UCPI Daily Report, 21 April 2021

Tranche 1, Phase 2, Day 1

21 April 2021

Opening Statements from:

David Barr QC, Counsel to the Inquiry
Peter Skelton QC, representing the Metropolitan Police Commissioner
Oliver Sanders QC, representing 114 spycops

Graphic: The Most Covert Secret Public Inquiry Ever

On 21 April 2021, Tranche 1, Phase 2 of the Undercover Policing Inquiry (UCPI) got underway. It will examine the ac tions of the Special Demonstration Squad, 1973-82.

David Barr QC

Counsel to the Inquiry

David Barr QC

David Barr QC

The first session was taken up by an opening statement by David Barr QC, Counsel to the Inquiry.

The Counsel to the Inquiry questions witnesses (this stops it being like a trial with different lawyers pressurising witnesses from different directions).

In the previous set of hearings last November, Barr’s questioning of undercover officers became notorious for its lack of intent.

As with the opening day of the November hearings, some previously unmentioned groups were named as having been spied upon.

Clear knowledge of the Special Demonstration Squad (SDS)’s operations – not only within the Metropolitan Police but at the highest level of the Home Office – was also discussed and confirmed.

A RECAP OF THE EARLY YEARS

However, Barr began with a brief review of what had been presented in terms of the SDS’ first three years (1968-1971), as covered in November’s ‘Phase 1’ hearings.

The SDS was set up in 1968, initially to counter anti-Vietnam War protests.

Barr said that experienced Special Branch officers were recruited for the new unit, and many of the first deployments only lasted a few weeks or months. . Officers began to inveigle themselves into the social lives of activists and, from 1971 onward, deployments tended to last around four years.

Despite the next anti-Vietnam War demo passing without clashes, the police and Home Office jointly decided to keep the new unit, even though the Home Office was anxious to ensure that the public didn’t find out about this deceitful and anti-democratic form of policing.

It was confirmed in November’s inquiry hearings that the SDS enjoyed a close relationship with MI5 – early spycops’ seemingly inconsequential reports were routinely copied to MI5. It seems clear that the Met and Home Office agreed that SDS officers would assist MI5 with ‘counter-subversion’. Officers were increasingly deployed for longer, and into more diverse groups. They targeted some campaigns now considered mainstream, such as anti-racism, and women’s rights.

SDS officers infiltrated groups, not based on any imminent threat, but in case there were any ongoing matters of interest to MI5, with extraordinarily little criminality reported. Despite this, ex-spycops think their intelligence was important and useful, and prevented public disorder.

Highly personal details were recorded of group members. Officers were given a significant degree of latitude, sometimes including the choice of which groups to infiltrate. They reported on events and people on the rather vague premise that they might be of use at some point in the future.

WHAT THE NEW HEARINGS WILL EXAMINE

Phase 2 of the Undercover Policing Inquiry is examining evidence from 29 SDS officers spanning the 10 years between 1973 and 1982. Of these, seven officers have both their real and cover names withheld, and so the Inquiry is limited as to what evidence about them can be made public. ‘Gists’ of their evidence – which, if the last hearings are anything to go by, will consist of extremely brief and non-illuminating summaries – will be published.

Barr said that all but one of the other 22 SDS officers from the era in question have their real names withheld. Officer Richard Clark (HN297), is the only one whose name will be given.

Of the 22 ‘open officers’ whose cover names are public, four are dead, seven provided witness statements and three did not provide any statements. The other eight will give oral evidence in these hearings and documents relating to their deployments will also be published.

During this period, deployments usually lasted for 3-5 years, unless the officer asked to leave, or his identity was compromised. (Unlike the first few years, there were no women spycops throughout this time).

Barr said that the hearings for this period will feature the earliest confirmed cases of spycops deceiving women they spied on into sexual relationships, and the theft of dead children’s identities, and potential miscarriages of justice.

SEXUAL RELATIONSHIPS

Undercover officers’ sexual relationships had life-altering impacts on the women they targeted. Barr acknowledges that the Met have apologised for this. This has not stopped them contesting the legal cases brought by such women, many of which have dragged on for years.

The era we will be looking at – 1973-82 – includes the first definite cases of officers deceiving women into relationships. At least five officers this during this period, with at least 12 women, though this is likely to be a dramatic underestimate of the true number.

Richard Clark (‘Rick Gibson’ HN297, 1974-76) is now deceased. He infiltrated Big Flame and the Troops Out Movement, becoming active and influential in both groups. He was sexually intimate with ‘Mary’ and her flatmate, and at least two other women.

