Tranche 1, Phase 3, Day 7

17 May 2022

Witness:
Derek Brice
Statement from:
Anthony Greenslade

Today’s hearing of the Undercover Policing Inquiry saw only one live witness, Derek Brice (officer HN3378), who deserves a prize for most evasive answers in the Inquiry so far.

It also featured the publication of written evidence from Anthony Greenslade (officer HN2401) who was apparently brought in to boost “low morale” among the spycops of the Special Demonstration Squad.

Derek Brice (officer HN3378)

Brice was a Detective Inspector in the Special Demonstration Squad (SDS), from around May 1973 to October 1974.

Brice had been allocated an entire day as he is the only SDS manager of his era who is alive and in sufficient health to give evidence – or so it was thought. His tenure covered a number of important aspects – it is the period of the first known sexual relationships between undercover officers and people they spied on, the early use of dead children’s identities and the significant public order event that was the 1974 anti-fascist protest at Red Lion Square that resulted in the death of Kevin Gately.

A good 90% of the hearing was an exhausting litany of failures to remembering anything, even the basics, interspersed with monosyllabic answers and claims that he had no awareness of stuff going on around him at the time.

After several years on Special Branch he was brought in as an officer with considerable expertise, although he had not been involved in any undercover work personally. He had served on the Bomb Squad, set up to investigate the Angry Brigade where he had been on the surveillance team – along with Greenslade. He continued to do work for the Bomb Squad after he was appointed to the SDS.

However, the exact relationship between the SDS and the Bomb Squad is not clear, and Brice did not leave us any the wiser. He stated that Conrad Dixon had been a senior manager at the Bomb Squad yet claimed not to know that Dixon had set up the SDS, nor – being shown a handwritten organisational chart [MPS-0737402] – that both teams were being jointly supervised at that time.

Of his time at the SDS he said he was asked to join but not interviewed, that he never received any guidance from the then-head of the SDS, officer HN294 (1970-1973), on what the team was about or what his job entailed. As with the undercover officers, he said he learned on the job.

Describing his work as ‘welfare officer’ (or ‘quartermaster’ in his statement) he failed to explain what that entailed. Making sure the officers felt safe on the job, and had not reached the stage of having enough of it yet – that was about it.

CONVENIENT AMNESIAC

He claimed not to have known about the use of dead children’s birth certificates as the basis of the false identity adopted by undercovers. This stretches credulity, especially as many officers prepared their cover story while he was serving on the squad. Brice simply cant recall much discussion about this.

Among the many things he could not recall or was not aware of was the SDS’s relationship with C Squad, which monitored the left wing more generally. Nor was he aware of how information was transferred to A8 – the public order branch of the Met Police.

Things became slightly ridiculous when Brice said he was unaware of the close relationship with the Security Service (aka MI5). He was shown a document [MPS-0735753] which put him at a meeting with the Security Service, where the latter spoke about setting up a new department (F6) to also gather intelligence on left wing groups and subversion.

The SDS was asked for support, to share information and to help out if secret agents would get in conflict with the law. Brice had no recollection.

ANOTHER PUSH FOR ANSWERS

Despite the frustrating evidence, there were a few hints here and there which led to follow up questions at the end of the session, many put in by the other legal teams present.

There was a bit of exploration about officer HN294, now deceased, who Brice served under. HN294 is a key figure in the unit as it was in his time that many of the unit’s abuses first appear. Theway he appears to have run the unit and its relationship to the rest of Special Branch remains obscure and unexplained.

Brice let it slip that HN294’s successors were more approachable. It had also been noted that HN294 ran the SDS as his own ‘fiefdom’. Pressed on this, Brice admitted that that HN294 was “fairly dour” and “kept things to himself”. We are given an insight into a manager who kept to himself and apparently did not even visit the undercovers at their safehouse.

He had previously denied that two undercovers of the era, Rick Clark (‘Rick Gibson’, officer HN297) and ‘Jim Pickford‘ (officer HN300) were widely known as womanisers. Asked about whether such a reputation would have affected their selection for undercovers, Brice says he never thought about the risk of officers forming inappropriate relationships. He thought that (inadvertently) the practice of forming the relationships was lowered by recruiting married men.

However, when pressed over whether knowing that officers had a reputation as “womanisers” would have impacted on his own thinking regarding recommendation for being an undercover, he was unwilling to say it would have ruled them out.

RED LION SQUARE

The last question came directly from the Inquiry’s Chair, Sir John Mitting. He drew attention back to the events of Red Lion Square and summoned the 1974 SDS Annual Report [MPS-07930906] to point out the line:

“Fortunately, the SDS gave forewarning of both the size of the demonstration and the possible disorder which might occur.”

Red Lion Square was the biggest public order event of its era and the first death on a protest in decades. The Chair noted that Brice was the only senior SDS officer alive from the time and asked for help in understanding the claim in the Annual Report.

Brice’s position is that it was at the end of his time in the SDS (actually he still had four months to serve in the unit when Kevin Gately was killed) and, in line with the rest of the day, he said he couldn’t be of assistance as he barely remembered the event.

Mitting noted the Inquiry also can’t find any written evidence to back up the SDS’ claim – and wonders would the information have been communicated orally? Brice confirms that such information would have been committed in a written report.

With this mystery left unsolved, the day finally came to an end. As with the missing material around the anti-fascist demonstration in Southall and the death of Blair Peach five years later, the SDS seems to have made big claims but the evidence to support it’s reason for existing is remarkably lacking – a topic which the Inquiry and core participants on all sides will no doubt return to.

Witness statement of Derek Brice

Anthony Greenslade (officer HN2401)

The day also saw the publication of the written evidence of Anthony Greenslade (officer HN2401). He joined the police in the mid-1950s, and Special Branch in 1960.

He worked at Britain’s seaports, and after a spell in Anguilla, returned to London in 1970 to work in a section that was concerned with Black Power for around a year. He said Conrad Dixon wanted to get rid of him from the Black Power desk.

BOMB SQUAD & SDS ADMINISTRATOR

He was then posted to the Bomb Squad from 1971-74, and during this time had dealings with the SDS, in late 1973 (for six months) but did not at first consider himself a member of the unit.

At this time the Bomb Squad was conducting surveillance of the Angry Brigade; he worked alongside Brice (see below). He served the unit as a DI towards the end of 1973, working in an admin role. He helped the SDS by purchasing 12 cars for the undercovers to use and setting up second safe house for the spycops.

SDS RECRUITS – BOTTOM OF THE CLASS

It seems that the SDS ‘Class of 73’ had a problem with passing exams. as Greenslade was tasked with improving the spycops promotions exam record – he ran weekly classes for them at the safe house that lasted 3-4 hours. Only three of his six students passed these exams.

Interestingly, he states that low morale was a known issue in the SDS, and he was not the only officer brought in to help solve this problem.

‘KINGPIN’

He says people were recruited in a random way, at the time by HN294 who he describes as the unit’s ”kingpin”, running the unit as a “fiefdom”.

He says he wasn’t involved in choosing targets or the officers’ reporting, or any liaison with outside agencies like the Security Service.

He says he doesn’t know about many of the other key issues we’ve heard former officers being questioned about this week, such as the use of deceased children’s identities, sexual relationships with targets (which he thinks would have been unacceptable), or tradecraft. He knew nothing about the any ‘incidents’ in the SDS.

He said that personal details were routinely included in Special Branch reporting – there was nothing unusual about the material that the SDS were including in theirs.

Greenslade simply repeats that the SDS contribution to policing was that they provided advance warning in demonstrations, something that Roy Creamer brought into doubt yesterday.

He said:

“Information about trade unions would have been reported because of the effect of trade unions on the economy.”

About overtime, he noted that members of the SDS received fairly high overtime payments, and remembers that ‘Phil Cooper‘ (officer HN155) was the “highest paid” Detective Seargent in the Met at the time”. However, he doesn’t think this money affected the length of time they spent on the unit or their reporting.

Greenslade retired in 1987 at the rank of Chief Superintendent.

Probably the most interesting thing in Greenslade’s statement is his negative view of undercover policing:

“The only matter I want to add is that I wish to add if that I disagree fundamentally disagree with the principal of Undercover Policing, it was damaging to individuals many suffered from the work, and some left the police afterwards. I think some people are psychologically unsuited to that kind of work, as I am.”

Witness statement of Anthony Greenslade

Transcript and video of the morning and afternoon the day’s hearing

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The current round of Undercover Policing Inquiry hearings, focusing on Special Demonstration Squad managers 1968-82, continue until Friday 20 May.

<<Previous UCPI Daily Report (16 May 2022)<<

>>Next UCPI Daily Report (18 May 2022)>>

Tranche 1, Phase 3, Day 6

16 May 2022

Witnesses:

Bill Furner
David Smith
Roy Creamer

The sixth day of the Undercover Policing Inquiry hearing evidence concerned with the Special Demonstration Squad’s managers 1968-82 began with a summary of William Furner’s statement being read out. He was a founding member of the Squad in the summer of 1968.

This was followed by live evidence from David Smith (officer HN103). The afternoon was taken up by Roy Creamer (officer HN3093), present by video link.

The Inquiry also published many documents today relating to other early managers who are now deceased: Conrad Dixon (officer HN325, founder of the Squad), Phil Saunders (officer HN1251), and Riby Wilson (officer HN1748).

Bill Furner

In his first statement, Bill Furner (officer HN3095), a founding member of the Metropolitan Police’s Special Demonstration Squad (SDS) had helped the Inquiry to identify people in photos taken at the SDS Christmas party in 1968. His second statement dealt with his job in the back office of the SDS.

Furner supported the first group of undercover officers, who infiltrated left wing groups preparing for the October 1968 demonstration against the war in Vietnam. Based at Scotland Yard, his job was administrative.

For instance, he checked officers’ expenses against their diaries, made sure they “paid their rents and that it was all genuine and above board”. He did not deal with cover identities, cars or houses.

He was present at the meetings held at the undercover flat, which all officers came to in order to hand over their diaries and reports, and to talk about who was attending upcoming events.

Occasionally, he also attended meetings and demonstrations, remembering ones at Trafalgar Square and at Twickenham. For these, he was simply part of the audience to make notes; he did not change his appearance other than to wear a scruffy coat.

In his written statement, asked what the SDS achieved for the benefits of policing, his response was that these deployments:

“meant that we had the people under observation and different organisations completely and utterly tapped. They did not make a move that we did not know about. The obvious benefit is that we knew what their aims were.

“For example there was one group that decided to chain themselves to the rugby posts at Twickenham when South Africa were playing. We knew about this, and uniformed police were told to be present with bolt cutters.”

Bill Furner is one of the few officers who says that information from the Security Service (aka MI5) came into their office, implying it was not a one-way street. The next sentence in his statement was gisted as “Reading this information was a major part of my job.”

The SDS had a very close liaison with the Security Service – “we helped each other”.

As Furner added:

“Special Branch were the arm to make enquiries… [we] had the power to effect arrest… The Security Service was divorced from police work.”

First witness statement of Bill Furner

Second witness statement of Bill Furner

David Smith

The appearance of David Smith (officer HN103) as a witness was marked by his ability to recall seemingly mundane administrative details about the SDS and an equal inability to recall anything which might be controversial.

He spent considerable time in his post as back-office sergeant in the SDS – from 1970 to 1974, giving him substantial knowledge of the unit’s administrative side.

Like almost all other police witnesses, Smith claimed he knew nothing about the sexual relationships that officers had whilst undercover. When queried on this – and characteristic of the roundabout way he answered questions – he started musing about there being fewer women involved in radical groups in those days, with the exception of the Women’s Liberation movement.

In his witness statement, Smith was more critical, saying it was “wrong and foolish”, as it posed a risk to the Squad – and obviously had an impact on the other parties.

“Some more wrong than others, but it was wrong, full stop.”

Unlike some of the witnesses we have (and will) hear from in this set of hearings, Smith was adamant that the SDS decided which groups they would target – and that the Security Service did not tell them what to do. He suggested that there was not much interference from outside the SDS. “We knew what we had to do” – “in many ways” the operation ran itself.

Special Branch relied heavily on the two senior SDS managers to oversee the unit – they decided on who was targeted, according to Smith. Unfortunately he wasn’t pressed on this topic, even when he contradicted himself, saying that Special Branch’s C squad advised on tasking.

Later, Smith said he often took Special Branch Registry files about individuals to the safe house, with a note asking the officer in the field if they could assist with information about these people.

Smith also says that right wing organisations weren’t appropriate targets for the SDS at that period in time, not worth infiltrating. However, by the time he had become a Chief Inspector in C Squad in the late 1970s and early 1980s and was responsible for right-wing and animal rights groups, that had changed and he had “put up” an argument for spying more on far-right organisations. Any final decision about targeting would have been made by the Chief Superintendent or similar.

“COMMON SENSE”

As with most officers, when asked whether there was any proactive attempt to advise officers not to become sexually involved with their targets, Smith said it was simply “common sense” not to do so. Obviously, not for everyone.

While there was no official training, Smith said the main thing that was “hammered home” to SDS officers was to avoid being an agent provocateur:

“We wanted them to be a fly on the wall not to be taking a leading part in things.”

He also said there were some organisations which were “pretty common throughout” meaning they were always spied on), then others “sort of came and went”. They adjusted their coverage accordingly, with “the advice of the rest of the Branch … it naturally evolved”.

Most of the undercovers had already spent three or four years in the Branch, so had a good idea about the organisations being infiltrated. He described their “rolling programme” – those whose deployments were ending could give very valuable advice to those whose time undercover was about to start.

The SDS was well-established by the time he joined in 1970: it had become a permanent unit subject to annual review. He was not worried about it being curtailed, saying:

“I thought it would go on as long… as it remained a secret”.

In Smith’s view, if a tactic is proven to be effective, you do not get rid of it.

ENDS JUSTIFY THE MEANS?

Smith said the SDS was necessary because it ‘sharpened’ things to get accurate numbers on demos to inform public order policing levels.

He then explained that joining a less extreme group, such as the Young Liberals, could provide a useful “stepping stone” and give some “street cred”, which would enable an officer to join more radical groups without seeming suspicious.

One officer, ‘Michael Scott‘ (officer HN298, 1971-76) did so and went on to infiltrate anarchist and Irish groups and the Workers Revolutionary Party, for example.

Next, Smith was asked how SDS reports were processed. He told the hearing that he received bundles of handwritten reports from the spycops. Sometimes information also came into the office by telephone. His job was to collate and put them in the standard format for typing up by the typing pool (which was next door).

He denied doing any “sanitising” or analysing – he says he was aware enough to recognise if anything “needed to be expedited.”

The next moment he said that sometimes he did “slightly sanitise” reports, getting rid of some specific details and making them “less precise” in order to send them to A8, which was outside of Special Branch. He said this was his “common sense” – nobody needed to tell him to do this, he just “instinctively knew”.

C Squad, the part of Special Branch which oversaw operations against left wing groups, prepared threat assessments for A8, which dealt with public order. The Inquiry suggests that they did 600-700 of these per year – this would have equated to 10+ every week. Smith was not surprised by these figures.

SDS intelligence would have been “woven into” these assessments – he says the unit helped by “padding out the juicy bits,” and being able to provide more precision in terms of numbers and the likelihood of violence. (The role of Special Branch Liaison officer was created at some point around this time, to “help A8” understand enough and act appropriately, while protecting the source of the information.)

Smith thought that about 50-60 SDS reports would have been written in the course of a week, of which around 75-80% went to the Security Service, adding “we didn’t send them the Irish stuff”.

He agreed with Geoff Craft (who we will hear from on Wednesday) that no other police officers were more closely monitored than the SDS officers. Monitored for what exactly? we may ask!

Unconvincingly, Smith says he cannot recall what happened at Red Lion Square in 1974. He was slightly too fast to say the name rang a bell, but that was all. It is quite unlikely that he can’t remember the death of Kevin Gately at a demonstration against the fascist National Front. Gately was the first person to die on a demonstration in England for decades – and to prevent such public order problems was the SDS’ ultimate reason for existing.

PICKFORD AND CLARK

‘Jim Pickford‘ (officer HN300) and Rick Clark (officer HN297) were both recruited as Smith was leaving the unit. Both men were known as ‘womanisers’ within Special Branch. Had he known at the time, he would have advised against recruiting them to the SDS, he now says.

Asked for his view about the sort of person who was suitable for undercover work, Smith said they needed to have a “balanced, calm disposition.” Otherwise, he kept his opinions about the spycops he worked with to himself.

Smith wasn’t hugely concerned about spycops being arrested and going to court – it didn’t happen very often – he can only recall one incident of an officer ending up in court and testifying under a false name. He agreed that “technically” this did constitute misleading the court, but also talked about “different degrees” – and drew upon an unconvincing analogy about speeding to suggest it was not all that serious.

Smith returned for some supplementary questions after lunch but said nothing of consequence.

