONS & MOVING UP THE HIERARCHY

As one of the founder members of the South East London branch of TOM, Clark gained access to the national movement, with an astonishing level of ruthlessness.

By March 1975, he had got himself elected as the Secretary – the top position in the branch. He and Richard Chessum were then elected as voting delegates to the TOM Liaison Committee conference.

That move gave Clark access to the national leadership, knowing he’d be accompanied by Richard Chessum, a man with a proven track record of genuine commitment. His cultivated friendship with Richard Chessum gave him credibility.

In April 1975, Clark got himself elected as a delegate to the London Co-ordinating Committee of the Movement and the All London meeting. He pointedly took an opportunity to, in his own words, ‘severely criticise’ another section of the Movement. It was a move that appeared to ensure that he was elected as the branch’s delegate to TOM’s National Co-ordinating Committee.

He saw members of Workers’ Fight coming into the branch and at the national level. This would endanger his access leadership of the Movement. Clark attended a private meeting of senior members of TOM, with leader Gerry Lawless, to discuss Workers Fight’s attempt to take over. There were only ten people at the meeting, all key in supporting Lawless’s position in the national Movement against what they saw as an attempt by Workers Fight and the Revolutionary Communist Group to take control of the organisation.

In his report, he noted Big Flame had also formed an ‘uneasy alliance’ with Lawless.

Mary’s flatmate was in Workers Fight (WF), and she had attended TOM pickets. She attended a large TOM branch meeting stacked with WF members. Clark saw his post under threat. A WF person was elected to go to a London conference that would elect national posts. Clark competed against his supposed friend Chessum for the second post and won by two votes. It’s believed one of them would have been from Mary’s flatmate with whom, conveniently, Clark had recently begun a sexual relationship.

STEP 4 – SECURE A NATIONAL POSITION

It worked – Clark got elected to the Organising Committee for London, a national position. So here we are: a spycop deprived the movement of Chessum, a decent man who supported the movement, and put himself in, with the help of the second woman he just happened to have started a relationship with.

In Oct 1975, Clark resigned as Branch Secretary as, holding national office, he no longer needed the position any more. He says in his report he made a scathing attack on WF, but Chessum said it was nothing of the sort.

Lawless then nominated Clark for a position on the National Secretariat and he got it – he was now one of seven people in charge of the whole of TOM.

He continued to attend meetings at Richard Chessum’s home and reported on him. He recorded that Richard Chessum had started a new job at the London Electricity Board – information that was passed to MI5, something that becomes relevant later. Mary and her flat-mate largely disappeared from Clark’s reporting, now that they had served their purpose.

Clark organised a national TOM rally, but failed to secure the appearance of any of the headline acts. He arranged speakers for meetings and organised steward protection from attacks from fascists. That was a legitimate protective measure against a common threat at the time. Yet we expect to see those from Youth Against Racism in Europe, Anti-Nazi League and the Socialist Workers’ Party, criticised for the same thing in a later part of the Inquiry.

Due to Lawless’s paternity leave, Clark became acting head of TOM for several months. In that time, he cancelled delegations to Ireland. He criticised certain members. At least one prominent organisation withdrew its affiliation. By the time Gerry Lawless returned, two members of the Secretariat had resigned. Remember this was a serving Metropolitan Police officer, working undercover, making day to day decisions for a campaigning organisation.

STEP 5 – SABOTAGE THE ORGANISATION

Clark then turned against Lawless. He held a meeting with Big Flame in his cover flat to organise opposition to Lawless’ leadership, decapitating the Troops Out Movement of its long-time head.

They planned a coup in the next conference. The new leadership proposed was five people including Clark himself. Was this about TOM, or getting in Big Flame’s good books?

Clark also embarked on sexual relationships with two female members of the Big Flame. For him, sexual relationships were a tried and tested tactic of getting exactly where he wanted to go.

However, Clark overplayed his hand and Big Flame rumbled him. We don’t know quite how. Telling different stories to different women and them comparing? Was he seen as Machiavellian? Or was it simply a lack or political authenticity?

It was not unusual for Big Flame to investigate new people who wanted to join if they did not trust them entirely. Members of Big Flame went to the government’s birth and death records archive at Somerset House and they found Rick Gibson’s birth certificate. Then they found his death certificate.

They confronted Clark with both. Richard Chessum tells of how he heard about this confrontation from his friends in Big Flame. How Clark went white and nearly started to cry. His ambitious plot to unseat Gerry Lawless was over.

Clark took flight and disappeared from the political scene altogether. Richard Chessum later saw a dossier that Big Flame had prepared, that included a letter from Clark written to one of the female activists, saying that he ‘had to go away’.

There was no retribution against Clark after his exposure. It stands out that none of the groups infiltrated were interested in violence unless in self defence. This shows the Met’s applications for anonymity for spycops at the Undercover Policing Inquiry inquiry on safety grounds are highly questionable.

HOW HIGH DID IT GO?

Clark’s taking of high office was known to his superiors, all the way up to the Commander of the Metropolitan Police Service. It completely abandons the early principle of the Special Demonstration Squad:

‘members of the squad should be told, in no uncertain terms, that they must not take office in a group, chair meetings, draft leaflets, speak in public or initiate activity’

Equally, the fact that he engaged in sexual relationships with activists was no secret either. Two officers, to date, have been honest enough to disclose that they knew of Clark’s behaviour. One of those officers, ‘Graham Coates’ (HN304, 1976-79), has gone further and admitted that sexual relationships were talked about at the weekly officer meetings and that his supervising officers would have been aware because they were present.

Senior officers knew of Clark’s history of sexual abuse, yet he left the police with a special medal, a Detective Inspector’s pension, and his conduct certified as ‘exemplary’.

There is only one explanation for this. His conduct was deemed acceptable. It continued for years, and dozens, probably hundreds, of women were sexually abused at the hands of these officers.

NOT JUST CLARK

Following Clark’s deployment, spycops taking of positions of responsibility and trust in infiltrated organisations was commonplace. ‘Michael James’ (HN96, 1978-83), started his deployment in the Socialist Workers Party where he was elected to a position on the Hackney District Committee. After two years he moved on into the Troops Out Movement, where Clark had been four years before in top positions.

James is an interesting officer because he gives different accounts of the position he reached. In his Inquiry impact statement – a document arguing the case for him being granted anonymity – he stressed his seniority, saying he was National Secretary of TOM, ie the top role. Once his anonymity was secure, he shifted, and tried to downplay and minimise the importance of his position.

The fact is was the National Membership and Affiliation Secretary of TOM for a good 18 months. He now seems to suggest he just happened to fall into his roles rather than actively pursuing them. But he was on the top level of the organisation, the National Steering Committee, which he occasionally chaired. He was one of nine people with a direct influence over the direction of the movement.

In this era, from Clark onwards, every single spycop took a role in the organisation they infiltrated, except for Graham Coates who was infiltrating anarchists without hierarchy or official roles. In some case officers took national leading roles. What resulted from this was not just information, but also the opportunity to have a say in the direction of the organisation, and ultimately the ability to derail that organisation.

Scobie then listed twelve more spycops who held office in the organisations they spied on in the 1970s. See Scobie’s written Opening Statement for the details.

‘Vince Miller‘ (HN354, 1976-79) was elected District Treasurer and on the social committee of the Outer East London District branch of Socialist Workers Party. He resigned from his position to mark the ‘disorder and ineffectiveness’ within the branch. Resignation combined with strong criticism is deliberately de-stabilising to the organisation.

‘Sandra Davies’ (HN348, 1971-73) has already said that she did not remember being elected to the Executive Committee of the Women’s Liberation Front – the group founded by Diane Langford who also did a strong opening statement yesterday. The undercover officer claimed she did not remember voting to oust the founding leader and create a completely new group, the Revolutionary Women’s Union.

Scobie warned the Inquiry that most undercover officers tend to ‘have forgotten’ the roles they had, or claimed they don’t know how they landed there. Alternatively, they say that the role was not really a position of trust at all. The institutionalised dishonesty creeps into every aspect of their evidence.

LYING ABOUT POINTLESS SPYING

While many spycops accurately described the Socialist Workers Party as not encouraging violence – indeed, expelling violent members – one officer who infiltrated them, ‘Paul Gray’ (HN126, 1977-82), has told the Inquiry there was a lot of violence (officers tend to say this to show they’d be at risk if they aren’t granted anonymity). Gray’s claims are undermined by his own reports, which show nothing of the kind. He is lying.

He says his time undercover had no impact whatsoever on his welfare but that answering questions for this Inquiry is impacting on his welfare. That is because he now has to justify the fact that in reality, he busied himself with pointless and personally intrusive reporting.

Gray reported on more children than any other officer. Recording the minutiae of their lives and sending them on to MI5. Almost all of these reports have photographs of the children attached. These children were either the children of Socialist Workers Party members or children who were engaged enough with their society to be part of the School Kids Against the Nazis.

During the course of Gray’s deployment, fascist group Column 88 were threatening to burn down the homes of SWP members. The National Front were attacking Bengalis in Brick Lane, smashing up reggae record shops and vandalising mosques. There was firebombing and murder. Instead of investigating the racist firebombing that killed 13 young black people in New Cross, the Special Demonstration Squad were reporting on school children and providing MI5 with copies of Socialist Workers Party babysitting rotas.

GOVERNMENT & CABINET KNOWLEDGE

Several of the spycops in the era now being examined, 1973-82, refer to visits to the SDS safe-house by the Commissioner of the Met. (This tallies with similar memories of officers both before and after the period).

One refers to congratulatory messages straight from 10 Downing Street. Another, who himself went on to become a Detective Chief Inspector, was told:

‘the continuation of the unit was one of the first decisions that a new Home Secretary had to make’.

The 1976 authorisation for the Special Demonstration Squad’s continued existence was signed off by Robert Armstrong, later Baron Armstrong of Ilminster. He was Cabinet Secretary and Head of the Home Civil Service. It is difficult to imagine a more highly placed civil servant.

MI5’s ‘Witness Z,’ has told the Inquiry:

‘the pressure to investigate these organisations often came from the Prime Minister and Whitehall’.

Put simply, the existence and functioning of the SDS was known of, and authorised, at the very top.

Every annual application for funding refers to the officers fully recognising ‘the political sensitivity’ of the unit’s existence. Authorisation is only ever granted ‘in view of the assurances about security’. In other words, as long as you can promise us we will not get caught, you can carry on.

The Met were protecting the Government from what they referred to in the 1977 Annual Report as ’embarrassment’. There is nothing embarrassing about preventing crime. But the destabilising of democratic movements, the wholesale and widespread intrusion on citizens, and their exploitation for political advantage? That is worth keeping secret.

Scobie ended with a plea:

‘This Inquiry has been set a challenge – to get to the truth. This means asking difficult questions, again and again, to uncover the truth.

‘Ordinary people have been involved in campaigns for a better society, for social equality, anti racism, anti-fascism, against apartheid and for trade union rights. The best of reasons, and the best of traditions.

‘We hope the Inquiry is ready, willing and equipped to meet that challenge. The Inquiry must be fearless and unflinching in the pursuit of the truth. The people of this country expect nothing less.’

Full opening statment from James Scobie QC, representing Richard Chessum & ‘Mary’

Rajiv Menon QC
representing Piers Corbyn

Piers Corbyn is now 74, but has not given up his lifelong activism. He was one of the first people to apply to be a Core Participant in the Inquiry, five years ago. He will give evidence via video next week.

But Rajiv Menon started his opening statement with some more general concerns, making seven points about undercover policing and the material disclosed for the new hearings (Tranche 1 Phase 2, covering 1973-82), and about the Inquiry’s approach to witnesses, redactions, and disclosure.

Firstly. What screams out of the pages is the fact that the SDS was never about protecting parliamentary democracy nor maintaining public order. It was to spy on people and organisations because of their ideas and politics.

The limited public disorder that some spycops describe was largely minor, and certainly did not justify the spying on an industrial scale that was unleashed on the British public in the 1970s or the consequent cost to the public purse.

Just to give two examples. There is a 21 page report on an International Marxist Group (IMG) conference in 1972, and 55 pages on another in 1976. These describe different currents and tendencies within the IMG and summarise debates, as well as details of attendees. What the reports do not include is anything touching upon the protection of parliamentary democracy or the prevention of public disorder.

In short, the SDS was engaged in secret political policing and pure intelligence gathering against the Left, at times Orwellian, at times more Monty Python. Several SDS officers admit gathering as much information as possible, however personal or trivial, because it was for others to decide what was relevant.

Secondly, the most significant document in the current bundle, we believe, is the statement of Witness Z on behalf of the Security Service, MI5, that confirms that the SDS has always been subordinate to MI5.

However, Witness Z is not being called to give evidence, and we cannot understand why this is. Their statement shows they have so much vital knowledge about the roles of the SDS and MI5, and their cooperation. About about MI5’s 1972 definition of subversion as ‘activities threatening the safety or well-being of the State and intended to undermine or overthrow Parliamentary democracy by political, industrial or violent means’, and how most if not all of those spied on by the SDS could not possibly be described as subversive according to this definition.

Thirdly, there are, on our count, 18 SDS officers who were deployed during the relevant period whose cover names have been disclosed and who are alive. But the Inquiry is only calling eight of them to give evidence. The 1970s was a critical period in the history of the SDS, the Inquiry should be hearing from as many spycops as possible.

Fourthly, we are also dismayed that the evidence of seven SDS officers whose real names and cover names have been restricted is not being disclosed. Instead it is redacted, edited and amalgamated into an eight page ‘gist’. We cannot say which officer did what. We need to know what they did individually if their information is any use to anyone at all.

Fifthly, many if not most of the SDS intelligence reports have been destroyed at some stage by the Met. Many of the disclosed reports that have survived are only in existence because copies had been retained by MI5. Interestingly, whilst MI5 is apparently happy to disclose copies of police documents, they are rather more circumspect in disclosing any of their own documents that might reveal the nature and extent of their own spying operations on political activists and others.

Sixthly, redactions. Most frustrating is the redaction of the names of many groups spied on and infiltrated by the SDS between 1969 and 1984. None of this is justifiable. We are looking at 35-50 years ago so what’s the problem? What are they hiding?

The Undercover Research Group compiled a first list of groups spied on according to the Inquiry in 2019. After the first set of hearings of the Inquiry in November 2020, more than 100 groups were added.

The SDS Annual Reports on the years 1969-84 have 130 group names redacted. Why must these remain secret forever, at the insistence of those who did the spying? It’s a betrayal of the purpose of the Inquiry.

Seventh and finally, disclosure. We are not being given enough time to read and digest material by the Inquiry. We were meant to get documents in mid March, but another 2000+ pages have been added in April. Nobody can go through all that in a matter of a couple of weeks.

PIERS CORBYN

Piers Corbyn had no idea of the extent of the spying on him. He has always been open about his politics and has nothing to hide, in contrast with the anonymous spycops who spied on him. Despite having been a Core Participant at the Inquiry for over 5 years, he knew little until recently.

He had only been provided with 53 Special Branch intelligence reports (most of which were relatively unrevealing) and no witness statements from any of the undercover police officers who had spied on him, still less any photographs of those officers to help him recollect these events that took place between 40 and 50 years ago.

Why was Piers Corbyn of interest? Special Branch opened a file on him over 50 years ago, in 1969, and he still can’t see it.

He was President of the Imperial College Union. He attended rallies against the Vietnam War. He joined the International Marxist Group (IMG). He supported Irish civil rights, anti racism, and trade union rights.

He was very active in London squatting in the 1970s. In 1982, he left the IMG and joined the Labour Party. In the 1980s, he was active in the ‘Fare Fight’ campaign to keep down the cost of public transport. In 1986, he became a Labour councillor in Southwark, a position he held for four years.

Piers Corbyn barely learned anything about the spying on him from the new documents disclosed by the Inquiry. He is mentioned in passing in a one report and in the witness statement of two others, who will not be giving evidence. The Inquiry has shown him pictures of some spycops but not the ones who spied on him!

Piers Corbyn was granted Core Participant status by the Inquiry for being one of the main organisers of squatting groups in London between 1972 and 1982, but this barely features in the intelligence reports in which he is named. In short, what is revealed by the disclosure is a damp squib.

What would tell us far more about the secret state’s interest in Piers Corbyn is his Special Branch Registry File. But nobody ever gets to see their Registry File, not even during a public inquiry into undercover policing.

We want to see is his file to see the full nature of why he was spied on. Why won’t they let him see it? Why can’t the Inquiry compel the police to do it? Is it because it’s so tedious and unnecessary that it will embarrass them? Or something else?

Whilst secrecy continues to trump openness, the Inquiry will only scratch the surface, however interesting and revealing some of the documents it is disclosing may be.

The victims of spycops are dismayed at the new delays to the Inquiry. This benefits those who want delay. More documents will be lost and destroyed, more witnesses will die. Justice delayed is justice denied.

Full opening statement from Rajiv Menon QC, representing Piers Corbyn

Kirsten Heaven
representing other Non-Police, Non-State Core Participants

Kirsten Heaven began by expressing the disappointment and anger felt by core participants last week, when they learnt that the next set of hearings, scheduled to take place in October 2021, would be delayed until sometime in the first half of 2022.

The Chair, Sir John Mitting, interrupted her with his reason for this delay – the excuse that the Inquiry want to disclose evidence to a new core participant from the Socialist Workers Party and then collect her witness statement, and says there is so much SWP material that it cannot be done between now and October.

Heaven went on to say that core participants had also just learnt for the first time – in the Counsel to the Inquiry’s Opening Statement two days ago – that the Tranche 2 hearings (covering the years 1983-1992) would no longer be heard in 2022, and would be delayed until at least 2023.

Waiting for another two years is not acceptable for the core participants who have already suffered from many years of delay. She reminded Mitting that his predecessor (Lord Pitchford, the original Chair of this Inquiry) had intended to conclude in 2018.

We are losing crucial evidence with every year that passes, as both officers and witnesses get older. We heard yesterday that, despite being in contact with spycops ‘Alan Bond‘ (HN67, 1981-86) for at least three years, the Inquiry has failed to take a witness statement from him and he is now said to be too ill to provide any evidence.

Heaven recommended that the Inquiry make it an urgent priority to collect statements from all former officers and managers. And that they provide the group with a full list of all Special Demonstration Squad (SDS) managers from the years 1968-82 who are due to give evidence in Phase 3, along with regular updates on their state of health.

The main cause of delay in this Inquiry has been the excessive demands for redactions made by the police and State bodies.

WHO WAS SPIED ON?

Heaven then moved on to analyse some of the facts in the documents recently released by the Inquiry covering the years 1973-82.

It is clear from looking at the newly disclosed evidence just how widespread this political policing was, and the wide range of left-wing groups which were infiltrated and spied upon. This included justice campaigns and defence campaigns, and even their lawyers. Trade unions & mainstream political parties were spied on. There was excessive surveillance of many sections of society, including children and young people. Spycops were involved in criminality, miscarriages of justice, and illegal blacklisting. They had begun stealing the identities of deceased children.

Information – including people’s details – was routinely copied to MI5, meaning the security service. There was deep collaboration between them and the spycops.

She described the SDS’ ‘oblique approach’ – unashamedly described by the unit’s founder Conrad Dixon as “the infiltration of relatively innocuous organisations” as a stepping stone to others.

The women’s liberation movement were targeted, with reports detailing such subversive events as jumble sales & a children’s Christmas party. The youth wing of the Liberal Party was targeted by ‘Michael Scott‘ (HN298, 1971-76) in order to gather intelligence about anti-apartheid activist Peter Hain. The spycops cynically targeted all sorts of non-radical groups, displaying an utter contempt for civil society.

According to a 1973 report from officer HN294, the International Socialists & International Marxist Group made for ‘disappointing’ targets as they did not do anything warranting police interest. It is clear that many of the spycops quickly realised that the groups they’d joined were not a serious threat to public order, or violent in any way. It is also clear that no meaningful risk or threat assessment seems to have been carried out, so how did the SDS know who should be targeted?

We now have a witness statement from ‘Witness Z’ made on behalf of the security services. It contains an admission that subversive organisations were not actually considered a high threat at this time, but that pressure to spy on them often came from the Prime Minister/ Whitehall. No stone should be left unturned in investigating this.

TARGETING JUSTICE

We see the continuation of reporting on lawyers & material that may be subject to legal privilege, often around justice campaigns following police misconduct.

An early example was ‘Alex Sloan‘ (HN347, 1971 reporting on the justice campaign that sprang up in 1971 after the death of teenager Stephen McCarthy (following his arrest and alleged assault by police). Sloan is also known to have taken part in a visit to an asylum seeker being held in Holloway Prison – why was the SDS interested in her case?

Heaven listed a selection of the groups and individuals whose names have appeared in Special Branch’s files or in the latest disclosure:

• Shrewsbury Two Defence Committee
• Roach Family Support Committee
• Stoke Newington and Hackney Defence Campaign
• Persons Unknown Defence Campaign
• Murray Defence Campaign
• Deptford Action Massacre Committee
• Friends of Blair Peach Committee
• Celia Stubbs (partner of Blair Peach and now a Core Participant)
• Graham Smith (another Core Participant)
• Justice for David Ewen Campaign July 1995
• Deborah Coles (Director of INQUEST, set up to monitor deaths in custody and support bereaved families)

It is clear that these justice campaigns were directly targeted by the spycops, despite the denials of police lawyers at the Inquiry.

Another development in this period was that the spycops reporting included children. One report, signed off by very senior officers and copied to MI5, included details about someone’s brother and his wife, and contained a line about the couple having a ‘Mongol child’.

The police’s lawyers say there is no need for concern because reporting on children ‘did not cause any harm’. But it was a gross invasion of privacy and family, and harmful to society.

‘Paul Gray’ (HN126, 1977-82) reported extensively on young people (and their teachers), and would send descriptions, details and even photographs of children off to his bosses (and MI5). One of the groups he targeted was School Kids Against the Nazis (SKAN) but none of them are here to speak for themselves, and we have no idea if the Inquiry has tried to contact any of them or not.

Heaven showed the Inquiry a short archival film from 1979 featuring the kids of Hackney SKAN handing out leaflets at schools and talking about racist scapegoating and the need to drive the National Front out.

DIVERSITY OF TARGETS

The next list of groups read out demonstrates the extent to which the SDS’s interests had grown since the unit started:

• Christian Aid
• Fellowship Party (No Racism No Violence say yes to Fellowship)
• Numerous branches of the Labour Party
• Orpington Young Liberals
• Lewisham Humanists
• 6 London Trade Union Councils
• National Union of Students
• Teachers’ unions
• Transport & General Workers Union Legal Workers Branch

There are many examples of intrusive reporting of women:

• Women’s Voice
• Spare Rib Collective
• Women Workers League
• Brixton Black Womens Group
• Greenham Common Women’s Support Group
• Lambeth Women For Peace

One report attributed to ‘Barry Tompkins‘ (HN106, 1979-83), includes details of a woman activist who had an abortion, and speculation about ‘the putative father’. This kind of invasion of privacy cannot be justified.

According to the police’s lawyers, the spycops were politically neutral and did not favour or target one group over another. However this is patently not true. Hundreds of groups and individuals perceived to be on ‘the left’ were targeted, while the rising far-right, who created fear through their use of violence, were not policed in the same way.

The SDS’s annual reports consistently downplayed the threat posed by the far-right.
An earlier statement by the police’s lawyers suggested that there was no need to infiltrate groups like the National Front because they tended to cooperate’ with Special Branch. There appears to be no evidence to support this.

Neither is there any evidence that the police were able (or willing?) to pre-empt or prevent National Front violence and racist public disorder during this period.

This makes for a stark comparison with the lengths the SDS went to in order to infiltrate the left. Heaven referenced one example: ‘Gary Roberts’ (HN353, 1974-78) was enrolled on a degree course as part of his cover. He attended classes four days a week for several years, and got involved in student politics (becoming an NUS vice-president).

BLACKLISTING

Many eyebrows were raised by the police lawyers’ insistence in their November Opening Statement that the SDS did not infiltrate trade unions and were not involved in blacklisting.

The SDS’s own report from 1972 contains references to trade union activity and strikes (the miners, the dockers and building workers), as well as the union-initiated Shrewsbury Two campaign.

‘David Hughes’ (HN299/342, 1971-76) joined the TGWU and attended their meetings. It appears that many of his reports (including those on the Claimants Union) are missing, but the Inquiry has decided that we do not need to hear more from him.

The Blacklisting Support Group are outraged by the police lawyers reference this week to “so-called blacklisting organisations”. There is no doubt that blacklisting occurred and any attempt to belittle it is deeply offensive to its many victims and their families.

Heaven reminded the Inquiry that it was Operation Reuben, the Met’s own investigation, that found:

‘police, including Special Branches and the security services, supplied information to the blacklist funded by the country’s major construction firms, the Consulting Association and other agencies.’

SPYCOPS – FOOTSOLDIERS OF MI5?

The SDS seem to have infiltrated all sorts of groups, even those which posed no threat to law and order, at the behest of MI5, harvesting photographs, bank account details, membership lists, phone numbers etc.

We are told by police lawyers that the SDS was ‘neither an agent nor a servant of MI5’, but at the same time they tell us the SDS was not in a position to challenge MI5 in any way. Which is true? It can’t be both.

It’s the job of this Inquiry to work out who really controlled the SDS, and answer more questions about this relationship.

The Home Office did provide some official guidance to Special Branch in 1967, 1970 and 1984, but these documents do not answer all of the pertinent questions. The SDS and Special Branch were specifically cautioned in 1984 to seek advice from the security services before targeting any alleged ‘subversives’, and warned against undermining ‘the legitimate expression of ideas’ or ‘interfering in the exercise of political and civil liberties’.

INEQUALITY OF INFORMATION

Before finishing her submissions, Heaven moved on to summarise some procedural points.

At the last hearings, the problems around disclosure and only having a live transcript rather than a proper live stream meant many core participants couldn’t participate fully.

Disclosure of documents has been little better this time, but a large number of documents were missing from what was initially disclosed and a month later it seemed that the volume made available to us fell far short of what had been promised.

This reinforces the unfairness and inequality embedded in this Inquiry.

We can see that there was significant cooperation between the spycops and the security services and, once again, we demand disclosure of all Special Branch ‘registry files’ and other information being held about core participants.

We ask for explanation of the file reference numbering systems so we can understand what the files were.

The Inquiry must be more proactive in encouraging members of the public to come forward with evidence. Publishing the cover names used by officers and photographs of them would be helpful.

We ask again for the full list of groups reported on to be published, and for groups’ names not to be redacted from evidence.

