Tranche 3, Phase 1, Day 2

14 October 2025

INTRODUCTION

On Tuesday 14 October 2025, the Undercover Policing Inquiry’s ‘Tranche 3 Phase 1’ hearings began taking Opening Statements from many of those who were spied upon by undercover police.

The hearings will run from October 2025 to July 2026 (with two breaks), examining the final 15 years of the Metropolitan Police’s Special Demonstration Squad, 1993-2008.

The three days of opening statements at the start are an opportunity for those who are significantly involved to set out what they expect to see in the hearings.

The Undercover Policing Inquiry (UCPI) is an independent, judge-led inquiry into undercover policing in England and Wales. Its main focus is the activity of two units who deployed long-term undercover officers into a variety of political groups: the Special Demonstration Squad (SDS, 1968-2008) and the National Public Order Intelligence Unit (NPOIU, 1999-2011). Spycops from these units lived as activists for years at a time, spying on more than 1,000 groups.

There is a full transcript and videos of this hearing available on that day’s page on the Inquiry website.

This is a long report, use the links to jump to a specific speaker:

• Maya Sikand KC, representing HN43 Peter Francis
• Fiona Murphy KC, representing ‘Category F core participants’ (families who discovered that the spycops had stolen their deceased relatives’ identities to create their cover names), including Liisa and Mark Crossland
• Charlotte Kilroy KC, representing ‘Category H core participants’ (women who were deceived into intimate relationships by these officers), in particular ‘Alison’, ‘Ellie’, ‘Maya’, ‘Sara’ and ‘Wendy’
• Angus McCullough KC, representing ‘S’, the ex-wife of spycop HN15 Mark Jenner
• Leslie Thomas KC, representing these clients of Bhatt Murphy solicitors: Bernard Renwick; Dr Graham Smith; Lee Lawrence; Mark Metcalf; Myrna Simpson; Stafford Scott; Winston Silcott
• Rajiv Menon KC, representing Duwayne Brooks OBE
• Ifeanyi Odogwu, representing Dr Neville Lawrence OBE
• Dave Morris, representing himself

Maya Sikand KC

Sikand represents whistleblower spycop HN43 Peter Francis ‘Peter Black/ Daley/ Johnson’. He has provided a written Opening Statement to the inquiry.

Sikand begins by pointing out that Francis and his legal team had to write and deliver this statement before being provided with all of the relevant disclosure from the Inquiry.

In particular, it was made before he was given the witness statement of HN86 who was the Chief Inspector in charge of the SDS and effectively Francis’ senior line manager when he was first recruited to the unit.

All opening statements had to be submitted in September. They were only disseminated to other Core Participants late on Friday afternoon before the hearings started on Monday, leaving little time to read and respond to their contents in the hearings.

Francis first supplied an opening statement to this Inquiry in 2020. Over a decade has passed since the Inquiry was officially announced by then-Home Secretary, Theresa May, in 2014.

‘NOBODY LIKES A WHISTLE-BLOWER’
(UNLESS WHAT HE SAYS SUITS THEM)

Sikand says Francis feels aggrieved that in all those years, he has not been thanked enough for his courage in speaking out, and that the Inquiry has not acknowledged his trauma. He complains that he hasn’t been treated as a hero, and has instead faced criticism from every corner.

In particular, Sikand highlights the criticisms of the Designated Lawyer group (other former officers, old colleagues of Francis) and the activists who were spied on between 1993 and 1997 by ‘Pete Johnson’ (his official cover name, although he also used the names ‘Pete Black’ and ‘Pete Daley’).

Later on, Sikand teaches Mitting the modern meaning of the term ‘throwing shade’, and provides some examples of the differing levels of contempt contained in their witness statements.

She quotes directly from the statement of ‘Lewis’, who certainly doesn’t pull any punches in his description of the man who went to the length of enrolling at Kingsway College in order to befriend him and spy on the very small group he was part of in those days:

‘A sad and lonely outsider who was a bit weird, boring and sometimes annoying.’

Francis says he understands why such groups would naturally feel anger upon discovering that somebody in their midst had been an undercover police officer, whose lies included emotional manipulation designed to elicit their sympathy.

For example, many of them sent him condolence cards after he lied to them that his mother had died. However, Francis complains of character assassination and says they should be blaming the Metropolitan Police, not him personally.

Sikand says that Francis ‘cannot apologise for telling the truth’ – however inconvenient his truth is. Nor can he apologise on behalf of his former employers, but he is sorry for any hurt and pain he may have caused; not just to those whose lives he infiltrated, but also the family of the real Peter David Johnson. She says he is especially remorseful about stealing the identity of a dead child.

Francis is pretty much unique among spycops in proactively divulging details that are detrimental to him personally. Others have only admitted disgraceful acts after others – usually the people they spied on – had exposed them.

ENDURANCE TEST

Sikand portrays Francis as someone who has been patient and loyal, who has stuck with this Inquiry, and unlike other officers, has always been willing to cooperate and participate.

She likens it to an endurance test, giving some examples of what her client has faced: the strange lies and bizarre allegations made by some of the more blatantly dishonest spycops. HN2 Andy Coles said Francis shot a wild boar with a firearm while undercover in Germany, and HN78 Trevor Morris suggested to a police internal investigation, Operation Herne, that Francis was twice admitted to a psychiatric hospital.

Only the previous day at the Inquiry, Oliver Sanders KC, representing the majority of spycops, had called Francis a liar and his claims preposterous. Sanders cited Francis’s mention of Commander Black and said there was no such officer.

Even by the standards of a professional defender of spycops, this is a ludicrous claim. Commander Colin Black is well known as one of the officers investigated by the Independent Police Complaint Commission over the spycops involvement with the Stephen Lawrence Inquiry in 1998. The Inquiry has published and cited an SDS document recording Black’s involvement with HN16 James Thomson in 2001.

Black is a key ficure, a manager who admitted at the time that they knew undercovers deceived women into relationships. After interviewing Thomson in September 2002, Black recorded in a document [MPS-0722289] that:

‘It is clear that he has entered into relationships during the course of his work which are inappropriate’.

Sikand points out that the Inquiry’s own official timeline shows that HN146 Colin Black was Operational Command Unit Commander Ops from April 1996. Black personally signed off the commendation given to Francis in 1998.

‘In accusing my client of fiction, Mr Sanders has in fact created his own.’

Francis also objects to redactions made to his witness statement, all the adverse criticism, and of course the very long wait to give his evidence.

‘Had I known that the public inquiry would take over ten years to hear my evidence, I would never have called for an inquiry in the first place’.

FIFTEEN YEARS AND COUNTING

He first spoke out about the SDS in March 2010, being referred to only as ‘Officer A’ in an account and accompanying article which both appeared in the Observer. Sikand notes that this was over six months before Mark Kennedy was exposed, catapulting spycops into the public consciousness.

Francis later spoke to the TV programme Dispatches, to the police’s own Operation Herne inquiry, and to the Stephen Lawrence Independent Review, which fed into the decision to set up the Undercover Policing Inquiry.

He says that the Inquiry has not bothered asking what he needs in order to give his evidence; they’ve just sent him what Sikand refers to as a ‘generic witness pack’. He finds it incredible that it took them until this year to create a Vulnerable Witness Policy, despite five years of the Tranche 1 and 2 hearings, and several years after Francis wrote his witness statement.

Francis says it is well-known that he suffers from severe mental health issues. These are caused by his undercover deployment and compounded by the lack of post-deployment support, the weight of being the lone whistleblower, and the stress of not knowing if he would be prosecuted for doing so.

After Francis took part in the landmark Dispatches documentary about spycops, senior police demanded that Channel 4 hand over the material with a view to charging Francis for breaching the Official Secrets Act.

This has all been exacerbated by the strain and uncertainty caused by this Inquiry’s many delays and glacial progress.

Like other core participants stuck in this limbo, Francis waited many years for disclosure and was then expected to respond within unreasonably tight deadlines. He has been excluded from the process of deciding just how much of the evidence, including his own, would be redacted and restricted, hidden from the public gaze.