Written statement of David Smith

Roy Creamer

Roy Creamer (officer HN3903) was an eagerly anticipated witness in this phase of the Inquiry. Originally, the Inquiry’s Chair, Sir John Mitting, had not planned to call Creamer to give live evidence. But after representations were made by non-state core participants (ie victims of spycops) Mitting relented and agreed that we should hear from him.

Though the former Special Branch manager is in his 90s, Creamer was well able to provide a detailed account of his time, his memory often better than younger colleagues.

He was questioned by Counsel to the Inquiry, David Barr QC.

BACKGROUND

Creamer was involved in the Special Demonstration Squad (SDS) at its formation in 1968, when he worked closely with Conrad Dixon. He was later active with the Bomb Squad, where he is best known for having investigated and arrested alleged members of the Angry Brigade. This topic was not touched on today. Later, he returned to C Squad (which deals with left wing activists) as a Detective Inspector. He retired in 1980.

Whereas, so far, many witnesses were relatively new to Special Branch when they encountered the Special Demonstration Squad, Creamer was already an experienced officer of ten years before the SDS was set up in 1968.

He spent much of the decade prior to the founding of the SDS, working on the left wing desks (B / C Squad). This work involved being sent to meetings, to report back on what was heard and look for the next opportunity to report on. At that time, the main focus was on the Communist Party of Great Britain, not the ‘ultra Left’ groups, which were not seen as much of a threat or considered worthy of police attention. This changed as those groups grew in size and strength.

ANARCHISTS

Creamer was particularly interested in the anarchist milieu. Rather than just reporting, he actively went out to talk to them and find out what they were about. In his justification, he said that anarchists openly boast about assassinating leaders, so it was important to find out who might be likely to try that. This interest led to him being called the ‘dialectician of dissent’ by a leading anarchist of his time, Stuart Christie.

The officer talked about his open approach to talking to anarchists, not hiding that he was from Special Branch. This lead to uneasy relationships with Christie, Albert Meltzer and others. He visited Meltzer’s bookshop to read the notices in the window on upcoming anarchist activities.

Creamer said that in his conversations he got very little on the anarchists themselves, but what he did learn about was their attitude to other groups which provided insight into how the different politics intersected with each other.

Barr noted that while the Angry Brigade was clearly of interest to Special Branch, what about Freedom Press, the anarchist publishers? Creamer was clear they were not targets for public order purposes. They were not a force to be reckoned with and were not really up for a fight.

There were ‘so-called anarchists’ who he considered hooligans, who didn’t want to obey anyone including protest organisers and so were a public order issue. He summed up anarchists as difficult to keep an eye on:

“I don’t think we were up for it. They were cleverer than us in many ways.”

TROTSKYISTS & THE ‘EXTREME LEFT’

Next, Barr explored Trotskyists groups such as the International Marxist Group (IMG), International Socialists (IS, later Socialist Workers’ Party) and the Socialist Labour League (SLL, later Workers Revolutionary Party).

Creamer described them in terms of how disciplined they were and their ability to discipline their members or the protests they organised. They could be difficult to infiltrate, but if you did you would learn a lot about what was going on. Other groups were easier to infiltrate but one learned less.

The SLL were the most disciplined group which actually meant they were much less of a public order issue. On the other hand, the IMG were not prepared to discipline themselves and did not have the will or numbers to particularly marshal their protests. The IS were a threat to public order, but only in the sense they were prepared to organise large demonstrations – which is what mattered from a policing point of view.

On the Maoists, he said that some of them were from the Far East themselves, and there was an uncertainty about their cultural norms. They could be quite loud and emotional on protests, but how much that came from anger over injustice or how much was their natural way was unclear. Given their numbers were small, he wrote that they were noisy and boisterous, but not dangerous, suggesting that a competent group of police could handle any of their demonstrations.

PRE-SDS PRACTICE

He briefly spoke of the far-right in his pre-SDS work. Then they were a mostly discredited group of little interest. Their demonstrations only received attention when attacked by the left.

Barr asked Creamer about the right of entry into a private home, a recurring legal issues in these hearings. Creamer admitted that in normal police work an officer would not go into a house without a warrant. This was the official line, including when Special Branch officers were sent to monitor meetings. Sometimes it did happen that a plain clothes officer got in, but it happened so rarely people did not think about it as an issue.

They next moved on to an extensive exploration of the usefulness of infiltrating many groups on the left. Creamer in his written statement had been quite critical of the role of the SDS and the unrealistic nature of what it was being asked to in terms of identifying public order issues.

Overall, it was Creamer’s assessment that prior to 1967, the standard Special Branch approach to public order and answering Security Service queries was sufficient, especially given the culture of the time. He was critical of the inefficient organisation and thought the lacklustre reporting back on protests was very weak. The latter was something Creamer actively tried to improve.

In particular, he noted that following a demonstration at the house of the Home Secretary, Roy Jenkins, his commanding officer Victor Gilbert was slammed for not being able to identify those responsible and explain their motivations. Something Creamer resolved.

He also took on Gilbert’s request to improve the quality of intelligence being sent to A8 (the uniformed police’s public order division):

“I felt it was my mission to do that.”

He sought out ways to write reports that would give A8 the correct impression, while noting that it was not possible to quantify the information they wanted, without offending them. For instance, if he thought a protest was going to be ‘lively’, he would up the estimated numbers so there would be sufficient police.

Special Branch’s attitude towards protests changed after the March 1968 anti-Vietnam War protest, which led to the founding of the Special Demonstration Squad.

SPECIAL DEMONSTRATION SQUAD

Creamer was hand-picked by SDS founder Conrad Dixon to play a part at the very beginning of this new Squad. His was almost exclusively a back office role – he says that he refused to be sent undercover, because he preferred to do things in an open way and because he clearly could not have got away with it, being known and recognisable to so many on the left.

He described Conrad Dixon as someone who took on setting up the SDS as an adventure, to Dixon it was difficult work but something he felt he could do. Creamer, in his words, was there to restrain him from ‘doing anything stupid’ – this was a tacit agreement between them.

Creamer helped Dixon with the reports and attended bigger meetings so he had the big picture – which meant that Dixon could tell those higher up the right answer:

“I knew what I had to, and he knew what to expect from me.”

Barr wanted to know if Dixon took legal advice on operating an undercover unit. Creamer was certain he that didn’t and it wouldn’t have been in his nature to do so:

“[Dixon] saw this as a challenge and he didn’t want to be inhibited by any scruples that other people might have because he trusted himself to be scrupulous as the situation demanded, no more and no less, and to be honest, that’s the situation.”

As to his role within the SDS, Creamer did admit that he looked out for the undercovers and helped them with advice. He particularly wanted them to avoid getting arrested, taking drugs, or contracting illnesses (in his words).

Though he conceded the subject was serious, Creamer spoke of the levity the spycops enjoyed as they spied on people and undermined campiagns:

“when we were in that squad, it was a lark in many ways, it was an adventure, and there was no ill will towards the people we were penetrating or whatever. It was an experiment to see if it could be done. That was the theme of Conrad’s police.”

REPORTS

Barr took him through a number of reports which bore his name. Creamer said that while reports were signed by him, that might be a cover for the undercover sourcing the material. Barr pointed out on that the language in the report on the Anti-Imperialist Solidarity Movement was very much the language used by Creamer.

Creamer noted that the two sets of minutes from meetings of the Vietnam Solidarity Campaign’s working committee dated December 1968 could not have been obtained by traditional Special Branch methods.

Of a report which noted that the attraction of the Maoist leader Abhimanyu Manchanda was based on him being willing to take the most revolutionary line, he said that he had to pass on the ‘germ of the ideal’. In fact he thought it would not lead to much, but at that point in time the people around Manchanda fell under the list of groups capable of ‘doing a mischief’.

One unusual report that discussed internal political divisions within the Vietnam Solidarity Campaign coalition remains a bit of a mystery. It was not from an undercover, or an informer, but by a source who knew what was going on. Creamer didn’t want to say more about it, though he clearly knew the origins. He also noted that was of a much higher standard than either he or Dixon could have produced.

VALUE OF THE SDS

The SDS had been established after the police were unprepared for the disorder at a March 1968 demonstration against the Vietnam war. The unit was established to gather intelligence and prevent any repeat in a further demonstration in October 1968.

Barr asked if undercover policing made a difference to the handling of the October demonstration. Creamer was of the opinion that it did in the run up to the day, as A8 received a higher standard of information. But on the day itself, no. It mainly came down to reassuring the powers that be that there was not going to be a violent protest.

Creamer’s most trenchant criticism, both in statement and orally was that the SDS were being sent out to look for evidence of pre-planned violence, which was never going happen. It was an unrealistic request.

He was firm that the SDS should have packed up after October 1968. As far as he was concerned, the unit was ‘hedged around’ with all sorts of difficult problems. Instead, management should have started again properly, picking out the good bits and getting rid of the bad bits. In any case, in his eyes the ‘battle had been won’ in October 1968.

However, the problem was the police were very reluctant to cancel demos outright – it was viewed as more trouble than it was worth. So protests were going to happen in any case. That attitude did not change until the violence at the August 1977 ‘Battle of Lewisham‘ clash between fascists and anti-fascists – which clinched it for Creamer that undercovers were no longer needed.

LATER LINKS WITH THE SDS

After leaving the unit, Creamer had little to do with the SDS directly. He did accept, however, that in his time as a Detective Inspector on the left wing desk in C Squad, he received intelligence that he recognised as emanating from the undercover unit.

Creamer is clear that C Squad did not influence the tasking of SDS undercovers – they had influence, and perhaps a veto, but to the best of his knowledge, C Squad did not use it.

Though he had his own thoughts on how things should be or could be improved, Creamer notes multiple times that any interference from him wouldn’t have been welcomed, so he stayed in his lane. He didn’t want to make waves and didn’t dare interfere with what the later SDS was doing; a fact that’s very iluminating about about Special Branch culture at the time.

Written statement of Roy Creamer

Transcript and video of the morning and afternoon the day’s hearing

---

The current round of Undercover Policing Inquiry hearings, focusing on Special Demonstration Squad managers 1968-82, continue until Friday 20 May.

<<Previous UCPI Daily Report (13 May 2022)<<

>>Next UCPI Daily Report (17 May 2022)>>

A report on the spycops conference held on 7 May in London.

The Campaign Opposing Police Surveillance, Blacklist Support Group, Police Spies Out Of Lives, The Monitoring Group and their supporters – a broad alliance of people spied on by Britain’s political secret police – gathered on 7 May to hear the latest from the Undercover Police Inquiry.

The session, hosted by The Monitoring Group, reported on the infiltration of campaigns, such as the Broadwater Farm Defence Campaign and the Stephen Lawrence family.

Ricky Reel’s mother, Sukhdev, said the police were more interested in monitoring her family and supporters than they were in finding out how her son had died at the hand of racists in west London in 1997.

Sukhdev Reel, mother of Ricky Reel, speaking in 2016

Helen Steel and Alison, from the Police Spies Out of Lives campaign, had their lives infiltrated by spycops who deceived them into long-term intimate relationships. They uncovered these spies, exposed them and are continuing the struggle for justice.

The Haldane Society of Socialist Lawyers hosted a session – with the Undercover Research Group and others – on how public inquiries had been whitewashes that have failed to get to the truth. The Grenfell inquiry refused to include class and race in the terms of reference, refused to look at failures leading up to the fire, but instead tried to scapegoat firefighters. Chris Peace, from the Orgreave Truth and Justice Campaign, said the British state refused to even give them an inquiry.

Labour MP John McDonnell MP committed to pursuing the fight for justice in parliament.

Lydia Dagostino, a lawyer coordinating the response of victims of spycops who’ve been designated as non-state core participants at the Undercover Policing Inquiry, talked about the continuing problems with the process.

She highlighted a lack of disclosure of police files, secret hearings of the supposedly public inquiry, and the enormously long delays – it’s more than eight years since the Inquiry was announced and it isn’t going to get round to looking at officers from the late 1980s and early 1990s for another two years, with the more recent ones being examined even further into the future.

Despite all of the Inquiry’s problems we will continue to fight for, in the words of Suresh Grover from The Monitoring Group, “exposure and disclosure”.

Lois Austin of the Socialist Party closed the conference by demanding the trade unions who were spied upon get their legal costs paid so they could participate in the Inquiry fully.
We need to rebalance the inequality of justice. The conference was a call to arms.

We have scores to settle for the terrible abuse of activists and family justice campaigns at the hands of spycops and their paymasters. Our campaigns for justice and to expose what the British state got up to, and what it is continuing to do, will continue.

Tranche 1, Phase 3, Day 5

13 May 2022

Witnesses:

Elizabeth Leicester (former member of the Workers Revolutionary Party)
Barry Moss (undercover officer 1968, manager 1980-82)

Today was the second day of live witness hearings in the Undercover Policing Inquiry’s current phase examining managers of the Special Demonstration Squad (SDS) 1968-82.

The first testimony came from Liz Leicester, a former member of the Workers Revolutionary Party.

We also heard the testimony of a central figure in the spycops scandal, Barry Moss, who was an undercover officer in 1968 and then a senior officer responsible for the SDS between 1980 and 1982.

He went on to be Commander of Special Branch during the time that undercover officer Peter Francis was deployed against the family of murdered teenager Stephen Lawrence’s, and several officers under his management had sexual relationships whilst undercover. Frustratingly, questions today were limited to the Tranche 1 era – 1968-82 – by the Inquiry’s Chair, Sir John Mitting.

Elizabeth Leicester (former member of the Workers Revolutionary Party)

First we heard from Elizabeth Leicester, who was part of the Workers Revolutionary Party (WRP) – originally known as the Socialist Labour League (SLL).

Leicester lived at White Meadow (aka The Red House), the WRP’s training centre in Derbyshire, between 1975-1978. Her former husband and WRP comrade Roy Battersby was a film director, and also a prominent member of the party.

We heard about Leicester’s involvement in the SLL – she worked in its Clapham office, on its paper, the ‘Workers Press’. Her and her husband were both part of the outer London branch. It was an unusual branch: is well known that Corin and Vanessa Redgrave were members but other prominent actors such as Clive Dunn, Spike Milligan [MPS-0747833] and Frances de la Tour were also involved.

Leicester said the open aim of the WRP was to establish a socialist state. It had a chain of bookshops and a film production company. Like yesterday’s witness Lindsay German, Leicester said that the WRP did not envision themselves being a vanguardist organisation – it was up to the majority of the working class to have a revolution.

She described the many strikes of the 70s, a “real upsurge of workplace democracy” – and made it clear that “we worked as genuine trade unionists” – rather than covertly infiltrating those unions. While they were inspired by the Russian revolution, the WRP used constitutional, non-violent and lawful means to advance their aims.

Amusingly, part of the WRP election manifesto was read out, with an unfortunate slip-up by the Inquiry’s lawyer – who accidentally said ‘conservative’ instead of ‘communist'(!)

WHITE MEADOW

Initially purchased by the actor Corin Redgrave supposedly as a “drama and arts centre”. Leicester is asked whether that was ever its real purpose – or was it always going to be a college of Marxist education? She said that the aim was to protect it from adverse attention from fascists – and not to alarm the locals.

A police raid took place at White Meadow on 27th September 1975. This seems to have resulted from a meeting between The Observer Newspaper and Special Branch officers a couple of days previously [UCPI0000034744]. Leicester also recalled that an aerial photo appeared on the front on the Daily Telegraph – presenting the WRP as a serious threat to the public. The WRP sued the editor of The Observer for libel.

A seven-page Special Branch report probably written by ‘Michael Scott‘ (officer HN298, 1971-76) [UCPI0000012240] gives many details on the White Meadow Centre. Dated 25 February 1976, the report describes the founding of White Meadow the previous summer. It also claimed 900 students had attended the centre in the previous six months. Leicester said that the figure was massively exaggerated.

Additionally, the report lists several financial costs associated with the centre. Leicester says there is no way an undercover could have gleaned that information by attending the centre – and suggest the intelligence might have come from ‘Peter Collins‘ (officer HN303, 1973-77) who also infiltrated the party.

SECURITY MEASURES

Understandably, after the police raid, security measures were increased. Leicester and Battersby searched students on entrance to the centre after the police raid. They also worried about electronic surveillance and found many listening devices. During a summer camp set up by the SLL, there was a concern about a police raid. For security Leicester says she took the membership and financial docs to London with her.

Leicester said the measures were to guard against both state and fascist infiltration. Some of the students who attended their centre were from Greece, Portugal and Spain all of which had fascist dictatorships in the early 1970s.

CONCLUSION

The Special Branch report also listed the subjects taught. As you would expect, these revolved around classic Marxist texts. Leicester jokingly wondered how the undercover got on with “Lenin, Vol. 38 – not an easy read!”

Leicester said it was outrageous that her family home – and two children – were spied upon. The WRP were not a public order threat – and the police knew that – and they were spied upon anyway.