We are still extremely concerned about the withholding of some spycops’ cover names.

Are secret ‘closed’ hearings really required for certain officers? At least one of these men appeared in the BBC’s True Spies documentary talking about his career so it is unclear why he cannot give public evidence to the Inquiry.

MORE OFFICERS, MORE EVIDENCE

Out of the eighteen officers from 1973-82 who are still alive, the Inquiry only plans to call eight to give evidence at these hearings.

‘Gary Roberts’ (HN353, 1974-78) initially supplied a statement in 2019. He has left the UK since then, so the Inquiry has decided to only provide a summary of his evidence. He was present at the 1974 Red Lion Square anti-fascist protest when Kevin Gately was killed, and at the Battle of Lewisham, but his reports seem to be missing.

Being abroad is no excuse to exclude him, he could still give evidence via Zoom like the other witnesses are in the UK.

Another officer who is not being called to give evidence or answer questions is ‘David Hughes’ (HN299/342, 1971-76). One of his reports was described on Wednesday by Counsel to the Inquiry as ‘the most disturbing document that we have found’. This referred to one person interrupting a reading group to talk about how TWO million people would be killed ‘when the socialist revolution took place’. The Inquiry needs to be able to better discern rhetoric and overstatement from actual threats.

Another spycop, ‘Bob Stubbs’ (HN301, 1971-76) was also at Red Lion Square, where he was punched in the face by a uniformed officer. We have not been supplied with all of the evidence about this day, the advance intelligence or any debriefing. The lack of them suggests they have been destroyed, making oral evidence all the more important.

‘Barry Tompkins‘ (HN106, 1979-83) denies reports of deceiving a woman into a relationship. We are now told that he will not be giving evidence due to ill health. However we have not seen any evidence that his condition has been properly verified by the Inquiry. There needs to be more transparency about such medical evidence.

RELEASE THE FILES

There was widespread, systematic contempt for the rights of those on the left of the political spectrum, whose common law rights and human rights have both been breached by the actions of the spycops. Any assurances from SDS & MI5 cannot be trusted.

Those who were spied upon must be shown their files so they can appraise what was done and correct the false information they undoubtedly contain. The whole purpose of this Inquiry was to learn from the mistakes of the past, so such human rights abuses would not be repeated in the future.

Heaven ended her submissions by suggesting that the sheer scale of the spycops scandal, the huge number of people spied upon, the apparent lack of accountability, exaggeration of risk, and the obvious political biases of the police all contribute to the belief that these undercover operations were unjustified and illegitimate. Instead they constituted an unlawful enterprise, conducted for political purposes and motivated by a desire to protect the Establishment rather than the wider public interest.

Full opening statement from Kirsten Heaven representing other Non-Police, Non-State Core Participants

Dave Morris

This was Dave Morris’ second opening statement to the Undercover Policing Inquiry, having already made a fuller statement at the November hearings. This one was mainly made in regard to the recently disclosed documents about undercover officer ‘Graham Coates’ (HN304, 1976-79) who used his association with Morris to gain access to the anarchist milieu in London during the mid to late 1970s.

Coates has been said by the Counsel to the Inquiry to have infiltrated the International Socialists/Socialist Workers Party and the collectives who ran Anarchy and Zero Magazines, as well as the ‘Persons Unknown’ defendants solidarity group. He also used a dead child’s identity and visited the area where he was born. We have also been told that in his written statement, he refers to SDS officers jokingly discussing sexual relationships with activists and that management were aware of the practice.

Morris started by reiterating his previous statement, and endorsing Kirsten Heaven’s description of the spycops activity:

‘an unlawful enterprise conducted for political purposes and motivated by the desire to preserve the power of the establishment rather than protect the wider public interest.’

ORIGINS

Morris told how had had come across anarchist/libertarian ideas through a BBC documentary series ‘Open Doors’. In early 1975 he attended Freedom Newspaper collective meetings, and then went to Anarchy Magazine, discussing housing, poverty, feminism, exploitation at meetings of the friendly, sociable, advertised and open group.

He said that printed articles representing a wide range of views, inevitably including some he disagreed with. He was also a postal worker and was local branch secretary of the Union of Postal Workers.

By the end of the 1970s, Morris had begun to get involved with environmental campaigns such as London Greenpeace and, with fellow London Greenpeace member Helen Steel, was one of two defendants in the famous McLibel trial.

A life-long community activist, Morris is currently Secretary of the Haringey Federation of Residents Associations, and Chair of the National Federation of Parks and Green Spaces.

He explained the common thread running through his activism:

‘The essence of my personal motivation and political beliefs has remained constant throughout the last 50 years or so – the desire to tackle injustice, to seek improvements in society in the public interest, and to encourage and empower people to have as much control over their lives as possible.’

TARGETED

Turning to the early spying he’s just been told about, Morris said:

‘Looking back on the surveillance and infiltration of groups I was involved within in the 1970s… and how I was personally targeted, I feel disgust at this cynical and blatant breach of trust. Not just for me but also for the other victims I knew and know – such as the family with young children whose home was where the Anarchy Collective held meetings. Of course, I am outraged not just by the tactics used but also by the very existence and purpose of the whole spying operation. This Stasi-like behaviour is totally unacceptable.’

All of Morris’ activity was standard campaigning activism, albeit at the left of the spectrum. Organising public meetings, social events, protests, defence for people whose rights were infringed. These are rights enshrined in international law and should have the highest protection.

Indeed, a lot of his work has been about upholding rights and the law.

The McLibel trial – the longest running court case in English history – helped defeat McDonald’s attempt to silence critics. Corporations haven’t tried that sort of thing again.

The McLibel 2 then won an additional victory against the UK government at the European Court of Human Rights because the McLibel trial had been unfair.

After the Climate Camp in 2008, Morris won a case against the police and showed that mass stop and search of campaigners was in fact illegal. In both of these legal cases, he rolled back infringements on the rights of people to voice their dissent against oppressive powers.

The spycop Coates has said:

‘anarchists I reported on posed a minimal challenge to public order… didn’t even discuss activities that could be a public order threat… I do not not think any information I provided was significant’.

Coates reported many personal details, naming the area Morris was brought up in, what A levels he did and more – and got all those details are wrong! What less subjective stuff in their reports were they also wrong about? Some spycop reports are written a month after the event described & may have been embellished by officers who weren’t even there.

A spycop report says Morris suggested that the Anarchy Collective should be involved in fire-raising activity on government building in support of a firefighters strike. But he remembers the group deciding to produce stickers and join local picket lines. It’s possible someone may have made an offhand joke, but the police should be able to discern between that and genuine beliefs or intent.

THE REAL THREAT

Morris also said that while the coverage of left-wing activists seemed to be very thorough, those on the far-right of the political system have had little attention.

Morris said that a proper risk assessment of threats to society at the time would have set its sights on other dangers.

London Greenpeace’s opposition to McDonald’s was wide ranging – not just the harm caused in the manufacture of the food, but its workers rights, its subversion of the parent-child relationship and more. Why was this subversion not targeted by the SDS?

Beyond that were fossil fuel companies, tobacco companies, tax havens, car companies, the military intervention in Northern Ireland, and major construction companies who ran an industry blacklist (that both Morris and Helen Steel were added to!). Why didn’t the police, who nominally exist to protect the public, target people organising these serious threats?

He concluded by saying:

‘It was a gross breach of peoples’ trust and human rights, which maybe could have raised an arguable case if targeting active gangs of mass killers but has no shred of legitimacy when it was actually being used to protect those who control society’s wealth and power from the real needs of the public.’

Full opening statement from Dave Morris

Tranche 1, Phase 2, Day 2

22 April 2021

Opening Statements from:

Diane Langford
‘Madeleine’
Phillippa Kaufmann QC, representing Core Participants who had relationships with undercover officers
Matthew Ryder QC, representing three anti apartheid activists (Ernest Rodker, Professor Jonathan Rosenhead & Lord Peter Hain) & Celia Stubbs

The second day of Tranche 1 Phase 2 of the Undercover Policing Inquiry, being the 28th anniversary of the racist murder of Stephen Lawrence, began with the Chair, Sir John Mitting, reading out a statement from Neville & Doreen Lawrence about their son.

He spoke of the police failings, of the suspects not being charged, and that the Macpherson report from the public inquiry was a landmark in showing the police’s racist faults. But Stephen’s legacy is ultimately one of hope, reminding us change is much needed, but also possible.

There was a minute’s silence for Stephen.

Diane Langford

The first speaker today was Diane Langford, an activist in groups who were infiltrated by undercover officers in the era that the current hearings are examining (1973-82). She will also give evidence on the afternoon of Monday 26 April.

The contrast between the opening statements of yesterday’s legal representatives of the police, spycops and the establishment compared to the emotional, direct and articulate submission of Diane Langford could not be more marked.

Her statement cut to the heart of everything that is wrong with the Undercover Policing Inquiry. This summary hardly does justice to her powerful speech, which is worth reading in full, or watch on YouTube.

POOR TREATMENT BY THE INQUIRY

Diane Langford has only recently become a Core Participant at the Inquiry. In 2018, the Undercover Research Group (URG) found her story of the exposure of spycop ‘Dave Robertson’ (HN45). Later, URG discovered that the group she had set up, the Women’s Liberation Front, was infiltrated by ‘Sandra Davies’ (HN348), and had let her know.

Her name appeared unredacted in many reports of the Special Demonstration Squad (SDS) disclosed at the previous Inquiry hearings last November, but it turned out the Inquiry had only reached out to her just beforehand.

‘When I was given copies they ironically came with a legal warning not to show them to anyone else.’

The Inquiry failed to ask her to give evidence, or tell her that she could seek legal representation.

By the time she knew Sandra Davies was giving evidence to the Inquiry it was too late to book a place at the limited screening venue.

Despite the poor treatment she has received from the Inquiry, Diane Langford is grateful to the Chair for, belatedly, granting her Core Participant status. She was perplexed however that, despite her 50 year history of activism, in his ruling, the Inquiry chair, Sir John Mitting, introduced her as ‘the widow of the late Abhimanyu Manchanda’ as if she was merely an appendage. Yet another example of the institutionalised sexism being present in the Inquiry as it was in the spycops.

Langford identified six undercover officers who spied on her:

• ‘Sandra Davies’ (HN348)
• ‘Dave Robertson‘ (HN45)
• ‘Dick Epps‘ (HN336)
• Mike Ferguson (HN135)
• ‘Peter Fredericks‘ (HN345)
• Jill Mosdell (HN346)

Langford expressed solidarity with others targeted by spycops, especially those no longer here to tell their story and push for justice, asking:

‘how many others who were spied on are completely unaware that their names appear in these files?’

‘I’ll never know what career opportunities were denied to me, or what other barriers have been placed in front of me during my life, as a result of the machinations of the Special Demonstration Squad. I’ll never know whether unpleasant incidents – for example, being denied credit or visas, or break-ins at my home – were connected to the surveillance I was being subjected to.’

WITNESS OF INJUSTICE

As a young person Langford saw injustice in Aotearoa/New Zealand where she grew up, including racism, sexism and class discrimination. Her brothers got an education, but she left school at the age of 15. Coming to London at 22, ironically to support her brother who had won a scholarship at the Royal Academy of Music, opened her eyes. Going to movies, and reading De Beauvoir and Sartre, Barthes, Kristeva, and the Autobiography of Malcolm X after he was killed, opened the way into political activism. She was very much influenced by the events of 1968.

Talking about being part of the women’s liberation movement, Diane Langford said that, as with many others, her commitment was based on personal experience, recognised as political. She gave the example of how, when she was in her early twenties, her flatmate died of an illegal back street abortion, aged nineteen.

‘The memory of her death remains vivid for me still, at the age of 79.’

That the basic goals of the movement remain unachieved and resisted confirms their profound nature.

Langford began her involvement in the Women’s Liberation Front, which believed that patriarchal, racialised capitalism cannot, and will not, meet those goals.

She listed three dramatic events that spring to mind when recalling the period under scrutiny:

– Dave Robertson threatened my friend with violence when she outed him as an undercover.
– Banner Books was burned down by fascists while undercover officers had surveilled and had access, and I believe a man died. This needs investigating.
– Robertson ignored an allegation of attempted rape at a meeting, instead focusing on my domestic arrangements and ridiculing my partner.

WHAT IS THE POINT OF THE INQUIRY NOW?

Langford then connected the spying in the past to the new Covert Human Intelligence Sources Bill rushed through Parliament just before the November hearings in 2020, which allows police to self-authorise to commit all crime, which undermines much of the point of the spycops Inquiry.

In January 2020 the current counter-terrorism spycops unit listed peace protesters as extremists. One of them was the Palestinian Solidarity Campaign seeking to uphold international law and to promote peace, yet it is targeted as a problem to be undermined.

In Langford’s activist life, women’s liberation has always been entwined with the Palestinian struggle – there is no liberation for women under the apartheid regime in Palestine. She asked:

‘If I was under surveillance in 1970 as a member of the Palestine Solidarity Campaign, am I still under surveillance now? I became a busier activist in the 2000s, more than in the 1970s that police have admitted. Where are the files?’

INCAPABLE OF UNDERSTANDING

‘Sandra Davies’ (HN348) spied on 77 meetings, of which 55 were related to the women’s liberation movement.

‘Sounds like more than I did! Why is the women’s movement not a focus of the Inquiry? The Inquiry is colluding with the state to limit the search for evidence…

‘To read these reports is to see some of the greatest ideas of our time crushed into the narrow confines of a mentality absolutely lacking in the capacity to comprehend them…

‘We see the callous use of women’s bodies by misogynous male officers who see such abuse as a perk of the job, and, a confluence of the sexist behaviour and patriarchal attitudes of so-called left wing men in socialist groups and that of those spying on them.’

THE REFUGE OF POOR MEMORY

‘This Inquiry reiterates the intrusive processes of surveillance, requiring the victims of spying to explain and justify themselves, when it is the perpetrators of surveillance who should be interrogated and held accountable.

‘Remarkably we witnesses are again being subjected to intrusion into our personal and political lives, as if some retroactive justification could be thereby found for utterly dishonourable and indefensible police actions, whereas the perpetrators of abuse are granted impunity, anonymity or the refuge of poor memory.’

The SDS reports of the 1970s show sexist and racist ideas were endemic.

This was illustrated time and again by HN45 and HN348. For example, a report from August 1, 1972:

‘so-and-so is a member of the Revolutionary Women’s Union. She lives in a council flat at ADDRESS GIVEN with her two children aged 6-and-a-half years and three years and her mother so-and-so. She is a divorced woman and is in receipt of £8.50 per week Social Security. She attends Revolutionary Women’s Union meetings regularly and is particularly interested in agitating for 24-hour nurseries. This woman is on very friendly terms with so-and-so. Her description is: Aged about 23 years, very thin build, medium length fair hair, blue eyes, very pale complexion, poorly clothed but neat and tidy, wears black rimmed glasses, cockney accent.’

The internationally celebrated artist David Medalla, who passed away in January, is described by HN348 like this:

‘Asian features and colouring, dirty appearance, very poorly clad. He is very opposed to the current Government in the Philippines.’

That government was the notorious Marcos dictatorship – just to provide historical context.

Browsing the disclosure provided by the Inquiry, Langford found other disgusting examples of racism and sexism: On 1 June 1978, a report about the Federation of London Anarchist Groups informs the Special Branch that a subject had cut his beard off ‘to reveal that he has a long face, large Jewish nose and full lips.’

A report signed off by Angus McIntosh, about the Women’s Organiser of the International Socialists, dated 22 October 1976, states she has :

‘typically Jewish lilt to her … and rather prominent nose, always scruffily dressed in blue jeans and T-shirt (without a bra).’

‘A negress was in the audience’ according to a July 1976 report of a meeting of Hackney International Socialists that discussed self-defence strategies for victims of physical attacks by the National Front.

What did 1970s undercover officers do to stop the National Front attacking people of colour? They were spying on anti-fascists.

‘These patronising violations of people’s personal space, of suppressing a child’s right to demonstrate against state-sanctioned physical abuse, the racist, anti-Semitic, sexist and judgemental descriptions of people’s personal appearance that filled the notebooks of the secret police may not amount to much in the eyes of the Inquiry. It’s the accretion of them that are the stuff of authoritarian regimes, hence the expression “petty apartheid”.’

ABHIMANYU MANCHANDA

Diane Langford was also very critical of the portrayal of her late former partner, Abhimanyu Manchanda (‘Manu’):

‘HN45 displays a vindictive hatred of Manu and a peculiar obsession with our personal relationship and child-care arrangements. He sent detailed reports to the Special Branch about what he apparently saw as transgressive behaviour – a man looking after his own child – and expressing horror that I was “sent out to work.” He informs his superiors of Manu’s “insufferable anecdotes” about our baby.’

In her Witness Statement, she dealt with the Inquiry’s inappropriate Rule 9 written questions about my personal relationship with Manu – in fact repeating this behaviour.

There is nothing in the reports about them overthrowing the state. Nevertheless, HN45 portrayed Manu as a danger, saying he only went on demos to cause violence. Which is rubbish, he knew you can’t tackle the state head on.

Why is Manu referred to in reports by his surname while others get their full names? That too smacks of imperialism.

FROM NAPALM TO BUNNY GIRLS

‘What did the Inquiry have in mind when they asked me about Dow Chemicals? Is the implication that Dow Chemicals, whose inhuman war crimes have never been accounted for, was under the protection of the British State? It may help the Inquiry to know that Dow Chemicals was the manufacturer of Napalm, a firebomb fuel/gel mixture used by the American military against Vietnamese civilians…

‘The continuum I spoke of earlier, can be perceived in UK state protection being accorded to Israeli arms manufacturers, in particular Elbit, who boast that their equipment is “battle tested” on Palestinians, despite widespread public disgust at the brutal treatment meted out to Palestinian civilians.’

What was behind the Inquiry’s question about picketing the Playboy Club? Does the Inquiry regard The Playboy Club, whose employees are referred to as ‘Bunny Girls,’ as an institution worthy of special protection by the secret police?

HN348 referred to the 1970 Miss World protest as an event that was organised by the Women’s Liberation Front, prior to her deployment. They actually didn’t organise it, but Langford did attended the demonstration.

‘It was a magnificent disruption of an exploitative commercial event degrading to women. It was not a threat to public order or security.’

THERE’S NEVER JUST ONE COCKROACH

Inquiries since the Macpherson Inquiry into the death of Stephen Lawrence have been devalued by the manner in which they’ve determinedly obstructed genuine ‘inquiry.’

For example, Priti Patel set up an inquiry into the atrocious police violence against women at Clapham Common, an incident that she herself set in train.

‘While the Inquiry is heavily weighted in favour of the State, how are we going to find out when the abuse started? I hope the Inquiry will not be deflected by the myth of “a few rotten apples.”

‘The cynical attitudes of the UCOs as evidenced by their misogynist reporting in the past and current lack of remorse makes it inevitable that any opportunity to take advantage of women would have been taken. There’s never just one cockroach.’

‘Where are these files kept? Who has access to them? Dozens of people, whose names recur in the files I’ve had sight of, have absolutely no idea that the secret police came into their homes under false pretences and spied on them. At the bare minimum anyone whose private space was violated, resulting in them being named in these files, should be informed and invited to be part of the inquiry.’

We need to see the faces of undercover officers, if only to stop suspecting our innocent old comrades of being cops. Why are the officers not compelled to supply contemporaneous photos themselves?

A request for a contemporaneous photograph of HN348 was declined by the Inquiry as they were not holding one in their files. Why not ask HN348 to supply one, as Langford’s legal representative suggested?

‘it bears out the idea that, as Audre Lorde put it, “the master’s tools will never dismantle the master’s house”. It is clear that women, People of Colour and others working for a better world will need to continue with our grassroots campaigning on behalf of ourselves and one another.

‘However, my hope is that this Inquiry will, in fact, prove useful to us in such struggles for justice, human rights and freedom.’

For more, see Diana Langford’s blog and her political memoirs

Full opening statement from Diane Langford

‘Madeleine’

‘Madeleine’ was deceived into a relationship by ‘Vince Miller‘ (HN354) towards the end of his infiltration of the Socialist Workers Party (SWP) while undercover from 1976 to 1979.

She had known him for three years by the time the relationship began. The relationship lasted for a short period of time over the summer and early autumn of 1979 until he suddenly disappeared.

Miller has admitted to a total of four sexual relationships during his deployment but insists they were all one-night stands. Despite him admitting that, the Inquiry had previously referred to his deployment as ‘unremarkable’ and granted him anonymity.

Madeleine not only describes a relationship lasting several months, as verified by her diaries, she also emphatically condemns Miller’s account of how they initiated their relationship.

‘the implications of some of the disclosures made by Vince Miller are also deeply offensive and revelatory. Describing the night we first got together he has stated that I “unexpectedly invited him to my bedroom” after we had both been drinking.

‘What exactly is he trying to say? That I was drunk and looking for a random man to have sex with? This is a deliberately untrue misrepresentation of the events of that evening.’

Since Madeleine has come forward to challenge such claims, Mitting has now agreed to release Miller’s real name to Madeleine. But she asserted:

‘HN354 shouldn’t have had his identity protected in the first place. HN354 lost the right to privacy due to his abusive acts and no legitimate reasons have been given for withholding his real name’.

POLITICAL ORIGINS

Madeleine described how her politics stemmed from her family background. She grew up in a large poor working-class family. Her father was a lifelong socialist and an active trade unionist, and both her parents were anti-racists.

Her father was part of the anti-fascist protests at Olympia in 1934 and at Cable Street in 1936 where he joined thousands of East Enders who fought to stop Oswald Mosley and the British Union of Fascists marching into a largely Jewish area to intimidate and attack the community.

Madeleine’s dad went on to join the International Brigades fighting fascists in the Spanish Civil War. He was at Guernica when the Nazis destroyed the city. He came back to the UK and volunteered to join the British Army at the start of the Second World War to continue his fight against fascism.

Madeleine wonders whether her father, a double war hero, would also have been considered a ‘subversive’ and a ‘dangerous extremist’.

The spycops reports just released by the UCPI and branding political activists as ‘subversives’, ‘dangerous extremists’, and ‘troublemakers’ paint a picture of people unrecognisable to Madeleine’s experience as an activist. To find out that the words were written by Miller, someone she trusted and cared about, is doubly painful.

She described the bigger picture, with the stilll-unfolding spycops scandal needing ‘to be understood and framed as the logical expression of the actions of a state and security apparatus wedded to the interests of the ruling class.’

TEENAGE ACTIVISM

Madeleine moved on to her youthful activism with the Socialist Workers Party. She recalled organising branch and public meetings, and endless discussion and debate. The SWP was open and welcoming, and had nothing to hide. It was public, selling the weekly Socialist Worker newspaper and leafleting on the High Street, on housing estates, pickets and demonstrations.

Madeleine said that Miller embedded himself deeply into the life of the SWP branch for three years. He described the branch as a ‘social and inclusive bunch’ – a fact that which he took full advantage of. He became treasurer (which seems to have been a common role for spycops taking office in groups), and was also on the social committee and in the industrial group.

She has found out that:

‘17 spycops were embedded in our party and yet in truth, the biggest threat to democracy in the UK at this time was not from the left but from the reinvigoration of fascism which once more began to emerge from the shadows and reveal its ugly face.’

THE GROWING THREAT OF FASCISM IN THE 1970S

Madeleine spoke about the political and economic backdrop in the UK during this period, which would prove a fertile breeding ground for fascism. Fascists attacked the left with increasing violence, attacking paper sellers, and committing arson against bookshops. In May 1978 a young Asian man, Altab Ali, was stabbed to death in Whitechapel. So where was the monitoring of the far-right by our security services?

The area around The Bladebone pub at the top of Brick Lane in London’s East End was a well-known haunt of the National Front (NF). After repeated attacks on the diverse community, protection was organised and the SWP were part of it. Miller describes the area as ‘heavily policed’ but Madeleine says she only saw that happen when there was active left wing presence. The protection that the community received was from activists like herself, not the police. Miller depicted the confrontations as a mere territorial dispute between the Swp and NF.

Miller’s analysis in his witness statement, describing the SWP and the NF as similar is very telling. Madeleine mentioned that a police report on a speech given by fascist John Tyndall at the NF ‘Battle of Lewisham’ march, describing him speaking in his ‘usual forceful manner’, but his exhortations to violence went unrecorded by spycops.

Madeleine gave another more personal example of police bias towards the far right:

‘I recall one Saturday selling papers at Barking Station in the week following a violent sledgehammer attack on a young female SWP member by a fascist who broke her pelvis. Jeering NF members watched as a tall man who had previously approached us in a friendly manner to buy a paper came up behind me and snatched my papers calling me a ‘red bitch’ and telling me to go away. He then walked over to the police who had witnessed his act and proceeded to laugh and joke with them. When I asked the police if they had seen what he’d done they smirked and told me to go home’

THE BATTLE OF LEWISHAM

On 13 August 1977, 500 NF supporters planned to march from New Cross to Lewisham. There was a huge mobilisation against it. At an anti-racist rally beforehand, a crowd of thousands was addressed by those notorious subversives the Mayor of Lewisham and the Bishop of Southwark.

Police tired to guide the NF marchers but thousands of people blocked them, and there were extended disturbances on the streets. It quickly became known as the Battle of Lewisham.

Madeleine emphatically refutes a claim made by Miller – and repeated in the SDS Annual Report that year – that bricks were stockpiled at various locations by the SWP along the planned NF route and that members of the SWP carried weapons to the march in bags.

‘I was at the demo on the day and can state categorically that no one that I knew had weapons or would have done such a thing. It is an easy assertion for HN354 to make – where is his evidence? Where are the names? Or should this be seen as an attempt to blacken the name of the SWP?’

The police were in reality undermining the efforts to fight fascism and combat racism by the only forces mobilising to protect communities and defeat those evils.

Madeleine continued:

‘The Battle of Lewisham is now rightly considered a watershed moment like Cable Street in the fight against fascism in this country. Unable to control the streets, the NF went into decline and the event is now proudly remembered as the moment when the far right was again defeated. It is now commemorated by the local council and seen as a symbol of a community coming together to say yes to black and white unity and no to the forces of hate.’

A KNOCK AT THE DOOR

All that was over 40 years ago.

Early one Saturday morning at the end of February 2020 Madeleine received an unexpected visit. Like anyone door-stepped early on a Saturday morning by someone with a hand-delivered an official-looking letter, she felt a wave of anxiety and stress.

‘What was I about to be told? Was I about to be given some terrible and tragic news?’