Big Flame’s members became suspicious of Clark and discovered that he was using a fake identity, at which point his deployment was ended. It is mentioned in the 1976 SDS report, and Big Flame is labelled ‘sinister’ even though there is no suggestion of criminality.

Jim Pickford‘ (HN300, 1974-76) infiltrated anarchists. His second wife, to whom he was married at the time, says he met a woman while undercover and went on to marry her. They had a child, but the relationship did not last long.

Vince Miller‘ (HN354, 1976-79) infiltrated the Socialist Workers Party (SWP). He said he had four one-night stands, and did not tell his managers about them. However, one of the women he had a relationship with, ‘Madeleine’, says it lasted for a couple of months. She also says that she had split up with her husband the year before, and was devastated by that, and describes herself as:

‘very shy and reserved. I was also quite vulnerable as a result of my marriage ending…. I now think Vince probably saw me as easy pickings’

‘Vince Miller’ disappeared soon after, leaving Madeleine distraught. He has now seen her witness statement but is sticking to his story. Madeleine will be make an opening statement on Thursday 22nd April and give evidence on Monday 10th May.

Barry Tompkins‘ (HN106, 1979-83) denies any sexual relationships, but an MI5 document says his managers thought differently, with activists being heard to refer to ‘Barry’s girlfriend’. He will not give evidence due to ill health.

Phil Cooper‘ (HN155, 1979-83) also denies sexual interactions, but the risk assessors said he told them he had a few. The issue will be examined by the Inquiry.

Two of the fully anonymous officers, HN302 (who served in the 1970s) and HN21 (who served in the late 1970s and early 1980s), have stated that they had sexual contact with women whilst in their cover identities. HN302 described a ‘brief encounter with one woman’ when, he says, ‘circumstances presented themselves’. He said it was not important to deployment. HN21 describes sexual encounters with two women from an evening class he attended, who were not part of the group he infiltrated. Both officers will give oral evidence in secret hearings of the Inquiry.

The Inquiry will not differentiate between brief and long relationships in a way that dismisses the former, they are all significant. That said, the Inquiry says it does not need to document every instance of sexual contact between spycops and civilians. Some women may not want to participate, and Barr says that on some occasions the need to ‘protect’ a former officer outweighs the need to contact any women he deceived.

The Inquiry has found no documents from this era (1973-82) that instruct spycops officers either to have nor to abstain from sexual relationships. But there was a mention from ‘Graham Coates’ (HN304, 1976-79) that he overheard comments and jokes about relationships from officers, in the presence of spycops managers.

During this time, all of the spycops (and their managers) were male. The SDS went 10 years without any women officers , which may well have had an influence of the unit’s culture. The vast majority of these men were married, and marital status was noted at the time of recruitment, It was perhaps thought that this would help to deter the undercovers from getting too close to their targets, but clearly it didn’t prevent them going so far as to initiate sexual relationships.

STOLEN IDENTITIES

Identity theft (the theft of dead children’s identities in particular) as practiced by many of the spycops in creating their ‘legends’ or cover stories was one of the reasons why this Inquiry was instigated.

Barr seems to suggest that officers started doing this in 1971 and by 1974 all officers were using the technique. No documents exist about this though, except for the Tradecraft Manual which was written in the 1990s.

The 2015 Operation Herne investigation reported that it was:

‘clear that the use of this tactic was sanctioned at the highest level, was deemed as operationally necessary and was one that newly appointed undercover officers were trained in.‘

To add insult to injury, a few spycops visited the place where the dead child whose identity they stole had lived. ‘Michael James’ says he was instructed to do so and was assisted by the local Special Branch to ensure the child’s family had moved away.

A new revelation was that one officer used the identity of a living person, Michael Scott, and committed a criminal offence in his name.

MISCARRIAGES OF JUSTICE

One of the main themes in these hearings is the question of miscarriages of justice. Did undercover officers function as agents provocateurs, withhold evidence, mislead or deceive courts?

In a criminal trial, the defence has a right to see all evidence that may be helpful to them. The police have a duty to ensure that any involvement of undercover officers in events which lead to criminal prosecutions is properly disclosed. There is a real risk of a miscarriage of justice occurring otherwise.

We will be hearing evidence from four people convicted after their involvement in an anti-apartheid demo in the early 1970s.