She notes that ‘Michael Scott’ (HN298), whose time at White Meadows was described by a senior officer as ‘his swan song’, was ordered not to go there but went anyway. He could have dropped out of attending without raising any suspicion, raising a glaring question Leicester asked aloud:

“So why did he choose to go there?”

Leicester finished by saying that it’s a shame that the WRP are not core participants at the Inquiry, and that Collins’ infiltration is not being investigated more. Former WRP members don’t have the full disclosure they deserve.

Witness statement of Elizabeth Leicester

Barry Moss (undercover officer 1968, manager 1980-82)

BACKGROUND

Barry Moss was one of the first undercovers of the Special Demonstration Squad (SDS), deployed for three months in 1968. He used the cover name ‘Barry Morris’. This period was covered in his first witness statement.

On leaving the SDS he took part in the accelerated promotion scheme, moving around all the main Special Branch squads. He also spent time outside of Special Branch in CID before returning in February 1980 to become Detective Chief Inspector (DCI) for the SDS, where he remained for a year before being promoted to Superintendent of ‘S Squad’ with oversight of the SDS.

After a period (1990-1991) as a uniformed Commander with responsibility for North East London, he became a Commander of Special Branch. In 1995 he was Commander of Operations which included responsibility for the SDS. In 1996 he became overall head of Special Branch until he retired in 1999. He helped establish the National Public Order Intelligence Unit, the second major spycops unit after the SDS.

In his capacity as head of Special Branch, Moss gave evidence to the Ellison Inquiry into police corruption surrounding the murder of Stephen Lawrence. He told Ellison that he had no knowledge of the workings of the SDS, a claim that, given his extensive career with the unit, cannot possibly be true.

However, the Inquiry’s Chair, Sir John Mitting, has refused to allow questions about this later period in this evidence, which deals only with his role as an SDS DCI (in the Inquiry’s Tranche 1 Phase 3 period, ie 1968-82).

LEGALITY OF UNDERCOVER POLICING

The evidence began with David Barr, Counsel to the Inquiry, diving straight into issues raised in the opening statement of Charlotte Kilroy, QC, on behalf of women deceived into relationships by spycops.

Barr wanted to know about the training Moss had received – any on race or sexual equality, or on human rights more generally? None.

What about the powers of entry which police officers had? Moss received some training on this at the beginning of his police career and later while with CID.

Barr sought to explore what grasp a senior commander such as Moss had of basic policing principles. Moss struggled quite a bit to answer on this. There was no sense he had ever given much thought to the reasons for doing things, particularly their necessity or purpose, let alone their lawfulness.

The complete lack of training or guidance given to managers and undercover officers was a recurring theme throughout the day, as was an utter disrespect for, and lack of interest in, the law. It was only from what he had picked up from the Inquiry that he realised they had been breaking the law.

Barr looked at intelligence reports Moss had authored as an undercover officer, including a meeting of Maoists in a private home. Moss admitted he was not given any guidance on the legality of entering a home without a warrant.

“I think my understanding of the rules in normal work would have been fairly clear. I had no idea that this may have been illegal, as I’ve seen from Ms Kilroy’s submission earlier to this Inquiry.

“We were there to garner information (…) it might have been illegal in one way or another, I did not think of it.”

When pressed, Moss admitted there was no consideration given to its legality at all.

INTERPRETING REPORTS & OTHER MATERIALS

The Inquiry also addressed time Moss spent serving with C Squad, the part of the Met’s Special Branch that dealt with left wing activists.

This included an important point where he interpreted the annotations next to dates on the Special Branch Registry File index of Diane Langford, as coming from an old government classification scheme.

He was able to say C meant Confidential, S was Secret and SP was Secret ‘Pink’ – meaning material accessible to anyone in Special Branch. He also described a further category, Secret ‘Green’, for top secret material.

He admitted that while at C Squad he had written several threat assessments on demonstrations and described the process by which these were constructed. Asked if he could tell if intelligence reports feeding into the assessment came from the SDS, he replied:

“Yes, the preamble usually gave an indication that it came from SDS, if you understood the system.”

When Barr returned to this point later on, Moss took him through how the intelligence gathered – such as lists of members – fed into constructing a threat assessment. If a group or branch was organising a demonstration, the starting basis was how many people were they, what sort of people were they and what links did they have to bring in other groups or branches which would bring in numbers.

Barr also had Moss explore the SDS’s relationship with C Squad, the part of Special Branch which oversaw operations against left wing groups.

From Moss’ evidence it is clear that C Squad was very important in terms of setting the agenda for the SDS. This included guidance on which groups should be targeted. Moss confirmed that C Squad was as a key ‘customer’ of SDS intelligence, and the main conduit for passing SDS reports on to the Security Service.

There was no regular contact with C Squad, but there did not need to be as, given their long relationship, the SDS was pretty much producing what they wanted anyway. Knowing what to report as an SDS officer was developed for the most part through having been an officer in the wider Special Branch.

MANAGING THE SDS

Moss took over from Mike Ferguson (a former undercover himself) as Detective Chief Inspector (DCI) in what appears to have been an abrupt transition. He received no handover from Ferguson and had to find his own way. He learned on the job, reading reports by undercovers, and relied heavily on his deputy, Detective Inspector Trevor Butler, who had also been deputy under Ferguson, and who Moss described at one point as a “mentor”.

He also relied heavily on his brief time as an undercover, 12 years previously. Asked whether he knew about misbehaviour by a number of previous undercovers, he denied knowing anything other than that Rick Clark had been exposed.

LITTLE CHANGE

Mostly Moss continued with practices that were already in place. The only change of note is that he considered the unit had too much coverage of the Socialist Workers Party (SWP) and when he became manager he directed a newly deployed undercover (‘Malcolm Shearing‘, officer HN19) to look at a different milieu.

He accepted it was up to him to review the justification of deployments but it was hard, because undercovers were deeply entrenched in groups and difficult to move around. He gave very little consideration to the legality or justification, or alternative ways of gathering the intelligence. As far as he was concerned the system he inherited was a good one:

“The SDS already existed, so why not use it?”

He did not assess the level of intrusion against what was actually produced. As far as he was concerned, it all served some purpose or another.

Asked if operational security was of paramount importance he replied:

“Yes, no other organisation in the country, or even in the world was doing what we were doing.”

This is ironic, given the extensive propaganda criticising political policing in Eastern Bloc countries. There were clearly many agencies doing exactly what they were doing, in dictatorships all over the world.

He was firm that the primary reason for the SDS was to gather intelligence on public order issues, and the intelligence for the Security Service was ‘ancillary’, although he belied some of his points on public order by admitting that putting an undercover into the anarchist newspaper Freedom Press would have been a stepping stone to get to another group.

INTRUSIVE REPORTING

Barr took Moss through a number of reports that he had signed off, and was responsible for as head of the unit.

His response was a mixture of not remembering the details, shifting the responsibility to others – whether individual undercover officers he was overseeing, or the ‘customers’ of the SDS – C Squad, A8 (the Met department delaing with public order) and the Security Service.

Moss did not compile or assess reports, but did sign them off – well, sometimes at least. The reports were disseminated as C squad saw fit, he had no influence on that. The SDS approach was to hoover up as much intelligence as possible, which was to be considered and analysed by others.

In a few, very few, cases (such as a 1980 report on an individual who had just joined the SWP that included his job at the General Post Office, his address and bank account, the fact that he was gay and was an avid reader of Gay News), Moss reluctantly agreed that with hindsight he should have been more cautious in signing it off, as some reporting was not appropriate; but hey, those were different times.

Barr then pulled up a long report dated August 1980, about a woman, her activities, relationships, where she lived, and with whom, Barr read out a long quote:

“In the last week [she] has intimated that she wishes to fall pregnant again, and for this purpose has ceased to take ‘the pill’ on a regular basis. She is however, not quite sure at the present as to who will sire this latest socialist offspring.”

Discussing her political involvement the report says that such:

“would not include an interest in Irish orientated groups … as her main interest, culturally, politically and personally is with the black races and persons of similar ethnic origins”.

Barr asked Moss:

“You signed it, so you would have read it?”

Moss replied:

“Yes.”

And he did think the content was relevant, because this individual would probably ‘settle down’ and be less active in the ‘ultra left’ if she had another child – adding sexism to his racism.

Barr pressed on:

“Did you consider the tone appropriate?”

Moss started stuttering:

“I — I — I thought one of the sentences was — was a bit odd, and I’m not sure I’d — in — in today’s light — I haven’t got it in front of me any more — “

Although Moss said he understood that the tone of this report would be unacceptable now, he was very reluctant to accept that the extraordinary level of detail was inappropriate – insisting that such details were of relevance to the Security Service, and therefore he would pass them on.

STEALING DEAD CHILDREN’S IDENTITIES

Moss said that at the time, he didn’t consider if using the birth certificate of dead children was lawful or not, but he did not see any other way for the undercovers to obtain documents in their cover names. He left it to his officers to create their fake identities, saying he wasn’t personally involved in this himself.

Moss accepted there was a risk, as Richard Clark (officer HN297) had been confronted with the death certificate of Rick Gibson, the dead child whose identity he’d stolen. However he said he thought “the chances of it happening again were probably remote”, because this had only happened once.

FAR RIGHT

The far right were not infiltrated in the same way as the left wing groups.

The SDS did not target them, something Moss says he and Butler discussed, due to a policy decision from a higher level – “because they were too violent, and we were concerned what the officer may have to do to prove his credentials”.

RELATIONSHIP WITH THE SECURITY SERVICE

Moss describes a cordial, good relationship between the Special Demonstration Squad and the Security Service under his management. They had meetings every few months and they appeared to be genuinely grateful for the intelligence supplied, particularly the intelligence on the SWP who in the Security Service’s mind had replaced the Communist Party of Great Britain as the main subversive group. He wanted to be as helpful to the Security Service as possible, provided it did not cut across the public order mandate of the SDS.

In these hearings, and earlier ones, we had heard there was almost no formal training or guidance for undercover officers, but today Barr brought out a syllabus from 1979, for a Special Branch training course that ran over three weeks.

Later in his career Moss held responsibility for organising these courses for Special Branch officers from all over the country, which ran parallel with courses by the Security Service for their staff. In conjunction, they would provide lecturers for a number of topics.

He supposed that the Security Service would have liked to have even more influence over the SDS than they did, saying:

“if we could accede to their requests without detriment to ourselves, then we would oblige them… it wasn’t quite a two way flow of information – we probably gave them more than they gave us”.

Asked if undercover officers took risks in order to gather intelligence for the Security Service, he said he left it to his officers to judge whether the risk was worth it – the priority was to maintain their cover in the group. Much of the communication with the Security Service was mediated by C Squad.

The names of the groups being infiltrated were given to the Security Service. Moss at first claimed that the officers’ cover names would not have been shared, then admitted that this may have happened, claiming their real names certainly weren’t though.

SUBVERSION

Discussion of the Security Service led to a long and technical discussion about the definition of ‘subversion’. It was clear that Moss had given no serious thought to what it meant, and made a lot of assumptions.

The nearest he had to any training on this was during the Security Service induction session for junior Special Branch officers, when there was some discussion of what ‘subversion’ was.

It was pointed out that several Special Branch Annual Reports said SWP were not really a threat, he responded that the Security Service certainly saw them as subversive.

BLAIR PEACH

After anti-fascist Blair Peach was killed by police on a demonstration in April 1979, a police internal investigation identified the officers reponsible, yet none face any charges and the report remained secret. There was a concerted public campaign for truth and justice. As with so many similar justice campaigns, it was spied on by undercover police.

Moss maintained that the main reason for gathering intelligence on the Friends of Blair Peach was the potential risk to public order.

Barr asked about the SDS Annual Report for 1979 which said:

“The culmination of the virulent anti-fascist demonstrations was the death of the Anti-Nazi League supporter Blair Peach and the subsequent campaign against Police.”

Moss admitted that this was “unfortunately phrased” and came from “a rather defensive mindset”.

Barr pointed out that in his own witness statement, Moss had referred to “the SWP piggybacking on to Blair Peach’s death”.

As Peach was an SWP member, Barr asked “wouldn’t it be fairer to recognise that Blair Peach was one of their own?” and further enquired:

“Would you accept that this was a justice campaign which ultimately did secure some justice?

Moss replied:

“I would.”

Moss said the SDS never received any requests for intelligence on the Blair Peach campaign, or any other similar justice campaign. This didn’t stop them from indiscriminately hoovering it up anyway.

THE NATIONAL FRONT

The SDS Annual Report for 1980 shows that the counter demonstrations organised against the fascist National Front were a major theme when Moss was Head of SDS. He claimed there was

“always a matter of debate within the police service how far the police should go to facilitate free speech.”

Moss was of the opinion that “it was the Left that caused the disorder in those circumstances” – and in his dubious logic, he suggested they should be banned from demonstrating:

“So what I’m saying, in rather a lengthy way, is, if the National Front had just been allowed to demonstrate and the left wing hadn’t turned up, there probably wouldn’t have been any disorder, in my opinion.”

Barr asked:

“What would have happened if the left and right had been allowed to appear without a police presence?”

Moss was sure:

“Oh, it would have been mayhem.”

RELATIONSHIPS

Almost all of the officers who were deployed undercover were married, yet their cover identities were of single men. Moss said it never crossed his mind that this might increase the risk of sexual activity occurring.

Was there not a risk of undercovers forming such relationships to protect them from suspicion and enhance their cover stories? In Moss’s view, this would have been such a “silly thing to do” that they wouldn’t have contemplated it, so he never felt the need to give them any advice about this.

We heard about the conversations Moss had with his officers when he met them at the unit’s safe houses (twice a week) – to check in about their welfare and their work. They were able to bring up any issues and discuss anything they wanted. However it seems that Moss never brought up the issue of sexual relationships with them.

Barr took Moss through a long list of undercover officers who had, under his watch, got intimately involved with women they were spying on; officer HN21 (cover name not published), ‘Barry Tompkins’ (officer HN106), ‘Paul Gray’ (officer HN126), and ‘Phil Cooper’ (officer HN155). Moss said he’d had no inkling of any of this at the time.

We also heard about some significant contradictions in how the SDS dealt with relationship issues. ‘Jim Pickford’ (officer HN300) confessed to falling in love with an activist (who he later married), and was removed from the SDS in the 1970s.

We’d heard earlier about Moss’s feelings about a Special Branch officer who was known to have been unfaithful to his wife – by indulging in an affair with a civilian colleague in New Scotland Yard – who he blocked from joining the unit.

However, when an officer already inside the unit (‘Paul Gray’, HN126) decided to live with his affair partner, another police officer, in the Met’s married quarters, Moss didn’t have a problem with it.

He went so far as to pay a personal visit to the wronged wife of this officer, presumably to put pressure on to keep her quiet, as she’d threatened (in an anonymous letter) to spill the beans about the entire operation of the ‘Hairies’, as the spycops were known.

We heard more about ‘Phil Cooper’ (HN155), and his wife. Moss said he “did not treat her well”, and upon questioning, admitted that there was some kind of domestic abuse going on, and possible violence.

Did that not give him concerns about Cooper’s suitability as an SDS officer?

“It probably should have done – if it was physical, but I can’t remember if it was physical or mental, if I can use that word. He was a larger-than-life-character.”

That chilling apology for domestic abuse ended Day 4 of the current hearings.

Transcript and video of the day’s hearing (Elizabeth Leicester on screen, Barry Moss audio only)

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The current round of Undercover Policing Inquiry hearings, focusing on Special Demonstration Squad managers 1968-82, continue until Friday 20 May.

<<Previous UCPI Daily Report (12 May 2022)<<

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Tranche 1, Phase 3, Day 4

12 May 2022

With the current Undercover Policing Inquiry hearings’ opening statements concluding yesterday, today saw the first day of evidential hearings. Testimony came from Dr Lindsey German, a witness who knew several undercover officers from the period covered in Tranche 1 of the Inquiry (1968-82) from her time in the Socialist Workers’ Party.

Dr Lindsey German was active for 30 years in the International Socialists (later the Socialist Workers’ Party or SWP). She was made a full-time student organiser in 1975, became the District Organiser for Central London in 1977 and was appointed to the Central Committee in 1979. She later helped found and lead the Stop The War Coalition.

However, today’s evidence focused only on the Inquiry’s Tranche 1 period (1968-1982). A detailed account of German’s political background can be found in her written statement to the Inquiry.

At least 24 undercover officers have spied on the SWP, recording such personal details as physical appearances, holiday plans, weddings, sexuality, and childcare arrangements.

INQUIRY OR TRIAL?

Before German’s questioning began, the Inquiry’s Chair, Sir John Mitting, responded to her witness statement, in which she addressed various common misconceptions and preconceptions about the SWP’s aims and tactics.

