Ahead of three days of questioning spycop HN2 Andy Coles, the Undercover Policing Inquiry spent a day taking evidence from ‘Jessica‘ who Coles groomed into a year-long relationship when she was a vulnerable teenage animal rights activist in the 1990s.

Over the past few weeks, a lot of evidence has been held back due to privacy issues, but Jessica insisted that an audio stream of her evidence be made publicly available to the public, so you can hear both the morning and afternoon sessions on YouTube.

She did not ask for any of the painful details to be held back, because she wants to ensure that there are no restrictions on the evidence given by Coles. He does not deserve and should not get privacy protection when he gives his evidence.

‘Jessica’ was questioned by Emma Gargitter for the Inquiry. She has produced a written statement [UCPI 37092] which was introduced into the evidence.

RECAP

This was the Thursday of the seventh week of ‘Tranche 2 Phase 2’, the new round of hearings of the Undercover Policing Inquiry (UCPI). This Phase mainly concentrates on examining the animal rights-focused activities of the Metropolitan Police’s secret political unit, the Special Demonstration Squad, from 1983-92.

The UCPI is an independent, judge-led inquiry into undercover policing in England and Wales. Its main focus is the activity of two units who deployed long-term undercover officers into a variety of political groups; the Special Demonstration Squad (SDS, 1968-2008) and the National Public Order Intelligence Unit (NPOIU, 1999-2011).

Spycops from these units lived as activists for years at a time, spying on more than 1,000 groups.

Click here for the day’s video, transcripts and written evidence

EARLY LIFE

Emma Gargitter began with questions about Jessica’s early life and involvement in animal welfare. She was adopted as a baby and she was bullied as a result. She recalled how every time she fell out with her friend he would bring it up, saying:

‘what’s wrong with you, even your own mother didn’t want you.’

We were shown a Special Branch report about Jessica from after she met Coles that describes her as

‘first coming to the attention of this Branch in June 1992 when secret information received, reported she is an animal activist.’

That same report notes that they had tried, and failed, to trace her birth details. It was clearly very distressing to her that they tried to do this.

She had an older brother who was killed tragically by a drunk driver while out on his bike. She was 11 years old.

‘It changed everything for all of us… my family was never the same. It destroyed our family…and I had to find my own way through that… Kids can be horrible. I was then bullied because my brother had died.’

Gargitter asked how well 11-year-old Jessica was able to find her own way through that. Jessica replied that, up until more recently, she thought she had kind of done OK. But looking forward to events when she met Coles, she realises how damaged she was.

Would teenage Jessica have appeared vulnerable or more robust? She said that at the time she thought she appeared quite OK. She had learnt that if you seem weak you get bullied more, so she would pretend things didn’t bother her, but looking back she says,

‘I don’t think I was fooling anybody.’

Following the death of her brother she suffered a series of family bereavements that made her very insecure:

‘I didn’t know who would be next. I thought I would die at the same age my brother had. I didn’t want to get close to people because it would be worse when they died. That was my attitude.’

Then she had a breakdown in college. She described suffering from severe social anxiety, she couldn’t go into a room if there were too many people there, and then she was humiliated by a maths teacher for answering a question too quietly.

That she was bullied by an adult was just too much. She stopped going to classes and they threatened to kick her out of school, so she went to the doctor and was given medication. She managed to finish school, but she needed that help.

ANIMAL RIGHTS & HUNT SABBING

Jessica explained that she had lots of pets as a child and she started volunteering at weekends and after school at an animal rescue centre when she was about 13.

She would go to demos with people from the rescue centre and heard people from groups like the British Union Against Vivisection (now known as Cruelty Free International) speak at those demonstrations.

She had seen leaflets from the Hunt Saboteurs Association about hunting and she thought it was appalling. She went hunt sabbing for the first time when she was 13 or 14, to a Boxing Day hunt meet.

She was by far the youngest person there, and she didn’t enjoy it. She felt sick, thinking something was going to get killed, and she was angry at these people who were hell bent on ripping some defenceless animal to bits. Saving that animal was an immediate and worthwhile thing.

After the hunt, the other sabs told her she shouldn’t come back until she was a bit older:

‘No one would take responsibility for me… I was maybe a bit lairy… I had a lot to say for myself.’

However, she returned to sabbing when she was 17 or 18, through her involvement in the Islington Animal Rights Group. She learned to drive when she was 17 and saved up for a car. She had a red Mini and she would pick people up to go sabbing. If there was no one else going she would go alone. Once she and just one other person sabbed the Surrey Union hunt.

In the beginning they used citronella in aerosols or spray bottles to mask the fox’s scent. You would see where the animal ran and then spray across the track to confuse the hounds and give the fox a chance to get away. They also had hunting horns, and the ‘gizmo’ that would play the sound of hounds in cry:

‘You could play it in a field and the whole pack would come running.’

The reaction of the hunters was not good. There was a lot of violence and she has been in quite a few scrapes. Just being there could lead to unprovoked attacks. The worst threat was the riders riding hard at you. One particular rider could make her horse kick, and she would make it rear up and kick people. Jessica saw one woman have her arm broken like that.

One of her friends was ridden down and taken away in an ambulance with broken ribs. The Surry Union hunt master was charged with ABH for riding someone down and causing lacerations to his head. There were a lot of injuries. This was also around the time Mike Hill was killed. The threat was always there.

She pointed out that the sabs never carried weapons. You knew you would be stopped and searched by police, and anything that could be considered a weapon would be taken away.

‘It really wasn’t us who caused it. It got in the way of sabbing. You didn’t want to be fighting with somebody while the hounds were killing.’

Q. Did you ever see a sab react?

‘Yes, I’ve responded myself.’

She explained that the last thing any of them would do is to go out intentionally looking for it, but that just standing there and letting yourself be hit made it worse. She had a friend who was a pacifist and he got a kicking every time.

Gargitter then asked about the Brixton hunt sabs. Coles reported that Brixton had a reputation for being violent. Were they more robust defending themselves?

Jessica said that they weren’t violent. It was mostly about numbers: there were a lot of them, they were city people and they wouldn’t be pushed around. She explained that a lot of it was about reputation.

‘We used to say “what time are Brixton going to get here?” because that would make the hunt worry.’

On a mass hit – where several different sab groups went to the same hunt – you’d get a lot of people showing up and they were all supposedly ‘Brixton’.

HN87 ‘John Lipscomb’ described Brixton sabs damaging hunters’ vehicles. Jessica never saw or knew about anything like that.

SPYCOPS – HN1 ‘MATT RAYNER’

Jessica says she had good friends in the West London hunt sab group, and would sometimes go out sabbing with them. HN1 ‘Matt Rayner’ (real name restricted) usually went out sabbing with them too. She remembers being driven in his van, and that he was known by the nickname ‘Chiswick’, but she doesn’t recall anything specific that he did.

Her address book from this time contains Rayner’s name and number. She thinks she probably got his details in order to arrange to be picked up for hut sabs, but is not sure that she ever called him.

She also knew him from London Boots Action Group pickets, handing out leaflets and holding the banner. He wasn’t memorable, he was just one of the group, but she did recall being told not to trust him once. Nothing specific, just ‘be careful, don’t trust him’.

She doesn’t recall thinking he was a police officer, just ‘dodgy’. She thinks she even called him that to his face once. She doesn’t believe he was ever confronted with the suspicion, and the longer he was there, with time, it died down.

She was away working in France when Rayner drove a vanload of animal rights activists to the Grand National horse race. Despite many other years trying, this is the one time activists actually stopped the race – all thanks to a spycop being an agent provocateur!

She also describes some other chicken raids (e.g. Leyden Street where people ran in during a demo and grabbed chickens), saying that both Rayner and Coles may have been involved in these events. Jessica wasn’t involved herself, but people called her to help rehome the chickens.

HN26 ‘CHRISTINE GREEN’

Jessica also came into contact with HN26 ‘Christine Green’ (real name restricted), but not until 2017, after she found out about Coles. Joe Tax (Christine’s partner) was a close friend of Jessica’s and she went to see him to talk about what she had discovered. She hadn’t seen him in years.

She had heard, from other hunt sabs, that Joe and his girlfriend had split up and he’d started a new relationship with a woman who then moved to Spain. Joe went to Spain to find her in around 1997-98. Asked if this was common knowledge Jessica replied

‘If I would’ve known I think anyone would have known.’

She had no idea that ‘Christine’ had been an undercover cop. Joe and ‘Christine’ were still together in 2017.

HN2 ANDY COLES ‘ANDY DAVEY’

Jessica left her parents’ home in early 1992, aged 19. She moved into a shared house in East London with her friend and lived there for about six months. She had the front top bedroom, which was furnished with a small table, and two single divan beds, only one of which had a mattress.

She acquired a dog while she was living there, in August 1992 from the Deptford Urban Free Festival.

‘We went to the festival with one dog, and we came back with two dogs and a pigeon’.

A number of dogs appeared in the reports and photographs, and Jessica told the Inquiry that, if needed, she could still name them all. She also described how she and her housemates would pool their unemployment benefits to feed the cats.

Her friend had the room directly below hers where there was a portable black and white TV. That room became a kind of communal room where people would gather and watch TV even when her friend wasn’t there.

Coles claims there was a TV room in the house, but Jessica thinks he’s actually referring to her friend’s bedroom. There was no spare room, as all the rooms in the house were occupied.

Jessica knew Coles as ‘Andy Van’ as (like numerous spycops) he had a van and was generous in giving lifts. Everyone called him that. She met him in late 1991 whilst she was still living with her parents, but ‘he was just a face in the crowd’.

She started to notice him when he began coming round to her East London address. The house always had people coming and going, but he would come round alone, and always later in the evening.

Jessica had just left home. She was unemployed, money was tight, and neither she nor her friend drank alcohol. Occasionally they would go to the pub and have a lemonade, but mostly they just hung out at home and watched telly, so the chances of finding them at home were high. Coles showed up quite frequently for several weeks, so often that there was a collective sense of ‘here we go again’.

It was inconvenient, because he came round late and stayed for quite a long time so it could be quite awkward. She recalls discussing it among the housemates: who invited him? And it turned out nobody did.

Jessica had no sense that he was romantically interested in her. It just wasn’t something that was on her radar. So, when he kissed her it came completely out of the blue. They were alone, watching TV and

‘I either turned to him or he said something which made me turn to him and then he just lunged straight at me and kissed me…

‘It was so awkward. Had he said something at any point, I would have been able to say I don’t think about you like that, but it was the shock and just the unexpectedness of it.’

It was excruciating hearing Jessica describe something almost all women will recognise from awkward and awful sexual experiences when we were young:

‘My overriding feeling was that I didn’t want to hurt his feelings…

‘I’d like to say now that I would have slapped him. But when I think about it, even now, I still get that awful, awkward feeling. I wish it had been different. I wish that I had done something different’.

After that first kiss, he would stay over, and when he did so it was in her room, in her bed. She never went to his place and didn’t know where he lived. She can’t remember when they first had sex, but she is sure it would have been him that initiated it. She was, and still is, very uncomfortable with physical intimacy.

Coles lied to Jessica about his age, telling her he was 24. In real life he was 32 and married. It never occurred to her that he was older than he said he was.

Jessica described herself as a ‘young 19 year old’:

‘I was naive and quite stupid, to be perfectly honest.’

In his cover identity, Coles was supposed to be 28. Jessica was 19 and looked younger. The fact that he told her he was 24, and told his bosses she was 20-25, shows deliberate effort to cover the age gap. What other reason can there be for him to do this, apart from that he knew it wasn’t right and was trying not to alarm those around him?

Had she known Coles was in his 30s, would she have reacted differently?

‘Yes… that’s not right… there’s no reason to be trying to go out with someone that much younger… it’s creepy. It’s inappropriate… it sounds terrible to say, but, you know, old age… at 19 someone like that is old.’

Coles was Jessica’s first boyfriend. She didn’t talk to her friends about him much. She was embarrassed by him: he was unpopular and awkward and a bit odd.

She says there wasn’t much emotional intimacy either:

‘I can’t remember very much about him. I think I was a pretty awful girlfriend… It was not love’s young dream… it wasn’t how I expected it to be.’

She explained that Coles always used condoms. They did have a conversation about it once:

‘I didn’t quite know what my expectations were of a sexual relationship, I don’t know, I think I just imagined that it would be different and I think I wondered if maybe it was because he was wearing condoms.’

She suggested they try without, but he told her he had to wear them because he had already had one child and wouldn’t risk having another. He told her his daughter was called Sophie, she was around two years old, and he wasn’t allowed to see her.

Jessica was shocked and she had a lot of strong feelings about this. At first she was relieved that he didn’t see his daughter, and then she felt bad because if he wanted to see her, that was sad.

Coles has denied all of this. He claims he stayed over at Jessica’s house, one time on the sofa and then she offered him a mattress in her room (where he stayed 3-4 times). Jessica replied: that never happened. He stayed more than 3-4 times and always in her bed.

Coles also tries to claim that Jessica flirted with him, chased him, and that she once said ‘you can fuck me if you like’. On this she was very clear:

‘He is a liar. An absolute liar… I don’t talk like that. It’s awkward, but also, it’s crass… I wasn’t upset with him, I didn’t throw myself at him, I didn’t chase him. That is lies.’

THE ANIMAL LIBERATON FRONT

Coles has said that Jessica was identified to him as ‘an ALF girl’ by another activist, ciphered as ‘JRA’.

Jessica points out how unlikely this is, and how stupid and dangerous it would be to describe someone as ‘an ALF girl’, even if they were (which she wasn’t). The ALF was involved in illegal activity so there was a culture of secrecy. Activists didn’t brag about it or identify themselves to others.

She says she didn’t really know JRA, although they were on ‘nodding terms’. Asked how she would define the ALF she replied:

‘Someone that regularly breaks the law to rescue animals or sort of non-violent direct action to shops and places that sell fur.’

Jessica doesn’t believe she was associated with people involved in ALF actions. The house where she lived received the ALF Supporters Groups newsletter, so she knew some of the names, but Geoff Sheppard (who had been to prison for planting incendiary devices in Debenhams shops) was the only one she knew personally.

Yet, Coles claims he got close to Jessica because he thought it would get him closer to an ALF cell.

Q. If a police officer was looking to find individuals involved in the ALF, would befriending you be likely to get him access to those people?

‘No.’

Q. Did you have contacts with animal liberationists elsewhere in the UK, outside of London?

‘He’s mischaracterising it. I had friends who were interested in animal rights that were from other places. He’s tarting it up.’

She and a friend got involved in Hackney an Islington Animal Rights, through an advert in Time Out. They went to London to go to the meeting and met Paul Gravett. He was friendly.

She explained that they were younger than everyone else, and most of the older members treated them as kids, but Paul and Geoff always gave them the time of day.

They took part in London Boots Action Group picketing shops protesting against the company’s vivisection, distributing leaflets and sometimes holding a banner, chanting ‘Boots torture beagles’.

They might get in trouble for obstructing the public highway, but basically they were walking up and down outside the shop handing out leaflets. She doesn’t think it was a front for people who wanted to get involved in ALF activity:

‘You would go, and hand out leaflets for hours and then go to the pub.’

We were shown a report from June 1992 that says Jessica had ‘expressed an interest in ALF-style liberations’ and claims that ‘now that she has moved to London and is living with other animal rights activists she is likely to commit criminal acts.’

Coles alleges in his report that she has a ‘radio telephone’ from her dad. She said this is inaccurate. There was a device, an early model carphone, that was used on hunt sabs, but it had nothing to do with her father, and was never at her house. She says she doesn’t think she did express an interest in ALF-style liberations, but she do one once.

THE GREAT HOOKLEY FARM CHICKEN RAID

‘He created a “cell”, if that’s what you want to call it, that I was in…

‘I had to be persuaded to do it. It was nerve wracking and it is nothing I would have done if it weren’t for him.’

Coles organised the action. He was the driver; it was his vehicle; and he asked a lot of people to be involved. He called a meeting, and there were too many people at it so lots of them thought it was silly and dropped out.

‘You wouldn’t do something like that with a big group of people some of whom you didn’t know. But I was in a relationship with him so I and my friend ended up going.’

People wore face coverings, and the aim was not to be discovered. They were given instructions, and told to pass the chickens in bags along a line, in a human chain.

‘I was scared to death… Everything about it is scary, getting caught, doing it, I am quite an anxious person and I was really anxious about everything’

Asked if Coles appeared anxious, she said ‘No’.

We were then shown an article about the action, written Andy Coles, and a photo in which Jessica can be seen liberating chickens. Coles says she is the person on the right, but she clarifies:

‘No I’m the one on the left. I know that because I was the only person stupid enough to wear my favourite jeans… That balaclava is made from a pair of socks.’

She told us how they grabbed chickens and put them in bags and poultry crates until no one could carry any more. Coles claims he was only the driver and photographer on that action (as though that would mean he wasn’t involved).

Jessica explains that is nonsense. Everyone mucked in, because the more hands you had, the more birds you could save. The chickens were loaded into Coles’ van, which was always the plan.

On the way home, they were pulled over by the police, with load of people and about 80 loose chickens in the back. Everyone was panicking and the chickens are making a racket so she and others started coughing in an ill-considered ineffectual attempt to cover it up.

Coles talked to the police, who could clearly see it was a van full of people and chickens, but they let them go.

‘We thought luck was on our side.’

We were shown a report from 4 December 1992 that claims people named in the report were old school friends of Jessica and that they got her involved in the action. Jessica denies this, she says they were not old school friends and it was Coles who got her involved in the action.

THE PRINCESS OF MONACO

In the summer of 1992, Jessica had been in a relationship with Coles for a few months when she received a job offer to to move to France and take care of dogs and cats for the Princess of Monaco. It was a fantastic opportunity.

She consulted with Coles before taking the job, because they were in a relationship.

‘I felt he had a say. I asked him “what do you think I should do?”’

He told her she should go.

‘That may be the one decent thing that he did.’

As far as Jessica understood, they were a couple at that time. The arrangement was that he would come and visit her there, and she can’t remember any formal goodbye.

While she was in France they had a long-distance relationship. They spoke occasionally on the phone, although they didn’t have much to say to each other, and wrote each other letters.

She remembers one his letters was mostly ordinary, about what he had been doing, but it had one line at the bottom that was odd and totally out of character, about oral sex.

‘I remember thinking: “Am I meant to think that’s sexy? ‘Cause it’s not.”’

While Jessica was in France, in September 1992, Special Branch created a Registry File on her, something done for people that are deemed to be worth monitoring in an ongoing way.

The only ALF action she had ever done was Coles’s chicken farm raid. A police note, dated October 1992, says that the photo on file is no longer a good likeness as ‘she now has very short hair and is much less feminine in appearance’.

She points out that this is untrue. She has photos from the time that show her hair was half way down her back, but more importantly, why is Special Branch reporting about a hair cut she never had? It is ridiculous. She wasn’t even in the country at the time. It doesn’t really make sense, unless oles was just trying to find something to report irrespective of whether it was true.

Coles started to complain about her being away and suggested that they ‘start seeing other people’. This made her angry. He wasn’t suggesting that they split up, just that they see other people.

She went back to the UK in December 1992 to see him and stayed at his place in Stanthorpe Road, Streatham for a week. She felt she was being unfair to him by being away:

‘It sounds so gross to say it but it was like he’s a man and it’s not fair on him and he has needs.’

Q. Did he ever say anything that caused you to feel that?

‘I think he had to have done… I couldn’t have come to that by myself.’

We were shown letters Jessica wrote from France to her best friend. One says, ‘it’s really weird but I’m still going out with Andy’.

In another, she tells her friend about how Andy had suggested that they should see other people because otherwise ‘he wouldn’t be getting enough sex.’ It appears to have been over between them by then.

In May 1993 Jessica was injured in France and she returned to the UK in June after spending some time in hospital. Again, she stayed at Coles’s place in Streatham, which she described as quite boring, a bit of an empty box.

In August 1993 her French job ended. She thinks that by then it was over between her and Andy.

She met someone else (at Coles’s house), identified to the Inquiry as ‘NM’. Suddenly she was looking forward to being with someone. There was some kind of chemistry and spark with this new man, and it highlighted for her that it wasn’t right between her and Coles. She told Coles, and he just agreed.

It was a very amicable ending, and she thought they were so grown up. A report of Coles’s from 1993 describes her as having a ‘romantic liaison’ with ‘NM’. Asked how she felt reading that in a police report she replied:

‘What purpose did it serve? It’s just… none of his business.’

A report from March 1994 describes her as ‘NM’’s girlfriend. It suggests that he was involved in ‘illegal ALF activity’. Jessica points out that there is no other reference to this and nothing specific in the report at all:

‘it’s all so vague… it’s just speculation’.

She makes clear that the only activities she and her new partner were involved in were demonstrations and hunt sabotage. Nevertheless, their house was raided by the police after someone who didn’t live there supposedly gave their address when they were arrested on an action they didn’t attend:

‘half a dozen guys in hazmat suits with masks on and like a policeman at the door and like police vans everywhere and they came in and lifted up the floorboards in some rooms… it always felt like there was something a bit suspicious about it.’

They broke things and took items away, including a housemate’s computer with her dissertation on it.

She speculates that it may have been Coles who gave the police their address. He certainly reports on their reactions to it.

THE HORSE & HOUND BALL

The report says the protest was organised by the Hunt Saboteurs Association, that there were 80-100 people in attendance, and that it was ‘loud and aggressive’.

Jessica disagrees with most of what the report says. The HSA didn’t organise things like that. It was a London Animal Rights thing, organised by word of mouth, and there were only 20-30 people there.

It was loud, but not aggressive, and they were packed into a fenced off area. A letter written by Coles at the time about being injured in the line of duty supports Jessica’s version.

He describes 30-40 people and a ‘loud and animated protest’ and describes receiving head injuries from the battery end of a police radio. Jessica doesn’t recall him being there.

Someone threw a bag of flour at people getting out of a limousine, echoing events from the previous year’s ball, where flour was thrown by undercover officer John Dines, leading to the arrest and wrongful conviction of someone else.

Jessica was violently arrested. She recalls being dragged over a crowd-control barrier and landing on her head, then being marched with her arm twisted up behind her back to a van. She doesn’t know what happened. She can only remember the pain. She thought the officer had broken her arm.

She asked to see the police surgeon. He turned up in a tuxedo, having been at the ball. After her release she went to A&E and was diagnosed with torn ligaments in her shoulder, elbow and wrist, and a broken collar bone. In the tradition of people assaulted by police officers, she was charged with assaulting a police officer.

In the run up to her trial, Coles filed reports about their defence strategy, Jessica’s intention to plead not guilty, and a meeting she had with potential witnesses that he describes as being ‘to concoct evidence’. It seems quite common for spycops to be reporting on defence strategies to the prosecution.

In court, she was found guilty and received a suspended sentence. She was told it was a good result that she wasn’t going to prison. However, it was the first time she had appeared in court, she couldn’t believe that the police had blatantly and deliberately lied under oath, and she couldn’t let it go. Despite being given no penalty by the court, the injustice of it outraged her. She appealed her conviction and was acquitted.

REACTION

Asked about her reaction to the discovery in 2017 that Coles had been an undercover police officer, she explained that Paul Gravett alerted her to a report about the infiltration of the groups they were in. Ten minutes after discovering that spycops even existed she found a picture of Andy Coles:

‘It made a lot of sense of our relationship. I didn’t doubt it.’

Asked how it felt:

‘There’s no feeling like it. Huge parts of my life… I didn’t have the control and the agency over them that I thought I did. I’d been steered and manipulated into a relationship that wasn’t really what I wanted but I went along with.’

Jessica broke down at this point.

‘The worst part… was my age, to know that at that age, someone so much older not who he said he was… it made me feel disgusting… it’s disgusting… I can’t come to terms with it properly.’

It has had a significant impact on her mental health that continues to this day.

Jessica has since discovered that her then housemate (now deceased) Andrea McGann and three other women all had unpleasant experiences with Andy. Three of the women describe him ‘lunging’ at them to kiss them, and one woman, peace activist Emily Johns, described him showing up at her house late at night, apparently angling to be invited to stay over for sex.

Robin Lane has also told her, and the Inquiry, that he had set Andy up with one of his friends for a one-night stand, and she described him being ‘a bit rough’.

Jessica pointed out how awful it is that Coles completely denies the entire relationship.

It exacerbates everything, having to prove that she is not lying:

‘Why would anyone want to do this? I have had to sit here. I’ve had to completely humiliate myself… I’m not lying about it. Why would I?’

The fact of him being a school governor and Conservative councillor in a position of power also made it worse:

‘It felt like my responsibility to warn people what he is like… I don’t want anyone else to feel the way that I have felt since finding out.’

After she had finished giving her evidence to the Inquiry, she was thanked by the Chair, Sir John Mitting, who said:

‘Thank you for attending today and giving evidence in circumstances that I know are not easy for you. And that I am aware is a considerable understatement. I know that yesterday’s arrangements were uncoupled and that increased your difficulty. Thank you for surmounting them and giving evidence as clearly as you have done.’

The ‘uncoupled arrangements’ is a reference to the fact that Bob Lambert’s evidence ran over so much that yesterday it was unclear whether Jessica would be able to give her evidence today, and Mitting even threatened not to hear it at all if she didn’t comply with whatever new timetable they same up with. This is as close to an apology as this Inquiry gets.

By the end of the day on Thursday, Jessica was very upset, and when she was asked if there was anything she wanted to add, she replied ‘I just want to get out of here’.

However, by Wednesday of the following week she was feeling a little better and she returned to make her final points.

She began by noting:

‘I found the Inquiry very re-traumatising it’s opened an awful lot of old wounds and personally it’s been quite damaging’

She explained that she has persevered, engaging with the process, and assisting the Inquiry,

‘because we need to know the truth.’

She told the Inquiry that she wishes to see her Special Branch ‘Reference File’. (Those who were spied on have been asking to see their files ever since this process began, and pages from Jessica’s file was referred to on several occasions by Gargitter in her questioning, yet Jessica has not seen the whole file.

Jessica then highlighted Coles’ attitude towards the theft of dead children’ identities. She reminded the Inquiry that her own family lost a child, and read some of the most awful sections of Coles’ Tradecraft Manual, on stealing dead children’s identities, noting ‘that perfectly describes my brother’.

She made the point that one of his recommendations – that it would be best to use the identity of someone who had been adopted and then died in childhood. She notes that Coles passed on his ‘tradecraft’ to futures officers. She noted that Jim Boyling’s identity was based on an adopted child and that Mark Jenner claimed that his father had been killed by a drunk driver, and she specifically asked Mitting to find out whether her brother’s identity ever was used by an undercover officer.

Finally, she told the Inquiry that the Metropolitan Police have accepted there is credible evidence that the sexual relationship between her and Andy Coles did happen.

The Met have apologised to Jessica, and said Coles would be facing the most serious disciplinary charges if he were still a serving officer. Coles refused to answer questions when interviewed under caution, and subsequently told the Peterborough Telegraph that the Met had actually exonerated him.

Jessica ended her evidence to the Inquiry by pointing out that the only person who still disputes the relationship took place is Andy Coles:

‘and he is a liar.’

Jessica has been to Peterborough to give talks and distribute leaflets about Coles’s spycop career and his ongoing denial of the facts.

After spycop Bob Lambert finally finished his seventh day of questioning, it was the turn of activist Claire Hildreth.

Testifying to the Inquiry is particularly impactful for those who were spied on, having to come into a public forum and painfully examine some of the worst things that ever happened to them.

It takes a lot of mental preparation, and Lambert’s stalling tactics meant that for most of the day Hildreth was unsure whether she’d even get to take the stand.

Even now, the spycops are doing what gives them personal advantage and don’t care about the negative consequences for others who’ve done nothing wrong.

RECAP

This was the Wednesday of the seventh week of ‘Tranche 2 Phase 2’, the new round of hearings of the Undercover Policing Inquiry (UCPI). This Phase mainly concentrates on examining the animal rights-focused activities of the Metropolitan Police’s secret political unit, the Special Demonstration Squad, from 1983-92.

The UCPI is an independent, judge-led inquiry into undercover policing in England and Wales. Its main focus is the activity of two units who deployed long-term undercover officers into a variety of political groups; the Special Demonstration Squad (SDS, 1968-2008) and the National Public Order Intelligence Unit (NPOIU, 1999-2011).

Spycops from these units lived as activists for years at a time, spying on more than 1,000 groups.

Click here for the day’s video, transcripts and written evidence

OVERVIEW

Hildreth was active in the London animal rights movement in the early 1990s, and was spied on primarily by Special Demonstration Squad officers HN1 ‘Matt Rayner’ and HN2 Andy Coles ‘Andy Davey’.

Hildreth moved to London in 1991. In Jan 1992, she moved to North Kensington as a housing support worker. A colleague took her to a World Day For Laboratory Animals event where she picked up a London Boots Action Group (LBAG) leaflet which called for a boycott of the chain of chemists due to their use of vivisection.

Hildreth was part of the group, whose main activity was leafleting outside Boots shops, until she left London in 1996. She is still committed to the causes of animal welfare, environmentalism and social justice.

SPYCOPS EXAGGERATING AND LYING, AGAIN

Andy Coles infiltrated LBAG, and attended their meetings. One of his reports, dated 16 July 1993, says a new LBAG committee had been formed. Hildreth is named as part of this ‘committee’, title its newsletter officer, assisted by Coles. Hildreth says the term ‘committee’ is overstating the case, it was just basic admin, and the group was essentially self-organising, and they would share tasks like chairing meetings.

Coles claims in his witness statement to the Inquiry that he volunteered to assist, as he had access to the Animal Liberation Front’s computer and also produced their newsletter. Hildreth says there was no ALF computer, and he didn’t create the newsletter. She adds that his report’s mention of Paul Gravett being involved is wrong too.

Coles claimed to run the membership list of LBAG. Hildreth says that’s another lie. She doesn’t remember Coles being involved much at all. He was based in South London and didn’t really come North much.

A report by HN1 ‘Matt Rayner’ says Coles was a ‘formal member’ of LBAG, but Hildreth says there was no such thing as formal membership.

However, she says that Rayner, in contrast, was very active. As was standard for Special Demonstration Squad (SDS) officers, Rayner and Coles had been equipped with vans. Rayner made himself useful driving people to demonstrations and related errands.

LONDON ANIMAL ACTION

Hildreth was involved in London Animal Action (LAA) from the group’s founding in October 1994. The group was founded to campaign on all aspects of animal abuse, not just Boots as the previous group had done. Rayner reported on 8 August 1995 says LAA members are ‘openly supportive of ALF action and many are involved’. She says this isn’t true.

At the request of the Inquiry’s Chair, Sr John Mitting, Hildreth defined ALF activity as breaking the law, largely by criminal damage, to draw attention to animal abuse or to liberate animals. Mitting complimented her on being so concise and accurate.

Rayner reported that the LAA attended events over a wide geographical area (because he drove them, Hildreth points out), and that LAA’s presence increased the chance of an ’emotional and confrontational’ response at an event. She says he’s being ludicrously over-dramatic.

LAA shared an office with London Greenpeace, and Rayner reported that Hildreth co-managed the office. Once again, she took issue with the mischaracterisation, as if everything was formalised and regimented. She says the office wasn’t really ‘managed’ as such, LAA would use it, and not much more than that.

Rayner singled Hildreth out in a report as a ‘capable, aggressive and dynamic’ LAA activist who ‘can be considered an ALF activist’. She took especial umbrage at this, explaining that she never threatened anyone, and that being a bit loud isn’t the same thing as being aggressive. Furthermore, she explained, it’s misogynist, he wouldn’t say that about a man with the same disposition.

She added that she wasn’t ALF either. Clearly, the ALF was such a bogeyman to the spycops and the wider establishment that officers were keen to say they’d found the activists.

LIVE ANIMAL EXPORTS

From January to October 1995 the port of Brightlingsea was the scene of large and sustained protests against the export of live animals. A Rayner report on an LAA monthly planning meeting in March of that year described their active support for the protests, and that a rota of drivers had been drawn up to take members there.

One of the listed drivers is Rayner, another is HN26 ‘Christine Green’. Hildreth says she mostly remembers Rayner doing it, and that she can’t really remember Green.

 

Rayner says he was an LAA bank account signatory. Hildreth says she can’t remember if that’s true, but says it’s likely, it fits with what he was like.

We’ve seen from earlier Inquiry hearings that spycops would often take on the role of treasurer in a group. It gave them access to information about who was donating money, and often to subscription and membership lists, along with people’s bank account details. Also, like the van driving, it was a practical role that didn’t require any political knowledge or insight.

The Inquiry showed two reports containing details of Hildreth’s living arrangements . One, from May 1993, said she was about to go on holiday for a month and plans to live in a squat afterwards. She says it’s not true, and indeed it wasn’t something she could have done because she had a residential job at the time. She went on holiday, but not for a month.

That detail and the squat reference seem to be gratuitously making her look like a slacker. Rayner absolutely knew the truth about her address as, ever helpful with his van, he had helped her move house. She points out that as well as being untrue, none of this reporting had any relevance to animal rights.

MISOGYNIST AND LIAR

Andy Coles’ recent witness statement to the Inquiry (para 172) reiterates his claim that he was LAA organiser and newsletter author, shared with Hildreth and one other person. She says he didn’t do either of those things and had minimal involvement in the group. She wouldn’t want to work with him anyway, she tried to avoid him, so it’s possible he did things when she wasn’t there.

Coles also says he held the LAA membership and subscription list. This is yet another exaggeration, Hildreth explains. He had no formal role but, like anyone who spent time in the office, he did have opportunity to get hold of copies of the lists.

Hildreth says she went hunt sabbing with Coles once, but never felt comfortable around him. He was a bit odd, and would say odd things, e.g. a story about his dog: that its original owner had died and the dog had started eating its owner’s body.

She said Coles was a misogynist, and that his witness statement to the Inquiry this year shows he still is. At the time, she warned other women who knew him that he couldn’t be trusted around them.

She was much closer to Rayner, and told him that Coles gave her the creeps and was less respectful of women than other men. Rayner seemed unsurprised. In his witness statement of 2022, he recalls her saying at the time that Coles was creepy; ‘it felt like she described him with a shudder’

Hildreth remembers a night out in Camden with seven or eight other women and them talking about Coles and how unsafe he made them feel.

Asked about ‘Jessica’, who was deceived into a relationship by Coles at the time, Hildreth knew her as a campaigner rather than as a friend. It was clear Jessica was young, in her late teens. Hildreth said it was also clear that Jessica was in a relationship with Coles but she was never close enough a friend to have discussed it.

The Inquiry brought up Hildreth’s 2018 statement to police, in which she said it wasn’t obvious to her that Jessica and Coles were a couple, and suggest her memory has been influenced by subsequent knowledge. Hildreth seemed to concede the point.

Regarding other relationships, a Rayner report of 11 May 1993 said Hildreth had consoled Liz after a traumatic life event. His participation in that was the beginning of his deceiving Liz into a relationship. However, Hildreth can’t remember this at all.

MISSING MATT

Rayner was already in LBAG when Hildreth joined. He was always a generous person and she looked forward to time with him. Beyond their activism, he spent a lot of time with her at her home, and they socialised together.