The Inquiry has anticipated that there will be evidence of miscarriages of justice. A panel has now been set up to examine any suspected miscarriages, with the possibility of then referring these cases on to the Criminal Cases Review Commission. The problem is that this panel is comprised solely of senior members of the police and the Crown Prosecution Service – the kind of people who have a history of deliberately creating these kinds of wrongful convictions in the first place.

HISTORICAL CONTEXT

The events of 1973-82 are the context for the hearings. Barr took us through a whirlwind tour of the major political events of the period.

The Vietnam War ended in 1975, with no more demonstrations against it involving significant violence after 1968. But the Cold War left a lot of the same tensions. The British Government feared the Soviet bloc sought to foment unrest in the UK, so Special Branch assisted MI5 in ‘counter subversion’. One officer, Barry Tompkins, reported an approach from the KGB Soviet secret police, but this was unique.

Two SDS officers specifically infiltrated Maoist groups. Diane Langford, who was in some of these groups, will make an opening statement on the morning of Thursday 22nd April , and give evidence on the afternoon of Monday 26th.

Special Branch’s interest in groups campaigning about Irish nationalist and civil rights issues is a consistent theme of this era. SDS officer ‘Alex Sloan‘ (HN347, 1971) targeted the Irish National Liberation Solidarity Front, and we will hear evidence from two members.

FASCISTS VS ANTI-FASCISTS

Racism was also a huge issue in the era, and reporting on anti-racist groups was very common indeed. The far-right was on the rise in England, opposed by the left. There were violent confrontations. SDS officers were involved in the fascist protest and anti-fascist counter-protest, known as the ‘Battle of Lewisham’, in August 1977.

Both a BBC film and an Associated Press report were shown from the ‘Battle of Lewisham’. It should be noted that the SDS’ annual report for that year suggested that this was a triumph of SDS intelligence, minimising the clashes and violence.

Blair Peach

Blair Peach

Even just this film clip, and the fact that the demo is now known as the ‘Battle of Lewisham’, makes this claim in the annual report laughable and casts doubt about the accuracy of the information in these annual reports. It was mentioned that one SDS officer complained that the intelligence supplied in the run-up was ignored by police planning for the demo.

On 23 April 1979, the National Front held a meeting in Southall Town Hall, West London. In the counter-demo Blair Peach – anti-fascist and Socialist Workers Party (SWP) member – was killed by a Metropolitan Police officer belonging to the notoriously violent Special Patrol Group.

The ensuing campaign for justice for Peach was infiltrated by SDS officers. Celia Stubbs, Peach’s partner, will be giving evidence to the Inquiry next week.

In the early 1980s, East London Workers Against Racism – a subgroup of the Revolutionary Communist Party, which supported victims of racist attacks and patrolled areas with racial violence – was infiltrated by SDS officer ‘Barry Tompkins’ (previously, we had been told by the Inquiry that Barry Tompkins infiltrated just one group – the Spartacist League of Britain). This meant that Tompkins reported on the victims of racist violence, apparently explaining this away as accidental or incidental.

Spying on victims of racist violence and the groups supporting them is a pattern that endured and is something we will see when we look at the 1990s and the spying on the family of Stephen Lawrence, Ricky Reel, and many others.

INDUSTRIAL UNREST

Barr said that the late 1970s saw high inflation, mass unemployment and industrial unrest. The Workers Revolutionary Party, International Socialists and Shrewsbury pickets campaign were all spied on.

Trade unions, and references to union membership, are common among SDS officers reporting. ‘David Hughes’ (HN299/342, 1971-76) and ‘Barry Tompkins’ (HN106, 1979-83) both reported being members of the Transport & General Workers Union
This is interpreted as being ‘incidental’, rather than a deliberate targeting of unions, which seems a rather dubious distinction.

The two-year Grunwick Strike of the 1970s was a cause celebre which was extensively reported on by spycops. The Inquiry also showed a news report of a picket and the bussing in of scab labour.

RECRUITMENT

All SDS officers in the era 1973-82 were recruited from Special Branch and all but one was of Detective Constable rank. Two said they had done more than usual ‘plain clothes in meetings’ infiltrations before joining the SDS. There was no formal recruitment process, and no formal training for the job.

By the mid-1970s, it seems to have become established practice that new recruits would spend some time – up to 6 months – in the SDS back office before being deployed themselves. Few record receiving any advice about getting involved in criminal activity (or legal cases) or sexual relationships.