Mitting was keen to assure her that he and his team do not have any preconceived views. However, their approach to questioning, and their loaded use of the word ‘revolutionary’, showed they clearly do.

At times it seemed like German was on trial, to the extent she observed that:

“A lot of the questions this morning have been about my politics, rather than the role of the undercover police, which is the aim of the Inquiry.”

She was not put off by this, using it as an opportunity to correct the Inquiry and share her views of how a more just and democratic society could come about.

Nevertheless, the Inquiry’s hostile approach to questioning members of the public who were spied upon could put off future witnesses. This concern has been raised by a number of victims of spycops’ abuses, who do not want, and should not have to, defend themselves against the Inquiry’s preconceived views and thinly-veiled attacks.

IMPROVING DEMOCRACY

Under questioning from David Barr QC, Counsel to the Inquiry, German talked about the aim of the SWP to replace Parliament with things like Workers Councils: “a higher version of democracy than we have now”. However, in her opinion, these revolutionary aims were never close to fruition in her time with the SWP.

Barr asked a series of questions about whether the SWP sought to “escalate” industrial disputes and “confront” fascism. He questioned German’s “critical view of the police” and the security measures taken by the SWP at their National Delegate conference [UCPI0000013228] in 1978.

German responded that a more assertive attitude by workers was the best strategy, something that had also been trade union policy, as well as the SWP. She gave context about the growth of fascism and how her relatives had fought fascism in World War Two.

She explained that the SWP’s security stemmed partly from fears of state surveillance and blacklisting – fears, that it turned out, were entirely justified – and added the threat from the far-right.

POLICE BIAS

German explained her views of police bias, in terms of crimes prosecuted and the fact that they are used as a force of repression. These views are backed up by the evidence currently before the Inquiry, which shows the police planning to attack demonstrators and treating the far-right much more favourably than the left. In her view, she confirmed, the institution of the police does not benefit the working class.

Barr made a large jump from that statement to ask if that meant she thought the police were “fair game” for physical violence in the streets. He asked whether if the police outside outside Conservative Party conferences – for example those who policed the Right to Work demonstration outside the one in Brighton in 1980 – [UCPI0000015888], were fair game for protecting the elite? Was it therefore legitimate to push through their cordons?

He pressed this point several times. German calmly argued that the question implied a misconception about whether people planned violence at demonstrations. They didn’t.

INTERACTION WITH OTHERS

Barr then went on to ask about a number of other organisations: School Kids Against the Nazis (SKAN), Women’s Voice, Rock Against Racism, Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament, and armed Irish republican group the Provisional IRA(!)

We’ve already heard how the spycops of the Special Demonstration Squad (SDS) targeted youth organisations like SKAN at the Security Service’s direction.

German agreed the SWP was involved in SKAN, however she said that it was a broad front and ‘larger groups’ joined the fight against fascism. The SWP were a minority in that organisation.

Women’s Voice was different, it was not a broad front type organisation, it was an organisation of socialist women. While Rock Against Racism was different yet again, formed by a small group of people in reaction to racist comments made by Eric Clapton.

Barr asked if the SWP had a “surreptitious” approach to “controlling” the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CND). She dismissed the claim, saying the SWP was open about and localised in its approach to CND.

She did agree that the SWP wanted CND to be “more militant” – not by doing more direct action (something that CND already did, and continue to do, a lot of), but by making more links with trade unions and the working class, and being more collective.

ARMED STRUGGLE

Barr then pressed German on the SWP’s support for “the armed struggle” [UCPI0000015994], particularly in Ireland. She replied that the SWP supported the Provisional IRA’s aims but not their bombing campaigns; she could support attacks on military infrastructure but not the bombings of pubs or other targets.

We were shown another Special Branch report [UCPI0000019543] about a party held at the home of SWP organiser Chris Harman. Somebody who attended the party, a former IMG member who had lived in Belfast, allegedly ‘while somewhat the worse for drink’, spoke of being ‘trusted by’ the Provisional IRA and ‘fully sympathetic to their cause’.

Barr asked how common such views were within the SWP.

German didn’t think this report was true. This person was involved in the H blocks campaign, seeking political status for IRA prisoners, and in supporting the hunger strikers – something that enjoyed wide support at the time.

Ironically, we know that if the SWP really were directly involved with the Provisional IRA, they probably wouldn’t have been spied upon; the SDS’s 1976 Annual Report stated it was policy not to infiltrate groups directly connected with the Provisionals as this would be too dangerous for the spycops.

CONFRONTING FASCISM

After a break, Barr’s questions moved to the relationship between the SWP and the far-right. He started with events in Red Lion Square in June 1974. The fascist National Front had booked Conway Hall for a rally, and a broad range of organisations organised a counter-demonstration to stop them.

At the time German was a student at the nearby London School of Economics, a short walk away. She recalls that journey, and the huge number of police vans she saw on the way:

“I’m not surprised that somebody died on that day. It was very very heavily policed and in a very violent way”.

The police pursued demonstrators, attacking them with truncheons and even throwing some over the railings into the underpass on Theobalds Road. During charges into the crowd by mounted police, Kevin Gately, a young student from Warwick, was killed.

German said:

“We didn’t go looking for trouble, we weren’t the people who created the trouble.”

Rather, the police had put a huge operation in place because they were determined to ensure the fascist event would go ahead.

Barr mentioned Lord Scarman’s inquiry after the event, saying that he “fairly and squarely put the blame on the IMG [International Marxist Group]” who “assaulted the police in an unexpected, unprovoked and viciously violent attack”.

German disagreed: “that’s not an accurate description”, pointing out that Gately was an IMG member, and:

“they were demonstrating perfectly acceptably.”

THE BATTLE OF LEWISHAM

Barr next cited a report from a 1976 meeting about racism in Hackney which described how a “negress in the audience” had said that Black people in Brixton were arming themselves with “knives and coshes”.

German pointed out that the “bizarre” report should be taken with a big pinch of salt, especially as there is no other evidence of this. It was down to her (not Barr) to comment on the language used by the author, saying “even in the 70s people didn’t talk like that”.

She also reminded Barr that this was a dangerous time for socialists, as well as Black and Asian people – fascists would attack people on the tube for wearing anti-racist badges. The SWP believed that combatting racists should be done collectively, involving the trade unions and wider groups.

“We were very careful, we didn’t want this to become a kind of individual gang fight between left and right”.

Barr had brought this up because he wanted to ask German about the August 1977 events that became known as the ‘Battle of Lewisham‘, and the SWP Central Committee’s attitude towards the anti-fascist counter-demonstrations that had been planned for that day.

German was at a by-election in Birmingham at the time of the Lewisham demonstration, and was not a member of the SWP’s Central Committee until 1979. Nevertheless, she patiently explained why it was so important to oppose a fascist demonstration that had deliberately chosen to walk through a multicultural community. It was a consciously provocative and intimidating act.

Indeed, not seeking to prevent the fascists marching would have been a mistake, as the consequence of not coming out on the streets (in Lewisham or anywhere else) would be more attacks on Black people – much, much worse.

Pressed, German provided more detail on the SWP’s approach to demonstrations, explaining that the SWP had an extensive stewarding operation:

“We wanted to make sure people could get to marches safely, that they would take place in a collective, disciplined way and not descend to individual fighting. We put a lot of effort into that.”

When asked about their use of obstruction as a tactic, she explained that they would occupy the road in order to prevent fascists from marching into areas where they might cause trouble. There were more than 50 racist murders of Black and Asian people in those years and the SWP felt strongly about this issue. There should have been official recognition that the National Front marches were unacceptable.

Nobody wanted the National Front in Southall – pretty much the entire community there were very clear about not wanting the fascists in their area, yet the police went out of their way to let that rally happen in 1979. There was a huge counter-demonstration, which SWP members attended, and this is when the police killed Blair Peach, who was a member of the Party.

Eventually, the Met banned all National Front marches in 1981.

German also gave examples of successful community resistance to the National Front such as occupying the space at the top of Brick Lane to stop them selling fascist papers there, painting over racist slogans, dealing with racism in ‘low-level ‘ways in workplaces, etc.

SPYCOPS IN THE PARTY

Finally, towards the end of the morning, Barr’s questioning moved to the activities of some of the spycops themselves. German was involved in the Right To Work campaign. In 1981 she spent three weeks on a Right To Work march – as did an undercover officer using the name ‘Colin Clark’ (officer HN80, 1977-1980).

She says that Clark put himself very much at the centre of the operation – “presumably to find out as much information as he could”. He took part in most of the day to day decisions, about money for food, etc, but also important discussions such as how to avoid dangerous situations or prevent young people who joined the protest march from being arrested.

Looking back, German said:

“It’s very disturbing that he was in this position… I feel uncomfortable, it’s disquieting…I find no justification for it whatever.”

After a brief detour to ask his characteristic questions about “trouble” during that Right to Work march (spoiler: there wasn’t any), Barr cited a 1982 report [UCPI0000015888] containing details of donations (including small ones) made to the campaign. This information was meant to be confidential, but it was hoovered up by the SDS.

The Inquiry sought a better understanding of the way the campaign (and the SWP) was organised and how these donations were dealt with. There were a number of questions about the office and headquarters, about the different positions within the SWP structure, and what these levels meant in terms of access to information and involvement in decision-making.

German explained that although some people in leadership roles worked from home, they would also come in to the office. Those who worked in the office would come along to meetings and social events, trips to the pub, etc.

She remembered some of the spycops – she says they attended social events and generally kept a fairly low profile. Some, like ‘Phil Cooper’ (officer HN155, 1979-1984), although not on the SWP’s Central Committee would have had some influence over what was going on. Of most concern, though, is the level of access to information of all kinds – people’s names and personal data, Party finances, etc – that he would have had. [UCPI0000011563]

TRIPE

Barr then moved on to a series of reports from October 1977, 1979 [UCPI0000013669], 1980 [UCPI0000013961], and 1983 [UCPI0000015986], all of which mention German by name.

TThe spycops had reported back about her appointment as a new District Organiser, and then her promotion to the SWP Central Committee and role of as ‘Women’s Organiser’. They reported on her attending a Blair Peach demo on the first anniversary of his death.

One exhibit said that the photo they had of her on file was no longer a good likeness, and requested a new one. The last detailed her new address and living arrangements.

Barr wanted German’s reaction to all of these. She described the last report as “tripe”, dismissing it as inaccurate and pointless. She said these reports represented a completely unjustified level of intrusion, and pointed out that much of the information they contained was in the public domain. Events such as the SWP National Conference at Skegness were advertised publicly.

Blair Peach was her neighbour, someone she regularly saw and spoke to. The demo where he was killed was described by someone she knew as “the most violent demonstration he’s ever been on”.

“We know that Peach was murdered by the police”.

That the spycops reported the SWP used his death “for their own ends” was a “complete disgrace”, saying more about the mindset of the undercover police and their attitudes towards those who demonstrated.

German said this Inquiry must address the “appalling way” the police treated “people who were going about perfectly legitimate political activity”.

SPYCOPS AT THE PARTY

After lunch, Barr pulled up more reports, from the Easter rallies the SWP held in Skegness in 1980 [UCPI0000014551] and 1982 [UCPI0000018180].

According to German, these weekend-long events in Skegness were part holiday/ social, part political. Many of those who attended were not party members or politically involved – some “just went there because the wanted a good time” – others accompanied their partners – many people brought their children.

These two reports contain long lists of attendees’ names (running to 50 pages). Barr pointed out the words “no trace” after many of the names – suggesting that Special Branch ran searches on all the names and this was the first time that many of these people had come to their attention. Some of them were only there as paid entertainers, comedians and the like.

German confirmed that these lists of names, as well as other documents displayed by Barr, containing internal Party statistics [UPCI0000016148], and the phone numbers of the SWP secretariat [UCPI0000016582] would have been confidential, as would the level of detail in thereport of the SWP’s 1980 National Delegate conference [UCPI0000016619].

German stated that there was no justification for this level of intrusion from the police. She concluded the police “simply wanted to put the Left in a very bad light.”

Notably, there was no such infiltration of the National Front, an obviously political decision.

Asked for her reflections on the spycops operation, she said it represented a big effort and a lot of public money for very little results.

Mitting had a few questions for her at the end of the day. He noted that electoral candidates – even the National Front – were legally permitted to hold election rallies in public buildings , to make some kind of point:

“I accept that you objected to it, but you knew that the law of the land actually provided that they were entitled to make use of these places?”

The Inquiry’s Chair then thanked her for her time, inviting her back for Tranche 2 – covering 1983-92, expected to occur in 2024 – “health and intellect permitting of course – that goes for both of us”, he laughed.

With that slightly disturbing ‘joke’, suggesting that ongoing delays to the process will continue to result in many witnesses, and perhaps even Mitting himself, being too dead, infirm or mentally incapacitated to take part, Day Four of this round of hearings came to an end.

Follow Lindsey German on Twitter: @LindseyAGerman

Witness statement of Lindsay German

Full list of associated publications

Video and transcript of the day’s hearing

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The current round of Undercover Policing Inquiry hearings, focusing on Special Demonstration Squad managers 1968-82, continue until Friday 20 May.

<<Previous UCPI Daily Report (11 May 2022)<<

>>Next UCPI Daily Report (13 May 2022)>>

Tranche 1, Phase 3, Day 3

11 May 2022

The third day of the 2022 Undercover Policing Inquiry hearings concerning the management of the Special Demonstration Squad 1968-82 included opening statements from:

Rajiv Menon QC (representing Tariq Ali, Piers Corbyn and Ernie Tate)
Dave Morris (activist, Inquiry core participant)
Kirsten Heaven (representing Other Non-Police, Non-State Core Participants [through the co-ordinating group])
Summary of Evidence of ‘Madeleine’ and Julia Poynter

Rajiv Menon QC (representing Tariq Ali, Piers Corbyn and the interests of Ernie Tate)

NB: Ernie Tate sadly passed away in 2021, without receiving any meaningful disclosure from the Inquiry.

SECRET HEARINGS AND MASSIVE REDACTIONS

First of all, Mr Menon spoke about the secret hearings that have been held during the last year, known as the ‘T1P4 hearings’. In his view, it is “fundamentally wrong and unfair” to conduct closed hearings as part of a so-called ‘Public Inquiry’.

The transcripts of those hearings have been heavily redacted, and we are told that this is being done “in the public interest”. Evidence was taken from five officers in T1P4, but we are not being told their real or cover names. Instead of being supplied with copies of their evidence, we have a document of ‘Unattributed Excerpts‘.

This was especially ridiculous in the case of officer HN21:

“an officer who was perfectly willing 20 years ago to speak openly about his undercover role in the BBC documentary True Spies, is unable to give evidence in open session to a Public Inquiry.”

This is someone who admitted having a sexual relationship with at least one woman, but we have not been permitted to question him or find out more about this.

It is estimated that 50% of the evidence gathered during T1P4 has been redacted, and might therefore remain secret forever. Menon repeated the request he made last year – that the Inquiry reconsider the need for such redactions, and commit to regularly reviewing decisions about disclosure, so that names and information can be made public in future if circumstances change.

POLICE VIOLENCE

This secrecy was also wrong in the case of officer HN41 who is of great importance to understanding what happened at the anti-racist demonstration in Southall on 23rd April 1979, when Blair Peach was murdered by the Met’s Special Patrol Group and Tariq Ali and many others were severely beaten by police officers.

HN41 says that he was warned by senior Special Branch officers not to go with his target group “because the uniform police were going to clamp down on the demonstrations” and “management considered the dangers were more than normal”.

Mr Menon states there is no doubt uniformed police were under secret orders to use violence at anti-fascist demonstrations. Meanwhile intelligence from the Special Demonstration Squad (SDS) seemed to heighten a view within the police that all anti-fascist demonstrators were subversives so fair game for police truncheons.

POLITICAL BIAS

According to DI Angus McIntosh (officer HN244), there was a “high level policy decision” not to infiltrate extreme right-wing groups. This confirms what we already knew about the prejudiced nature of SDS surveillance. Yet, given HN41’s observations, who exactly made this decision and why?

Mr Menon asks us to bear in mind that the SDS was an integral part of the secret state. Senior offices and politicians were well aware of the SDS’ existence, something borne out by the disclosure we have had.

He also lets the comments of SDS manager Geoffrey Craft (officer HN34) about “mob rule”, “lefties” and “scruffy, hairy so-and-so’s” speak for themselves, having described it as “classic ‘Reds under the Bed’ stuff with a dose of McCarthyism thrown in for good measure” [Inquiry document number MPS-0747446, not yet published on the Inquiry website].

GOOD – FOR NOTHING?

Following up on his earlier points on HN41, he addresses the claimed success of SDS in combating public disorder by asking:

“Are Red Lion Square, Grunwick, Lewisham and Southall supposed to be police ‘successes’? If so, perhaps this gives the measure of what the police were trying to achieve at the time”.