Rayner’s departure from his deployment was perhaps the most elaborate of any known spycop.

He said he was moving to France and, after a farewell party with comrades in November 1996, took two activists with him to the port, where they saw him get stopped and questioned by Special Branch officers. Presumably this was a stunt to lend credibility to his emigration.

As with other spycops, letters arrived to old friends from the new country, but Rayner kept it up for a year, including a move to Argentina from where a letter arrived saying he had found a new partner. In reality, of course, he’d been back at Scotland Yard the whole time.

Seeing the secret police reports now, Hildreth says it goes far beyond what’s justifiable. After the unmasking of Mark Kennedy in 2010, the first spycop to be publicly exposed, she started to wonder about Rayner. She eventually found out it was true but still couldn’t accept it and was in denial for a long time. It made her feel stupid for being fooled.

Hildreth had missed her friend. She used to Google him, in vain, but always hoped he was doing well and that she’d see him again.

At this point in her testimony, Hildreth stopped, in tears. She then said that Rayner’s recent disclosure, seeing the horrible things he said about people he spied on, had finally made her fully accept the truth.

It was difficult to hear that final part of Hildreth’s evidence, not just for her pain at but because it is so similar to what we’ve heard from other people who were spied on. Whether it was sexual relationships or close friendships, the spycops deliberately created personal bonds that had nothing to do with gathering intelligence.

Finding out someone you were close to was an undercover officer is devastating. It’s a peculiar form of bereavement, the person you loved isn’t just gone but they never actually existed. The person who was actually in your life was only ever a paid actor, tasked to undermine what you hold most dear.

Even more troubling than hearing from people who were spied on describing their loss, we’ve heard one officer after another testify on this and it is clear that it didn’t occur to them what it would do to people when they disappeared. They still seem unable to conceive of what it’s like to genuinely care about someone other than yourself.

Hildreth told the Inquiry that the personal impact is hard to explain to those who haven’t experienced it. Reliving it for the Inquiry has intensified that. The emotional impact is huge. The betrayal of friendship and trust, it’s unacceptable. Truth and the Inquiry have taken a toll on her mental health.

CONCLUSIONS

The Inquiry Chair, Sir John Mitting, said that they’re learning that retelling these experiences in such a forum is hard for people in her position. He complimented her for being so clear.

With that, Hildreth’s evidence was complete. Her testimony took less than two hours. Lambert had taken a cumulative six days, and Mitting’s final comments alluded to this:

‘If everybody gave answers as directly and in as straightforward a manner as you… my task would be a great deal easier’.

If Mitting wants succinct direct answers then maybe he should stop indulging the tactical ditherers playing Anti Just A Minute wasting hours with hesitation, repetition and deviation. If he interjected more, as other inquiry chairs do, it would keep the whole thing on course.

Rayner is due to give evidence to the Inquiry 15-17 January 2025.

Coles is scheduled for 18-20 December 2024.

At the Undercover Policing Inquiry, Monday 9 December was devoted to the evidence of two witnesses, ‘Callum’ and ‘Walter’, who had been involved in hunt saboteur activity in the 1980s.

There were a lot of restrictions on what could be reported in order to protect the identity of the witnesses. They were in the hearing room behind a screen. We’re doing separate reports for them.

RECAP

This was the Monday of the seventh week of ‘Tranche 2 Phase 2’, the new round of hearings of the Undercover Policing Inquiry (UCPI). This Phase mainly concentrates on examining the animal rights-focused activities of the Metropolitan Police’s secret political unit, the Special Demonstration Squad, from 1983-92.

The UCPI is an independent, judge-led inquiry into undercover policing in England and Wales. Its main focus is the activity of two units who deployed long-term undercover officers into a variety of political groups; the Special Demonstration Squad (SDS, 1968-2008) and the National Public Order Intelligence Unit (NPOIU, 1999-2011). Spycops from these units lived as activists for years at a time, spying on more than 1,000 groups.

Click here for the day’s video, transcripts and written evidence

WHICH SPYCOPS

Callum has submitted a 74 page witness statement and 14 exhibits (photos, etc) to the Inquiry.

He started by saying that has been involved in animal rights and hunt sabbing since the early 1980s. Additionally, he was part of the anti poll tax campaign in 1990.

Callum was mostly spied on by officer HN2 Andy Coles, but was also reported on by HN10 Bob Lambert, HN5 John Dines, HN87 ‘John Lipscomb’, and HN17.

HUNT SABBING

He started hunt sabbing aged 17, having seen a Hunt Saboteurs Association (HSA) advert in the Daily Mirror and then joining his local group.

The HSA was the first animal rights organisation, founded in 1963. It aimed to centralise the movement and share tactics. It was a time long before social media, and the mainstream media didn’t report on it, so street stalls, leaflets, gigs, and zines were the main methods of communication.

The HSA published a magazine, Howl, mostly discussing tactics. The organisation was always very democratic.

Callum explained how sabs would use various methods to distract the hunters’ hounds, such as hunting horns, sprays to cover scent, and recording of hounds in cry to distract.

Sabs did not want to get into confrontations with hunters – to do so would distract from saving the animals. The idea was to stay away from the hunt and observe, so they could accurately judge where to intervene between the hunt and the fox.

Hunters, on the other hand, were often violent to sabs (something that continues to the present day). Callum described how they’d be charged down by horses and whipped. Sometimes hunters would get off and assault sabs. Their terriermen would try to corner sabs and attack them. Hunt supporters also used to get involved, blocking, assaulting, and sometimes hiring people to come and attack sabs.

Callum never saw sabs initiate violence. He was also clear that self defence isn’t violence.

After particularly serious violence or egregious behaviour by a hunt, sabs would call for a ‘joint hit’ – the next time the hunt met, sab groups would come from far and wide to show that such attacks would only mean greater disruption to the hunt.

Sabs didn’t want the police to know their plans in advance because police were invariably on the hunters’ side, and after the Criminal Justice Act 1994 introduced the offence of aggravated trespass, sabs would get pre-emptively arrested.

Callum used to get phone calls from police officers on a Friday telling him if he turned up to a certain hunt that weekend he would be arrested just for being there. This illustrates his point that it wasn’t about what was legal, but that the police took the side of the hunters irrespective of the law.

In private documents the police are clearly aware of which side is the violent one, but all the stuff written for external consumption demonises the sabs. The Special Demonstration Squad’s annual reports to the Home Office talk about ‘serious violence’ happening, implying it’s the sabs committing it rather than the other side.

We’ve already heard from spycop Bob Lambert that the HSA was actually ‘entirely lawful’.

LIPSCOMB’S LIES

Callum and other hunt sabs were spied on by HN87 ‘John Lipscomb,’ and we were shown a report submitted by him [MPS0743621], of a discussion of tactics that took place between around 35 hunt sabs in April 1988.

Under the subheading ‘Violence’, the report says that ‘many of the saboteurs present had recently received a trashing from farm hands hired by the Surrey and Burstow Hunt. Callu advocated that all saboteurs should arm themselves with heavy tsicks every time they entered a wood’.

It goes on to note that Callum ‘frequently carries a 12 inch spanner tucked inside his boot’. Callum dismissed the suggestion of the spanner outright, saying ‘the idea is ridiculous’.

He confirmed that he did recommend carrying sticks when going into woods though. He explained that in open country you can see the hunters and avoid them – ‘get at least a fence between you and them’, he advised – but in woodland you can’t tell if people are close by. Entering unarmed and facing the prospect of coming up against a group of terriermen armed with spades, sabs would be less likely to be attacked if carrying a piece of wood.

Having been hospitalised, had bones broken, been stabbed and shot at by hunters and their supporters, Callum was keen to deter further violence. He re-emphasised that seeking confrontation would only have distracted from the point of being there, to save the hunted animals. Avoidance is the first tactic, a fight is bad tactics.

Lipscomb also wrote an end of season summary of hunt sabbing for Special Branch’s C Squad [MPS0743655, 14 May 1989]. In it, he talks about the decline of one hunt sab group as a ‘boost, from the police point of view’.

The report talks of discord between groups, attributed to Callum’s violence. In fact, Callum explained, one person at another group had done a deal with police not wear masks or carry hound whips to steer hounds. Callum’s group didn’t see the benefit, and anyway no group can make agreements on behalf of others. His group still worked with many others.

Lipscomb’s witness statement to the Inquiry says the group sought out violence and were a public order issue wherever they went.

Callum dismissed the claim. He recalled that the sabs needed to find ways to reduce the hunts’ violence, so they would try to counter the impression that all sabs were weedy, feeble vegans, incapable of defending themselves.

They got camouflage jackets and masks to look identical, which didn’t just make them look a bit more intimidating, it also meant the hunters couldn’t easily tell which sabs were women, and they were reluctant to hit women so would err on the side of caution. It also made it hard to identify individual sabs for arrest.

He recounted one incident of him being badly wounded by masked hunt supporters. The police arrived and even the ambulance driver had to tell them to leave Callum alone. The police didn’t take any action or even investigate, until Callum wrote to his MP about this matter.

Callum had seen the unmasked face of one of these attacker, someone he recognised as one of two ‘whippers in’ employed by a Hunt. The police brought the other whipper-in to an identity parade. Callum addressed the man by name and explained why he was innocent. He named the guilty man, but nothing happened. The police never arrested anyone, let alone charged them.

BRIXTON HUNT SABS

Brixton sabs were renowned for their supposed aggression in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Other groups used this reputation, telling sketchy hunters that Brixton were coming, and it made the hunters back off. They were trying to reduce violence, and it worked.

HN87 ‘John Lipscomb’ says in his witness statement that Brixton sabs would trash cars and were a constant threat to public order because of their hatred of rich people and the hunt, and general desire for violence.

Callum scoffed at this. If those things happened it would have been reported, yet there are no such press reports. He says it was all ‘smoke and mirrors’.

In reality, it was just another hunt sab group, no different from the rest. But the word ‘Brixton’ had resonances for hunters. It implied criminality, drugs, city living, Black people – all things that scared rural bigots.

ALF

Hunt sabs were described by police as ‘the link’ between the animal rights movement in general and the Animal Liberation Front.

Callum says there was certainly a link, animal rights was a new community and quite amorphous. Sabbing wasn’t a gateway to the ALF though. One again at the Inquiry, it’s clear the police see movements as being like them, with specialist units and assigned ranked roles. Activism isn’t like that at all.

We were shown a Special Demonstration Squad briefing note written by HN2 Andy Coles, possibly with contributions from others [MPS0245213]. It claims most ALF activists come through the HSA because sabbing is a ‘fertile training ground for militant activism’.

Yet Callum was the only sab in his ALF group, so it’s really not much of a ‘fertile ground’.

He said that his motivation was to save animals and change people minds. He saw ALF raids – going into farms or labs in the dead of night and taking animals away – were very effective. His first two arrests had been for simply leafleting. Being peaceful and law abiding didn’t preclude arrest, so he thought he might as well do more radical action, directly saving lives and with less risk of arrest.

Callum emphasised that it was non-violent. They did the minimum damage to get access, rescued as many animals as they had homes for, then went back in and did graffiti and damage as ‘economic sabotage’. He said that if that counts as ‘violence ‘then the RSPCA kicking a door in to save a trapped dog is also violence.

If they had just taken animals and not done the graffiti as well, a battery chicken farmer might not even have noticed the 100 missing chickens from the thousands at the farm, and it would be no loss as they were only worth pennies each.

They never confronted anyone, if they saw security patrols then they called it all off.

POLL TAX IMPRISONMENT

Callum said that, frustrated at the police’s refusal to act against a hunter who’d severely assaulted him, he intended to use incendiary devices to damage the hunter’s vehicle in the dead of night. This plan would later prove to be his undoing.

The Poll Tax was one of the most unfair and hated policies of the Thatcher government. The Prime Minister had called it her ‘flagship policy’. It replaced local council rates – taxation based on property value – and replaced them with a fixed charge per person. A family of four adults in a terraced house would pay four times as much as a single person living in a mansion.

A police report on the huge protest against the Poll Tax in March 1990 says Brixton hunt sabs were there having ‘opportunist’ involvement in fighting with police.

Callum says it’s just further demonisation of the Brixton group. Again, the police are thinking regimentally. In reality, he was there on his own, not with sabs. He remembers the march as well-mannered. But at Trafalgar Square police surrounded the protesters and closed in.

HN5 John Dines – who was arrested undercover on the day – says people were punching, kicking and throwing stuff before the police waded in. Callum laughed at the gall of the claim, it’s well established that the police provoked the protesters, and he pointed out that a BBC documentary had proved that.

The police were doing snatch squads, darting into crowds and pulling someone out for arrest, attacking those nearby with truncheons. Callum saw a sergeant knock a woman to the ground and continue to beat her.

Callum got between them, the officer swung for Callum, who punched him back. In the ensuing retaliation and arrest Callum sustained a bruised head and cut hand. He was not arrested on the Poll Tax march, but was arrested months later at home. His home was searched and the incendiary devices found. Like so many arrested for the Poll Tax protest, he was given a lengthy prison sentence.

HN87 ‘John Lipscomb’ thinks he identified Callum from photos of the protest he was shown at an SDS meeting. We were shown the SDS annual report 1990-91 that claims that it was evidence from their officers that led to the arrest.

Callum says the spycops’ reporting on him would have had a significant impact on his sentencing, if that had been revealed in court. One again, police withheld evidence from a court case that the defence had a right to see. This is a miscarriage of justice.

AFTER PRISON

He remembers getting a lot of mail sent to him when he was inside, ten letters a day, books and magazines, and a massive pile of Christmas cards. That feeling of solidarity was essential for his mental health.

After getting out, his natural instinct was to ‘pay back’ this support by helping others in the same way.

He pointed out that if you look at any progressive movement there is always some illegality. Even if you don’t agree 100% with what someone’s done, it’s important for their movement to look after them when they’re in prison.

Callum says he has never done anything illegal since coming out of prison. He had a son, and started a career. He wanted to pay back the support he had in prison, so started helping out with the ALF Supporters Group (ALFSG).

He explained that the ALFSG was fundamentally about supporting ALF prisoners. Sections of the constitution were read aloud that make that clear. They tried to raise enough money to support animal rights prisoners in a wide range of ways, such as helping them access vegan food and toiletries while they were inside, money for travel expenses, phone calls, postage, etc.

The £24 a year membership was a lot at the time, so most of their members were older people with good jobs.

They produced a newsletter, but had it carefully vetted by lawyers to ensure there was nothing that could be seen as incitement.

HN2 ANDY COLES

Callum has supplied a photo of a party held to celebrate his release from prison. HN2 Andy Coles is in the photo, and Callum thinks this is the first time they met. However he doesn’t recall speaking to him on this occasion.

Callum first spoke to Coles on an animal rights info stall when Coles, as was standard for spycops, had a van and offered the use of it as a way to ingratiate himself. Callum said this was very useful transporting all the merchandise for stalls, or making the lengthy trip to London to collect the ALFSG newsletter from the printer.

We were shown a report by Coles [MPS0745986] saying Callum had returned to hunt sabbing now his probation over, and he was ‘itching to have a go at hunt heavies’ and wants to be generally violent.

Coles’s witness statement to the Inquiry [UCPI035074 page 106, para 224] said he ‘slogged his guts out’ to become second in command of the ALFSG, doing the admin and keeping the membership records with a computer bought from campaign funds.

Callum says Coles is lying about all of this. There was no hierarchy with a second in command, nor a computer bought by the Group. At most, Coles would have seen address labels when he was doing the quarterly envelope stuffing for the newsletter. That was the limit of his admin work.

Coles claims to have helped write the ALFSG newsletter, Callum says that’s nonsense. He could have submitted an article like anyone else, but doesn’t remember that he did.

It’s apparent that Coles lied about other things too – for example he’s reported that ALF activists informed people that they planned to do actions before actually doing them.

Callum was very clear that there was a ‘very strict security culture’ amongst animal rights activists at this time. Nobody talked about the actions they had done, never mind those they hadn’t even done yet. And those, like him, who weren’t actively involved did not need or want to know!

The ALFSG had initially been set up just to support ‘ALF’ prisoners, but mergedtheir prisoner list with the Support Animal Rights Prisoners (SARP) one, and broadened itssupport to include hunt sabs and other animal rights prisoners. The ALFSG was a public, wholly law abiding group. Coles basically spent three years watching Callum do legal activity.

‘I’m surprised he wasn’t pulled out after 12 months because it’s not telling them anything about me… I’m sort of an absence in his reports, which is odd, you know, you think he’d be saying lots about me, what I was doing, but there’s very little about me actually, because I wasn’t doing anything which could bring me to the attention of the police.’

TACTICAL EXAGGERATION AND LIES

Coles said he visited animal rights prisoner Robin Lane with Robin’s wife. It was actually Callum who went. Once again, we see undercover officers taking real events and putting the wrong name in – either claiming they did something so they appear more involved, or else doing something criminal and then attributing to others.

This is now looking like tradecraft rather than many individuals stumbling on the same tactic. Either way, it must’ve felt so easy for them, how would the bosses ever know what was true (unless a public inquiry eventually put the documents to the people involved)? Three of the officers we’ve seen who did a lot of this – Bob Lambert, Roger Pearce and Andy Coles – were promoted to Special Branch management roles where they had long and successful careers.

Coles reported a list of people contacting the ALFSG wanting to find out how to become ALF activists. Callum says this is talking as if they were applying to be members of the ALF, which is risible. He said there was only the occasional person doing anything like that, and that they used to politely decline. They couldn’t have done that even if they wanted to. Also, the enquirer’s sense of security was so poor you wouldn’t want to work with them anyway!

Coles reported that a group of people who were planning an attack on a meat facility asked if they’d have ALFSG support if they were imprisoned for it. Callum says that too was ridiculous on several levels. Firstly, they’d already know that prisoners were supported.

But more to the point, for security reasons, activists did not tell people in advance about actions. The ALFSG could only find out who did an action after it happened, if the people were arrested and imprisoned. Again, there was a very strict security culture for everybody’s sake. They didn’t want to know who did what!

Coles claims he was given an ALF spycatcher role, and talked of a prospective trip to Belfast to investigate a suspected mole. Police records show that management declined permission, saying it was too risky for him to go.

Callum says there was no ‘spycatcher’ involved in the case, let alone any chance of Coles going. In reality, eight people had been arrested for ALF action. They’d been badly abused in the cells with beatings and being burned with cigarettes. One of them had given full statement incriminating others in order to protect themselves and get a lesser sentence.

The ALFSG did not support ‘grasses’. Callum went to find out what happened and agreed the ALFSG would not support that prisoner. This person was not an ‘informer’, just someone who grassed very readily in order to protect themselves and get a lesser sentence.

Once again, a spycop exaggerates what’s going on and takes credit for someone else’s deeds in order to seem important.

Callum was frequently stopped by the police at the time, presumably because the police thought he was still an ALF activist. Coles was ideally placed to tell the police that he wasn’t, but doing so would have undermined the stories he was telling his bosses.

COLES’S RELATIONSHIPS

Callum was asked about Coles claiming at the time that he’d had a one night stand with a known animal rights activist. Callum hadn’t previously noticed Coles having any romantic or sexual interest in anyone, and he’d thought Coles might be gay. This was the only time he heard anything sexual from Coles.

Callum says Coles never told him about being any kind of ongoing relationship. He’d said he was a delivery driver, who moved around a lot, and being single fitted with his lifestyle. He didn’t seem interested in a relationship.

Here’s an officer spying for years who didn’t appear to Callum to ever have a relationship, and Callum thought that was fine. So much for other officers saying having relationships was vital to establish credibility and acceptance.

FAMILY INTRUSION

Coles visited Callum at his home and at his parents’ home. He says it was totally unnecessary for Coles to name and report on his young son, who was under six when Coles left. His excuse was that it was to identify Callum’s partner.

We were shown a long, hand written letter, supposedly sent from Budapest on 1 January 1996, from Andy to Callum, his partner and child.

It says he was glad to hear Callum was well, as he said he was going to leave the country with little detail.

He says he didn’t believe it when, years later, he was told Andy Coles was a spycop. Even when he was shown photos he couldn’t quite accept that this man who came over their house, walked their dog, and played with their son had been doing it all as a paid police role.

Callum highlighted the fact that Andy Coles doesn’t really report anything much about him or his partner. What was he doing in spending so much time with them? How can he justify befriending a young family for three years?

‘it’s a betrayal of a friendship… this is somebody we considered a friend, he came to our house, we walked our dogs together, he played with our son and we had no ill feelings about him whatsoever, there was nothing we can say “oh yeah Andy, he was a bit of a twat” or something, you know, it was a case of he’s a nice guy, helped us out and then went abroad…

Now it’s all tainted… it changes the view of your life.’

At the Undercover Policing Inquiry, Monday 25 November was devoted to animal rights Geoff Sheppard completing his evidence, which he did remotely.

For yet another week, there was no livestreaming of Inquiry hearings, and once again the public relied entirely on live tweeting from Tom Fowler and ourselves.

RECAP

This summary covers Monday of the fifth week of ‘Tranche 2 Phase 2’, the new round of hearings of the Undercover Policing Inquiry (UCPI). This Phase mainly concentrates on examining the animal rights-focused activities of the Metropolitan Police’s secret political unit, the Special Demonstration Squad, from 1983-92.

The UCPI is an independent, judge-led inquiry into undercover policing in England and Wales. Its main focus is the activity of two units who deployed long-term undercover officers into a variety of political groups; the Special Demonstration Squad (SDS, 1968-2008) and the National Public Order Intelligence Unit (NPOIU, 1999-2011). Spycops from these units lived as activists for years at a time, spying on more than 1,000 groups.

This was the third day of Geoff Sheppard’s evidence – for his earlier evidence, see our report from the previous hearing.

Having already covered his involvement with HN10 Bob Lambert ‘Bob Robinson’, this hearing was intended to focus on the other spycops who targeted him.

Click here for the day’s video, transcripts and written evidence

BACKGROUND

In 1995, Sheppard was set up by spycop HN1 ‘Matt Rayner’ and received a seven year sentence. Rayner’s boss at the Special Demonstration Squad was Bob Lambert who, in his earlier career undercover in the 1980s, had ensured Sheppard got a four year prison sentence.

‘Matt Rayner’ hasn’t had the same level of attention as some other spycops, but he is one of the central figures in the infiltration of animal rights campaigning in the 1990s.

He stole the identity of a dead child, had a long-term relationship with activist Denise Fuller, broke the law many times and was convicted under his false identity, and set Geoff Sheppard up with a wrongful conviction.

Sheppard got into animal rights activism in 1980 when he watched a documentary on factory farming and became a vegan, though he didn’t know the term at the time.

He went on his first demo in 1981 and got involved in direct action in 1984, giving the example of breaking windows of butchers’ shops or burger chains.

Asked if he was ever involved in liberating animals, he said:

‘No, actually that’s one of my regrets, that I was never involved in actually liberating an actual animal. But I could give you an idea as to why that was the case.’

As to whether his animal rights activism ever caused harm to anyone, Sheppard replied:

‘Not physically, no. But possibly to their bank balance… that was a deliberate decision… I wouldn’t have felt comfortable harming anybody.’

He said that he’d only been hunt sabbing on two or three occasions when extra help was required because of potential violence from the hunters. He had become involved in London Greenpeace in part because of its support for animal rights.

DIFFERENT GROUPS, COMMON PURPOSE

The Inquiry showed a secret police report by Lambert (UCPI028517) which said that there was close cooperation between the Animal Liberation Front and London Greenpeace because:

‘The latter is dominated by anarchist Animal Liberation Front activists or supporters, who see the name ‘London Greenpeace’ as a good vehicle for promoting Animal Liberation Front propaganda and actions.’

Sheppard, echoing numerous other witnesses before him, said that simply wasn’t true, and indeed many people in London Greenpeace had no interest in animal rights.

‘I used to attend London Greenpeace quite often and I certainly wasn’t thinking of it as affording me a cloak of respectability, not at all…

I think people attended London Greenpeace such as myself who were interested in animal rights and animal liberation, it was because there were some people there who were interested in those issues.’

It’s one of the major recurring misconceptions we’ve seen in police reports throughout the Inquiry. They imagine activists are looking for ways to hoodwink others into supporting their cause. They seem incapable of believing that people genuinely support the causes and act with integrity. This says much more about those writing the reports than it does about their subjects.

The Inquiry referred to Hackney and Islington Animal Rights Campaign, which Sheppard was involved with in the 1980s and 1990s. He confirmed their meetings were open to the public and held monthly.

‘it was a group that would hold public meetings. It would mainly be at the weekend or on a Saturday going out on the streets handing out leaflets about different aspects of animal abuse. That was the kind of thing that they would do.’

He was shown a range of reports about the group that named him (UCPI02848, 3 January 1986 by Lambert; MPS-074410, 17 March 1992 by HN2 Andy Coles; MPS-074410, 10 April 1992, also by Coles; MPS-0740030, 15 March 1993 by Rayner; MPS-0744116, 12 November 1993, also by Rayner). The last of these said the group was disbanding.

Sheppard disputed the description of him as having a prominent role:

‘Well, I wouldn’t say I was one of the principal organisers. I definitely used to help out to some extent. I seem to remember that for a time I was the person who would go and open up the room if there was a public meeting… I helped in that respect, certainly.’

This is another inaccurate recurring theme of the police reports. The police seem to find it difficult to conceive of loosely affiliated like-minded people acting in concert, and so they try to superimpose a hierarchy on to any groups spied on. They pick members and attribute commanding roles to them. This also helps in making their reports sound like they’ve uncovered secrets.

Additionally, as we’ve especially seen in many of Lambert’s reports, the officers will organise things themselves but attribute it to group members.

IMAGINARY HIERARCHY

Sheppard was then shown a report (MPS-0744109, 20 July 1992, by Matt Rayner and Andy Coles):

‘Geoff Sheppard, the life and soul of the Hackney and Islington Animal Rights Campaign has decided that for the time being the group will confine itself to an educational workshop with public meetings, enlisting the support of guest speakers and videos.’

This makes him not only the central figure but able to unilaterally take decisions on what the group will do. This is not what he was, nor how the group worked.

‘I think these undercover officers tend to exaggerate everything that they say… my nature is not really the life and soul of anything, to be honest.’

The Inquiry turned to the Animal Liberation Front Supporters’ Group (ALFSG), which Sheppard had supported since the mid-1980s and was briefly active in running its finances in the early 1990s. He described the ALFSG as supporting animal rights prisoners, and producing a newsletter.

A 1993 report by Rayner (MPS-0744489) said Sheppard left his role in order to commit himself to more direct animal rights work such as street protests:

‘Sheppard remains convinced that the only really effective way to fight vivisection is through economic sabotage’

This is quite a sensationalist way to describe activities, and also inaccurate, as Sheppard pointed out:

‘I don’t think that was quite right. I would say economic sabotage was certainly one of the ways to fight vivisection, but there were also other good ways to fight vivisection as well, you know, through showing people the reality of vivisection on the streets, with leafleting, back in those days, anyway.’

A 1992 report by Andy Coles (MPS-074225) revealed the supposed command structure of the ALFSG:

‘The central organising figure behind the Animal Liberation Front Supporters Group is Vivien Smith who, despite her incarceration in Holloway Prison, is still able to carry out this role. Smith is assisted by Geoff Sheppard, a regular visitor, who acts as her agent.’

Sheppard rebuffed the whole thing.

‘No, that’s an exaggeration. I remember visiting her in Holloway Prison on one occasion. Just once. So, you know, “regular visiting” is a ridiculous thing to say. It just simply wasn’t true… I certainly have no recollection of acting as her agent, no.’

LONDON BOOTS ACTION GROUP

They then turned to the formation of London Boots Action Group, another campaign against vivisection. At that time, retail chemist Boots had two of its own vivisection facilities. The Inquiry showed reports from HN5 John Dines ‘John Barker’, as well as ones from Andy Coles that mentioned Sheppard.

‘we would stand outside Boots stores, not obstructing the entry or anything like that, but we would be handing out leaflets to people as we were standing outside various Boots stores in and around London. Certainly from my point of view, that’s the main activity that I remember. You know, rather boring hours of activity getting probably quite cold standing outside Boots stores.’

A Matt Rayner report from 1992 (MPS-073939) said:

‘11 members of the London Boots Action Group travelled to Margate to join the national demonstration against Charles River, the parent company of Shamrock Farm near Brighton [breeders of monkeys for vivisection].’

It described a peaceful demonstration and then:

‘In bad temper and some frustration, the London Boots Action Group contingent went into Margate to vent their anger on local branches of Boots and McDonald’s. [privacy] and [privacy] let off a handful of stink bombs in both establishments, while [privacy] and [privacy] entered Boots, loaded baskets with goods which they packed very slowly at the checkout before casually leaving the store without the goods and without paying for them.

‘[Privacy] and [privacy], with [privacy], [privacy] and [privacy] repeated the performance in McDonald’s by ordering huge quantities of food and drink, which they abandoned when produced. These actions cause intense annoyance to the staff and management at both places’

Sheppard confirmed he was at the earlier demo but has no recollection at all of the later events, and said he never did anything like that.

It’s worth mentioning that even if it all happened exactly as described, annoying retail staff is hardly a matter for an elaborate undercover operation with copies of reports being sent to MI5.

Another Rayner report (MPS-074579) said someone at a London Boots Action Group meeting had suggested a protest outside the home of a director of Boots. Sheppard has a vague memory of doing such a protest once which, he pointed out, was legal and quite common at the time.

Several reports described security concerns in the group and that some members, including Sheppard, dismissed them because the group had no secrets. It was open to the public and produced a newsletter about its activities. They said that if anyone wanted to discuss sensitive or illegal matters they shouldn’t do so at the meetings.

Asked to elaborate on the clear implication of this, Sheppard said:

‘London Boots Action Group, in its own right, was not involved in anything like that, but obviously individuals who attended London Boots Action Group may have been, such as myself, involved in direct action.’

HIDDEN TREASURER

Moving on to 1995 and London Animal Action, a Matt Rayner report (MPS-0741078) said the group held two bank accounts. One had Paul Gravett and Sheppard named as signatories, the other had Gravett and Rayner himself.

Though it’s alarming to think of spycops taking on such a pivotal active position in a group, by 1995 it had become standard tradecraft.

As an illustration of how common this was, we had previously learned about these officers’ roles in a single week of Inquiry hearings:

HN354 Vincent Clark ‘Vince Miller’ (1976-79)
Treasurer, SWP Walthamstow branch
Treasurer, SWP Outer East London District

HN80 ‘Colin Clark’ (1977-82)
Treasurer, SWP Seven Sisters & Haringey branch
Treasurer, SWP Lea Valley District
National Treasurer, Right to Work Campaign

HN356/124 ‘Bill Biggs’ (1977-82)
Treasurer, SWP Plumstead branch

HN155 ‘Phil Cooper’ (1979-83)
Treasurer, Waltham Forest Anti-Nuclear Campaign
National Treasurer, Right to Work Campaign

SPYCOPS PASSING OFF THEIR WORK AS HIS

We were then shown reports detailing the formation and function of the Animal Liberation Investigation Unit. It was described as co-ordinating regional groups to support and attend one another’s activities which were specifically described as within the bounds of the law.

Those setting it up had to be personally informed and vouched for. Sheppard said he has no memory of being invited and doesn’t believe it happened. Despite this, the reports named him as the London co-ordinator, and we were treated to an extensive description of the responsibilities that entailed.

Sheppard apologetically responded:

‘I was not in any way involved in the Animal Liberation Investigation Unit. Not as far as I remember, anyway. I am pretty sure that I was not. So that seems to be fabricated, really.’

Asked why Rayner would have said this, Sheppard said:

‘I would like to know whether he was possibly acting in that role, and maybe he was putting my name there instead.’

We next looked at a Special Branch report from outside the Special Demonstration Squad (MPS-073960), concerning Operation Wheelbrace which targeted animal rights activists:

‘Geoff Sheppard has become very much a force unto to himself and is not part of any specific group dealt with under Wheelbrace. He is behind the new British Anti-Vivisection Association.’

Sheppard was categorical in his response:

‘I was certainly not behind it, I had no involvement in setting it up… I wasn’t really involved, other than buying packs of leaflets off them in order to distribute. Possibly I used to go round door to door putting them through letterboxes. That was my involvement, really, with that organisation.’

Asked about all these groups being spied on, he declared:

‘it was totally unnecessary for the undercover police to be doing this. I mean, these groups had no intention of toppling British democracy, they weren’t involved in violence against individuals, and, as I said before, as far as I am aware there were a lot of police informers in the animal rights movement, apparently, so I don’t see why there was any necessity to have undercover police officers involved.’

THE OFFICERS

Having looked at the various campaign groups, the Inquiry moved on to ask Sheppard about the spycops themselves.

They started with HN11 Michael Chitty ‘Mike Blake’. Sheppard has a vague recollection of meeting him once, when Chitty drove a carload of people back to London after attending a trial in Sheffield.

In 2014, Chitty told Operation Herne – the Met’s self-investigation into spycops before the public inquiry was announced – that he’d known Sheppard well. Sheppard himself denied this.

JOHN DINES & WRONGFUL ARREST

Moving on to John Dines, Sheppard remembered him from London Greenpeace, but without much in the way of specifics.

They never socialised together and:

‘The only main thing with this individual was that he threw a bag of flour at an anti-hunt demonstration and I got arrested for it.’

The Inquiry went into this in some detail. It was a Horse and Hounds ball, held at the Grosvenor House Hotel in 1991.

Sheppard described his presence:

‘this was a hunt ball, so these were people attending the ball who were engaged in the practice of hunting wild animals to death and our presence there was to let them know that we very much disagreed with that so-called sport…

‘there were quite a few people there. So possibly 30 or 40 people, perhaps… it could have been 60 people, maybe… as far as I remember, it was just mainly shouting. Holding placards, that kind of thing.

‘I don’t have a memory of seeing the bag of flour being thrown or landing. I probably saw it but I just can’t remember it. All I can remember is my arrest… maybe John Dines was standing behind me, but I never saw who threw it.’

Sheppard was arrested. He was later told that Dines was the one who’d thrown it. Sheppard was tried and convicted.

‘afterwards, outside, John Dines must have come outside with me and I think one of the officers who had been involved in the arrest was coming out and John Dines shouted at him, “Tell the truth in future”. That’s the bit that I remember.’

This makes it a miscarriage of justice – a police officer had evidence that exonerated the accused, but withheld it from the court. This is far from the only time spycops did this. Mark Ellison KC’s 2015 report on spycops and miscarriages of justice says there was evidence of this happening numerous times.

The case that brought the whole spycops scandal to the public eye, the exposure of Mark Kennedy, became common knowledge when prosecuted climate activists asked to see his reports. Rather than hand them over, the state withdrew and in January 2011 the trial collapsed.

It later came out that Kennedy had recorded conversations that exonerated the accused. Had he not been unmasked between the arrests and the trial, there would likely have been wrongful convictions.

Plainly, police withheld evidence in cases that resulted in Geoff Sheppard’s more serious convictions too.

Somewhat bizarrely, the Inquiry asked Sheppard at some length about why he didn’t complain to police about his wrongful prosecution.