Sikand asserts:

‘Peter Francis firmly believes that only when you come into the cold light of day unmasked can you be truly accountable.’

PROTECTING THE GUILTY

Francis is highly critical of the fact that the majority of his SDS colleagues sought, and were granted, anonymity in the Inquiry. Both of his line managers (HN86, and HN67 ‘Alan Bond’) have been given full anonymity, as have two other senior Special Branch officers (HN58 and HN53) who he blames for failing to properly support him after his deployment ended.

He believes that such senior and significant individuals, no longer even active in policing, should not be permitted to hide behind a cloak of secrecy in an inquiry which should be underpinned by ‘the key tenets of accountability, openness and transparency’.

Sikand speaks more about the ‘duty of candour’, and about the new statutory standards which will soon be introduced via legislation (the Public Office Accountability Bill, known as the Hillsborough Law). This will require all public servants – including police – to act honestly, with frankness and transparency in testimony and in disclosing documents, especially in court cases and official investigations like this one.

Francis asks why exactly the Inquiry has decided that HN81 ‘Dave Hagan’ no longer needs to appear. He is a crucial witness, at the heart of many of the important issues this Inquiry was set up to examine, such as the infiltration of the campaign for justice by the family of murdered Black teenager Stephen Lawrence.

We are now told that Hagan is too ill due to PTSD from his deployment. Francis understands that some officers are genuinely ill and unable to participate as a result, but notes that HN81 seems to have been well enough to produce and send in a 77 page, very detailed, self-serving witness statement fairly recently.

Francis points out that Hagan is someone who has repeatedly impugned his credibility, yet there will be no opportunity for these allegations to be questioned and his version of events tested.

To learn at the last minute that he won’t be turning up isn’t just of concern to Peter Francis, says Sikand. It’s bound to be a huge disappointment to the Lawrence family and other core participants, and erode public confidence in this Inquiry’s ability to get to the truth.

Francis believes that such untested evidence should be afforded less weight than his own. He says he’s willing to answer the questions put to him, go ‘through the wringer’, and have his evidence robustly examined.

He expects to come under attack from all sides. He’s aware that he might offend people with his unvarnished truths, but says this shouldn’t be ‘some sort of expensive tax-funded popularity contest’. He says his evidence will not be sanitised; he plans to account for himself candidly, using ‘unflinching and unfiltered language’.

THE MANY ACHIEVEMENTS OF PETER FRANCIS

Francis claims that he did a good job, successfully gaining his targets’ trust and infiltrating their ‘inner circle’. According to him, he was a highly effective undercover officer who excelled at gathering high grade intelligence for his paymasters, and asserts that this is borne out by his annual appraisals.

He says that the Security Service appreciated the quality of his unrivalled reporting on Militant Labour activists, and he was later awarded an official Commendation for his SDS work.

He notes that many of his core disclosures about the secrets of the SDS, made over a decade ago, have now been proven to be true.

Everything from the operational details of the spycops’ tradecraft through to specific forms of what is now considered unacceptable and unjustifiable misconduct on their part (e.g. sexual relationships while undercover, and the theft of deceased children’s identities).

Despite the shade that has been flung, many other SDS officers have now given evidence which corroborates what Francis has always said about the way the unit operated.

He claims that there is now considerable collateral evidence that SDS officers were tasked with spying on and undermining Black family justice campaigns.

He notes that those who were targeted in this way, who have plenty of experience of the police’s institutional racism and misconduct, have not been hugely surprised by these revelations. Francis believes that they have welcomed his blowing the whistle on these highly intrusive and inappropriate undercover policing operations.

YOU WOULDN’T MAKE IT UP

Sikand reiterates that he should be considered a whistleblower:

‘Mr Francis has stuck his head significantly above the parapet, without any whistle-blower protection and without any psychological support associated with his whistle-blowing.

To this day, the Metropolitan Police Service still do not recognise him as a whistle-blower, despite the misconduct he has uncovered. He has suffered a significant detriment for the greater good.’

She notes there is no legal protection or support available to police officers who make such disclosures in the interests of the public. In his submissions Francis suggests that legal reform is needed and that this is something that the Inquiry should include in its official recommendations.

Sikand points out that Francis has nothing to gain from telling the truth. It hasn’t won him any friends, nor financial gain, but instead come at considerable personal expense to him and his partner. He hasn’t been thanked by anyone.

Francis says that people forget that the undercovers themselves are also victims of the SDS. Sikand explains:

‘Many officers who were approached to join the SDS were already in some ways vulnerable, being attracted by such an extreme and isolating role in order to escape from personal problems.’

She quotes Francis’ more blunt description:

‘We referred to the SDS as mushroom undercover policing, because we were kept in the dark and fed bullshit.’

Francis says he is not the only one of the spycops to be left with complex PTSD, having been ‘hung out to dry’ by the Metropolitan Police.

He goes into more detail about the ways in which he was badly failed by his employers, before, during and after his deployment.

He complains that he did not receive enough information about what would be involved, or the likely psychological impact on him. Training and ethical, legal, or practical guidance were practically non-existent. He believes that the undercovers were deliberately and negligently left to their own devices, so that they might ‘swim deeper’.

According to Francis, these failings were ‘abject, inexcusable and unforgivable’. He says that when his time in the field ended, he really struggled to reintegrate, both into Special Branch and into his real identity.

The indifference and lack of support with this rehabilitation led to him suffering a mental breakdown, and going off work sick. He ended up suing the police for psychiatric damage, and receiving a settlement in 2006.

Fiona Murphy KC

Murphy represents the Crosslands and other bereaved families whose deceased relatives’ identities were stolen to create undercovers’ identities.

They are known as Category F core participants in this Inquiry, and you can download their written Opening Statement.

The Category F families say that there is no good reason, justification or necessity for the SDS’s ghoulish practice of stealing identities from dead children.

Murphy refers to the unit as a lawless clique, and points out that:

‘The choice of senior and junior officers alike to ignore the obvious legal, moral and ethical abhorrence of the practice in preference to the vain hope that the families would never find out, reflected the morality of the kindergarten.’

SMUG INHUMANE DISDAIN

The SDS’s 1995 version of its Tradecraft Manual, written by HN2 Andy Coles shortly after his deployment ended, drips with smug, inhumane disdain for anyone outside the SDS.

His instructions for stealing an identity say:

‘On finding a suitable ex person, usually a deceased child or young person with a fairly anonymous name, the circumstances of his or her untimely demise was investigated.

If the death was natural or otherwise unspectacular and therefore unlikely to be findable in newspapers or other public records, the SDS officer would apply for a copy of the dead person’s birth certificate.

Further research would follow to establish the respiratory status of the dead person’s family, if any. And, if they were still breathing, where they were living.

If all was suitably obscure and there was little chance of the SDS officer or more important one of the wearies running into the dead person’s parents/siblings et cetera the SDS officer would assume squatters’ rights over the unfortunate’s identity for the next four years.’

The families note that this tradecraft was known about by very senior officers, right up to the rank of Deputy Assistant Commissioner.

This includes HN587 Peter Phelan, who was due to give evidence on Monday 20 October but excused at the last minute. Most of the officers who have been asked admit that they did not give the morality of the practice much thought.

WE WERE NEVER MEANT TO FIND OUT

There is plenty of evidence to show that the police never considered how the bereaved families would feel about the theft of their loved ones’ identity. The Met didn’t really think about the possibility of reputational harm if the public knew, because they confidently assumed that it would never ever become public knowledge.

One spycop after another has defended the practice at the Inquiry by saying nobody was ever meant to find out. This is also true of anyone else who commits identity theft. The crime doesn’t become legal or justified just because a police officer does it.

It is clear that concerns were raised many years before the spycops tactic of identity theft was finally formally ended in 1994.

It has been said that this change was prompted by practical considerations, such as the computerisation of birth and death records, and the risk of someone finding a death certificate in the cover name, rather than any consideration at all for the bereaved families.