Really “scraping the justification barrel” is the suggestion that the unit’s usefulness includes working out that some groups pose no threat at all, by infiltrating them for long periods of time (which we see in many of the SDS Annual Reports).

ALTERNATIVE INTELLIGENCE GATHERING METHODS

He next looked at whether there were less harmful ways of collecting intelligence, using the case of SDS officer Roy Creamer and the anarchist scene of the late 60s/ early 70s. DI Creamer was described by noted anarchist Stuart Christie as “the Yard’s dialectician of dissent.”

Creamer was curious as to what made anarchists tick. He was the epitome of what Menon called the ‘direct approach’, as opposed to the ‘oblique approach’ developed by Conrad Dixon and the other spycops.

Instead of going undercover, he established friendly relationships with targets and talked to them. The barrister suggested the ‘direct approach’ was a proportionate and less damaging approach to the gathering of intelligence than the SDS method.

However, we at the Campaign Opposing Police Surveillance strongly recommend you never talk to coppers, especially if they seem friendly!

SDS & MI5

Menon next moved to a theme of increasing importance in the Inquiry – the relationship between the SDS and the Security Service (aka MI5) [see Inquiry document MPS-0747446 when they upload it to the Inquiry site].

He emphasised the Security Service’s interest in this new unit from the moment it was founded. They recognised the Squad’s potential value as a long-term intelligence gathering operation against all those it deemed ‘subversive’. If anything;

“MI5 were the organ grinders, and SDS were the monkeys. Only the monkeys did not know to whose tune they were really dancing.”

Even Craft says that: “the Branch were the legs of the Security Service… SDS was only a development of that”, and that the SDS provided the Security Service with “a huge base of information for their vetting activity”.

Opening statement of Rajiv Menon QC

Dave Morris (representing himself)

This was a relatively short statement from Morris, who has already given several previous opening statements to the Inquiry and a witness statement.

His name appears in multiple SDS reports released by the Inquiry. He was active in various anarchist and environmental groups:

“I have been involved since 1974 in a range of groups and campaigns trying to encourage the public to support one another and empower themselves where they live and work, to challenge injustice, oppression and damage to the environment, and to make the world a better place for everyone.

“The various groups I have been involved in over the decades have been open and collectively-run, and engaged in the kind of public activities which the public are invited to join in or to replicate for themselves, and which are essential if humanity is to progress and survive.”

These groups challenged the government and powerful companies, as well as ruthless and unaccountable elites which were ‘subversive of society and people’s real needs.’

Morris said:

“I am proud of the many groups and campaigns I have been involved in and believe that such efforts should be supported, not undermined.”

One of those campaigns which is now known to have been infiltrated was the Torness Alliance anti-nuclear campaign.

Having noted that the Inquiry’s Chair, Sir John Mitting, had been furnished with an education in Trotskyism from Tariq Ali, Morris correspondingly provided Mitting with a primer on anarchism, explaining that some institutions simply cannot be reformed but must be replaced by genuine democracy.

He helpfully provided a list of books for the Chair to read in order to better understand anarchist thinking:
Anarchism – A Very Short Introduction by Colin Ward
Demanding the Impossible by Peter Marshall
On Anarchism by Noam Chomsky
and just in case Mitting was partial to science fiction, Ursula Le Guin’s classic The Dispossessed.

Morris mentioned one spycop, ‘Tony Williams’ (officer HN20), who became treasurer and secretary of the London Workers Group and whose reporting was no doubt passed on to the Security Service for blacklisting purposes. Apparently the SDS told the Security Service they considered Williams’ withdrawal from the field ‘no great loss’ as he had not been ‘particularly productive’.

Morris criticised the Inquiry for continued delays and other problems to do with the publication of documents – some of which were released so late in the day that there was insufficient time for anyone to process them properly.

Morris was particularly critical of the police and the Inquiry for failing to prioritise the welfare of the spycops’ victims. He made the point that those undercover officers had a duty of care towards the public. The police’s sudden championing of privacy and human rights, when it came to applying for anonymity, was hypocritical and self-serving, and only because they themselves were now being exposed to public scrutiny.

Finally, in a slightly surreal moment, Mitting asked Morris which book he would select from his list if he could only pick one. Dave unhesitantly went for Peter Marshall’s Demanding the Impossible, although he warned that it was a “weighty tome”.

Opening statement of Dave Morris

Kirsten Heaven (representing the ‘Non State Non Police Core Participants, through the coordinating group’)

In previous hearings we heard shocking evidence of what Heaven described as “an unjustifiable, unlawful, and profoundly anti-democratic system of surveillance that was fundamentally flawed”.

Managers are now in the spotlight to answer for that regime. However:

“The witness statements disclosed in this Inquiry contain a litany of denials and an apparent unwillingness to accept responsibility or admit knowledge on key decision making and events. The managers appear reluctant to give a full and honest explanation of why things went so badly wrong within the SDS in the Tranche 1 era (1968-1982), and beyond.”

Basically, if they retain a sense of loyalty to the police, it is deeply misplaced, Heaven said, referring to the recent appalling exposures:

“This is an institution which has been found to be institutionally racist, institutionally corrupt and marred by a culture of toxic masculinity, homophobia, misogyny, and sexual harassment.”

OVERSIGHT

These managers emphasised to their funders at the Home Office how robust their supervision of the undercovers was. Yet there was no code of conduct or formal training.

“Did the managers conceal these practices from their political masters or was it – as the non-state co-operating group suspect – that the cover-up went to the highest political level?”

In order to understand the problems of the SDS we must understand who controlled the unit, and the extent to which the SDS was being directed by the likes of other parts of Special Branch and the Security Service, referred to as the ‘customers’.

Worryingly, there is disclosed evidence that although they were aware of the problems, the Home Office and senior police officers all turned a blind eye. This meant there was no effective external oversight of the SDS, or of wider Special Branch.

Additionally, both the Home Office and the Security Service knew that the SDS activities of the time were unlawful. This was the reason for shrouding it in secrecy, a secrecy that allowed the abuses to flourish.

As raised in other Opening Statements, a problematic definition of ‘subversion’ was used to justify reporting on pretty much anything and anyone. The Security Service was able to exercise its influence over the affairs of Special Branch to shape how the unit operated.

Senior police officers were willing to go along with this, and ignore the lack of public order benefits of these deployments. Claims that the SDS benefited and improved the police’s attitudes to public order simply don’t stand up. Heaven used the events of Red Lion Square, Southall and Lewisham as examples. The Brixton riots of 1981 demonstrated just how useless the unit when it came to predicting or preventing public disorder.

There was no real attempt to evaluate the usefulness of the unit more generally. Annual Reports were written up in order to justify its existence and ongoing funding. It was the duty of the managers “to consider the threat to freedom of speech and democratic principles posed by the SDS”, and they failed to do this.

MANAGEMENT OF THE SDS

Heaven noted that the SDS was managed loosely and wonders whether the early ‘free and easy’ style became the blueprint for the future. Despite claims of close supervision, the managers remained blind to the various sexual relationships, and the sexist banter, of these officers.

As to the standardisation of the lengths of deployments to four years, she wants to know if there was a “positive and considered managerial decision to extend all deployments well beyond twelve months”, adding:

“It is not rocket science that the longer a UCO [undercover officer] is deployed, the greater chance there is of collateral intrusion, the development of close personal ties, sexual and intimate relationships, misconduct and abuse of power and trust”.

The lack of training given to both undercover officers and their managers is concerning. The Inquiry must look at what basic police training was at the time to understand how much they knew about legal principles such as entering private property without a search warrant or conduct issues such as sexual relationships while on duty. How did the managers reconcile this with the activities of the SDS?

DODGY REPORTING

As previously evidenced, there is much reporting which is distressing and inappropriate, peppered as it is with racism and misogyny. Nobody pointed it out at the time. The SDS managers all now say that these reports were produced for others to comment on, evaluate and use.

However, these senior officers were responsible for the unit’s work, and as such have a duty to explain this reporting along with the other practices that took place under their watch.

CONCLUSION

The SDS, as an operation, was never lawful. These abuses were aided by the Home Office sanctioning and maintaining the unit’s secretive existence, leading to a “catastrophic failure of policing at the heart of British democracy”.

The way that the unit acted during this period (1968-1982) paved the way for the abuses committed later – we were told that their “abhorrent practices survived and even flourished following legal reforms.”

Opening statement of Kirsten Heaven

‘Madeleine’ and Julia Poynter: Written statements

These written statements, from two ‘civilian witnesses’, were published in full today. The Inquiry prepared a short summary of each, and read it out loud. We prepared our own, below:

‘Madeleine’

‘Madeleine’ was deceived into a relationship with an undercover officer known as ‘Vince Miller’ (officer HN354), who infiltrated the Walthamstow branch of the Socialist Workers Party (1976 -1979). Since then Vince’s real surname (Harvey) has been released.

It turns out that he reached the level of Superintendent before retiring from the police, and went on to a top job, National Director at the National Criminal Intelligence Service. The Undercover Research Group have published a summary of Vincent Harvey’s post-undercover career.

(‘Madeleine’ had already provided the Inquiry with a written statement in February 2021, and gave compelling evidence in hearings of May 2021. Also see Charlotte Killroy QC’s statement on her behalf this week)

COLD AND CYNICAL TACTICS

In her statement, ‘Madeleine’ recounted the stressful and “excruciating” nature of her live witness testimony at the Inquiry in May 2021, where she suffered “intrusive questioning”.

This was so bad that other women from ‘Category H’ suffered “such significant distress that they were unsure if they would be able to continue their participation in the Inquiry”. This raises serious questions about the treatment of witnesses, who are in effect sexual abuse survivors.

‘Madeleine’ mentioned Vince sending her a postcard at the end of 1979, after he disappeared from her life, giving her false hope about him. She now knows that this was “a cold and cynical tactic”, perpetuated on other women by other undercovers who’d disappeared in similar ways.

MANIPULATED BY THE INQUIRY

She then recounted how she’d generously acceded to the Inquiry’s request not to demand Harvey’s real name, in order to ‘protect’ one of his family members.

However, she then found out more about his long career in policing, which involved many public appearances. She was shocked to learn that while Harvey was its Director, the National Criminal Intelligence Service had responsibility for the Animal Rights National Index (a forerunner of another undercover political policing unit, the National Public Order Intelligence Unit) and the National Domestic Extremism Database:

“I think it is imperative that he is required to provide evidence relating to this role in later tranches.”

Perhaps most disturbing for ‘Madeleine’ was the revelation that Harvey had been in charge of a child sexual abuse investigation, Operation Pragada, saying she felt “physically sick” and “turned her stomach” on finding this out.

‘Madeleine’ now feels manipulated into the decision she made not to demand his real name. The Inquiry would have known about his later senior policing roles. It is a disgrace that they allowed this to happen.

INCOMPLETE RECORD OF REPORTING ON ‘MADELEINE’

Madeleine has always maintained that the 23 Special Branch reports in her witness pack could not be a complete record of the reporting on her.

Having now come across a report of a meeting that took place at her home, but did not mention her name, she believes that Harvey purposefully omitted her name from the list, due to his involvement with her.

‘Madeleine’ now wants to check all 175 reports produced by Harvey – which the Inquiry has chosen not to publish – to see if they refer to events that she attended with him. All reports thought to have been authored by this officer should be disclosed.

Opening statement of ‘Madeleine’

Julia Poynter

Julia is also a former member of the Socialist Workers Party (SWP), and knew both ‘Madeleine’ and ‘Vince Miller’ back in the day. She has come forward and was able to collaborate her old comrade’s accounts of the time. Poynter also knew ‘Phil Cooper’ (officer HN155) who infiltrated the SWP (1979-84) after ‘Vince Miller’ had ended his deployment.

Poynter was shocked that the Inquiry held 62 reports which mentioned her name. She described her political trajectory, going from being a disillusioned Labour Party member to joining the SWP in 1975, where her “main focus was anti-racism work through my involvement with the Anti Nazi League”.

MISSED OPPORTUNITY

Poynter says that when she attended a Trade Union Conference on Undercover Policing in November 2019, she saw ‘Vince Miller’s name on a document listing all the undercovers, but did not connect this with the man she knew. If only the Inquiry had released a photo at that time, she would have been able to identify him:

“I could then have provided this evidence to the Inquiry at a much earlier date.”

Two years later, listening to the 2021 hearings, Julia realised that ‘Madeleine’ was an old friend of hers, who she had not seen for many years. She was shocked that Harvey was still maintaining that this had only been a one-night stand:

“It was clear to me at the time that it had been a significant relationship for her.”

‘PHIL COOPER’

Poynter went on to discuss her interactions with ‘Phil Cooper’, who she met through her boyfriend. Cooper and her then-partner set up Waltham Forest Anti Nuclear Campaign (WFANC) in about 1980. Cooper said in his written statement that he had not formed any significant friendships in the group.

However, Poynter recalls that:

“[her boyfriend] and Phil got on very well and were good friends. WFANC would meet at our house and Phil would attend those meetings. My memory of Phil is that he was a real laugh, very much into drinking and having a good time.”

Cooper drank heavily, and smoked weed regularly. On one occasion, she says he was so inebriated that he fell off his chair and broke it.

Poynter addressed many of the Special Branch Reports which mentioned her name. One such report describes a 1981 SWP branch meeting – a fireman contact has offered to help carry out a personal investigation, following a spate of racist attacks on Asians in the area.

According to the report:

“The SWP intend to use this information to stir up further unrest within the Asian community in Walthamstow.”

She does not accept this cynical interpretation – what’s been left out of the report is what had actually happened – in early July petrol had been poured through the door of an Asian household in the area, killing Parveen Khan (28) and her children Kamran (11), Aqsa (10) and Imran (2). She stated:

“The community were rightfully angry and we were reaching out and helping to build alliances in the community. It is offensive that the police were spying on us carrying out this work rather than spending resources identifying the murderers, who as far as I am aware have never been caught.”

Opening statement of Julia Poynter

Transcript of the full day’s hearing

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The current round of Undercover Policing Inquiry hearings, focusing on Special Demonstration Squad managers 1968-82, continue until Friday 20 May.

<<Previous UCPI Daily Report (10 May 2022)<<

>>Next UCPI Daily Report (12 May 2022)>>

Tranche 1, Phase 3, Day 2

10 May 2022

The second day of the 2022 Undercover Policing Inquiry hearings concerning the management of the Special Demonstration Squad 1968-82 included opening statements from:

Catherine Brown (representing the Home Secretary)
James Scobie QC (representing Lindsey German, ‘Mary’, & Richard Chessum)
Fiona Murphy QC (representing ‘Category F’ core participants – families who discovered that the identities of their loved ones had been appropriated by the spycops to construct cover names)
Charlotte Kilroy QC (representing ‘Category H’ core participants – women deceived into sexual relationships, as well as a child born as a result of one of those relationships, and one man deceived into a long term close friendship)
Charlotte Kilroy QC (representing Diane Langford and ‘Madeleine’)
Owen Greenhall (representing Lord Peter Hain, Ernest Rodker and Jonathan Rosenhead)
Sam Jacobs (representing Celia Stubbs)

Catherine Brown (representing the Home Secretary)

A very brief appearance, just confirming that the current Home Secretary remains supportive of the Inquiry’s work.

Opening statement of Catherine Brown

James Scobie QC (representing Lindsey German, ‘Mary’, & Richard Chessum)

‘Mary’ – one of the women who was deceived into a relationship
Richard Chessum – associated with Big Flame, Troops Out Movement and other campaigns
Lindsey German – Socialist Workers Party / Stop the War campaigner.

Scobie argued that the material disclosed by the Inquiry demonstrates that:

• There was no justification for the spycops’ infiltrations on the grounds of preventing public disorder. The true purpose was political and economic. There was no legal justification and the Government knew this.
• The Special Demonstration Squad (SDS) was really part of a large data-harvesting scheme, run on behalf of MI5, targeting anyone with left-wing politics.
• ‘Public order’ was used as an excuse, to justify the unit’s ongoing existence.
• The Government was aware that these operations were targeting lawful, democratic activities.
• The intelligence gathered by the SDS was used to blacklist law-abiding members of the public and prevent them from being employed in a wide range of jobs.

He pointed out that the Socialist Workers Party (SWP) has been mischaracterised in order to justify its being infiltrated (by over 24 SDS officers over the years). In fact, the ‘revolutionary change’ they advocated was democratic in nature, with the aim of creating equality for all. As he put it:

“The aims of revolutionary socialism are to transform society from within, re-addressing the balance of power away from the minority that holds it, to the majority that should. That process has to be democratic by definition.

“They campaigned on issues such as sexual discrimination, racism, low-pay, unsafe working conditions, unemployment and poverty. All of which needed transforming.

“They focused on building a mass movement and broad-based campaigns with the aim of helping to create a better society.”

According to ‘Colin Clark’ (officer HN80), who spent five years embedded within the SWP’s headquarters, the Party:

“were strongly opposed to government policy but were not seeking to subvert the institutions of the state.”