John Dines had deceived deceived Helen Steel into an intimate relationship. Sheppard confirmed that he knew Steel from London Greenpeace meetings but he didn’t socialise with her or Dines:

‘I was always rather a standoffish type of person. I didn’t go to a lot of social events, so probably I didn’t have as many opportunities to see them together as other people would have had.’

ANDY COLES

Andy Coles was the next officer discussed. He infiltrated peace and animal rights groups from 1991 to 1995. In that time, he groomed a vulnerable teenager, ‘Jessica’, into a relationship.

‘I knew him very little, but I think he was – people called him Andy Van, because he always had a van available to drive people around or move items around.’

Beyond that, Sheppard’s recollections about Coles were scant. He believes they would have been in London Boots Action Group together.

‘I don’t actually remember him being with me on pickets outside Boots, but he probably was doing that… If you ask me to picture inside my mind right now a meeting of the London Boots Action Group with him sitting there, I don’t think – I can’t really picture him…

‘You know, if you are going to talk about Rayner, then I have much more knowledge, because I was closer to him. I wasn’t very close to this Andrew Coles, he had obviously not been assigned to focus on me, because he didn’t focus on me and I had very little involvement with him.’

One of Coles’ reports from 1992 describes a woman involved in London Greenpeace, London Boots Action Group, and other groups in South London. It says she does not approve of ‘lethal force against animal abusers’ and claims this means she disagrees with ‘her boyfriend, Geoff Sheppard’.

Sheppard rejects this outright.

In an undated document called ‘Six months post-op debrief’ (MPS-0743479), presumably six months after Coles’ deployment ended in 1995, he said he was a close associate of Sheppard’s in the ALF, and that he’d gained the trust and confidence of extremely good security-conscious activists, including Sheppard.

‘Well, that’s just completely incorrect, because he was not… he definitely never gained my trust or confidence. I had very little to do with him…

I had a prison sentence already for the Debenhams act, so maybe it boosted his credibility to make out that he was closer to me than he actually was.’

MATT RAYNER

In contrast, Sheppard remembered HN1 ‘Matt Rayner’ well.

‘I don’t even know if you would say we were friends, but I think we developed a situation where we were close associates… And the reason I don’t use the word “friend”, is because I don’t really remember socialising with him all that much, or if at all.’

Speaking to Operation Herne’s investigation into spycops, Rayner described himself and Sheppard as ‘firm friends’.

‘I think that’s a bit too strong. As I said, he was a close associate and that association was all based around animal liberation, based around those issues. I wouldn’t say that we would become firm friends, I think that’s putting it too strongly…

‘I trusted him because he showed a willingness – a great willingness – to be involved in direct action and I was involved with him in direct action on quite a few occasions.’

A police document (MPS-074616) authored by spycops manager HN67 ‘Alan Bond’ in August 1992, not long into Rayner’s deployment, was quoted:

‘Had an informal chat with HN1 [‘Rayner’] – things within his organisation are obviously settling down and he now appears to be progressing steadily.

‘Geoff Sheppard has now taken HN1 under his wing and is telling other comrades that he can vouch for him – almost as if he is acting as HN1’s mentor within the organisation.’

Sheppard called it out as false:

‘I don’t think I started doing direct action with him until some time in 1993. So at that time I wouldn’t have had any idea whether he seemed to be a trusted person or not.’

Sheppard said Rayner visited his home a couple of times.

The first of these he believes was around May 1994, and Rayner was with a woman he had deceived into a relationship, Liz Fuller.

The second was around March 1995, a few weeks before Sheppard was arrested, precipitating his second spell of imprisonment.

‘the thing that has stuck in my mind from that visit is that we were basically we were talking about vivisection, animal experimentation, and the kind of people that were involved in animal experimentation, and we were obviously, you know, very unhappy about these kind of people.

‘And I remember him suddenly dropping into the conversation, “well, if you would like – if you want to shoot the vivisector, then I would be willing to drive you there”. Of course at this time I had already informed him that I was in possession of the shotgun. This was the suggestion that he made to me.

‘My answer to him, because I felt that I was sort of letting him down, because it seemed as if it was something that he wanted to do. I didn’t actually say no. I said to him, “I’ll think about it”, which was my way of kind of gently letting him down. Because I thought – to me it seemed as if I was kind of letting him down by not doing something that he seemed to be interested in doing.’

SPYCOP FACILITATING CRIME

Sheppard remembered Rayner always had a vehicle – at first a van, later a car – that was used to give lifts to activists. This was standard practice for spycops – in a community without much disposable income, and events to go to that were often some distance away, being able to give lifts meant you got told about everything.

Spycops would also use the long drives to get personal information, and drop people at home thus finding out their addresses.

Sheppard said he was with Rayner on many occasions when Rayner was the driver for people committing criminal damage to buildings connected to vivisection. This was after Sheppard’s prison term for the Debenhams actions, and also after a period of several years following his release when he was not involved in criminal activity. He remembers Rayner advocating direct action and responding in agreement.

At this point the hearing took a break for lunch. Despite their earlier promises to publish transcripts of hearings by lunchtime the next day, they have failed to do so on numerous occasions.

At the time of writing, the afternoon transcript is still not online and the Inquiry has not responded to emails asking when we can expect it. This means that we don’t have any extended verbatim quotes for the afternoon session and must work instead from notes and live tweets.

Rayner told Operation Herne that he once appeared in court as a witness after Sheppard had been arrested at an anti-fur protest outside Harrods. Sheppard himself doesn’t even remember the arrest, saying it happened to him so many times they all blur into one.

Sheppard does remember Rayner and his partner Liz Fuller and was well aware they were a couple.

John Dines reported in July 1990 that Sheppard was reluctant to get involved in taking ‘extreme direct action’ following his release from prison that March.

BACK TO ACTION

A 1993 report by Rayner said Sheppard had resumed ‘ALF-style activity’. Sheppard agrees that this is true and says Rayner was ‘putting me in the position he was in’. He explained his resumption as being half due to a residual belief in direct action, and half due to the influence of Rayner:

‘I valued his perception of me… I suppose maybe some part of me wanted to do it to please him’

The report said Sheppard had ‘gathered around him a small group of established, trusted and highly committed activists’.

He says he hadn’t, but that maybe Rayner had done this, and persuaded them all to get involved.

There were 10 to 15 actions, all of them criminal damage (eg breaking windows and throwing paint), all at vivisection institutions. There was no targeting of individuals or homes.

A report dated November 1994 talks about Sheppard developing a new ‘enthusiasm for anti-government public order type confrontation’ and going along to an anti-Criminal Justice Bill protest in October.

These were huge, broad-based protests against planned draconian new laws that criminalised protests and curtailed human rights. The protests had support from most parties except the Conservatives. It was far from ‘anti-government’.

He remembers being in Hyde Park when trouble broke out, and being charged by mounted police officers, one of whom hit him in the head with a baton. He did not break any shop windows that day (as claimed in the report).

INCENDIARY ALLEGATIONS

Sheppard freely admits four of them – including Rayner – were considering an incendiary campaign targeting Boots, but explains he got scared, and only got 95% of the way to producing an effective device. According to an expert who examined the items found at Sheppard’s home in 1995, there were components that could be used to manufacture a timed incendiary device, along with an instruction booklet.

Rayner asked to take away the 95% completed incendiary device that Sheppard had built but couldn’t get any further with. Sheppard agreed. Rayner didn’t take the booklet that detailed how to make these devices, and he assumed Rayner had his own copy.

In his witness statement, Sheppard writes of trying to make a working incendiary device, and deciding to turn it into a ‘dummy’, that would look like an incendiary device but not work as one.

Asked about an incendiary device that was recovered from a branch of Boots in Enfield, Sheppard says that was an action of Rayner’s after Sheppard said he didn’t want to be involved any more. The device found in Enfield was examined and found to be ‘viable’. According to the expert, if it had functioned it would have burnt for several minutes.

After the device was discovered in Enfield, somebody called the store and claimed there was a second device hidden there, and so the shop was evacuated. Somebody also rang the media.

Apart from Rayner and Sheppard, the other two people in the cell were both women. Sheppard didn’t make any anonymous phone calls about devices planted in Boots, so if this was a caller with a male voice, the only other person it could be was Rayner.

SHOTGUN

Sheppard didn’t go out with the intention of purchasing a shotgun. An armed robber he’d made friends with in prison asked him to look after the firearm. They dropped off the ammunition (some live and some not) at the same time as the gun.

They contacted him later from another country saying they were short of money and asked if he would buy it from them. He agreed to do this, thinking it could be useful for things like shooting out lights and cameras, or windows. He never intended to use it against a person. He thinks he paid between £100 and £200.

Asked why he kept the gun and the device/ components in his house, Sheppard says he doesn’t understand what was going on in his head at the time, and wonders if he had some kind of ‘death wish’ to have taken such a risk.

He says he and Rayner went out to Epping Forest together to test the gun.

1995 ARREST

When Sheppard’s home was raided the police recovered a double-barrelled shotgun (with only one working barrel) and some ammunition. We were shown a photo.

The Inquiry was shown a typed and handwritten note by Sheppard that included the paragraph:

‘we should trust our instincts above all else and if they lead us to sympathise with the use of lethal violence against animal torturers, then so be it.’

Sheppard says he wrote it in prison for an article in Arkangel magazine, that ‘maybe’ he would have had sympathy for someone who took lethal action against vivisectors, had it happened, but that he had no such intent himself.

It had the title ‘Follow the Force’. Sheppard explained he was referring to the ‘force within’ and the article ended by telling the reader to be true to themselves, which ‘99.95% of the time’ will tend to mean non-violence.

We were shown an intelligence report from 1 June 1995 attributed to Rayner (who claims it is a composite report, not written solely by him). It said Sheppard’s arrest on 26 May 1995 came as a shock to many animal rights activists, and that Geoff Sheppard intended to murder Professor Colin Blakemore, a neurobiologist and outspoken advocate of vivisection in medical research.

We were also shown the debrief of Rayner where he says Sheppard was looking after a shotgun and he didn’t know what to do with it. Rayner admitted Sheppard never told him that he planned to target Blakemore, but says that Blakemore was ‘public enemy number one within the anti-vivisection movement, there was constant talk by many activists, Geoff Sheppard included, of wanting to do him harm’.

Sheppard later appealed against his 1995 conviction, on the basis of Rayner’s involvement, encouragement and facilitation. In his grounds for appeal, he listed the ways in which Rayner had been involved: actively encouraging him to take part in actions, transporting him and others to actions, encouraging him to buy a shotgun and offering him money towards the purchase. Paul Gravett, Sheppard’s comrade, says he remembers Sheppard telling him about it at the time.

Sheppard now says Rayner didn’t encourage him to buy it, and didn’t even know about it until after it was paid for.

Geoff Sheppard was sentenced to seven years for his possession of a firearm and other items to be used for criminal damage. We were shown an authority document from Special Branch for Rayner to visit Sheppard in prison on the Isle of Wight in November 1996. Rayner also wrote to Sheppard in jail, with a number of letters exchanged.

This ended the questions, but not the questioning. The Inquiry went round in circles for a while, literally asking the exact same questions about the shotgun over and over, occasionally adding the prefix ‘are you sure’. It’s not clear what they thought this would achieve, and eventually they stopped.

Tranche 2, Phase 2, Day 2

15 October 2024

This summary covers the second day of ‘Tranche 2 Phase 2’, the new round hearings of the Undercover Policing Inquiry (UCPI), examining the animal rights-focused activities of the Metropolitan Police’s secret political unit, the Special Demonstration Squad, from 1983-92.

The UCPI is an independent, judge-led inquiry into undercover policing in England and Wales. Its main focus is the activity of two units who deployed long-term undercover officers into a variety of political groups; the Special Demonstration Squad (SDS, 1968-2008) and the National Public Order Intelligence Unit (NPOIU, 1999-2011). Spycops from these units lived as activists for years at a time, spying on more than 1,000 groups.

Opening statements: Day 2

James Wood KC (Albert Beale; Gabrielle Bosley; Jane Hickman; Claire Hildreth; Hilary Moore; Rebecca Johnson; Robin Lane; Dave Morris: Geoff Shepherd; Paul Gravett; Helen Steel; Martyn Lowe)
Rajiv Menon KC (Friends of Freedom Press)
Dave Morris (McLibel Support Campaign)
Peter Weatherby KC (Hunt Saboteurs Association)
Sam Jacobs (Sharon Grant OBE; Stafford Scott)
Owen Greenhall (Joan Ruddock; Diane Abbott)
Fiona Murphy KC (The Category F Core Participants and TBS)
Kirsten Heaven (Non-Police Non-State Core Participants’ Co-ordinating Group)

1) James Wood KC

James Wood KC opens today’s hearing. He is speaking on behalf of 12 individuals represented by Hodge Jones and Allen:

• Albert Beale
• Gabrielle Bosley
• Jane Hickman
• Claire Hildreth
• Hilary Moore
• Rebecca Johnson
• Robin Lane
• Dave Morris
• Geoff Sheppard
• Paul Gravett
• Helen Steel
• Martyn Lowe

Their written Opening Statement goes into much more detail than his abbreviated oral submissions.

Wood began with some strong words about the officers of the Special Demonstration Squad, stating that they had:

‘committed some of the most serious abuses of state power against activists in modern times. They displayed, we say, a complete contempt for the basic rights and dignity of those they spied upon’.

Introductions

Wood went on to introduce those he represents, all of whom had been targeted for their involvement in a wide range of groups, including London Greenpeace, the women’s peace movement, the Trafalgar Square Defendants Campaign and various animal rights groups.

He noted that their political views, and the tactics they chose to use, varied, but made the point that none of them encouraged or promoted any form of direct action that would cause harm to anyone.

He took some time to explain that London Greenpeace was a small, autonomous, group, established in 1971 and completely independent from the much larger Greenpeace organisation that now exists. He provided pen portraits of those who were active in the group in the 1980s and explained a little about their background and interests.

Both Albert Beale and Martyn Lowe could be described as ‘pacifists’ and had long been involved in anti-nuclear, peace campaigning and projects. Albert is due to give evidence on 11 November and Martyn is scheduled to appear on 4 November.

Dave Morris spoke later that morning, about the McLibel case in which he and Helen Steel were involved. Morris was also part of the Trafalgar Square Defendants Campaign, set up in the aftermath of the anti-Poll Tax demonstration that took place in central London in March 1990. He will be providing more evidence on 5 November.

Like Morris, Steel was also involved in a wide range of environmental and social justice groups over the years. She was also one of the women targeted and deceived into a long-term sexual relationship by one of the spycops, and so is part of the ‘Category H’ group. Helen will give evidence on 27 November.

Gabrielle Bosley got involved with London Greenpeace in the mid 1980s. She will give evidence on 7 November.

Paul Gravett became active at the same time. He was particularly interested in animal rights, and Wood went on to give an overview of the main groups that Gravett was involved in. These included Islington Animal Rights, London Boots Action Group (LBAG), and London Animal Action (LAA).

These groups were heavily infiltrated, both by a string of undercover police officers and by corporate spies (sent by the fur trade and vivisection industry). This Inquiry should examine how much information was being shared by the Special Demonstratoin Squad (SDS) with such players. Paul is due to give evidence on 13 November and 14 November.

Claire Hildreth was also passionate about animals, and involved in both LBAG and LAA. Hildreth formed a very close friendship with one of the spycops, HN1 ‘Matt Rayner’. She will appear on 11 December.

Wood turned next to a discussion of the Animal Liberation Front (ALF), a name used by people who took direct action to end animal suffering. He highlighted that one of the ALF’s principles was:

‘Reverence for Life: In all actions we take the utmost care that no harm should come to either human or animal life.’

The Animal Liberation Front Supporters Group (ALF-SG) had a press officer and an office, that produced publications. It did not take part in direct action.

Robin Lane served as press officer, and spokesperson for the group, between 1986-88. He has a long history of involvement in campaigning against animal abuse, and will give more evidence on 12 November.

Wood also mentioned Greenham Common women’s peace camp very briefly, as it has largely been covered by the evidence given by Jane Hickman, Hilary Moore and Rebecca Johnson during the Inquiry’s ‘Tranche 1 Phase 1’ hearings earlier this year (which examined spycops 1983-1992 who targeted groups not involved in animal rights).

Wood simply noted that there was no real justification for this SDS targeting; it was done on the ‘apparent whim’ of Margaret Thatcher.

Unsafe convictions

Geoff Sheppard was convicted of two serious offences, and the safety of both convictions is cast in doubt by the conduct of two different undercovers. Geoff will give evidence on 14 November and 15 November.

In July 1987, times incendiary devices were planted at several Debenham’s stores, set to go off overnight when the buildings were locked and empty, with the intention of them triggering the store’s sprinkler systems and thereby causing huge economic damage to the furs that Debenhams controversially still sold at the time. HN10 Bob Lambert ‘Bob Robinson’ was closely involved in initiating, planning and carrying out this action.

Sheppard went to prison for his part in the Debenham’s action. By the time he was released, Lambert had been made an SDS manager. However he had trained up a protégé, HN1 ‘Matt Rayner’, who encouraged Sheppard to return to activism and facilitated this by providing transport.

Sheppard’s second conviction, in 1995, was for a firearms offence. Rayner was lauded for providing the intelligence that led to this, but kept quiet about the role he had played in inciting Sheppard.

Had the SDS now decided that securing criminal convictions should be one of their roles? Wood contends that the SDS was ‘completely unsuited’ for this, given that they would always prioritise maintaining their cover over the criminal justice system. The involvement of the spycops was never disclosed to the courts and none of the usual safeguards were in place to ensure fair trials.

Legal privilege

In another issue which has come up in other Opening Statements, Wood explored the SDS’s ‘disdain’ for the criminal justice process, and lack of respect for the principles underpinning fair trial processes. SDS reports are full of details about what should have been considered ‘legally privileged material’.

Bob Lambert frequently visited Sheppard while he was in prison on remand. His reports contain information about the two co-defendants, the meetings they had with their lawyers, legal strategies and interpersonal conflicts.

Officer HN109 has told the Inquiry that he did not have a clear understanding of the concept of ‘legal privilege’ and so did not provide any guidance about to the undercovers he managed. It appears that none of the unit’s managers did, and such information was routinely recorded and retained.

Lambert’s lies

Wood then returned to the Debenham’s story, going into more detail about Bob Lambert’s involvement. Lambert organised the first planning meeting, and argued that all Debenham’s stores, even those that didn’t sell fur, were legitimate targets.

He chose the Harrow branch as his target, and told the others that he had successfully planted a device there. £340,000 of damage was caused as a result. Overall, this anti-fur campaign is estimated to have cost Debenham’s around £4m. They stopped selling fur as a result.

Lambert continues to deny that he was directly involved in this action. Wood highlighted some of the discrepancies around this. Most shockingly, we heard for the first time today that CCTV footage from Harrow had been handed over to the (anti-terrorist) police who first attended the scene. It was then snatched by Special Branch officers, and has never been seen since.

From examining Lambert’s reports, it is clear that he was privy to far more information about these improvised incendiaries than he should have been, and that he curated the content of reports in a way that seems designed to mislead, and hide the extent of his direct involvement.

He claimed that these reports had been ‘sanitised’ by his managers but the relevant managers all deny doing so. The Inquiry has not been able to find all the reports that are believed to have been produced around this time.

However, there are SDS reports, identifying another person, ‘MSW’, as a ‘quartermaster’ for the Debenham’s campaign. ‘MSW’ was politically active between 1979-84, but says he had no knowledge of this serious crime, and did not even know the two men who were convicted or ‘Bob Robinson’ (Lambert) himself.

Lambert also made false, unfounded, allegations about Helen Steel being involved, which she denies. It seems that there may be a pattern of Lambert fabricating such stories to cover up his own deeds, and perhaps to advance his career.

Another witness, Chris Baillie, has come forward and told the Inquiry that Lambert had set him up to be arrested for criminal damage done by a third person to a butcher’s window. He will appear as a witness on 6 November.

It is clear that some people were suspicious about exactly what Lambert was up to, However, according to one of his managers, HN109:

‘the value in his intelligence potentially blinded more senior officers to how it was being obtained.’

Other SDS officers, like HN11 Mike Chitty ‘Mike Blake’, are known to have made similar comments.

Having later become an SDS manager himself, was Lambert able to destroy records relating to his own deployment and misconduct? Did he also ensure documents relating to Geoff Sheppard’s relationship with ‘Rayner’ were destroyed?

Interestingly, Lambert also told some activists that he carried out a similar, incendiary, action in Selfridge’s in August 1988.

The Inquiry will undoubtedly have lots of questions for Lambert when he finally appears between 2-5 December. It is estimated that his evidence will require four full days, longer than anyone else in this set of hearings.

Responding to the State

Wood made some comments about the Opening Statements we heard yesterday, in particular the one delivered by Peter Skelton on behalf of the Metropolitan Police.

Some of the mistakes made by the SDS are repeated, for example a failure to distinguish between various animal rights groups and those involved in them – labelling them all as ‘militant’ – along with attempts to exaggerate the impact of animal rights campaigners on those they protested.

Pickets outside shops, offices and homes may have been annoying or unwelcome, but at the time they were entirely lawful, and represented only a minor inconvenience, not a public order problem, and were hardly ‘terrifying’ in the way the police would have us all believe.

Even Bob Lambert is known to have written:

‘By late 1984, however the public order threat posed by various animal rights groups had all but disappeared.’

He notes that the only clients of his who were convicted of criminal offences had been encouraged and supported to take those actions by undercover officers.

It is clear that the SDS had a motive for portraying animal rights activists as ‘extremists’: this boosted their reputation and annual applications for increased funding. The Met continue to make these allegations because they seek to justify the highly intrusive infiltration of these groups.

What was the point?

These deployments were entirely speculative, and, Wood says, ‘entirely without justification’.

Despite spending years in the field, SDS officers didn’t always produce much useful intelligence in their reports, from the ‘cosy world of middle-class animal right campaigning’. Their deployments were not reviewed regularly.

Out of control

There was a lack of supervision or managerial control. Undercovers were given the freedom to operate as they wished, resulting in impropriety. Some (for example, HN2 Andy Coles ‘Any Davey’) took up positions of responsibility in the groups they targeted; others (like Bob Lambert) are known to have used their dominant personalities to influence the direction and activities of their target groups.

Most of the undercovers were older than those they spied on (having followed the advice they were given to ‘knock a few years off’ their real ages), and as a result younger activists often looked up to these men, and sought their advice about personal issues. There is evidence of them abusing their power, manipulating and ‘grooming’ people.

We heard that Claire Hildreth had confided in HN1 ‘Matt Rayner’ about her experiences with ‘creepy’ HN2 Andy Coles ‘Andy Davey’. He did not report Coles’s predatory behaviour to managers at the time.

This feeling of freedom undoubtedly extended to inciting and committing other serious crimes. The spycops believed they could act with impunity, and that their superiors would always have their backs.

Relationship with the Security Service (MI5)

According to Wood:

‘the evidence shows the Security Service and the SDS working alongside each other in close liason at all times’

The written Statement provides a great deal more detail about this. We know there were weekly meetings between the two. There was ‘intense political interest and influence’ in the units’ targets, including the groups listed above.

Re-traumatising the victims of these violations

The final issue raised by Wood was about the ‘procedural difficulties’ faced by Helen Steel. He explained that she had been finally been given disclosure, but this meant she had been supplied with ‘many thousands of pages of material’ and asked to respond under extreme time pressure.

This material relates to the abuse she suffered, and includes many untrue and unproven allegations made about her by those abusers. Reading this has been extremely distressing and re-traumatising for her, but the Inquiry is not taking a ‘trauma-informed’ approach, and appears not to understand the significant and cumulative effect on Helen.

Her privacy has already been grossly violated by these officers, and now she (like other Non State Core Participants) is being expected to apply for privacy redactions within a very tight and inflexible time-frame.

He reminded the Inquiry’s Chair, Sir John Mitting, that the primary focus of this Inquiry should be to examine police misconduct, rather than unproven allegations made by former officers about their victims. The effectiveness of this Inquiry could well be impacted, by the inability of Helen and others to participate fully and effectively and provide crucial evidence.

A reminder

Wood drew Mitting’s attention to a European Court of Human Rights judgment, ironically from Helen’s own landmark case, Steel and Morris v United Kingdom.

This ruled that:

‘even small and informal campaign groups, such as London Greenpeace must be able to carry on their activities effectively and that there exists a strong public interest in enabling such groups and individuals outside the mainstream to contribute to the public debate by disseminating information and ideas’

He was sure that if the European Court had been aware of the state-sponsored intrusion of London Greenpeace at the time of this case, their words would have been ‘more forceful’. Democratic principles, such as freedom of speech and freedom of expression, do not seem to be recognised by the Met.

He went on to say that the SDS ‘represented the worst in our society’, the police were ‘incapable of properly balancing…civil and democratic rights’ and the unit should not have existed.

Mitting’s response

Having heard all of this, Mitting asked Wood to communicate to Helen that he acknowledges ‘her detailed and informative statement’, saying her evidence ‘is of the greatest assistance to me’.

He went on to add that he is ‘encouraged to hear’ that she will provide oral evidence during these hearings, but wants her to send in the documents she refers to it her witness statement, especially the photos, as soon as possible (before she gives evidence on 27 November).

2) Rajiv Menon KC

Menon spoke again on Tuesday, this time on behalf of the Friends of Freedom Press (FFP).

They provided an Opening Statement and other evidence in the Inquiry’s Tranche 2 Phase 1 hearings earlier this year (Steve Sorba from FFP provided a witness statement and gave oral evidence in Week 2), about the SDS’s spying on the anarchist movement.

In particular HN85 Roger Pearce ‘Roger Thorley’ infiltrated the Freedom collective between 1979 and 1984 and later became a commander of Special Branch.

Today’s additional written Opening Statement addresses the evidence of SDS managers and other recently disclosed material.

Menon began by reiterating core participants’ profound concern that the Inquiry will be holding hearings in closed session, and that evidence will remain hidden from public scrutiny, perhaps forever, to protect the privacy of the officers and their families and the interests of the British state.

He then went on to consider the evidence of SDS managers, which raises important questions about SDS practices, where officers were allowed to cross what should have been operational red lines. Managers turned a blind eye, or sanctioned unconscionable behaviour, pointing out that the position of the Met becomes more and more untenable with every Tranche of Inquiry hearings:

‘the SDS did not serve any proper policing purpose’.

Historical overview

Menon noted that the decade under investigation in this tranche, from 1983 to 1992, is critical. The election of Margaret Thatcher in 1979 saw a shift in the political direction of the country. The post-war consensus between organised labour and capital was abandoned, leading to a showdown with the trade unions.

The period was marked by struggles against racism and fascism, and the titanic struggle between the miners and the government. The gloves came off, and the police played a key role as enforcers of government will, known as ‘Maggie Thatcher’s Boot Boys’.

The SDS was an elite squad within Special Branch and they knew their officers would be protected at all costs. That meant attitudes changed.

During the 1980s we see reporting shift from a more old-fashioned objective style, to one that was exaggerated and inaccurate, intrusive, pejorative and laced with scurrilous fantasy. Officers and managers shared jokes inside the intelligence community echo chamber, at the expense of those on whom they spied.

Under the shadowy direction of MI5 the SDS created a culture whereby the supposed public order policing purpose was secondary to the real purpose of the SDS as a secret political police force.

Entitlement and arrests

Menon then examined evidence about the pay and overtime SDS officers felt they were entitled to.

‘SDS officers were overpaid and overvalued. SDS managers colluded in allowing their undercover officers too much independence, Roger Pearce’s mantra was: always defer to the officer in the field. This degree of autonomy spiralled out of control in the 1980s…

‘These undercover officers were likely to have been the highest paid officers in the Met, at least for their rank…

‘undercover officers could claim [overtime] for all their time in the pub or even in bed with an activist, supposedly gathering vital intelligence to protect the state, “Fucking for Queen and country” as Roger Pearce so crudely put it in his first novel.’

Menon also notes that during the Tranche 2 period now being examined (1983-1992), more SDS officers were arrested and ended up in court in their cover names. Although often for relatively minor offences, this was inevitably a stepping stone to more serious criminal involvement by SDS officers, as well as spying on defence lawyers.

It was also in direct contravention of Home Office instructions which unequivocally forbid any use of informants that may result in misleading a court.

None of the SDS managers appeared to regard the reporting on a legal advice as a problem.

Fantasy reporting

He then considered the problems inherent in MI5 using SDS undercover officers as human intelligence sources, often producing ‘fantasy reports for MI5’.

Menon notes evidence that senior managers felt that:

‘being a fantasist was a good trait for a undercover officer.’

‘Productive’ officers like Roger Pearce understood the game. Pearce would sex up his reports with lurid detail that played to the taste of his managers. His reporting style became the new SDS template for the 1980s.

HN115 Detective Chief Inspector Tony Wait says that MI5 received copies of virtually everything that SDS produced. They were ultimately serving the same political masters: a Conservative government, determined to crush the so-called enemy within.

The evidence of HN109 and HN11 Mike Chitty paints a further, worrying picture. HN10 Bob Lambert, HN5 John Dines ‘John Barker’, HN8 (names restricted) and another unnamed undercover officer formed a ‘cabal’ within SDS. Lambert was the leader, and Menon notes,

‘There is reference in Eric Docker’s witness statement to the detective superintendent of C Squad, Dave Short, saying of Lambert: “The man’s out of control, you’ve lost him.”’

But was Lambert a rogue officer or was he playing a managed role, a participating agent provocateur? Lambert’s protégé, Dines, expressed the opinion that ‘rules are made to be broken’.

Lambert and Dines were regarded as the elite within a squad, that operated in a culture of impunity.

An inevitable problem

As an anarchist organisation that dates back to the 1880s, Freedom has a long historical memory. They say this is exactly where such state-sponsored spying always ends up, as agent provocateur activity which gets out of control or is carefully orchestrated with appropriate plausible deniability from the people in charge.

And so we come to ‘Operation Sparkler’, the prosecution of two Animal Liberation Front activists after improvised incendiary devices were placed in three Debenham’s stores, where Lambert is suspected of placing the third.

The investigation was taken over by SO12, Special Branch, away from SO13, the anti-terrorist squad. This appears abnormal as SO13 made the arrests. Was Special Branch trying to ensure that certain lines of enquiry were not pursued?

HN39 Eric Docker was promoted to detective chief inspector of SDS in October 1987, the month after the arrests. It was he who wrote up the commendation report for Bob Lambert.

Then, towards the end of the 1980s, things changed again. The Security Service Act was passed and the Service, also known as MI5, came slightly out of the shadows, as its activity was put on a statutory footing for the first time.

Margaret Thatcher was ousted, following the hugely successful anti-Poll Tax campaign in 1990, and MI5 had to do a full re-think. By 1992, there had been a change of focus and approach to ‘domestic extremism’.

This is addressed in the corporate witness statement of ‘Witness Y’. MI5 told Special Branch that they no longer needed all the ‘product’ that the SDS supplied.

This was the exact moment when there should have been a re-think, but instead of disbanding SDS, the Metropolitan Police Service and Special Branch doubled down, expanding their domestic surveillance operations, as we will see in Tranches 3 and 4 looking at later spycops’ activity, when the very officers who were the most responsible for the worst excesses of the SDS – Lambert, Dines and Coles – became the unit’s managers.

Menon ended his statement with the advice that the Inquiry needs to ask some searching questions, especially of those managers who were meant to be supervising the Lambert-Dines cabal:

‘Whether SDS activity was simply immoral or also criminal remains to be fully explored. On behalf of Freedom we suggest that there is now more than sufficient evidence from witnesses and documents for you, sir, to conclude that it was both.’

3) Dave Morris

Next we heard from Dave Morris, the only Core Participant to make oral submissions (as he is appearing as a ‘litigant in person’), on behalf of the McLibel Support campaign.

The McLibel case ended up becoming the longest trial in English legal history. There were just two defendants, Dave Morris and Helen Steel.

Morris explained that Steel had been unable to contribute as much as she might have liked towards the accompanying written Opening Statement, due to the Inquiry’s delays in making disclosure to her and the unreasonable length of time allowed for her to go through this evidence. She has only managed to write a partial personal witness statement, but aims to produce another before giving oral evidence on 27 November.

It made a refreshing change to hear directly from one of the people who had been targeted by the spycops. Morris will give further oral evidence on 5 November.

Introducing the McLibel case

Dave explained some of the background to this infamous legal case. As life-long community activists, he and Steel were both involved in fighting for a better future, they were both involved in London Greenpeace, and along with other campaigners, distributed copies of a leaflet entitled ‘What’s wrong with McDonald’s?’

When the McDonald’s corporation threatened legal action, Steel and Morris refused to back down, and found themselves defending a libel case against a well-resourced, powerful multinational. They had to represent themselves, as legal aid was not available for such cases.

They relied on the help of volunteers to assist them, and received ‘pro bono’ advice from a young barrister named Keir Starmer for around ten years.

As a result of publicity around this ‘David and Goliath’ case, the leaflets which McDonald’s had set out to suppress were widely distributed for many years, all over the world.

We now know that the SDS not only infiltrated the campaign, they also collaborated secretly with McDonald’s before and during the case, something Morris condemned as ‘a serious miscarriage of justice’.

We also now know that one of the undercovers, HN5 John Dines ‘John Barker’ engineered a long-term relationship with Steel – they even lived together – and this had been described the day before by the Inquiry’s own Counsel, David Barr KC, as Dines’s

‘cold, calculating emotional and sexual exploitation’

Infiltration

In the 1980s, London Greenpeace was a small group, campaigning about issues that were of widespread public concern, like the treatment of animals and workers and the environment. The trust and privacy of those involved was abused by the infiltration of SDS spies.

HN10 Bob Lambert ‘Bob Robinson’ became a prominent and influential activist in what he described himself as ‘a peaceful campaigning group’. During his time undercover, he deceived four women into sexual relationships and fathered a child with one of them.

In 1986, he helped to create and distribute the original 6 page fact-sheet which asked ‘What’s wrong with McDonald’s?’ and provided the reader with a list of answers (everything from nutrition and diet, environmental damage, unethical advertising, worker exploitation, factory farming, global poverty…).

Morris brandished a copy on screen, and explained this was the leaflet that prompted McDonald’s to threaten libel action. A shorter version was produced and given out during the McLibel trial, with at least 3 million copies being printed and distributed in the UK.

When HN5 John Dines ‘John Barker’ joined the group, he also helped to produce and distribute these leaflets, organise events and protests, and become the group’s treasurer.

It wasn’t just these two SDS officers who infiltrated London Greenpeace; there were also at least six ‘inquiry agents’, corporate spies sent by McDonald’s to gather information between 1989-91.

McDonald’s hired former police officers for this operation, and one of them had a fraudulent sexual relationship with a member of the group, which lasted for around six months.

As a result of the intelligence gathered by the SDS and these inquiry agents, McDonald’s served libel writs on five named individuals in September 1990.

Three of the group felt they had no option but to pull out of what promised to be an expensive, unfair fight, leaving Morris and Steel to stand up to McDonald’s in court.

The case – including a full appeal – ran until 2005.