The families want to know why it took so long. The issues likely to be caused by computerisation were mentioned in the unit’s Annual Report of 1990-91. The now-infamous Tradecraft Manual, with its flippant and degrading references to bereaved families, refers to ‘many earlier fears’ as well as the problem of computerisation.

The Category F families’ written statement includes a list of questions they would like the Inquiry’s Chair, Sir John Mitting, to investigate.

According to the SDS Annual Report of 1994-95, SDS management conducted a thorough review before a new, more secure procedure of creating an entirely fictitious cover identity was introduced. However, this review has never been disclosed to the families, so they are left wondering if it has been lost, destroyed, or withheld.

The families disagree with the Metropolitan Police’s assertion made in the opening statement delivered by Peter Skelton KC the previous day: that HN26 ‘Christine Green’, deployed in 1994, was the very first SDS field officer to use a wholly fictitious cover name. They remind Mitting that this was common practice in the earliest years of the unit’s existence (1968-1974) and that it was done by HN56 ‘Alan Nicholson’ in 1990-91.

LIFE IMITATING ART

When the SDS was formed in 1968 officers simply made up names. It was only after the theft of a dead child’s identity was featured in the 1973 spy film The Day of the Jackal that it became standard practice for SDS officers. They even referred to finding an identity as ‘the Jackal run’.

As well as being illegal and immoral, it carried an obvious tactical vulnerability – ssuspicious comrades might find the death certificate. While there are several reasons why a birth certificate can’t be found, there is no excuse for having a death certificate if you’re alive.

And sure enough the fifth known officer to do it, HN297 Richard Clark ‘Rick Gibson’, had members of Big Flame confront him with ‘his’ death certificate. He had to end his deployment immediately. Despite this, the practice continued for more than 20 years.

The families have heard from Peter Francis that it was standard practice for SDS officers to not merely use the birth certificate but also research the family and background of the child whose identity they were planning to use, and would go as far as to visit places in person.

Some managers have denied that this kind of investigation took place, but the Category F families remain firmly unconvinced by these denials. They want to know exactly what research was carried out, what was recorded, and what consideration, if any, was given to the ethics of doing this.

QUESTIONS FOR HN16 JAMES THOMSON

Kevin Crossland was killed in 1966 aged five, along with his sister and mother. The family’s only survivor of the plane crash was David Crossland, Kevin’s father, who remarried (to Liisa) and they had another son, Mark, afterwards.

David sadly died in 2001. It was only much later that Liisa and Mark discovered that Kevin’s name and identity had been stolen by a police officer, Detective Sergeant James Thomson.

It appears that Thomson had, around the time of David’s death, been procuring false documents in the name of Kevin, giving the name ‘Kevin Crossland’ when he was arrested in his undercover persona, and possibly even hiring private detectives to research the real Kevin’s family.

Liisa has said that she felt shocked, confused and disgusted by these revelations. Understandably, she and Mark seek answers, and hope that Thomson will provide some when he appears at the Inquiry.

However, they note that to date, his evidence has been ‘contradictory, inconsistent and wholly unreliable’, and that he has a reputation for lying to everyone. Not just the activists he spied on and the women he deceived for several decades, but also his SDS managers, other police officers, this Inquiry and its risk assessors. Even by the standards of the spycops, he is unlikely to be truthful.

The ‘Kevin Crossland’ persona was apparently an entirely unauthorised, additional false identity that he created for himself. He had already been issued with false documentation in his official, agreed, cover name, ‘James Straven’, before being deployed undercover by the SDS in early 1997. He registered both false identities on the electoral roll at the flat he lived in while undercover.

The Crosslands want to know why his managers didn’t make any effort to properly discipline him for doing so.

When asked about this matter in 2002, Thomson made a series of conflicting claims to SDS management, which included saying that he wanted a name he could use if he was ever arrested, and saying he wanted a name he could use to travel to the United States, as part of his eventual exfiltration.

They found out that neither explanation could be true. He had in fact applied for a certified copy of the birth certificate as far back as 1991, more than five years before he even joined the SDS.

We now know, from Thomson’s own statement, that he added Kevin Crossland’s name to the electoral register in 2000, used it to set up electricity and bank accounts in 2001 and even applied for a ‘Kevin Crossland’ provisional driving licence in 2002.

Another excuse provided by Thomson was that he suffered a head injury early in his deployment, and it was a mental illness (dissociative identity disorder) which caused him to start making irrational decisions.

MULTIPLE OFFICERS WITH MULTIPLE IDENTITIES

The Crossland family do not believe him. They know that bad practice was commonplace within the SDS, and shared informally from one officer to another. Also, Thomson was not the only spycop to acquire and make use of additional false names and identities.

For example, we heard in Tranche 2 that HN5 John Dines had cover documents in at least two extra names as well as his official cover name, ‘John Barker’. He even had a driving license as ‘Wayne Cadogan’. Also, that HN2 Andy Coles used other false names, not just ‘Andy Davey’ (e.g. he was arrested as Christopher Andrew Jones while hunt sabbing in November 1994).

Thomson has been criticised by others for his shoddy tradecraft. He is known to have travelled on a dodgy passport that he’d tampered with by removing pages, and indeed to have multiple passports.

Unlike the other spycops, who tended to do a complete vanishing job from their targets’ lives when their deployments ended, ‘James Straven’ took the extraordinary risk of staying in contact with a number of women friends for up to sixteen years after his supposed departure.

QUESTIONS FOR THE MET

Thomson claims to have been arrested and given the name ‘Kevin Crossland’ to the police on two occasions. He must have known that there was a risk of his managers finding out about these. The Crosslands believe that this indicates that he was confident that they wouldn’t mind.

They want the Inquiry’s Chair, Sir John Mitting, to study the chronology closely and find out the truth, if he can.

It is clear Thomson was only able to act like this because of a complete lack of effective management, supervision or oversight.

This is further illustrated by his apparent lack of ‘product’, the reports that were meant to be the point of his deployment. Between January 2000 and March 2002, he submitted just 21 intelligence reports; fewer than one per month.

There is a seeming reference to the Thomson affair in the Met’s 2008 internal SDS Closing Report and ‘alarm bells being missed’.

Supposedly SDS managers carried out a detailed investigation into Thomson’s activities. A Detective Inspector, known to us only as HN53, recalls compiling a list of criminal offences committed by Thomson. Detective Sergeant HN9 told Operation Herne, the police’s internal spycops inquiry, that he had fully expected Thomson to be arrested for his wrongdoing.

NO CONSEQUENCES

However, Thomson was never arrested and charged, nor even formally disciplined. Murphy submits that he was shielded from prosecution because the SDS preferred to do things informally, protecting the entire operation from scrutiny or exposure.

She notes that all that happened was a temporary reduction in his vetting status, a temporary removal of his firearms licence, and a temporary move to administrative duties. He was allowed to continue working as a Metropolitan Police officer until 2014.

An officer who left the SDS before Thomson joined, HN56 ‘Alan “Nick” Nicholson’, has given evidence about James Thomson trying to get hold of a cover driving licence, after his undercover deployment had ended, ‘for nefarious purposes’. He did not remember what name this licence was in.

Incredibly, Thomson was recommended for promotion after his criminal activities had come to light, by none other than the now-disgraced SDS boss, HN10 Bob Lambert, someone who was quite partial to criminality and fraudulent expenses claims himself.

This is just one of many issues which the Crosslands want the Inquiry to thoroughly investigate. They heard, and acknowledge, what the police had to say the previous day about supporting their campaign for answers.

However, it is clear that the Crosslands need to gain a greater understanding of the institutional knowledge around many of these issues in order to make sense of what happened, and what they term ‘the institutional malaise’ that led to such a lack of effective scrutiny and oversight on the part of senior police officers. These answers can only come from the Met itself.

Murphy ends with these words:

‘It is increasingly apparent, as this Inquiry commences its third tranche, that cloaking the SDS in secrecy and depriving it of any form of public scrutiny or accountability facilitated the SDS to descend into yet further depths.’

Charlotte Kilroy KC

Kilroy represents the Category H core participants. In this tranche, this means women who were deceived into sexual relationships by undercover officers, as well as ‘Wendy’, who was groomed by SDS officer James Thomson and deceived into a long-term close friendship.