Scobie showed that although the unit had a purely public order remit when it was founded, by the mid-1970s this justification became increasingly contrived, as public disorder was on the decline. Instead, the unit moved towards serving ‘customers’ such as MI5, who “told them what to get and where to get it”. SDS management had regular meetings with the security services.

Between 1968 and 1971, there was an “exponential” increase in the number of SDS reports being produced, from a few hundred to tens of thousands. The vast majority contained personal details of left-wing sympathisers, rather than anything relating to public order. This is an accurate reflection of the true priorities of the spycops, not the ‘skewed’ picture the police now claim it to be. The content of the unit’s Annual Reports back up his assertion.

Even the public order successes claimed by the SDS are misleading. Scobie was able to demonstrate how they did this, in Lindsay German’s experience of the Right to Work campaign.

The SDS exaggerated the potential threat of disorder and then claimed the credit for it not occurring, when in fact it was the campaigners themselves who ensured events were well-stewarded and passed off peacefully.

Scobie highlighted the Metropolitan Police’s refusal to acknowledge the racist nature of many acts of extreme violence, such as the murder in 1978 of Altab Ali. Racially motivated attacks were relatively common, yet those responsible were ignored by the SDS.

The real threats of public disorder and violence came from the far-right, yet Scobie noted that according to Detective Inspector Angus McIntosh (officer HN244), there was a deliberate policy decision, made at a high level, for the SDS not to infiltrate them.

From the (closed) evidence of officer HN21:

“From the SWP side, it was mostly shouting. From the far right thing, it was mostly physical violence.”

Instead, two Special Branch officers were reportedly (in 1968) sent by their Chief Superintendent to take tea on the lawn of one well-known fascist (later imprisoned for inciting racial hatred), Lady Jane Birdwood, and “thank her” for the information she shared with them.

Next, we heard about the guidelines applied to Special Branch’s work, and therefore to the SDS, and the way ‘subversion’ was interpreted by them. Definitions were left deliberately vague, so that legitimate political and industrial activity could be treated as ‘subversive’ and therefore fair game for the spycops.

This may explain why senior managers (and the Home Office, according to material that’s now been released) were keen to ensure that the existence of the unit remained secret, and the public never found out that these officers had been given unchecked powers to “pry into political opinions and private conduct of law abiding citizens”, and to interfere with freedom of assembly and expression.

At least nine spycops are known to have assumed positions of responsibility within the SWP. These include ‘Colin Clark’ (officer HN80) and ‘Phil Cooper’ (officer HN155), who provided incredibly detailed reports and received commendations for their work. Their reports included a lot of information about trade union activity, an area neither MI5 or Special Branch was officially permitted to investigate. The SDS bent the rules to suit themselves.

The real reason for the systematic ‘hoovering up’ of hundreds of SWP members’ data was political and economic policing. SWP activists were at real risk of being refused work and blacklisted, and this is something Richard Chessum experienced himself. This document from 1975 refers to a ‘close and mutually profitable relationship’ between the police and employers.

Members of Parliament were concerned enough about this issue back in the 1970s to ask questions about trade unionists being targeted, but the police lied to them.

Opening statment of James Scobie

Fiona Murphy QC (representing ‘Category F’ core participants – families who discovered that the identities of their loved ones had been appropriated by the spycops to construct cover names)

Their earlier Opening Statements (in November 2020 and April 2021) described the devastation of losing their loved ones, and the horror they suffered upon learning that their identities had been used in this morally abhorrent way.

This stage of the Inquiry is of particular importance to them as they seek to learn how the practice of using the identities of dead children began and how it came to be normalised by the spycops.

Murphy took a moment to remember Barbara Shaw, who sadly passed away last year. She had been instrumental in pursuing justice for the families affected in this way for the past decade, since learning that her son’s name, Rod Richardson, has been stolen by one of the spycops.

In 2021, the Crown Prosecution Service concluded there was sufficient evidence to bring a criminal prosecution against officer EN32/HN596, but they nonethelss decided not to press charges. They feel it is ‘not in the public interest’ as the officer was only following his unlawful training. The fact that a conviction would be likely is surely enough to prosecute him, and his unlawful mentor – who we now know to be Andy Coles (officer HN2).

The CPS told Rod Richardson’s family of their decision last year, eight years after the truth was revealed, and two weeks after Barbara Shaw had died.

The delays of this Inquiry continue to cause significant distress to the remaining families, who ask that officers now “volunteer the full truth without any ambiguity and without any economy as to that truth”.

There is one family listed whose name has been redacted from the Statement. This is due to a Restriction Order granted by Mitting, awarding both real- and cover-name anonymity to the undercover who used the name of their deceased child. This means that they too are silenced, and cannot speak up in public, cannot seek support, and:

“Against a backdrop of unspeakable trauma, the family feel degraded, humiliated, debased and silenced both in the public domain and in their personal relations. The family have been shut out from the opportunity to scrutinise whether even the process that resulted in the imposition of the restriction took proper account of the ongoing gross interference with their rights.”

The families say that the evidence they heard last year ‘crystallised’ their views, that there was no need for this ghoulish practice to have been adopted in the first place, or maintained for so many years, and they question the need for the spycops operation’s very existence.

As Murphy put it:

“the Special Demonstration Squad (“SDS”) was a secret operation, operating in isolation from and far beyond the moral and legal norms of policing; and they had every confidence that its secrets, including the immorality and illegality at the core of its practices, would remain secret.”

Murphy then provided an overview of the practice, the many contradictions and how mangers sought to justify it.

In the early years of the SDS, only one officer (‘Mike Scott‘, officer HN298) stole the identity of a deceased child. He says he did so on his own initiative. Other undercovers in those years (1968-74) simply created fictitious identities, and this worked fine. They were able to obtain driving licences, library cards, etc, in their invented names, and no deployments were compromised as a result. Regional and National Crime Squad officers continued in this way until at least 1998, again without any problems.

However, we now know that many SDS officers (approximately half of those represented by the Designated Lawyers) chose this method of constructing an identity based on the real name of a deceased child, from 1974 onwards.

It’s been suggested that this became standard procedure due to deployments based on purely fictitious identities being compromised. However there is no evidence of this being the case.

There were spycops who raised concerns about this practice, and about the moral implications, and at least one who is known to have refused to adopt this method of creating a ‘legend’. ‘Colin Clark’ chose to use a fictitious name during his time undercover (1977-82), with a passport issued and no known problems.

When deployments were compromised, this was often due to the officers themselves making mistakes – for example, ‘Graham Coates‘ (officer HN304) accidentally gave his real name when stopped for drink driving.

Richard Clark (officer HN297) was confronted by Big Flame activists with a copy of a death certificate for the person he was pretending to be (‘Rick Gibson’) and had to be pulled out of the field immediately as a result.

Whether or not this tactic originated with The Day of the Jackal book, or the film of the same name, or the KGB (!) remains unknown.

Murphy went on to say that the SDS was “an entirely misguided enterprise”, blaming the unit’s managers for perpetuating this unethical and illegal practice and a “toxic culture” of secrecy. She cited the current temporary MPS Commissioner, who recently spoke out about failures of leadership resulting in institutional toxicity that could not be explained away as just a few ‘bad apples’.

Opening statement of Fiona Murphy QC

Charlotte Kilroy QC (representing ‘Category H’ core participants – women deceived into sexual relationships, as well as a child born as a result of one of those relationships, and one man deceived into a long term close friendship)

Kilroy began her oral statement with some very old case law – about the ransacking and seizure of property by the Earl of Halifax, in the home of John Entick, in 1762. The relevance to the Inquiry soon became apparent.

Entick went on to sue for trespass, and the resulting, 260-year old judgement Entick v Carrington is one of the most important pieces of British constitutional case law. It establishes that the state cannot issue “general warrants”, or any kind of speculative or non-specific invasion of private homes in search of evidence of crimes. This, together with the Common Law principles of personal security, liberty and property, underpins much of modern policing.

BACK TO THE FUTURE

Fast forward two centuries, to 1968. Following unrest on the March 1968 Grosvenor Square demo, the Special Demonstration Squad (SDS) was set up by Special Branch and the Home Office, seemingly with any proper legal or political oversight. Very quickly, officers were creating false identities, being provided with accommodation and expenses and being deployed for years on end.

They routinely entered private homes, and were given very little direction about what to report or who to target. They gathered huge amounts of very private information and shared that with other agencies. This plainly conflicted with the bedrock of the law. However, they had a weapon the Earl of Halifax did not have: secrecy.

Charlotte then re-told the now familiar story of officer Mark Kennedy’s unmasking in 2010, which began the unravelling of the secrecy surrounding the SDS and Kennedy’s unit, the National Public Order Intelligence Unit.

It was revealed that they had entered the private homes of thousands of people and that Kennedy was one of dozens of officers who had deceived women into sexual relationships. Some even had children. All this was discovered by accident and it is only because of that accident that this Inquiry exists at all.

THE PROBLEM WITH SECRECY

“Secret surveillance powers characterise the police state and are a menace.”

This was the ruling of the European Court of Human Rights in Klass & Others v Germany 1978. Secret surveillance poses a danger of undermining, even destroying democracy, while claiming to defend it. In all democracies governed by the rule of law, covert powers are confined to the most serious threats. Secrecy is always dangerous to democracy. It corrupts, and it encourages abuse.

THE APPLICABLE LAW

Ms Kilroy QC made detailed written submissions on the applicable legal framework.

Freedom of Expression is described as “the primary right” in a democracy, because “without it, an effective rule of law is not possible”. The right to hold and share opinions without interference and without being monitored and placed under surveillance is protected in both common and international law.

The sanctity of the home, the family, and possessions is zealously protected in common law and Article 8 of the Human Rights Act and is considered absolutely sacred, just as every person’s body is considered inviolate. Any interference is considered trespass, and the burden is on the police to justify their trespasses.

Mr Sanders, representing some of the former undercovers, yesterday suggested that everything a public authority does is considered lawful until ruled otherwise by a court. That is untrue. A statutory instrument is presumed lawful, but a trespass is not. Using deception and tricks to gain an invite to someone’s home is no justification, and even where a warrant exists, it is not lawful if it allows discretion as to who the target of the warrant is, or speculative searches for evidence of crime.

THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS

The primary focus of Ms Kilroy’s submissions is UK Common Law, nevertheless, international law is also relevant. Yesterday the police suggested it was not applicable, and Mitting appeared to agree.

This is wrong for 3 reasons:

1. The European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) was applicable law at the time, and the UK was committed to comply with it. Any failure to do that must be relevant to an assessment of the statutory regulation of undercover policing, which is part of the Inquiry’s task. How can the Inquiry conclude the statutory regulation of undercover policing was adequate, if it led to the UK breaking its international human rights commitments?

2. One of the great iniquities of secrecy is that it obstructs accountability. The UK twice changed domestic law in response to ECHR rulings during the 1980s and 90s. If people had been able to raise the practices of the SDS in Strasbourg it would very likely have led to changes in law.

3. The Inquiry is tasked with examining the effects of undercover policing on individuals and the public in general. The large scale breach of people’s Human Rights and the denial of redress due to secrecy is clearly a serious effect.

INVESTIGATORY POWERS TRIBUNAL RULING IN WILSON

This case from 2021 addresses all the rights outlined above in the context of undercover policing. The Investigatory Powers Tribunal (IPT) ruled that the Met and National Police Chiefs Council had violated Wilson’s rights under Articles 3, 8, 10, 11 & 14. The ruling is summarised here.

The police lawyers yesterday sought to diminish the relevance of this case to the inquiry, by saying that it is based on the facts of that case. That is of course true, but the similarity between the facts and the impact on individuals spied on in that case, and those in Tranche 1 of this Inquiry, is impossible to ignore.

Specifically, the police’s argument – that allowing the police to make proportionate responses to demonstrations is a justification for undercover operations – was rejected by the IPT. Likewise, they cannot be considered to justify trespass.

The findings that the operations violated Wilson’s rights to freedoms of expression and association also have obvious implications for the actions of the SDS.

The IPT also ruled that two senior officers knew about the sexual relationship and others adopted a policy of “don’t ask, don’t tell”. A finding the inquiry must bear in mind when questioning managers in this tranche. The police accepted the judgment, and did not appeal any of the findings.

POLICING BY CONSENT

The whole concept of Policing by Consent is likely to be viewed by most CP;s and as fantasy of the liberal state. Some activist groups have recently declared their withdrawal of any consent.

However, the concept did provide Kilroy with some extra ammunition. For instance, Principle 5 of the Peelian Principles (1829) states that officers are injuncted at all times to uphold the historic tradition that “the police are the public and the public are the police”.

The police are only members of the public paid to give full time attention to duties that are incumbent on every member of the public. Lying and deceiving the public and trespassing on their privacy, property and intimate lives fundamentally undermines this principle.

THE 2005 INQUIRIES ACT

The police submissions yesterday sought to suggest that the applicable legal framework is not relevant to the Inquiry’s task, because Section 2 of the Inquiries Act says the Chair cannot determine individual liability. However that does not mean that the law is not relevant to the Terms of Reference in other ways.

CONCLUSIONS

Managers ought to have been well aware of the risks posed by their operations, yet in the Inquiry’s Tranche 1 period alone (1968-82), at least 6 officers engaged in deceitful relationships with numerous women.

It is a striking feature of all the evidence so far that the common law and human rights of the individuals and the impact of long-term undercover operations on those rights were rarely if ever considered:

• There was no guidance or training on privacy or relationships
• Tasking was broad brush and officers were given free rein to decide who to spy on
• There was no restriction on entering homes
• No guidance was given about what to record, and undercover officers were expected to hoover up as much information as possible
• Very little crime, disorder, or intelligence suggesting a risk to democracy was ever recorded. Usually reports showed an absence of such risks

In conclusion, Kilroy stated that it is the Category H position that these operations were incompatible with all standards of law. Scrutiny, when it finally came, came only by accident. Responsibility for that lies with the senior police officers and Home Office officials who maintained this secrecy for so long. The Police were corrupted by these practices. Their betrayal of the values of truth, integrity and honesty is made particularly clear by their willingness to lie to the courts, attacking the very institutions it was their duty to support.

Why did managers decide to abandon all the tenets of common law and the principles of policing, simply to find out how many officers to send to a demonstration, or whether people’s ideas were “subversive”? Answering this will be an important area of investigation for the inquiry.

Charlotte Kilroy QC (representing Diane Langford and ‘Madeleine’)

The experiences of these two women provide more evidence of the police overreaching their legal powers with open ended, ‘broad brush’ investigations that relied on the spycops’ discretion. Any tests of justification for targeting and reporting on them fail, something particularly egregious given the deception of Madeleine into a relationship.

 

Diane Langford, a long time political activist, has never taken part in or been arrested for criminal activity. Despite this, at least six undercover officers infiltrated her life, and reported on her, and on private meetings held in her home. These reports contained personal information about her, often accompanied by inappropriate personal comments on her views and domestic arrangements.

Both ‘Sandra Davies’ (officer HN348) and ‘Dave Robertson’ (officer HN45) have admitted that they never witnessed any public disorder or criminal behaviour being committed by Diane or her comrades. It is difficult to see what justified the level of intrusion she suffered or the use of police resources.

Groups like the Women’s Liberation Front were targeted for no reason other than curiosity on the part of the police and/or security services. According to Sandra Davies, the undercovers were not provided with guidance or limits about entering private homes or collecting personal, private details of their targets. Robertson’s remit was likewise to gather as much intelligence as possible on his targets.

In Diane’s case, there is none of the evidence that would be required to justify an overt investigation, never mind a covert operation. This made the surveillance unlawful.

Diane now knows that the files relating to her have not all been disclosed, and requests that this happens so she can fully and properly assist the Inquiry.

‘MADELEINE’

‘Madeleine’ was deceived into a relationship by undercover Vincent Harvey (aka ‘Vince Miller’, officer HN354).

She describes how after giving evidence on this last year, she learned his real name. This led to her finding out that he went on to lead the Operation Pragada investigation into child sexual abuse in Lambeth and later became a national director at the National Criminal Intelligence Service. Madeleine was shocked by this, given what he did to her.

Kilroy pointed out that Harvey was allowed to choose his own targets and use his personal judgement when deciding what to include in his reports. He took up positions of trust (such as Secretary and Treasurer) within SWP branches and used these as an opportunity to gather intelligence on party members and activities. He reported personal information expecting it to be of use to the Security Service.

Madeleine was involved in SWP activities which were entirely open and lawful, aiming to create a fairer society. Vince Harvey himself noted that their main interest was in building a working class movement, for all that there was rhetoric around ‘revolution’.

Madeleine’s evidence is confirmed by a new witness in the Inquiry, Julia Poynter, a former SWP member, who attests to both the nature of the local SWP groups and Madeleine’s relationship with Harvey.