The pair went on to win a case against the British Government in the European Court of Human Rights, and were formally represented there by Keir Starmer there (as they received legal aid for this). That court ruled that the state had violated their right to a fair hearing and freedom of expression, but had no idea about the extent of the intrusion they had suffered.

Breaching legal privilege and spying on Starmer

Dines reported that the leaflet ‘is causing much concern within the corporation’, shortly before the McLibel writs were served. According to him:

‘Arrangements are in hand to monitor events arising from these legal proceedings’.

He went on to report on confidential discussions between the recipients of those writs and their lawyers.

In a later report he boasts:

‘It is accurate to say that I was “by the side” of Helen Steel and Dave Morris in 1991 and relaying the legal advice back to my bosses in the SDS’.

He used to collect Steel after she had attended legal strategy meetings with Starmer.

Secret unlawful collaboration between McDonald’s and the Met

It is clear that information flowed in both directions, between McDonald’s and the SDS.

McDonald’s recruited Sid Nicholson in 1983 as Head of Security. In his prior 31 year police career, he had worked in apartheid South Africa before coming to London and rising to the rank of Chief Superintendent in the Met, covering the Brixton area.

He was responsible for McDonald’s security and ran their spying operations. He brought in other former police officers, such as Terry Carroll (also from Brixton), who was hired as a Security Manager, and admitted in 2013:

‘I was aware that Sid would liaise with Special Branch officers about the protestors’.

He also recalled Sid telling him that there was a ‘Special Branch bloke’ inside London Greenpeace.

In 1990, he had sent Nicholson a memo, promising:

‘I will get onto Special Branch to get an assessment’.

Nicholson testified during McLibel that his security team were ‘all ex-police’, and it’s clear that this strategy meant they were all able to get hold of information from mates who were still on the force. One of the McDonald’s spies held two long meetings with a Special Branch officer in June 1990 to share private information.

Morris noted in passing that Bob Lambert had worked on Special Branch’s C Squad, with special responsibility for the Brixton area, while Nicholson was still in post.

A police ‘file note’ from 2002 (disclosed recently by the Inquiry) reveals that although HN5 John Dines ‘John Barker’ was heavily involved in the anti-McDonald’s campaign in 1990, the SDS had made sure that his name

‘was deliberately omitted from the McDonald’s libel writ list’

Morris describes this as ‘blatant manipulation of the legal process’, and calls on the Inquiry to investigate the roles played by undercovers in this web of secret collaboration and subterfuge.

The search for the truth

Dines began cynically faking a mental breakdown in 1991, and finally disappeared from Steel’s life the following year, telling her that he was going abroad. As a result, she suffered heartache and worry, and spent many years trying to find him.

By 1995, Lambert had been promoted to SDS manager, and was worried about the possibility of either Dines or the Commissioner being sub-poenaed to give evidence at the McLibel trial, if Steel were ever to discover the truth about her ex-partner.

By 1998 Steel and Morris knew only that Special Branch had provided their private details to McDonald’s, and successfully sued the police over this. In 2000, the Met offered to make a pay-out of £10,000, plus costs, rather than go through ‘a difficult and lengthy trial’.

Morris says now:

‘Had the true picture been known we may well have not settled the claim.’

The judgments of the High Court and the Court of Appeal found that much of what had been printed in the leaflet was true, and that McDonald’s had breached both employment and animal welfare legislation. However they were never prosecuted. Why not?

Consequences of the case

London Greenpeace never fully recovered after the McLibel case, and its activities gradually fizzled out.

Although the ‘McLibel Two’ won on some points, they also lost on some. As a result, Steel and Morris had damages of £60,000 awarded against them, which they refused to pay. Morris says the case:

‘certainly had real consequences. Not only Helen and myself, but also Keir had to put in years of unpaid and intense work to help defend the action’.

For Steel, the stress of fighting the case was magnified by the trauma of Dines’s fake breakdown, her concern and her efforts to trace him. She then had to deal with the additional trauma of gradually uncovering the shocking truth about his identity.

Morris says this case is another example of the police:

‘showing their utter disregard for the integrity of legal proceedings’.

4) Peter Weatherby KC

Peter Weatherby KC appeared on behalf of the Hunt Saboteurs Association (HSA).

Before talking about the activities of the HSA, Weatherby made clear:

‘there was no legitimate justification whatsoever for undercover policing targeting it as an organisation or its supporters or its activities or their families or their homes or their private and sexual lives…

‘undercover policing interfered with a fundamental constitutional and convention rights of Hunt Saboteurs Association supporters relating to freedoms to organise, assemble and act as well as their personal rights as autonomous individuals.’

He outlined various transgressions of undercovers, quoting SDS officer HN2 Andy Coles ‘Andy Davey’:

‘Misleading a court is something done by criminals and government ministers alike – we shouldn’t be squeamish about the ends justifying the means in our own case.’

This casual approach to misleading criminal courts is an affront to the rule of law. Managers knew and consented, and:

‘if ever this Inquiry needed evidence that the SDS was allowed to operate beyond any normal lawful limits, this is it… [SDS] was a political policing unit to which normal lawful limits were simply not recognised or applied.’

The HSA was formed and still exists to prevent the killing of animals in blood sports. Its core activities were and are to take non-violent direct action to prevent such cruelty and to lobby government to enact laws to criminalise and stop activities such as fox-hunting and hare-coursing. Some supporters report illegal hunting to police and provide evidence for prosecutions, there’s nothing inherently unlawful about those core activities.

Opinion polls show the majority of the public is against blood sports and has been throughout at the whole history of the Hunt Saboteurs Association. The Hunting Act passed in 2004, cementing the HSA’s position on the right side of history.

It is a national association with democratic structures, which takes part in national lobbying. Activities against hunts are invariably through local groups.

The HSA has always believed in non-violence. This is a moral and a practical choice. Confrontation or violence are a distraction. To make a hunt ineffective, saboteurs lay false scents, blow hunting horns to draw hounds away, and make noise to cause wild animals to seek safety.

Weatherby notes:

‘Pursuing wild animals with dogs may well not have been unlawful during the period under consideration and neither was disrupting that cruel pursuit in the ways described.’

Conversely, hunt supporters often sought to deter and intimidate saboteurs through organised violence perpetrated by hired thugs. Hunt saboteurs have been killed and sustained serious injuries requiring hospital treatment. This is an important point which Weatherby addressed at some length and in more detail in his written statement.

Violence directed at hunt saboteurs was so severe that the HSA collated these experiences and submitted a written report entitled ‘Public order, private armies: Security guards of British hunts’ to the Home Affairs Select Committee investigating the use of private security firms. There was little subtlety in the campaigns by hunt supporters against hunt saboteurs and the threats were in plain sight.

Undercover officers witnessed the violent attacks on hunt sabs and on occasion reported on where the real threat lay. Managers refer in contemporaneous documentation to the risk of officers being injured by hunt supporters.

HN2 Andy Coles ‘Andy Davey’ stated:

‘I feared serious assault from terriermen or being shot at by irate farmers more than anything else during my tour.’

In 1992 the British Field Sports Society (BFSS) ran a campaign to encourage hunts to use so-called stewards to deter saboteurs.

In the words of BFSS spokesperson, Nick Herbert:

‘we’re going to start hunting the saboteurs.’

This left little to the imagination.

Herbert went on to become an MP and was policing minister between 2010 and 2012. In that role, he defended undercover officers having sex with women they spied on.

He is now Lord Herbert and chair of the College of Policing, responsible for the authorised professional practice for undercover officers.

In this context, Weatherby examined whether the HSA were a public order threat. An SDS report from 1989 summed it up:

‘From a public order point of view the threat of violence these days comes more from supporters of the hunt rather than from the 20 to 30 saboteurs.’

Why then were the HSA made a target? The answer is politicised bias. Put simply, ‘Those associated with hunting had greater access to the corridors of power than those who opposed hunting.’

Weatherby referred to obvious and key areas of questions the HSA urge the Inquiry to focus on.

Justification

Any such deployments should be subject to precise justification based on a rigorous process, based on evidence properly recorded and regularly reviewed and supervised at a high level.

None of this appears to have occurred. There was no tenable justification for the deployments against the HSA.

Weatherby cited the 1995/1996 SDS annual report:

‘The emphasis that penetration of hunt sabotage groups is a means to an end rather than an end in itself in terms of SDS operations remains valid.’

Thus, from the SDS’s own mouthpiece, it seems their justification for infiltrating the HSA was a speculative attempt to identify people who might be involved in other acts. Could this means to an end infiltration ever be justifiable in principle? The HSA firmly refute that idea.

Proportionality

What proportionality exercises were conducted? Were legitimate aims identified at all? Is there evidence of any significant useful intelligence obtained at the time?

Weatherby notes that even if what he calls the ‘Animal Liberation Front excuse’ were accepted, most so-called ALF activity involved low-level criminal damage caused when rescuing animals or damage perhaps to butchers’ shops.

Instructions and training

What were the instructions to undercover officers? What was their training? What were their limitations, not only generally but on those target activities?

Weatherby pointed to undercover officers taking part in, encouraging or organising serious criminal activities; he notes that a number of the women personally violated in deceitful relationships were hunt saboteurs, and adds:

‘you’ll hear from witnesses who were befriended by undercover officers, they not only went to festivals and abroad with them, but they welcomed them into their own homes and families and introduced them to friends unaware of their true identities.’

Finally, he notes that police bias against hunt sabs often led to unlawful arrests. Many such detentions did not result in charges and not infrequently hunt saboteurs took successful civil claims.

Officers like Lambert, Dines and Coles were also arrested, which raises a number of uncomfortable issues. Did these officers infringe legal privilege? Were these arrests used as a means of enhancing the standing of undercover officers in their deployments? Did undercover officers mislead criminal courts?

‘The Inquiry must not only establish the facts concerning these violations of fundamental rights and affronts to the administration of justice, it must also establish accountability and bring to an end such unacceptable practices.’

5) Sam Jacobs

Sam Jacobs appeared next, on behalf of Sharon Grant OBE (in relation to Bernie Grant) and Stafford Scott (Broadwater Farm Defence Committee)

There is an accompanying written Statement.

Jacobs made a brief oral statement, and referred the Inquiry to wider points made in the opening statement of the co-operating group of non-state non-police core participants, about shocking SDS mismanagement, culture and lack of accountability.

He notes that documents disclosed in this Tranche have important implications for all of his clients, including those whose evidence will be heard in Tranche 3 who, because of restriction orders have not yet had sight of the material.

Targeting

How groups or individuals were selected for targeting by the SDS remains opaque. Managers’ statements shed little light.

Only HN115 offers a detailed account of targets identified by the SDS, following consultation with the Security Service and senior managers from other squads.

Jacobs urges the Inquiry to consider:

‘the interests and concerns of the Metropolitan Police which will have informed the apparently amorphous targeting strategy.’

Like Scobie on Monday, Jacobs gives the example of a Special Branch report from January 1983, ‘Political extremism and a campaign for accountability within the Metropolitan Police’, which makes it plain the police viewed any attempt to bring accountability as subversive in itself.

The subversive aims of the Greater London Council included ensuring the police complaints procedure worked effectively. The report describes attempts to develop monitoring groups as ‘grandiose’, and ‘sinister’ and sought to discredit democratically elected officials as having extremist connections.

Jacobs concludes@

‘It is clear that the very notion of police accountability was viewed as problematic by Special Branch…

‘reporting on these groups and the various justice campaigns in the Tranche 2 period [1983-1992] and beyond was a deliberate objective.’

Sharon Grant OBE

Managers’ witness evidence about reporting on elected officials is inconsistent and has served only to muddy the waters and to raise further concerns.

The 1 June 1988 briefing paper produced for the Security Service’s Management Board on counter subversion refers to F Branch monitoring of various mainstream political groups, including the Labour Party.

This casts doubt on managers’ claims that there should be no active reporting on MPs or that reporting on members of Parliament by the SDS and Special Branch was either discouraged or was simply incidental.

Reports on Bernie Grant and other MPs were frequently supplied to the Security Service. Special Branch had a direct interest in the activities of elected politicians and they did report on their activities.

The 1983 report on police accountability references dozens of elected officials, including Bernie Grant, with (inaccurate) details of their purported political beliefs and allegiances.

The interest of the Metropolitan Police and the SDS appeared to be at its highest when Bernie Grant was critical of policing methods or of the police. The Met is most concerned with its own reputation and using Special Branch reporting to defend itself from criticism.

Sharon Grant has long-held concerns that the Met was the source of unfavourable media stories about her husband and the evidence disclosed to date heightens those concerns.

Stafford Scott

Managers’ evidence has exacerbated Scott’s concerns about why he and the Broadwater Farm Defence Committee were reported on by undercover officers. The Metropolitan Police made it clear that they regarded any campaigns for police accountability and justice to be subversive by their very nature, and Scott was involved in precisely this area of work in his community.

Managers’ statements insist that reporting on such groups was a by-product of reporting on the other political groups, and so was justified in the interests of public order.

However, not one single report on Stafford Scott or of the activities of Broadwater Farm Defence Committee that raises any legitimate concerns about public order, or evidences manipulation of the group by political activists.

Managers approved and submitted reports by undercover officers, yet did not confront or address the racism that was so clearly prevalent. Two of the reports describe speakers at public meetings as ‘negroes’.

HN78 Trevor Morris ‘Anthony “Bobby” Lewis’ is referred to as ‘a coloured potential recruit’.

It is clear that he was regarded as a useful asset, who would be able to obtain access that might not be available to other undercover officers.

HN59 states that managers would edit reports, sometimes removing words or phrases. HN109 states that he had an editorial role over the reports, removing irrelevant or judgmental comments. Yet explicitly racist language was not edited.

Undercovers’ and managers’ constant refrain is that the language used in reports was reflective of its time and should not be judged by today’s standards:

‘yet this is language that is more in tune with the segregated American deep south than London in the 1980s.’

The language and attitude expressed in the reports, which went unchallenged by managers, shows that minorities were regarded as a threat by the Metropolitan Police whenever they sought to organise around issues of justice and accountability.

The opening statement of the Met Commissioner to Tranche 2 Phase 1 described reporting on social justice campaigns, family campaigns and community organisations as ‘indefensible’, resulting from:

‘a critical failure on the part of its managers’.

Scott asks the Chair to be aware that these attitudes and behaviours do not operate in a vacuum, and the critical failures of the SDS managers were also critical failures on the part of the Metropolitan Police and the Home Office, and not just the individuals giving evidence to this Inquiry.

6) Owen Greenhall

Owen Greenhall appeared on behalf of Diane Abbott OBE and Dame Joan Ruddock, who have supplied a written Opening Statement.

Diane Abbott has been a leading anti-racism campaigner for decades. In 1987 she became the first black woman to be an MP, representing Hackney North and Stoke Newington. Re-elected in 2024, she is now the longest-standing continuously serving female MP, the ‘Mother of the House’.

The Right Honourable Dame Joan Ruddock PC is an anti-apartheid campaigner and former chair of the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CND). She was MP for Deptford from 1987 to 2015 and held several ministerial positions, including Minister for Women, Minister for the Environment, Food and Rural Affairs, and Minister for Energy and Climate Change.

Greenhall explained that both Abbott and Ruddock were subject to SDS reporting and they share a number of concerns (expressed in their opening to Tranche 2 Phase 1 earlier this year and expanded here)
(i) The targeting of MPs and the adequacy of disclosure.
(ii) Concerns over racial discrimination in the activities of the SDS.
(iii) Concerns over the use of information gathered by the SDS.
(iv) Procedural issues related to the Inquiry.

The targeting of MPs

Reporting on MPs was a central concern in the creation of this Inquiry, and was debated in Parliament in March 2015.

The response from the Minister for Policing Criminal Justice and Victims, Mike Penning, was that he would:

‘do everything I can to make sure that the documents are released… We have to find out exactly what went on.’

Spying on MPs raises serious concerns over the erosion of the Wilson doctrine against police surveillance of Members of Parliament, inappropriate collection of personal information and interference with the democratic process. Greenhall pointed out:

‘It’s notable that only Labour MPs appear to have been targeted.’

Former undercover officer Peter Francis has revealed that Special Branch files on MPs were typically ‘very extensive’ and often contained personal and private information.

HN78 Trevor Morris ‘Anthony “Bobby” Lewis’ was asked whether he ever saw a file on an elected politician. He replied:

‘I was going to say hundreds. Many, many, many… they are all marked ‘Secret’… probably top secret.’

Trevor Morris published a book ‘Black Ops: The Incredible True Story of a British secret agent’ using the pseudonym Carlton King.

Greenhall quoted from that book:

‘It is the job of the Security Service to vet and assess senior politicians; the Branch assisted with this duty where and when required. When the Branch came across intelligence relating to politicians (through its agents, desk officers or SDS operatives et cetera)… it would pass this intelligence to the Security Service.’

Yet very little of this reporting has actually been disclosed by the Inquiry to date (when questioning Morris they didn’t menton his book and later absurdly said MI5 had forced them not to admit he was in fact Carlton King).

Core participants ask that these discrepancies are investigated to ensure that the Inquiry uncovers the full truth of what took place.

Racial discrimination in the activities of the SDS

Greenhall quoted Home Office guidelines produced right at the start of this Tranche, in 1984:

‘Special Branch investigations into subversive activities in particularly sensitive fields, for example in educational establishments, in trade unions, in industry and among racial minorities, must be conducted with particular care so as to avoid any suggestion that Special Branches are investigating matters involving the legitimate expression of views…

‘It is not the function of the force Special Branch to investigate individuals and groups merely because their policies are unpalatable, or because they are highly critical of the police, or because they want to transform the present system of police accountability.’

Yet there was extensive reporting on racial justice campaigns and police accountability issues.

Indeed, Managers appear to have been unaware of the guidelines. Annual reports for the SDS indicate that campaigns on racial issues were a key aspect of targeting, the Anti-Nazi League, a variety of local anti-racist and anti-fascist groups and predominantly black family justice campaigns regularly feature.

The purported justification – concern that these groups might be taken over by other organisations – is racist, assuming black-led organisations could not preserve their own independence.

The use of information gathered by the SDS

Throughout the Tranche 2 period (1983-1992), the SDS worked hand in glove with the Security Service. One primary purpose of the Security Service was vetting. The SDS played a crucial part in this.

‘Witness Y’ accepts:

‘it is in my view highly likely that some (possibly most) of the information sought from SDS officers was sought in order to be used for vetting purposes’

Security Service influence on targeting is confirmed by SDS managers. HN115 Tony Wait states:

‘The Security Service influenced our targeting decisions quite a lot. Most of our deployments were in agreement with them. We would always seek their views before deciding on new targets.’

Security Service requests were often coupled to political and diplomatic concerns at the time (see our report on the Opening Statement on behalf of CND).

As Carlton King, aka HN78 Trevor Morris, writes:

‘the Branch was only one cog in the British state’s domestic national security apparatus, the Security Service (MI5) was an even more central component, as was the Home Office, the judiciary, the press and of course the politicians, in particular cabinet-level government ministers who sat at the centre of this machine and could therefore tweak it to their advantage.’

That past involvement coming in one of the largest anti-nuclear movements could inhibit the future career of those concerned is reminiscent of the authoritarian regimes which the SDS and Security Services claimed to be fighting against.

Greenhall therefore asked the Inquiry to:

‘fully explore the use that was made of SDS reports for vetting purposes, particularly in relation to politicians and civil servants.’

Procedural issues

Greenhall echoed the concerns raised by many other core participants.

‘The disclosure and Rule 9 process for Tranche 2 has been heavily delayed for the non-state core participants and that has had the effect of marginalising their impact and in many respects excluding them from effective participation.

‘The impact of these delays has almost exclusively been to the detriment of non-state core participants… limitations on attendance at hearings has hindered the engagement of the core participants in the Inquiry…

‘The Inquiry is asked to ensure that procedural issues do not reduce the accountability of those responsible for the SDS… [and] to take steps to minimise the prejudice to non-state core participants affected by the delays.’

7) Fiona Murphy KC

After lunch, we heard from Fiona Murphy KC, representing ‘TBS’ and ‘Category F’ Core Participants (people deceived into relationships by undercover officers)

‘TBS’

Murphy spoke first on behalf of TBS, whose mother ‘Jacqui’ had a long-term sexual relationship with HN10 Bob Lambert.

TBS was born in 1985 and his father, posing as a committed animal rights activist using the name ‘Bob Robinson’ (an identity Lambert stole from a dead child), was involved in his life until 1988. Then he disappeared, abandoning TBS, who did not learn of the true identity of his father for a further 24 years. He has provided a written statement to the Inquiry.

TBS has given powerful testimony, setting out the difficult process of reconciling himself to his biological father’s absence, his tragic attempts to learn more about the fiction that was ‘Bob Robinson’, to identify with that fiction, and how TBS has struggled to come to terms with the reality that his understanding of his parentage was based on a lie.

TBS complains that the treatment of him by the Inquiry has not been fair, has not been consistent, has not been predictable and has not facilitated him in being heard in relation to decisions that affect him.

He aligns with the remarks of other core participants about issues arising from delay and disclosure. The unorthodox approach to the marshalling of evidence taken by this public inquiry runs the significant risk of the truth being obscured.

The Inquiry also chose to limit TBS’s legal funding, locking his lawyers out from considering the evidence of civilian witnesses, including the evidence of his own mother.

‘These experiences have undermined TBS’s confidence in your Inquiry, sir, and he endorses the analysis of the non-state non-police core participants opening statement that this is an Inquiry in crisis.’

The Commissioner’s responsibility

TBS has outlined in his witness statement:

‘The Metropolitan Police Service do not seem as an organisation to accept that … they had responsibility to try to minimise the impact, to hold their hands up, to accept that they had allowed a toxic culture to develop which led to these issues. To acknowledge the wrongs done and to provide resources to help the victims, such as me, to access specialist psychiatric and psychological help.

‘It feels scary that as an organisation the MPS [Metropolitan Police Service] were happy for me to go through my whole life without knowing the true identity of my biological father. And if it were not for the work of activists and journalists I would probably never have known the truth or had the chance to meet my biological father.

The Metropolitan Police Service simply left me alone to deal with all of this, both before and after I learned of Bob Lambert’s true identity.’

The Commissioner of the Met apologised to TBS in his opening statement for the distress he has suffered growing up not knowing his true parentage, for the fact that the Metropolitan Police should not have allowed Bob Lambert to behave in the way that he did, and committing to ensure that TBS receives answers to his questions during this Inquiry.

The apology addresses Bob Lambert’s conduct, it does not address the organisational responsibility of those who knew of TBS’s existence in the years and decades following his birth. It does not address the Commissioner’s own failings in relation to TBS in the period leading to and following Bob Lambert’s exposure.

TBS invites the Metropolitan Police to provide a corporate evidential witness statement deposed in full compliance with the Commissioner’s duty of candour, addressing the chronology of the organisation’s awareness of the developing public interest in the SDS in general and Bob Lambert in particular.

When did the Met became aware that there was a significant likelihood that Bob Lambert’s true identity would be disclosed publicly? When was it obvious that Bob Lambert’s identity would become known to TBS? What decisions were taken regarding the need to notify Bob Lambert’s identity to TBS before his mother pieced the evidence together from press reports?

Lambert was exposed on 15 October 2011. He made apologies on 23 October to London Greenpeace and to Belinda Harvey, who he had deceived into a relationship. He made no mention of Jacqui or TBS. He made no effort to contact them.

Eight months later, by chance, Jacqui stumbled on the truth when she saw an article in the Daily Mail on 12 June 2012.

‘It was unconscionable for the Metropolitan Police Service to leave TBS and his mother to find out the truth in the manner in which they did.’

Murphy set out the legal framework on the Rights of the Child, citing pronouncements at the highest judicial level that the best interests of children are not served by the concealment of truth. On the contrary, it causes mental and psychological suffering which does not diminish with age.

Knowledge of one’s true identity positively contributes to personal development, to one’s sense of self and there are also of course important practical consequences, including in relation to knowledge of potential hereditary medical conditions.

Had the Metropolitan Police sought advice at the time of TBS’s birth or at any stage subsequently, they would have been advised that notifying TBS of his true parentage was in his best interests.

TBS will learn facts about his childhood and early development during this Inquiry. The decision to restrict his legal funding is therefore particularly cruel. TBS has had to suppress his identification with the non-existent ‘Bob Robinson’ and to come to terms with the true identity of Bob Lambert.

In his own words:

‘The father that disappeared was a fabrication, and I’ve had to grapple with deconstructing that myth that my life was built around.’

The impact upon TBS of this deception has been profound and it endures to this day.

Murphy highlighted some details from the evidence, such as the decision to obscure Bob Lambert’s identity and whereabouts at the time when ‘Jacqui’ was seeking to have TBS adopted by her new husband, misleading social services and the family courts. The name of the individual who did this has been restricted by the Inquiry, preventing publication.

She also notes:

‘Bob Lambert’s deployment as “Bob Robinson” continued for a further three years after TBS’s birth, but that he was permitted to return in a managerial role. Despite his having demonstrated in these starkest terms that his professionalism and propriety could not be relied upon and that he posed a significant risk of ongoing harm to those among whom he was deployed.’

Murphy then made a chilling appeal to the Inquiry:

‘There is evidence, sir, that we ask you to consider with care that there were other children born of these abusive relationships.

‘At a bare minimum, sir, it is the Commissioner’s responsibility to assure you that no other human being is living a life with the truth obscured from him or her as it was from TBS for more than two decades.’

Families whose loved ones’ identites were stolen

‘Category F’ are the families whose loved ones’ identities were stolen by the Special Demonstration Squad and its officers. They have also provided a written Statement.

The Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police publicly apologised to the families on Monday, adding that misconduct by officers while using the dead children’s identities was disrespectful to their memories, and the Commissioner has apologised to all the families for this and for the Metropolitan Police’s failure to stop that misconduct from occurring.

Murphy noted that the apology was welcome, but detailed the inadequacies of the Met’s response:

‘What is apparent is that the risk to families from such events was never considered, although it ought to have been. This is but one example of the SDS’s deplorable myopia.’

Senior officers within the Metropolitan Police were fully aware of the practice but did not take any steps to stop it for two decades, nor to close the SDS.

Few officers turned their minds to the inevitable impact on the families or the devastation that this practice has wrought on their families, already made vulnerable by the premature loss of a child or a young adult, and how the memories they all cherish have been tainted and tarnished by it.

The families participating in this tranche covering the period between 1983 and 1992 are:

• Frank Bennett and Honor Robson in relation to the theft and abuse of their brother Michael Hartley’s identity.
• Faith Mason, in relation to her son Neil Martin.
• Marva and Judy Lewis in relation to their brother Anthony Lewis.
• Kaden Blake, in relation to her brother Matthew Rayner.

They represent only a small proportion of the victims of identity theft by the Metropolitan Police in this period.

The families want to understand the extent of the intrusion into their own lives and how the identities were used.

They are concerned that in taking a child’s identity the officers went on to research and use details from the families’ private and family lives, so as to test their identity choice and to build their ‘legends’.

Meanwhile, no care was given to the risks to which the families were thereby themselves exposed.

Officers went far beyond acceptable conduct, seducing women, inveigling themselves into the lives of others, attending parties and weddings and even celebrating the birthdays of dead children as if they were their own. They committed criminal offences and appeared in court as witnesses or defendants in the names of dead children’s names.

They undermined lawful and legitimate protest movements. For the Marva Lewis and her family it was especially bitter to learn that HN78 Trevor Morris ‘Anthony “Bobby” Lews’ sought to undermine campaigns for racial justice while:

‘pretending to be my brother… he had stolen the identity of a deceased young black boy and his work undercover contributed to undermining the investigation into the racist murder of another black boy, Stephen Lawrence.’

‘The restricted family’

The families registered their regret and disappointment with the Inquiry. They are concerned that onerous restriction orders over historical practices are impeding the Inquiry’s investigations.

Many officers continue to enjoy anonymity, to the dismay of the families. This means it is the dead child’s identity with which their misconduct will be forever associated, and not the identity of the officer who was responsible.

The Chair has said that any attempt to challenge the restrictions, which were applied without reference to the families, is ‘discouraged’ and:

‘would almost certainly result in the existing restrictions being upheld… [and it’s] very unlikely that the Inquiry would extend funding for the purposes of any such scrutiny’.

The families have not been placed on an equal footing to the police core participants, and the Inquiry is failing to comply with the principle of open justice.

These problems are at their most acute in relation to ‘the restricted family’, a family who have been forced to participate in this Inquiry anonymously by reason of a restriction order covering their own name, to protect the identity of the officer who stole it.

They have been silenced and disempowered, denied the opportunity to speak openly about the trauma they have suffered, and their hopes that this Inquiry might expose the truth and achieve a measure of accountability have rapidly faded.

8) Kirsten Heaven

Our last speaker of the day, Kirsten Heaven appeared on behalf of ‘the co-operating group of NPSCPs’ – this means all the Non-Police Non-State Core Participants in this Inquiry, whose lawyers try to work together to represent everyone’s shared interests.

They produced a lengthy written Opening Statement for Tranche 2 Phase 2, in addition to the individual and group statements many of these people have made.

Initial observations

She pointed out that at the same time as making various apologies for the actions of undercover officers and ‘systemic management failings’ in yesterday’s Opening Statement, the Met also sought to persuade Mitting that the Inquiry should really now focus its attention on what they call the ‘primary question’: whether or not the spycops deployments were justified, rather than exploring the way these undercovers behaved.

She said:

‘Put simply, abhorrent behaviour and systemic managerial failure are matters that clearly go to the heart of the question of justification’

The Met are ‘wrong on this issue’, she added.

She then reminded Mitting of how the Investigatory Powers Tribunal dealt with this issue in the case brought by Kate Wilson (one of the women deceived by spycop EN12 Mark Kennedy ‘Mark Stone’).

The ensuing judgment from that case was highly critical of the ‘broad, open-ended authorisations’ used by the spycops units. These deployments were speculative ‘fishing operations’ and resulted in extensive collateral intrusion. They cannot be justified.

‘Abhorrent, abusive, cruel and morally repugnant’

The four undercover officers that we’ll hear most about in this set of hearings have still not shown any real remorse, for the impact of what Heaven described as ‘the most abhorrent, abusive, cruel and morally repugnant behaviour in the history of the SDS’.

For example, HN2 Andy Coles ‘Andy Davey’ continues to deny that he – as a 32 year old married man – groomed a vulnerable teenager, Jessica, into a sexual relationship, pretending to be much younger than he actually was. The Met accept that ‘Jessica’ has been telling the truth.

The Inquiry must be sceptical about any evidence it hears from these men. Heaven continued by skewering the laughable idea that these spycops might still have reputations worth protecting.

Coles has claimed that ‘Jessica’ had a ‘father issue’ and was ‘obsessed’ with him. Since his identity was uncovered, by activists, multiple women have come forward to report similar stories of his creepy, predatory, ‘sex pest’ behaviour. He has made denigrating comments about some of these women too.

He was a married man, supposedly trying for a baby with his wife at the same time as grooming and sexually abusing a much younger activist.

HN10 Bob Lambert, after leaving the police, tried to reinvent himself as a respectable academic lecturer.

Coles, described as ‘another aspiring novelist’, went on to become a Tory party councillor in Peterborough, Deputy Police & Crime Commissioner for Cambridgeshire, and even a school governor.

At one point he endorsed a campaign to protect young people from sexual exploitation despite being a perpetrator of it himself.

Unlike Lambert, Coles did not receive an MBE or a Police Commendation for his work in the SDS, and is known to have complained about not being given the recognition he felt he deserved for his ‘sacrifice’.

‘An elite undercover officer’

We have heard about a ‘cabal’ centred around Lambert, a group of men who saw themselves as a superior elite group within a special secret squad, fiercely loyal to each other.

By all accounts, Lambert himself is an over-entitled, self-promoting, arrogant man, described by HN109 as a ‘charismatic attention seeker’ and by former undercover colleague HN11 Mike Chitty ‘Mike Blake’ as ‘a professional liar’.

He has shown no remorse for the cruel and abusive deception of ‘Jacqui’, or the three other women he had relationships with, claiming now that he did not intend to ‘target’ them, just succumbed to ‘weakness and irresponsibility’.

The ‘Category H’ Opening Statement suggests that Lambert may well have been motivated by a desire to seek out extra-marital sex with a younger woman, and notes that he has not returned the awards he was given for his contributions to policing.

Lambert has continued to use his skills of ‘deception and duplicity’ in his academic career. Despite stating that the animal rights movement was a ‘very serious business’, suggesting that these were dangerous people, he used to take his baby son along to meetings with these activists.

Lambert is known as a manipulative figure, who has already used a range of tactics to deflect criticism of his unethical behaviour and try to control the narrative. He is likely to go to great lengths to defend his reputation, and may well try to feign contrition. Hopefully Mitting will keep this in mind when he hears Lambert give evidence in December.

Lambert has hinted that he might publish a book about his experiences one day, and Heaven suggests that the Inquiry investigate the existence of a draft.

Rather than seeking to understand the serious impact the spycops’ actions had on those they targeted, Lambert seems to have treated many aspects of the SDS as a big joke. Even HN5 John Dines ‘John Barker’, probably his closest friend in the unit, said that you don’t get a pointed answer from Lambert ‘unless you ask him a pointed question’.

Lambert rose through the ranks to become an SDS manager, then left the force in 2007. Sir Ian Blair, the Met’s Commissioner at the time, attended his retirement party. We still don’t know how much he and other senior cops knew about the way that Lambert operated, and if they bothered asking questions to find out how the SDS was obtaining its intelligence.

It’s all very well for police lawyers to turn up at this Inquiry with yet more ‘apologies’ for the spycops’ abuses, but we need to hear evidence from these senior officers.

‘Rules are make to be broken’

Dines and Lambert were very close, and frequently praised each other. They seem to have had a lot in common, including a deep-seated misogyny and lack of respect for activists, especially women, or their own wives.

Other officers say that HN5 John Dines was very competitive, a ‘gong hunter’, who ‘wanted to be a gold star SDS officer’ and sought notoriety. It seems likely that this last wish will be granted.

Dines made many disparaging remarks about his time undercover (saying he found it ‘unpleasant, miserable and boring’) and about those he targeted, including Helen Steel. He professed to be in love with her, but coldly stated that he ‘couldn’t give a rats’ about the impact on her of his deception and the way in which he disappeared from her life.

Like Lambert, Dines received a police commendation. He did not want his wife to attend the ceremony in 1992.

Dines has refused to provide oral evidence to this Inquiry, so will not be appearing during these hearings.

Back in 2003, the Met paid out a huge sum of money to enable Dines to relocate his family from New Zealand to Australia. This was due to their fears that Helen Steel – after years of dogged research on her part – would succeed in tracking him down.

It seems that the police knew enough about his misconduct to realise that this could have resulted in a civil claim against the force. The 2003 BBC ‘True Spies’ documentary series had helped to confirm her suspicions about Dines and his true identity.

As well as demanding money for relocation costs, and compensation for the effect on his new career (as an extremely well paid barrister, who often took on cases defending radical activists in the New Zealand courts) Dines asked his former colleagues at the Yard to write him references and help him find new work in Australia.