You can download their written Opening Statement. As it says, by 1993 the practice of deceiving women in this way was a fully entrenched part of the SDS’s operations.

SUSTAINED SYSTEMIC ABUSE

Kilroy points out that this Inquiry has already heard evidence of dozens of such sexually abusive relationships spanning the previous 25 years. Many involved women who were young, and/or vulnerable in some way. For some of them, the undercover officer was their first serious boyfriend. For many, he seemed a potential life partner, a soul mate.

The undercovers made up all kinds of false stories to entrap and manipulate the women they targeted in this way, to downplay suspicions and deepen their emotional involvement. They inflicted an emotional whirlwind on their victims. They used remarkably similar strategies to exit from their lives, convincingly feigning breakdowns over a sustained period before disappearing, leaving the women shaken to the core, worried for their partner’s lives.

All of this was done with the full knowledge and approval of SDS managers and, as is now clear, the knowledge and approval, or at least indifference, of more senior officers.

Kilroy reminds Mitting that:

‘Woman after woman has told this Inquiry about the havoc these men wreaked with their lives, the confusion, paranoia and heartbreak. The lost life chances, houses not bought, jobs not taken, children not had.’

They have told us about the worry caused by their loved ones suddenly disappearing without trace, the fruitless searches they embarked on. Then came the devastation that accompanied the appalling discovery, usually many years later, that these men had been paid to lie and spy. This has understandably caused huge trust issues, and for many, paranoia and paralysis.

‘Many women have told you that they feel they have been raped.’

As this Inquiry goes on, we hear yet more of these stories, with disturbing new twists and features, all ending in irrevocable damage.

In these new hearings, Tranche 3 Phase 1, we will hear from four of these women: ‘Alison’, ‘Ellie’, ‘Sara’ and ‘Wendy’.

In Phase 2, which starts in February 2026, we’ll hear about seven more.

A CHANGE IN THE LAW IS LONG OVERDUE

Before going further, Kilroy addresses a common misconception: that these deceptions were basically equivalent to any con man or lothario who tells lies in order to trick women. Immoral but normal, in short.

She says that these cases are fundamentally different, because the misconduct is much more serious, and the damage caused by it far more severe and far-reaching. This is abuse being carried out by paid agents of the state, acting with the active or tacit approval of some part of the state apparatus and then deliberately concealed, by the state, for many years.

These men were trained and guided to be the opposite of their real selves, overseen by an unknown group of managerial staff, and paid by the state for every second they spent with the women they lied to. They planned their profoundly distressing departures long ahead of time. They were only ever in these women’s lives to undermine the values the women held most dear; to betray them, their friends, and their principles.

Kilroy describes the impact on the victim and explains how this experience ruptures our trust in the entire world:

‘This is not just one act of sex or one act of deception, but thousands of memories of intimate moments in hundreds of days trashed. The photograph albums we have in the mind are polluted by an intruder and that intruder is the state, who we have always been told to trust. The painstaking work of reconstructing our memories to represent truth will take a lifetime…

The particular evil of the acts perpetrated by each of these undercover officers and their managers and superiors must also be properly acknowledged. I will be asking you to do that in your report on the SDS. I will also be asking you to recommend that in future this conduct is accepted to be a serious sexual offence…

It cannot be right that an ordinary person who impersonates a person’s husband or pretends to be a different gender is committing rape, but undercover officers who trick their way into women’s bodies, and their managers who conspire with them to do so, are not committing any sexual offence at all.’

VIOLATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS

The officers who have behaved in this way and have been questioned at the Inquiry have all accepted that they did so in the clear knowledge that consent would never have been given if their true identities were known.

Kilroy points out that this violation has been found by a court to be a breach of article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights – the right to freedom from torture, inhuman or degrading treatment – saying it is shameful that domestic UK law does not yet fully recognise the special breach of trust and the severe consequences for the victim.

She proposes that a new statutory offence is created, to deal with this form of ‘aggravated rape’, and promises to address this in more detail in her closing submissions at the end of Tranche 3.

She also mentioned the case brought by ‘Monica’ who was deceived into a relationship by HN14 Jim Boyling ‘Jim Sutton’.

She brought a case to challenge the Crown Prosecution Service’s decision not to prosecute him for sexual offences and misconduct in public office. Her case failed. Kilroy asks Mitting to include a recommendation in his report that the decision of the Appeal Court be revisited.

She says that society owes this to the women as recompense for the failings that led to their abuse, and owes it to future generations to ensure nothing like this ever happens again.

MORE APOLOGIES FROM THE POLICE

Kilroy notes that in his opening statement, the Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police has made yet another apology for the way these women were treated, and the SDS managers’ failure to prevent this mistreatment.

It repeats what the police have said before about these relationships being ‘abusive, deceitful, manipulative and wrong’, the result of an institutional culture of sexism and misogyny within the police force.

He has also condemned the attitudes of the SDS managers, who he says demonstrated a:

‘complete disregard for the sexual autonomy of the individuals who were being deceived into sexual relationships and the emotional and psychological consequences of that deception on them’

He also rejected the impression given by the unit’s Tradecraft Manual, that such relationships fell into a ‘grey area’, rather than being wrong.

Kilroy highlights three more admissions that have now been made by the police.

1. It is thanks to the efforts of many of the women who are ‘Category H’ core participants at the Inquiry (i.e. women deceived into relationships) that many senior police officers have begun to recognise sexual misconduct as an abuse of power.
2. There is said to be ‘deep regret’ that this wasn’t recognised or understood earlier.
3. The police want to apologise for the way they have treated these women in the past. Specifically, the way they responded to their civil claims, their insistence that they could ‘Neither Confirm Nor Deny’ what had happened, and their failure to prioritise candour and openness over continuing secrecy. They additionally now apologise for taking so long to recognise the abuse of power inherent in this serious sexual misconduct.

Welcoming these developments, the women agree that this has taken the police far too long. Taking part in this Inquiry has at times been an ordeal. The women have attended many of the hearings. As well as giving their own evidence, they have listened to that of former officers, who have often been deeply duplicitous and contemptuous.

SPYCOPS DISAGREE WITH THE POLICE

Kilroy explains that some officers have pointedly refused to align themselves with the police’s apology, and their evidence has been:

‘marred by repeated failure to show remorse for their sexual misconduct and by attempts to justify it.’

She goes on to speak about the power of the women’s contributions to the Inquiry:

‘All of us who have heard the women speak for themselves, describing what it means to be deceived and ill-treated in this way, the thousands of degradations, large and small which it involves, will have been struck by how impossible it is for anyone else to properly describe what has happened to them or to imagine it.

Their evidence, the damage that has been done to them, and the dignity of their suffering leaves an indelible impression. There is, in short, no substitute for hearing from the women themselves.’

She then extends an invitation to the Commissioner to meet with the women as a group and hear from them directly, with the aim of working to ensure that these abuses are never repeated.

Kilroy moves on to give a little more detail about each of the four women who will be a witness in this first set of Tranche 3 hearings running up to Christmas 2025.

TRANCHE 3 PHASE 1 WITNESSES:
‘ALISON’ (MONDAY 8 DECEMBER)

‘Alison’ was deceived into a five-year relationship by HN15 Mark Jenner ‘Mark Cassidy’ between 1995-2000. She was 30 when it began, and thought they would have children and a life-long relationship. She will be exhibiting video footage she filmed, showing their life together.

‘Mark Cassidy’ (as she knew him) moved into her flat, but refused to have children with her. As a result they attended couples counselling for 18 months. She says now that this was extremely cruel of him. She had no idea that he already had a wife and children.

Kilroy goes further, pointing out that:

‘It requires a cold, calculating mindset to sustain a deception this pervasive. His behaviour could be described as “sociopathic”.’

Jenner disappeared very suddenly from her life, turning it upside down. Alison spent years looking for him, and says that at times she questioned her own sanity. Eventually she met Helen Steel, who had been similarly abused by HN5 John Dines.