WHO WAS TARGETED

Barr quoted the 1975 SDS annual report, and the claim that officers:

‘concentrated on gathering intelligence about the activities of those extremists whose political views are to the left of the Communist Party of Great Britain’

It is unclear how you could be to the left of the Communist Party of Great Britain – we can only surmise that the police perhaps meant groups who were likely to cause them more trouble than the CPGB? However, given that they also targeted members of groups such as the Liberal Party’s youth wing, this claim is undermined no matter how you interpret it.

The SDS specifically said that schisms among the left were something the police could take advantage of; they did not want these groups to sink their differences and unite, and potentially cause trouble for the State. Having a large number of small separate groups to surveill and spy on meant more work for undercover officers. The SDS annual report of 1975 says though the political disorder is on the wane, they should keep spying on people just in case anything changes.

SDS annual reports always included a list of groups targeted during the year. Apart from one officer spying on the far right (and only because the left-wing group he had been sent to infiltrate then sent him to do this), all the groups are on what can broadly be seen as the left: communist, socialist, anti-nuclear, Irish liberation, women’s rights.

The 1976 SDS annual report said anarchists are a continuing nuisance on demonstrations, and the surveillance is justified by rumours of an Angry Brigade type group emerging.

In 1982, the annual report said SDS information had led to the anarchist Freedom Collective being raided. They say their uniformed colleagues found ‘pamphlets dealing with the manufacture of explosive devices, home-made guns, assassination techniques and booby-traps,’ yet mysteriously there were no arrests.

The 1982 SDS report also mentions the SWP organising a picket of the Tory party conference. Sussex police praised the SDS’s intelligence, although it is unclear what extra preparation the police would need to manage a picket – surely something that they would be able to comfortably manage?

USING THE DEATH OF BLAIR PEACH

A particularly offensive SDS interpretation of political activist’s motivations is made regarding the Blair Peach justice campaign which states:

‘The focal point of much of the extremist activity in 1979 was the General Election held in May with the extreme Left contriving to take advantage of the National Front’s election campaign to provoke hostile confrontation whenever possible. The culmination of the virulent anti-fascist demonstrations was the death of the Anti-Nazi League supporter Blair Peach and the subsequent campaign against the Police.’

This biased interpretation – as unable to conceive of integrity and genuinely held left-wing and anti-fascist beliefs as it is incapable of admitting the police can be in the wrong – is repeated later in the same report:

‘The SWP contrived to make use of all public meetings arranged by the NF to arouse anti-fascist feeling; the death of Blair Peach, an active supporter of the Anti-Nazi League, which was a consequence of a violent anti-fascist demonstration in Southall, provided the extreme left wing with an opportunity to mount a sustained campaign to discredit and criticise the Police.’

Barr at least noted that the reports are defensive about the Blair Peach campaign, seeing it as anti-police.

Notably, the now-published Metropolitan Police report from 1979, though it concedes Peach was killed by a police officer, places the blame for the situation on the protesters.

ONLY INFILTRATING THE RIGHT BECAUSE THE LEFT SAID TO

The officers deployed 1973-82 only infiltrated left-wing organisations. The main group targeted in this era was the International Socialists/ Socialist Workers Party.

One officer, ‘Peter Collins‘ (HN303, 1973-77), infiltrated the Workers Revolutionary Party. Not knowing he was a spy, they asked him, in turn, to infiltrate the National Front.

This infiltration of the National Front is bragged about in the 1974 SDS report, showing a total lack of awareness that the fact that their only foray into infiltrating the far-right was instigated by a left-wing group and done to maintain cover.

It mentions that other areas of Special Branch were spying on right-wing groups.

WHO ELSE APART FROM THE POLICE?

Barr stated that although MI5 is not a subject of investigation for this Inquiry, its relationship with the spycops is. Barr also praised MI5 for helping provide a great quantity of documents and providing a witness statement.

Just nine activists targeted by spycops during this decade will give oral evidence, and three more have given statements. This means that we’ll hear from fewer than one activist per year of these operations.

Barr added that we will see statements from the families of two former undercover officers.

Further, written evidence will be heard from two risk assessors who interviewed ex spycops ahead of the Inquiry, as there’s a dispute of fact about the testimony of officer ‘Phil Cooper’ (HN155) and whether he admitted sexual activity with women he spied on.

OVERSIGHT AND KNOWLEDGE OF THE SDS WENT TO THE TOP

The 1975 SDS annual report emphasises the paramount importance of secrecy about the unit’s existence to avoid ‘an embarrassment for the Commissioner’ as well as maintaining officer security.