The fourth officer discussed by Heaven was HN1 ‘Matt Rayner’. He also deceived a woman, Denise Fuller, into a romantic and sexual relationship that lasted around one year. Denise is due to give evidence on 6 January 2025.

Rayner knew that fellow officer Andy Coles had tried to sexually assault a woman, but did not report this incident to the SDS managers.

Loyalty and lies

We’ll be hearing evidence from some of the unit’s managers later in this Tranche (in January 2025).

When SDS officers have spoken publicly about the unit in the past (for example, in ‘True Spies’) others clearly saw this as a ’betrayal’ of the SDS’s secret status.

Heaven commented earlier about officers being ‘selective’ in their evidence and what they chose to reveal to this Inquiry. It seems that many of them still have a strong sense of loyalty to each other.

Their employers, the Met police, have now made it very clear that they consider some of the problems associated with the unit to have been caused by the managers’:

‘failure to lead the SDS properly and effectively’.

They have been admissions of failings in terms of welfare, discipline and misconduct; a lack of proper training; a lack of scrutiny or oversight; a failure to maintain professional standards or to ensure that reporting was appropriate or ethical.

Heaven points out that SDS managers should not allow any perceived loyalty – towards either the Met or the officers they managed – prevent them from providing honest answers to this Inquiry. Some undercovers (including Lambert and Coles) have already made comments critical of their managers, in an attempt to shift blame away from themselves.

One of the managers that we’re due to hear from, at the very end of this set of hearings on 22-23 January 2025, is known to us only as HN109. He applied for anonymity in this Inquiry, and was granted it.

We have since learnt that his reasons for doing so were not any worries about activists tracking him down, but concerns, even in 2023, about the hostility of officers who he had managed, and the risk of them ‘causing trouble’ for him and his family.

We heard evidence about the ‘Scutt incident’ in the Tranche 2 Phase 1 hearings a few months ago. Bob Lambert threatened and physically assaulted HN109, in front of other members of the SDS. It will be interesting to hear what all these managers have to say about each other and how effective or ineffective their individual styles of management were.

Heaven makes it clear that this will be the time for SDS managers to call in the ‘insurance policy’ and make it clear just how much senior officers knew, or didn’t know, about the unit and its officers’ behaviour.

Carlton King, self-styled ‘Black James Bond’

Heaven then moved on to talk about ‘Carlton King’, an image of whom was shown on the screen.

Described as an ‘author and prolific podcaster’, it is unsurprising that a member of the public recognised that this was an alias being used by a man called Trevor Morris, who had been an undercover officer in the SDS, before going on to work in the secret services.

As his costume shows, has cultivated a somewhat ‘glamorous’ image of himself.

As well as producing a regular podcast, he has published a book (‘Black Ops: the Incredible True Story of a British Secret Agent’) which contains an entire chapter about the SDS and more musings about the workings of Special Branch.

He makes no secret of the fact that he infiltrated a number of groups during his deployment, and spied on the family of murdered teenager Stephen Lawrence.

The Inquiry presumably knew about this, but chose not to share this decidedly pertinent information with Core Participants, or the wider public, and when questioned, claimed that Morris needed the protection of a Restriction Order.

Since then, Mitting has made a ruling on this, and it is clear that MI5 and/or MI6 have been involved and told Mitting that he can neither confirm nor deny that Trevor Morris and ‘Carlton King’ are in fact the same man.

Heaven pointed out the obvious absurdity of this approach. The book is on sale to the public, and was published with the agreement of the ‘intelligence community’ and Home Office.

‘Carlton King’ has appeared in mainstream media reports sharing his opinions about events such as the Manchester Arena bombing. Comments left below such reports make it obvious that commenters knew of his true identity.

‘Jenny’ and ‘Bea’ have both been clear that they did not consent to sex with Trevor Morris, and consider it rape.

Morris has been utterly unrepentant about deceiving them in this way. It is noted that at no time (in either his book or podcast) has he divulged that he used his false identity to trick women into having sex with him.

Although he has done a great deal of self-promotion and publicly shared a lot of stories about his time as a spy, when Morris gave evidence to this Inquiry he claimed to suffer from problems with his memory and recall of the past.

Heaven pointed out that there is a risk of this Inquiry’s findings being undermined if it is not able to consider all the evidence that exists, and that the impact on the spycops’ victims could be ‘devastating’.

When he appeared in Tranch 2 Phase 1 hearings, Morris made many uncorroborated, outlandish allegations and displayed a degree of indifference towards the women whose human rights he had abused. Heaven suggested that perhaps his ‘nonchalance about such issues can now be understood better’ by his time in the security services. However this post-deployment history has not been officially disclosed to NSCPs, not even to the two women he deceived.

Understanding the ‘customers’

After this, she went on to discuss some other ‘procedural matters’: information that the Non State group recommend that the Inquiry seek to obtain to help it understand the true motivation and utility of SDS reporting (including more information about the ‘customers’ of this intelligence, and the relationships between the SDS/ Special Branch and others) These may include, for example, private companies, employers, foreign governments, other police forces in the UK and elsewhere.

After this, there were a few closing comments, about the delays in disclosure; the concerns raised by many NSCPs about the Inquiry being in a state of ‘crisis’ (which resulted in a recent letter to the Home Office, and request to meet with the Home Secretary).

Those who were spied upon are being told that they will have a very short time frame (potentially as little as two weeks) between receiving hundreds of jumbled pages of disclosure and having to respond to the Inquiry. This is extremely stressful, and inherently unfair.

She finished by asking that the Inquiry laid out the steps it proposed to take to prevent any ’further loss of confidence and trust’ in the process.

Tranche 2, Phase 2, Day 1

14 October 2024

The first day of the new round of Undercover Policing Inquiry hearings, setting out what to expect in the next three months.

CONTENTS

Introduction
Provisional timetable of upcoming live evidence

Opening statements: Day 1

David Barr KC (Counsel to the Inquiry)
Peter Skelton KC (Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis)
Oliver Sanders KC (Designated Lawyer’s Core Participant Group, HN122; HN1; HN32; HN69; HN39; HN109)
Neil Sheldon KC (Home Office)
Quincy Whitaker (John Burke-Monerville)
Rajiv Menon KC (Richard, Nathan and Audrey Adams)
Charlotte Kilroy KC (The Category H Core Participants)
James Scobie KC (Michael Chant, Lindsey German, Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament)

Introduction

The Undercover Policing Inquiry held its ‘Tranche 2 Phase 1’ hearings in the summer of 2024. ‘Phase 2’ has just begun, two weeks later than scheduled, and these hearings are due to continue until 23rd January 2025. There are 39 days when hearings will be held. The Inquiry has scheduled some breaks.

The majority of witnesses will be civilians who were spied on by undercover officers from the Special Demonstration Squad (SDS), but we are due to hear evidence from at least four of the undercovers, and five officers who worked in the unit’s back office (four of them senior managers).

This round of hearings kicked off on Monday 14th October 2024. Opening Statements were delivered online over Days 1 and 2.

Provisional timetable of upcoming live evidence

Please note that this timetable is a provisional one and may well change over the coming weeks; it’s already been altered a few times. Check the Inquiry’s website to be sure!

Click on each hearing’s title for more detailed information and timings for each day.
Day 3 (Mon 21 October)
• 2:00 PM: ZWB
Day 4 (Tue 22 October)
• 10:00 AM: Kaden Blake
Day 5 (Wed 23 October)
• 10:00 AM: HN122 ‘Neil Richardson’
Day 6 (Thu 24 October)
• 10:00 AM: Richard Adams
• 2:00 PM: John Burke-Monerville
The Inquiry takes a break for the week commencing Monday 28 October
Day 7 (Mon 4 November)
• 2:00 PM: Martyn Lowe
Day 8 (Tue 5 November)
• 10:00 AM: Dave Morris
Day 9 (Wed 6 November)
• 10:00 AM: Chris Baillee
Day 10 (Thur 7 November)
• 11:00 PM: Gabrielle Bosley
Day 11 (Mon 11 November)
• 10:00 AM: Timothy Greene
• 2:00 PM: Albert Beale
Day 12 (Tue 12 November)
• 10:00 AM: Robin Lane
Day 13 (Wed 13 November)
• 10:00 AM: Paul Gravett
Day 14 (Thu 14 November)
• 10:00 AM: Paul Gravett
• 2:00 PM: Geoff Sheppard
Day 15 (Fri 15 November)
• 10:00 AM: Geoff Sheppard
The Inquiry takes another break during the week commencing Monday 18 November
Day 16 (Tue 26 November)
• 10:00 AM: Belinda Harvey
Day 17 (Wed 27 November)
• 10:00 AM: Helen Steel
Day 18 (Thu 28 November)
• 10:00 AM: ‘Jacqui’
Day 19 (Mon 2 December)
• 10:00 AM: HN10 ‘Bob Robinson’ Bob Lambert
Day 20 (Tue 3 December)
• 10:00 AM: HN10 Robert Lambert ‘Bob Robinson’
Day 21 (Wed 4 December)
• 10:00 AM: HN10 Robert Lambert ‘Bob Robinson’
Day 22 (Thu 5 December)
• 10:00 AM: HN10 Robert Lambert ‘Bob Robinson’
Day 23 (Mon 9 December)
• 10:00 AM: ‘Callum’
• 2:00 PM: ‘Walter’
Day 24 (Tue 10 December)
• 10:00 AM: AFJ
Day 25 (Wed 11 December)
• 10:00 AM: Clare Hildreth
Day 26 (Thu 12 December)
• 10:00 AM: ‘Jessica’
Day 27 (Wed 18 December)
• 10:00 AM: HN2 Andrew Coles ‘Andy Davey’
Day 28 (Thu 19 December)
• 10:00 AM: HN2 Andrew Coles ‘Andy Davey’
Day 29 (Fri 20 December)
• 10:00 AM: HN2 Andrew Coles ‘Andy Davey’
The Inquiry takes a break for the two weeks commencing Monday 23 & 30 December
Day 28 (Mon 6 January 2025)
• 10:00 AM: Denise Fuller
Day 29 (Tue 7 January)
• 10:00 AM: HN1 ‘Matt Rayner’
Day 30 (Wed 8 January)
• 10:00 AM: HN1 ‘Matt Rayner’
Day 31 (Thu 9 January)
• 10:00 AM: HN1 ‘Matt Rayner’
Day 32 (Mon 13 January)
• 10:00 AM: HN115 DCI Tony Waite
Day 33 (Tue 14 January)
• 10:00 AM: HN115 DCI Tony Waite
Day 34 (Wed 15 January)
• 10:00 AM: HN69 DCI Malcolm MacLeod
Day 35 (Thu 16 January)
• 10:00 AM: HN32 DS Michael Couch
Day 36 (Mon 20 January)
• 10:00 AM: HN39 DCI Eric Docker
Day 37 (Tue 21 January)
• 10:00 AM: HN39 DCI Eric Docker
Day 38 (Wed 22 January)
• 10:00 AM: HN109
Day 39 (Thu 23 January)
• 10:00 AM: HN109

Opening Statements: Day 1

1) David Barr KC (Counsel to the Inquiry)

David Barr KC is the Counsel to the Inquiry (CTI), and his written Opening Statement outlines the position of the Undercover Policing Inquiry.

He was the first to address this set of hearings, known as Tranche 2, Phase 2 (T2P2).

Although Mitting and Barr were clearly in the hearing room, Core Participants who showed up were not allowed in and public access to the opening statements was ‘online only’. This was a cruel decision.

CTI’s statement included multiple accounts of predatory undercover officers lying about their ages in order to target and groom very young and vulnerable women. He described ‘cold, calculating emotional and sexual exploitation’, while the victims of these and other officers were denied the opportunity to be together at the Inquiry venue. Instead they were left isolated, listening to disturbing revelations at home.

Barr explained that T2P2 will examine the deployments of 7 ‘open’ former Special Demonstration Squad (SDS) officers (for whom at least the cover names have been made public), 11 ‘closed’ officers (whose real and cover names have been withheld, and who will give evidence in secret) and 14 former SDS managers. It will look at the infiltration of activist groups from 1983-1996. 26 members of the public have made statements and 22 will give oral evidence.

The Inquiry’s work in this period will include:

‘Whether the undercover deployments in question were capable of justification, the sexual deceit of women (both admitted and alleged), reporting on black justice campaigns, the alleged participation of undercover police officers in serious offending, potential miscarriages of justice, failure to declare the involvement of undercover officers to prosecutors or courts, violation of legal professional privilege, alleged participation in torts, the influence of UCOs within groups, the continuing use of deceased children’s identities and officer welfare will be key aspects of our investigation in this phase.

‘So too will the knowledge, attitude, actions, or inactions of managers within the SDS in relation to these and other issues. Standing back from specific events, the culture of the unit will remain an important overarching theme.’

The language Barr used is interesting. The Inquiry will investigate whether these undercover deployments were ‘capable of justification’, not whether or not they were justified. It may already be clear to Counsel to the Inquiry that the actual conduct of the unit cannot be justified. Any assessment of justification must therefore be hypothetical, ignoring the facts of the operations.

It is also encouraging that he appears to have kept the role of managers and the culture of the unit in his sights.

He focused his statement primarily on the 7 ‘open’ officers:
• HN11 Mike Chitty ‘Mike Blake’ – deployed April 1983-June 1987 into the animal rights movement in South London. Chitty will not give evidence. The Inquiry believes he lives abroad. However, interviews he gave to ‘Operation Herne’ will be published.
• HN10 Robert Lambert ‘Bob Robinson’ – infiltrated London Greenpeace, in North
London, and other groups between 1984 and 1989. CTI states ‘his ultimate target was the Animal Liberation Front.’ Lambert will give live evidence from 2-5 December.
• HN87 ‘John Lipscomb’ – successor to Chitty, who infiltrated the animal rights movement in South London between 1987 and 1990, first in Bromley then Brixton. His reporting focused on hunt saboteurs. He provided a witness statement but ‘Lipscomb’ is considered too ill to give evidence.
• HN5 John Dines ‘John Barker’ – infiltrated anarchist groups, including London Greenpeace, 1987 -1991, overlapping with and replacing Lambert. He has made witness statements, but Dines is refusing to give oral evidence. He lives abroad.
• HN122 ‘Neil Richardson’ – infiltrated the West London Branch of the Revolutionary Communist Party and then Class War, 1989 – 1993. ‘Richardson’ will give oral evidence on 23 October.
• HN2 Andrew Coles ‘Andy Davey’ – infiltrated a number of animal rights groups in South London between 1991 and 1995. Coles will give oral evidence from 18-20 December.
• HN1 ‘Matt Rayner’ – infiltrated animal rights groups 1992-1996, including London Boots Action Group, London Animal Action, and the West London hunt saboteurs. Based in north-west London, he reported on activists as far afield as Liverpool and Manchester. ‘Rayner’ will give live evidence from 7-9 January 2025.

Barr addressed a number of themes:

Sexual Relationships

This was perhaps the strongest yet from Barr on sexual relationships the officers had. He addressed the relationships each officer had:

On his own admission, Chitty entered into sexual activity with female activists whilst he was undercover. This included a relationship with the woman known to the Inquiry as ‘Lizzie’.

He remained in contact with members of his target group, including ‘Lizzie’, after his deployment had ended, and this was eventually discovered. There is evidence that Detective Sergeant Chitty went so far as to propose marriage to ‘Lizzie’.

Lambert admits to having sexual relationships with at least 4 women while undercover between 1984-1989, including fathering a child with an activist known as ‘Jacqui’. Lambert has told the Inquiry that he informed his manager (DI Barber) of this pregnancy in the pub. Barber allegedly decided not to report it and left Lambert ‘to deal with the situation’. (‘Jacqui’ will give evidence on 28 November)

Lambert went on to have a nearly 2-year relationship with Belinda Harvey starting in 1987. Harvey states Lambert ‘often professed his love for her, expressed a desire to have children with her and had planned with her to settle down in a home of their own.’ She describes being ‘deeply troubled’ when Lambert suddenly claimed he had to flee the country. (Belinda Harvey will give evidence on 26 November).

Dines admits to a sexual relationship with activist Helen Steel while undercover from 1990-1992. Dines claims in his statement that he used Steel ‘to maintain his cover and obtain intelligence.’ Barr pulled no punches, describing Dines’s behaviour as ‘cold, calculating emotional and sexual exploitation.’ (Helen Steel will give evidence on 27 November).

‘Lipscomb’ admits to multiple instances of sexual activity with female activists, including ‘sexual fumbling’ while sharing beds in activist squats.

Coles is accused of having had a sexual relationship with a 19-year-old activist known as ‘Jessica’ in 1992, when he was actually 32 and married. Barr noted that Coles denies this. However his statement went on to give detailed accounts of how he initiated sexual contact and a relationship with ‘Jessica’. (‘Jessica’ will give evidence on 12 December)

Barr mentioned other women who recall unpleasant incidents where Coles ‘lunged’ at them, and chased them around. Fellow officer ‘Matt Rayner’ also confirmed in an interview that a woman he spoke to at the time described Coles as ‘creepy’ in his undercover persona:

‘it felt like she described him with a shudder.’

‘Rayner’ admits to a sexual relationship with activist Denise Fuller from 1993-1995. He describes his feelings as ‘genuine’ despite being married in his real identity. However Fuller draws attention to his contemporary intelligence reports about her which suggest his claims of ‘genuine feelings’ are a lie. (Denise Fuller will give evidence on 6 Jan 2025)

Management knowledge of sexual relationships

A key issue is the extent to which SDS managers knew about and condoned these relationships. Several officers claim managers must have been aware. DS Chitty is recorded as telling ‘Operation Herne’ that Lambert bragged about fathering a child through a relationship whilst deployed. Lambert states he believes managers knew about his relationships with both ‘Jacqui’ and Belinda.

Dines explains in his statement that ‘he believes that his managers knew about his sexual relationship with Steel.’

HN1 ‘Matt Rayner’ states relationships:

‘were seen as a grey area – they were not advised or encouraged… but they were not prohibited either. This understanding was reinforced by the fact that my managers were aware of [my] situation and did not tell me to stop.’

‘Rayner’ had quite a lot to say about back-room knowledge of sexual relationships. Barr explained:

‘Rayner’ also overlapped with officers whose deployments will be considered in Tranche 3. HN26 ‘Christine Green’ [was] deployed at the same time as ‘Rayner’ into animal rights circles… ‘Rayner’ states that he knew of her ‘friendship’ with an activist ‘and assumed it was sexual… The office would have known’.

‘Rayner’ further recalls that HN14 Jim Boyling ‘Jim Sutton’ made reference to being in a relationship whilst deployed and acknowledges that he also knew that HN15 Mark Jenner ‘Mark Cassidy’ was having a sexual relationship whilst deployed.

‘Rayner’ later acted as mentor to HN16 James Thomson ‘James Straven / Kevin Crossland’, another officer who went on to form intimate relationships in his undercover identity, albeit ‘Rayner’ denies knowing about them.’

Barr’s account here is quite striking, giving one of the clearest impressions to date of how prevalent sexual relationships were within the SDS, and how generalised and widespread knowledge about them must have been within the unit.

Barr made it very clear that there will be no consideration in this Inquiry of whether these relationships could have been justified:

‘We shall need to examine the utility of the deployment in order to help answer the question whether it was capable of justification. That does not mean that we will be examining whether sexual deception was justified. It was not.’

Identity theft

‘Bob Robinson’ (Lambert) and ‘John Barker’ (Dines) were cover names stolen from the identities of deceased children.

The cover name ‘Neil Richardson’ (HN122) was derived in part from the life story of Neil Robin Martin who died aged 6.

Neil’s mother, Faith Mason, has provided a powerful witness statement which tells his story and describes the impact on her and her family of learning his identity had been used in this way. There is evidence that HN122 traveled to the area where Neil’s family lived.

Coles used the first name and date of birth of a deceased child and added the surname ‘Davey’, to form his cover name ‘Andy Davey’.

HN1 used the identity of Matthew Edward Rayner, who died of leukemia at the age of 4. Matthew’s brother has provided written evidence to the Inquiry and his older sister, Kaden Blake, will give evidence about her brother and the impact the use of his identity has had on the family. (Kaden Blake will give live evidence on 22 October)

Officers committed serious crimes

A major issue to be examined during this Tranche will be about undercover officers who incited or participated in serious crime.

Andy Coles claims he participated in animal liberations and other criminal activity to maintain his cover.

‘Matt Rayner’ is accused by Geoff Sheppard of encouraging him to use a firearm to shoot a vivisector and offering to act as driver.

Bob Lambert is accused of perpetrating an arson attack on a director’s home and writing leaflets inciting criminal acts.

Witness Chris Baillie alleges that Bob Lambert drove him to a butcher’s shop where another activist threw a brick through the window. Baillie was then arrested and convicted, while Lambert was not. (It is expected live evidence about these allegations will emerge throughout the T2 evidence hearings).

Most significantly, Lambert is accused of planting an incendiary device at the Debenham’s store in Harrow on the night of 11 July 1987. Barr noted that DS Chitty is recorded as telling ‘Operation Herne’ that he believed that DS Bob Lambert had led the cell which attacked Debenham’s stores. Core Participant Paul Gravett accuses Lambert of being

‘involved from the start and of being the person who attacked the Harrow branch.’

Geoff Sheppard also states:

‘Lambert was deeply involved and committed the attack in Harrow.’

Helen Steel and Belinda Harvey provide corroborating accounts of Lambert’s alleged involvement. Lambert claims he had no advance knowledge of the action. However, the convictions of Andrew Clarke and Geoff Sheppard for the attacks are currently under appeal ‘based upon DS Lambert’s alleged actions and undisclosed role.’

(Paul Gravett will give evidence on 13 and 14 November and Geoff Sheppard will give evidence on 14 and 15 November)

Undermining the justice system

Barr cited multiple instances where officers were arrested or appeared in court using their false identities, without disclosing their true identity or status to the court.

Lambert was arrested and bound over in court for a protest at a meat market in 1985. Documents show a senior police officer was informed of Lambert’s true identity but there is no record of the court being informed.

Dines was arrested at the Poll Tax riot in 1990 and charged under a false name. Managers directed him to fail to appear in court and ‘cancel all records’, suggesting contact with the court or prosecution.

HN1 ‘Matt Rayner’ recalls giving evidence in court as a defence witness for two activists, without disclosing his true identity to the court. His manager Bob Lambert commented he had ‘behaved in a thoroughly professional manner throughout.’

Coles was arrested and charged under a false name at a hunt saboteur demonstration in 1994. His managers instructed him not to appear in court.

Barr noted that:

‘The Inquiry will explore further with SDS managers in tranche 3 [hearings next year examining 1993-2008] what this reveals about their attitude to the criminal justice system.’

He describes the hierarchy of SDS interests:

‘the first and primary interest being to ensure that deployments were not interrupted by overt involvement in the criminal justice system, even if that meant providing a false name to a court, and/or failing to provide significant information to the prosecution or a court (vis. that a defence witness was in fact a police officer).’

There are also concerning allegations about officers’ reporting and conduct towards Black justice campaigns.

The Rolan Adams Family Campaign and Trevor Monerville Defence Campaign, both involved Black teenagers who died in racist attacks. Rather than properly investigating these murders, the SDS sent officers to report on the justice campaigns.

(Richard Adams, father of Rolan Adams, and John Burke-Monerville, father of Trevor Monerville, will both give evidence on 24 October)

The Security Service

The Inquiry is also investigating the SDS’s relationship with the Security Service (MI5). Alongside CTI’s Opening Statement, the Inquiry also published the written statement by someone known only as ‘Witness Y’, on behalf of MI5.

Barr described how the Security Service’s assessment of subversion as a threat declined significantly during the T2 period.

Witness Y explains the Security Service ‘scaled back’ counter-subversion work in three steps in 1988, 1992 and 1996. By 1996, subversion was assessed as a ‘low to negligible level’ threat.

Despite this, undercover deployments into activist groups continued throughout this period. Documents show regular discussions about targeting took place between the two agencies.

A 1989 Security Service briefing described the SDS as ‘sympathetic and responsive to the needs of the Service,’ and stated it was ‘extremely important that everything possible’ be done to maintain SDS coverage of certain groups.

Justification

As noted above, despite recognising that aspects of police behaviour could never be justified, the Inquiry does intend to investigate whether the targeting and infiltration of these activist groups was ‘capable of justification’.

However, Barr noted that several officers’ statements cast doubt on whether the groups posed a serious threat.

HN87 ‘John Lipscomb’ states in his witness statement that he ‘doubted the utility of his reporting’ on animal rights activists.

HN122 opined at the end of his deployment that ‘the threat to national security from CWO and CWF was very low.’

Barr said:

‘the question that arises is… whether he should not have been deployed into these groups at all?’

An SDS report authored by HN1 ‘Matt Rayner’ in 1996 asserted there were only ‘about 20’ committed Animal Liberation Front extremists in the UK and stated ‘the overt groups such as LAA [London Animal Action] are only of passing public order interest, not significant in its own right.’

In all, there was a sense in Barr’s delivery that he gave rather short shrift to the police interpretation that these deployments were justifiable. He ended a long list of misconduct allegations in Lambert’s deployment with the observation that:

‘Lambert’s deployment was regarded as an outstanding success by his managers such that he was awarded a Commissioner’s Commendation.’

However, whether the deep irony of that comment was intended is difficult to assess. Barr’s delivery is always very dry; and what the Chair of the Inquiry’s view will be of the justification or not of these blighted operations remains to be seen.

More evidence uploaded

Barr also mentioned several hundred new pieces of evidence being uploaded onto the Inquiry website.

These include correspondence between the United States Air Force and the Ministry of Defence in 1983, on the subject of ongoing protests at RAF Upper Heyford and the potential ‘political repercussions’ if an American serviceman were to shoot a British peace protester on the base.

Another item is a report which lawyers acting for the ‘Category H’ (individuals in relationships with undercover officers) victims had recommended for Mitting’s reading list back in Tranche 1, and the lawyer acting for the Met referred to in the last set of hearings.

Entitled ‘The police in action’, this is a detailed study carried out by academic researchers and published by the Policy Studies Institute in 1983. It describes the pervasive sexism and racism found in the force.

2) Peter Skelton KC

Next we heard Peter Skelton KC deliver an Opening Statement on behalf of the ‘Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis’, ie the Metropolitan Police as an institution.

A longer, written, Statement is available on the website; this was a much shorter, oral, submission.

Skelton only spoke for around 15 minutes, but used much of this time to apologise on behalf of the Metropolitan Police Service (MPS) to various Non State Core Participants.

Apology number 1

He began by thanking two more families for speaking about the distress they had suffered after making the shocking discovery that spycops had stolen the identities of their loved ones.

The Met apologised to Francis Bennett and Honor Robson for the theft of their brother Michael Anthony Hartley’s identity by HN12, and to Marva Lewis and Judy Lewis for the theft of their brother Anthony Lewis’ identity by HN78. There were assurances that this sick practice is no longer being used to create cover identities, and ‘will never be used again’.

Apology number 2

There were also apologies for ‘Bea’ and ‘Jenny’, two women who gave ‘moving accounts’ of the impact of discovering they had been deceived into sexual relationships by HN78 Trevor Morris during Phase 1.

According to Skelton, the Met was ‘profoundly disappointed’ by his failure to ‘take responsibility for his actions and to apologise for the hurt he has caused them’.

Apology number 3

Finally, apologies were made to two Black families whose justice campaigns were spied on: the families of Rolan Adams and Trevor Monerville. The Met now say that they were spied on due to undercovers ‘following their existing targets into them’, but admit that this reporting should have stopped earlier and the information gathered should not have been retained.

Smearing the animal rights movement

Apologies over, Skelton went on to talk about the police’s justification for infiltrating animal rights groups. He spoke of a growth in ‘militant’ animal rights activism during the 1980s and ‘90s, describing direct action as ‘serious crime’.

He name-dropped groups such as the Animal Liberation Front (ALF) and Animal Rights Militia (ARM), and suggested that these ‘attacks’ were ‘violent’, ‘prevalent’ and ‘widespread’, claiming this justified the deployment of long-term undercovers in the animal rights movement.

However, he went on to acknowledge that these deployments were marred by officer misconduct, particularly regarding deceitful sexual relationships. Every single officer sent in to the animal rights movement during this period (1983-1992) engaged in sexual activity while undercover.

Apology number 4

The first was HN10 Bob Lambert, whose deployment lasted over 4 years. During this time, he had relationships with at least four women, fathering a child with one of them. The Met now also apologised to that child, now a man known as ‘TBS’, for the distress he has suffered

Details were given of the other officers:

• HN11 Mike Chitty, who had a sexual relationship with ‘Lizzie’ between 1985-87, and has admitted other ‘sexual impropriety’
• HN87 ‘John Lipscomb’ admitted to sexual activity with at least four women
• HN5 John Dines had a serious long-term relationship with Helen Steel
• HN2 Andy Coles had a relationship with ‘Jessica’
• HN1 ‘Matt Rayner’ had a relationship with Denise Fuller.

Apology number 5

Skelton reaffirmed that the Met ‘unreservedly apologises’ for these relationships, and the ‘widespread culture of sexism and misogyny’ they represent. Again, there is disappointment about the failure of some of these officers to provide oral evidence and/or witness statements to this Inquiry.

According to the police, and contradicting the level of ignorance claimed by previous witnesses, SDS managers knew, or should have known, about these relationships. There should have been ‘vigilance, critical enquiry, explicit prohibition and training’ but there wasn’t.

More management failures

The Met’s statement details a number of instances of undercovers being arrested, and sometimes charged and taken to court in their false identities.

They now admit that proper disclosure should have been made, to investigators as well as prosecutors and courts, and that miscarriages of justice are the inevitable result of their failure to do so. The unit’s managers failed in their duties and responsibilities, to protect fair trials and not allow courts to be misled.

Skelton also made some comments about the welfare of undercover officers, pointing out that the SDS managers could have been more proactive about intervening to offer them support (perhaps with trained psychologists). He stated that each manager had their own unique style of management, meriting individual examination, but admitted that there were ‘systemic management failings’ that the Met could take corporate responsibility for.

One of these was a failure to intervene when it came to the ‘overall tone and content’ of reporting. Another was what seems to have been an ‘aversion to discipling wrongdoing’, which, coupled with commendations and praise for Lambert, contributed to a growing culture of impunity for increasingly serious misconduct.

Justification

Before ending, Skelton reiterated that the animal rights movement was viewed as ‘subversive’ and dangerous, and the covert infiltration of these groups was therefore necessary. He suggested that any final assessment of the justification and value of these deployments, and the reports they generated, could only be done by consulting the ‘wider intelligence community’, and mentioned the statement from ‘Witness Y’.

3) Oliver Sanders KC

Our final speaker in the morning session was Oliver Sanders KC, who represents the ‘Designated Lawyers’ group of former officers.

These are two undercover officers, whose real names are being kept secret: HN1 ‘Matt Rayner’ and HN122 ‘Neil Richardson’.

The rest worked behind the scenes. These were HN32 DS Michael Couch, and three managers: HN39 Michael Docker, HN69 (Malcolm MacLeod), and HN109 (whose real name we don’t know).

Again, there is a much longer written Opening Statement but this was quite a short speech.

Whinging about the Inquiry itself

Sanders began by complaining on behalf of his clients about the Inquiry and how it was being conducted.

To the amazement and disgust of listeners, who reacted furiously on social media, he ended up spending approximately half of his time on this topic. He claimed that the Inquiry was now a ‘two tier process’, and that former officers were being maltreated, ‘belittled and sneered at simply because they served as police officers in a different era’.

They felt that they were being subjected to ‘heavy adversarial challenge’ (translation: they were asked questions, by David Barr on behalf of the Inquiry – unlike most public inquiries, the Non State Core Participants in this one are not being allowed to ask questions, either themselves or via their own lawyers).

In comparison, they thought that ‘civilian witnesses’ (i.e. those they spied on) were being allowed to share their experiences without being challenged at all (which viewers of the Tranche 1 hearings will know is not true).

He complained about the length of time each hearing took, and about the fact that some of the recent hearings in the summer went on past 6pm (going so far as to produce a table in the written document detailing exactly how many minutes each witness spent giving evidence).

He pointed out that many of the officers are now in their 70s and so a long day is tiring for them – obviously many of those they spied on are also getting older now, as is Mitting himself! – and was anxious to tell us how they had ‘voluntarily given up their time’ to provide witness statements.

Many of the Non State Core Participants have still not received any disclosure from the Inquiry, or the police, despite repeatedly requesting their files for the past ten years. As a result, even though they were involved in groups known to have been spied on, they may never find out the identity of the undercovers who infiltrated those groups (because these officers have been granted full anonymity).

In Sanders’ view, it’s a waste of time to give space to anyone who can’t specify which officer reported on them. He tells us that the Inquiry need not bother hearing oral evidence from such members of the public ‘simply for the sake of it’.

He went on to say some stuff about how public order policing wasn’t just about violence and riots, but about preventing any disruption to a ‘tranquil state of affairs’.

Sexual relationships are not the same as each other

He started well, saying that ‘all sexual misconduct’ by officers was wrong, and should be condemned, not condoned. But he quickly went on to tell us that his clients are upset that their sexual activity (described variously as sexual fumblings, one-night stands and oral sex) might be thought of as some kind of ‘sexual relationship’. It seems they are keen not to be seen as ‘on a par with Bob Lambert’.

Spycops campaigners were astounded to hear him use what was quickly termed ‘the Bill Clinton defence’.

According to him, as so far, we only know about six officers committing some kind of sexual misconduct, the other 30 who served in the SDS during these years are therefore all innocent of such deeds. He claims this would have made it harder for managers to spot the problem.

Furthermore, he says his clients don’t recognise the description – of an institutional ‘culture of sexism and misogyny’ – as something they were part of in the 80s (despite the Met themselves using these words).

He went on to talk about more about ‘sexual attraction’, saying it wasn’t just heterosexual male officers who committed sexual misconduct (as we’ll hear about women officers in future Tranches, and there is one known case of a gay male officer infiltrating the far-right).

Tradecraft Manual

Sanders ended by saying that he was keen to ‘dispel any myths’ about the SDS ‘Tradecraft Manual’ that’s come to light since this Inquiry started.

According to him, it’s just an ‘unfinished draft’, and was never ‘officially endorsed’. However one of the authors of this text, Andy Coles, is scheduled to make an appearance as a witness in December, so he can be asked about this.

4) Neil Sheldon KC

After lunch, we heard from Neil Sheldon KC, who represents the Home Office. The Home Office is considered a Core Participant in the Inquiry, and separately is responsible for funding the Inquiry – no conflict of interests there!

We heard that the Home Secretary awaits the findings and recommendations of this Inquiry with great interest, and has noted Mitting’s ‘public commitment’ to wrap it all up by producing a final report before the end of 2026.

Interestingly, the current Home Secretary, Yvette Cooper, is the first Labour Home Secretary since this Inquiry was first announced by Theresa May. There have been many reshuffles since then, with six different Tories occupying the post in the intervening years, but as we’ve already heard, many Labour MPs were reported on by spycops, and it’s entirely possible that they targeted Cooper (or her father, a prominent trade unionist) at some point.