It was a solicitor from the Undercover Policing Inquiry. Madeleine received the news that ‘Vince Miller’ was not a boyfriend and comrade.

She couldn’t think of the man she’d known as a devious abuser. She remembered him as someone who seemed emotionally vulnerable – as she was herself at the time, having just left an abusive partner. This targeting and use of trauma as a means of getting close to surveillance targets is emerging as one of the most common themes within SDS deployments.

‘I now know that the Vince Miller I thought I knew doesn’t actually exist. He is a wholly constructed fiction, a fake identity used as a tool for the purposes of political surveillance sanctioned by the state which infiltrated the most intimate parts of my body and my life…

‘The initial revelation of the true identity of a man with whom I had enjoyed an intimate sexual relationship and shared thoughts and feelings of a deeply private nature left me feeling nauseous and revolted. I felt degraded and abused and continue to feel a real sense of violation. I feel that both my trust and my values have been betrayed by an agent of the state.’

THE TRUTH IS SECRET

Madeleine was told that there were a substantial number of intelligence reports on her and her friends which she could only see if she signed a secrecy agreement not to even discuss the contents with anyone else apart from her lawyer.

‘The knowledge that the state holds secret files on me filled me with anxiety and a sense of paranoia. I wanted to know. What is in those files? What information is held? What details of a personal nature do they contain? And how personal and intrusive are those details?’

For Madeleine, not being able to share this with her husband was especially hard. It cuts off a source of support for both of them as they deal with the impact of the truth.

All the Inquiry’s core participants have been in this position, not being able to share it or discuss it with anyone – even others who’ve been given the same documents.

She condemned the cruelty of the police and Inquiry refusing to hand over documents until just before the Inquiry hearings will discuss them. There are women who have known their partner was a spycop for many years, and who are not due to receive the reports on them for many more years.

Later, at the end of Madeleine’s testimony, Mitting said that he would ask the Inquiry lawyers to see that her husband could see the documents. This is too little too late.

When another core participant had earlier asked whether she could share her disclosure with one other trusted person it was refused. Not being able to discuss these matters with anyone else other than your legal representative adds another layer of trauma and stress for those affected by the actions of the state.

‘The files that I have seen contain information of a very intrusive and personal nature. They reveal detailed physical descriptions of myself and my flatmates and information about my employment, my wages, my address, and the precise time, date, and registry office location of my first marriage which happened before Miller’s deployment but appears in a report written by him.’

CRADLE TO GRAVE SURVEILLANCE?

‘I have also discovered, to my horror, that MI5 has had files on me since 1970 when I was aged 16 more than 6 years before HN354s deployment. This is shameful. Most people would consider a 16-year-old little more than a child and the Inquiry now knows that other children have been spied on too. I was incredibly young when I first became politically active in left-wing groups. We know the SDS was formed in 1968 and that extensive spying was happening at that time. I therefore wonder if I was spied on as early as 13 when I was a schoolgirl?

‘Miller has even reported on the pregnancy of a woman in our branch and the name her baby was to be given. This went straight to MI5. Was this unborn baby given a security service’s file? Was my child given a registry file too? I find it outrageous and deeply offensive to realise that we have been treated as “targets” regarded as “subversive and dangerous extremists” and that relationships have been used as a tool for state surveillance via the invasion of our lives and bodies.’

WHAT’S CHANGED?

Madeleine questions how much has changed in police culture. Did Miller contribute to the prevailing culture within the Metropolitan Police at that time and since, as he later became a senior officer?

She asked for all reports on her to be removed from the archives and destroyed. The SDS has shown us that secret policing, by its unscrutinised nature, is liable to abuse citizens. There is no telling how the information on file may be used against its subjects in future.

We’ve already seen Miller downplay the harm he did to others, and he is far from alone among the spycops in this regard. Madeleine said spycops should be given no leeway for their behaviour because any allowances made to them because of their position or role in society will be exploited by them in order to cover themselves.

As well as today’s opening statement, Madeleine will giving evidence to the Inquiry on Monday 10th May.

Full opening statement from ‘Madeleine’.

 

Phillippa Kaufmann QC
representing Core Participants who had relationships with undercover officers

Kaufmann began by saying it is now clear that in the era being examined by the current UCPI hearings, 1973-82, numerous spycops had sexual relationships with women while using their undercover identities.

Some of these women were the targets of their spying operations, others came into contact with the spycops socially.

We were told in the past that these deceitful relationships only rarely occurred, but the evidence now being published provides a different picture.

It has now been confirmed that at least eight officers entered into such relationships over a five year period. Of these, ‘Jim Pickford‘ (HN300, 1974-76) and perhaps ‘Alan Bond‘ (HN67, 1981-86) had children with women they’d spied on.

The practices and culture established in this period led to what came later. It shows the long running sexism which infected the Special Demonstration Squad (SDS).

WHY WEREN’T WE TOLD?

It’s not just the SDS that’s at fault. The Inquiry only contacted Madeleine in February 2020, and got a lawyer late in the year, yet she was known about when the Inquiry first dealt with the spycop who abused her, ‘Vince Miller‘ (HN354, 1976-79), in 2017.

Why wasn’t she contacted earlier? Why were we assured a woman would be sent to tell her the awful truth, but instead a man went to her home?

Why wasn’t Madeleine put in touch with Police Spies Out of Lives – which represents and supports women deceived into relationships by spycops – as the Inquiry had promised?

In 2017, Miller gave the Inquiry the name of the other Socialist Workers Party member he had sex with. Why did the Inquiry also wait three years before starting to try to to find her?

The Inquiry accepted his version at face value, called his deployment ‘unremarkable’, and ruled that his real name would not be published because he deserved privacy.

The order to protect his name will now be revoked. Why has this changed, apart from the fact that Madeleine is now actively involved in the Inquiry? Why should that make the difference, given his acts remain unchanged? Why was he ever seen as deserving of anonymity?

NOT JUST ACTIVISTS

Miller also admitted to having sex with two other women (who he says he wasn’t sent to spy on) during his deployment. Why didn’t the Inquiry tell us about that straight away?

Those other two women were also deceived by a paid State character who was the opposite of what he claimed to be. This isn’t a private matter for the officer, it’s as relevant to the Inquiry and the public as a relationship with an activist. We have no idea how many other spycops the Inquiry knows about who have also already admitted they had sex with non-activist women while undercover.

The Inquiry must already be well aware that spycops are liable to lie about this subject. Jim Boyling told the Met that Rosa, with whom he ended up having two children, had nothing to do with his target group. It was a bare-faced complete lie. Any instance of a spycop using their identity to deceive women into sex is an abuse of power and a violation of the women. It always needs investigating.

The Counsel to the Inquiry told us yesterday they won’t investigate every relationship, which is one thing. But why isn’t it telling us about ones they know about, and whether it is trying to find the women involved?

Trust is a major issue for these deceived women. The lack of transparency from the inquiry generates gratuitous anxiety, distrust and fear.

Any spycop who deceives someone into sex forfeits their right to anonymity. It was not necessary to their deployment. This practice was gratuitous and a grossly intrusive invasion of private citizens’ lives.

HN21 also admitted, in 2019, that he had sex with 2 women while undercover, yet still has anonymity for both his real and cover names. Why?

SPYCOPS SEXUAL RELATIONSHIPS 1973-82

In the era 1973-82, which the Inquiry is currently examining, eight officers are known to have deceived women into sexual relationships.

HN302 (cover name restricted, 1970s), whose deployment began in 1973,admits one sexual encounter with a woman from another group rather than the one he spied on. He said ‘circumstances presented themselves’. He says it wasn’t necessary to his deployment and he didn’t think it important.

Richard Clark (‘Rick Gibson’ HN297, 1974-76) had relationships with ‘Mary‘ and her flatmate in 1975, and two women in Big Flame. He told his cover officer that this had caused his cover to be compromised, which implies that he told these women different stories and they realised.

Big Flame found the birth and death certificates of the child whose identity he’d stolen. Mary and Richard Chessum’s statement to the Inquiry on Friday will give more detail.

‘Jim Pickford‘ (HN300, 1974-76) fell in love and wanted to tell the woman the truth about himself. Another officer helped him tell the SDS managers. His wife found out and their marriage ended. He married the new woman and had a child with her, though that marriage didn’t last and she can’t be found today.

HN21 (cover name restricted, late 1970s-early 1980s) admits to occasional sexual encounters with women he knew from ‘an evening class’ (we don’t know what kind of class that was).

‘Barry Tompkins‘ (HN106, 1979-83) is mentioned in a security liaison note as having a relationship, though he denies it. The Inquiry hasn’t called him to give evidence, so we may never find out more about this.

‘Vince Miller‘ (HN354, 1976-79) deceived Madeleine and three other women into relationships. He’s blamed it on having been drunk every time. He lied to the Inquiry about it. He is adamant that his sexual relationship with Madeleine was a one-off event, but she is very clear that they had an ongoing relationship, for months. She still has a diary showing the dates they spent together, but it is notable that he never stayed overnight.

‘Phil Cooper‘ (HN155, 1979-83) told the Inquiry’s risk assessors he had several relationships, but now denies having said it. The officials he spoke to will be giving evidence.

‘Alan Bond‘ (HN67, 1981-86) lived with Vince Miller before Miller was deployed. He may have had a child while undercover. Despite this, he was promoted, and went on to be second in command of the SDS in the 1990s. This means that he oversaw many of the officers who we know also deceived women into relationships, including John Dines, Matt Rayner, Bobby Lewis and Andy Coles. His attitude to this issue must be explored.

‘Paul Gray’ (HN126, 1977-82) was alleged to have had an affair with a fellow officer, in a letter received by his managers that is thought to be from his wife. His managers found allegations ‘were not totally accurate’. Does that mean the affair was with someone he was spying on, rather than a colleague? None of this is actually mentioned in HN126’s witness statement.

We now know that during those five years, a third of the officers in the unit engaged in sexual relationships while undercover. There may be more. But the Inquiry is only calling one, Vince Miller, for evidence.

The issue of sexual relationships is one of the main reasons for the inquiry’s existence and must be prioritised. At the November hearings, we were provided with extracts from each individual officer’s witness statement (with their cipher number attached).

However, it appears that this time, the Inquiry intends to only supply a short ‘gist’, blending the officers’ accounts together, rather than directly quoting any extracts, or identifying which officers are addressing which points. This makes it impossible to ask any meaningful questions of these officers, and makes the gist almost worthless. There’s no good reason why the inquiry cannot provide individually identifiable extracts like last time.

When these spycops give evidence in secret ‘closed hearings’ we will be demanding that as much of this evidence as possible is published afterwards and only the minimum details necessary are kept confidential..

NOT JUST ACTIVISTS

Sexism was endemic in the SDS – reports rate women’s attractiveness and comment on the size of breasts. No account was taken of the impact of the officers’ behaviour on their wives and families. When Paul Gray’s wife alleged an affair the managers’ only concern was protecting the unit’s secrecy; there was no concern for her welfare.

‘Sandra Davies’ (HN348, 1971-73) the first female SDS officer, had her welfare totally disregarded. She was just a tool, used to spy on women’s groups that were closed to men.

Spycops gave no thought to the dignity of women, to their right to choose who they had sex with, the risk of harm if they found out the truth, or what would happen if they got pregnant. Most officers involved readily admit there was no necessity for these relationships.

Numerous women’s organisations were spied on, despite posing no threat at all to public order. It was just a deep hostility to women’s equality.

With at least a third of officers having sex with women while undercover, management cannot claim ignorance. By 1971 they knew deployments were going to be long, about four years. It was clear spycops were becoming important activists and socialising. Deploying married officers clearly didn’t prevent them deceiving women into sexual relationships.

‘Graham Coates’ (HN304, 1976-79) reports officers making joke references to sexual relationships in front of managers, who were ‘deliberately blind’. Jim Pickford and Rick Gibson had reputations for chasing women.

Why would Coates be lying? We’ve confirmed the officers Coates names did in fact have such relationships. His account is clearly credible. If he is telling the truth, the other ‘amnesiac’ officers must be lying.

QUESTIONS FOR BOSSES

It appears Rick Gibson may have deliberately targeted women in order to reach an influential position in the group he was infiltrating. This is hugely significant for the management.

The SDS’ 1974 annual report say security is top priority, and the frequent meetings of all spycops keep close tabs on what officers are doing and feeling. Later reports reiterate that there is constant contact with supervisors and very close monitoring of every spycop.

There’s no question that supervisors would have listened carefully to what spycops reported. Officers must be hiding the truth from the Inquiry. We can’t take their word at face value.

We know Pickford and Gibson’s relationships were disclosed to managers, and that they suspected Tompkins of having one. They absolutely knew that this went on, and they did nothing. The message to the spycops was therefore that there’s nothing wrong with the practice Doing nothing to safeguard the women is the result of the police’s institutional sexism.

From the early days, the SDS had a culture of spycops using the bodies of women as a perk of their jobs. A state institution that exists to serve the public they’re abusive. It is deeply misogynistic. And it appears to have become part of the armoury of tactics.

If Alan Bond fathered a child while undercover, this has major implications. But he won’t give evidence to the Inquiry due to ill health. The Inquiry has known of his condition for three years yet has not taken a statement from him.

After all this misogyny in the 1970s, a 1981 Special Branch memo refers to an early spycop named Miss Pelling, who infiltrated the Communist Party of Great Britain in 1921. She remembers colleagues as gentlemen who never took liberties.

The memo says:

‘This, naturally, is as true of the present Branch’s treatment of the fairer sex as it was in Miss Pelling’s day’

WE NEED EACH OTHER’S KNOWLEDGE

The Inquiry needs the help of those who were spied on. They must not just be contacted but given full disclosure of documents relevant to them with plenty of time to read and respond so they can expose the lies.

‘Alison‘, deceived into a relationship by spycop Mark Jenner in the 1990s, has highlighted lies in the reports about her. Jenner’s reports don’t identify her even when she was at events. He appears to have deliberately written both himself and her out of reports. But Alison can shed light and show the lies, and the real impact Jenner had.

There are so many Alisons who could do the same for this phase of the Inquiry but who won’t get a chance to, because the Inquiry is keeping the facts secret.

Spycop Mark Kennedy told the Home Affairs Select Committee that the ‘two’ women he had sex with (real number: at least 11) ‘provided no intelligence at all’.

Yet at this moment, one of those women, Kate Wilson, is at the Investigatory Powers Tribunal abundantly proving she was a main target of Kennedy’s deployment.

Spycops lie, the women they abused can prove this and help to uncover the truth.

The new extra delays to the Inquiry are simply cruel to the people waiting for answers. Women deceived into relationships by spycops should be given their files, and any documents that mention them immediately. The Met have said they’re happy to do this, if the Inquiry decrees it.

The Inquiry Chair, Sir John Mitting, responded that delays are inevitable, and that ‘perhaps the request cannot be fulfilled’. He gave no reason at all as to why this might be.

Full opening statement from Category H Core Participants (Individuals in Relationships with Undercover Officers)

Matthew Ryder QC
representing three anti-apartheid activists (Ernest Rodker, Professor Jonathan Rosenhead & Lord Peter Hain), & Celia Stubbs

Finally today, an opening statement from Matthew Ryder QC. He represents anti-apartheid activists Ernest Rodker, Professor Jonathan Rosenhead and Lord Peter Hain, as well as Blair Peach’s partner Celia Stubbs.

From the 1960s there was a large, global, anti-apartheid movement. They were right, and their opponents were wrong. The British government appeased and supported a regime it should have opposed.

Ryder stated that It should be a matter of deep regret that spycops targeted anti-apartheid campaigners. The real threat to democracy was the apartheid regime itself.

The Anti-Apartheid Movement (AAM) was formed in 1959 and was not affiliated with any political party. Peter Hain was part of the ‘Stop The Seventy Tour’ (STST) which campaigned against tours by South African sporting teams.

The Dambusters Mobilising Committee opposed the sanctions-busting Cahora Bassa Dam project in Mozambique, which would directly benefit South Africa’s apartheid system. DMC was also targeted by spycops.

The spycops were partisan; they spied on anti-apartheid groups well into the 1970s, long after the Stop The Seventy Tour, while ignoring the growth of far-right groups. The right-wing intimidation and violence suffered by anti-apartheid groups were seen as regrettable but understandable by the spycops. Those promoting racial equality were seen as the problem, rather than the racists.

The bias was so pronounced that the first spycops infiltration of the far-right National Front came about by accident when an officer infiltrating the Workers Revolutionary Party was asked by his unwitting targets to spy on the NF!

Spycops suffered from ‘mission creep’, spying on not just the ‘ultra-left’ but anyone on the broad left, irrespective of whether they had anything to do with disorder. Spying on any group could be excused as a stepping-stone to a group that was more of interest to the police. This was apparent in the deployment of Doug Edwards (HN326, 1968-70)who infiltrated the (law-abiding) Independent Labour Party.

MURDER IN LONDON

The South African State’s security service was active in London in the 1970s, targeting the African National Congress and Anti-Apartheid Movement. Peter Hain had a letter bomb delivered in 1972, opened by his 14-year-old sister. The incident remains uninvestigated.

Bombings and murders were committed against anti-apartheid campaigners. Military materials were used. Few charges were ever brought. Some of these attacks were later admitted to by South African agents.

The spycops seem to have been wholly uninterested in pro-apartheid violence. Instead, they obsessively collected information on a wide range of left-wing groups who opposed it.

The police lawyers told us yesterday that we needed historical context to understand the spycops. Well, here it is.

Yesterday the police told the Inquiry said they would have behaved identically if a racist campaign had opposed a black sports team touring England. But supporting racism is different from opposing it. Equivocation between the motivations and actions of the left and far-right was apparent in the witness testimony of Madeleine earlier.

This sounds a lot like the police 23 years ago, telling the Macpherson Inquiry into the murder of Stephen Lawrence that it had a colour-blind approach. It is as if they have learned nothing.

It is also a lie, given that there were active violent racist campaigners at the time and the undercovers left them alone. That now, today, they cannot see why this is wrong is highly regrettable.

The SDS officers recorded extraordinary and gross levels of detail. The birth of Ernest Rodker’s son and a note saying that Ernest himself had been admitted to hospital were reported and copied to MI5, as were reports about who was at Peter Hain’s family home including his younger siblings.

This is what a totalitarian regime would do with dissidents. Parents are now having the chilling experience of reading secret police reports on their children.

A 1975 report on Ernest Rodker names elected councillors and their choice of reading material. It was also copied to MI5. The Labour Party conference was reported on by spycops. Peter Hain asks if the Liberal and Conservative conferences were ever spied upon?

If, as is plausible, this information was passed by MI5 to their South African counterparts, it is the very opposite of protecting the public.

The Stop The Seventy Tour was not ‘subversive’. SDS officer Mike Ferguson (HN135) had a key organisational role in the group. He then went on to hold senior positions in the spycops unit, recruiting and advising new officers. It seems his work was perversely viewed as a good example.

WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS

The excuses for targeting anti-apartheid groups need debunking. Contrary to the police version, violence was never an aim or method. Contemporaneous documentation proves it. It was not secret or revolutionary, it simply opposed the cruel and racist South African regime. Mike Ferguson’s reports do not suggest any violence at any time. Officer Dick Epps says at one demo people were told to attack police. This was emphatically denied as a lie by all of the activists involved.

The arrest and prosecution of spycops officer ‘Michael Scott‘ (HN298, 1971-76) at the ‘Star and Garter demonstration’ is a powerful example of how spycops deliberately abused their power and eroded the judicial process.

On 12 May 1972, in the car park of the Star and Garter Pub in Richmond, activists blockaded a coach of rugby players on their way to the airport, about to embark on a tour of South Africa. One of those arrested and convicted was undercover officer ‘Mike Scott’.

As mentioned in yesterday’s hearing, Scott was using the stolen identity of a man who was still alive. Scott spied on privileged legal conversations between lawyers and defendants. He did not correct the police ‘s claim in court that the protesters were on the road, when in fact they were on private land: the car park. Senior officers endorsed his going to court to lie about this.

This is an early example of spycops creating miscarriages of justice.

Home Office guidance in 1969 is unequivocal – undercover agents should avoid misleading courts at all costs. The spycops unit simply ignored this .The SDS tradecraft manual of the 1990s specifically told spycops that they could disregard the usual rules about not lying to courts.

If we conservatively estimate that there was one wrongful conviction per officer per year of service, it means the spycops caused about 600 wrongful convictions. It is a huge scandal that is going relatively unremarked upon.

Another example was the prosecution of ‘Desmond/Barry Loader‘ (HN13, 1975-78) in 1977. He and others were tried for public order offences. Barry’s charges were dismissed while the others were convicted of public order offences. He was arrested again shortly after this, leading to a conviction. However he was only given a small fine and ‘bound over’. Neither the defence nor prosecution was told that he was an undercover officer. It appears that the only disclosure was to ‘a court official’ (name redacted so we have no idea who this was) who fixed the results.

The 2015 Ellison Review of Potential Miscarriages of Justice said that spycops must have withheld evidence from court, including evidence that would have exonerated the defendants.

In 1974, infiltrating the Troops Out Movement, spycop Mike Scott was accused of being a spycop officer by Gerry Lawless. Some spycops chose to accuse genuine activists of being spies to distract attention from themselves. Scott, however,chose a different tactic – of punching Lawless in the face, so hard that he broke a finger. These officers considered themselves to be above the law in many ways.

Mike Ferguson, who infiltrated the Anti-Apartheid Movement, is – uniquely – known by his real name, but his cover name is restricted. This means those he spied on cannot know he was a spy and cannot come forward. This has led to another Mike, a real campaigner called Mike Craft, being accused of being the spycop. Craft’s comrades here emphasise that he was wholly innocent. This is also a reminder to all activists to never accuse comrades of being a police spy without any hard evidence.

Even by the standards of the day, the SDS’ targeting anti-apartheid campaigners was an unjustified, disproportionate, and erroneous political choice. The Inquiry should confirm that as a matter of historical record.

CELIA STUBBS

Ryder then moved on to talk about Celia Stubbs. She is a Core Participant because of her relationship with Blair Peach and led the campaign about his murder by police in 1979. Stubbs recently spoke movingly about it, and spycops, to Channel 4 News.

Peach and Stubbs were both members of the SWP as well as active anti-racist campaigners. Stubbs has campaigned all her life, always to strengthen civil society, and was targeted by the undercovers as a result. Both Stubbs and Peach had spycops files kept on them, opened in 1974 and 1978, long before Peach was killed. We have not seen any of the documents involved that pre-date Peach’s death.

On 23 April 1979, there was a plan to march and sit down at Southall Town Hall protesting at a National Front meeting. Special Patrol Group (SPG) officers piled out of a van and one struck Blair killing him.

All six SPG officers refused to cooperate with the investigation that followed.

Commander Cass’ report at the time confirmed a police officer had killed Peach and identified Inspector Alan Murray as the person most likely to be responsible. Illegal weapons and Nazi regalia were found in the lockers and homes of the SPG officers. Cass’ report was not published until more than 30 years later.

No officer was ever brought to justice for due to a major police cover-up. Officers refused to cooperate with investigations.

The Met told their lawyers to give a knowingly false version of events at Blair Peach’s inquest. They will have seen the Cass report that contained the truth, but still, they lied. The corruption extended beyond the police.

The killing of Blair Peach remains one of the most notorious events in British police history, a national disgrace, and a permanent stain on the Met.

An SDS annual report to the Home Office cites the death of Peach and the ensuing campaign for justice as a key focus for the unit. This is not about subversion or disorder. The Home Office’s response was to renew the SDS’s funding.

The SDS reported on the campaign for promoting actions like writing to MPs and local newspapers, and phoning in to radio shows. Again, this is not public disorder or subversive activity. A number of spycops even attended Blair’s funeral, while police evidence gatherers photographed the attendees for later identification by the SDS.

Combined with the cover-up, it is clear that the infiltration of the Blair Peach campaign was about preventing guilty police officers from being held to account.

THE SPYING HASN’T STOPPED

The spycops units have continued to take an active interest in the Blair Peach campaign ever since. A commemorative event was organised for the twentieth anniversary of his death in 1999, and this was targeted by spycops, with the excuse that such campaigns were ‘anti-police’. Justice campaigns were routinely portrayed as some sort of risk to public order even when they plainly weren’t.

Campaigners for police accountability in cases where the police played a part were a major target for the SDS, and this continued for decades. Police admit undercover officers spied on at least 18 family and justice campaigns, and the true total is likely to be much higher. On our website we name thirteen examples that we are sure of and summarise these cases of police incompetence, arrogance and murder.

Police lawyers told the Inquiry last November that the SDS and NPIOU never directly targeted justice campaigns. But the documents we see in these hearings prove that is untrue. Officers were tasked to spy on the Peach campaign.

Why would the SDS highlight the Peach campaign to the Home Office if it were not a direct focus? Why are some reports only about the Peach campaign? Why were so many other campaigns targeted later? The denials of the police lawyers are simply not plausible. Their statement should be publicly corrected and withdrawn.

The 1979 SDS annual report describes the Peach campaign as a main focus, yet the Inquiry has disclosed suspiciously few documents relating to this.

It is striking that there is so little evidence relating to either the 1979 Southall demonstration where Peach was killed, not the 1974 Red Lion Square anti-racist protest at which Kevin Gately was killed. There is a real concern that reports may have been destroyed by the police in order to cover up the facts around both fatalities.

Earlier in this Inquiry, there were references made to a report about the Southall demonstration at which Peach was killed, This report – key evidence about an extremely important and relevant historical event – has still not been disclosed to us, and we are left wondering if it has been deliberately withheld from the Inquiry, or just not shared with us?

For Stubbs, this conspicuous lack of evidence is just one more obstruction to truth and accountability.

TRUTH, THE WHOLE TRUTH

Celia Stubbs was also involved in the Hackney Community Defence Campaign and Colin Roach Centre, both of which were targeted by spycops. She is extremely disturbed about the fact that her lawyers were put under police surveillance, and Special Branch files were opened on them.

This Inquiry has had police material for years, yet only passes it to witnesses shortly before the hearings, giving us little time to properly analyse and respond. The extremely limited opportunity for victims to question witnesses limits the Inquiry’s ability to get the truth.

Celia Stubbs and Blair Peach sought to bring people together and make a fairer world. They were spied upon. She wants answers and accountability. She does not have to prove her innocence; the state must show why it spied on her.

There is nothing in the police documents disclosed by the UCPI that justifies spying on Celia Stubbs.

Bringing the hearing to an end, Mitting reminded us that tomorrow is the 42nd anniversary of Blair Peach’s death. The Inquiry will resume at 10 am with Mitting speaking briefly about Blair Peach and then there will be a minute’s silence.