Documents were frequently seen, discussed and approved by a Deputy Assistant Commissioner. We have yet another officer – ‘Michael James’ (HN96, 1978-83) – reporting that the Commissioner himself visited the SDS safe house. We’ve previously had this activity confirmed by ‘Doug Edwards’ (HN326, 1968-71) and Peter Francis (1993-97) who both added that their Commissioners presented them with bottles of whisky.

From 1983, there is a programme and briefing pack prepared for a visit to the SDS by Sir Kenneth Newman, the then Met Commissioner. The briefing pack includes a brief profile of each member of the SDS at the time, and was prepared for him ahead of an extended buffet lunch with the SDS officers at what is described as an ‘in-field location’.

It would be nice if the inquiry would question Sir Kenneth about his knowledge of the SDS but he is one of three old ex Commissioners who have died since the Inquiry was announced seven years ago.

But there can be no doubt that this phase of the Inquiry will put the nails in the coffin of senior officers’ claims that the SDS was a rogue unit, totally secret and unknown even to the rest of the Met.

SELF-APPROVAL TO CONTINUE

A 1976 document shows that the SDS set up a group to make the case for continued Home Office funding.

This group looked at whether the spycops unit was still needed or not, and if the intelligence it provided was still useful to MI5/ and uniformed police. It is no surprise that this set of SDS officers unanimously felt that they were still needed, extremely useful to MI5, and these operations must be allowed to continue.

They admitted that political disorder and violence had declined, but apparently subversive issues like ‘abortion, trespass, unemployment, and civil liberties’ had not. This meant there were more groups organising demonstrations, all potentially needing surveillance. Also, the manifold splinter groups would not, for some reason, cooperate with the police.

The annual reports were passed up the chain of command within the Met. They record praise and support coming in from senior officers.

REALLY THOUGH, SHOULD THEY CONTINUE?

The issue of the spycops’ relevance was re-examined in the mid-1980s, when a Home Office civil servant wondered if the unit was still needed for dealing with modern problems as opposed to being a hangover from the situations which arose many years earlier.
The Home Office authorisation for the unit’s 1985funds shows that these discussions had taken place.

Despite these discussions, and the fact that the Home Office directly funded the spycops renewing this funding annually for 20 years, a search of all Home Office archives failed to find a single document. Luckily the police & MI5 haven’t been quite so careless. Barr flagged up that there are more Home Office documents being published by the Inquiry today.

MI5 AND SUBVERSION

Another documents being published is a letter from MI5 to Chief Constables to remind them of Special Branch guidance on the distinction between subversion and mere militancy.

A witness from MI5, known as Witness Z, explained that subversion threatens the safety or well-being of the state whereas militancy is just the use of direct action with aim of, for example, achieving better working conditions. It’s militant to oppose the government, but only subversive if you seek to overthrow representative democracy itself.

A variety of government agencies and ministers did not seem to share this distinction, as demonstrated by the blacklisting scandal. According to the Independent Police Complaints Commission, all Special Branches routinely gave details of politically active people to the construction industry blacklist.

MI5 was extremely interested in subversive groups trying to infiltrate non-subversive groups such as trade unions.
As an illustration of a non-criminal group with subversive elements, Barr cited a 1974 SDS report from ‘David Hughes’ (HN299/342) on a Marxist discussion group. An attendee said that come the English revolution, the two million people who presented a permanent threat to its success would have to be killed (including senior police officers, all big businessmen and members of the Conservative Party). Even the report notes that most people present did not share this person’s opinion.

MI5 occasionally asked the SDS to obtain specific information, and occasionally helped protect the spycops’ security, but they had no significant control over the SDS’s choice of targets.

Some MI5 documents suggest a feeling that the SDS’s tactics enjoyed some advantages over MI5’s usual informants – as the spycops were frequently met and briefed and ‘all options are open’.

AFTER THIS

Barr ended by saying that immediately after these three weeks of hearings, the Inquiry will be conducting secret, ‘closed’ hearings for officers from this era whose identities are protected.

After that will come ‘Tranche 1 Phase 3’, dealing with the unit’s early managers (up till1982). These were scheduled to take place in October but have now been put back to some time in the first half of 2022.

We have also now been told that the Inquiry no longer expects to look at ‘Tranche 2’ (covering the years 1983-1992) next year – this means it is likely to be dealt with in 2023 instead.