Their written Opening Statement is online. This has been written to address both Parts of Tranche 2, citing the 2024 General Election as their reason for not submitting a separate statement for Part 1. They hope to add more evidence before Mitting reaches Tranche 5.

It’s all changed now

They fully agree with Mitting’s earlier comments, that:

‘the arrangements for overseeing undercover policing deployments are now very different from those which obtained in the past’.

In the Tranche 2 era (1983-1992), there was no statute law in place to govern the use of undercover officers. Since then, we have seen the enaction in 2000 of the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act (RIPA), followed by the Investigatory Powers Act of 2016. The fact that undercover units’ abuses continued well after RIPA came into force shows that it had no real effect on political undercover policing. The problem isn’t what the rules say, but that polce officers ignore the rules with impunity.

Sehldon said that any use of undercovers nowadays must be considered ‘necessary and proportionate’, and be formally authorised at a more senior level than before. Deployments lasting longer than 12 months require the approval of a judicial commissioner.

The law was further amended in 2021, and there is now even more guidance governing criminal conduct by what are now termed ‘Covert Human Intelligence Sources’

The Home Office is keen to prove that ‘the picture is dramatically different today’ from how it was in the years 1983–1992.

Home Office ignorance

Sheldon went on to make a few comments about the evidence seen so far. The Home Office provided annual authorisation – and funding – for the SDS, and correspondence up till 1989 shows that in return they received what he terms ‘a high level description’ of the unit’s work, with reassurances about issues such as officer welfare and supervision, and a few examples of the spycops’ successes.

However, they state that they did not seek to direct or monitor the way the unit worked and had very limited knowledge of the actual operations. It was suggested that ‘operational partners’ deliberately kept any concerns to themselves, as they were anxious to avoid the Home Office examining Special Branch/ the SDS too closely.

He says the Home Office did express a direct interest in two particular movements during this era; anti-fascist action and the animal rights movement. He understands that this set of hearings will focus on the officers who infiltrated the animal rights movement.

He reiterated that the Home Office was not aware of any of the ‘deeply disturbing behaviour and conduct’ (by which he meant sexual misconduct, the theft of deceased children’s identities, and any conduct which might have led to miscarriages of justice).

Back in 2020, the Opening Statement provided by the then-Home Secretary referred to a report produced by Stephen Taylor in 2015. According to this, a small number of Home Office officials knew about the SDS’s operations (especially in 1983-86), the identity of some of the groups being targeted and the type of information being gathered about them.

However they were not aware of the issues listed above, and there has been no new evidence since to suggest otherwise (partly because the Home Office has been purged of every document relating to the SDS).

Requests for the Inquiry

The Home Office would like witnesses who make references to ‘the Government’ to be pressed to clarify which branch of the government they are referring to, and not be allowed to use ‘the Home Office’ as a shorthand for the entire apparatus of the British State.

Sheldon’s final point was about an assertion made by HN78 Trevor Morris ‘Anthony “Bobby” Lewis (also aka Carlton King) in his witness statement, about the Home Office deeming the Socialist Workers Party (SWP) to be a ‘subversive organisation’.

When questioned by Counsel to the Inquiry in July, Morris was unable to provide any evidence of this. The Home Office hopes the Inquiry continues to ‘rigorously test’ and seek corroboration of any such allegations in future.

5) Quincy Whitaker

Quincy Whitaker appeared on behalf of John Burke-Monerville, who has also submitted a written Opening Statement for this Phase.

What happened to Trevor

 

Whitaker began by relating the tragic story of what happened to John’s son, Trevor Monerville. On New Year’s Eve 1986, as a teenager of 19, he went out with his aunts to a nightclub in Hackney. He was seen outside the club, then disappeared, and was found, badly injured and semi-conscious, inside a car parked on a nearby estate.

Instead of taking him to hospital, the police arrested him. His father visited Stoke Newington police station while out looking for his son, and was told he was not there – a lie the police later apologised for.

Over the next few days, Trevor was transferred from custody to Homerton Hospital’s A&E unit and back again several times. Because he was too unwell to attend court, a magistrate visited him in his cell to conduct a remand hearing. From here he was sent to prison – HMP Brixton – with yet more hospital visits, culminating in emergency brain surgery on 6 January.

Medical evidence suggests that his injuries, including the blood clot in his brain, and the memory loss and epileptic fits that plagued him for the rest of his life, were caused by him being beaten ‘multiple times’.

The Crown Prosecution Service finally dropped the charges against him on 8th January, but despite this, Trevor was frequently stopped by the police. By the end of 1988 he had been arrested five more times, although each case was dropped or ended in an acquittal.

His family were so desperate to help him escape this near-constant police harassment that they put out a fundraising appeal to help him leave the country. He lived in St Lucia for a number of years, but had to come back to London when his epilepsy worsened.

In 1994, Trevor was stabbed 10 times on his way home, in front of witnesses, and died as a result. Nobody has been brought to justice for his murder.

Another of John’s sons, Joseph Burke-Monerville, was shot and killed in 2013, but due to police failings, those responsible were never put on trial.

A third son, David Bello-Monerville, was fatally stabbed in 2019, and the perpetrators found guilty the following year.

As Whitaker put it, this family’s entire lives have been ‘blighted by tragedy, stonewalling, and the consequences of endemic racism’.

The family’s campaign for justice

Understandably, the family have been asking for answers, and accountability from the police, ever since Trevor was first injured, all those years ago. They set up the Justice for Trevor Monerville Campaign (JTMC) and campaigned for a public inquiry.

The entire family have suffered police harassment. Even John’s mother, in her 70s at the time, was arrested on trumped up charges, and successfully sued the police for malicious prosecution.

Burke-Monerville met with ‘Operation Herne’ (an internal police investigation into the spycops operations) in 2016, and was shown a document which mentioned the JTMC, listing it as a group which had been ‘directly penetrated, or closely monitored’ in 1987.

They told him that this didn’t mean that officers had infiltrated his family, just attended meetings around the campaign, adding that the SDS might have made it up anyway, to help justify their operations.

According to them, there were no other records relating to JTMC; they had all been destroyed. The Met then sent him an apology for retaining that document, but not for spying on him and his family in the first place.

More reports have come to light since then, making it clear that the campaign was spied on for at least 9 years. These date from March 1987 – a report in which HN95 Stefan Scutt ‘Stefan Wesolowski’ describes the JTMC and its entirely legal aims – up till February 1996 – a report into preparations for a memorial event on the second anniversary of Trevor’s death.

Interestingly, this last report shows that the campaign had now been allocated a Special Branch reference number of the kind given to people with files for active ongoing monitoring – John wonders why.

We now know that another undercover officer, HN15 Mark Jenner ‘Mark Cassidy’ attended the first such memorial, in March 1995, something John considers a ‘gross violation’ of his family’s privacy.

Burke-Monerville also learnt for the first time in 2016 that the inquest into Trevor’s death had resumed in 1996, concluding on the same day. None of the family were there. The police told the Coroner that they could not be contacted, and so they were neither invited nor informed. John had lived and worked at the same addresses for many years, and the intelligence report proves that the police knew exactly where the family were in 1996.

He would like this Inquiry to get to the truth of all of these matters. He wants to know why his family’s campaign was targeted by the police, instead of being assisted in their quest for justice. He is keen to hear from anyone with information about any of his sons’ deaths, describing racism in the police as ‘the rotten thread that mats these tragedies and police failings together’.

Despite what the police have said, it is clear to Burke-Monerville that his family was directly targeted by the spycops. There is no evidence that the campaign posed a threat to public order, or that it had been infiltrated by ‘left wing extremists’ (two reasons they’ve given in the past to explain why such groups might have been spied on).

He believes that police racism ‘was at the heart of the police brutality and corruption that the black community experienced’ and ‘underlay the targeting of black justice groups seeking accountability’ for this.

The police don’t like being criticised or held to account

Whitaker drew the Inquiry’s attention to the Met’s ‘excessive interest’ in any groups which criticised the police, especially those who sought to raise concerns about institutional or individual racism in the police.

The Inquiry’s Chair, Sir John Mitting, was reminded that he’d said that he ‘must examine the possibility that the deployments into black justice groups were influenced by conscious or unconscious racism’.

The Inquiry has now published excerpts from the Met Commissioner’s annual reports (covering the years 1983-1994), and these provide evidence of the police’s attitudes towards any groups seeking accountability for police misconduct, who are all seen as ‘anti-police’.

For example, the 1985 report includes a section entitled ‘Divisive Activity’ and later draws a distinction between statutory police ‘consultative’ groups (set up in the wake of the Scarman report) and the other, independent, police monitoring groups, often associated with the GLC Police Committee, described here as ‘purposively hostile to the police’ and not ‘constructive’ enough in their criticism.

Whitaker noted that there was detailed evidence of police officers using extremely crude, derogatory, racist language, and that this went unchallenged, with displays of racist prejudice being ‘expected, accepted and even fashionable’, according to the 1983 report mentioned by Barr this morning. More recent reports (such as Baroness Casey’s review in 2023) find that the Met continues to suffer from a problem with institutional racism.

Now in his 80s, John Burke-Monerville is tired, and considers this Inquiry his last chance for the truth; he hopes it can provide some answers so that future generations don’t have to go through what he has been through.

6) Rajiv Menon KC

Rajiv Menon KC appeared next, representing Richard, Nathan and Audrey Adams, yet another Black family who had been forced to campaign for justice. A racist attack on two of their sons in 1991 resulted in the death of Rolan Adams. Nathan survived this attack, and together with Richard and Audrey, his parents, has submitted a written Opening Statement to the Inquiry.

The origins of racist policing

Menon began by stating that ‘one of the defining features of British policing in the last 50 plus years has been its racism’, and went on to provide the Inquiry with a long and comprehensive list of how this institutionalised racism manifested itself.

He explained that this embedded racism had its origins in Britain’s Empire. A significant number of British police officers in the 20th century – including many Metropolitan Police Commissioners and other senior officers – had backgrounds in colonial and/or military policing.

As Menon pointed out, these colonial police forces were often used to enforce ‘racial, discriminatory and authoritarian laws’. Any opposition to British rule was viewed as ‘sedition’. The police ’had paramilitary training and draconian powers’ and were rarely held to account for abusing those powers.

As the Empire shrank in size, many of these men came back to Britain and took up posts in the Met and other police forces around the UK, binging these attitudes with them.

In Menon’s submissions:

‘Sir Kenneth Newman’s reign as Metropolitan Police Commissioner was a particularly grim time.’

During these years (1982-87) those who opposed racist policing, young black people in particular, were targeted and blamed for the public’s lack of confidence in the force.

Undercover policing was ’blighted by the same racism that blighted every other area of policing’ and there is a danger of this Inquiry ‘reproducing this blight’ unless it starts seriously considering the impact that racism had on the spycops operations.

The attack on the Adams boys

The way that the Adams family were spied on, following the racist murder of Rolan and racist attack on Nathan, are a clear example of the way that racism affected the police response.

A photo of the Adams family was shown on screen, as Menon explained the events of 21st February 1991. Rolan and Nathan (aged 15 and 14) had gone to a youth club in Thamesmead to play table tennis. On their way home, they were chased by a gang of 12-15 white youths, shouting racist abuse, who caught up with Rolan and stabbed him in the throat. Nathan was chased but managed to get away, and came back to find Rolan dying.

This was not the first case of racist violence in the area. Other black boys were attacked, hospitalised and in some cases killed in similar racist group attacks. Community groups, such as the Greenwich Action Committee Against Racial Attacks (GACARA), the local council’s Racial Equality Committee and even youth workers from the youth club, had all tried to raise the problem but the police failed to act, or even to recognise the threat posed by far-right and racist criminal groups.

The gang responsible for this incident – who called themselves the ‘Nazi Turn Outs’ – were all known to the police, and described as ‘something of a British National Party (BNP) youth group’.

Even after Rolan’s murder, they were arrested and released on bail, and only one of them was charged with murder. Menon compared this with the police and Crown Prosecution Service’s enthusiastic over-use of ‘joint enterprise’ against other groups of young people. Nobody was ever charged with attacking Nathan.

The police were reluctant to treat it as a racist crime, insisting that it was some kind of deracialised dispute over territory. However the trial judge recognised that this was a racially motivated murder, and said so in his summing up.

Nathan began to be harassed by the police shortly after the attack: as well as being stopped and searched, he was arrested and told that he was banned from going to Thamesmead. The police demonstrated their hostility towards the Adams family in other ways, for example, stopping friends and relatives on their way to visit them.

The Rolan Adams Family Campaign was set up in the aftermath of Rolan’s murder to support his family as they fought for justice. A campaign leaflet was shown on screen. They organised memorial marches and demonstrations, and campaigned for the closure of the controversial BNP bookshop. They reached out to other victims of racist violence and prejudice.

They did not trust PC Fisher, the ‘Family Liason Officer’ assigned to them. They felt that he only pretended to show any ‘empathy’ and tried to ‘tease out information’ from them when he showed up, unannounced, at their home.

They kept getting threatening phone calls, gloating about Rolan’s death, and just a few months after the murder, were advised by the local council that they were in such danger that they should move house immediately. Why did the police not offer them any protection from these threats?

Richard Adams wants an explanation for why the police chose to spy on him and his wife, parents who had just lost a child, law-abiding citizens who just wanted justice after the murder of their son. He asks if a white family would have been spied on in these circumstances.

He says that they long suspected that they were being spied on and that their phones were bugged, but were told they were being paranoid. Nathan now says ‘learning I had been spied on made me a bit sane again’. He goes on to add:

‘I want the Inquiry to get to the truth, to be transparent and to hold people in high places accountable’.

The Adams family feel let down by the police, the justice system and politicians. They believe that if the police had taken more action to tackle racist violence, they could have prevented other murders, like those of Rohit Duggal and Stephen Lawrence, in the following years.

‘Puzzled and angry’ about this Inquiry

They are ‘puzzled and angry’ about a number of issues. They say they have received so little disclosure that don’t know much more now than they did back in 2019, when they were granted Core Participant status.

They reiterate that there is no way that this Inquiry can possibly ascertain the role and contribution of undercover policing towards detecting or preventing racist crime, something which should be of ‘overwhelming public importance’, unless it openly and publicly investigates the undercover policing of far-right and racist criminal groups.

Mitting previously told them that the issue of racist criminal groups would not be covered in Tranche 2 because the SDS did not infiltrate such groups, begging the question ‘why not?’ SDS managers should be asked to explain their targeting decisions.

They note that the Inquiry’s Terms of Reference clearly state that it will:

‘include, but not be limited to, the undercover operations of the Special Demonstration Squad and the National Public Order Intelligence Unit’ (NPOIU)’

The Inquiry is still due to examine undercover policing by units other than the SDS and NPOIU, in Tranche 5, and the Adams family would like confirmation that this issue will be covered then.

So far we have only heard about one deployment involving a far-right group, and this was about HN56 ‘Alan “Nick” Nicholson’ spying on a ‘fairly inactive BNP branch’ in Essex. Mitting has said that the infiltration of far-right groups will only be discussed in ‘closed’ hearings.

The Adams family contend that it is important to hear from as many spycops as possible in open, public hearings. They says there is no value to Non State Core Participants, or the wider public, in the Chair hearing these witnesses’ evidence in secret, and using Restriction Orders to prevent everyone else from accessing it. They ask again for a proper explanation of this level of secrecy in what is supposed to be a ‘public inquiry’.

Mitting popped up on screen to respond to Menon (as always). He confirmed that the SDS had indeed infiltrated right wing groups from the 1980s onwards, but repeated that ‘for reasons that I would hope would be obvious’ that he still intended to hear about these in closed hearings.

For most of us, it is not obvious why this material cannot be heard in public. Plenty of other officers have been granted anonymity and the Inquiry is using screens and voice modulation to protect some from identification. It is unclear why this cannot be done for these deployments, and what the real risks would be.

7) Charlotte Kilroy KC

Charlotte Kilroy KC represents the ‘Category H’ Core Participants (women who were deceived into relationships by spycops).

‘Married 32-year-old undercover police officer (UCO) Bob Lambert dropped five years from his age when, in 1985, he stole a deceased child’s identity as his ‘undercover persona’. During a four-year deployment… he had sexual relationships with four women, fathering a child…

‘In 1987 Lambert’s close SDS colleague 32-year-old UCO John Dines also dropped five years from his age when he stole a deceased child’s identity to infiltrate the same group of activists. He befriended Helen Steel when she was 22 and pursued her as a 24-year-old with propositions of love for months… eventually persuading her in 1990 to enter into a relationship…

‘Dines trained UCOs Andy Coles and HN1… [who] assumed the names and birthdays of deceased children, also losing more than 5 years from their real age…

‘Married police officer HN1, had a year-long sexual relationship with Denise Fuller in his cover name ‘Matt Rayner’…

‘When aged 32, married police officer Andy Coles had a year-long sexual relationship with 19-year-old Jessica, for whom he was her first boyfriend. He has since risen to high ranks within the police…’

The opening paragraphs of Charlotte Kilroy KC’s written Opening Statement hit like punches to the guts. She outlines the misconduct of SDS officers, one after another, until we were left with the impression of something more akin to a predatory sex ring than a unit investigating crime: officers knocked years off their ages and used their training and trade craft to groom and manipulate young and vulnerable women.

In her oral opening statement, Kilroy looked at the devastating impact of that abuse. Her statement focussed on four women: Belinda Harvey, Helen Steel, Denise Fuller, and ‘Jessica’, all of whom will give evidence in the coming months.

Kilroy highlighted the deeply personal and long-lasting trauma caused by the deceptive relationships, exposing the systemic issues of misogyny and institutional indifference within the Special Demonstration Squad and the Metropolitan Police Service.

Bob Lambert and Belinda Harvey

Bob Lambert, a 32-year-old married officer, fathered a child with a woman named ‘Jacqui’ while infiltrating activist groups, before starting a relationship with Belinda Harvey, who was not involved in any of the groups targeted by the SDS.

Harvey, a 24-year-old aspiring accountant, met Lambert at a party in 1987. Lambert, using the cover name ‘Bob Robinson’, quickly pursued her, initiating a romantic relationship within days.

He manipulated her emotionally, altering her lifestyle and encourage her to abandon her career aspirations. Over two years, Lambert maintained the deception, making Harvey believe she had found her life partner.

SDS managers were fully aware of Lambert’s behaviour. They knew he had fathered a child with another woman during his deployment. Kilroy explained:

‘For the Metropolitan Police and SDS management, Belinda’s life and body had little value’

John Dines and Helen Steel

Dines, another married officer, deployed alongside Lambert, targeted Helen Steel, a 22-year-old environmental and social justice campaigner. Ten years older than Steel, Dines befriended her in 1987, apparently at Lambert’s suggestion, and mounted an elaborate campaign to seduce her.

Like Lambert, Dines used various tactics to manipulate Steel, including fabricating stories about his parents’ deaths and even staging a fake arrest to gain her sympathy. Once Steel succumbed to his advances, Dines showered her with love notes and promises of a future together. The relationship lasted two years.

When the time came for Dines to exit his deployment, he pretended to have a breakdown, drawing out his disappearance over several months, even after his deployment ended, leaving Steel devastated.

Kilroy emphasised the cruelty of Dines’ actions, noting that Steel spent years searching for him, genuinely concerned for his well-being, unaware that his entire identity was a fabrication. The SDS, rather than offering Steel any protection or compensation, assisted Dines by moving him and his family to Australia to avoid discovery.

Dines has shown no remorse for his actions, filling his witness statement with insults and false allegations against Steel, furthering her suffering. Kilroy described Dines as a man with ‘so little empathy for other human beings and so much hatred for women,’ calling for a closer examination of how someone so callous could be allowed to operate unchecked.

‘Matt Rayner’ and Denise Fuller

Like Lambert and Dines, ‘Matt Rayner’ exploited Denise Fuller’s vulnerabilities, using her mental health concerns as a means of gaining her affections. He portrayed himself as caring and supportive, but his reports to his SDS colleagues are filled with sarcasm and contempt.

‘Rayner’ initiated a sexual relationship with Fuller immediately after a traumatic life event, and reported on her continuously throughout that relationship, which lasted more than a year. He was encouraged by his managers and his relationship with Fuller was no secret within the unit.

Kilroy highlighted the ongoing injustice Fuller faced, pointing out that Rayner had managed to conceal his real name from both Fuller and the public, maintaining his privacy while she continued to suffer the emotional and psychological consequences of his deception.

Andy Coles and Jessica

The final case Kilroy discussed was that of Andy Coles, who, at the age of 32, posed as a 24-year-old and began a relationship with ‘Jessica’, a vulnerable 19 year old, having had a difficult childhood.

Coles used manipulative tactics to gain her trust, visiting uninvited and hanging around until he could initiate a relationship. Coles groomed Jessica into an awkward sexual relationship – her first – which lasted a year. ‘Jessica’s’ lack of confidence made it difficult for her to resist Coles’ advances.

Coles had since risen to high ranks within the police, becoming head of training for the Association of Chief Police Officers and later deputy Police and Crime Commissioner, all the while callously denying the relationship with Jessica and trying to discredit her with false claims.

Difficult and uncomfortable questions

Kilroy then went on to discuss the ‘difficult and uncomfortable questions’ arising from the evidence, which go beyond the misogyny and sexism of the police and the culpability of individual undercovers and SDS managers. Misogyny alone cannot explain the way the officers behaved.

There is a further sinister and disturbing dimension: while undercover, officers were liberated from ordinary moral codes and:

‘they indulged themselves in a wide range of fantasies, apparently untrammelled by any sense of moral or ethical responsibilities towards other people…

‘They toyed with their victims’ feelings. They often wielded the extraordinary power they were given with breathtaking cruelty or recklessness…

‘Their experiments with these women have left a trail of emotional devastation which continues to reverberate up until the present day.’

Kilroy made the point that undercover deployment in alternative personae effectively released undeercovers from the moral constraints and supervision ordinarily applied by their communities and families, thereby unleashing:

‘a range of dark behaviour for which the men faced no real consequences.’

The SDS leadership, along with the higher echelons in the Met, the Home Office and MI5, should all have been aware that the serious dangers inherent in this kind of undercover operation means such long-term deployments are unlikely to ever be appropriate. They certainly could never be justified in the context in which they were used by the SDS.

It is deeply concerning that they experimented with the lives of the general public and either were not aware, or did not care enough to avoid the obvious dangers.

Kilroy concluded:

‘the Commissioner suggests that the SDS’s infiltration of what he describes as the militant aspects of the animal rights movement was justified, but marred by the misconduct of its officers. He also suggests further justification comes from the evidence of Witness Y, for MI5.

‘This is wrong. It indicates the Commissioner still does not appreciate the serious inherent risks involved in these kinds of long-term deployments. Such deployments are too intrusive and too dangerous ever to be justified in this kind of context.’

The ‘James Bond’ effect

Kilroy also highlighted the role of MI5 in ‘soliciting and perpetuating the conduct of UCOs which led to the abuse of women’.

MI5 were ‘eager and appreciative consumers’ of SDS intelligence and ‘they must have been aware of the tactics used’.

She argued that MI5’s encouragement caused officers to believe they were domestic James Bonds:

‘There is no doubt though that many revelled in the perception that they were a “secret and reliable source”. The idea that they could, like Mr Bond, play fast and loose with both women and the rules seems to have been a powerful fantasy for more than one UCO.’

The culture of ‘backing up’

Kilroy notes that many undercover officers:

‘continue to conceal their own sexual misconduct or that of their colleagues. To this day they feel little or no remorse or empathy for the Cat H CPs [women deceived into relationships by undercover officers].’

She notes how much other undercovers and managers must have known about the relationships and the fact that:

‘the longstanding culture of “backing up” which requires police officers to cover up for each other, even when there has been wrongdoing, continues to take priority over the public interest’.

Eliminating this culture must become an Metropolitan Police goal.

Apologies

The women deceived into relationships are critical of the lack of genuine apologies or acceptance of responsibility from most of the undercover officers.

Coles denies the relationship occurred, Chitty and Dines have declined to cooperate with the Inquiry. Trevor Morris refused to apologise when given the opportunity to do so. Even those who have offered apologies, like Lambert and ‘Matt Rayner’, have done so in ways these Core Participants consider insincere or inadequate.

They welcomed the apologies and admissions made by the Commissioner for the Metropolitan Police in his opening statement, including accepting that at least nine SDS undercovers, including all the officers targeting animal rights campaigns, had engaged in sexual activity with women in this period, which were, in the Met’s own words:

‘a gross violation of the women’s dignity and human rights’.

However, Kilroy noted it:

‘should not have taken until 2024, well over a decade since the revelations about police misconduct became public, for these apologies and admissions to be forthcoming.’

Taking a trauma-informed approach

Kilroy ended her statement by highlighting the profound trauma caused to the women by engaging engaging with the Inquiry itself. It was always going to be hard to read and respond to the evidence of the undercovers who abused them, and to confront their abusers in hearings.

But this inevitable pain has been compounded by lengthy delays followed by extreme pressure to produce evidence in short time frames.

They have been distressed by strict rules prohibiting them from communicating with each other, disregard for their privacy concerns, and disparities in the approach taken to police witnesses.

They are disappointed that no panel members with relevant experience will be appointed to consider recommendations.

They do not consider that the Inquiry has taken a trauma-informed approach, which recognises their special need as victims for fairness and due process. They have suffered as a result.

‘They continue to hope that improvements can be made to the Inquiry process which properly recognise their status as victims, and accord them the special care and respect they need.’

8) James Scobie KC

To end the day, we heard brief opening submissions from James Scobie KC, representing the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CND), a former leading member of the Socialist Workers Party (SWP), Lindsey German, and Michael Chant of the Revolutionary Communist Party of Britain (Marxist-Leninist). The Inquiry has published a written Opening Statement.

Scobie already made opening submissions on behalf of these clients in Tranche 2 Phase 1 hearings earlier this year, and plans to make more in future. Today’s submissions relate to CND, specifically addressing the continued attempts by both the security services and the police to justify the infiltration of this group.

Those justifications are not supported by the evidence that has now been released. The security service witness, known only as ‘Witness Y’, weakly claims that CND was assessed to have been infiltrated by communists and that it took MI5 until 1985 to work out this wasn’t true.

However, the SDS assessment in February 1982 was that the Communist Party’s influence within CND, and in particular its national council, had waned quite dramatically and was unlikely to grow again. MI5 agreed with that assessment. Witness Y conceded that MI5 did not consider CND to be a ‘subversive’ organisation. So why were they still being spied on?

Witness Y tries to imply that spying on the peace movement was more acceptable then than it would be nowadays. But as early as 1963, Lord Denning said that for most British people it would be:

‘intolerable to us to have anything in the nature of a Gestapo or Secret Police, to snoop into all that we do’.

Spying on CND would have been considered an unacceptable intrusion, a waste of resources and an egregious example of state interference in the democratic process, even at the time.

The most damning proof of that, Scobie asserts:

‘is the Security Service’s own collusion in deceiving the public by stating that they and the Special Branch did not cover law-abiding non-violent activities like CND activities. They plainly did.’

Scobie highlighted the ‘evidential void’ surrounding the decision to target CND:

‘The senior police officers in charge of the SDS between 1981 and 1986 have not assisted the Inquiry. Most of the officers who managed CND deployments have passed away. The documents associated with their period as managers disclosed by the Met Police and Security Services are silent as to both justification and authorisation.’

Chief Inspector Malcolm MacLeod – who has now said that the infiltration of CND was not justified – referred at the time to the decision to target CND ‘coming from his masters’. Those masters were clearly not MI5, because he used that term in documents addressed to them.

Scobie notes that:

‘MacLeod claims that he cannot now remember who he was referring to. In respect of CND, whoever was pulling the strings was bypassing MI5.’

Scobie looked in some detail at internal discussions between the SDS, Special Branch and MI5 about the deployments into CND from 1984 on, particularly the fact that MI5 requested a new officer, ‘Timothy Spence’, be deployed into the SWP. Very unusually, the SDS refused MI5’s request, and insisted he be sent into CND. Once again the ‘masters’, whoever they were, were bypassing MI5 on CND targeting.

The Home Affairs Select Committee set up an inquiry into Special Branch’s activities in 1984, and a number of other incidents around that time raised serious questions about the targeting of CND.

There was widespread public denunciation of the investigations into Madeleine Haigh. Haigh was a CND supporter who wrote to her local newspaper protesting about the cancellation of an anti-nuclear event in Worcester. Shortly afterwards she was visited by two policemen who claimed to be investigating a mail order fraud, but turned out to have come from Special Branch.

Cathy Massiter was an MI5 intelligence officer who was tasked with investigating left-wing subversive influence within CND, and became a whistle-blower after leaving the job. In 1985 she appeared in an episode of Channel 4’s 20/20 Vision programme, entitled ‘MI5’s Official Secrets’, saying:

‘We were violating our own rules. It seemed to be getting out of control. This was happening, not because CND as such justified this kind of treatment but simply because of political pressure; the heat was there for information about CND and we had to have it.’

Chief Inspector Wait claims not to recall any discussions with senior Special Branch managers about the justification for infiltrating CND, and not to recall why he refused to go along with MI5’s requests to deploy ‘Spence’ into the SWP.

Astonishingly, there is no mention of Cathy Massiter in his statement, even though he acknowledged the breach of SDS security in an Annual Report at the time, and as Scobie says, the impact of her revelations would have caused ‘unforgettable’ panic within Special Branch at the time.

Scobie asserted that the Inquiry has received ‘no assistance’ from SDS managers ‘on the issues of justification and authorisation’.

The Met has offered two outlandish suggestions as possible justification:

‘concern that CND could be infiltrated by communist groups and the KGB’ and ‘venturism around the US air bases could lead to protestors being shot.’

Neither assertion is backed up by the evidence. If evidence does exist, the Commissioner should look to the Met Police’s own documents and disclose them.

Scobie then reached the heart of the matter:

‘The Commissioner submits that the Metropolitan Police Special Branch was obliged to monitor the CND, linking that obligation to significant government and military interests in the 1980s. That is the firmest indicator yet of where the authorisation for the CND deployments came from. Government targeting.’

Scobie examined relations between the Met Police and the Home Office in the early 1980s, and described a rift which developed around 1983.

That year, Special Branch produced a report with the title ‘Political extremism and the campaign for police accountability in the MPS district’, about the efforts of the Greater London Council (GLC) police committee and others to hold the police accountable for their actions. The report was politically partisan, and the response from the Home Office expressed ‘very serious concern at the breadth and tone of, and market for, that report’.

Deputy Assistant Commissioner Hewett replied on 4 March 1983:

‘We are dealing here with a broader concept of public order intelligence, and on this particular aspect I probably had gone as far as the Special Branch should go.’

There was nothing in the report that could be said to relate to public order. The Home Office saw that the response did not stand up to examination, and it was Hayden Philips’ view that Special Branch had gone too far, by looking into legitimate political activity which could not be considered subversive.

What is most interesting about this is that the most senior Special Branch officers had decided not only that they could use Special Branch resources, including the SDS, to resist lawful attempts by a democratically elected council to make the police accountable to the community they were supposed to be serving, but also that they could do so despite having been told by the Home Office that they could not, and having said that they would not.

Scobie made clear:

‘This was a wilful assault on democratic activity, acting beyond police powers with knowingly unsustainable justification, in contravention of an order from a Government Ministry…

‘They would not have acted in this manner unless they were confident of support from an authority higher than the Home Office.’

There is evidence that in February and March 1983, Special Branch were engaging directly with the highest levels of government. Margaret Thatcher made a direct and specific request to the police in respect of intelligence on the police accountability movement.

The same appears to be the case for CND. Chief Inspector Martyn MacLeod has indicated that he would not be surprised if the Prime Minister had a role in tasking because ‘the whole thing became very politicised’.

National Archives releases from 1983 show a government scared of losing the battle of public opinion on disarmament. The Prime Minister’s office was devising ways of neutralising CND.

It seems MI5 let the Government down by rightly refusing to cooperate on party political issues targetting law-abiding groups. The evidence now suggests that the Met stepped into that void.

This evidence comes on top of the arguments outlined by Scobie earlier this year in his opening statement to Tranche 2 Phase 1 about the creation of the Ministry of Defence DS19 Propaganda Unit, and Michael Hessletine’s use of SDS intelligence to undermine opposition to the government in the general election of 1983.

The 1984 SDS annual report has a section on CND, but its focus was not on public order or subversion; it was on (a) membership numbers; (b) the political position, noting the Labour Party’s official espousal of unilateral nuclear disarmament; and (c), that:

‘CND has skilfully manipulated public opinion over issues about which people are genuinely concerned.’

He ended his submissions with some comments on disclosure, or rather, the lack of it.

The evidence provided MI5 is ‘woefully inadequate on an issue of such importance.’

In respect of the Met Police, there is evidence of ‘a high level Special Branch directive that led to all files on CND being destroyed. While there may have been some justification on the basis of the Home Office guidelines for destroying files on the individuals, there can be no justification for the destruction of files on policy, liaison, authorisation and justification.’

Scobie urged the Inquiry to investigate this political interference further and to focus not only on the role of the Home Office but also on the engagement between the Met and the Ministry of Defence, the Cabinet Office and the Prime Minister’s office, noting that:

‘[CND] had hundreds of thousands of members in local branches and nationally. The CND was a mass democratic movement of ordinary people, but like governments before, and since, the Thatcher Government was terrified of two things: first, a mass movement of people; and, secondly, democracy itself.’

Tranche 1, Phase 3, Day 10

20 May 2022

Witness:

Trevor Charles Butler (officer HN307)

 

This was the last day of the 2022 round of the Undercover Policing Inquiry hearings, which have examined Special Demonstration Squad managers 1968-82.

The day began with the Inquiry’s Elizabeth Campbellon reading out summaries of evidence relating to three men who worked in the Special Demonstration Squad (SDS) back office towards the end of this period covered by this ‘tranche’.

Richard Reeves Scully (officer HN2152) joined Special Branch in 1968. He’s not entirely sure when he was sent to work in the SDS back office, but it’s thought to have been around 1977. His role was handed over to Paul Croyden in 1979.
Witness statement of Richard Reeves Scully

Paul Andrew Croyden (officer HN350) served in the SDS for two years, from July 1979 to August 1981.
Witness statement of Paul Croyden

Christopher Skey (officer HN308) was also part of the SDS for around two years, and then spent a year as Liaison Officer between Special Branch and the uniformed public order unit (aka ‘A8’). Skey provided two witness statements, one in 2020 and another in 2021 which added a little more detail about his time as a Liaison Officer.

The Inquiry also published documents relating to two deceased senior officers:

Ken Pryde (officer HN608) was described as “the Detective Chief Inspector in charge of the SDS from November 1977 till early 1978” – although this doesn’t correspond with what the Inquiry has told us elsewhere.

Mike Ferguson (officer HN135) is said to have run the unit from January 1978 until February 1980, having spent time undercover himself ten years earlier (reporting on anti-apartheid campaigners like Peter Hain).

Trevor Charles Butler (officer HN307)

On this final hearing of 2022 the Inquiry heard oral evidence from one man: Trevor Charles Butler OBE (officer HN307). He was recruited to the unit in 1979 and left in 1982. He was questioned by David Barr QC, Counsel to the Inquiry.