Full opening statement from Ernest Rodker, Professor Jonathan Rosenhead and Lord Peter Hain
Full opening statement from Celia Stubbs

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Tranche 1, Phase 2, Day 1

21 April 2021

Opening Statements from:

David Barr QC, Counsel to the Inquiry
Peter Skelton QC, representing the Metropolitan Police Commissioner
Oliver Sanders QC, representing 114 spycops

On 21 April 2021, Tranche 1, Phase 2 of the Undercover Policing Inquiry (UCPI) got underway. It will examine the ac tions of the Special Demonstration Squad, 1973-82.

David Barr QC

Counsel to the Inquiry

The first session was taken up by an opening statement by David Barr QC, Counsel to the Inquiry.

The Counsel to the Inquiry questions witnesses (this stops it being like a trial with different lawyers pressurising witnesses from different directions).

In the previous set of hearings last November, Barr’s questioning of undercover officers became notorious for its lack of intent.

As with the opening day of the November hearings, some previously unmentioned groups were named as having been spied upon.

Clear knowledge of the Special Demonstration Squad (SDS)’s operations – not only within the Metropolitan Police but at the highest level of the Home Office – was also discussed and confirmed.

A RECAP OF THE EARLY YEARS

However, Barr began with a brief review of what had been presented in terms of the SDS’ first three years (1968-1971), as covered in November’s ‘Phase 1’ hearings.

The SDS was set up in 1968, initially to counter anti-Vietnam War protests.

Barr said that experienced Special Branch officers were recruited for the new unit, and many of the first deployments only lasted a few weeks or months. . Officers began to inveigle themselves into the social lives of activists and, from 1971 onward, deployments tended to last around four years.

Despite the next anti-Vietnam War demo passing without clashes, the police and Home Office jointly decided to keep the new unit, even though the Home Office was anxious to ensure that the public didn’t find out about this deceitful and anti-democratic form of policing.

It was confirmed in November’s inquiry hearings that the SDS enjoyed a close relationship with MI5 – early spycops’ seemingly inconsequential reports were routinely copied to MI5. It seems clear that the Met and Home Office agreed that SDS officers would assist MI5 with ‘counter-subversion’. Officers were increasingly deployed for longer, and into more diverse groups. They targeted some campaigns now considered mainstream, such as anti-racism, and women’s rights.

SDS officers infiltrated groups, not based on any imminent threat, but in case there were any ongoing matters of interest to MI5, with extraordinarily little criminality reported. Despite this, ex-spycops think their intelligence was important and useful, and prevented public disorder.

Highly personal details were recorded of group members. Officers were given a significant degree of latitude, sometimes including the choice of which groups to infiltrate. They reported on events and people on the rather vague premise that they might be of use at some point in the future.

WHAT THE NEW HEARINGS WILL EXAMINE

Phase 2 of the Undercover Policing Inquiry is examining evidence from 29 SDS officers spanning the 10 years between 1973 and 1982. Of these, seven officers have both their real and cover names withheld, and so the Inquiry is limited as to what evidence about them can be made public. ‘Gists’ of their evidence – which, if the last hearings are anything to go by, will consist of extremely brief and non-illuminating summaries – will be published.

Barr said that all but one of the other 22 SDS officers from the era in question have their real names withheld. Officer Richard Clark (HN297), is the only one whose name will be given.

Of the 22 ‘open officers’ whose cover names are public, four are dead, seven provided witness statements and three did not provide any statements. The other eight will give oral evidence in these hearings and documents relating to their deployments will also be published.

During this period, deployments usually lasted for 3-5 years, unless the officer asked to leave, or his identity was compromised. (Unlike the first few years, there were no women spycops throughout this time).

Barr said that the hearings for this period will feature the earliest confirmed cases of spycops deceiving women they spied on into sexual relationships, and the theft of dead children’s identities, and potential miscarriages of justice.

SEXUAL RELATIONSHIPS

Undercover officers’ sexual relationships had life-altering impacts on the women they targeted. Barr acknowledges that the Met have apologised for this. This has not stopped them contesting the legal cases brought by such women, many of which have dragged on for years.

The era we will be looking at – 1973-82 – includes the first definite cases of officers deceiving women into relationships. At least five officers this during this period, with at least 12 women, though this is likely to be a dramatic underestimate of the true number.

Richard Clark (‘Rick Gibson’ HN297, 1974-76) is now deceased. He infiltrated Big Flame and the Troops Out Movement, becoming active and influential in both groups. He was sexually intimate with ‘Mary’ and her flatmate, and at least two other women.

Big Flame’s members became suspicious of Clark and discovered that he was using a fake identity, at which point his deployment was ended. It is mentioned in the 1976 SDS report, and Big Flame is labelled ‘sinister’ even though there is no suggestion of criminality.

‘Jim Pickford‘ (HN300, 1974-76) infiltrated anarchists. His second wife, to whom he was married at the time, says he met a woman while undercover and went on to marry her. They had a child, but the relationship did not last long.

‘Vince Miller‘ (HN354, 1976-79) infiltrated the Socialist Workers Party (SWP). He said he had four one-night stands, and did not tell his managers about them. However, one of the women he had a relationship with, ‘Madeleine’, says it lasted for a couple of months. She also says that she had split up with her husband the year before, and was devastated by that, and describes herself as:

‘very shy and reserved. I was also quite vulnerable as a result of my marriage ending…. I now think Vince probably saw me as easy pickings’

‘Vince Miller’ disappeared soon after, leaving Madeleine distraught. He has now seen her witness statement but is sticking to his story. Madeleine will be make an opening statement on Thursday 22nd April and give evidence on Monday 10th May.

‘Barry Tompkins‘ (HN106, 1979-83) denies any sexual relationships, but an MI5 document says his managers thought differently, with activists being heard to refer to ‘Barry’s girlfriend’. He will not give evidence due to ill health.

‘Phil Cooper‘ (HN155, 1979-83) also denies sexual interactions, but the risk assessors said he told them he had a few. The issue will be examined by the Inquiry.

Two of the fully anonymous officers, HN302 (who served in the 1970s) and HN21 (who served in the late 1970s and early 1980s), have stated that they had sexual contact with women whilst in their cover identities. HN302 described a ‘brief encounter with one woman’ when, he says, ‘circumstances presented themselves’. He said it was not important to deployment. HN21 describes sexual encounters with two women from an evening class he attended, who were not part of the group he infiltrated. Both officers will give oral evidence in secret hearings of the Inquiry.

The Inquiry will not differentiate between brief and long relationships in a way that dismisses the former, they are all significant. That said, the Inquiry says it does not need to document every instance of sexual contact between spycops and civilians. Some women may not want to participate, and Barr says that on some occasions the need to ‘protect’ a former officer outweighs the need to contact any women he deceived.

The Inquiry has found no documents from this era (1973-82) that instruct spycops officers either to have nor to abstain from sexual relationships. But there was a mention from ‘Graham Coates’ (HN304, 1976-79) that he overheard comments and jokes about relationships from officers, in the presence of spycops managers.

During this time, all of the spycops (and their managers) were male. The SDS went 10 years without any women officers , which may well have had an influence of the unit’s culture. The vast majority of these men were married, and marital status was noted at the time of recruitment, It was perhaps thought that this would help to deter the undercovers from getting too close to their targets, but clearly it didn’t prevent them going so far as to initiate sexual relationships.

STOLEN IDENTITIES

Identity theft (the theft of dead children’s identities in particular) as practiced by many of the spycops in creating their ‘legends’ or cover stories was one of the reasons why this Inquiry was instigated.

Barr seems to suggest that officers started doing this in 1971 and by 1974 all officers were using the technique. No documents exist about this though, except for the Tradecraft Manual which was written in the 1990s.

The 2015 Operation Herne investigation reported that it was:

‘clear that the use of this tactic was sanctioned at the highest level, was deemed as operationally necessary and was one that newly appointed undercover officers were trained in.‘

To add insult to injury, a few spycops visited the place where the dead child whose identity they stole had lived. ‘Michael James’ says he was instructed to do so and was assisted by the local Special Branch to ensure the child’s family had moved away.

A new revelation was that one officer used the identity of a living person, Michael Scott, and committed a criminal offence in his name.

MISCARRIAGES OF JUSTICE

One of the main themes in these hearings is the question of miscarriages of justice. Did undercover officers function as agents provocateurs, withhold evidence, mislead or deceive courts?

In a criminal trial, the defence has a right to see all evidence that may be helpful to them. The police have a duty to ensure that any involvement of undercover officers in events which lead to criminal prosecutions is properly disclosed. There is a real risk of a miscarriage of justice occurring otherwise.

We will be hearing evidence from four people convicted after their involvement in an anti-apartheid demo in the early 1970s.

The Inquiry has anticipated that there will be evidence of miscarriages of justice. A panel has now been set up to examine any suspected miscarriages, with the possibility of then referring these cases on to the Criminal Cases Review Commission. The problem is that this panel is comprised solely of senior members of the police and the Crown Prosecution Service – the kind of people who have a history of deliberately creating these kinds of wrongful convictions in the first place.

HISTORICAL CONTEXT

The events of 1973-82 are the context for the hearings. Barr took us through a whirlwind tour of the major political events of the period.

The Vietnam War ended in 1975, with no more demonstrations against it involving significant violence after 1968. But the Cold War left a lot of the same tensions. The British Government feared the Soviet bloc sought to foment unrest in the UK, so Special Branch assisted MI5 in ‘counter subversion’. One officer, Barry Tompkins, reported an approach from the KGB Soviet secret police, but this was unique.

Two SDS officers specifically infiltrated Maoist groups. Diane Langford, who was in some of these groups, will make an opening statement on the morning of Thursday 22nd April , and give evidence on the afternoon of Monday 26th.

Special Branch’s interest in groups campaigning about Irish nationalist and civil rights issues is a consistent theme of this era. SDS officer ‘Alex Sloan‘ (HN347, 1971) targeted the Irish National Liberation Solidarity Front, and we will hear evidence from two members.

FASCISTS VS ANTI-FASCISTS

Racism was also a huge issue in the era, and reporting on anti-racist groups was very common indeed. The far-right was on the rise in England, opposed by the left. There were violent confrontations. SDS officers were involved in the fascist protest and anti-fascist counter-protest, known as the ‘Battle of Lewisham’, in August 1977.

Both a BBC film and an Associated Press report were shown from the ‘Battle of Lewisham’. It should be noted that the SDS’ annual report for that year suggested that this was a triumph of SDS intelligence, minimising the clashes and violence.

Even just this film clip, and the fact that the demo is now known as the ‘Battle of Lewisham’, makes this claim in the annual report laughable and casts doubt about the accuracy of the information in these annual reports. It was mentioned that one SDS officer complained that the intelligence supplied in the run-up was ignored by police planning for the demo.

On 23 April 1979, the National Front held a meeting in Southall Town Hall, West London. In the counter-demo Blair Peach – anti-fascist and Socialist Workers Party (SWP) member – was killed by a Metropolitan Police officer belonging to the notoriously violent Special Patrol Group.

The ensuing campaign for justice for Peach was infiltrated by SDS officers. Celia Stubbs, Peach’s partner, will be giving evidence to the Inquiry next week.

In the early 1980s, East London Workers Against Racism – a subgroup of the Revolutionary Communist Party, which supported victims of racist attacks and patrolled areas with racial violence – was infiltrated by SDS officer ‘Barry Tompkins’ (previously, we had been told by the Inquiry that Barry Tompkins infiltrated just one group – the Spartacist League of Britain). This meant that Tompkins reported on the victims of racist violence, apparently explaining this away as accidental or incidental.

Spying on victims of racist violence and the groups supporting them is a pattern that endured and is something we will see when we look at the 1990s and the spying on the family of Stephen Lawrence, Ricky Reel, and many others.

INDUSTRIAL UNREST

Barr said that the late 1970s saw high inflation, mass unemployment and industrial unrest. The Workers Revolutionary Party, International Socialists and Shrewsbury pickets campaign were all spied on.

Trade unions, and references to union membership, are common among SDS officers reporting. ‘David Hughes’ (HN299/342, 1971-76) and ‘Barry Tompkins’ (HN106, 1979-83) both reported being members of the Transport & General Workers Union
This is interpreted as being ‘incidental’, rather than a deliberate targeting of unions, which seems a rather dubious distinction.

The two-year Grunwick Strike of the 1970s was a cause celebre which was extensively reported on by spycops. The Inquiry also showed a news report of a picket and the bussing in of scab labour.

RECRUITMENT

All SDS officers in the era 1973-82 were recruited from Special Branch and all but one was of Detective Constable rank. Two said they had done more than usual ‘plain clothes in meetings’ infiltrations before joining the SDS. There was no formal recruitment process, and no formal training for the job.

By the mid-1970s, it seems to have become established practice that new recruits would spend some time – up to 6 months – in the SDS back office before being deployed themselves. Few record receiving any advice about getting involved in criminal activity (or legal cases) or sexual relationships.

WHO WAS TARGETED

Barr quoted the 1975 SDS annual report, and the claim that officers:

‘concentrated on gathering intelligence about the activities of those extremists whose political views are to the left of the Communist Party of Great Britain’

It is unclear how you could be to the left of the Communist Party of Great Britain – we can only surmise that the police perhaps meant groups who were likely to cause them more trouble than the CPGB? However, given that they also targeted members of groups such as the Liberal Party’s youth wing, this claim is undermined no matter how you interpret it.

The SDS specifically said that schisms among the left were something the police could take advantage of; they did not want these groups to sink their differences and unite, and potentially cause trouble for the State. Having a large number of small separate groups to surveill and spy on meant more work for undercover officers. The SDS annual report of 1975 says though the political disorder is on the wane, they should keep spying on people just in case anything changes.

SDS annual reports always included a list of groups targeted during the year. Apart from one officer spying on the far right (and only because the left-wing group he had been sent to infiltrate then sent him to do this), all the groups are on what can broadly be seen as the left: communist, socialist, anti-nuclear, Irish liberation, women’s rights.

The 1976 SDS annual report said anarchists are a continuing nuisance on demonstrations, and the surveillance is justified by rumours of an Angry Brigade type group emerging.

In 1982, the annual report said SDS information had led to the anarchist Freedom Collective being raided. They say their uniformed colleagues found ‘pamphlets dealing with the manufacture of explosive devices, home-made guns, assassination techniques and booby-traps,’ yet mysteriously there were no arrests.

The 1982 SDS report also mentions the SWP organising a picket of the Tory party conference. Sussex police praised the SDS’s intelligence, although it is unclear what extra preparation the police would need to manage a picket – surely something that they would be able to comfortably manage?

USING THE DEATH OF BLAIR PEACH

A particularly offensive SDS interpretation of political activist’s motivations is made regarding the Blair Peach justice campaign which states:

‘The focal point of much of the extremist activity in 1979 was the General Election held in May with the extreme Left contriving to take advantage of the National Front’s election campaign to provoke hostile confrontation whenever possible. The culmination of the virulent anti-fascist demonstrations was the death of the Anti-Nazi League supporter Blair Peach and the subsequent campaign against the Police.’

This biased interpretation – as unable to conceive of integrity and genuinely held left-wing and anti-fascist beliefs as it is incapable of admitting the police can be in the wrong – is repeated later in the same report:

‘The SWP contrived to make use of all public meetings arranged by the NF to arouse anti-fascist feeling; the death of Blair Peach, an active supporter of the Anti-Nazi League, which was a consequence of a violent anti-fascist demonstration in Southall, provided the extreme left wing with an opportunity to mount a sustained campaign to discredit and criticise the Police.’

Barr at least noted that the reports are defensive about the Blair Peach campaign, seeing it as anti-police.

Notably, the now-published Metropolitan Police report from 1979, though it concedes Peach was killed by a police officer, places the blame for the situation on the protesters.

ONLY INFILTRATING THE RIGHT BECAUSE THE LEFT SAID TO

The officers deployed 1973-82 only infiltrated left-wing organisations. The main group targeted in this era was the International Socialists/ Socialist Workers Party.

One officer, ‘Peter Collins‘ (HN303, 1973-77), infiltrated the Workers Revolutionary Party. Not knowing he was a spy, they asked him, in turn, to infiltrate the National Front.

This infiltration of the National Front is bragged about in the 1974 SDS report, showing a total lack of awareness that the fact that their only foray into infiltrating the far-right was instigated by a left-wing group and done to maintain cover.

It mentions that other areas of Special Branch were spying on right-wing groups.

WHO ELSE APART FROM THE POLICE?

Barr stated that although MI5 is not a subject of investigation for this Inquiry, its relationship with the spycops is. Barr also praised MI5 for helping provide a great quantity of documents and providing a witness statement.

Just nine activists targeted by spycops during this decade will give oral evidence, and three more have given statements. This means that we’ll hear from fewer than one activist per year of these operations.

Barr added that we will see statements from the families of two former undercover officers.

Further, written evidence will be heard from two risk assessors who interviewed ex spycops ahead of the Inquiry, as there’s a dispute of fact about the testimony of officer ‘Phil Cooper’ (HN155) and whether he admitted sexual activity with women he spied on.

OVERSIGHT AND KNOWLEDGE OF THE SDS WENT TO THE TOP

The 1975 SDS annual report emphasises the paramount importance of secrecy about the unit’s existence to avoid ‘an embarrassment for the Commissioner’ as well as maintaining officer security.

Documents were frequently seen, discussed and approved by a Deputy Assistant Commissioner. We have yet another officer – ‘Michael James’ (HN96, 1978-83) – reporting that the Commissioner himself visited the SDS safe house. We’ve previously had this activity confirmed by ‘Doug Edwards’ (HN326, 1968-71) and Peter Francis (1993-97) who both added that their Commissioners presented them with bottles of whisky.

From 1983, there is a programme and briefing pack prepared for a visit to the SDS by Sir Kenneth Newman, the then Met Commissioner. The briefing pack includes a brief profile of each member of the SDS at the time, and was prepared for him ahead of an extended buffet lunch with the SDS officers at what is described as an ‘in-field location’.

It would be nice if the inquiry would question Sir Kenneth about his knowledge of the SDS but he is one of three old ex Commissioners who have died since the Inquiry was announced seven years ago.

But there can be no doubt that this phase of the Inquiry will put the nails in the coffin of senior officers’ claims that the SDS was a rogue unit, totally secret and unknown even to the rest of the Met.

SELF-APPROVAL TO CONTINUE

A 1976 document shows that the SDS set up a group to make the case for continued Home Office funding.

This group looked at whether the spycops unit was still needed or not, and if the intelligence it provided was still useful to MI5/ and uniformed police. It is no surprise that this set of SDS officers unanimously felt that they were still needed, extremely useful to MI5, and these operations must be allowed to continue.

They admitted that political disorder and violence had declined, but apparently subversive issues like ‘abortion, trespass, unemployment, and civil liberties’ had not. This meant there were more groups organising demonstrations, all potentially needing surveillance. Also, the manifold splinter groups would not, for some reason, cooperate with the police.

The annual reports were passed up the chain of command within the Met. They record praise and support coming in from senior officers.

REALLY THOUGH, SHOULD THEY CONTINUE?

The issue of the spycops’ relevance was re-examined in the mid-1980s, when a Home Office civil servant wondered if the unit was still needed for dealing with modern problems as opposed to being a hangover from the situations which arose many years earlier.
The Home Office authorisation for the unit’s 1985funds shows that these discussions had taken place.

Despite these discussions, and the fact that the Home Office directly funded the spycops renewing this funding annually for 20 years, a search of all Home Office archives failed to find a single document. Luckily the police & MI5 haven’t been quite so careless. Barr flagged up that there are more Home Office documents being published by the Inquiry today.

MI5 AND SUBVERSION

Another documents being published is a letter from MI5 to Chief Constables to remind them of Special Branch guidance on the distinction between subversion and mere militancy.

A witness from MI5, known as Witness Z, explained that subversion threatens the safety or well-being of the state whereas militancy is just the use of direct action with aim of, for example, achieving better working conditions. It’s militant to oppose the government, but only subversive if you seek to overthrow representative democracy itself.

A variety of government agencies and ministers did not seem to share this distinction, as demonstrated by the blacklisting scandal. According to the Independent Police Complaints Commission, all Special Branches routinely gave details of politically active people to the construction industry blacklist.

MI5 was extremely interested in subversive groups trying to infiltrate non-subversive groups such as trade unions.
As an illustration of a non-criminal group with subversive elements, Barr cited a 1974 SDS report from ‘David Hughes’ (HN299/342) on a Marxist discussion group. An attendee said that come the English revolution, the two million people who presented a permanent threat to its success would have to be killed (including senior police officers, all big businessmen and members of the Conservative Party). Even the report notes that most people present did not share this person’s opinion.

MI5 occasionally asked the SDS to obtain specific information, and occasionally helped protect the spycops’ security, but they had no significant control over the SDS’s choice of targets.

Some MI5 documents suggest a feeling that the SDS’s tactics enjoyed some advantages over MI5’s usual informants – as the spycops were frequently met and briefed and ‘all options are open’.

AFTER THIS

Barr ended by saying that immediately after these three weeks of hearings, the Inquiry will be conducting secret, ‘closed’ hearings for officers from this era whose identities are protected.

After that will come ‘Tranche 1 Phase 3’, dealing with the unit’s early managers (up till1982). These were scheduled to take place in October but have now been put back to some time in the first half of 2022.

We have also now been told that the Inquiry no longer expects to look at ‘Tranche 2’ (covering the years 1983-1992) next year – this means it is likely to be dealt with in 2023 instead.

Does mean we’ll have to wait until 2024 for Tranche 3 (covering the SDS in 1993-2007), and then even longer for Tranche 4 evidence to come out? (Tranche 4 looks at the National Public Order Intelligence Unit, aka the NPOIU, which deployed the likes of Mark Kennedy).

Peter Skelton QC

representing the Metropolitan Police Commissioner

Skelton began by saying his speech would be short. The first Met opening statement at the Inquiry last year looked at what went wrong in general, and what the value there is in undercover policing. This one is just about the topic in hand, SDS officers 1973-82.

He warned the inquiry to be wary of how it assesses the work of the SDS. We must judge by the standards of the time, not those of today. We don’t have all the reports from the time, nor fresh memories, so cannot have a full picture. Also, remember some the intelligence gathered was intended for MI5, who have secret uses that mere mortals can only imagine but must presume to be wholesome and necessary (I paraphrase slightly).

In the era under examination, 1973-82, the SDS’ work was in response to what government and public thought important – the need to preserve public order & state security, he said.

Skelton then mentioned events of the time with a very broad range of connection to the SDS. Angry Brigade firebombings, Bloody Sunday, IRA bombings in England, the 1972 miners and dockers strikes resulting in a state of emergency. He continued a summing up of strikes, a one-day near-general strike in 1973, the two-year Grunwick strike, and in 1978, the Ford industrial action leading to the ‘Winter of Discontent’ of multiple strikes and other industrial action. Then there were clashes between the National Front & antifascists, including the deaths of Kevin Gately & Blair Peach.

Skelton’s citing of these two killings is quite upsetting. The Met should not refer to the deaths of people killed by them as if they were events that they had no influence on, let alone use it to justify any and all forms of policing.

Skelton said the Inquiry must properly understand all the social context and explain it, otherwise it risks making unfair judgments. Evidence from people involved may be selective and biased, so the Inquiry should rely on expert historical evidence. Such evidence would need to be scrupulously neutral and factual with no contentious assertions. He claimed was done in the Litvinenko inquiry & Birmingham bombings inquests. The Met think it would be of even more use here.

In the era considered, the SDS had 9-12 undercover officer to infiltrate Trotskyists, Maoists/Marxist-Leninists, anarchists, anti-fascists, anti-nuclear and Irish nationalist support groups.

As well as the SDS annual reports glorifying the work of the unit, the Inquiry found documents that show that the unit’s management appraised the continued value of the unit. They concluded that it should continue (as if they might have voted to end their own jobs, because they in fact considered the work of no value at all). These documents also emphasise the importance of ‘negative intelligence’, that knowing an event won’t take place or a group isn’t dangerous is valuable, and that MI5 agreed. This sounds like a self-fulfilling prophecy, in which a world without intelligence gathering is unimaginable.

SDS contact with MI5 was frequent and productive, Skelton said. The unit saw the Secret Service as a customer which exercised some influence over the placement of spycops.

STEALING FROM THE DEAD

The SDS stole the identities of dead children to build cover stories for the undercover officers (and ‘Michael Scott’ HN298 stole the identity of a living person in 1971). Skelton kept referring to ‘using’ identities, but by any definition this is identity theft.

Earlier deployments, he explained, had been shorter, perhaps just a few months. But it was soon extended as it seems the quality of information gathered improved with longer deployments. As such, fake identities needed to be able to withstand more scrutiny. It became standard practice for officers to have a flat rented and have specially bought cars.

The police couldn’t insert a fake birth register entry, so they stole real ones. The Met apologises to families of people whose dead relatives’ identity was ‘relied upon in this way’.

SEXUAL RELATIONSHIPS, WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS & BLACKLISTING

Spycops should never have had sexual relationships while in undercover persona, no matter how brief. It was not justified in the era being examined and the Met apologises unreservedly. We need to find what managers knew.

Officers had interactions with the criminal justice system. ‘Michael Scott‘ (HN298, 1971-76) was arrested and convicted – using the identity of someone who was still alive – on an anti-apartheid protest. But what the managers knew can’t be decided until we hear from them in the Tranche 1 Phase 3 hearings – which have just been delayed until next year.

Skelton tried to fend off the fact that SDS officers illegally supplied personal details of activists to employment blacklists. He claimed that police got material from far beyond the spycops, so we can’t be sure that what he called ‘so-called blacklisting’ involved information from SDS officers.

Stating this, Skelton seems to ignore that the Information Commissioners Office seized a blacklist of more than 3,200 people at the offices of The Consulting Association, maintained for the construction industry, in 2009.

In 2012 the Information Commissioners Office’s investigations manager David Clancy confirmed that there was information in the files that ‘could only be supplied by the police or the security services’.

In 2013, SDS whistleblower officer Peter Francis said that he believed information he’d reported when undercover in the 1990s had ended up in blacklist files.

Turning to the 1979 killing of Blair Peach by police, and the SDS’ spying on the campaign for justice, including attending the funeral, Skelton reminded the Inquiry that the Crown Prosecution Service said no further investigation is possible, and it is not the Inquiry’s job to investigate the killing.