Alison pieced together her suspicions and worked out what Jenner was. However, even after she brought a civil claim against the police, they refused to confirm whether or not he was ever a police officer, citing their supposed cast iron policy of ‘neither confirm nor deny’. The impact of this, and Jenner’s deception, has been huge.

Kilroy highlights the fact that, rather than showing any remorse or empathy in his statement, Jenner has sought to portray himself as the true victim, showing scant regard for either Alison or his former wife, ‘S’.

‘S’ will also be appearing, on Tuesday 9 December, and telling the Inquiry how her ex-husband’s deceit and sexual infidelity has impacted her.

Four days have been allocated to hearing what Mark Jenner himself has to say, 15-18 December.

‘SARA’ (FRIDAY 17 OCTOBER)

‘Sara’ met HN16 James Thomson ‘James Straven’ while hunt sabbing in 1998, and this developed into a sexual relationship soon after. She has described it as serious and intense; she loved him, and thought it was mutual.

He told her all sorts of lies, and used similar manipulative tactics to other SDS undercovers to end their sexual relationship after a year or so, telling her that he had been sexually abused as a child.

However, he didn’t do this in order to exfiltrate himself from the field. Instead they continued as emotionally intimate but platonic friends until she moved abroad in 2001. At this point he started a new relationship with someone she knew, ‘Ellie’.

‘Sara’ wrote to him afterwards but he never replied. She was left feeling profoundly unsettled.

It wasn’t until August 2018 that she learnt (from the Inquiry) that ‘Straven’ had in fact been James Thomson, an undercover police officer.

This shocking news has affected her in many ways. She’s been left feeling angry, paranoid and betrayed. As time has gone on the stress has been exhausting, and she’s realised more about the ways in which she was used and violated. She feels disgusted, distressed and drained.

‘ELLIE’ (TUESDAY 23 OCTOBER AND MONDAY 3 NOVEMBER)

‘Ellie’ was also deceived by HN16 James Thomson ‘James Straven’, and had her first serious relationship with him. When it began she was just 21. He was 38 at the time, but told her he was 33.

She had first met him over a year earlier, while volunteering at a wildlife hospital with a mutual friend, ‘Wendy’.

She and her sister moved in with Wendy, and Thomson then asked Wendy to set them up as a couple. Their relationship developed quickly; she describes him being romantic and sending her postcards. After a year or so, he told her that he had to move to the United States as his children were now living there, and he left.

However, he didn’t disappear entirely. He stayed in touch and continued to string her along. They would sometimes meet up in person for dates and continued kissing when they did. They stayed in contact with regular emails to each other.

Even after she moved to Australia in 2005, Thomson continued being romantic and sexually suggestive in his communication. They had sex again in 2015, and several years after this he asked for her Australian address.

This was well after the Inquiry had been set up. He must have known the truth would come out.

Despite knowing Ellie’s home address, and her email, Thomson lied to the Inquiry when they asked him if he could help to locate her.

A year later, in 2018, he contacted Ellie himself. He confessed to being a police officer, telling her not to tell Wendy. He did not apologise to her.

She still hasn’t fully processed this. She feels anxious and unsafe. She is now single and says that she can never trust another man again.

‘WENDY’ (TUESDAY 23 OCTOBER)

‘Wendy’ found out the truth about ‘James Straven’ from her friend Ellie in 2018.

She had known him for over 20 years by this point. She first met him in 1997, when she was a hunt sab, just 17 years old. She suspected that he had a romantic interest in her, but for many years, they were just friends.

Her mother was terminally ill, and died in 2001. ‘Straven’ met her mother during this period, and inveigled himself into Wendy’s support circle, driving her to hospital and taking other support roles.

Wendy bought a house with her inheritance, and was shocked to find out recently that the police tried to prevent this purchase.

She moved to Australia in 2005 but ‘Straven’ remained in contact with her, always asking her for news of mutual friends and acquaintances in the animal rights scene.

Since she found out that he was in fact a police officer named James Thomson, she has made huge changes in her life, and stepped back from involvement in animal rights and some of the work she used to do. She doesn’t feel safe, and doesn’t trust people.

She feels guilty about introducing him to people like Ellie, and for the part she may have inadvertently played in him gathering information. Both her mental and physical health have suffered.

CONCLUSION

Kilroy says the deeds of James Thomson seems quite extraordinary, and declares them scandalous even by SDS standards.

She highlights that he has been the subject of numerous critical internal police reports over the years, which record a catalogue of misconduct, lies and potential criminal offences. The failure to discipline him was representative of just how lawless the SDS had become.

However, these reports contain little sign of concern or care for the women he deceived. Such relationships are not even mentioned in the Met’s 2009 internal SDS Closing Report.

This omission makes it clear that other forms of undercover misconduct such as misleading courts were taken much more seriously than the abuse of women’s human rights and bodily autonomy. As recently as 2009 these abuses were viewed as incidental, inevitable and an intrinsic part of the job. They still are by many serving senior officers.

Kilroy suggests:

‘Sexual relationships were synonymous with and necessary to the “deep swimming” approach to undercover deployments that was so celebrated by Bob Lambert and the SDS.’

Officers of all ranks remain blinded by institutionalised misogyny, and far too many still seek to make excuses for the spycops’ sexual misconduct. However, the general public have been horrified to learn about these deceitful relationships. It is clear to them that the culture of the police needs to change.

Kilroy ends her submissions by drawing Mitting’s attention to one more point, which is raised in the written opening: that the Inquiry should explore why the legislative changes made in the Tranche 3 era (1993-2008), for example the introduction of the Human Rights Act 1998 and Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000, did not effect any real change in the way the SDS operated.

This is another argument for the introduction of a new criminal offence, rather than relying on failed police regulations and codes of conduct to prevent sexual relationships from taking place.

Mitting responds, thanking Kilroy’s clients for their witness statements and their willingness to give oral evidence about these matters.

He follows this by saying he thinks that recommending changes to the laws around rape are beyond this Inquiry’s Terms of Reference, and would require more input from ‘fields well outside undercover policing’. He tells Kilroy that they should both reflect on this.

This avoidance of the issue underlines one of the Inquiry’s major failings. It is common practice for a public inquiry to appoint a panel with relevant life experience to advise it.

Since the beginning, we have said that Sir John Mitting’s immensely privileged white male life cannot have given him the understanding required to address systemic racism and sexism. To achieve its aims, the Inquiry needs a diverse panel of advisors, as has proved so vital in other inquiries. Mitting has steadfastly rebuffed the suggestion.

Four days have been allocated to hearing what James Thomson has to say for himself: 5, 6, 10 & 11 November.

Angus McCullough KC

Angus McCullough KC speaks on behalf of ‘S’.

She is the ex-wife of HN15 Mark Jenner ‘Mark Cassidy’. Along with two other former wives of undercover officers, she was designated as a Category M core participant in this Inquiry (families of police officers).

They contributed a joint Opening Statement at the start of Tranche 1, back in November 2020, and we reported on McCullough’s powerful opening statement then.

Since that time, the other two women (‘KTC’ and Jennifer Francis) have decided to end their involvement in the Inquiry.

McCullough says that much of what has been heard in evidence since 2020 has borne out what was said in that statement, while some of it has gone beyond even their very worst fears.

THE BACKGROUND OF ‘S’

He starts by providing some more information about ‘S’, who has submitted a new Opening Statement for Tranche 3 Phase 1. She says that she was in a happy marriage with Jenner, and they had two young children. He was already a Special Branch officer and confided that he had been asked to take on undercover work.

His manager, HN10 Bob Lambert, came to the house to meet her. She knew that Lambert had received a Commendation for his own undercover work, and erroneously believed him to be a trustworthy, family-oriented man. She was given the impression that her husband’s new role would be dangerous but very important for the safety of society.

She made many personal sacrifices in order to support Jenner’s career choices, and took care to keep his new work secret from friends and family members. He told her that it would mean him being away most evenings and weekends, so she took on the bulk of the work of caring for their two children at these times.

LOYALTY AND PERSONAL COST

This unwavering support extended to agreeing, following an incident when one of his targets walked past the house, to uproot her young family and move out of London.