Does mean we’ll have to wait until 2024 for Tranche 3 (covering the SDS in 1993-2007), and then even longer for Tranche 4 evidence to come out? (Tranche 4 looks at the National Public Order Intelligence Unit, aka the NPOIU, which deployed the likes of Mark Kennedy).

Peter Skelton QC

representing the Metropolitan Police Commissioner

Peter Skelton QC

Peter Skelton QC

Skelton began by saying his speech would be short. The first Met opening statement at the Inquiry last year looked at what went wrong in general, and what the value there is in undercover policing. This one is just about the topic in hand, SDS officers 1973-82.

He warned the inquiry to be wary of how it assesses the work of the SDS. We must judge by the standards of the time, not those of today. We don’t have all the reports from the time, nor fresh memories, so cannot have a full picture. Also, remember some the intelligence gathered was intended for MI5, who have secret uses that mere mortals can only imagine but must presume to be wholesome and necessary (I paraphrase slightly).

In the era under examination, 1973-82, the SDS’ work was in response to what government and public thought important – the need to preserve public order & state security, he said.

Skelton then mentioned events of the time with a very broad range of connection to the SDS. Angry Brigade firebombings, Bloody Sunday, IRA bombings in England, the 1972 miners and dockers strikes resulting in a state of emergency. He continued a summing up of strikes, a one-day near-general strike in 1973, the two-year Grunwick strike, and in 1978, the Ford industrial action leading to the ‘Winter of Discontent’ of multiple strikes and other industrial action. Then there were clashes between the National Front & antifascists, including the deaths of Kevin Gately & Blair Peach.

Skelton’s citing of these two killings is quite upsetting. The Met should not refer to the deaths of people killed by them as if they were events that they had no influence on, let alone use it to justify any and all forms of policing.

Skelton said the Inquiry must properly understand all the social context and explain it, otherwise it risks making unfair judgments. Evidence from people involved may be selective and biased, so the Inquiry should rely on expert historical evidence. Such evidence would need to be scrupulously neutral and factual with no contentious assertions. He claimed was done in the Litvinenko inquiry & Birmingham bombings inquests. The Met think it would be of even more use here.

In the era considered, the SDS had 9-12 undercover officer to infiltrate Trotskyists, Maoists/Marxist-Leninists, anarchists, anti-fascists, anti-nuclear and Irish nationalist support groups.

As well as the SDS annual reports glorifying the work of the unit, the Inquiry found documents that show that the unit’s management appraised the continued value of the unit. They concluded that it should continue (as if they might have voted to end their own jobs, because they in fact considered the work of no value at all). These documents also emphasise the importance of ‘negative intelligence’, that knowing an event won’t take place or a group isn’t dangerous is valuable, and that MI5 agreed. This sounds like a self-fulfilling prophecy, in which a world without intelligence gathering is unimaginable.

SDS contact with MI5 was frequent and productive, Skelton said. The unit saw the Secret Service as a customer which exercised some influence over the placement of spycops.

STEALING FROM THE DEAD

The SDS stole the identities of dead children to build cover stories for the undercover officers (and ‘Michael Scott’ HN298 stole the identity of a living person in 1971). Skelton kept referring to ‘using’ identities, but by any definition this is identity theft.

Earlier deployments, he explained, had been shorter, perhaps just a few months. But it was soon extended as it seems the quality of information gathered improved with longer deployments. As such, fake identities needed to be able to withstand more scrutiny. It became standard practice for officers to have a flat rented and have specially bought cars.

The police couldn’t insert a fake birth register entry, so they stole real ones. The Met apologises to families of people whose dead relatives’ identity was ‘relied upon in this way’.

SEXUAL RELATIONSHIPS, WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS & BLACKLISTING

Spycops should never have had sexual relationships while in undercover persona, no matter how brief. It was not justified in the era being examined and the Met apologises unreservedly. We need to find what managers knew.

Officers had interactions with the criminal justice system. ‘Michael Scott‘ (HN298, 1971-76) was arrested and convicted – using the identity of someone who was still alive – on an anti-apartheid protest. But what the managers knew can’t be decided until we hear from them in the Tranche 1 Phase 3 hearings – which have just been delayed until next year.

Skelton tried to fend off the fact that SDS officers illegally supplied personal details of activists to employment blacklists. He claimed that police got material from far beyond the spycops, so we can’t be sure that what he called ‘so-called blacklisting’ involved information from SDS officers.

Stating this, Skelton seems to ignore that the Information Commissioners Office seized a blacklist of more than 3,200 people at the offices of The Consulting Association, maintained for the construction industry, in 2009.