Skelton conceded that SDS reporting has a lot of personal info on people spied on, some of which might not have been justified to record (eg social events & family members). He tried to wiggle out of taking responsibility for this saying such information was often asked for by Special Branch and MI5, as if that makes it alright.

The Met acknowledges that it might be ‘more detail than necessary’, but then again, you just never know. Some seemingly innocuous information can be connected to useful things later. In the era under examination, the concept of ‘collateral intrusion’ on family members wouldn’t have been considered.

The Met notes that outdated language shouldn’t be judged if it was uncontroversial at the time, unless it was discriminatory, or gratuitously insulting, or with no purpose.

The Met, Skelton concluded, engages with the Inquiry with ‘a willingness to learn and to improve’.

Those of us who fought for ten years to get the Inquiry and drag the Met into it despite all their obstructions, smears, shredding of paperwork and delays will take some persuading on this point.

The Inquiry’s Chair, Sir John Mitting, then asked Skelton about miscarriages of justice. Mitting said that we may see such things described in these hearings. If there are grounds to believe it, Mitting said he will refer these cases to the review panel set up for it, instead of waiting for the witness hearings of managers which have just been delayed to next year.

The conviction Mitting has in mind was 49 years ago, the people involved are now old and deserve their answer as soon as possible, rather than waiting until after the end of the Inquiry. The clearing of their names should start as soon as possible. Something we can agree on.

Oliver Sanders QC,

Representing 114 spycops

Oliver Sanders QC spoke last, representing 114 spycops.

His opening statement at the first Inquiry hearings in November 2020 was shocking, rowing back on matters of fact and responsibility the Met have long admitted and accepted.

A LITTLE KNOWLEDGE

Sanders reiterated Skelton’s point that without complete evidence there cannot be fully informed findings. Some officers remember reports and events that have no surviving documents. Instead, the Inquiry is heavily reliant on what MI5 retained and have supplied.

Of the fraction of material that survives, a fraction of that, in turn, is to be released to the public, and even then it is redacted (thanks, in part, to the Met lobbying for the greatest possible secrecy), so people will inevitably form the wrong idea about what went on.

The secrecy means the public especially misses some especially important dangerous activities the public can’t be told about, and therefore receive an even more distorted picture.

DANGER LURKS BELOW

Spied-on groups had a spectrum of members, so just because one member testifies to the Inquiry that they were no threat it does not mean that others were not dangerous, or that the group couldn’t be hijacked by dangerous people.

The SWP had a lot of teachers, social workers, etc at the branch level who were moderate and law-abiding, but others were interested in violence and disorder, spoke to the Palestine Liberation Organisation, and wanted to take over other campaigns.

Some people targeted by spycops have extreme anti-police views. Police are seen as the embodiment of the establishment, so it is in some groups’ interests to promote an anti-police narrative.

There are ‘contentious incidents’ such as the deaths of Blair Peach and Kevin Gately (who were both killed by police). We need to be sure we deal with facts, not hearsay.

Police will talk of a threat to public order, but civilian witnesses will dispute it. The spycops say the Inquiry needs to get more contextual evidence rather than simply choose one side to believe.

For example, officer ‘Dick Epps’ (HN336, 1969-70) remembers anti-apartheid activists damaging cricket grounds. No media coverage was found to support that, so the Inquiry suggested that he was confusing it with something else, but in fact, there was a documented event with details as described by Epps (the Chair, Sir John Mitting, really took this point to task at the end).

There are the SDS annual reports prepared for the Commissioner, and there are reports for Special Branch that have now been found and are currently being redacted. Beyond that, we can look at contemporaneous Hansard and media (as if the media are not briefed by police with stories of ‘rentamob’)

Sanders had not only agreed a line of argument with Skelton but drifted into paraphrasing him. Skelton treated the Inquiry to a reiteration of the need for historians to testify to the Inquiry.

WRITE YOUR OWN ANSWERS

Skelton also said the Inquiry should look at contemporaneous publications by the groups that spycops targeted. This sounds fair, but bear in mind that throughout the existence of spycops, officers had written material for the campaigns they infiltrated.

From John Graham writing about the anti-Vietnam War protest in a 1969 edition of Red Camden to Mark Kennedy’s Indymedia posts, via Roger Pearce writing for Freedom, Bob Lambert cowriting the McLibel leaflet and John Dines’ anti-police section of the Poll Tax Riot booklet, it’s been very common practice. To judge the validity of their infiltration on their writings for the groups would be the police marking their own homework.

Skelton refuted the idea that spycops were a waste of police resources. He pointed out that the SDS was only a handful of officers among thousands of Met staff, so it is not like it’d have made much odds to redeploy them into something more useful to the public (such as catching the killers of people whose justice campaigns they spied on and undermined).

Some evidence puts emphasis on the cause being just, such as anti-racist and anti-apartheid campaigns. This is irrelevant to public order policing – order must be maintained no matter the politics of those who threaten it. It does not matter if the police agree or not.

DON’T KNOW RIGHT FROM WRONG

Police cannot be expected to decide which causes were just or will be thought just in the fullness of time. So, them spying on anti-apartheid campaigners Stop The Seventy Tour would have been the same if it were a far-right group (Skelton ignores the fact that spycops barely touched the far right).

Public order is not just an absence of violence – intimidation and obstruction are disorder and liable to escalate. With large events, there’s crowd psychology that can be hijacked by dangerous people. So, a protest being harmless may only be due to the police’s successful handling of it.

It is obvious that if the South African cricket tour had gone ahead, the Stop The Seventy Tour campaign would have had a big impact, so it’s right that they were targeted by spycops. The activists themselves describe how rugby fans hated them for disrupting games. With drinking involved, it is a powder keg waiting for just such a spark.

UNKNOWN RELEVANCE

As for the personal details and irrelevance of much of the information gathered, Skelton explained that every spycop hoovered up all info they could and reported it unfiltered, it was not up to them to discern. Besides, the kind of stuff they reported appears in other Special Branch reports, whether it is from the SDS or others (as if the rest of Special Branch is a beacon of integrity). Plus, MI5 used it and we do not know what was useful to them.

Any reporting on members of groups would inevitably include personal information. It identifies them, and it might be useful to either Special Branch or MI5. Yes, it included details about children, but it does not hurt them really, he explained.

In fact, some activists had children and used that to influence other children. There is a National Union of School Students pamphlet encouraging strikes and disruption. Gotta clamp down hard on that, right?

It is not the spycops’ fault they reported irrelevant things. Why did MI5 retain the seemingly trivial stuff for so long? MI5’s Witness Z should explain.

With that final deflection, Sanders ended his statement. But Mitting was not done with him.

ADMIT WHEN YOU’RE WRONG

Mitting now returns to the claim about the Stop The Seventy Tour ‘attacking cricket grounds’. The spycop concerned, Dick Epps, refers to digging up Lord’s pitch and pouring oil. But Mitting has checked and this never happened.

Mitting suggests Epps confused it with the Third Test at Headingley in 1975, a ‘George Davis is Innocent’ protest. Mitting spoke to Epps a while ago about it, and Epps accepted he may be misremembering.

Mitting sternly told Sanders that if he thinks the Inquiry has something wrong, then re-examine it, but otherwise, do not make such assertions without checking.

Sanders says there was another cricket pitch attack, but still a different place, a different time and with weedkiller rather than oil. So why didn’t Mitting suggest that to the officer instead of the Headingley event? Mitting, like the rest of us, appeared unable to see why saying Epps was wrong made any sort of defence for saying he was right.

And with that, the hearing concluded for the day.

---

The Undercover Policing Inquiry resumes at 10am on Thursday 22 April.

It will hear opening statements from:
Diane Langford (activist)
“Madeleine”(deceived into a relationship)
Phillippa Kaufmann QC, representing people in relationships with spycops
Matthew Ryder QC, representing Stop the Seventy Tour anti-apartheid activists, and Blair Peach’s partner Celia Stubbs.

The UCPI will also pause at 11am for a minute’s silence on Thursday and Friday, the anniversaries of the deaths of Stephen Lawrence and Blair Peach, whose loved ones’ campaigns for justice were targeted by SDS and NPIOU officers.

<<Previous UCPI Daily Report (19 Nov 2020)<<

>>Next UCPI Daily Report (22 Apr 2021)>>

Tranche 1, Phase 1, Day 14

19 November 2020

Evidence from:

Officer HN 333 (summary of evidence)
Officer HN 339 aka ‘Stewart Goodman’ (summary of evidence)
Officer HN 349 (summary of evidence)
Officer HN 343 aka ‘John Clinton’ (summary of evidence)
Officer HN 345 aka ‘Peter Fredericks’

This was the final day of hearings in the first phase of the Inquiry, looking at the earliest years of the Special Demonstration Squad (SDS) from its formation in 1968 to around 1972.

We heard evidence from five former undercover officers of the SDS. The Inquiry gave brief summaries of four of their careers, before the fifth, ‘Peter Fredericks’ gave evidence in person for several hours.

Once again the Inquiry’s Chair, Sir John Mitting, locked horns with Rajiv Menon QC, barrister for those who were spied upon. The bias of the Inquiry was set out in even starker terms when we discovered that, in the summary of officer HN339 ‘Stewart Goodman’, it actively hid the officer’s admissions of criminality. It’s as if the Inquiry is more on the police’s side than the police themselves. 

Officer HN 333
(summary of evidence)

Temporary Mystery Man

Very little is known about this officer. Their real and cover names are being restricted, along with details of the groups he targeted.

The reason for restricting real and cover names and target group was previously set out by Mitting as:

“There is, however, a small – in my judgement, very small – risk that if his cover name were to be associated with the valuable duties which he performed subsequent to his deployment, he would be of interest to those who might pose such a threat.”

He was on duty as a plain-clothes Special Branch officer at the large anti-Vietnam War demonstration on 27 October 1968, then joined the SDS shortly afterwards.

According to his witness statement, there was tight secrecy around the SDS. There was also no formal training, though once in the field the undercovers would share their experience and knowledge. He did not use the name of a deceased child, and there was only limited guidance about choosing a cover name.

He was deployed for 9 months, into a now-defunct left wing group. He attended meetings and demonstrations, but said it was a ‘loose association’ rather than a formal organisation, so he did not have any roles of responsibility.

He gave verbal updates to SDS managers at the safe house – he said he was not responsible for writing intelligence reports.

Having become ill, he was withdrawn (via a planned process) in 1969, giving his excuses to the group. He then returned to normal Special Branch duties.

The full witness statement of HN333.

A summary of information about HN333’s deployment can be found on p122 of the Counsel to the Inquiry’s Opening Statement.

Officer HN 339 aka ‘Stewart Goodman’
(summary of evidence)

‘Stewart Goodman’, the Drunk Driver

This officer joined Special Branch in the 1960s, during which time he attended meetings of the Campaign Against Racial Discrimination.

He said “everyone in Special Branch knew about the existence of the SDS”, which contrasts with other officers saying it was a well-kept secret, or something about which there were only vague rumours.

He was married at the time the joined the SDS, but there was no welfare check to discuss the impact of his new job on his family.

He was deployed undercover from 1970 to 1971, initially against the Anti-Apartheid Movement, from which he also reported on the Dambusters Mobilisation Committee. Most of his early reporting relates to this latter organisation, which was a coalition of anti-apartheid groups who opposed the construction of the huge Cabora Bassa dam in Mozambique to supply electricity to South Africa.

He subsequently infiltrated the Lambeth branch of the International Socialists (now the Socialist Workers Party), where he became treasurer (a position more than one of his contemporaries occupied in groups they infiltrated). This put him very close to the branch secretary – ‘effectively his right hand man’. He attended both public and private meetings.

While spying on the IS, much of what Goodman reported on was internal party discussions and political disputes. As well as at Lambeth branch, he also reported on the group’s affairs at a national level – including reporting on a major rift. He went to their national convention at Skegness. It appears IS were targeted because the security services believe they fell within their definition of ‘subversion’.

Goodman also said:

“MPs giving their support to protest movements was potentially of interest to Special Branch”.

The Inquiry also notes that his “intelligence evidences a particular interest on the part of IS in trade union activity”.

He did not use the name of a deceased child and says he did not have any sexual relationships.

INQUIRY COVER-UP

Non-state core participants have been worried about the Inquiry having a lawyer read a summary of an officer’s activity, with no opportunity to question the officer. What we hadn’t anticipated was the Inquiry being even more inclined to cover-up an officer’s wrongdoing than the officer themselves.

Speaking for the Inquiry, Elizabeth Campbell said:

“HN339 recalls being involved in some fly-posting while in his cover identity, but no other criminal activity. Near the end of his deployment, HN339 was involved in a road traffic accident while driving an unmarked police car, which necessitated the involvement of his supervisors on the SDS. HN339 states that he does not remember much about his withdrawal from the field, but suspects that this event may have been a catalyst for the end of his deployment.”

 

Goodman was not merely ‘involved in a road traffic accident’.

For those willing to wade through the statements, on page 18 of Goodman’s witness statement he said:

“I crashed my unmarked police car. I had been at a pub with activists and I would have parked the car away from the pub so as not to arouse suspicion. I drove home while under the influence of alcohol and crashed the car into a tree”.

 

The car was a write-off. When uniformed officers arrived, Goodman breached SDS protocol and broke cover, telling them he was an undercover colleague. Rather than arresting and charging him, they drove him home.

He was eventually charged and went to court, accompanied by his manager Phil Saunders. He believes he was prosecuted under his false identity, and that Saunders briefed the magistrates. He was convicted and fined.

Having been bailed out by his managers, he was withdrawn from his undercover role, but faced no formal disciplinary action.

INQUIRY UNDERMINING ITSELF

It is utterly outrageous that the Inquiry told the public that the only crime Goodman committed undercover was fly-posting and then, literally in the next sentence, referred to a much more serious criminal offence, for which he was convicted (with the complicity of uniformed police and the judiciary).

The Inquiry cannot claim ignorance, as they not only specifically mentioned the incident, but made a conscious choice to turn his statement from an admission of criminal culpability into a more neutral account, with no crime mentioned.

Investigating the often-corrupt relationships between the spycops and the courts is one of the stated purposes of this Inquiry, yet here they are deliberately burying examples of wrong-doing that the officers themselves admit to.

Because Goodman wasn’t called to give evidence to the Inquiry in person, there is no way to question him about the possibility of judicial corruption. Beyond that, we are left wondering what else has been covered up in this way, and lies there among the screeds pages that the Inquiry bulk-publishes after it has finished discussing a given officer’s deployment.

The full witness statement of HN339 ‘Stewart Goodman’.

A summary of information about HN339’s deployment can be found on p138 of the Counsel to the Inquiry’s Opening Statement.

Officer HN 349
(summary of evidence)

The Failed Anarchist

Both the real name and the cover name of this officer has been restricted by the Inquiry. The names of the groups he targeted have also been withheld, which has made it impossible for anyone he spied on to come forward to the Inquiry with their evidence.

He was recruited by another undercover to join the SDS after a short time in Special Branch. He was not given formal training; instead he read reports in the back office and met with other spycops before being deployed.

He grew his hair and beard and started wearing scruffy clothes, but did little else to develop his ‘legend’. His cover story was poorly developed compared to his colleagues (he had no cover job, for instance).

Deployed in the early 1970s, he was apparently not initially tasked to spy on any particular group, instead he went to demonstrations in central London and sought to get to know regulars.

He was eventually asked to target various loose-knit anarchist groups.

While at the safe house he would discuss anything and everything – including details of their deployments – with the other spycops, something other spycops have denied in their evidence to the Inquiry. In his witness statement he said:

“No topic of conversation would be off limits.”

If and when necessary, managers would take an undercover off for private chats, away from the group:

“This happened more frequently for officers who were involved in the more sensitive areas of work.”

The deployment was unsuccessful as the target group were mistrustful of strangers and did not let him build up relationships with them. Consequently, following a meeting with his managers, he was withdrawn after just nine months in the field.

He then spent time in the SDS back office, before returning to other Special Branch duties. He notes he did work with intelligence gathered by SDS undercovers though it was not marked as such. He also made requests for specific information from the SDS while at Special Branch.

HN349 noted that most Special Branch officers were “aware of the SDS and had an idea of the kind of groups they had infiltrated”. He also noted:

“It was also generally accepted by myself and fellow UCOs [undercover officers] that the Security Services provided some of the funding for the SDS.”

The full witness statement of HN349.

A summary of information about HN349’s deployment can be found on p141 of the Counsel to the Inquiry’s Opening Statement.

Officer HN 343 aka ‘John Clinton’
(summary of evidence)

‘John Clinton’ and the Subversive Pickets

This undercover served in the SDS from early 1971 until sometime in 1974. He was deployed into the International Socialists.

Prior to joining the SDS, he had been deployed as a plain-clothes Special Branch officer to report back on public meetings. Whilst in Special Branch, he had heard ‘vague whispers’ of the existence of a secret unit.

He had no formal training. He spent 3-4 months in the SDS back office, reading up on the political landscape. His cover story was basic and he gave his cover job as van driver, in case he was spotted elsewhere in London by his targets. He was give a vehicle as part of his cover.

INTERNATIONAL SOCIALISTS

Clinton was tasked by his managers to infiltrate the International Socialists (IS). From October 1971 to March 1972, many of his reports are of the IS’s Croydon branch. However, he explained that the documents do not reflect the totality of his reporting during this period. Rather, he attended various IS meetings and demonstrations across London before focusing on the Hammersmith & Fulham branch.

This branch was chosen as there was “a lot of Irish activity discussed”, which he knew was of great interest to the Met.

He found it easy to join as they were keen for new members; he turned up at meetings and demonstrations, expressing his enthusiasm for the cause. Once in, he used a ‘flaky’ persona to avoid being given responsibility in the group.

He was aware that the SDS was interested in both public order and counter-subversion issues. He said that IS was a “Trotskyist subversive group with links into Irish Groups”. He witnessed public disorder during his time undercover, but noted that any violence was not caused by IS members.

Clinton did consider IS to be subversive, writing in his witness statement:

“I witnessed a lot of subversive activity whilst I was deployed undercover. IS were constantly trying to exploit whatever industrial or political situation that existed in the aim of getting the proletariat to rise up. During industrial disputes they would deploy to picket lines and stand there in solidarity.”

He attended a wide range of public and private events, providing significant reportage of IS’s internal affairs, including details of elections and appointments, and political rifts. He also reported on trade union membership and industrial action taken by IS members. He did not join a trade union, but did go on demonstrations in support of industrial action organised by trade unions.

Other matters covered included campaigns supported by the group, such as women’s liberation, tenants’ rights and the Anti-Apartheid Movement.

Clinton noted that he had considerable discretion as to what he reported on, but was guided by what he knew Special Branch to be interested in generally. He received general tasking and updates at the SDS weekly meetings.

He wrote:

“My remit was to gather intelligence on IS. That was both with a view to public order, but also information that was relevant to counter subversion. What they were doing politically, how they were organised, and the identity of influential individuals was all important information.”

THE DEATH OF KEVIN GATELY

Clinton was infiltrating International Socialists in London in the summer of 1974, yet he made no mention of their involvement in the large anti-fascist demonstration on 15 June 1974 at which a protester, Kevin Gately, was killed.

At 6 feet 9 inches tall, Gately stood out, and his head is readily seen above the level of crowd in photos of the demonstration. This may well be why he was killed. Police charged into the crowd on horseback, lashing out with truncheons. Gately’s body was found afterwards.

The inquest found Gately died from a brain haemorrhage caused from a blow to the head from a blunt instrument. His exceptional height led several newspapers of the time to allege his death was the result of a blow from a mounted police truncheon.

It was the first time anyone had died on a demonstration in Britain for over 50 years. It was a huge cause célèbre for the left. Clinton didn’t mention this, nor any of the vigils for Gately and campaigning that followed among IS and the broader left.

It is a glaring omission that arouses suspicion. He would certainly have known of it and may well have been part of the demonstration and subsequent commemorations and events. Given the SDS’s avid focus on such justice campaigns later on, it would be very odd if their officer in IS didn’t remember it as being significant.

As with Stewart Goodman earlier, because this was an Inquiry lawyer reading out a hasty summary, lawyers for the ‘non-state core participants’ (those who were spied on) weren’t able to question Clinton about any of this.

END OF DEPLOYMENT

Clinton left his deployment in September 1974 as he had enough of being an undercover; this was supported by his managers. In one of the earliest known developed exit strategies, he used a ‘phased withdrawal’, telling the group he was going travelling.

Being undercover permanently changed him, in that it made him very private in his personal affairs.

In late 1980s, he was posted to Special Branch’s C Squad for a few months and would have received intelligence from the SDS in that role, but as it was ‘sanitised’ he would not be privy to full details of the spycops’ doings. He retired from the police after 30 years.

THE MAN WITH THE VAN

It’s interesting to note that he was a van driver, with a van supplied by the SDS. This became a common part of later spycops’ deployments.

As Clinton said, it gave them an excuse if they were spotted somewhere unexpected. It also made them the group’s unofficial taxi: they would drop everyone home after meetings, thereby learning people’s addresses. If a group was planning to go on any political action, they would ask the member with the reliable van first.

It became a standard part of spycops’ fake identities across decades and units. Andy Coles (SDS, 1991-95) was known as ‘Andy Van’.

Later on, Mark Kennedy (National Public Order Intelligence Unit, 2003-2010) was known as ‘Transport Mark’, in charge of logistics for all the Climate Camps.

The full witness statement of HN343.

A summary of information about HN343’s deployment can be found on p154 of the Counsel to the Inquiry’s Opening Statement.

Five More Spycops

As if these summaries truncated enough, the Inquiry also published without summary documents relating to five former members of the SDS who have not provided witness statements:

– HN346, real name Jill Mosdell, cover name unknown. Spied on Stop the Seventy Tour, the Anti-Apartheid Movement & related groups.

– HN338, real name restricted, cover name unknown. Spied on the Vietnam Solidarity Campaign, the International Marxist Group (in particular the Notting Hill and West London branches), and the Anti-Internment League.

– HN1251, real name Phil Saunders, cover name, if any, unknown. Detective Inspector in the SDS, overseeing undercover officers.

– HN332, real name restricted. Cover name, if any, unknown. Detective Inspector and subsequently head of the SDS.

– HN394, real name restricted and cover name, if any, unknown. Detective Sergeant and then Detective Inspector in the SDS.

It wasn’t explained are SDS bosses are not even not giving statements? Are they somehow deemed irrelevant? Are they refusing to cooperate? Have they died?

It’s not clear why there appears to be no mention of HN 394 on the Inquiry website.

Officer HN 345 aka ‘Peter Fredericks’

Only one officer, ‘HN345’, gave ‘live’ evidence at the Undercover Policing Inquiry on Thursday. He was questioned by Counsel for the Inquiry, David Barr QC, and later by Rajiv Menon QC and Ruth Brander on behalf of non-state core participants. Questions were based on his written witness statement.

His mannerisms and tone obviously do not come across in the time-delayed transcript, so it is worth noting that he was usually grinning, poked his tongue in and out whilst speaking, and drew out certain words.

The opening questions are formalities, confirming that he knew the contents of the witness statement he provided, and that they are is true. Even at this, he was cocky. Asked if he was ‘familiar with the contents of the witness statement, he replied ‘slightly’.

He came across as incredibly creepy, and his evidence reiterated a number of now familiar themes: the lack of training or guidance these officers received; the bizarre claim that they all sat together in a flat for hours writing reports without exchanging information or ideas about their deployments; the ‘fishing expedition’ nature of the deployments – where everything and anything was passed on to the managers, who it was assumed would only include the information that they considered important in the final intelligence reports; the inexplicable infiltration of groups involved in political debate and even humanitarian aid; stark and shocking evidence of deep rooted sexism, racism and political prejudice; the fact that the Inquiry has only received a small fraction of the overall reporting; and the ever-present influence of “Box 500”, the code name for MI5.

GOING UNDERCOVER

Fredericks joined the police in the mid 1960s, and in the course of his ordinary policing, was offered the opportunity to do some undercover work. He “thought it sounded more interesting than road traffic duties” and agreed. Fredericks was deployed by the SDS for about six months, in 1971.

He was trained ‘on the job’ to do this ‘ordinary’ (i.e. non-spycop) undercover work. Whilst undercover he came across people involved with political groups – including the anti-apartheid Stop the Seventy Tour campaign, and the “Black Power movement”. He had not been tasked to report on either of these groups, he said it “just happened while I was doing other things”. He sent the information he gathered to his bosses.

Fredericks was asked by Ruth Brander – on behalf of Peter Hain – whether he knew that the information he had gathered about the Stop The Seventy Tour was being given to the Security Services. His lengthy response included the claim that “the system needed to know about it and I was pushing the information up”. And what about the South African security services? He didn’t have much of a response to this, managing only a weak “no”.

He explained that as a result of this intelligence-gathering, he was noticed by both Special Branch and MI5. He was interviewed and invited to join Special Branch, as a member of “C-squad” dealing with ‘domestic extremism’. He was in the section that dealt with Trotskyists and anarchists (as opposed to the one that dealt with the Communist Party of Great Britain and similar groups). He said he could not remember being briefed about any specific groups.

He said he had not heard of what was called the Special Operations Squad (SOS, later the Special Demonstration Squad) at the time. The Inquiry was shown one of Fredericks’ reports [UCPI0000005817] from his time at C-squad, before he became a member of the SOS, about a meeting on the Vietnam war where another non-state CP, Tariq Ali, was speaking.

ANOTHER AMNESIAC SPYCOP

As with most of the other officers who have so far given evidence, he said he remembered what documents proved and little more. Asked about his reporting on Tariq Ali, whose activism was so prominent at the time that his name would be used in headlines, Fredericks said he could only “remember the name very clearly but no more. It’s one of those strange things”.

While part of C-squad, he was also instructed to attend demonstrations.. At one of these demos, about the conflict in East Pakistan/ Bangladesh, he met a woman who was connected to the ‘Operation Omega’ campaign.

He gave an account of an incident he witnessed during another Bangladesh demo. He stated that he and other plain-clothes Special Branch officers had been summoned by radio back to Scotland Yard, and he was near Parliament when he spotted a police communications vehicle on fire and the female officer inside “in distress”. He said he didn’t notice any other serious trouble or violence that day:

“I didn’t notice anything to be worried about. Having said that, of course we did have the fire”.

As a result of his accidentally making connections with various political groups, he seems to have been flagged as a potential recruit for the SOS. He was approached by Ken Pendered, told that the Security Services (MI5) had written a letter commending him and that he would be transferred to this secret squad and given an undercover identity.