Jenner and Lambert both told her that Jenner would be at risk of serious violence if they stayed in their original home.

The move entailed enormous upheaval (though the financial costs were covered by the SDS). Now that she’s discovered the true nature of his target groups – antifascists and trade unions – she questions the whole basis of the move.

She stuck with her husband throughout his deployment and for many years afterwards, but they eventually separated. Even after the spycops scandal broke in 2011, he did not tell her the truth.

She only learnt about his sexual infidelity, and the long-term sexual relationship he had entered into while undercover, from reports which began appearing in the media in 2013, in which the other woman was referred to as ‘Alison’.

This news blind-sided her and her family. She has described how the devastating impact of this discovery was exacerbated by the police’s policy to ‘Neither Confirm Nor Deny’ any information about these undercovers. She couldn’t trust what Jenner told her. Much of the truth has only been revealed due to what she credites as the ‘hard work and tenacity’ of Alison and the other women who had been deceived by spycops.

‘S’ has had to re-examine every aspect of her marriage and work things out for herself. She has realised that when Jenner took trips abroad without her and the children, something he did multiple times during his deployment, using his holiday time and their family money to do so, he was accompanied by Alison. The couple went on trips to Vietnam, Greece, Israel, Thailand, the Netherlands, Scotland and Northern Ireland together.

‘S’ says it is inconceivable that the SDS managers did not know the truth about these trips, and about the relationship with Alison. He and Alison lived together from February 1996 to March 2000.

‘S’ considers it her duty to take part in this Inquiry, and she hopes that her unique perspective will help it uncover the truth.

AN INTIMATE VIEW OF THE SPYCOPS

Some of the explanations and excuses she’s heard in the spycops’ evidence so far do not ring true to her, based on her knowledge of the unit. She is in a position to counter the narrative that has been spun by these officers, by relating her own experiences and memories.

She says that it is not the case that SDS officers had to spend long periods away from their real families, isolated and stuck in their undercover identities, a claim made by HN2 Andy Coles, HN43 Peter Francis, and HN78 Trevor Morris.

She remembers things differently. Jenner returned to her and their children almost every single weekday morning (when Alison and his other targets thought he had gone to work) and stayed with them until as late as 5pm on the days when there was no SDS meeting.

Similarly, many of the spycops have said that they were left to their own devices, unsupervised for the most part, and had very little contact with the unit’s managers.

‘S’ recalls that Jenner spoke with his boss, Bob Lambert, on the phone every day. The entire SDS met in person twice a week, and Jenner had a circle of friends in the unit. ‘S’ met many of his colleagues, and their wives and partners, at events such as the SDS Christmas parties.

Finally, she remembers well the culture of secrecy that surrounded the unit, and how important it seemed. She describes feeling so brainwashed that even when Jenner’s misdeeds were being exposed in Parliament and in the media, she felt unable to talk freely or seek support from anyone.

THE LACK OF WELFARE SUPPORT

It is obvious that nobody at all, either within the SDS or the wider Metropolitan Police, ever considered the impact of these deployments on the officers’ partners or children, or ways of mitigating this. The only thing offered to ‘S’, after Jenner had been exposed, was a panic button.

Many of the former spycops have spoken about the way that this work affected their mental health. She notes that those who are giving evidence in this tranche say their personalities changed during their deployments – they became more short tempered and aggressive, suffered from paranoia and anger or developed conditions such as PTSD and dissociative identity disorder.

Yet the SDS managers ignored these problems, or failed to prevent them. And they did nothing to support the families who bore the brunt of the behaviour of these damaged men.

THE RISK OF RELATIONSHIPS

Of most concern to ‘S’ was the revelation that the risk of spycops engaging in sexual relationships was common knowledge within the unit by 1994, yet nobody thought to let her know about this when Mark was being recruited.

Jenner was advised by HN2 Andy Coles that such relationships were ‘inevitable’ but claims he didn’t believe that he would engage in one himself. It is noteable that he began his deceitful relationship with ‘Alison’ in the early months of his deployment.

‘S’ provides a list, in her written statement, of evidence relating to this sexual misconduct and its prevalence.

As McCullough notes:

‘Peter Francis says that he would be very surprised if the whole of the SDS did not know that nearly every SDS officer was having sex whilst undercover.’

Far from the shallow, ‘fleeting and disastrous’ relationships recommended by Coles in the unit’s infamous 1995 Tradecraft Manual, it appears that during this era, these relationships were often long-term ones, considered serious and committed by the deceived women.

The spycops moved in with them, went on holiday with them, celebrated Christmas, New Year and Valentines Day with them, proposed marriage to them, and in some cases, maintained these fictional relationships in some way long after their deployment had ended.

QUESTIONS RAISED SO FAR

‘S’ hopes that she will learn more about her husband’s recruitment and his deployment. She says she has been shocked by some of the evidence that has now come to light, leaving her with more questions, such as:

• If one of the reasons for the SDS’s policy of only recruiting married men was to minimise the risk of them indulging in sexual relationships while undercover, but found it ‘clearly ineffective’, why wasn’t it scrapped?
• If the purpose of SDS managers visiting officers and their wives at home during the recruitment process was to carry out some kind of assessment of their suitability, but nobody was ever assessed as unsuitable, what was the point?

In addition, she has included a long list of questions in paragraph 25 of her written Opening Statement, most of which are queries first raised by her and the other Category M women in 2020. As of 2025, they still have no answers.

WHAT ‘S’ HOPES FOR FROM THIS INQUIRY

‘S’ says that she appreciates the Met Commissioner’s apology to her and other ex-wives, reiterated the previous day.

Disappointed by some of the tight-lipped witnesses who have already appeared, she hopes that the SDS officers – undercover officers and managers – who give evidence in Tranche 3 do so with more candour, and the same sense of commitment that they had to their SDS work.

She has observed that many of the other witnesses (i.e. those who were spied on) have been remarkably candid in their evidence, and she wishes the spycops would do the same. She believes it is disrespectful of them not to.

She has chosen to be anonymous in order to protect the privacy of her children. She hopes that this Inquiry results in more recognition of the impact of the SDS on them and women in her position.

‘S’ now seeks openness, transparency and answers. She would like to feel assured that lessons will be learnt and laws introduced to ensure:

• that nobody will be subjected to sexual deceit in the name of policing again
• that undercover officers’ partners will not be exploited in the way that she was
• that there is a cultural and systemic change in police attitudes towards women, to expunge misogyny and sexual misconduct from policing

‘S’ is due to give her evidence in person on Tuesday 9 December.

Leslie Thomas KC

Leslie Thomas KC speaks on behalf of six clients of Bhatt Murphy solicitors.

They have given a written Opening Statement.

INTRODUCTION

The first three were all spied on by the SDS because of their involvement in campaigning for justice after the deaths of close family members, all of whom were killed in contact with the police.

They are:

• Myrna Simpson (the mother of Joy Gardner)
• Bernard Renwick (the brother of Roger Sylvester)
• Lee Lawrence (the son of Cherry Groce)

The other three are:

• Winston Silcott, a victim of a miscarriage of justice. He was falsely convicted of the murder of PC Keith Blakelock and later had the conviction quashed.
• Dr Graham Smith, who founded the Hackney Community Defence Association (HCDA), which supported people who had suffered as a result of police misconduct.
• Mark Metcalf, who was involved in the Colin Roach Centre in Hackney, where HCDA was based.

Bhatt Murphy, their solicitors, also represent other people whose experiences of the spycops have been very similar. We’ve heard from some of them in previous tranches, including Sharon Grant OBE and Celia Stubbs. Stafford Scott will supply a written witness statement to be published as part of Tranche 3 Phase 1, but he is not being called to give oral evidence.

The police have never liked being criticised. They didn’t like the many groups who campaigned for police accountability and protested about police harassment, racism and brutality, even when that behaviour had inflicted serious injuries and death.

Thomas starts by reminding us about the founder of the police, Sir Robert Peel, and his seventh principle of policing, quoting it in full. He says that the SDS:

‘forgot that they were citizens in uniform, and instead treated fellow citizens as enemies.’