This was a notably reticent witness, who favoured one-word answers (and often that word was “no”).

In his witness statement, Butler referred to True Spies, the 2002 BBC documentary series that detailed the work of the SDS, as:

“an earth-shattering breach of the ‘need to know’ principle”

It’s clear he sees the Inquiry in the same light. Safeguarding a ‘need to know’ principle is his vocation, and he treated the Inquiry as a violation of that.

Butler claimed to remember very little about events that took place in the 1970s, including his time in the SDS and in other parts of Special Branch.

Butler attended police training courses, and learnt about the main principles of police powers, but freely admitted not bothering to consider these while he was in the SDS.

He said that he didn’t think normal police discipline regulations – covering, for example, sexual misconduct – applied to the spycops as they were:

“experienced, trustworthy men, who I had no concerns about.”

He was happy to go along with existing day to day practice, and very happy with the SDS’s method of unfiltered reporting (hoovering up as much information as possible and putting it all on file). He doesn’t seem to have gone out of his way to question anything, to consider doing things differently, or to actively review deployments or assess their value.

He had no qualms about officers stealing dead children’s identities, and said he had no idea that other undercovers had been issued with British Visitor Passports, which did not require a birth certificate.

Butler recalled little contact with the senior managers above him, saying:

“We were left to our own devices”

This was due in part to the move of the SDS office out of New Scotland Yard to Vincent Square. He also professed to be unaware that some of them had previously been involved in running the unit.

He couldn’t recall why the SDS 1979 Annual Report said that “covert policing is being subjected to increasingly close and critical scrutiny” or any concerns at this time about the spycops’ relationship with the Security Service (aka MI5).

There were a lot of subjects that he claimed no recollection of at all.

SUBVERSION

He says that he didn’t receive any training of the type listed in the 1979 ‘Initial Training for Special Branch Officers’ Agenda. He relied on his own “common sense” to guide his understanding of what was or was not ‘subversive’.

He didn’t recall seeing Special Branch’s 1970 Terms of Reference, and its definition of the word ‘subversion’, before. During this period, the Security Service actively tried to expand the working definition of ‘subversion’, and a slightly different definition appeared in a Circular sent out to Chief Constables in 1974 (referring to industrial disputes) . Butler says he doesn’t recall seeing this either.

A similar Circular, referring to subversive activities in schools, was sent out in 1975. Butler does not recall any sensitivity around reporting on school-children, or the School Kids Against the Nazis.

COMPREHENSIVE COLLECTION OF DATA

What were the most important things the SDS did?

According to Butler’s written statement, the main aims of the SDS were public disorder and collecting information to update Special Branch’s files.

Addressing the second of these, Barr asked him to explain why this was so important, and what such information was used for – for example, was this related to public order?

According to Butler, after some waffle, such details weren’t always immediately important, but might have what he called “latent value” – meaning they might

“possibly be relevant at a future date.”

Might the information be used for vetting purposes?

In paragraph 129 of his statement, Butler admits that “parts may seem unacceptable in today’s context” and Barr quoted the whole thing, ending with:

“I do not believe that individuals finding their names on a Special Branch or Security Service file is too high a price to pay for comprehensive intelligence coverage, providing that those individuals were not unlawfully discriminated against because of this.”

Barr asked him to explain what he meant by this, and Butler admitted that he must have been referring to people losing their jobs or being blacklisted – he says this is “unacceptable” but insists that it would only have happened if such information was ‘leaked’ from Special Branch, and he doesn’t believe this happened:

“I’m convinced that Special Branch records were properly maintained and there was no leakage.”

We saw the kind of information that was kept on file for its ‘latent value’ – contact details copied from the address book of “a leading member of the Freedom Editorial Collective”.

Having established that ‘N/T’ stands for ‘No Trace’ – it is clear that the majority of these names have not already come to the attention of Special Branch. These names were retained for decades and Butler doesn’t see it as a problem.

Asked to explain how gathering intelligence on individuals assisted with public order, he claimed that this would enable the police to make arrests after disorder had occurred. The SDS were quick to claim their public order ‘successes’ but nowhere is this kind of success mentioned.

PLAYING SQUASH WITH THE BOYS

Trevor Butler liked to play squash with his colleagues. Because of something Barr said today, we now know that he also played squash with the guys from the Security Service as well (a minor detail that was redacted – and replaced with the word ‘sport’ – in one of the documents released by the Inquiry).

He says he got to know the officers:

“some of them very well, others not so well, but reasonably well, all of them”

The unit was an all-male environment. Butler remembers banter and jokes. Were any of these of a sexual nature?

“I can’t remember, but probably”

However, he insists that he heard no suggestion of spycops being the subject of sexual advances, and nothing about sexual contact actually occurring. He said he didn’t consider this to be a risk:

“they were married men with a stable background who I trusted not to get involved sexually outside of their marriage.”

He says he never asked them if they had come under “pressure to indulge in sexual activity” never mind asking directly if they’d engaged in any form of sexual contact.

If this is true, then the lack of curiosity exhibited by him and other managers clearly demonstrates a culture of ‘don’t ask, don’t tell’ within the SDS. He didn’t remind them not to engage in sex on duty, consider setting up ‘cover girlfriends’ or finding other ways of reducing the risk.

Rick Clark (‘Rick Gibson’, officer HN297, 1974-76) is known to have had at least four relationships; he was investigated by the group he infiltrated, Big Flame, and was exposed as a result. Butler claims he can’t remember anything about this.

Similarly, he says he didn’t hear any gossip about ‘Jim Pickford‘ (officer HN300, 1974-77), withdrawn after falling in love with an activist, who he went on to marry.

BARRY’S GIRLFRIEND

Another incident was discussed in more depth. ‘Barry Tompkins‘ (officer HN106, 1979-83), in his witness statement, details a ‘platonic’ relationship with a woman that he met while undercover. He says they were just friends, and he slept in her home – supposedly in her child’s bedroom with a noisy hamster – a few times, rather than driving home drunk.

This woman was often referred to as “Barry’s girlfriend” amongst those he was infiltrating. Tompkins says that he was asked by his manager, Trevor Butler, to account for an intercepted phone call in which an activist had talked about storing “items from Ireland” at “Barry’s girlfriend’s place”.

“I think Trevor said something along the lines of ‘You’re not going to get us in trouble, are you?’ and I simply said ‘no, it’s nothing like that’.”

Butler says he does not recall this at all. He categorically refuses to accept that this may have happened but he forgot about it (like everything else). He is adamant that Tompkins must have confused him and another manager from the office.

Asked what he thinks he might have done if these events had occurred as laid out in Tompkins’ statement, he says “my outlook was probably different then than it is now”, yet goes on to say that he can’t remember what his outlook was then.

Barr was somewhat flummoxed by this and points out that if he doesn’t know what his outlook was before, how does he know it’s changed?

“Now, I think I would have insisted that he ended such a relationship. Then, I might have been more tolerant.”

Butler explained that he has become less tolerant since becoming “older and more disagreeable” (his words, verbatim).

In those days, he goes on, he wouldn’t have been concerned about a platonic relationship like this. Would he have investigated to find out if more was going on?

“That’s a hypothetical question. It didn’t happen.”

But he added:

“I would have investigated very thoroughly.”

Would a sexual relationship have led to disciplinary action? Butler says he would have made sure the officer left the SDS, but agreed that there might have been difficulties taking formal disciplinary action, and that decision would have been ‘above his pay grade’.

Another exhibit was shown: a Security Service note about a visit to the SDS – in the shape of senior managers  ‘Sean Lynch‘ (officer HN68) and Dave Short (officer HN99) – in June 1982, after Butler had left. It contains the remarkable line:

“Information on this subject may be bedevilled by the fact that HN106 [‘Barry Tompkins’] has probably bedded [privacy] and has been warned off by his bosses.”

Does he know what this refers to? Is is something he told Dave Short? Unsurprisingly, Butler can’t help with this as, yet again, he can’t recall. (NB: Tomkins himself says that this refers to a different woman, who the Security Service wanted to use as an informant, and who he denies sleeping with).

In his witness statement Butler says that he knew ‘Barry Tompkins’ was married with young children at the time.

“I would have reminded him about his obligations to them and to the job in fairly strong terms if I had even the slightest suspicion that he had or was tempted to stray.”

Barr put it to him that this demonstrated consideration of the possible impact on this marriage, and of the risk to both the SDS and the wider Met, but none for the woman who ‘Barry’ had formed this close friendship with. Butler confirmed that he did not or would not have given her any consideration at all.

NO CONSIDERATION FOR WOMEN

Other officers that are known to have had sexual relationships in this era include Vince Harvey (‘Vince Miller’, officer HN354, 1976-79), with four women; officer HN21, with one woman; and ‘Paul Gray’ (officer HN126, 1977-82).

Butler says he gave zero consideration to the harm that any of these women may have suffered as a result.

He said he knew ‘Phil Cooper’ (officer HN155, 1979-84) quite well, but

“he didn’t give me any reason to suspect that his behaviour was cause for concern.”

He added that Cooper wouldn’t have confessed to doing sex and drugs to Butler anyway as it would have led to trouble for him.

Barr read out a declaration from Butler’s statement:

“As far as I was concerned, then and now, the SDS provided a terrific service’ trouble-free”

Did he still think that, in light of all this evidence?

Butler asserted that:

“I considered I was extremely lucky. I had a couple of years working with a very successful team who presented no problems and I suspected were doing nothing untoward.”

The strength of his loyalty to the SDS is very clear throughout. Pressed about the sexual misconduct that has come to light, the most critical comment he could make was to say that he was “disappointed”.

REPONSIBLE ROLES

Butler’s statement refers to undercovers not “crossing the line between acceptable recording and unacceptable direction setting and incitement”, so Barr explored this topic.

In his witness statement, ‘Mike James‘ (officer HN96, 1978-83) said that he’d been advised by colleague ‘Geoff Wallace’ (officer HN296, 1975-78) not to get too involved, or become too prominent, in the groups he was infiltrating.

However, he was elected to the Hackney District Committee of the Socialist Workers Party (SWP) and chaired meetings of the Party’s Clapton branch, becoming their ‘District Book Organiser’.

The same officer was then encouraged by his bosses, in around 1980, to get more involved in the Troops Out Movement (TOM), and ended up being elected as TOM’s Membership and Affiliation Secretary.

He didn’t get a chance to discuss this with his managers beforehand – the nomination “came out of the blue” – but says he told them as soon as he could and they were “pleased” with this news.

Butler cannot recall being one of those managers. However he agreed that this would have been seen as “a good thing” as it gave the SDS much more access to information.

He didn’t view this position (which came with a seat on the TOM’s national steering committee) as a problem. He says he wouldn’t have interfered, just trusted the officer’s judgement as to what he felt “comfortable” with.

‘Paul Gray’ (officer HN126, 1977-82) also spied on the SWP, rising beyond branch roles to join its North West London District Committee. This was also “a good thing”, according to Butler.

Surely this meant he could be voting on things and influencing the direction of the group? “I don’t know what they did” was Butler’s response.

Asked if he, as the manager receiving information, he tried to find out what they did, Butler simply answered “no” as a sentence in its own right. Again.

SPYCOPS’ WIVES

Before new undercovers went out into the field, Butler would visit their wives at home. He would explain that their husbands’ working hours and appearance would change, but nothing more about what this “important work” actually entailed.

He says he wanted to ensure they “were happy to support their husband in the role” and “understood the difficulties” – i.e. the disruption to family life caused by long, irregular hours. He agreed that the SDS asked a great deal of these officers’ wives.

ANTI-RACIST ACTIVISM IN 1981

‘Barry Tompkins’ (officer HN106, 1979-83) reported on a meeting that took place in Walthamstow in August 1981, organised by the Winston Rose Action Committee.

They were campaigning for a public inquiry into the death in custody of Winston (a 27-year-old boxer, who had been born in Jamaica) a month earlier.

One of the speakers was Fran Eden, of East London Workers Against Racism (ELWAR), a group which Tompkins had infiltrated. Butler was asked what he thought the policing value of this reporting was.

Barr ventured to suggest that sending an undercover officer to spy on such a meeting might not be good optics for the Met, and could risk “doing more harm than good”. If he’d been discovered, might that not have served as a catalyst for the community to take to the streets, as they had done in Brixton and other places around the country already that year?

Butler’s said “that could probably be said of every report that an undercover officer submitted”, doubling down on his opinion that “it was wholly justified and a fine report”.

He had no concerns about Tompkins reporting on a Revolutionary Communist Tendency meeting that took place in Brixton directly after the riots, on 16th April, about setting up South London Workers Against Racism, organising legal defence for members of the local community, involving legal representatives.

Also in April, Tompkins reported on ELWAR holding an election meeting in Stoke Newington Town Hall, as one of their members was standing as a candidate in the upcoming local elections.

Barr suggested that electoral activity isn’t exactly subversive.

But in Butler’s view, if a group’s worth reporting on, then it’s worth reporting on every single thing they do:

“my attitude was always it’s far better to report too much than too little.”

BLAIR PEACH

Just like the other managers we’ve heard from at the hearings, Butler said he barely remembered the events around police killing Blair Peach and the subsequent justice campaign. It is yet another stretch on his credibility.

According to the SDS 1979 Annual Report, there was “a sustained campaign to discredit and criticise the police” after Peach’s murder. Butler admitted that he may well have written this.

The SDS reported on these campaigners, but Butler insisted that the Metropolitan Police’s only interest in such intelligence would be due to potential disorder, nothing to do with collecting information about people who were critical of the police.

Barr pointed out that there was “very little trouble indeed” from the justice campaign, and asked why the Friends of Blair Peach were described in that way.

Butler ended up in another awkward dance, trying to avoid the point that the justice campaign was deliberately targeted for calling for accountability from the police. He did at least concede it was inappropriate to take photographs of mourners at Peach’s funeral.

MESSED-UP PRIORITIES

The SDS 1980 Annual Report said that “anti fascist activity continued to tax the resources” of the police.

Butler explained that when it came to confrontations between the far right and the far left, the police tended to blame the anti-fascists for causing (or as he re-worded it, ‘creating’) serious disorder, for “attacking those they opposed”.

He said the police were also “a good target” for the demonstrators.

He grudgingly admitted that the far right were responsible for lots of serious street violence, but said it wasn’t the SDS’s job to predict or prevent racist attacks, who were “more interested in large scale social disorder”.

His attention drawn to the section of the SDS 1981 Annual Report headed ‘Security’ (on page 7). Operational security is described as always being “of paramount importance” for the unit – both for the “personal protection of the field officers and to prevent embarrassment to the Commissioner by its existence becoming public knowledge” – and the “political sensitivity” around the SDS operations is mentioned.

Squeezing blood from the stone, Barr got Butler to admit that such ’embarrassment’ would stem from the public learning that undercover policing tactics weren’t restricted to drugs gangs and serious criminality, but were also being used in a political way, “to manage public disorder”.

Barr went on to note that the Report says that all infiltrations had to be fully justified on the basis of the Commissioner’s responsibility for the preservation of public order.

Under the heading ‘Coverage’ (on page 4) is a list of groups whose infiltration would be hard to justify on these grounds, such as Womens Voice, the Freedom Collective, and the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CND).

Butler claimed not to know who the first two were, but even he couldn’t pretend not to have heard of CND, a hugely popular campaign that held protests hundreds of thousands strong.

Instead, he suggested that CND demonstrations were often ‘infiltrated’ by “extremists”, and then added another explanation for spying on them: that the SDS didn’t have enough undercovers to infiltrate all of the groups, but many of those people attended CND events.

We now know that CND was infiltrated, in its own right, by John Kerry (officer HN65, 1980-84) but Butler claimed he wasn’t involved, saying this must have happened as he was leaving. However Kerry joined the unit in 1980 and Butler didn’t leave until 1982.

HOME OFFICE: PLAUSIBLE DENIABILITY

In his statement, Butler recalled meeting for “a beer and a lunch” with a relatively senior Home Office official every month.

His bad memory returned when he was asked about these meetings – he couldn’t remember their purpose or anything about what business was discussed at them, but says that he knew that it had no influence over the unit’s work.

The SDS was set up by the Home Office in 1968, and was directly funded by them for twenty years. Funding had to be applied for and renewed annually.

The 1976 authorisation for the Special Demonstration Squad’s continued existence was signed off by Robert Armstrong, later Baron Armstrong of Ilminster. He was Cabinet Secretary and Head of the Home Civil Service. It is difficult to imagine a more highly placed civil servant.

The Security Service’s ‘Witness Z’ has previously told the Inquiry:

‘the pressure to investigate these organisations often came from the Prime Minister and Whitehall’.

Put simply, the existence and functioning of the SDS was known of, and authorised, at the very top.

There is nothing embarrassing to the police or Home Office about preventing crime. But the destabilising of democratic movements, the wholesale and widespread intrusion on citizens, and their exploitation for political advantage? That is worth keeping secret.

Every annual application for funding refers to the officers fully recognising ‘the political sensitivity’ of the unit’s existence. Authorisation is only ever granted ‘in view of the assurances about security’. In other words, as long as you can promise us we will not get caught, you can carry on.

There appears to have been a lot of careful work to ensure no proof of the link survives. After the spycops scandal broke, in 2015 former Audit Commission director Stephen Taylor looked into the links between the SDS and the Home Office. His report said the ‘investigation did not identify any retained evidence available in the Department of any correspondence, discussions or meetings on the SDS for the 40 year period’ that the unit existed. Nothing. In the entire Home Office.

Time and again Taylor found reference to a file, catalogue number QPE 66 1/8/5, understood to have covered Home Office dealings with the SDS. It has disappeared. It would have contained material classified Secret or Top Secret, which would have strict protocols around its removal or destruction, yet there is no clue as to what happened to it.

They physically searched all storage facilities in the Home Office. It’s gone. Taylor couldn’t make allegations but rather pointedly said ‘it is not possible to conclude whether this is human error or deliberate concealment’.

Butler appears to be well acquainted with the Home Office’s stipulation that details of their involvement must never come to light.

DRINKING ON THE JOB

Finally, Barr asked Butler some questions on issues raised by the Inquiry’s Non State Core Participants (ie, victims of spycops).

One significant issue had been about the spycops’ consumption of alcohol whilst on duty.
Butler was asked about their expenses claims, and clarified that they were not allowed to claim for alcohol they’d drunk, unless it was as “part of a substantial meal”.

He admitted that they could have claimed for drinks consumed by other people, which would have “been shown as an incidental expense”, but had no recollection of any of them doing so.

In his words, most of the officers “drank regularly but not excessively”. He contradicted other witnesses by saying they “usually had a beer” when they met at the safe house.

He went on to explain that they wouldn’t want to drink so much as to be drunk in their activist group, or be caught drink-driving (as having a driving licence was important for their jobs). This contradicts countless reports from the people who were infiltrated.

He had no concerns about anyone drinking to a level that impaired their judgement or affected their long term welfare.

Was he concerned about them buying lots of drinks for those they were spying on? No. He assumed they would buy rounds when out with activists, but “you wouldn’t buy excessive drinks just because you could afford to.”

DEPARTURE

The last thing we heard about from Butler was about his leaving the SDS. He was told by Commander Wilson that he was being moved on, ostensibly on the grounds that he was getting too close to those he managed and losing his objectivity:

“he said that it was time for me to move on to another role before I unquestioningly took the side of the UCOs [undercover officers] in all matters.”

It seems likely that had something to do with him fighting their corner on the issue of overtime payments, possibly another illustration of his loyalty to the undercovers. He continues to insist that they did an “excellent job”.

WHEN WE MEET AGAIN

The Inquiry’s Chair, Sir John Mitting, then closed this round of hearings with the line:

“When we’ll meet again remains to be seen.”

The next set of evidential hearings (covering ‘Tranche 2’, the SDS 1983-92) are not due to take place until 2024. In the meantime there may be an interim report from the Inquiry to look forward to.

Witness statement of Trevor Butler

Transcript, video of the morning and afternoon the day’s hearing

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<<Previous UCPI Daily Report (19 May 2022)<<

Tranche 1, Phase 3, Day 9

19 May 2022

Witness:Angus McIntosh (officer HN244)

 

The penultimate day of the 2022 Undercover Policing Inquiry hearings, dealing with spycops’ managers 1968-82.

Today, we first heard about Richard Walker (officer HN368), who worked in the SDS back office for over three years. He was not called to give oral evidence, but provided the Inquiry with a witness statement, so a summary of this was read out by a member of the Inquiry team.

The Inquiry then introduced documents relating to Lesley Willingale (officer HN1668), who is now deceased.

Only one witness gave evidence at the hearing: Angus Bryan McIntosh (officer HN244), the Detective Inspector who served as second in command of the Special Demonstration Squad (SDS) from mid 1976 to late 1979.

Lacking the polished veneer of his colleague Geoffrey Craft (officer HN34) the previous day, Angus McIntosh (inadvertently) gave more insight into the attitudes of the unit towards those it was targeting. A number of his statements caused outrage.

Otherwise, what we encountered was not dissimilar to much of the other live evidence so far. A mixture of truth and dissembling; though more forthcoming than others, he also had inexplicable memory lapses on important issues.

He was a teenager when he joined the police, moved to Special Branch in 1964, and continued to be promoted, up to Commander level – moving to National Coordinator of Ports Policing when it was formed in 1987, and staying in this role until he retired from 11 years later – very much a career Branch man.

TRAINING

Rebekah Hummerstone, barrister for the Inquiry, began by questioning him about his understanding of the law around policing.

McIntosh recalled attending police training courses at Bramshill and Hendon during this time, but these were general, and didn’t cover anything to do with undercover policing.

He was asked how he understood police powers to apply to undercover work, and admitted that they hadn’t given much thought to this at the time.

He suggested that if officers were invited to enter a private home or premises – even if this was under false pretences – they did not need a warrant, and suggested that in fact, not accepting an invitation might raise suspicions and therefore jeopardise their cover story.

He says his role entailed him applying his common sense and instinct – it was about “careful people management” of the individual officers to ensure their morale and safety.

His Special Branch background provided useful knowledge of the groups being targeted, the style in which reports were created, and some of the possible pitfalls. However the unit’s tactics were new to him, and he says there was no manual, and no specific SDS training course in those days.

In his statement he says that he introduced tutoring for SDS officers so they could take their ‘promotions exams’, and felt that his role included providing informal training for them, including the new recruits, who joined the office team first.

He says that he just learnt on the job, as was standard practice in those days, and adopted the unit’s existing practices.

CRAFT WORK?

Yesterday’s witness, Geoff Craft, couldn’t remember working with McIntosh in the SDS. Bizarrely, today McIntosh could not recall working with Craft either. The Inquiry’s Chair, Sir John Mitting, has asked both men to explain why, as the timeline prepared by the Inquiry shows significant overlap.

McIntosh’s only theory to explain this confusion is that he knows that he was away on various training courses for months, during which time someone else – probably Lesley Willingale (officer HN1668) – would have been acting up to cover his Inspector role.

MIKE FERGUSON

He did remember Mike Ferguson (officer HN135). He says that he first learnt the details of what the SDS (or ‘Hairies’ as they were known within the Branch) did from Mike, before he joined the unit himself.

He actually recalled an incident that took place during Ferguson’s undercover deployment, in which he infiltrated the Anti-Apartheid Movement.

Ferguson turned up one day at McIntosh’s home, ‘seeking refuge’ – his wife didn’t recognise him but Angus recognised his voice and let him in.

“He visited my flat in his undercover appearance and clothing before I was part of the SDS. He wanted to be in a safe place and took refuge in my flat. I do not know what it was that he was seeking refuge from, but he wanted to be off the street.”

Later on, when they worked together – Ferguson became Chief Inspector of the unit in early 1978, so was effectively McIntosh’s boss – he remembers them as close, Ferguson as able to give practical advice to the officers, based on his own personal experience of going undercover, and seems to have shared a lot of his knowledge with McIntosh.

THE BLACK FOLDER

Despite saying “there was no training manual”, McIntosh clearly remembered the ‘black loose-leaf folder’ that others have mentioned, which contained SDS tradecraft and knowledge that had built up over the years.

He described it as “full of good advice for the new officers”, but at the same time claimed that he never looked inside himself. Unfortunately, this contradiction was not picked up on.

He was asked if managers ever checked the contents, to ensure that suggestions of bad practice were removed, but seemed to think this wasn’t needed.

TASKING AND SUPERVISION

McIntosh would expect requests for information – including those from the Security Service – to come in via a Special Branch Squad, usually C Squad which dealt with left-wing activism.

The SDS managers met daily with their line manager, an S Squad Superintendent, and such requests could be discussed then. Sometimes they turned them down, if they didn’t have a source in a suitable place.

Referring to A8 (the uniformed public order unit) McIntosh said:

“We fed them; they didn’t feed us”

That is, although the SDS provided them with plenty of information, they didn’t receive any requests from them.

Sometimes this information was delivered via a phone call, especially when it was urgent news about an upcoming demo.

The unit’s managers had a lot of autonomy and made a lot of important decisions without any external input. They would keep the S Squad Superintendent informed, but not always give them all the details. They wouldn’t necessarily report any problems that arose.

NO SPYING ON THE FAR RIGHT

McIntosh said he was too junior to have been party to a “high-level policy decision” like the one not to infiltrate the far right. However he recalls that it was thought it would be too difficult and dangerous for an undercover to be sent in, as these groups were so very violent, and prone to criminality.

This is another glaring contradiction. Ever since the spycops scandal broke in 2010, the police have denfended it by saying they had to infltrate groups in case they were planning anything violent or criminal. But McIntosh says it wasn’t safe to infiltrate groups who were violent or criminal, so they focused their attentions elsewhere.

He then added that the police didn’t need to spy on the far right to keep an eye on them; they could obtain good information about them from the left-wing groups who monitored fascist activity, with much less risk to officers.

This is something we learned at one of last year’s hearings. Several spycops said that, despite the far right waging campaigns of violence and murder, they weren’t regarded as much of a problem. Only one SDS officer infiltrated the far right in the 1970s, and he did so inadvertently.

‘Peter Collins‘ (officer HN303, 1973-77) infiltrated the Workers Revolutionary Party who, in turn, sent him in to spy on the fascist National Front.

THE SECURITY SERVICE

McIntosh suggested that his lowly position as a Detective Inspector meant that he had very little contact with the Security Service (aka MI5).

However, this is somewhat contradicted by a document he was shown; a summary of the contact that took place between the Security Service and the SDS in 1979.

It shows that he and Ferguson attended a meeting in February on behalf of the SDS, and the Security Service were keen for these meetings to become regular monthly events.

HOME LIVES

It was considered essential for undercovers to have stability, an ‘anchor’, and so almost all of them were married men. McIntosh made a point of always visiting the partners of new recruits before deployment. He said the main reason for this was to introduce himself, gain her trust, and ensure she had a way of contacting him if she had any problems. He says hardly anyone ever rang the telephone number they were supplied with.

He would use this opportunity to tell the officer’s partner what to expect: long absences, working evenings and weekends, etc. Although they wanted to asses the officer’s domestic situation, they “certainly didn’t investigate”.

It was left to the officer to ‘use his judgement’ about how to explain his changed appearance and new job to his spouse: “rightly or wrongly, we left it to them to deal with it”.

The welfare of these women was of very little concern to the managers of the SDS, the only thing that mattered to them was maintaining the secrecy around these operations.

He also referred to the wives and families in the context of overtime, saying he was concerned that officers weren’t spending enough time at home, at the same time claiming the long hours of overtime were important for maintaining their cover stories.

STEALING IDENTITIES OF DEAD CHILDREN

McIntosh was asked about spycops’ theft of dead children’s identities to create undercover backstories or ‘legends’.

He seems genuinely aggrieved by this – not regretting the practice as such, but the fact that it was exposed by activists:

“I think it is most unfortunate that this Inquiry has enabled the poor families and relatives to realise that this has happened. In normal circumstances, it wouldn’t have happened. I mean, it’s extraordinary.”

WELFARE

Undercovers were expected to phone the office before 11am every day to ‘check in’. The meetings at the SDS safehouse also served a social purpose – as we’ve heard before, they offered an opportunity for the officers to relax together and be themselves. One of them would cook lunch, but the office staff did not join the undercovers at the pub.

We have heard about a dysfunctional drinking culture within the SDS. McIntosh was asked of the officers were given any guidance on drinking; he says no beyond no drink-driving.

SEXUAL RELATIONSHIPS

Again, as previously, the Inquiry spend considerable time on officers deceiving women they spied on into sexual relationships, as McIntosh oversaw a number of undercovers who did this.

The Inquiry asked about the comments of ‘Graham Coates‘ (officer HN304) about the sexist banter at the meetings. McIntosh remembers the banter but does not recall jokes about Rick Clark’s sexual prowess (see below). He says he was out of earshot most of the time, having individual talks in the other room.

Like Richard Walker (officer HN368), another manager who has given a written statement, McIntosh says that what banter he heard, he did not take particularly seriously.

McIntosh felt he was able to build close relationships with the undercovers and that they could have approached him for help with problems, but if these problems were what he called “self-induced” he suspects they may not have been entirely honest with him as a senior officer. Particularly, he couldn’t see any of them confiding in him about a relationship in the field as this could have affected their career.

Asked if Ferguson was someone they felt they could confide in, he said yes, “he was a man’s man.”

McIntosh was also agreed that the risk of relationships was a real one and meant a serious a security risk to the unit. However, he did not view it as a case of an officer abusing his power; in his view “things happen” and it was a personal, individual matter, security risks aside.

SPECIFIC OFFICERS

The Inquiry then asked McIntosh about a number of officers whose problematic behaviour has been frequently discussed at the hearings.

Vince Harvey (aka ‘Vince Miller’, officer HN354, 1976 -1979)

When joining the SDS, Harvey had been in a long term relationship, but that had ended. McIntosh was not aware of that fact, but would have dealt with it as a matter of welfare.

McIntosh said he was “amazed” at learning of Harvey’s sexual relationships while undercover, which had only come to his attention through the Inquiry.

Had he known, he says he would have taken this to Superintendent level and expects that Harvey would have been withdrawn.

Richard Clark (aka ‘Rick Gibson’, officer HN297, 1974-76)

Clark was exposed after the group he infiltrated investigated him and confronted him with his stolen identity. He also had multiple sexual relationships while undercover, which contributed to this exposure. McIntosh recalls Clark being withdrawn from the field, but claimed not to know many of the details.

However he says he was part of the surveillance team who sat outside the pub while Clark was being confronted by his suspicious comrades, just in case things turned nasty for the officer. He thought that Craft was there with him; yesterday Craft testified that he was there, but with Superintendent Derek Kneale (officer HN819).

McIntosh’s vague memory is incredible, given the severity the threat this represented to the secrecy of the entire unit.

This officer’s compromise doesn’t seem to have prompted any particular evaluation around security and processes. New officers were trained in exactly the same way as Clark, complete with the stolen identity that could lead suspicious comrades to a damning death certificate.

He described Clark as “very outgoing… the type that would brag about anything.”

He said he’d had no idea about Clark getting involved with at least four women while undercover, and sounded quite upset about Clark’s conduct:

“His behaviour has let everyone down.”

Not because of the possible impact on the women though but, extraordinarily, blaming Clark for everything, including this Inquiry being set up and a spotlight being shone into the workings of the SDS.

He sounded genuinely distressed that things had ‘unravelled’ and the unit was no longer a secret, saying:

“One of the proud things of SB was that the SDS was run without the general knowledge of the Branch let alone the police force or anyone else. Now the whole thing’s been exposed, unravelled, and that’s why I think it’s a great shame.”

‘Jim Pickford‘ (officer HN300, 1974-77)

McIntosh described Pickford as a “strange character” but also claimed to be unaware of his reputation as a womaniser. Another officer has told the Inquiry that Pickford confided in him that he had “fallen in love with” a female activist, prompting him to go straight to one of the unit’s managers (in his words, “the one with a Scottish name”).

This led to Pickford being withdrawn from the field. McIntosh denies being this manager, and insists that he knew nothing, and just thought Pickford’s deployment came to its natural end.

He said that if he had known about this, he would have gone to more senior management, and Pickford would have had to leave the Branch (as this would have affected his vetting status). Craft also denied knowing about this situation at the time.

However, Sir John Mitting said that in the Inquiry’s ‘closed sessions’ where certain officers have given evidence without the public present, he heard very detailed and convincing testimony from an undercover about them telling management about Pickford.

McIntosh expressed surprise that Pickford’s subsequent marriage (to the same activist) saying it was “amazing that rumour control kept it a secret”. He again suggested that this might all have happened while he was away from the unit – perhaps Leslie Willingale had been the manager?

Perhaps conveniently for McIntosh, the Inquiry is unable to check this as Willingale is dead.

THE PRINCIPLE OF SEXUAL DECEPTION

McIntosh didn’t think officers had to be reminded that sexual conduct on the job was a breach of police regulations.

He said he never “probed”, or asked them if they were engaged in such activities it would have been pointless to do so as they were unlikely to tell him, their supervising officer, that they were breaking the rules.

He denied that such relationships equated to an abuse of position or power. He viewed this as “sexual contact between consenting adults”, not something he gave a “green light” to but only because it was against police regulations.

He was asked if he considered this to be deceit:

“I can’t really answer that”

Instead, he posed a counter-question:

“Does everyone say before they have a sexual encounter, what is your occupation? And if it’s a certain one, do they say ‘Definitely not, because you are a policeman, or postman?’ So no.”

Which, again, is starkly reminiscent of what his colleague Craft said yesterday, leaving a strong impression that the managers are coached as to what to say, or got together to straighten out their stories.

SPYING ON BLAIR PEACH’S FUNERAL

The Inquiry has heard that another former undercover was advised by his managers not to attend the April 1979 demonstration against the fascist National Front in Southall, because it was known that the uniformed police was going to ‘clamp down’ on the protesters.

McIntosh denied being that manager, or having any knowledge of this, but understood why the warning would have been passed on:

“Well, we don’t want our officers arrested. We don’t want our officers involved in violence.”

Despite him saying this warning represented a “fairly unusual statement” he was not pressed to explain the rather curious fact that, according to officer HN41, a decision had been taken beforehand to crackdown on the protesters.

Likewise, McIntosh could not remember that the SDS had arranged for an undercover to be smuggled into Scotland Yard to make statement about the death of Blair Peach. Chuckling, he replied:

“Not on this occasion, but we used to smuggle in officers for various reasons”

Again, he wasn’t asked to explain.

An undercover who was infiltrating the Anti-Nazi League, officer HN21, was tasked with attending Peach’s funeral. McIntosh says he can’t remember if it was him, or another manager, who gave this instruction.

McIntosh provided his justification for spying on the mourners, claiming it was necessary to “identify disorder” and normal to cover such events of interest:

“because the whole reason of the funeral was for a person involved in extreme left wing politics and demonstrations, that’s all.”

Even HN21 has said that there was no known risk of public disorder at this event. Faced with this, McIntosh dismissed his officer’s professional judgement as a “subjective one”.