Owen Greenhall (representing Lord Peter Hain, Ernest Rodker and Jonathan Rosenhead)

Greenhall opened with the anti-apartheid protest at the Star and Garter Hotel in Richmond, almost 50 years ago today. Activists sought to delay the departure of the British Lions Rugby team on their tour to South Africa.

Among them was a man known as “Mike Scott” (officer HN298). Fourteen activists, including Scott himself were arrested that day and later convicted at trial. This has already been referred to the panel considering miscarriages of justice. It is an affront to justice that he deliberately deceived the defence, prosecution and court to as to his identity and the nature of his role.

There was no prior authorisation for him to participate in a demonstration leading to his arrest; he withheld key factual information that should have acquitted the defendants; the presence of an undercover officer was never disclosed to the arresting officers, the defence, the prosecution or the court; and he breached legal privilege, reporting and recording confidential conversations between defendants and their lawyers.

These concerns have already been articulated in previous statements, however we are now looking the role of SDS managers. It is clear from the evidence at the current Inquiry hearings that this was all done with the full knowledge and encouragement of SDS managers and senior officers in at all levels of the Metropolitan Police.

SDS manager Sergeant David Smith (officer HN103) was present at the first court appearance on 15th May 1972 and SDS managers monitored the case closely. Within days details had been communicated to the highest levels of Special Branch.

Deputy Commissioner Ferguson Smith sent a memo confirming the Assistant Commissioner had been verbally briefed. Senior management were strongly supportive, saying HN298 had acted with “refreshing initiative” and that they should “take advantage of the situation”.

Discussions were had about assisting Scott in maintaining his deception, participating in criminal proceedings in a false identity, and even applying for legal aid. The only concern expressed was about the potential for embarrassment to the police if they ever got found out.

This apparently sent the tone and created a template for a policy of total secrecy, lack of disclosure and complete disregard for legal privilege and the integrity of the criminal justice system.

Like Scott, ‘Desmond/Barry Loader’ (officer HN13) was arrested a number of times, faced trial, and was even found guilty of public order offences. No disclosure was ever made, however the court was told he was “an informant” (not a police officer), and were asked to ensure he did not go to jail.

In both cases, SDS managers at all levels were quickly aware of and complicit in the lies, with Deputy and Assistant Commissioners and even the Commissioner himself involved in decisions to deceive the courts. There is no mention of any concern for the rights of co-defendants or the integrity of the criminal justice system.

The themes of lack of policy, training, guidance and oversight; an overriding need to preserve total secrecy of SDS and prevent reputational damage to the police; and lack of consideration for the rights of those spied upon are echoed in other areas of concern, such as the targeting of political groups, the indiscriminate collection of information and undercover officers taking active roles within political groups.

Greenhall went into some detail about the targeting of the Anti-Apartheid Movement and the Young Liberals and notes that the evidence paints a picture painted of targeting led by the undercover officers themselves, with SDS managers unable to exercise proper control.

He also cited deeply personal details recorded on his clients and their families by the SDS and passed on to the Security Services.

He concluded by citing similar concerns over the indiscriminate recording and retention of information by Special Branch as reflected in a Home Office Paper produced in 1980 which noted that some of the information collected “may not easily be justified”, reflecting that disproportionate data collection was directly related to the lack of clear management guidance and recommending independent oversight and supervision. Yet forty-two years later, here we are.

Opening statement of Owen Greenhall

Sam Jacobs (representing Celia Stubbs)

Celia Stubbs was the partner of Blair Peach, who was killed by a police officer striking a blow to his head during a protest against racism in Southall in April 1979.

The circumstances of the tragic death of Blair Peach and the sustained cover-up that followed it is told in Celia Stubbs’ statement, and was summarised for Part 2 of the Inquiry. Undercover officers reporting on her commenced in the 1970s, and continued at least into the 1990s.

Her statement today, read out by Sam Jacobs, focused on the question how she became a target of the SDS and why intelligence was gathered on her for decades. Importantly, she found out that the Metropolitan Police still withholds information on the death of Peach.

The managers who have given written evidence generally deny any knowledge of why the Blair Peach campaign was reported on. However, when it comes to explaining the reporting on the funeral of Blair Peach, Angus McIntosh says that he would not have known to what use such information would have been put, but his understanding is that it was “for the Security Service, and for vetting, and identification/tracing”.

More was revealed in the summaries of the closed hearings the Inquiry has held. Officer HN21 recalled “one of the management” asked him to attend Blair Peach’s funeral, and it “could have been Geoff Craft [officer HN34].”

As to why it was that the SDS wanted to report on the funeral, HN21 describes that “part of the core business was to identify people, individuals who were connected to groups.” In the instance of attending Blair Peach’s funeral, the motive “was just that” and he had not thought that there was any possibility of disorder.

As was mentioned earlier today, SDS managers did not want undercover officers to attend the rally at Southall, as it was known that uniformed officers were planning to “clamp down on the demonstrations” and dangers were “more than normal”.

Undercover officer HN41 also described the “disastrous mistake” in public order planning of closing down part of Southall.

For Celia Stubbs,

“this offers a glimpse into the information likely within the report that may have been profoundly important in exposing the approach of the police to the rally, and the violence which resulted in the death of Blair Peach.”

Crucially, HN41 recalled he was “smuggled in” to Scotland Yard to give a statement as the “Murder Squad” had heard of his presence at Southall. This shows that the officers investigating Blair Peach’s death were well aware of the SDS presence and likely knowledge of events, knowledge that was never revealed in the inquest at the time.

The fact that this has only been dealt with in closed hearings raises concerns about the ability for Stubbs and others to participate effectively in the Inquiry, as without full access it is not possible to question the witnesses properly. As Jacobs emphatically stated:

“This evidence must be revisited by the Chair.”

These revelations only add to Stubbs grief about the ongoing refusal of the Metropolitan Police to be open and honest about its actions. It is painful that time and again, it is up to her to come up with new evidence of the police’s failure. And of the Inquiry’s for that matter.

Like Diane Langford who we heard earlier this week, Stubbs submitted a Subject Access Request and received her Special Branch Registry File and some further documents from the Metropolitan Police that were not disclosed by the Inquiry.

The documents include the first information on her, with a photo attached, her relationship to Peach, and an assault by two members of the National Front for wearing an Anti-Nazi League badges.

One file shows that Special Branch information was collated on all individuals who provided a statement in respect of the killing of Blair Peach. Why was that information collected and put on file?

The disclosed reports – while heavily redacted – reveal the disdain that the Metropolitan Police held towards those seeking to hold police to account. Though she never did achieve justice for Blair Peach, her campaigning was valiant and dignified. To Special Branch, however, she was a mere “propaganda tool” for the “left wing publicity machine.”
Stubbs hopes the Inquiry understands how traumatic discovering this has been:

“I have felt more distressed but also angry. To put it bluntly, police officers took my partner’s life and then concealed the truth. The concluding job of this Inquiry is to uncover the truth.”

 

Video of the morning session
Video of the afternoon session
Transcript

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The current round of Undercover Policing Inquiry hearings, focusing on Special Demonstration Squad managers 1968-82, continue until Friday 20 May.

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Tranche 1, Phase 3, Day 1

9 May 2022

Proceedings opened today in the third round of evidential hearings in the Undercover Policing Inquiry, with statements from the Inquiry’s lead barrister, David Barr QC, and lawyers representing the Metropolitan Police Service and individual undercover officers.

Also released were statements from several non-state witnesses, summaries of which can be found below.

Hearings will continue tomorrow with statements on behalf of the Home Office and representatives of some of the victims of police spies, including the statement of Charlotte Kilroy QC which featured heavily in the comments made today.

COUNSEL TO THE INQUIRY, DAVID BARR QC

The opening statement from the Inquiry barrister, David Barr QC, was long and detailed, for a large part summarising some of the evidence the Inquiry is releasing today. However, it did highlight further disturbing evidence of the scale and extent of wrongdoing by these undercover units.

In addition to the deliberate targeting of school children campaigning against the far right, seemingly at the behest of the Security Service (aka MI5), Barr cited a Special Branch memo that shows police were involved in passing information about trade union activists to private companies:

“some employers plead to be given warning if known agitators seek or obtain employment with them… when a Special Branch officer is himself seeking help from an employer, or from a union official, it is asking a good deal to expect him to insist invariably that he is engaged in a one-way traffic.”

The Inquiry also highlighted an MI5 report pointing out the dangers of vetting amounting effectively to blacklisting:

“The transmission of security information to an employing authority can have serious consequences for the person concerned, leading in extreme cases to purge from the Civil Service or, in other cases, to denial of access to classified information which can have an adverse effect on careers.”

Considerable attention was paid to the relationship between the Metropolitan Police’s undercover political policing unit the Special Demonstration Squad (SDS) and MI5. Though complex and changeable, their interaction was involved, and it is clear that the latter was highly influential on spycops’ reporting and activities.

Barr also cited Special Branch annual reports, noting that over five thousand files were opened, mostly on individuals, and over a million entries were made in Special Branch files in 1979 alone.

His statement notes that:

“the SDS reported on the activities of black justice campaigns and infiltrated far left groups which, amongst other things, actively promoted racial equality. SDS reporting on such matters formed a part of a wider Special Branch interest in racial tension”

Barr spent some time on the context of the SDS within Special Branch and how it related to the Security Service and the Home Office, including what defined the undercover unit’s reason for existence – particularly the definition and interpretation of subversion.

Though dry and historical, this will no doubt be of significance for placing any conceivable justification of the SDS in a wider context.

In particular, Barr highlighted the kind of rhetoric the police spies used about their targets and pointedly asked:

“Were revolutionaries behind and exploiting every public demonstration, ‘pop’ festival, or squat or sit-in? Or were Special Branch, even allowing for risks to national security generated by the Cold War, looking for Reds under the bed? Was SDS reporting for public order purposes, in all the circumstances, invaluable?”

He also summarised the results of recent secret, closed hearings where the Inquiry heard further evidence from undercover officers that included candid accounts of sexual relationships officers had with their targets.

This included the use of sex as an operational tactic, and the recognition that the women would not have consented if they had known they were sleeping with a police officer, as well as accounts that certain officers were known by colleagues to be “sexual predators”.

One undercover undermined the manager’s position of claimed ignorance, referring to Rick Gibson, known to have had multiple relationships while undercover, saying:

“Rick had a certain reputation and it gradually came out that he had had a sexual relationship which led to his being compromised, and that was, to my way of thinking, generally well known among the existing SDS officers.”

Finally, in recognition of the fact that the massive delays that have plagued the process have left victims without answers for too long, the Inquiry announced their intention to produce an Interim Report at the end of this first tranche of evidence. The scope and timing of that report are still to be decided.

COORDINATED STATEMENTS FROM THE MET & EX-UNDERCOVER OFFICERS

In surprisingly defensive and clearly coordinated opening statements, lawyers representing the Met and the designated lawyers for over 100 individual ex-undercover officers claimed that it would be “unfair” to judge the activities of the Special Demonstration Squad without hearing from the officers and agents that the SDS gathered the intelligence for.

Peter Skelton QC, representing the Metropolitan Police Service (MPS) suggested the Inquiry should not seek to establish whether the early years of police spying on political groups were justified (despite this being a key part of the Inquiry’s terms of reference), saying that it is “inherently problematic and unfair”.

He went on to say:

“If the Inquiry does intend, however, to make findings about the justification and value of SDS deployments into specific groups, or its reporting on specific individuals, during in the T1 period, then this can only be done fairly by asking former officers of MPSB [Met Police Special Branch] C Squad, A8 Uniform Branch, and the Security Service, directly to explain the justification for seeking intelligence on those groups and individuals, and what value the resulting intelligence had to their work.

“They should also explain why intelligence needed to be sought using undercover deployments, rather than by some other means – for example, open sources such as public meetings and publications, or alternative closed sources such as informants and surveillance.”

This echoes the long-standing demands of campaigners and core participants for a fuller investigation into where ultimate responsibility for the activities of Britain’s secret political police lies.

However, it also reflects a recognition by police core participants in the Inquiry that their undercover operations are difficult (if not impossible) to justify based on any of the evidence they have been able to provide so far. It seems they now wish to imply they were just following orders, and to pass the buck for decision making and justification of the operations further up the chain.

Both former undercover officers (represented by Oliver Sanders QC for their opening statement) and the Met make clear in their statements that the SDS was by no means an autonomous policing unit; it produced intelligence for “customers” on request.

The Met noted the huge volume of reports the SDS provided to the Security Service, often in response to specific requests, while the officers’ lawyers specifically claim that it was the Security Service who were seeking information on school children and that is why the SDS filed those reports.

Far from offering any justification for the operations, both statements raise extremely worrying questions about the extent to which even deeper, darker secret agencies have been allowed to subvert policing resources into unlawful and anti-democratic activities that had no possible legitimate policing end.

WHOSE HISTORY?

Both the Met and ex-undercover officers also repeated calls to know what relevant books the Chair is reading and for “independent, neutral, expert witnesses” to be called to give evidence about the historical context of the time.

They back up their somewhat disingenuous claim that such evidence could be neutral, by claiming that “history is an academic discipline and historians observe certain ethical and professional requirements” but go on to cite Christopher Andrew, the author of ‘Defence of the Realm: The Authorised History of MI5‘ as one such possible ‘objective’ expert.

Overall, they appear very concerned that, by present day-standards, what they did is clearly abhorrent, and they seem to hope putting it into the historical context of the sexist, racist policing of the 1970s (like a real-life episode of ‘Life on Mars’) might lead to them being judged in a more favourable light.

SPYCOPS STEALING DEAD CHILDREN’S IDENTITIES

The issue of undercover officers stealing dead children’s identities also came up. Both barristers apologised again for the practice but were keen to point out that it wasn’t really the SDS’s fault. They want Mitting to look at where the practice originated, citing a variety of earlier examples, including the fact it was used by other agencies such as the KGB. Their worry is that the SDS will get all the blame for this ghoulish practice.

Skelton also added that the Security Service had a way of tracking when dead children’s identities were being stolen to generate false passports; this is the first we have heard of this.

At the end of Skelton’s statement, Mitting addressed some of the points he had raised.

He did not accept that the theft of dead children’s identities should be investigated more widely. He was focused on the SDS and was not investigating the Security Service, and he rather pointedly warned the police that they may not want to compare their own practices to those of the KGB:

“I can’t believe that you would want us to think that the KGB were the inspiration for the practice of a domestic police force. I think the less said about that the better, no?”

As far as he was concerned, he did not need the assistance of a historian as during the period the Inquiry covers he was a ‘sentient adult’ interested in political affairs and he feels he is already aware of the political and social circumstances of the time.

If he needs any further information on a particular aspect, he can ask a witness, as, he says, he did in his previous questioning of Tariq Ali on the nature of Trotskyism. He also recognised that historians themselves have widely differing perspectives.

He was equally scathing of the request to let core participants know all the books he had read. Saying that he had a library of over 300 books, he was not going to catalogue them all, or put into the public domain every bit of evidence that had formed his understanding. He was happy to have reading material suggested to him, though.

To his mind, the most useful material he could get were the documents themselves; with most of the senior officers from A8 and the Security Service deceased, that would be his best source – if those documents exist. Apparently, despite calling for the evidence, the Met do not know where their own material, such as the risk assessments sent to A8, might be found…

However, though Mitting is not going to call on junior officers still alive, as they would not have had the full picture either, he is going to ask those who can help to do so.

Nobody pointed out that the Met are actually calling for evidence that only they can provide, and so far have failed to do. In fact, they have produced very little evidence that could put their boys in the SDS in a good light.

WERE SPYCOPS EVEN LEGAL?

The final issue he addressed arising from Skelton’s arguments was the issue of the lawfulness of the SDS itself. This has been raised by Charlotte Kilroy, QC on behalf of the women targeted for relationships – whose statement will be heard tomorrow. Kilroy has advanced a powerful set of arguments challenging the foundation of undercover policing.

Both Skelton and Sanders were clearly worried by this and sought to head some of the arguments off at the pass. Sanders spoke a lot about the ‘values’ and ‘context’ of the 1970s in his defence, and raised the point that it would also affect the likes of MI5, MI6 and GCHQ.

Mitting responded that the main issues of lawfulness to his mind related to whether undercover police had the right to enter private homes as part of their work and the distribution of confidential information such bank details without a warrant.

He is open to further submissions on these points which go to the heart of all activities of the undercover policing units, and it is expected Ms Kilroy QC will go deeper into these issues tomorrow at 12:15pm.

Oliver Sanders QC, speaking for the undercover officers themselves, following Mitting’s response to Skelton, was left floundering. The goal posts have not only been moved but the ball has been taken away, he plaintively complained.

His statement clearly showed the SDS are worried they will take the brunt of the blame for the egregious behaviour even though other spies were also at it. He echoed much of Skelton’s points where he could.