Those he represents were citizens who sought justice, and found themselves under surveillance and covert scrutiny as a result. He reminds us that these were often traumatised and grieving people whose lawful campaigns were treated as threats.

He says the evidence clearly shows:

‘a pattern of fabrication, inter-generational targeting, trauma and mission creep.’

His clients were not accused of criminality or public order breaches. What they had in common was taking legal action against the Metropolitan Police in an effort to simply hold the police to account for what they had done.

THE SDS: PAID TO LIE

In their reporting, the SDS frequently lied about these campaign groups. There are many examples of them fabricating information, from making up names of non-existent groups, to misrepresenting their politics, to false accusations of all kinds.

It is noticeable that most of the people Thomas speaks about are Black. The SDS’s bias and prejudice against both those on the left and against Black people obviously informed the way they reported on these groups. Thomas explains that this tended to mean portraying them as dangerous or at least hopelessly open to exploitation.

Whether it was to justify their infiltration and ongoing surveillance of a particular group, or to justify their own existence, it is clear that the SDS often deliberately exaggerated their reports.

Thomas notes that the Met’s internal SDS Closing Report, compiled in 2009 after the unit had been closed down, refers to them ‘padding out an otherwise redundant operational deployment’.

ONCE TARGETED, ALWAYS TARGETED

Some of this surveillance went on for decades and often across multiple generations of the same families.

Lee Lawrence was just 11 when his mother was shot. Joy Gardner’s son was five years old when his mother was suffocated to death. Winston Silcott was a young man when he was wrongly convicted of murder and sent to prison.

Just like Celia Stubbs, who we know was the subject of surveillance for decades after the police killed her partner Blair Peach, all of them were targeted by the police for many years, compounding the trauma they had already lived through.

The spycops’ intrusion knew no bounds. They often attended, and reported on, funerals and memorial services, events that should have been private. Thomas asks the Inquiry’s Chair, Sir John Mitting:

‘What kind of police force spies on grieving families?’

CREEPY AND CHILLING

Many of the spycops’ reports had very little to do with public order, the supposed reason for their undercover operations, and did not even pretend to be.

In what Thomas terms a clear sign of mission creep, these reports included details of civil legal claims and defence strategies, meetings with lawyers. They prove that, contrary to earlier claims, the unit definitely was monitoring members of Parliament and elected officials.

By targeting groups and individuals who were involved in or supporting those involved in litigation, the SDS undermined the rule of law.

There are accounts of peculiar burglaries and break-ins, where the only thing taken seems to have been information. There are suspicions of SDS involvement in these incidents.

The unit’s managers were complicit in the wrongdoing of the undercover officers. They sanctioned and approved their actions, signed off on their reports and failed to raise concerns about the inclusion of racist language or legally privileged material. There is a strong sense that this rot ran up the chain of command.

The surveillance of police accountability groups, and other entirely lawful and peaceful justice campaigns, is widely understood to have a ‘chilling effect’ on democratic participation.

Back in 1984, the Home Office clearly told Special Branch (in response to their 1983 report Political Extremism and the Campaign for Police Accountability within the Metropolitan Police District) that they should not spy on people just because they were ‘highly critical of the police’, yet it is obvious that the SDS merrily ignored these instructions. Because they could.

For more about police spying on police accountability groups, see this excellent article by Donal O’Driscoll of the Undercover Research Group.

MISINFORMATION AND MISSING EVIDENCE

Winston Silcott, like many of those maltreated or killed by the police, was demonised and smeared in the media.

It has long been suspected that the SDS gathered all sorts of information about bereaved families, their friends and supporters, so the police could pass misinformation on to the media and undermine their campaigns. It is crucial that this Inquiry investigate this matter.

Both HN78 Trevor Morris and HN15 Mark Jenner have told the Inquiry that they submitted many more reports than have been disclosed here. In the absence of so many of the SDS’s reports, it will not be as easy to fully understand why (or when) groups were targeted.

This is made more difficult by the fact that so many of the former spycops are not being expected to give evidence. For example, HN81 ‘Dave Hagan’, whose absence is particularly frustrating for the family justice groups he spied on.

MYRNA SIMPSON

Thomas then gives more information about each individual he represents, starting with Myrna Simpson.

He asks for an image of Joy Gardner to be displayed, but the Inquiry doesn’t bother to show it to those of us watching on YouTube.

Joy was born in Jamaica, and later moved to the UK where her mother, a British citizen, was already living. At the time of her death, she was a mature student, living in North London with her five year old son who had been born there.

Thomas describes in detail exactly how, in July 1993, Gardner was killed in the presence of her young son by police officers from the Met’s Aliens Deportation Group.

Having been denied any contact with her solicitor, she was forced to the floor, bound, handcuffed and gagged with 13 feet of surgical tape wrapped round her head, preventing her from breathing. She was taken to hospital in a coma, and died there of asphyxiation caused by the tape and restraints.

‘JUSTICE FOR JOY’ CAMPAIGN

Joy’s mother, Myrna Simpson, campaigned for truth and accountability for many years following this tragedy, and continues to do so.

The police officers responsible for Joy’s death were acquitted of manslaughter at a trial in 1995, having told the jury that Joy was ‘the most violent woman they had ever dealt with’. There has never been an inquest or a public inquiry.

Thomas tells us that this acquittal raised concerns within the highest levels of the Met at the time. They were terrified that riots would break out.

At least four different SDS officers are known to have filed reports about Myrna Simpson and her campaigning. One of them, HN78 Trevor Morris, fabricated a false story about the involvement of the Socialist Workers Party, and also claims to have spoken at one of the public meetings held by the campaign in Tottenham Town Hall.

Simpson doesn’t believe this happened, and doesn’t wish to give it the dignity of a response, but has no memory of the meeting.

It’s unlikely the truth will ever be known, as Counsel to this Inquiry failed to test the claims made by Morris when he gave his oral evidence last year.

At no point do the SDS managers seem to have considered the propriety of spycops involving themselves in such campaigns or speaking at such public meetings.

Simpson was horrified by the derogatory and untrue reporting that appeared in the media following her daughter’s death, and has provided the Inquiry with an academic report of these smears.

She does not accept that there was any justification at all for the spycops’ intrusion into her life, saying:

‘Our aim was not to make trouble. It was just to get a voice as we needed justice for Joy, for the way she was killed. We still need that justice.’

BERNARD RENWICK

Renwick is taking part in the Inquiry on behalf of his family, including his parents, Sheila and Rupert, who came to London from Grenada over 60 years ago and had five children.

Bernard Renwick’s brother, Roger Sylvester, was killed by police in January 1999. We are shown a picture of him. 30 years old at the time, his death resulted from prolonged restraint by eight police officers. They have never faced criminal charges. The inquest jurt took just two

ROGER SYLVESTER JUSTICE CAMPAIGN

The family waited for almost five years for an inquest, which finally took place in 2003. The jury took just two hours to return a unanimous verdict of unlawful killing, but that was later quashed in the High Court.

The family have continued campaigning for justice for Roger, but were disappointed by the decision of the Crown Prosecution Service earlier this year not to prosecute the officers who killed him.

The campaign was set up and led by members of Sylvester’s family, and the very first march and vigil took place in Tottenham just one week after his death.

Renwick strongly disputes what HN81 ‘Dave Hagan’ put in the report he filed about this event, which included the claim that it was ‘predominantly’ Black youth to make it sound scarier. Renwick points out that it was led by his parents and their pastors, widely publicised, and attended by local people of all ages.

He is adamant that there has never been a group with the name ‘Friends of Roger Sylvester’, yet this name appears in SDS reports authored by Hagan.

There are many other falsehoods and inconsistencies in these reports, including complicated, entirely concocted stories about Sylvester’s family and their relationship with other family justice campaigns and groups such as the Movement for Justice.

Renwick says that the police did not view his brother as the vulnerable young man he was, someone struggling with mental illness. Due to their racism, they saw him as a Black man who posed a threat. This racial prejudice can also be seen in the intelligence reports of the SDS, which led to riot police turning up at the inquest.