He was also questioned about HN326 and HN68 visiting him at his home – he can’t remember exactly when or why this took place, although he and HN326 were already acquainted. However, his pride at having been noticed by “Box” (i.e. MI5) was still evident in his demeanour, fifty years on.

NO FORMAL TASKING OR TRAINING

He confirmed that he was not given any training on the definition of ‘extremism’ or ‘subversion’, giving the somewhat vague answer that:

“what is subversive to one group could be helpful to another, or positive to another”.

He added that he had his own private views on those terms, and he cannot remember any received understanding within Special Branch on this point.

He felt the training he was given when he joined Special Branch was not particularly useful. In contrast, there was no training or guidance when he was transferred to the SOS. “We were left to our own devices”.

He had “no memory” of being instructed on what information was and wasn’t of interest. In his previous undercover work, he had been very selective in what he reported, but in the SOS he tried casting a wide net and gathering as much info as possible, from all sorts of people.

He compared himself to the provenance of antiques – “if I can be seen to be someone who knows a lot of people, different organisations, perhaps I would gain more trust”. He would hand over all the info he gathered. If he made mistakes in his report, someone would correct them. He didn’t type his own reports – there was a typing team for that – and others in the SOS decided what was relevant enough to be included.

As undercover officers, they were quite isolated, although they would have conversations at the ‘safe house’, the SDS flat. “We were on a bit of a learning curve” he explained.

In common with his contemporaries that the Inquiry had already heard from, Fredericks described being given a free rein on how he worked, negligible feedback on his reports, and no indication of what was good or bad in his work.

NEITHER GOOD NOR BAD

Were his bosses ever pleased with the intelligence he provided? “Not pleased, not dis-pleased” he answered. Indeed, the only time he can remember anyone being ‘pleased’ with his work was when that complimentary letter from ‘Box’ turned up right at the start.

Was this SOS work just an extension of the work he’d been doing in Special Branch, then? It appears not. Fredericks explained one of the main differences: “You didn’t go anywhere near the office” at Scotland Yard once you were in the SOS.

However, it should also be noted that Fredericks doesn’t think the Inquiry have seen all of his reports – there are only three reports of political meetings attended by ‘Fredericks’ in the bundle– yet he said he was “fully occupied” during his months with the squad, sometimes attending several meetings in the same day and filing several reports every week.

OPERATION OMEGA – HUMANITARIAN AID

Fredericks did not remember who had tasked him to infiltrate Operation Omega (also known as Action Bangla Desh), although it may have been Ken Pendered again. He doesn’t remember any discussions with his managers about the motivations of these groups, or being directed to infiltrate any groups in particular. He claims not to remember the names of other groups that he reported on, just Operation Omega’.

Asked about the aims and objectives of the police in infiltrating this organisation, he said they were trying “to reduce or eliminate unhelpful behaviour on the part of certain individuals within these various groups”. However, he also admitted that much of the work done by the Operation Omega group was humanitarian. Operation Omega was in fact a very small, London-based group involved in taking humanitarian aid to victims of the war in the Bangladesh (then East Pakistan) as it seceded from the Dominion of Pakistan in 1971.

Fredericks described the group as having plans to build housing for people, who had lost their homes during the war. They met up to stuff envelopes together and talk, and said that decisions were not made in his presence. “It was more admin than anything else” he said and noted that he didn’t have access to the group’s mailing list, but if he had, he would have passed it on to his superiors. He didn’t know the members very well, and he wasn’t “involved in the hierarchy”.

One of the members of the group told him that her family had donated £6,500 to the cause. “That was a great deal of money in those days” Barr suggested [it equates to approx £75,000 today] and some members of the group travelled to East Pakistan to deliver aid; he heard that one of them gave birth while in custody there. He wasn’t invited to go to East Pakistan with them.

Fredericks did attend demonstrations with the group, but can’t remember “anything special about those”. One was in Slough and involved several thousand people but was un-policed and peaceful.

“Would this have been unusual?” asked Barr, who said he was getting the impression that there were no public order concerns that day. Fredericks described them as sort of “a walk in the park on a Sunday”.

Barr said that there don’t appear to be any surviving reports by Fredericks about Operation Omega. Fredericks confirmed that he will have made two or three a week for about six months. We can only speculate as to why this might be.

FLY-POSTING WAS THE ONLY CRIME

Fredericks was also asked about an instance where he apparently went fly-posting with the group. He got no special permission from his managers to do this, he said, but on the other hand, no one was upset that he did it.

He went on to say that fly-posting wasn’t serious – “the authorities have more important things to do”. Barr agreed that it was “at the very very bottom end of the scale of criminal offending”. He was asked if Operation Omega were involved in any other criminal activity. “None at all,” he replied.

We were shown the Special Demonstration Squad’s Annual Report, written at the end of 1971 [MPS-0728971] in which Action Bangla Desh is indeed listed as having been ‘penetrated’ by the spycops, however Operation Omega is not.

When asked if there were any other officers reporting on Action Bangla Desh, or whether this would have been a reference to his work, Fredericks expressed a belief that he was the only officer deployed against Operation Omega. Nevertheless, we were also shown another report on Action Bangla Desh signed by officer HN332.

YOUNG HAGANAH – ‘WIDENING THE GEOGRAPHY’

At Operation Omega events, Fredericks met two women from the ‘Young Haganah’. He said he didn’t ‘join’ or participate in this group, or socialise with them and had no plans to infiltrate them, and no memory of being instructed to do so (by Phil Saunders or any other manager).

When asked about the connection to Israel he said “it just widens the geography”. He then admitted that he doesn’t know anything about the Young Haganah, but knew, from doing some research, that the original Haganah were involved in setting up the state of Israel decades before. The ‘Young Haganah’ were a completely separate group, who “just wanted to help people” he said. “I felt they were OK”.

Despite taking care to be someone who knew people here and there, to make himself less likely to raise suspicions, there came a time when he “knew something was wrong”. He recalled being diplomatically ‘steered away’ from meeting Bangladeshi Prime Minister Sheikh Mujibur Rahman and two Labour MPs at a function, by the woman whose family had funded the Operation Omega group’s activities.

BLACK POWER

Rajiv Menon QC, on behalf of the Inquiry’s non-state core participants, pointed out that Fredericks referred to himself as being of ‘mixed heritage’ in his witness statement and asked if, in 1971, his mixed heritage was perhaps more visibly apparent than it is now.

Fredericks batted the question away:

“It’s not for me to judge. I don’t know. I don’t spend that much time looking at myself in the mirror.”

 

Menon asked Fredericks if he thought he was asked to target Operation Omega or the Black Power Movement because of his race.

“No. I never came across anything vaguely associated with that statement,” he replied, as if the police might have sent a white officer to infiltrate Black Power groups.

Fredericks said said he was not directed towards infiltrating the Black Power movement by anyone in the SOS. He had just met a guy at Speakers Corner and “hit it off”. He was then invited to Black Power events & meetings, which led to him meeting activists from the United States.

He knew that any such group would be considered to be of interest to Special Branch, and although he was “on the periphery, by no means at the heart of it”, he “did meet some interesting people” at this time.

Fredericks said he got on “pretty well” with some of the Black Power members, but later that he didn’t get to know them “hugely well”. A lot of his time with them was spent socialising, and playing pool, rather than discussing politics, but he thought this was a good tactic to gain their trust.

THE MANGROVE 9

Fredericks was asked if he remembered the case of the Mangrove 9. ‘Not clearly, no,’ he replied.

The Counsel’s scepticism was clear even on the transcript:

‘It doesn’t ring any bells at all? Let me see if I can help you.’

The Inquiry was then told how, on 9 August 1970 – a few months before Fredericks joined the SDS – there was a demonstration in Notting Hill about the police harassment of the Mangrove restaurant. As a result of that demonstration, nine black activists were arrested and prosecuted for riot.

There was a defence campaign set up, and their trial started at the Old Bailey in October 1971, while Fredericks was in the SDS, undercover in Black power groups.

Fredericks said:

“I was not involved closely with them. I would have read about it in the papers. I would have known something, perhaps.”

As with John Clinton’s failure to mention the death of Kevin Gately, this absence of memory is simply not credible. Even the Counsel knew it:

“And you don’t remember any conversations with any of your SOS colleagues, or anybody else in Special Branch, about this seminal event in the history of the Black Power Movement?”

Fredericks determinedly kept the lid on the can of worms:

“Definitely not. Definitely not.”

REPORTING ON RACIAL JUSTICE GROUPS

The Inquiry was shown one of his reports [UCPI0000026455] of a Black Defence Committee meeting in a pub in September 1971. The speaker was a student from South Africa, described in the report as “coloured”, and talking on the subject of apartheid. There were a dozen people (including Fredericks) in the audience.

There was a second Black Defence Committee meeting [UCPI0000026456] later that month. Solicitor Michael Siefert was the speaker, who was part of the Angela Davies Defence Committee (they were all members of the Communist Party of GB). Fredericks said he couldn’t remember much about that campaign, and he was not given any guidance on the appropriateness of spying on a justice campaign.

THREATENED BY A JOKE

Finally, he was asked about an incident he recounted in his written statement – at a meeting of around 80-90 people on the subject of violent protest, with a speaker from the USA. His witness statement included a description of worrying that he was “going to be kicked to death” after someone suggested that there was an MI5 spy in the room and he thought he was about to be accused.

He recalled the feeling “when you know you’re outnumbered and you’re in deep difficulties” – before he realised that the activists were joking, not serious – and said that he was aware “that I was involved with people who had access to and were prepared to use violence as and when necessary”.

However, when he was asked more generally about the Black Power activists, he stated that he never witnessed any violence, or public disorder, nor had he any memory of the group committing criminal offences. When asked whether they encouraged disorder, he seemed unable to give a coherent reply and said this was “difficult to answer”.

In fact, Fredericks’s recollections of Black Power seemed to amount to very little at all.

When asked if he thought his infiltration of Black Power was the best use of a police resource he replied, “there were times when I thought I was wasting my time, but… there were…people up there, senior people, who knew a lot more about the landscape”, who considered his deployment a good use of resources.

Back in the day, he thought it was worth keeping “an eye on what was going on, to prevent the sort of excessive behaviour that sometimes accompanies these projects”, and his view remains the same now, although he clarified “it’s not something I think about a lot”.

SEXISM

When asked about intimate relationships between undercover officers and the people they spied on, his jaw-dropping response led to gasps of horror from around the room. It is so glaringly sexist that it warrants being repeated verbatim here:

“I have, if you like, a phrase in my head which helps guide me here. If you ask me to infiltrate some drug dealers, you can’t point the finger at me if I sample the product. If these people are in a certain environment where it is necessary to engage a little more deeply, then shall we say, I find this acceptable, but I do worry about the consequences for the female and any children that may result from the relationship”.

It appears that the police lawyers (who hover in the background posing as “technical IT support” for the witnesses) may have had words with him about this during the break, because when pressed on this point later by Ruth Brander, representing non-state CPs, he appeared to recant his earlier statement a little, saying that the situation with these relationships was “hugely confusing”.

Although he admitted “you could call it deception, you could call it anything you like, it can’t be nice”, he also implied that the relationships may not even have happened, saying it is like you are “gazing into a darkened room, looking for a black cat you can’t see that may not be there…”. Speaking of the spycops who committed these abuses, he said “Perhaps – my view is perhaps they had no choice”.

Neil Woods, who was an actual undercover drugs officer, had no time at all for this as he responded on social media:

‘To compare sampling some drugs undercover to having a sexual relationship in a deployment is very twisted indeed. The casual nature of this comparison is revealing. One could argue that it’s as a result of canteen culture, the grim sexism that male dominated culture can produce. But this is beyond mere sexism, it’s disregard to the point of malice. A machine of misogyny.’

POLICE RACISM

Menon asked Frederick about racism, and Fredericks claimed that he did not encounter any hurtful racism in the police, although he talked about how disparaging things were said “with humour. I think it’s called irony”.

Menon then drew his attention to a report [MPS-0739148] (nothing to do with Fredericks) that relates to a conviction at the Central Criminal Court in February 1969.

At this point, as at numerous previous hearings, Menon clashed with the Chair, Sir John Mitting, who said:

“You are about, I think, to ask a witness about a document that is nothing at all to do with him… I’m not conducting an inquiry into racism in the Metropolitan Police for the last 50 years, I’m looking at the SOS.”

Menon pointed out that it was, in fact, an SOS document that he wanted to show.

Mitting relented without changing his position:

“I will let you do it. But this is not to be taken as a precedent for what may happen in the future. I’m really not willing to allow people to question other witnesses about documents that are nothing to do with them.”

This is a further example of Mitting’s refusal to admit the fact of institutional racism and bigotry in the Met, something which, though the Met admitted it more than 20 years ago, Mitting has called a ‘controversial’ view.

Institutional racism and sexism are at the core of the spycops scandal. For Mitting to reduce it to individual actions is a denial of the systemic nature of the abuses committed by spycops.

Allowed to show the document about the court case, Menon drew the Inquiry’s attention to details of the convicted man’s involvement in the Vietnam Solidarity Campaign and Black Power groups, then states “he has the usual attitude of coloured people towards police and authority”.

Is this the kind of ‘casual banter’ you were referring to, or something more sinister?, asked Menon.

“What I’m reading could be described as an overly wide brush-stroke”, Fredericks responded, adding:

‘we are all human beings, and no group occupies one sort of social or moral space, there is a divergence, and it’s up to us to learn to live together.’

Fredericks recognised that racism has been common in humanity, but was unwilling to agree that it has ever been a particular problem in British society, or in the police.

A FETISH FOR FOREIGN SPIES?

In addition to his obvious pride in recalling his commendation letter from MI5, Fredericks spoke about one woman from the Operation Omega group who appears to have fascinated him, because he believed she was a foreign spy.

He described her as having a “hidden agenda” – he found it hard to explain what he meant by this – he said she seemed different to the others. “She didn’t fit”, he said, but he couldn’t work out why. He was not sure if he could mention which country she was from, and after receiving permission said that she was from the United States, appearing to suggest there was a link with the CIA.

“I could be totally wrong, but it attracted my attention”, and he clearly still remembers the strength of his hunch now. “I don’t know what it was, but this woman knew what she was doing”.

Freericks was in his 20s at the time and remembered that she was older than him, and most of the others in the group. He said he was very careful – listening, and doing as little talking as possible.  “We enjoyed each other’s company,” but there was mutual suspicion.

When asked if they had a romantic relationship, he said, “I’d rather not comment, but no is the answer”.

He said he would certainly have mentioned her in his reports, but didn’t gather any meaningful info (although earlier he said that he discovered her work address). This, like many of Fredericks’s answers hints at a hidden grimness to his operation. But without proper testing of the testimony, that’s all we can say.

His international spying fantasies seem to have come full circle at the end of his deployment, when – after being suddenly removed from the field – it transpired that part of the reason for this was that one of his referees (from the ‘positive vetting’ process carried out when he first joined the police) turned out to have been a Russian spy.

A SUDDEN END

Fredericks’s deployment was ended abruptly – he just stopped attending the meetings – but he said there was no consideration of possible ‘safety concerns’. He said that when he joined the unit he was told that he would be looked after, but when he left there was precious little after-care. His time undercover just ended, and there was no debriefing.

He received no guidance from his bosses about mixing with the activists he had spied on after his deployment had ended.

This led to the recounting of a curious incident in which, long after his deployment ended, Fredericks called round on someone he’d befriended while undercover – “there was no romantic involvement, I just found her interesting as a human being” -only to find out she had committed suicide not long before.

Even if we accept this at face value, it is disturbing, exposing his absence of care about the power wielded by spycops, and the lack of awareness that it is even an issue. There appears to be no part of him that felt this deception was in any way wrong. He thought – and clearly still feels – it was OK to just put his spycop persona back on for his own edification. What other activities do spycops do this for?

BITTER AFTERTASTE

Fredericks summed up his leaving the SDS:

“The way I felt was if I was no longer part of the system, then my existence doesn’t matter, my opinion doesn’t matter, get on with the rest of your life”.

He still seemed bitter about this. He did see a psychiatrist after his deployment ended, however he said he doesn’t know why his managers sent him to see someone who had no understanding of undercover policing: “The whole thing was a waste of time”. He said he did not attend any of the SDS social events or reunions.

Despite expressing the belief that the spycops’ techniques were more effective than normal Special Branch operations, and that being more deeply embedded with the activists meant he was able to gather more info from them. “I have my views,” he said, “but I’m ready to admit that I’m wrong”.

However, his creepy answers, and his unrepentant tone and demeanour throughout the questioning suggest that is not really the case.

 

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COPS has produced a report like this for every day of the Undercover Policing Inquiry hearings. They are indexed on our UCPI Public Inquiry page.

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Tranche 1, Phase 1, Day 13

18 November 2020

Evidence from:
Officer HN348 aka ‘Sandra Davies’

The penultimate day of the Undercover Policing Inquiry’s first phase was scheduled to have two people appear.

Helen Steel, a lifelong environmental and social justice activist who was in numerous spied-upon groups and was deceived into a relationship by undercover officer John Dines, was due to deliver her opening statement. However, she was unable to do so.

The rest of the day was given over to evidence from Special Demonstration Squad officer HN348, which seemed something of an odd proposition, given that she appeared to have had about as minor a deployment as is possible for a spycop – long ago, not for long, deployed into one group that doesn’t appear to have warranted spying on even by the police’s standards.

As it turned out, this was the point; her testimony demonstrated the lack of guidance given to officers, and the seemingly total absence of any consideration of the impact of this intrusion on the lives of those targeted.

She infiltrated the Women’s Liberation Front for about two years, 1971-73, using the name ‘Sandra Davies’. A small feminist group with Maoist leanings, its meetings were attended by about 12 people, hosted at one of the member’s homes.

’Davies’ was a full-time spy on them for two years, producing no intelligence of any value, and would have stayed longer if she hadn’t been compromised by another officer. It’s the generalised, hoover-up approach to information gathering, checking on people who pose no threat.

PRIDE OR SHAME?

Davies has been granted anonymity by the Inquiry despite being assessed as having a low risk of any kind of reprisal. In her ‘impact statement’, she said that she wanted anonymity because she would be embarrassed if the group’s main activist found out the truth. She also said her reputation would be tainted if her friends found out she had been a spycop.

It’s an extraordinary display of mental gymnastics – when we question the purpose of spycops, police tell us that they’re doing vital & noble work ensuring the safety of everyone, yet when we question why they want anonymity, they say it would be humiliating to be known as one.

This feat is matched by the idea that although the spycops used the Stasi principle of gathering all information on anyone close to political activity, with the expectation that some of them might turn out to be a problem at some point in the future, this was necessary to protect us from having to live in a repressive Stasi-like State.

MAXINE PEAKE IS A SPYCOP

As the Inquiry persists with the idea that a glitchy live transcript is adequate public access – denying the feel of the witness’ evidence, causing eyestrain for viewers and excluding anyone visually impaired – Police Spies Out of Lives once again provided a read-along on their YouTube channel.

Today, guest star Maxine Peake read the words of ’Sandra Davies’.

 

The read-along’s popularity exceeded the Inquiry’s own ‘viewing’ figures.

There will be another read-along, of HN345‘s evidence, on Thursday 19 November, starting at 11:30.

SANDRA DAVIES WAS ALSO A SPYCOP

HN348 made a written statement to the Inquiry last October.

She recalled using the cover name ‘Sandra’, and having seen some documents listing members of the Women’s Liberation Front that name ‘Sandra Davies’, she conceded this may well have been her. The evidence – which we’ll come to a bit later – seems conclusive, yet she still wouldn’t completely confirm it was her.

It set a pattern for the afternoon, of the documents showing things, and her saying that she was unable to recall anything beyond what the documents showed.

In this report, we’ll call her Davies for ease of reading.

JOINING THE SPYCOPS

Davies was vetted before joining the police, and joined Special Branch in January 1971, having passed an exam and several interviews. She didn’t have any undercover experience before being asked to join the Special Demonstration Squad (SDS), and it appears that she did this remarkably quickly – by mid-February.

She was asked if this meant there were only 3-4 weeks before she was recruited into the SDS, She said she couldn’t remember, but thought it was longer, perhaps a few months. However, her first SDS report is dated 17 February 1971.

She explained her motivations for joining Special Branch – these included her career development within the police, which she viewed as a long-term career.

RECRUITED BY HIGH-FLIER IMBERT

Until she was approached by Peter Imbert (who later became Commissioner), she had never heard of the SDS. He was the one who asked her to join, and explained that her job would be to ‘collect and disseminate information about anti-social behaviour’. She understood that intelligence was needed to prevent the police being unprepared for serious public order situations like the demonstration against the Vietnam War in March 1968.

Imbert will not be giving evidence at all, as he is one of the three Metropolitan Police Commissioners who have died since the Inquiry was announced. Between them, Imbert, David McNee, and Kenneth Newman ran the Met from 1977 to 1992. More than that, as Imbert’s recruitment of Davies to the SDS shows, they will have had a lot of relevant knowledge from the time before they became Commissioner.

It’s not enough to know what the officers did. We need to know who authorised and sanctioned these operations. The loss of testimony from those Commissioners, who were ultimately in charge of the SDS for a third of its existence, is one of the effects of the colossal delays the police have inflicted on the Inquiry process.

TRAINING? WHAT TRAINING?

Apart from being advised to keep a ‘low profile’, Davies was given very little training or guidance. She didn’t know how long she would be deployed for. She doesn’t remember any ‘home visit’ from a senior officer.

Asked why she was recruited, she said:

‘perhaps they were just looking for a woman, and in those days there weren’t that many of us! Perhaps there was nobody else.’

The SDS’ annual report of 1971 [MPS-0728971] said:

‘The arrival of a second woman officer has added considerably to the squad’s flexibility and has proved invaluable in the comparatively recent field of women’s liberation.’

The other woman was Jill Mosdell – Sandra confirmed that she knew Mosdell well and they became good friends. Mosdell was deployed into the Anti-Apartheid Movement from 1970-73.

DEPLOYMENT

She described her preparation for going undercover as taking off her wedding ring and make-up, finding a cover address (a shared house in Paddington to which she went only occasionally) and being ready to tell people she was a student at Goldsmiths if they asked (they never did).

She said that she would go to meetings and other events, then a day or two later visit one of the two SDS ‘safe houses’, where she would draft a report. This would then be discussed with her manager, amended, and sent for typing up.

She attended the safe house most days, and would talk to the other officers there, though, she claims, not in any detail about their deployments.

She didn’t have any experience of writing such reports beforehand, and was given little in the way of guidance. Her approach was to report anything she observed. According to her, the spycops were ‘building up a picture of the people who were involved in these various groups’.

PERSONAL INTRUSION

Davies was shown a report she’d made [UCPI0000026387] in August 1971, about a member of the Women’s Liberation Front (WLF) and the North London Alliance in Defence of Workers’ Rights (LADWR) travelling to Albania on holiday. The activist’s photo was attached to the report.

Asked why she’d felt that degree of personal information was necessary, she replied that it might be:

‘to do with the bookshop in North London, and the links with other extreme groups associated with that bookshop’

She said that the Women’s Liberation Front merited investigation by the spycops because ‘of the way they were expressing themselves, and their links’ to other groups of interest.

Most of her reports concern her attending regular meetings, often in people’s homes.

Was she ever given guidance about balancing people’s privacy vs what was needed for ‘effective policing’ – for example was she given guidance about entering people’s homes?

She was told that her job was to “be an observer, not a participant”, that she should avoid being an ‘agent provocateur’ but stick to recording what was said in the meetings she attended.

Her supervisor would accept her hand-written report, she said she didn’t always see the typed version; neither did she know who typed it or where it went. She claimed not to have realised that reports were routinely sent to MI5, but concedes it might have happened (most of the SDS reports that have been published for these hearings are marked as copied to MI5). She said she didn’t think much about this at the time.

SHARING SECRETS

The Inquiry was then shown a document [UCPI0000014736] which is Special Branch’s response to a request for intelligence from ‘Box 500’ – that is to say, the Security Service, MI5.

Two weeks earlier, they had asked Special Branch to find out about a couple of WRU/ LADWR activists’ recent house move.

It appears that Davies (whose name is attached to the report) was tasked to find out where they had gone, and duly supplied the information to her bosses, to send on to the security services. Davies said, again, that she had no memory of this.

She described some of the large women’s liberation meetings that she attended, some of which involved hundreds of women, and said that there were lots of stalls, leaflets being handed out, she didn’t have to work hard to be invited to meetings.

She checked in with her managers to get approval for any meeting she attended.

EXTREMISM & SUBVERSION

Officer HN45, ‘David Robertson’ was already deployed, and he gave her a presentation about the Maoist movement, and Abhimanyu Manchanda who led the Revolutionary Marxist-Leninist League.

Davies said:

‘I can’t remember one word of that presentation, but it was really a group that was opposed to our form of democracy’.

Asked what she was told about ‘subversion’ and ‘extremism’, she repeated:

‘We all understood that these groups were working against our form of democracy’

There was the feeling that she meant something else. Just as previous officers have conflated national security with the convenience of the government of the day, so Davies seemed to use ‘democracy’ to mean the current political hierarchy. As Dave Smith said yesterday, capitalism and democracy are not the same thing.

The SDS was spying on numerous open, democratic organisations, including political parties whose sole function was to participate in our form of democracy. Her close colleague Jill Mosdell was infiltrating the Anti-Apartheid Movement, whose sole objective was to bring democracy to South Africa.

Sandra said that her purpose was to see if the Women’s Liberation Front would ‘take direct action or whether it was just words’.

Asked if direct action was a problem, she said that in our country:

‘we’re entitled to our opinions and we can say what we like, well no, we can’t say exactly what we like but we’ve got Speakers Corner…. people can say what they like as long as they don’t go too far’

She seemed unaware that every regime on earth would describe their system in that way. Davies had a glaring absence of any questioning of the inherent rightness of the morals and intentions of the police and State.

DON’T DO CRIME

The next document was a Home Office circular about informants taking part in crime. Sandra does not recall seeing this before, but felt she understood the principles. She was very clear that she did not get involved in any criminal activities.

‘You’re there to uphold the law not break it… regardless of what role you’re playing’

According to her the police do use informants that are involved in criminality, but police officers shouldn’t get involved in criminality.

Were there rules about forming close relationships with activists?

Davies said she was told to ‘listen, learn and report back’, the spycops were not to get close to their targets. She was confident that officers in her day did not have sexual relationships with the people they spied on:

‘It didn’t need to be discussed specifically, it was something that didn’t happen’

Davies said she hadn’t heard about spycops deceiving people into relationships until she was contacted about this Inquiry, about three years ago. She hadn’t been to any SDS reunions over the years, so hadn’t heard stories from anyone else. She watched a documentary, ‘found it quite shocking’ and didn’t know what to believe.