In 2012 the Information Commissioners Office’s investigations manager David Clancy confirmed that there was information in the files that ‘could only be supplied by the police or the security services’.

In 2013, SDS whistleblower officer Peter Francis said that he believed information he’d reported when undercover in the 1990s had ended up in blacklist files.

Turning to the 1979 killing of Blair Peach by police, and the SDS’ spying on the campaign for justice, including attending the funeral, Skelton reminded the Inquiry that the Crown Prosecution Service said no further investigation is possible, and it is not the Inquiry’s job to investigate the killing.

Skelton conceded that SDS reporting has a lot of personal info on people spied on, some of which might not have been justified to record (eg social events & family members). He tried to wiggle out of taking responsibility for this saying such information was often asked for by Special Branch and MI5, as if that makes it alright.

The Met acknowledges that it might be ‘more detail than necessary’, but then again, you just never know. Some seemingly innocuous information can be connected to useful things later. In the era under examination, the concept of ‘collateral intrusion’ on family members wouldn’t have been considered.

The Met notes that outdated language shouldn’t be judged if it was uncontroversial at the time, unless it was discriminatory, or gratuitously insulting, or with no purpose.

The Met, Skelton concluded, engages with the Inquiry with ‘a willingness to learn and to improve’.

Those of us who fought for ten years to get the Inquiry and drag the Met into it despite all their obstructions, smears, shredding of paperwork and delays will take some persuading on this point.

The Inquiry’s Chair, Sir John Mitting, then asked Skelton about miscarriages of justice. Mitting said that we may see such things described in these hearings. If there are grounds to believe it, Mitting said he will refer these cases to the review panel set up for it, instead of waiting for the witness hearings of managers which have just been delayed to next year.

The conviction Mitting has in mind was 49 years ago, the people involved are now old and deserve their answer as soon as possible, rather than waiting until after the end of the Inquiry. The clearing of their names should start as soon as possible. Something we can agree on.

Oliver Sanders QC,

Representing 114 spycops

Oliver Sanders QC

Oliver Sanders QC

Oliver Sanders QC spoke last, representing 114 spycops.

His opening statement at the first Inquiry hearings in November 2020 was shocking, rowing back on matters of fact and responsibility the Met have long admitted and accepted.

A LITTLE KNOWLEDGE

Sanders reiterated Skelton’s point that without complete evidence there cannot be fully informed findings. Some officers remember reports and events that have no surviving documents. Instead, the Inquiry is heavily reliant on what MI5 retained and have supplied.

Of the fraction of material that survives, a fraction of that, in turn, is to be released to the public, and even then it is redacted (thanks, in part, to the Met lobbying for the greatest possible secrecy), so people will inevitably form the wrong idea about what went on.

The secrecy means the public especially misses some especially important dangerous activities the public can’t be told about, and therefore receive an even more distorted picture.

DANGER LURKS BELOW

Spied-on groups had a spectrum of members, so just because one member testifies to the Inquiry that they were no threat it does not mean that others were not dangerous, or that the group couldn’t be hijacked by dangerous people.

The SWP had a lot of teachers, social workers, etc at the branch level who were moderate and law-abiding, but others were interested in violence and disorder, spoke to the Palestine Liberation Organisation, and wanted to take over other campaigns.

Some people targeted by spycops have extreme anti-police views. Police are seen as the embodiment of the establishment, so it is in some groups’ interests to promote an anti-police narrative.

There are ‘contentious incidents’ such as the deaths of Blair Peach and Kevin Gately (who were both killed by police). We need to be sure we deal with facts, not hearsay.

Police will talk of a threat to public order, but civilian witnesses will dispute it. The spycops say the Inquiry needs to get more contextual evidence rather than simply choose one side to believe.

For example, officer ‘Dick Epps’ (HN336, 1969-70) remembers anti-apartheid activists damaging cricket grounds. No media coverage was found to support that, so the Inquiry suggested that he was confusing it with something else, but in fact, there was a documented event with details as described by Epps (the Chair, Sir John Mitting, really took this point to task at the end).

There are the SDS annual reports prepared for the Commissioner, and there are reports for Special Branch that have now been found and are currently being redacted. Beyond that, we can look at contemporaneous Hansard and media (as if the media are not briefed by police with stories of ‘rentamob’)

Sanders had not only agreed a line of argument with Skelton but drifted into paraphrasing him. Skelton treated the Inquiry to a reiteration of the need for historians to testify to the Inquiry.