Sir John Mitting then intervened, suggesting that:

“many people might think it distasteful for a police officer, whether undercover or not, to attend the funeral of someone who had died in the circumstances we now know and record the names of all of those capable of being identified who have attended it.”

Mitting’s choice of phrasing, ‘died in the circumstances we now know’, is very telling. Blair Peach was killed by police officers. The police investigation showed this at the time, and identified Inspector Alan Murray as being highly likely to have been the killer. Yet even now, Mitting seems incapable of describing it in this way.

At last year’s hearing on the anniversary of Peach’s death, the Inquiry held a minute’s silence. In his preamble, Mitting avoided all mention of the police, and merely referred to Peach being killed by ‘a blow to the head’. In doing this, he insults all victims of spycops and underlines his partisan nature that is draining the Inquiry of its potential to get to the truth.

The comments made by McIntosh in response were the most outrageous yet:

“I can understand some people being upset by it, but, however, in public disorder … I’m quoting Northern Ireland for instance, funerals are often a hotbed of problems, and it wasn’t the friends and relatives of the person whose funeral it was, it was because there was an opportunity of demonstration against… it would be anti-police, in one way or the other.”

It is an extraordinary rant, with the bizarre suggestion that the National Front might have demonstrated at the funeral.

“Unfortunately, sir, I don’t think there’s a lot of respect in those circumstances for the real reason of the occasion.”

He didn’t see the irony in his comments.

Undercovers are known to have spied on the Blair Peach campaign at other events over the years. In one of last year’s hearings, we saw internal documents showing they were still spying on vigils for Peach on the 20th anniversary of his death.

In his written statement, McIntosh said that he did not believe they were reported on because they sought to discredit or criticise the police.

However, today he told the Inquiry something different, and was asked to clarify his views – why did he think those people had been reported on?

One of the excuses he gave was that if an undercover was sent to cover an event, they understood it was their duty to report the names of those present, without any filtering. It’s more likely that they would have included activists’ names on the list as the officers are more likely to have recognised those people.

He then claimed to not recall the full details about the demonstration where Blair Peach was killed. Which was maybe the first time ever that a police officer used those words, acknowledging what has actually happened.

Witness statement of Angus McIntosh

Transcript, video of the morning and afternoon the day’s hearing

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The current round of Undercover Policing Inquiry hearings, focusing on Special Demonstration Squad managers 1968-82, continue until tomorrow, Friday 20 May.

<<Previous UCPI Daily Report (18 May 2022)<<

Tranche 1, Phase 3, Day 8

18 May 2022

Witness:
Geoffrey Craft (officer HN34)

The eighth day of the 2022 Undercover Policing Inquiry‘s hearings examining spycops managers 1968-82 was devoted to the evidence of just one man: Geoffrey Craft (officer HN34).

Craft was a Detective Inspector with the Special Demonstration Squad (SDS) from May 1974 to October 1976, when he was promoted to head the unit as Detective Chief Inspector, which he remained until October 1977. In 1982 he returned to oversee the spycop unit as Chief Superintendent of ‘S’ Squad.

The pattern of questions remained the same as previous days, starting with his training and understanding of the law. Craft was a much more capable witness than Derek Brice, who gave evidence on the previous day. He was able to responded quickly to questions, many of which clearly irritated him.

On some points he was quite open, but like other officers he suffered inexplicable amnesia about highly significant moments and could not recall the characters of any of the undercovers deployed during his time.

He came across as very much loyal to Special Branch and found little fault with it, and clearly believed that he himself had done nothing wrong, although he did express disappointment in learning about the behaviour of undercovers under his watch. He claims no contemporary knowledge of any of that wrongdoing and appears to characterise himself as naive.

TRAINING AND THE LAW

There was no training or thought given to the lawfulness or ethics of what the SDS was doing, or the intrusion into private life that came from it.

When he joined the SDS, there was no real handover, Craft moved in as second in command to Derek Kneale (officer HN819) who told him what he needed to know. Intelligence was gathered to support public order policing and secondary to that was reporting on subversive activities, material which C Squad  – the department concerned with left-wing activists – then channelled to the Security Service (aka MI5). The undercovers’ targets were chosen following discussions on which groups were involved in public order issues at the time.

In an incredible piece of double think, when asked if he had considered back then whether the public would approve of what the SDS was doing, Craft said he had concluded that the public as a whole are happy to live in a parliamentary democracy and public demonstrations were part of that, so the police naturally needed intelligence to ensure appropriate policing.

SUBVERSION

As with previous witnesses, considerable time was devoted to Craft’s understanding of the term subversion. It was clear that he had just gone along with existing practice, and like so many other things had given it little or no consideration.

Basically, he and other Special Branch officers would have absorbed what they needed to know as junior officers and he was comfortable in his own mind what was subversive or not.

This also brought up the issue of spying on school children, covered in previous hearings. Craft’s position was that they would have only been interested in school children if they were involved in one of the organisations they were monitoring for public order purposes.

They would have reported on School Kids Against Nazis because they were supported by the Socialist Workers Party, he said.

This contrasts with the evidence specifically highlighted by lawyers representing ex-undercover officers that this was done at the specific request of MI5 who were interested in ‘subversion’ in schools.

TARGETING

Who an undercover officer should target was a matter for the Chief Superintendent responsible for the SDS, who had to bear in mind it was primarily for public order purposes. However, there would be coordination with the Secret Service (via C Squad) and other squads to avoid duplication, and their views were taken into ‘consideration’ – especially as it was C Squad that had to produce the threat assessments. The SDS was simply a support service in that, albeit a major one.

Craft never considered whether there were alternative ways to get intelligence as that was not ‘S’ Squad’s responsibility – that was down to ‘C’ Squad. Like other managers, he speaks of a cordial relationship with the Security Service, in which the SDS tried to accommodate requests for further information.

Craft was later questioned about the decisions to target a number of specific organisations (see below). What stood out most in his responses was the suggestion that groups were targeted “just in case” and that this was standard practice for the SDS:

“We tried to be ahead of the game, certainly”

USE OF REPORTING

Intelligence gathered by the SDS was passed on to C Squad, who sent it to A8 (Public Order Branch) or the Security Service. In his recollection, a great deal of the intelligence that eventually went to A8 in the form of a C Squad threat assessment was likely to have originated in the SDS. It was unusual for the SDS to have more direct contact, except perhaps at weekends when an undercover may phone in an urgent bit of intelligence during a protest.

A8 and C squad had other sources, but the SDS brought to the public order picture the intentions of the revolutionary groups – especially as those groups tended not to cooperate with the police. Craft repeated the line that it was equally important to reassure A8 that there was not going to be any trouble, to keep policing to a minimum. Otherwise, uniformed police would be pulled off other duties to the detriment of the people of London.

Craft like other mangers said filtering of what intelligence the undercovers provided was not his problem – others decided that. Barr pointedly noted that C Squad, where most of the intelligence went first, did not seem to do a great deal of filtering either. “You’re probably right”, Craft conceded.

Asked why Special Branch wanted reports on individuals, Craft replied it it was for the Security Service. Pushed, he accepted that the intimate personal details recorded were for the Security Service and were not simply a result of lax attitudes. It was not, according to him, used for Special Branch vetting as they only dealt with vetting relating to Irish Republicanism.

FEAR OF THE MEDIA

Craft told the Inquiry that the operational security of the SDS was paramount. This meant that, should the operation become public, the Commissioner needed to have a strong defence: “that the police were acting as the police were sworn to act, in the preservation of the Queen’s peace.”

Asked what he feared, Craft was very clear: the media. More specifically “the attack upon the police by the media, for acting undercover to achieve the result we did.” How he could square that with taking instructions from the Security Service on infiltrating groups that were acting perfectly lawfully but considered ‘subversive’, was a question he failed to answer.

SPILLING THE BEANS

As part of the questioning on the relationship with the Security Service, Barr drew the Inquiry’s attention to document [UCPI0000027451] which discussed the knowledge of the SDS as an undercover unit among other police forces in 1976.

It turns out it was quite well known after a Special Branch course run by the Metropolitan Police Special Branch had included a lecture on the SDS and its successes, given by the unit’s founder Conrad Dixon.

This was later considered have been a mistake and the subject was not supposed to be mentioned again. Craft expressed surprise, saying this was all new to him and he should have known about it.

COVER IDENTITIES

The practice of stealing dead children’s identities to create cover stories was already in place when Craft arrived on the scene and he did not consider the ethics of it at the time, he just assumed it was legal.

He claimed that because the SDS was a top secret operation it seemed inconceivable that any family would find out.

In hindsight, of course, that isn’t the case, and he says his view now is that bereaved families had suffered enough:

“anything the SDS did to exacerbate that was very sad.”

Barr, for the Inquiry, reminded him that Richard Clark had been exposed by discovery of the death certificate for his stolen identity. Craft elaborated on how difficult it must have been for the activists to find this. However, he did not revisit the utility of the tactic in light of these events.

SUPERVISION & SEXUAL RELATIONSHIPS

The Inquiry came next to the issue of supervision of the undercovers, and – importantly – the managers’ awareness of the sexual relationships. Craft denied knowing anything about the sexual relationships officers had indulged in on his watch.

He was asked about various officers who served under him, many of whom are now known to have engaged in intimate relationships while undercover. Rick Clark (‘Rick Gibson’, officer HN297, 1974-76) and ‘Jim Pickford‘ (officer HN300, 1974-77) came up multiple times during the day, mainly because they were singled out in previous evidence as womanisers who had sexual relationships with women in their target groups.

Craft denied knowing anything of their reputation, and said he did not know any reason why they should not have been undercovers.

Other officers mentioned included:

• ‘Alan Bond‘ (officer HN67, 1981-86)
• Mike Chitty (‘Mike Blake’, officer HN11, 1981-86)
• ‘Barry Tompkins‘ (officer HN106, 1979-83)
• ‘Paul Gray‘ (officer HN126, 1977-82)
• ‘Phil Cooper‘ (officer HN155, 1979-84)

Craft claimed not to be aware of their relationships, nor to have had any concerns about their behaviour. Indeed it made him wonder how well he actually got to know the members of his team.

We heard about the great meetings held twice a week, where allegedly everything was discussed, the camaraderie, how they called each other by their first names, and rank was not an issue.

As he saw it, these get-togethers should have served for the spycops to realise they were still in a police operation, although why he felt that a friendly get together where everyone used first names and rank was not an issue would remind officers it was a police operation was not clear.

Pressed on why he never gave any guidance that sexual relationships were off limits given that the undercovers were young men being put into potentially tricky situations (not least Clark being put into Goldsmiths College), he answered:

“The thought just never crossed my mind.”

However, earlier in his evidence he stated that it was drummed into all police officers that sex while on duty was cause for dismissal and he was even able to cite a case going back to 1830 in support of this.

FILTH

Barr asked Craft to elaborate on a point from his statement where he expressed why he was so against undercover officers having sexual relationships. In his answer Craft started with the risk of disease, and then went on to talk about the wife, the family and marriage. Finally, he referred to things they might have let slip while having sex “which could have damaged the operation”.

Pressed on this, he said that the threat to the family he was thinking of was the risk of sexually transmittable disease and the break-up of the marriage.

The matter-of-fact-way that Craft said this brought home the extent to which female campaigners were viewed as filth, merely potential spreaders of sexually transmissible diseases, rather than human beings with their own rights and dignity. It’s the Met’s contempt for political dissent compounded by their institutional sexism.

Asked about consideration for the woman deceived, Craft said he is not happy about the relationships, musing:

“But what is the alternative? Because accepting that rape is not involved, does all sexual activity in terms of modern moral attitude require a legally endorsed exchange of CVs before sexual activity takes place?

“And so, to the extent to which the man concerned is operating under false colours, is that something which one could prevent? I don’t know.”

Specifically, Craft was not happy with Rick Clark (‘Rick Gibson’, officer HN297, 1974-76) and said as much. Clark never said anything to Craft about the multiple sexual encounters he had had while undercover, which – according to what he told contemporaries – had contributed to his exposure.

Craft also did not like the fact he had not picked up on that at the time – clearly seeing it as a his own failure, though only in hindsight. At the very end of the day, in further questioning, he was asked how come he didn’t have the same opinion of Rick Clark, and another officer, ‘Jim Pickford‘ (officer HN300, 1974-77) that other witnesses have shared with the Inquiry?

His response may have actually contained some truth:

“People that are good at putting up a front can sometimes confuse one.”

In this, he is effectively claiming that both men had concealed their misconduct from their bosses, and blaming his own naïvety.

He claims no memory of Vince Harvey (‘Vince Miller’, officer HN354, 1976-79) coming to him for advice about the “amorous” attentions of an Socialist Workers Party member.

BOB LAMBERT

Even more unlikely, he stated that he never came across Bob Lambert (‘Bob Robinson’, officer HN10, 1983-88).

One of Lambert’s colleagues, whistleblower Peter Francis, has spoken of the unparalleled regard Lambert was held in long after his undercover deployment:

“He did what is hands down regarded as the best tour of duty ever”

Lambert was involved in the most shocking activities of the spycops. He stole the identity of a dead child, was prosecuted under his false identity, acted as an agent provocateur (allegedly burning down a shop) and deceived women he spied on into sexual relationships, including having a child with one.

Lambert later went on to run the SDS in the 1990s, deploying other officers to act similarly.

‘Who is Bob Lambert?’ – talk given by COPS, March 2015

Bob Lambert is one of the pre-eminent figures in SDS history, and his exposure in October 2011 was one of the pivotal moments in the spycops scandal.

Craft said:

“I wouldn’t recognise the man.”

He also says he was shocked to discover that Lambert had fathered a child with an activist:

“One wonders how he had the time.”

Asked what he would have done had he learned about an undercover having sex, Craft confidently declared he would have removed the undercover from the field.

At this point the Inquiry’s Chair, Sir John Mitting, intervened, asking whether the undercover would have been formally disciplined. Craft answered in theory yes, but there would have had to be a hearing, which would potentially expose the secret unit, so probably not.

WIVES & WELFARE

The thinking behind using married officers, according to Craft, is that the home life gave them something stable to return to, away from the stress of undercover life. It was all about stability, not about preventing sexual relationships.

Craft was asked about the officers’ wives. He said he didn’t always visit the wives of new recruits; they were invited to Christmas parties. He admitted that – despite the importance of these officers being married and enjoying stable home lives – there was no ongoing monitoring of their marriages, and not much care and attention paid to their wives. In retrospect, he sees that the job would have had an impact on them, and says the police should have done more to look after them.

He explained the reason for deployments tending to last four years, and said that the concerns he had about lengthy deployments were about the officers’ well-being but not because he considered any risk to family life, or an increased risk of what he termed “transgressions”.

POSITIONS OF RESPONSIBILITY

Craft claimed that undercovers he was supervising did not rise high in the ranks of the groups they were targeting. However, it quickly became clear that they did.

Richard Clark rose through the ranks of the Troops Out Movement (TOM) to become National Convener. Craft said he would not have approved of this.

Clark got involved in factional in-fighting – why wasn’t that stopped? Craft doesn’t know, and he can’t explain why he did nothing.

However he does seem to have approved of Vince Harvey (‘Vince Miller’, officer HN354, 1976-79) becoming both Treasurer and Secretary of Socialist Workers Party branches – agreeing that this represented a “fantastic opportunity” as “it clearly gave him access to all the membership”.

‘Phil Cooper‘ (officer HN155, 1979-84) and ‘Colin Clark’ (officer HN80, 1977-82) – also held “significant positions” within the Party and had access to the Party’s headquarters.

Would Craft have considered it proper or improper for someone to take or copy documents?

“Proper” was his prompt response – it was a “jolly good thing” – he would have completely approved and seen their work as very valuable; he still doesn’t consider that anything these officers did was illegal.

‘Gary Roberts‘ (officer HN353, 1974-78), in his witness statement, tells how he got involved in the student union at Thames Polytechnic, becoming Vice President, and attended National Union of Students conferences as an official delegate. Why didn’t Craft tell him not to take up this position?

Craft’s only respoded:

“It had happened so we were stuck with it.”

POLICE ARRESTED

We heard about a number of officers who were arrested during Craft’s tenure.
‘Desmond “Barry” Loader’ (officer HN13, 1975-78), was arrested and prosecuted on two occasions.

Loader’s first arrest (described on page 12 of this ‘Minute sheet’) took place on an anti-fascist march from Ilford to Barking in September 1977, which he attended with his ‘comrades’ from the Communist Party of England (Marxist-Leninist). He was arrested under the Public Order Act, allegedly while “shielding two children” from the police, and is said is have been “somewhat battered”.

The case was complicated by an arresting officer having served with this undercover years earlier. This led to concerns about him being recognised in court, blowing his cover.

Craft went along to Barking Magistrates for a conversation with this Constable and met with a magistrate and a “helpful” clerk. Later entries show the SDS remained in contact with these officials. The trial eventually took place in 1978 – by this time Craft had moved on, and his successor, Ken Pryde, was in post.

We also heard about ‘Michael Hartley‘ (officer HN12, 1982-85) being arrested for fly posting on Holloway Road, alongside a ‘comrade’ from the Revolutionary Communist Group (RCG).

Craft denied remembering this case, or considering the fairness of the other RCG member being prosecuted. This report was signed off by Craft and sent to the Commander of Operations.

UNDER CONSTANT REVIEW?

In a covering letter attached to the 1976 annual report we see the claim that the SDS was engaged in “constant review”, with reference to a small working party examining the unit’s work in detail, and increasing its effectiveness as well as shrinking the number of personnel required (to 12 deployments, which is said to be the minimum required to gather the necessary level of intelligence).

This working party was the only formal review of the SDS that Craft can recall. Barr pointed out that it was therefore a bit of an exaggeration to call it constant review. “I think it’s painting a slightly strong picture” admitted Craft

After seeing some letters of thanks and appreciation – such as one from Lancashire police following a demo in September 1976 and another one from 1977 – we heard more about the results of the Watts working party in 1976. The review found that, though public disorder at protests had declined since the SDS’s formation, police and the Security Service thought the SDS should continue its work.

WHAT WAS THE POINT?

Why couldn’t the police just monitor open sources and talk to activists? Craft claimed that undercover tactics were essential because the people they were spying on would never have told the police what they were up to.

“Accurate, timely intelligence was vital for proportionate policing and for keeping the peace”.

He insists that the SDS made a considerable difference to the policing of public order. The benefits for the Security Service are described as ‘off-spin’.

Craft was promoted in mid 1981, to run S Squad, and so had oversight of the SDS for the next three years – he calls it a “fairly close” relationship and says he sometimes visited the office and had discussions with those in the field.

What did they talk about? Just general stuff.

Does he recall any problems or welfare issues arising? What about new officers? Were you involved in discussing deployments? Probably not – Craft claims this would probably have been a conversation between the SDS and C Squad

RED LION SQUARE

Barr read an excerpt from the unit’s 1974 Annual Report (paragraph 20 on page 13) – about the death of Kevin Gately on 15 June during mounted police charges into a crowd at an anti-fascist demo at Red Lion Square, London.

Craft may have written this paragraph, but he isn’t sure. It mentions the SDS giving the uniformed police:

“forewarning of both the size of the demonstration and the possible disorder which might occur.”

However, while Craft knows that the SDS had undercovers deployed in most of the left-wing groups involved, he can’t remember any specifics about what intelligence the unit was able to contribute, nor how they did so. The Inquiry has failed to find any other evidence relating to this.

WHO TO SPY ON?

A number of Barr’s questions examined the motives behind the targeting of specific groups or events.

In reference to the far-right, Craft spoke about how “essential” it was to collect intelligence about extreme groups at both ends of the spectrum if the police were to successfully keep the peace between them. He confirmed that he did offer the SDS’ services for this purpose, but ultimately it was C Squad who decided.

When it came to the anti-racist groups, he said those who cooperated with the police were of no concern; those who didn’t were seen as a problem.

Asked why the Anti-Apartheid Movement was reported on (before his time in the unit) he said they were involved in disorder and criminal damage, referencing the direct action taken by the Stop the Seventy Tour campaign.

He admitted that the group had been “very thoroughly infiltrated” as a result of a reputational “hangover”, even though it was run by Young Liberals, rather than ‘ultra Left’ types.

Barr also asked about the Troops Out Movement (referenced in the SDS’s 1976 Annual Report). Craft admitted that TOM wasn’t seeking to overthrow the State and wasn’t really a public order threat. He attempted to justify their infiltration – describing them as “an umbrella movement” who might be infiltrated or ‘manipulated’ by the ‘ultra Left’, or attract Irish Republican support – it was here that he expressed the opinion that it was best to infiltrate them “just in case”.

In relation to the various anarchist and situationist groups, Barr pointed out that that Roy Creamer (officer HN3903, who gave evidence earlier in the week) had painted a benign picture of – for example – the Freedom Press.

Craft said he was “happy to bow to Roy Creamer’s expert knowledge” rather than attempt to distinguish between the various groups – it was “quite beyond me”.

In 1976 Richard Clark’s cover was compromised. The group he was infiltrating, Big Flame, is listed on page 4 of the Annual Report, described as a “sinister” organisation, albeit one with no known illegality. It is reported that members are “well-educated” and have links to the Angry Brigade. It is also credited with “practical ingenuity” in the field of security consciousness, compared to other ultra-Left groups:

“There is little doubt that this organisation has more to hide, and hence more to fear, from the police than some of the others”.

Craft says he’s “hesitant” to talk more about this paragraph now. This was possibly a reference to his slip-up, saying something that should have been restricted, earlier in the day.

DUBIOUS DEPLOYMENT DECISIONS

Was it Craft who instructed one of the undercovers to attend the funeral of Blair Peach, who was killed by police on an anti-fascist demonstration in 1979?

He doubts it, but can’t be sure. He agrees that Peach’s death and inquest were “bad news for the Met police” (the inquest found that Peach had been killed by a police officer). Did the SDS take a special interest in the campaign? Only in that it would have been wise to keep an eye on them in case of disorder, Craft asserts.

Why was the Campaign for Nucelar Disarmament (CND) targeted? Obviously a male officer couldn’t have infiltrated the women’s peace camp at Greenham Common – in Craft’s words, they needed “a lady” for this.

Craft claims this is the only time that the SDS had any interest in CND, however the Inquiry already knows that John Kerry (officer HN65, 1980-84) infiltrated CND itself.

What about animal rights – why were you interested in spying on them? Craft talked about firebombs, attacks on research centres, “quite akin to terrorism”. He went on to say that he thought this whole thing “started with one policeman in Essex who was keeping an index” and the Branch took this over, realising the movement was “dangerous”.

The SDS’s 1974 Annual Report describes the Workers Revolutionary Party (WRP) as a “highly disciplined organisation” that has not caused any public order problems (paragraph 28, page 15). Their interest in “industrial unrest” is mentioned, and Craft openly admitted that this would have been purely for the benefit of the Security Service.

Several spycops infiltrated the WRP but these deployments ended in Craft’s time – does he recall why? He doesn’t, but imagines they were no longer considered a threat to public order. (Former WRP member Liz Leicester gave evidence to the Inquiry last week.)

The Inquiry noted that Craft signed off on every Annual Report during this era, and always endorsed them in glowing terms, in the knowledge that these went to the Home Office and were instrumental in securing the go-ahead (and funding) for the spycops operations to continue.

PRAISE FROM THE HIGHEST LEVEL

Craft still believes in the immense value of the SDS’s work. He remembers the Commissioner visiting the SDS while he was running the unit – he visited the safe house, met the undercovers, ate lunch with them – “he was chatting to everybody”. Craft remembers “it was good for morale”.

He was similarly positive about another visit paid to the SDS safe house by the Home Secretary, accompanied by the Met Commissioner, Sir Kenneth Newman, while he was at S Squad.

This means the Inquiry has now heard that every Commissioner from the squad’s inception in 1968 until 1993 was personally involved and approved.

• 1968-72 – John Waldron
  Rajiv Menon QC told the Inquiry Waldron gave officers champagne after an October 1968 Vietnam War protest
• 1972-77 – Robert Mark
  Spycop Graham Coates told the Inquiry Mark visited the safe house to congratulate officer
• 1977-82 David McNee
  Spycop Roger Harris told the Inquiry Mark and McNee both visited the safe house
• 1982-87 – Kenneth Newman
  Geoff Craft told the Inquiry Newman visited with the Home Secretary
• 1987-93 – Peter Imbert
  Imbert was previously a Special Branch officer, spycop ‘Sandra Davis’ told the Inquiry Imbert personally recruited her to the SDS

Additionally, before the Inquiry began, whistleblower officer Peter Francis described how the Commissioner he served under (Paul Condon, 1993-2000) visited the safe house and gave out bottles of whisky as a token of his gratutude.

This completely demolishes the Met’s earlier claims that the SDS was some kind of ‘rogue unit’ that senior officers were unaware of.

However, the Inquiry will not be hearing evidence from Sir Kenneth Newman, nor David McNee or Peter Imbert. All three of them have died since the Inquiry began.

It’s not enough to know what the spycops did. We need to know who authorised and sanctioned these operations. We need to know why. The loss of testimony from those Commissioners, who were ultimately in charge of the SDS for a third of its existence, is one of the effects of the colossal delays the police have inflicted on the Inquiry process.

FINAL QUESTIONS

Craft was questioned more about ‘Phil Cooper‘ (officer HN155, 1979-84). According to a Security Service note from a meeting with Detective Inspector ‘Sean Lynch‘ (officer HN68, 1968-74) in the summer of 1982:

“despite his misdemeanours, Cooper has not been withdrawn as an SDS source”.

‘Lynch’ is said to be worried:

“because Cooper’s position in the Right To Work movement gives him regular access to Ernie Roberts MP and meetings at the House of Commons”.

We know that ‘Cooper’ was having marital difficulties at this time; it sounds as though anything about his work becoming public could have had serious consequences, and been highly embarrassing for all concerned. Craft agrees that he too would have been concerned – this was “too close” to what he calls “legitimate politics”.

Craft was asked if he had ever heard the term “Wearies” – used to refer to the activists spied on by the SDS – and he denied ever hearing it, then or since, adding “I don’t even know what it means”.

There was one final lasting confusion. Craft does not recall Angus McIntosh (officer HN244) working in the SDS office as his deputy. But as far as the Inquiry knows, their time in the unit definitely overlapped. We’re due to hear McIntosh’s evidence tomorrow, on Day 9, so perhaps this mystery will be cleared up then. Craft has repeatedly said he’s “confused” by this:

“It’s amazing – I know him very well – but have no recollection at all of working with him in the SDS”

Craft has submitted two written witness statements to the Inquiry:
First witness statement (December 2020)
Second witness statement (February 2022)
Documents referred to are listed in the Inquiry’s Bundle for the day.

Video of the morning and afternoon the day’s hearing

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The current round of Undercover Policing Inquiry hearings, focusing on Special Demonstration Squad managers 1968-82, continue until Friday 20 May.

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Tranche 1, Phase 3, Day 7

17 May 2022

Witness:
Derek Brice
Statement from:
Anthony Greenslade

Today’s hearing of the Undercover Policing Inquiry saw only one live witness, Derek Brice (officer HN3378), who deserves a prize for most evasive answers in the Inquiry so far.

It also featured the publication of written evidence from Anthony Greenslade (officer HN2401) who was apparently brought in to boost “low morale” among the spycops of the Special Demonstration Squad.

Derek Brice (officer HN3378)

Brice was a Detective Inspector in the Special Demonstration Squad (SDS), from around May 1973 to October 1974.

Brice had been allocated an entire day as he is the only SDS manager of his era who is alive and in sufficient health to give evidence – or so it was thought. His tenure covered a number of important aspects – it is the period of the first known sexual relationships between undercover officers and people they spied on, the early use of dead children’s identities and the significant public order event that was the 1974 anti-fascist protest at Red Lion Square that resulted in the death of Kevin Gately.

A good 90% of the hearing was an exhausting litany of failures to remembering anything, even the basics, interspersed with monosyllabic answers and claims that he had no awareness of stuff going on around him at the time.

After several years on Special Branch he was brought in as an officer with considerable expertise, although he had not been involved in any undercover work personally. He had served on the Bomb Squad, set up to investigate the Angry Brigade where he had been on the surveillance team – along with Greenslade. He continued to do work for the Bomb Squad after he was appointed to the SDS.

However, the exact relationship between the SDS and the Bomb Squad is not clear, and Brice did not leave us any the wiser. He stated that Conrad Dixon had been a senior manager at the Bomb Squad yet claimed not to know that Dixon had set up the SDS, nor – being shown a handwritten organisational chart [MPS-0737402] – that both teams were being jointly supervised at that time.

Of his time at the SDS he said he was asked to join but not interviewed, that he never received any guidance from the then-head of the SDS, officer HN294 (1970-1973), on what the team was about or what his job entailed. As with the undercover officers, he said he learned on the job.

Describing his work as ‘welfare officer’ (or ‘quartermaster’ in his statement) he failed to explain what that entailed. Making sure the officers felt safe on the job, and had not reached the stage of having enough of it yet – that was about it.

CONVENIENT AMNESIAC

He claimed not to have known about the use of dead children’s birth certificates as the basis of the false identity adopted by undercovers. This stretches credulity, especially as many officers prepared their cover story while he was serving on the squad. Brice simply cant recall much discussion about this.

Among the many things he could not recall or was not aware of was the SDS’s relationship with C Squad, which monitored the left wing more generally. Nor was he aware of how information was transferred to A8 – the public order branch of the Met Police.

Things became slightly ridiculous when Brice said he was unaware of the close relationship with the Security Service (aka MI5). He was shown a document [MPS-0735753] which put him at a meeting with the Security Service, where the latter spoke about setting up a new department (F6) to also gather intelligence on left wing groups and subversion.

The SDS was asked for support, to share information and to help out if secret agents would get in conflict with the law. Brice had no recollection.

ANOTHER PUSH FOR ANSWERS

Despite the frustrating evidence, there were a few hints here and there which led to follow up questions at the end of the session, many put in by the other legal teams present.

There was a bit of exploration about officer HN294, now deceased, who Brice served under. HN294 is a key figure in the unit as it was in his time that many of the unit’s abuses first appear. Theway he appears to have run the unit and its relationship to the rest of Special Branch remains obscure and unexplained.

Brice let it slip that HN294’s successors were more approachable. It had also been noted that HN294 ran the SDS as his own ‘fiefdom’. Pressed on this, Brice admitted that that HN294 was “fairly dour” and “kept things to himself”. We are given an insight into a manager who kept to himself and apparently did not even visit the undercovers at their safehouse.

He had previously denied that two undercovers of the era, Rick Clark (‘Rick Gibson’, officer HN297) and ‘Jim Pickford‘ (officer HN300) were widely known as womanisers. Asked about whether such a reputation would have affected their selection for undercovers, Brice says he never thought about the risk of officers forming inappropriate relationships. He thought that (inadvertently) the practice of forming the relationships was lowered by recruiting married men.

However, when pressed over whether knowing that officers had a reputation as “womanisers” would have impacted on his own thinking regarding recommendation for being an undercover, he was unwilling to say it would have ruled them out.

RED LION SQUARE

The last question came directly from the Inquiry’s Chair, Sir John Mitting. He drew attention back to the events of Red Lion Square and summoned the 1974 SDS Annual Report [MPS-07930906] to point out the line:

“Fortunately, the SDS gave forewarning of both the size of the demonstration and the possible disorder which might occur.”

Red Lion Square was the biggest public order event of its era and the first death on a protest in decades. The Chair noted that Brice was the only senior SDS officer alive from the time and asked for help in understanding the claim in the Annual Report.

Brice’s position is that it was at the end of his time in the SDS (actually he still had four months to serve in the unit when Kevin Gately was killed) and, in line with the rest of the day, he said he couldn’t be of assistance as he barely remembered the event.

Mitting noted the Inquiry also can’t find any written evidence to back up the SDS’ claim – and wonders would the information have been communicated orally? Brice confirms that such information would have been committed in a written report.

With this mystery left unsolved, the day finally came to an end. As with the missing material around the anti-fascist demonstration in Southall and the death of Blair Peach five years later, the SDS seems to have made big claims but the evidence to support it’s reason for existing is remarkably lacking – a topic which the Inquiry and core participants on all sides will no doubt return to.

Witness statement of Derek Brice

Anthony Greenslade (officer HN2401)

The day also saw the publication of the written evidence of Anthony Greenslade (officer HN2401). He joined the police in the mid-1950s, and Special Branch in 1960.

He worked at Britain’s seaports, and after a spell in Anguilla, returned to London in 1970 to work in a section that was concerned with Black Power for around a year. He said Conrad Dixon wanted to get rid of him from the Black Power desk.

BOMB SQUAD & SDS ADMINISTRATOR

He was then posted to the Bomb Squad from 1971-74, and during this time had dealings with the SDS, in late 1973 (for six months) but did not at first consider himself a member of the unit.

At this time the Bomb Squad was conducting surveillance of the Angry Brigade; he worked alongside Brice (see below). He served the unit as a DI towards the end of 1973, working in an admin role. He helped the SDS by purchasing 12 cars for the undercovers to use and setting up second safe house for the spycops.

SDS RECRUITS – BOTTOM OF THE CLASS

It seems that the SDS ‘Class of 73’ had a problem with passing exams. as Greenslade was tasked with improving the spycops promotions exam record – he ran weekly classes for them at the safe house that lasted 3-4 hours. Only three of his six students passed these exams.

Interestingly, he states that low morale was a known issue in the SDS, and he was not the only officer brought in to help solve this problem.

‘KINGPIN’

He says people were recruited in a random way, at the time by HN294 who he describes as the unit’s ”kingpin”, running the unit as a “fiefdom”.

He says he wasn’t involved in choosing targets or the officers’ reporting, or any liaison with outside agencies like the Security Service.

He says he doesn’t know about many of the other key issues we’ve heard former officers being questioned about this week, such as the use of deceased children’s identities, sexual relationships with targets (which he thinks would have been unacceptable), or tradecraft. He knew nothing about the any ‘incidents’ in the SDS.

He said that personal details were routinely included in Special Branch reporting – there was nothing unusual about the material that the SDS were including in theirs.

Greenslade simply repeats that the SDS contribution to policing was that they provided advance warning in demonstrations, something that Roy Creamer brought into doubt yesterday.

He said:

“Information about trade unions would have been reported because of the effect of trade unions on the economy.”

About overtime, he noted that members of the SDS received fairly high overtime payments, and remembers that ‘Phil Cooper‘ (officer HN155) was the “highest paid” Detective Seargent in the Met at the time”. However, he doesn’t think this money affected the length of time they spent on the unit or their reporting.

Greenslade retired in 1987 at the rank of Chief Superintendent.

Probably the most interesting thing in Greenslade’s statement is his negative view of undercover policing:

“The only matter I want to add is that I wish to add if that I disagree fundamentally disagree with the principal of Undercover Policing, it was damaging to individuals many suffered from the work, and some left the police afterwards. I think some people are psychologically unsuited to that kind of work, as I am.”

Witness statement of Anthony Greenslade

Transcript and video of the morning and afternoon the day’s hearing

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The current round of Undercover Policing Inquiry hearings, focusing on Special Demonstration Squad managers 1968-82, continue until Friday 20 May.

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