MANAGEMENT

She described the SDS as being run by two Superintendents, a Chief Inspector, and two Sergeants.

Davies mainly reported to Phil Saunders and, to a lesser extent, HN294. They would have a direct debrief at the safe house.

She wasn’t provided with any back-up or support, she was sent out alone. She actually created her own security arrangements (with her husband) for travelling home late at night.

WOMEN’S LIBERATION

In her written statement, Davies said:

‘Women’s liberation was viewed as a worrying trend at the time.’

It seems clear that this is why she was recruited. Asked who exactly was worried by women’s liberation, she could only vaguely offer ‘all sorts of people’. She hurried to clarify that this didn’t mean those people were worried about the entire movement, just ‘factions within it’.

Counsel to the Inquiry then led her through a set of questions that exposed the hypocrisy and absurdity of Davies’ deployment in the Women’s Liberation Front.

She confirmed that, as a uniformed constable, she’d had the same powers and responsibilities as her male colleagues. However, women officers got 90% of the men’s wage at that time.

She was reminded of an violent confrontation in which she’d helped rescue injured officers and come back covered in blood. She was given no support or aftercare following the incident, beyond being told ‘you joined a man’s job so get on with it’.

According to her statement, the WLF mainly campaigned for equal pay, free contraception, and free nurseries. These are things that seem not just reasonable, but far more in keeping with a fair and just society than the practices of the police who employed her.

The policies and campaigning methods weren’t subversive by any real measure, so why was she sent to infiltrate the women’s movement, and specifically the Women’s Liberation Front?

Davies said it was because the WLF had links with ‘more extreme groups’. Asked if she was told the names of these groups that were supposed to be her true target, she once again became vague, referring to ‘a lot of unrest’ at the time. She mentioned the Angry Brigade, and added that the ‘Irish situation was very volatile’.

Davies’ own statement says the activists she spied on were not breaking any laws, just hosting meetings, leafleting and demonstrating – ‘all within the bounds of the law’ – and that she did not witness or participate in any public disorder during her entire deployment. So what was the point?

‘I was tasked to observe them because Special Branch did not know much about them’

IRISH CONNECTIONS

The Inquiry was shown a report [UCPI0000026992] of a WLF study group on 11 March 1971, comprising of seven people meeting in someone’s home.

Davies reported that one woman present praised the recent actions of the IRA, which she described as ‘a good way to start a revolution’. She’d put the words in quote marks.

We should note that, at this time, the IRA was only attacking British military targets in Northern Ireland. It is extraordinary that this comment on current affairs, made in a private home with no intent for action of any kind, was deemed worthy of reporting and filing by Britain’s political secret police. So much for ‘you are free to express your opinions’.

There seemed to be little else in the way of Davies reporting on the Irish situation she’d suggested as one of her true targets.

CHINESE CONNECTIONS

The next report [UCPI0000026996] was of another meeting of the study group, on 15 April, with 11 people present this time. Davies reported ‘general discussion’ of a ‘The East is Red’ – which she described as a ‘Chinese Revolutionary film’ – which was due to be shown twice that weekend.

Then came a report [UCPI0000026997] on a meeting of the Friends of China, that took place on 27 April. It was held in another private house, the home of Diane Langford, Besides Langford, her partner Abhimanyu Manchanda (a prominent Maoist), and Davies, there were only five other people present. Once again, Davies told the Inquiry that she had no memory of this meeting, but accepts that this report was hers.

According to the report, the Friends of China’s first matter of business was discussing the WLF’s magazine. Someone [their name is redacted] criticised the effort and resources put into it, before two members agreed to each take away 50 copies to sell.

There was more discussion of ‘The East Is Red’, which had been screened again, at the Cameo Poly Theatre in Regent Street. One person said it had shown too much violence, but another replied that there hadn’t been enough. A completely legal discussion about a legal film screened in a public venue.

The next document [UCPI0000027026] was a report of a WLF meeting, dated 8 December 1971. The speaker at the meeting had just returned from a trip to China and was ‘was clearly very impressed by the Chinese system’. This developed into a group discussion about all aspects of everyday life in China, including the use of acupuncture.

The speaker showed photos of life in China and is reported as saying Britain was ‘in desperate need of change,and that the Chinese methods would work here’; in his opinion ‘violent revolution’ was the means of achieving this change.

THE REVOLUTIONARY WOMEN’S UNION

The Women’s Liberation Front held their AGM on 6 February 1972. They agreed to adopt a new constitution (that meant only women could be members) and new aims. There was also a proposal to change the organisation’s name to the Revolutionary Women’s League, but this was left for another meeting

Its new list of aims said it sought:

• ‘To organise women in general, working class women in particular, to fight for the elimination of all exploitation and oppression and for a socialist society.
• ‘To expose the oppression suffered by women and to relate this to capitalist society and to oppose those who confuse the effects of women’s oppression for the real cause, ie the private ownership of the means of production.’

This is entirely lawful, and not anti-democratic unless, like the spycops, you think democracy and capitalism are the same thing.

The group wanted to achieve these things as a path towards things that sound largely moderate and desirable to modern ears:

• ‘To demand equal opportunities in employment and education.
• ‘To fight for equal pay for work of equal value.
• ‘In order that women have real opportunities to take part in social production, we demand that crèches and nurseries are installed at the place of work, education and in the community, wherever there is a need.
• ‘All women should have the right to have children or not. In order to make this right effective, alongside child-care facilities, adequate contraceptive and abortion information and facilities should be made available free on the NHS.
• ‘To demand maternity leave for a definite period with no loss of pay, in the pre-natal and post-natal periods, and the right to return to the same job, guaranteed by law.
• ‘To fight against all discrimination and injustice suffered by women in all realms of society, in laws as regards marriage and divorce, in the superstructure; customs and culture.
• ‘To fight against the discrimination suffered by unmarried mothers and their children.
• ‘To wage a consistent struggle against male chauvinism and to strive to educate and encourage men to participate in all our activities.
• ‘To take our full part in the struggles against the growing attacks on our standard of living and our democratic rights and against the growing racism and fascist policies of the ruling class.
• ‘To mobilise women to support the anti-imperialist struggles of all oppressed peoples for the realisation of our common aim, the ending of the system of exploitation and oppression.’

ANGRY BRIGADE

Having cited the Angry Brigade as one of her true targets, she was asked about her reporting on them.

The Angry Brigade, a left wing group responsible for around 25 bombings in the early 1970s (the term should be qualified with the fact that they were relatively small devices and, between them, caused slight injury to one person).

Davies had reported [UCPI0000008274] attending a women’s liberation conference in 1972. She wrote that one woman associated with the Angry Brigade gave out copies of their ‘Conspiracy Notes’. The ‘Stoke Newington 8’ – a group of people facing serious charges connected with the Angry Brigade – were reaching out to other radical groups at the time for support.

The meeting was reported as chaotic, with calls for better structure to the discussion being heckled by Gay Liberation Front activists.

That appears to be the extent of her reporting on the Angry Brigade.

BLACK POWER CONNECTIONS

One of Davies’ reports [UCPI0000027028] was about a WLF weekly meeting that took place on 18 November 1971 – again in someone’s home – where 15 people attended.

There was a talk by Leila Hassan from the Black Unity and Freedom Party (BUFP)

Asked if Special Branch had asked her to pay special attention to this group, Davies said ‘not to my knowledge, no’.

Was she aware of the trial of the ‘Mangrove Nine’, a group being prosecuted following an incident in the Mangrove restaurant, a venue that had been raided by (racist) police officers many times?

Davies claimed to know absolutely nothing about this case, and nothing of Leila Hassan’s connection with them.

All in all, it seems Davies had done basically nothing about her supposed true target groups, only mentioning them in passing when they came into the orbit of the WLF.

SO WHAT DID SHE ACTUALLY DO?

The reports Davies made show a pattern of weekly WLF meetings held in the evenings at people’s private homes. They were mostly study groups, reading political texts and discussing them. One example [UCPI0000026990] describes reading ‘Lenin Conversation with Clara Zetkin’ which deals with women’s emancipation in 1920.

Asked how she avoided revealing anything personal about herself, Davies said it was easy because she was never asked. Others liked to talk a lot, and liked to be listened to. Yet she also said that she doesn’t remember those soliloquies mentioning any personal details about any of the people in the group.

She was asked if she ever felt uncomfortable spending time with those women every week, knowing that they didn’t knowing her true identity and role:

‘I was doing a job at the time, so I wasn’t – I don’t think I considered that, no. I was just doing my job.’

SUBVERSIVE BAKED GOODS

According to one of Davies’ reports [UCPI0000010932], the Black Unity and Freedom Party was planning a children’s Christmas party in 1971, and they asked the WLF to contribute home-made sweets and cakes.

Asked why the intention to bake was worthy of reporting by police charged with preventing disorder, Davies seemed to suggest it was a ruse to spring some indoctrination on the kids:

‘They were involving themselves with children and the sweets and cakes were an addition. They wanted to get their philosophy across to as many groups as they could. That was their aim’

Another of Davies’ reports [UCPI0000010907] mentions a jumble sale being organised by the WLF. Again, she defended this because:

‘they would have used it as another opportunity for advertising their aims’

Both of these reports were copied to MI5.

At this point, the fact that Davies herself admits the WLF’s aims didn’t warrant intrusion by undercover police is largely obscured by the absurdity of her claim that a jumble sale was a recruiting ground for radical political activist.

IDLE GOSSIP

Davies reported [UCPI0000010931] a letter which criticised an un-named activist for having an affair, and mentioned the termination of the employment of an un-named person (who may or may not be the same person – we can’t tell because of the name’s redacted) at Banner Books.

Why was it necessary to report this personal gossip?

Davies, yet again, didn’t remember, but accepted she had written the report.

Then how would it have helped effective policing of public order situations?

‘It just shows how the group was functioning… giving people an insight into what was happening at the time.’

She said that it wasn’t felt irrelevant by her managers, as it wouldn’t have got as far being typed-up if that were the case.

DIRECT INFLUENCE

Some of Davies’s reports are on meetings of the WLF Executive Committee. This was a group of six people, and the only way she could have been in those meetings is if she was a member. That required holding office in the group and thereby influencing its direction, something that SDS founder Conrad Dixon had specifically forbidden.

The documents show that somebody called Sandra Davies was elected treasurer of the WLF (the same post that ‘Doug Edwards’ took in the Tower Hamlets branch of the Independent Labour Party).

Despite allegedly having no memory at all being on this Executive Committee, or attending any of these meetings, she was remarkably adamant that she didn’t influence the direction or policies of the group in any way.

The Inquiry returned to Davies’ report of the WLF Executive Committee meeting of February 1972 [UCPI0000010906] again.

This meeting appears to mark a change of leadership and a change of direction for the group.

This was when the idea of changing the group’s name to the Revolutionary Women’s Union (RWU) was first formally proposed, and eventually agreed. As part of such a tiny group, how much influence did Davies have? Was she responsible for its adopting a more radical, ‘Revolutionary’ name?

A month later, Davies reported [UCPI0000010911] on an emergency meeting of the RWU’s Executive Committee.

This time, the Committee decided to suspend three members from the wider group for ‘disruptive behaviour’. They agreed to serve them the three with written notices of suspension, and spend three weeks compiling a dossier with details of their ‘disruptive tactics’. These would then be circulated to all members.

Despite this prolonged, controversial and divisive work being agreed and carried out by the small group, Davies says she remembers none of it.

Did she remember that this internal division then led to reduced enthusiasm and drive within the group?

‘I can’t comment on that. I have no idea’.

Six weeks later, on 4 May 1972, Davies attended another Women’s Revolutionary Union meeting at a member’s home.

According to her report [UCPI0000010913], it opened with comments about a general lack of enthusiasm within the group, older members dropping out and not being replaced by new ones. This appears to be a direct consequence of the suspensions Davies had a hand in. One of those present was convinced that her phone was tapped, and warned/ reminded the others not to discuss their WRU activities over the phone.

END OF DEPLOYMENT

Davies’ deployment was terminated in February 1973. There had been ‘an incident’ involving another officer, HN45, ‘David Robertson, with a risk of his cover being blown. As a result, he, Jill Mosdell and Davies were all withdrawn from the field at the same time.

Despite serving in the Met’s elite subversion, demonstration and disorder unit for two years, Davies said in her witness statement:

‘I did not witness or participate in any public disorder whilst serving with the SDS. I do not even recall going on any marches or demonstrations. I did not witness nor was I involved in any violence.’

Looking back, she continued:

‘I do not think my work really yielded any good intelligence, but I eliminated the Women’s Liberation Front from public order concerns’

That is a mitigation that could be applied to thought-crime spying on literally anyone. More to the point, it was a fact that must have been obvious very early on in her deployment. And yet, she was still there, spying full-time on that group, two years later.

There was no suggestion that her managers gave much thought to whether what she was doing was worthwhile. As with other deployments, it seems that once they had their spycops in place, keeping them there was more important to the police than the information they gathered.

The rights of the people being spied on – who had police officers in their lives and homes week after week – didn’t get a look-in.

Had it not been for the incident with HN45, she probably would have stayed on even longer, as there was ‘no indication’ that her managers wanted to withdraw her. Nor is there any indication she would have left:

‘I was submitting my reports and was guided by superior officers’

Davies told the Inquiry that she stood by what she wrote in her statement:

‘In hindsight, I would not have joined the SDS as I was putting myself too much at risk and there were more worthwhile things I could have been doing… I question whether police officers should be undercover at all’

And that remains her view now, 50 years after being deployed herself.

Here ended the Counsel to the Inquiry’s questioning.

ARE YOU SURE ABOUT THAT?

After this, Ruth Brander, representing non-state core participants at the Inquiry (ie people who were spied on), was permitted to revisit three of the topics raised.

First, Brander asked about the SDS officers meeting at the safe house. Davies had said they much of the day was spent waiting around, yet did not discuss much detail of the deployments that they were all immersed in. What did they talk about?

Davies said the spycops would write their draft reports, and wait for their turn to have one-to-one talks with the managers. She said the atmosphere was good and – despite the common values of the times and them being outnumbered by men – the women officers were not subjected to any sexist behaviour.

So, Brander asked, if they didn’t talk about the people they spied on, what were the topics of conversation?

Davies said it was general chat, probably ‘holidays and houses and families’.

Moving on, Brander asked if, although she said she wasn’t aware of any sexual relationships between spycops and people they targeted, there were other emotional involvements, such as going out for dinner or drinks. Davies insisted not.

SPYING ON CHILDREN

Finally, Brander asked about Davies’s report [UCPI0000010928] on a school strike organised by the Schools Action Union in May 1972.

Several North London schools had taken part in the strike with a list of demands that, rather like the Women’s Liberation Front’s calls for an end to gender inequality, appear moderate:

• Teacher-pupil committees to run the schools
• No school uniforms
• No corporal punishment
• Free school meals and milk
• Freedom to leave school during the lunch break

Davies said that she hadn’t been involved in it, she would just have picked up details from what people said.

Brander asked if she’d given any consideration to the appropriateness of reporting on school children.

‘I wasn’t reporting on children,’ Davies protested.

‘Well, the report here is about action taken by children, isn’t it?’ Brander pressed her.

Davies, her memory apparently intact now, replied:

‘I don’t know anything about the Schools Action Union, I wasn’t involved in any of that.’

Brander’s eyebrow could be heard raising, even through the silent transcription. She pointed out that it’s quite a lengthy report – running to 13 separate numbered paragraphs of intelligence – with a lot of detail. It named several of the children who’d been arrested.

The fact that the typed report exists means that, as with the others, it was discussed and approved by the spycops’ managers.

The accompanying written witness statement from HN348.

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COPS will be live-tweeting all the Inquiry hearings, and producing daily reports like this one for the blog. They will be indexed on our UCPI Public Inquiry page.

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Tranche 1, Phase 1, Day 12

17 November 2020

Opening statement from Dave Smith

Witness hearings procedural meeting

Tuesday 17 November was scheduled to be a day off for the Undercover Policing Inquiry, but two items pushed their way onto the schedule.

Dave Smith, blacklisted trade unionist and core participant at the Inquiry, was due to give his opening statement along with everyone else last week. However, it was dramatically withdrawn after a legal challenge to its contents; specifically, that he was going to give the real name of one of the spycops who spied on him, Carlo Soracchi. This came even though the name has been in the public domain for 18 months and you just read it at the end of the previous sentence.

This led to anyone referring to Soracchi (real name of SDS undercover ‘Carlo Neri’) at the Inquiry having to promise not to say his actual name. After that was sorted out, Smith contracted Covid so had a further few days’ delay until today.

The other matter was a meeting of the barristers representing the various core participants at the Inquiry – police and those that were spied on – about the format of questioning witnesses. It followed a couple of grumpy exchanges between the Chair and Rajiv Menon QC, who represents non-state core participants, including the one where Mitting threatened Menon with being silenced.

Dave Smith
Blacklisted trade unionist

Smith explained that he spoke on behalf of the Blacklist Support Group (BSG), representing union members who were unlawfully blacklisted by major construction firms.

When the BSG first spoke about being blacklisted for union activities, they were ignored by the authorities and ridiculed as conspiracy theorists. But it isn’t a conspiracy theory, it’s conspiracy fact – and it involves the collusion of the police and the security services.

TRADE UNIONS HAVE ALWAYS BEEN BLACKLISTED

Trade unions arose during time of the industrial revolution and British Empire, Smith said. As dynastic fortunes were made in the slave trade, Parliament – an institution then comprised solely of the very wealthy – was passing the Combinations Acts to make trade unions illegal.

State agents have spied on working class organisation ever since. Hostility towards trade unions – just like racism and sexism – became so deeply ingrained in the mindset of the British establishment that it has carried on through the generations.

In 1834, year of the Tolpuddle Martyrs, a meeting of the Master Builders in London agreed that every craftsman wanting work had to sign ‘the document’, a declaration that they would never join a trade union. Failure to sign meant dismissal or refusal of work which, in turn, meant destitution.

In 1919, a group of Conservative MPs, captains of industry, and ex-military intelligence officers set up the Economic League, ‘a crusade for capitalism’, keeping left wing union activists under surveillance and out of work. They had direct formal and informal links with police and MI5. Thousands of workers lost work.

THE CONSULTING ASSOCIATION

The Undercover Policing Inquiry will find that, after the Economic League closed down in 1993, Cullum McAlpine, director of Sir Robert McAlpine Ltd, bought the construction part of the Economic League’s blacklist to set up The Consulting Association.

This secret body was comprised of major construction companies including: Balfour Beatty, Laing O’Rourke, Costain, Skanska, Kier, Bam, Vinci, AMEC and AMEY. Between them, they illegally orchestrated the blacklisting of construction workers.

The Consulting Association was run by former Economic League employee, Ian Kerr. The Information Commissioner’s Office raided it in 2009, seizing files on 3,213 people. Details in the files included not only names, addresses and National Insurance numbers, but photos, phone numbers, car registrations, and information about the subject’s medical history and family members.

When a blacklisted worker was elected as a union representative, or when they raised concerns about safety on site, submitted an employment tribunal or took part in a protest, it was recorded on their Consulting Association blacklist file.

The Consulting Association didn’t have spies everywhere. Instead, construction companies nominated a contact, usually a director, who received information from managers on site and forwarded it to Ian Kerr.

INDUSTRIAL SCALE INDUSTRIAL BLACKLISTING

Every job applicant on major building projects had their name checked against the Consulting Association blacklist. If there was a match, the worker would be refused work or dismissed.

Each blacklisting name-check cost £2.20. The last set of invoices for Sir Robert McAlpine alone, when the company was building the Olympic Stadium, was for £28,000. This isn’t a few managers chatting after work, it’s industrial-scale, systematic blacklisting of union activists.

Because of blacklisting, in the middle of the 1990s building boom there were highly qualified and experienced workers who found themselves virtually unemployable. While many construction workers took their families on holidays, blacklisted workers defaulted on their mortgages.

THE HUMAN COST

Partners of blacklisted workers had to take two or three jobs to keep the family afloat. One wife of a blacklisted worker has spoken about the painful decision not to have a second child because of the family’s financial hardship. Families lost their homes and there were divorces.

Smith described how, in the 1990s he was a worker and trade union safety representative on the Jubilee Line Extension. Some of his fellow workers who took part in a safety dispute over the lack of fire alarms at London Bridge station ended up being blacklisted.

Some of those workers went on to take their own lives. No one can say that blacklisting was the sole reason for any suicide, but prolonged periods of unemployment and family tensions are not good for anyone’s mental health. Blacklisting has contributed to deaths.

Blacklisting causes workers’ deaths in other ways. When union safety reps are sacked for highlighting unsafe conditions such as asbestos, electrical safety or poor scaffolding, it sends a message to other workers and creates a climate of fear where they’re too scared to report concerns.

As a result, the blacklisting of safety reps is a factor in workplace fatality rates in the construction industry – consistently the sector with the highest number of deaths of any major industry in the UK.

Parliament was so outraged by The Consulting Association that it introduced the Blacklisting Regulations 2010. In 2016, a High Court case was settled when the UK’s biggest building firms made a public apology and paid damages for their blacklisting activities.

SPYCOPS BREAK THE LAW

But the Undercover Policing Inquiry will find that it wasn’t just the major firms who kept union activists under surveillance and contributed to blacklisting – it was the same political police who are at the heart of the Inquiry.

The police’s internal spycops investigation, Operation Herne, produced a report on blacklisting which said:

‘Police, including Special Branches and the Security Services, supplied information to the blacklist funded by the country’s major construction firms, The Consulting Association’

The police investigation found that, prior to The Consulting Association’s foundation in the 1990s:

‘Special Branches throughout the UK had direct contact with the Economic League, public authorities, private industry and trade unions.’

The Undercover Policing Inquiry has already seen that, from the start of the Special Demonstration Squad (SDS) in 1968, spying on left-wing trade union activists was a central part of the unit’s activities.

Special Branch files were effectively a database for MI5, private firms and others to find out about trade union activists. Indeed, many trade unions had their own dedicated Special Branch files.

SPECIAL BRANCH INDUSTRIAL UNIT

The Special Branch Industrial Unit was established in 1970, just two years after the SDS, ‘with the aim of monitoring trade unionists from teaching to the docks’ and developing a network of industry contacts that included company directors, as well as General Secretaries of trade unions.

The police’s Operation Herne report said the Special Branch Industrial Unit had a dedicated officer as official liaison with Economic League. Industry informers had two-way sharing of info with Special Branch’s Industrial Unit. Intelligence gathered by both undercover and uniformed officers was available to the Industrial Unit and was passed on to both major employers and blacklisting organisations.

SDS spycops often worked for the Industrial Unit, before or after being deployed undercover. One was HN336, who told us yesterday that Chief Superintendent Herbert Guy ‘Bert’ Lawrenson, head of the Metropolitan Police Special Branch’s C Squad in the SDS’s early days, went to work for the Economic League.

For all its admissions, Operation Herne didn’t even mention Lawrenson. Blacklisted workers expect the Inquiry to examine the relationship between officers from the Special Branch Industrial Unit and their former boss, the man who quite possibly hired & trained them, Bert Lawrenson.

SPYCOPS DATABASE

As well as Special Branch files, police intelligence on political activists was kept on the National Domestic Extremism Database (NDED), originally compiled by the National Public Order Intelligence Unit (NPOIU), a sister unit to the SDS and one of the main topics of the Inquiry.

This database holds information on thousands of citizens who the State considers ‘domestic extremists’, many of whom have committed no crime whatsoever. Another unit responsible for the database was the National Extremism Tactical Coordination Unit (NETCU).

Superintendent Steve Pearl, NETCU’s former head, told the Daily Telegraph that the unit was set up to:

‘take over MI5’s covert role watching groups such as the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament, trade-union activists and left-wing journalists’.

The Consulting Association constitution required companies to send a director to secret quarterly meetings.

In October 2008, Detective Chief Inspector Gordon Mills of NETCU gave a presentation to a secret Consulting Association meeting that included eight senior managers from blacklisting firms. He told them of ‘emerging threats’ from the left wing, for which ‘companies needed to have strong vetting procedures in place’. Bear in mind that this was a police officer helping the Consulting Association, a company whose work was illegal.

In a witness statement compiled for the High Court blacklisting trial, Ian Kerr, Consulting Association CEO, said that NETCU:

‘wanted an output for their information… I gave them the email addresses of the contacts in the construction industry and they would feed them information’

NETCU and the Special Branch Industrial Unit, along with all the spycops units, are now absorbed into the Met’s Counter Terrorism Command. State spying on unions is now classified as counter-terrorism!

Sharing of police intelligence across all sectors of industry continues through Operation Fairway and the National Domestic Extremism and Disorder Intelligence Unit’s Industrial Liaison section. In 2010, the National Coordinator for Special Branch urged police forces across the UK to become ‘more proactive’ in putting on Special Branch briefings, to share information with academics and contacts in business and the public sector.

Special Branch clearly know that when they tell an employer someone is on a database of extremists, it will affect lives. It is the only possible result – and, therefore, the only real purpose – of their sharing information on trade unionists.

PERSONAL SPYCOPS

Smith then focused on a small group of union activists on the blacklist of which he was part. From the early 1990s until mid 2000s, they were spied on by three separate SDS officers: Peter Francis, Mark Jenner and Carlo Soracchi.

Mark Jenner infiltrated the construction union UCATT as ‘Mark Cassidy’. Claiming to be a joiner, he attended Hackney Branch of UCATT, and his union subscriptions were paid by a bank account set up by Special Branch.

In his undercover role, Jenner attended picket lines, protests, meetings and conferences. After each meeting, his partner recalled him at their shared home typing up pages of handwritten notes, presumably to be fed back to Special Branch as intelligence reports.

Jenner also infiltrated the Colin Roach Centre, which was home to Hackney Trade Union Resource Centre, and two small union groups in which Jenner actively inveigled himself; the Building Workers Safety Campaign and the Brian Higgins Defence Campaign.

Jenner actually chaired meetings and used his position as ‘a worker fighting for safety at work’ to contact union branch secretaries from unions including UCATT, UNISON, TGWU, RMT, EPIU, NUT and CPSA.

He wrote letters to safety body London Hazards Centre, and to INQUEST, the charity that supports people campaigning over deaths in police custody. Brian Higgins and John Jones were leaders of groups Jenner infiltrated, and both have entries on their blacklist files relating to those campaigns.