WRITE YOUR OWN ANSWERS

Skelton also said the Inquiry should look at contemporaneous publications by the groups that spycops targeted. This sounds fair, but bear in mind that throughout the existence of spycops, officers had written material for the campaigns they infiltrated.

From John Graham writing about the anti-Vietnam War protest in a 1969 edition of Red Camden to Mark Kennedy’s Indymedia posts, via Roger Pearce writing for Freedom, Bob Lambert cowriting the McLibel leaflet and John Dines’ anti-police section of the Poll Tax Riot booklet, it’s been very common practice. To judge the validity of their infiltration on their writings for the groups would be the police marking their own homework.

Skelton refuted the idea that spycops were a waste of police resources. He pointed out that the SDS was only a handful of officers among thousands of Met staff, so it is not like it’d have made much odds to redeploy them into something more useful to the public (such as catching the killers of people whose justice campaigns they spied on and undermined).

Some evidence puts emphasis on the cause being just, such as anti-racist and anti-apartheid campaigns. This is irrelevant to public order policing – order must be maintained no matter the politics of those who threaten it. It does not matter if the police agree or not.

DON’T KNOW RIGHT FROM WRONG

Police cannot be expected to decide which causes were just or will be thought just in the fullness of time. So, them spying on anti-apartheid campaigners Stop The Seventy Tour would have been the same if it were a far-right group (Skelton ignores the fact that spycops barely touched the far right).

Public order is not just an absence of violence – intimidation and obstruction are disorder and liable to escalate. With large events, there’s crowd psychology that can be hijacked by dangerous people. So, a protest being harmless may only be due to the police’s successful handling of it.

It is obvious that if the South African cricket tour had gone ahead, the Stop The Seventy Tour campaign would have had a big impact, so it’s right that they were targeted by spycops. The activists themselves describe how rugby fans hated them for disrupting games. With drinking involved, it is a powder keg waiting for just such a spark.

UNKNOWN RELEVANCE

As for the personal details and irrelevance of much of the information gathered, Skelton explained that every spycop hoovered up all info they could and reported it unfiltered, it was not up to them to discern. Besides, the kind of stuff they reported appears in other Special Branch reports, whether it is from the SDS or others (as if the rest of Special Branch is a beacon of integrity). Plus, MI5 used it and we do not know what was useful to them.

Any reporting on members of groups would inevitably include personal information. It identifies them, and it might be useful to either Special Branch or MI5. Yes, it included details about children, but it does not hurt them really, he explained.

In fact, some activists had children and used that to influence other children. There is a National Union of School Students pamphlet encouraging strikes and disruption. Gotta clamp down hard on that, right?

It is not the spycops’ fault they reported irrelevant things. Why did MI5 retain the seemingly trivial stuff for so long? MI5’s Witness Z should explain.

With that final deflection, Sanders ended his statement. But Mitting was not done with him.

ADMIT WHEN YOU’RE WRONG

Mitting now returns to the claim about the Stop The Seventy Tour ‘attacking cricket grounds’. The spycop concerned, Dick Epps, refers to digging up Lord’s pitch and pouring oil. But Mitting has checked and this never happened.

Mitting suggests Epps confused it with the Third Test at Headingley in 1975, a ‘George Davis is Innocent’ protest. Mitting spoke to Epps a while ago about it, and Epps accepted he may be misremembering.

Mitting sternly told Sanders that if he thinks the Inquiry has something wrong, then re-examine it, but otherwise, do not make such assertions without checking.

Sanders says there was another cricket pitch attack, but still a different place, a different time and with weedkiller rather than oil. So why didn’t Mitting suggest that to the officer instead of the Headingley event? Mitting, like the rest of us, appeared unable to see why saying Epps was wrong made any sort of defence for saying he was right.

And with that, the hearing concluded for the day.


The Undercover Policing Inquiry resumes at 10am on Thursday 22 April.

It will hear opening statements from:
Diane Langford (activist)
“Madeleine”(deceived into a relationship)
Phillippa Kaufmann QC, representing people in relationships with spycops
Matthew Ryder QC, representing Stop the Seventy Tour anti-apartheid activists, and Blair Peach’s partner Celia Stubbs.

The UCPI will also pause at 11am for a minute’s silence on Thursday and Friday, the anniversaries of the deaths of Stephen Lawrence and Blair Peach, whose loved ones’ campaigns for justice were targeted by SDS and NPIOU officers.

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