Where he did expand on something new, was the request for expert advice from a psychiatric analyst. He was keen to suggest that this would shed light on the undercovers’ activities and give necessary context.

Mitting said no, there is sufficient material on the subject from the 1990s and 2000s, and Sanders’s suggestion went beyond what was reasonable to expect of the Inquiry.

As far as he was concerned, it was already obvious that being undercover had adverse impacts on some of the officers. He also pointed out that if we are going to talk about psychological damage, he would have to investigate the damage done to the victims of the police spies.

ADDITIONAL STATEMENTS

In addition to the oral statements reported above, written statements were also published on the Inquiry website today on behalf of Diane Langford, John Rees and Joan Rudder

DIANE LANGFORD ON THE IMPORTANCE OF SPECIAL BRANCH REGISTRY FILES

Diane Langford was active in the Britain Vietnam Solidarity Front, set up the Women’s Liberation Front, was the partner of Maoist leader Abhimanyu Manchanda, and gave a strong statement during the last set of hearings in May 2021 (and also wrote up how she got involved in the Inquiry).

This year, she submitted an additional statement after finding out that the Metropolitan Police held more information on her, which the Inquiry had failed to find even though it was right in front of them. The Inquiry has something to learn here, from a core participant who would not take no for an answer.

Langford submitted a Subject Access Request to the Metropolitan Police for her Registry File. And, quite extraordinarily, she got it. The 12 pages provided is a heavily redacted copy of her personal file opened by Special Branch, the ‘history sheet’ listing the dates that information was added, and what it entailed.

Unsurprisingly, the Inquiry refused to provide her with all the included reports, saying such was “not proportionate” (read: too much work). Langford subsequently asked for the material linked to 12 specific Registry File entries to which the Inquiry agreed.

They subsequently identified two reports she had not seen previously, but said they did not consider it necessary for her to get them before the current hearings.

Clearly, the history sheet complements the disclosure provided to date by the Inquiry, Langford says:

“It seems to me to be a very simple and proportionate way to identify relevant reporting.”

As it appears to give a more detailed picture of the undercover deployments, she has some useful advice for Mitting:

“If other civilian witnesses are provided with their own history sheets it could help them to assist the Inquiry in its investigations significantly.”

Langford also concludes that the decision to open a Registry File on her was made largely as a result of SDS intelligence. What if the Britain Vietnam Solidarity Front had not been infiltrated in the first place?

This is an important issue for the Inquiry to keep in mind. Infiltrating groups on the left becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy: because a spycop is planted next to you, you get ‘mentioned’ in their reports on a regular basis, and a certain amount of ‘mentions’ would become a reason to open a personal file.

The formal designation as ‘a person of interest’ has significant implications, Langford states, blacklisting being an obvious example.

“Did the opening of my Registry File lead to other agencies opening files on me? Did it lead to trade union ‘blacklisting’ agencies spying on me at work?”

Diane Langford has every right to ask these questions, as her Subject Access Request also revealed some heavily redacted reports (not released) on her separation from Manchanda, her union activities, and even on the books she took to work: “frequently seen reading Maoist literature.”

Langford finds this particularly disturbing:

“a clear example of thought policing… how on earth did this information end up in a Special Branch report?”

She wants the Inquiry to tell her who produced the reports and who the information was collected for.

Langford is now 80 years old, and yet the state still holds files on her based on her attendance at political meetings over half a century ago. Her own research has brought to light yet more discrepancies in the work of the Inquiry. It turns out some of the reports listed on her Registry File have been disclosed by the UCPI before, but do not name her. How did the information that she attended end up in her file?

Last but not least, the history sheet of her personal file ends in 1984, and she wonders if this is because Registry Files were computerised in the mid 1980s.

“As I said in my first statement, given that I am as politically active now as I was then, I find it extremely unlikely that the surveillance of me has ever stopped and feel that this is something that is relevant for the Inquiry to investigate.”

CONFRONTING FASCISTS ON THE STREETS – REES AND RUDDER

Joan Rudder and John Rees were anti-fascist activists in the late 1970s.

Rudder worked for the Anti-Nazi League in London and had been present at the ‘Battle of Lewisham’ in August 1977, when the fascist National Front had been confronted and repelled by a huge number of people.

Rees took part in a demonstration in Southall, south London, on 23 April 1979 to protest against a march of the National Front. This protest became notorious after anti-fascist protester Blair Peach was killed by police.

Rees lived with his parents and came to London specifically for the day. He had been active in the Socialist Workers Party at Hull University, but attended this demonstration alone.

The questions the Inquiry asked of these two witnesses were quite revealing, exposing the context of the investigation. The Anti-Nazi League (ANL) and the Socialist Workers Party had put out calls to attend the demonstration, and it seems the Inquiry still hopes they can be held responsible for organising riots. The Inquiry relentlessly probed this line, asking:

“Did the ANL use violence to advance its aims? Did the ANL foresee a time when violence would or would be, necessary to realise its aims? Did the ANL advocate, provoke or approve of public disorder in order to advance its aims? Did the ANL consider it necessary to break the law to advance its aims? If so, please explain.”

Both were asked about the violence they witnessed, and both give convincing and detailed accounts of how the police were responsible for most if not all confrontations.

Joan Rudder recalls how she saw many wounded people, most having been beaten on the head. After the police refused them access to the ambulances, she accompanied them to a house made into a make-shift medical centre.

However, they were not allowed to stay there until things had quietened down. They were forcibly evicted:

“As we exited the house we went along a path to the gate, which was obviously open, the police had stationed themselves either side. I am guessing 6 or 8 officers were either side with truncheons drawn ready.

“As we went through the gate we were attacked and beaten. I was beaten on the crown of my head, my head split open. I have got six stitches and the hair has never grown back.”

“My long lasting memory of this event was that the police were out of control. Without doubt. The people I was standing with, nobody had any weapons or anything that could be used as a weapon.

“On the counter demonstration we were being herded around by the police. Their whole mobilisation was to deny our right to peacefully protest, they had riot shields, they were out with the horses, they had their batons drawn and they were long batons they weren’t short ones. Someone somewhere must have authorised their use.”

In this context it is worth repeating the reference made by Barr QC in his opening statement today to secret evidence heard by the Inquiry in closed hearings.

An undercover officer, HN41, was present at the demonstration at Southall at which Blair Peach died, even though his managers had some reservations about him attending “because uniform police were going to clamp down on the demonstrations”. This quite clearly suggests that the police violence in Southall that killed Blair Peach had been planned in advance.

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The current round of Undercover Policing Inquiry hearings, focusing on Special Demonstration Squad managers 1968-82, continue until Friday 20 May.

<<Previous UCPI Daily Report (13 May 2021)<<

>>Next UCPI Daily Report (10 May 2022)>>

 

Ahead of next week’s sessions of the public inquiry into Britain’s political secret police, here’s a roundup of what’s happened since last autumn’s hearings.

• Campaigners continue to expose the scandal of five decades of secret infiltration of left wing and progressive campaign groups
• Kate Wilson, deceived into a relationship by spycop Mark Kennedy, won a historic court victory which slammed all the Met’s political undercover policing as unlawful – not just the relationships, but the spying itself
• Spycops managers from the 1970s due to give public evidence in May 2022 at the Undercover Policing Inquiry (May 9th to 20th)
• Spycops victims condemn the continuing delays, secrecy and lack of disclosure during the Inquiry
• Women deceived into relationship by spycops publish two shocking books
• A growing scandal over ‘missing’ Met police reports into their killing of two anti-fascists, Kevin Gately and Blair Peach, on 1970s demonstrations
• Head of the Met was forced to resign following public outrage over institutionalised sexism in the force

After the last round of public hearings of the Undercover Policing Inquiry hearings, we learned that it was holding further secret hearings with spycops, from which victims and the wider public were excluded. Our condemnation of it was reported in the Guardian and the Morning Star.

COPS has found out that 43 UK police forces and three specialist police forces were involved in or collaborated with spycops.

The Spycops Info podcast – victims of spycops taking a deep look at the scandal – continue to cover many aspects of the scandal, interviewing people spied on, laying out the organisational structure, and promoting the ongoing campaign for truth and justice. The latest episode previews the upcoming round of public inquiry hearings.

The Undercover Research Group has finished summarising the documents from last year’s hearings and have now started summarising the evidence hearings. This is an enormous task. They will then prepare a report about what has been learned so far about spycops operations. They are in the process of setting up a new Undercover Research Portal site.

COPS held a successful online seminar about spycops as part of the COP26 Climate Coalition events in Glasgow in November 2021.

POLICE ‘LOSE’ FILES ON PEOPLE THEY KILLED

Few significant files or disclosures have been made public by the Inquiry, despite them saying that they would ‘trickle information out’ and promising the full Special Branch Annual Reports. Heavily cut versions of these for 1970-1983 have only recently been disclosed.

A large number of less important files have been published, and it’s plain to see the extraordinary level of detail recorded on activists. Undercover police officers took on formal roles in organisations they were spying on, and all manner of documents – right down to Socialist Workers Party branch babysitting rotas – were copied to MI5.

But the police and Inquiry are now claiming that crucial reports are ‘missing’, of the two anti-fascist demonstrations (Red Lion Square 1974, and Southall 1979) in which police violence killed Kevin Gately and Blair Peach. Officers deployed at the time are claiming they didn’t attend the demonstrations. This is a major scandal. COPS will continue to pressure for full and quick disclosure.

WOMEN DECEIVED BY SPYCOPS PUBLISH STORIES

Women deceived into relationships by spycops have told their own stories in two recent books.

Donna McLean was deceived into a two-year cohabiting relationship by Special Demonstration Squad officer Carlo Soracchi. Her astonishing story was revealed in Small Town Girl: Love, Lies and the Undercover Police, published in February 2022.

Five women deceived into relationships by spycops tell their stories in Deep Deception: The story of the spycop network, by the women who uncovered the shocking truth.

It covers not only the deception, but how the women uncovered the truth. Each of their stories has unique features, but perhaps the most harrowing element is the similarity – these officers were clearly trained and guided in the abuse they inflicted. Far from the ‘rogue officer’ explanation the Met have tried to give, it is abundantly clear that this was all strategy and tactics, taught and honed over decades.

The composite picture exposes the institutional sexism and cynicism of the spycops units, and of the police who continue to cover up and defend them to this day.

SPYCOPS ARE UNLAWFUL, COURT RULES

Kate Wilson finally won her 10-year legal battle when her case went to the Investigatory Powers Tribunal (IPT) in September 2021. Kate had been deceived into a long-term relationship by undercover officer Mark Kennedy, and her environmental and social justice activism had been spied on by at least five of Kennedy’s colleagues.

The IPT ruled that not only was Kennedy’s intimate abuse unlawful, but crucially the wider spying had no place in a democratic society. The damning judgement declared the entire undercover policing operation unlawful and a breach of five articles of human rights legislation, including violations of the right to protest, the right to a private and family life, and the right to freedom from torture, inhuman or degrading treatment.

 

Read more about Kate’s case and the IPT ruling on Police Spies Out of Lives, the campaign representing women deceived into relationships by spycops.

UNDERCOVER POLICING INQUIRY HEARINGS

The Undercover Policing Inquiry – the full-scale public inquiry into Britain’s political secret police, which has been dragging on sine 2014 with no end in sight – resumes in London for two weeks starting on Monday 9 May. These will be hearing evidence from managers of the Special Demonstration Squad 1968-82.

Core Participants – people the Inquiry deems profoundly involved in the spying, mostly the victims – will be making a number of powerful public Opening Statements from 9th to 11th May (after the official Inquiry and Police statements), which will be broadcast on the Inquiry’s YouTube channel.

Planning for attendance, events and publicity around the hearings are underway.
In a meeting with Core Participants and lawyers, the Inquiry said that it will not start Tranche 2 of the hearings (covering the years 1983-92) until 2024. It does not expect to conclude before 2026. Given the long record of delays – many deliberately imposed by the Met to avoid accountability – we think it is likely to be even later.

These delays are still a big issue for victims of spycops, especially given that many Core Participants are ageing and in ill-health, and are entitled to disclosure and answers now.

Read more about the Undercover Policing Inquiry – including an FAQ and detailed reports from previous hearings – on the Undercover Policing Inquiry section of our site.

SPYCOPS & TRADE UNIONS CONFERENCE

There’s still time to book for our free second trade union and social activism conference this Saturday, 7 May 2022, from 10.30am to 5.30pm.

You can attend in person or online, and it’s absolutely free.

It’s being held at UNITE House, 128 Theobalds Rd, Holborn, London, WC1X 8TN.

It’s being organised jointly by Campaign Opposing Police Surveillance, Police Spies Out Of Lives, The Monitoring Group and the Blacklist Support Group.

For more details and booking information, see Undercover Policing, Trade Unions and Social Activism.

POLICE CRIME & SENTENCING BILL

The PCS Bill is going through parliament and has now been knocked back to the House of Commons by the House of Lords. The Bill gives powers to police to outlaw a range of traditional protests, even individual protest.

Along with the CHIS Bill, it appears to be trying to make legal in the present everything illegal and unacceptable that the Undercover Police Inquiry is currently investigating from the past.

The House of Lords can only hold up the Bill, it cannot stop it. We need to continue to oppose the Bill and continue to protest.

Spycop victims accuse Inquiry of misreading public mood over secret hearings, and call for review of anonymity orders granted to former undercover offices, and for no more secret hearings.

Victims of political undercover policing are angry that the Undercover Policing Public Inquiry announced last week that it had just heard evidence from five former undercover police officers in secret.

The Inquiry was set up following the revelation that a unit of Metropolitan Police officers had secretly infiltrated and targeted over 1000 mostly left-wing organisations and campaigns for over 40 years, committing many abuses along the way.

The five officers, known only by numbers, who served in the 1970s and early 1980s, gave evidence before Inquiry Chair, Sir John Mitting. All the victims and their lawyers were excluded and it can only be guessed which representatives of the state attended.

Such is the extent of the secrecy that the Inquiry will not even give reasons for the hearings nor explain how they will work. Members of the public will not even get to know if evidence is given about them, which is of concern given previous mis-characteristions of groups by other undercover officers at open hearings.

Hence, a number of unknown former police spies have just given secret evidence to a public inquiry about unknown organisations and activities they had secretly targeted.

Victims designated as ‘core participants’ by the Inquiry say that denying them access is a betrayal of the need for fundamental openness within this public inquiry. Once again, they see an undermining of trust in the fairness of of Mitting.

One of the core participants, Lois Austin,pointed out:

“These officers were given anonymity years ago. Given all we have learned about the process and abuses, that anonymity needs to be reviewed immediately. These officers were involved in a unit that abused people and democracy, running unchecked for forty years.

“The idea that any of them are at any kind of risk is simply ridiculous and we do not buy the police line. As far as we are concerned this is all about the police trying to protect senior officers. By contrast, when evidence is given live we get remarkable insight into the institutional sexism and racism of these state-sanctioned units.”

The campaigners’ anger has been exacerbated by the release last month of the real name of undercover officer Vincent Harvey. As “Vince Miller” he was undercover in the 1970s, where he used his position to target women for sexual relationships.

It has since transpired that Harvey went on to become a high ranking officer and a Director of the National Criminal Intelligence Service. Core participants were not given the chance to question him when he gave evidence earlier this year.

Core participant Donal O’Driscoll said:

“It boils down to the State protecting a senior officer. We were denied the right to put important questions to Mr Harvey when he gave evidence. Our worry is how much this pattern is repeating now. With this unnecessary secrecy, how many other important facts are being covered, what further miscarriages of justice are being buried?”

‘Jane’ one of the women targeted for relationships, added:

“These officers, who are having all their evidence heard in secret by the inquiry, spied improperly on people participating in legitimate political protest groups – this has been demonstrated by the Investigatory Powers Tribunal’s recent judgment against the Metropolitan Police in the Kate Wilson case.

“The Inquiry, in the light of this far reaching and extremely critical judgement of undercover policing, has to stop this approach of secrecy and protecting the police. The broad sweeping tactic of sending in undercover officers into the lives of people participating in left-wing politics has been shown to be wrong in the IPT.

The whole sorry debacle of political undercover policing has to be exposed, and the citizens, who have had their right to participate in politics violated, deserve to have the whole truth of what has happened to them.”

 

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Notes:

1. The five undercover officers have the ‘nominals’ HN21; HN41; HN109; HN302, and HN341. Other than that they served during the period 1968-1982, little else is known of them, though one may have had a relationship with a civilian woman, and others are likely to have stolen identities from dead children.

2. The Undercover Policing Inquiry was set up in 2014 by then-Home Secretary Theresa May. It is on track to be one of the biggest and longest public inquiries in history, beset by numerous delays. It began hearing evidence in November 2020, and held a second set of evidence hearings in April 2021. It is expected to conclude around 2026. Campaigners have long pointed to its bowing to excessive police demands for secrecy as the root of its problems.