Smith personally remembers Jenner being particularly disruptive at meetings they both attended in Conway Hall, London. While spying on picket lines over unpaid wages at Waterloo, Jenner also came into contact and spied on other people, some of whom are now core participants in the Undercover Policing Inquiry.

One of these is Steve Hedley, currently Senior Assistant General Secretary of the RMT rail union. In the 1990s, Hedley was in a union delegation to Northern Ireland as part of the peace process organised by the Hackney Trade Union Resource Centre and the Colin Roach Centre. Mark Jenner was also part of that delegation and stayed at Hedley’s family home during the trip.

ANTI-FASCIST & PROUD

The trade union movement is proud of opposing fascism. At the time of spycops Peter Francis, Carlo Soracchi and Mark Jenner’s deployments, fascists were terrorising communities, planting bombs and committing racist murders. They also targeted union offices.

Construction union activists stewarded labour movement events to protect them from fascist thugs. One loose network, of which Smith was a part, who did this was known as the ‘Away Team’. Spycops Peter Francis, Mark Jenner and Carlo Soracchi all spied on them.

Smith flatly accuses Mark Jenner, and through him the British State, of interfering with the internal democratic processes of an independent trade union. They did it by covertly joining the union UCATT, participating in debates and voting at meetings on policy motions; by distributing literature favouring a particular candidate; by calling for the sacking of an elected union convener; and by creating divisions.

Jenner also deceived ‘Alison’, an activist for the National Union of Teachers, into a five year co-habiting relationship during his deployment (Her account of this was heard on Day 6). Misogynist abuse of women activists is one of the most disgraceful human rights violations of the whole spycops scandal.

CARLO SORACCHI

When Jenner’s deployment was coming to an end, another spycops officer, Carlo Soracchi, using the name ‘Carlo Neri’ was sent to spy on the same group of activists.

On more than one occasion, Soracchi incited Frank Smith, Dan Gilman and Joe Batty to fire bomb a charity shop in North London. Joe Batty was a TGWU union steward. He has been denied core participant status by the Inquiry.

Soracchi claimed the shop in question was run by Roberto Fiore, leader of Italian fascist party Forza Nuova. Fiore fled Italy while being wanted by Italian police in connection with the terrorist bombing of Bologna railway station in 1980 that killed 85 people.

Smith accuses Carlo Soracchi of being an agent provocateur, of deliberately attempting to entrap union members by inciting them to commit arson. The spied-upon activists wanted nothing to do with the idea: they are trade union and anti-fascist activists, not terrorists.

Soracchi also deceived a Transport and General Workers Union rep from a homelessness charity, Donna McLean, into a relationship. She was one of two women he targeted for a relationship, the other being ‘Lindsey’.

Soracchi, having orchestrated a split from Donna, then moved in with Steve Hedley as a lodger. In October 2004, Hedley was victimised and sacked from the Channel Tunnel Rail Link project, a dispute that appears on his blacklisting file. Soracchi turned up on the picket line, spying on union members while supposedly showing solidarity with Hedley.

Smith mused on the bizarre fact that he was prohibited from saying Carlo Soracchi’s real name in this statement. He’s known it for over five years. When he published the book Blacklisted: The Secret War Between Big Business & Union Activists in 2016, he opted not to use Soracchi’s real name.

However, it’s now been in the public domain for 18 months. Four weeks ago Smith had an article published in Tribune in which he referred to Soracchi’s incitement to commit arson, using his real name.

It’s another one of the topsy-turvy aspects of the Inquiry that it, as the body charged with uncovering the truth about spycops, is the one place that we can’t say the spycop’s name.

PETER FRANCIS

Spycops did not merely spy on trade unionists: the intelligence they gathered was passed on to employers and found its way onto the blacklists.

Former spycop Peter Francis admits opening the Special Branch file on Frank Smith in the early 1990s. It included entries about his anti-racist role in the Away Team and his relationship with an American woman, Lisa Teuscher.

Francis says the blacklist file on Frank Smith uses his appraisal and almost his exact words: ‘under constant watch officially and seen as politically dangerous’. It’s laughable to suggest a construction manager could be the source of that.

Francis also gathered intelligence on Lisa Teuscher, primarily because of her role in the anti-racist campaign group Youth Against Racism in Europe. Spycops had her refused Indefinite Leave To Remain in the UK. She has a blacklist file, despite not working in construction at all.

SYSTEMATIC SHARING

No-one is suggesting spycops personally provided info to the blacklist. That was not their job. It was more senior officers from the Special Branch Industrial Unit or NETCU who were tasked with sharing information with ‘industry contacts’.

Another glaring example of information being fed to The Consulting Association blacklist from Special Branch relates to an incident in November 1999. Every Remembrance Day, the fascist National Front lay a wreath at the Cenotaph. That year, Frank Smith, Dan Gilman and Steve Hedley were there at a counter-demonstration.

Operation Herne has confirmed that the three core participants were observed by police on the day and that intelligence about their participation at the Cenotaph was added to Special Branch files. Within a few days, the same information appears on the blacklist, marked as supplied by Costain.

Two senior Costain managers are known to have had close relationships with Special Branch spycops: Dudley Barrett (now retired) and Gayle Burton (currently a senior executive at the Jockey Club).

If the purpose of the spycop units was genuinely, as the police claim, to detect serious criminality or public disorder, why, in over ten years of spying, were none of these people ever charged or prosecuted with a serious criminal offence? This is nothing to do with disorder or crime, it’s purely political policing.

Smith made another accusation: that the Special Branch Industrial Unit and NETCU supplied information to the blacklist.

PARTISAN POLICING

Despite what the police claim, they are not neutral. The State is never neutral in a major dispute between big business and trade unions. Police collusion in blacklisting is not an aberration, or the actions of a rogue unit, it is standard operating procedures for political police.

Seven million people in the UK are members of trade unions. And the unions are simply their members, rather than something separate. To spy on any union members or officials is to spy on the union as a whole. Those seven million deserve to know which of their branches were spied on, and which reps weren’t who they thought they were.

We want the names of the trade unions and all of the 1,000+ political groups that were reported on by the spycops to be released. But we want much more than that. We want the names of the contacts, and the companies that were provided with information about union members.

BLACKLISTING BEYOND CONSTRUCTION

We have found the construction industry’s blacklist, but clearly other industries have their own versions. The BBC kept a Staff Transfer Register (of those vetted by MI5). The Subversion in Public Life database, run by the security services, was used to blacklist civil servants. The retail sector’s National Staff Dismissal Register blacklist was actually funded by a £1million grant from the Home Office!

The 2002 BBC documentary True Spies featured an undercover officer explaining that Ford’s Halewood factory in Liverpool provided Special Branch with a list of all job applicants to vet. One of the spycops featured in it stated:

‘It was very, very important that trade unions were monitored… We were expected to check these lists. You call it blacklisting and that’s what it is. In any war there are always going to be casualties’.

PRIVATISATION OF STATE SPYING

Assistant Chief Constable Anton Setchell was the officer in charge of the UK police ‘domestic extremism’ spycops between 2004 and 2010. He is currently head of global security at Laing O’Rourke, one of the construction firms who worked with spycops to create and maintain the blacklist.

Superintendent Steve Pearl, who ran NETCU, is now a non-executive director at Agenda Security Services. Barrie Gane, the former deputy head of MI6, sits on the Board of Threat Response International. Both companies report on activists for corporate clients.

Control Risks, a private security firm that employs ex-State spies, had a £59,000 contract with Crossrail to keep union activists under surveillance. Those spied on included Frank Morris, first union rep on the publicly funded project, who was sacked within days of being elected.

Given the mass privatisation over the past four decades, has there been a blurring of the lines between State and corporate spying? Which companies got contracts? How much taxpayers’ money have they been given? If State spying is now privatised, what oversight is there?

WE UNCOVERED THE TRUTH

Smith said that the Blacklist Support Group is extremely sceptical about the Undercover Policing Inquiry’s chances of success. Everything we know so far about the spycops scandal in relation to trade unions and blacklisting is known because activists have uncovered it.

Steve Acheson has one of the largest blacklist files in the country and was almost unemployable for nearly a decade, nearly losing his home. It is people like Steve who have helped uncover the truth – not the police.

When the Blacklist Support Group first complained about police involvement in blacklisting in 2012, the Metropolitan Police refused to even accept the complaint! After lawyers got the complaint accepted, the Independent Police Complaints Commission, confirmed that:

‘it is likely that all Special Branches were involved in providing information about prospective employees.’

NETCU, a spycops unit that operated for seven years, now claims that all their files have been destroyed, and not a single page still exists. That is a blatant lie. Not only must their files still exist, I imagine they’re still being accessed.

As the Hillsborough families, the wrongly imprisoned striking miners, the Birmingham 6, and so many others can attest, it’s not name-calling to say police are capable of lying. So why do the police get the benefit of the doubt?

As recently as 2018, the police were telling us, and the Inquiry, that only one spycops officer had joined a union. It was clear then that this was nonsense. Any officer spying on unions without being a member would have stuck out a mile. They’re still lying to us.

We want our police files. But the police say they ‘neither confirm nor deny’ that they have such a file, due to national security.

TRUTH DENIED

In July 2018, the Blacklist Support Group held a meeting with Inquiry team, and specifically requested the release of police files on Brian Higgins and John Jones. This was because those two core participants were both severely ill and in their 70s.

The BSG was given assurances by the Chair of the Inquiry, Sir John Mitting, that everything possible would be done to make this disclosure happen. More than two years later, the files have still not been released. Brian has died.

What possible national security reason can there be for denying a dying man access to his police file from the 1990s? Brian Higgins’ family are outraged at their treatment by the Inquiry.

The Inquiry is relying on reports from the police’s internal investigation, Operation Herne, yet they are selective, partisan publications. What’s striking is their use of language. They qualify terms, such as ‘alleged victimisation’ and ‘supposed blacklisting’, even though they had cast-iron proof in their own files.

There are 74 appendices to Operation Herne’s report – including witness statements with the former Special Branch contact with the Economic League – none of which have been disclosed to the Blacklist Support Group.

The Herne officers called Smith’s book, ‘Blacklisted’, ‘the most comprehensive collection of material on the subject’, a fact that demonstrates the need for accounts from activists who have uncovered the truth to be treated by the Inquiry with as much, if not more, validity as witness statements from the officers.

The 1968-72 spycops’ annual reports that have been published by the Inquiry should be seen for what they are: PR exercises for their bosses. The Inquiry must stop taking police documents as objective.

LIES, DELAYS & EXCLUSION

Rather than being transparent and accessible, the Inquiry has set up as many barriers as possible to prevent core participants, the public and the media from being able to view or listen to proceedings. Seeing the oral evidence is only possible for 60 people who have pre-registered, who must then travel to London during a lockdown to sit in a windowless, unventilated room and watch the proceedings on a TV screen.

The only other way to view evidence is via a transcript feed, which is like being transported back to the 1980s to watch it on Ceefax. This just doesn’t work. People get their news from the media, and the Inquiry’s system makes it impossible for journalists to check quotes which, in turn, means they can’t post reports in time for the TV and radio news.

BBC reporter Dominic Casciani said:

‘from a practical perspective as a working reporter, a public inquiry becomes largely impossible to report’

At the start of each day, the Chair states that:

‘members of the public are entitled to hear the same public evidence as I will hear and to reach your own conclusions about it.’

This is patently not true. Though it’s easily resolvable. The Inquiry could live-stream all of the evidence, exactly as the Grenfell public inquiry is doing. Unfortunately there seems little chance of this, and we seem to be watching a good old-fashioned Establishment cover-up take place before our eyes.

DON’T EXPECT JUSTICE

The treatment of blacklisted workers by the British legal system does not make us optimistic. The multinational corporations that ruined so many lives were literally able to buy themselves out of a High Court trial involving over 700 claimants.

Blacklisted workers do not expect justice from the State investigating itself. Blacklisted workers are participating in the slim hope that some evidence of the anti-union bias, institutional racism, and institutional sexism of the British State’s spying machinery will be exposed.

Keeping this dark underbelly of anti-democratic political policing hidden is against the public interest. It only helps the perpetrators, not the survivors, nor the British public.

The police can claim all they like that they were protecting democracy. But by spying on trade union members and colluding with our blacklisting, spycops are actually just protecting big business and capitalism.

For the avoidance of all doubt: capitalism and democracy are not the same thing.

PDF of the accompanying written opening statement from Dave Smith on behalf of the Blacklist Support Group

Witness hearings procedural meeting

 

The Inquiry then held a meeting of four of the barristers representing core participants, in the hope of agreeing a format for asking questions of witnesses.

All this revolves around the “Rule 10” issue, referring to legislation setting out guidance for how a public inquiry should work. Rule 10 is not permission to ask questions of a witness, but the right to submit them to the Inquiry to have them asked. There is no requirement for the Inquiry to accept those questions to be asked, or to let a non-Inquiry barrister ask the questions – that is all at the discretion of the Inquiry’s Chair.

At the moment, the various lawyers submit their lists of questions to one barrister, the ‘Counsel for the Inquiry’, who then deals with the witness. The idea is that this stops it turning into an ‘adversarial process’ that feels like a criminal trial, with witnesses trying not to be ‘caught out’. It means placing a lot of trust in the impartiality, thoroughness and skill of the Inquiry Counsel.

Over the last week, the barristers for some of the different categories of core participants have been submitting the questions they would like to have asked alongside those being asked by the Inquiry. Some of our questions have been accepted by the Inquiry and asked. This has allowed us to unpick some of the points that matter most to us.

NO FURTHER QUESTIONS

However, there has been an issue with this system. Once a question has elicited an answer, it has not been possible to follow up with another question. We have said all along that our input at this stage would be necessary for the effective examination of witnesses’ evidence. Another issue is the Inquiry’s reluctance to accept questions about the wider issues, such as institutional sexism, rather than about specific ‘facts’, as if the Inquiry is buying the police line that the past is a different country.

Last week, the Inquiry allowed two of the barristers representing non-state core participants to ask questions of witnesses. However, the request to do this from one of those barristers, by Rajiv Menon QC, led to Mittings’ extraordinarily fractious behaviour.

Specifically, SDS undercover and administrator Joan Hillier was asked about the possibility that her close colleague, Helen Crampton, had deceived someone she was spying on into a relationship. The Chair, Sir John Mitting, felt that this question was sprung on Hillier without warning and was therefore not fair.

THRASHING IT OUT

The meeting today included Menon, with Ruth Brander (also working for the non-state core participants), Oliver Sanders QC (representing 114 undercover officers), and Peter Skelton QC (from the Metropolitan Police).

Mitting began by saying that the format for questioning witnesses remains a ‘work in progress’. There will be a meeting in January for those involved, to discuss how it will work for the next round of hearings. These are currently scheduled to take place in March or April 2021.

All four lawyers said that was fine with them.

Mitting said to Menon that Rule 10 is there to allow the Inquiry to control its proceedings. He listed three incidents that he wanted to give Menon a dressing-down for:

1. Tariq Ali, answering a question of Menon’s, had named an individual, breaching a Restriction Order on divulging the name.

“This isn’t a court”, said Mitting. We can’t explore every relevant issue, we have statutory limits. I have to protect people’s rights and privacy.

2. Menon’s question to spycop John Graham (about taking part in a ballot at a political meeting that he had infiltrated) was described by Mitting as ‘unhelpful’. He agreed it did not cause any harm, but he still didn’t like it.

3. Mitting felt that Menon questioning former officer Joan Hillier about her colleague Helen Crampton (who may have had a relationship with someone she was spying on in the Vietnam Solidarity Campaign, George Cochrane) was bang out of order.

Mitting said witnesses must have significant advance warning of what they’ll be asked about. We can’t let you do this stuff, it’s not a trial, we have different processes than a court.

MENON NAMES NAMES

Menon said that Ali was asked by the Inquiry about a meeting at the Notting Hill branch of the Vietnam Solidarity Campaign. A spycops’ report was on the screen, with a redacted name of someone who’d distributed a leaflet. Ali couldn’t comment without knowing the name.

Menon explained that he knew the name. He believed the man to be dead and so unaffected by privacy issues, and hoped that telling Ali the name would help jog his memory. Which, indeed, it did.

It turns out the man in question is not dead. Menon said if he’d known that he wouldn’t have named him, and he apologised. It was also this incident which led him to be more vague when questioning Joan Hillier later on.

Menon emphasised that these mistakes are the inevitable result of having to process thousands of pages of police documents in a short space of time, check the facts and formulate questions. They received 5,500 pages with only four weeks to go before the hearings began.

MENON DE-VOTED

Menon then turned to his questioning of officer John Graham, defending it stoutly. Graham was one of nine undercover officers present at a meeting that voted on the route of a demonstration. Menon said it was directly relevant to the Inquiry, not because the nine might have swung the decision one way or the other, but because we should be told how the police voted.

If, say, they voted with the people wanting a confrontational route, then it’s directly in the Inquiry’s remit – it’s about spycops and public order policing. Either way voting at all is contrary to Special Demonstration Squad founder Conrad Dixon’s document on the ‘penetration’ of groups, which insists they eschew active roles.

Mitting admitted that “no harm whatever had been done by that line of questioning”, and that his doubts about its usefulness were just a “matter of opinion” between him and Menon.

MENON & THE FIRST SPYCOP RELATIONSHIP

Menon then addressed his questioning of Joan Hillier. The issue of officers deceiving people they spied on into relationships is a major theme of the Inquiry, and here we have a strong indication that it was happening from the start. He said Hillier is the only surviving officer who infiltrated the group (Notting Hill branch of the Vietnam Solidarity Campaign), so he would be failing in his professional duty both to his clients and to the Inquiry’s seeking the truth if he didn’t ask questions of the only possible witness.

Menon said he only got the information the night before. He drafted specific questions (albeit without sources) and sent them to the Inquiry lawyers, but they didn’t bother getting back to him. When Counsel to the Inquiry failed to ask about this, he applied to ask these questions himself. At the time, Mitting agreed that this was an important issue, and gave permission for the questions to go ahead, so it’s a bit rich to complain.

Menon stands by his decision to raise this issue, and has suggested that better communication on the Inquiry’s part might prevent problems of this kind arising again.

Mitting said that the outside world doesn’t understand the Covid-times problems of getting documents to everyone who needs them. He recognises that it puts a lot of time pressure on lawyers, but that’s going to be the way it is.

Menon asked if documents could be handed out piecemeal, as soon as they’re redacted and whatever, rather than piling them up and dropping them in a massive stack at short notice. He wants maximum time with as much of the evidence as possible. He requested that materials for the next hearings are made available sooner rather than later (eg in December rather than February), to him and the other non-state lawyers, so they have time to go through the evidence in advance of the next set of hearings.

BRANDER: GIVE US TIME

Ruth Brander (also representing non-state core participants) said it would help to have a proper explanation about exactly what the Inquiry’s delays are. Victims of spycops feel like they’re at the bottom of the list for their input, the last to get the disclosed files, and left with explanations.

She said non-state core participants will be able to give real value to the understanding of documents yet they don’t get to see them until they’re made public, after they’ve been brought up as evidence in the Inquiry. It makes her clients feel repeatedly excluded from the Inquiry. (Non state core participants have repeatedly raised this issue with the Inquiry Legal Team, but been consistently ignored. It is seen as another way in which the Inquiry is skewed in favour of the police, who obviously have access to the files that they themselves made.)

Brander pointed out that if the non-state core participants only see the material “for the first time, as it’s passing by their eyes on the screen, they have virtually no opportunity to feed into the process”,

Mitting said that he asks for questions for witnesses to be handed in a week in advance, and they generally do get asked, so what’s the problem?

Brander said both she and Menon struggle with the seven-day deadline because she’s not allowed to share the disclosed police documents with most of her clients. For most, they first see the evidence as it rolls by on the screen during the hearing. At the end of each day, she receives queries from her clients wondering why certain questions weren’t asked.

Especially, the women deceived into relationships want to know about the origins of the practice, but aren’t allowed to see documents unless they relate to the period that the particular officer was involved in.

BRANDER: EVIDENCE ALREADY SHOWS WE NEED ACCESS

Brander noted that we’ve had two officers this week who admitted going out for dinner and drinks with women they spied on very early in the history of the spycops units, and that they did it to bolster their credibility. This is important and relevant to the women later abused by officers, but they don’t get to suggest questions because they don’t see the material in advance.

Brander made a solid proposal, asking for the remainder of this phase – namely this week – to have ten minutes at the end of witnesses’ evidence for non-state questioning. This will allow her to communicate with clients who’ve come up with questions while following the hearing. She emphasised that this would assist the Chair in his role, not just be some kind of ‘favour’ to her.

She then said she wants to broaden the scope of questioning, not keep it limited to people directly affected by that individual witness. The women deceived into relationships have a lot of knowledge and expertise that others can’t bring to bear on this. Black justice campaigns and others will be in a similar expert position to see the systemic issues and ask the right questions of the witnesses to reveal the over-arching themes.

POLICE LAWYERS

Skelton represents the Metropolitan Police. This is the organisation which tried to strike out court cases brought against them by the women, and caused years of delay to this Inquiry, by applying for every officer to be given total anonymity and every hearing to be conducted in private).

He said ‘the Met hasn’t improperly delayed the disclosure process’. He added that he knew Menon didn’t believe him but his clients hope that the Inquiry does.

That out of the way, Skelton said that Menon’s questioning of Hillier was an ‘issue of fairness’ and suggested that such contentious issues need more consideration. Hillier should have been told she’d be asked about Helen Crampton’s alleged relationship, and seen the evidence if it exists. This can’t be allowed to happen again.

Skelton said the Inquiry is inquisitorial not adversarial, it’s not trying to build a case. Rule 10, under which witnesses are questioned by a single lawyer working for the Inquiry, encourages witnesses to give ‘free and open evidence’ because they feel the questioner is neutral, not hostile. He took the trouble to specify that this was especially important for elderly witnesses like these, who have felt ‘personally under attack’ for many years

Skelton concluded by saying that everyone wants to see their questions asked, but that would have to apply to everyone and would be long-winded and unwieldy (and costly). The Met are satisfied with the current, ‘hybrid’ arrangement, and would like Mitting only to allow extra questions when there are ‘significant factual disputes’.

Sanders, representing a lot of individual officers (including HN328 and HN336), endorsed Skelton’s words. And criticised Menon for asking questions of HN328 last week without Mitting’s express permission. Police witnesses aren’t alleged to have done anything wrong, he said, referring to the subjects of an Inquiry into the wrong-doing of police officers. It unsettles them to be asked things they didn’t expect. Some of the non-state core participants have partisan and hostile views about the officers, he said. The police hate the idea of the non-state legal representatives getting ten minutes to effectively cross-examine them.

David Barr (Counsel to the Inquiry) said Rule 10 avoids delay and repetition, makes it fairer and keeps costs down. It’s more work for lawyers, certainly, but basically worth it.

Mitting said he’d discuss this issue with Barr and get back to everyone.

MITTING: FEELING BETRAYED

Before the break, Brander brought up another issue. The system of suggesting questions in advance cannot work when her clients who would have questions to suggest don’t see the evidence in advance. Either they need access to the evidence in advance, or else they have to be allowed to ask questions at the end. To have neither is “have both hands tied together behind our backs” and shuts us out.

Mitting then made a really insensitive criticism of ‘Rosa‘, one of the women who was deceived into a relationship by spycop Jim Boyling. Mitting said that multiple core participants have asked for a live-stream to their homes, like Mitting has to his. He has only granted this request to one person, ‘Rosa’, because of her exceptional circumstances. When she applied , she said she didn’t want these circumstances to be made public.

Mitting said he was surprised that Phillippa Kaufmann QC’s opening statement last week included a detailed description of Rosa’s story and circumstances, using a lot of the same phrasing that she’d previously wanted kept confidential.

Brander seemed taken aback, unsure of the exact basis of Mitting’s complaint. It wasn’t relevant to the question of seeing evidence in advance, it was more like venting something that had been bothering him for a while. His tone firmly indicated a sense of having been hoodwinked in some way.

Brander said she’d try to speak to Rosa but could certainly affirm that there is no doubt to the truth of Rosa’s statement. Rather it appears she decided it was OK to mention her circumstances in public in the specific context of Kaufmann talking about exactly what spycops did to women they abused.

PROCEDURE DECISION

The Inquiry took a break for Mitting and Barr to discuss the changes to the procedure of questioning witnesses. They came back with the decision that for the rest of this phase – i.e., until Thursday, with only two witnesses – once Counsel for the Inquiry has finished asking the aggregated questions from the various lawyers, the hearing will pause for 10 minutes and the lawyers can tell Mitting if they’ve anything additional to ask.

Mitting spelled out that there is no way this will be the format for the next hearings, but a better system will have been designed by then. Brander and Menon thanked him.

MITTING: ALOOF AND REMOTE

Brander raised Mitting’s querying of Rosa, saying Rosa wants to make a public response as:

‘she was quite alarmed that her integrity was called into question in a public hearing without advance notice’

As for the chronology, Brander explained, Rosa’s refusal to agree to her application being made public was a week before the Opening Statement was finalised, which included a lot of the same details. It was a very difficult and painful process for Rosa to feel she could put her story in a public Opening Statement made to the Inquiry. She took it right to the deadline because it was so unsettling for her.

Mitting said he accepted all that unreservedly, and that he never meant to criticise her integrity:

‘It’s not necessary, frankly, for her to make a public response, but she’d free to do so if she wishes’.

This is yet another example of his absolute failure to understand what he’s dealing with. He treated it as if Rosa had somehow got one over on him, or debased his precious gift of confidentiality. The fact that he brought it up in response to a request for live-streaming speaks volumes too; the subject was public streaming, yet he didn’t talk about that, but went off into something that appears to have stuck in his craw since last week and he can’t shake it.

His final comment, with the dismissively barbed ‘frankly’ jutting out, showed that he has no understanding of the scale of the trauma Rosa and the other women face. Nor, indeed, of the way that trauma in general produces conflicting intense feelings.

Many of those abused by spycops simultaneously feel that they want the world to know their story, but also that they’ve been invaded too much and can’t stand the pain of the slightest thing more being taken from them. When dealing with the huge trauma that comes from having your life violated by spycops, it is hugely important for victims to have some semblance of control over the narrative of their own lives.

Mitting showed more concern for his feeling put-out at having a decision seemingly undermined than for all the unspeakable horror that Rosa has been subjected to and her right to tell of it as she see fit, despite having had it explained to him so unflinchingly and eloquently by Phillippa Kaufmann QC.

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COPS will be live-tweeting all the Inquiry hearings, and producing daily reports like this one for the blog. They will be indexed on our UCPI Public Inquiry page.

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