Bernard Renwick is due to give evidence in person on Thursday 27 November.

LEE LAWRENCE

Thomas introduces Lee Lawrence as ‘an award-winning writer’. His book, The Louder I Will Sing: story of racism, riots and redemption, is about growing up as a young Black man in the UK, including the way that the shooting of his mother, Cherry Groce, has influenced every aspect of his life. He founded an initiative to tackle youth violence, the Cherry Groce Foundation.

Lawrence’s mother, Cherry Groce, was shot by the police in September 1985, during a surprise raid of the family’s home. Lawrence was just 11 years old at the time. He and his sisters were in the house when the raid happened.

Their mother was left paralysed, and had to use a wheelchair for the rest of her life. He and his siblings became her main carers, and he continued living with her until he was 27.

In his statement Lawrence describes an incident which took place in October 1999. Having intervened to prevent a racist attack, Lawrence was charged with assault.

One of the SDS undercovers, HN81 ‘Dave Hagan’, began filing inaccurate reports about Lawrence and this case, in which he made sure to refer to him as ‘Lee Groce’, and ‘the son of Cherry Groce’.

Cherry Groce died in 2011, as a result of the injuries she’d suffered in 1985. Lawrence fought for an inquest, which eventually took place in 2014. He and the other surviving members of the family were finally allowed to see the police’s own report into the botched raid, which had been deliberately withheld for 29 years.

The inquest found that Groce’s death was the result of ‘serious and multiple police failures’, after which the Met Commissioner issued an apology to the family. Cherry Groce never received an apology when she was alive.

THE ‘GROCE FAMILY SUPPORT CAMPAIGN’ (SIC)

We now know that the name ‘Cherry Groce’ appeared in an SDS report just six weeks after she was shot.

The 1985 SDS Annual Report contains the bizarre claim that the ‘GROCE Family Support Campaign’ is an organisation that has ‘been effectively penetrated by SDS officers’.

Earlier in 2025, the Inquiry heard evidence from HN115 Tony Wait that the term ‘penetrated’ usually meant that a spycop had infiltrated a group and repeatedly attended/ reported on its activity.

Lawrence disputes this. Friends and members of the local community did meet to discuss what had happened, but he says there was never a definable campaign as such, so he is at a loss to understand what this might have referred to.

He has now seen around a dozen reports about his 1999 arrest and subsequent trial, at which he was acquitted. They contain false allegations, details of his solicitors and his defence case, and the possibility of him taking civil action against the police. They all appear to have been written by HN81 ‘Dave Hagan’.

Although Hagan has provided a written statement to the Inquiry, he has not even tried to explain this reporting. He has been excused by the Inquiry from giving evidence in person to answer any questions.

Lee Lawrence’s second book, The Colour of Injustice, described as ‘a history of the overpolicing and under-protection of Britain’s Black community’, was published in October 2025, and he was interviewed by the Guardian in September.

Thomas ends by asking Mitting to consider whether the Met’s ‘damage limitation perspective’ was a driving factor in its persistent interest in campaigns for justice and police accountability.

WINSTON SILCOTT

PC Keith Blakelock was killed in October 1985 during disturbances on the Broadwater Farm estate in Tottenham. These disturbances followed the death of Cynthia Jarrett after four police officers had entered her home.

Winston Silcott and two other men were convicted of Blakelock’s murder in March 1987, and he was sentenced to life imprisonment. However, all three convictions were quashed in 1991 after it became clear that the case rested on a police-fabricated ‘confession’, and there was no other evidence to link them with the crime.

THE ‘TOTTENHAM THREE’ CAMPAIGN

Many people campaigned tirelessly for these convictions to be overturned. Amongst them was Winston’s brother, George Silcott, and a good friend of his, Delroy Lindo. There was also Stafford Scott, of the Broadwater Farm Defence Committee, who gave written evidence to the Undercover Policing Inquiry in Tranche 2.

Even though none of them had links to left wing politics or groups, or to any public order concerns, and they were campaigning against a clear miscarriage of justice, they became the subjects of SDS reporting, ‘with alarming regularity’, according to Thomas.

These reports included all sorts of personal information about family members, details of phone calls made from prison, legal matters and George Silcott’s election campaign.

Even after the convictions were overturned, the SDS spying continued. Winston was the subject of SDS reports until at least 2001. He ended up spending longer in prison than the other two because of a second conviction relating to an incident where he acted in self-defence, but he is now out.

Six different SDS officers reported on the Silcott family. In addition, HN5 John Dines deceived Helen Steel into a relationship while undercover. Like other spycops who abused women, he manipulated her into feeling she’d found her soulmate.

Six months into the intense relationship, Dines found a flat that backed on to the Silcott family home and moved in there with Steel. This was during the campaign for Winston’s release.

The Silcotts have long held suspicions about some strange incidents involving items in their house being moved or disturbed, and wonder if there is a connection.

Winston’s conviction was quashed in November 1991. Around the same time, Dines and Steel moved out of their flat. Dines’s undercover deployment ended soon after.

The officers in charge of the investigation into the murder of Keith Blakelock were later prosecuted for fabricating the evidence that was used against the Tottenham Three, but were acquitted.

Despite being found completely innocent of Blakelock’s murder in 1991, Silcott has been the subject of unfair treatment by the police, both from individual officers and as an institution, ever since. He says he feels that he has a ‘target on his back’ because of his association with a crime the Court of Appeal agrees he did not commit, and that none of the SDS’s continued surveillance of him can be justified.

DR GRAHAM SMITH

Dr Graham Smith is a recently-retired university lecturer, and an expert in police complaints. He was involved in founding the Hackney Community Defence Association (HCDA) in 1988, and was active in it throughout its seven year life-span.

DEFENDANTS’ INFORMATION SERVICE

Separately, Dr Smith and others set up a project called the Defendants’ Information Service (DIS) in 1994. This was a very useful database of police officers who had been, in his words:

‘found to have lacked credibility and whose evidence was either not relied on by prosecutors or rejected by the courts.’

They had to register with the Data Protection Registrar so that this information could be shared with criminal defence and police litigation solicitors. The Association of Chief Police Officers and several police forces complained about the existence of the DIS, and tried to prevent this registration, or stop the service from operating, but failed.

The DIS database, its reports written for solicitors, and correspondence with them, were considered subject to ‘legal professional privilege’, i.e. they were confidential and sacrosanct from partisan spying by police. Despite this, HN15 Mark Jenner filed reports containing details of DIS.

The Colin Roach Centre, which hosted the DIS project, was broken into overnight on 22-23 December 1994, and it is thought that this may be why.

‘HACKNEY COMMUNITY DEFENCE ASSOCIATION’ (HCDA)

HCDA was first reported on within a month of its launch, by HN10 Bob Lambert ‘Bob Robinson’, who described it as ‘a front organisation for local anarchist activists’.

Smith says that this is simply not true. It was set up as a self-help group for victims of police injustice – Trevor Monerville’s family were involved – who thought it might be worth taking their cases to civil courts instead of trying to get justice from the police complaints procedure.

HCDA gained a reputation for the good work it did campaigning for police accountability, and supporting many local people with their cases in both the criminal and civil courts. A lot of these cases involved police brutality and false accusations, including the planting of drugs.

HCDA investigated cases and published reports into corrupt policing. They were instrumental in overturning many miscarriages of justice and highlighting the ongoing racism that had led to them. They were also very successful at helping people to claim damages and win settlements from the Met for the mistreatment they had suffered.

HN78 Trevor Morris ‘Anthony ‘Bobby’ Lewis’, one of the very few Black officers in SDS history, was asked to report on the group’s activities in 1991.

HN15 Mark Jenner was deployed in February 1995. He was specifically tasked with infiltrating HCDA, which is described in SDS documents at the time as being:

‘involved in the coordination and opposition to local police allegations of harassment, racism and wrongful arrest.’

Unfortunately for Jenner, this was the year when HCDA disbanded, and Dr Smith says he withdrew from community activities.

Undeterred, Jenner recorded this development in June 1995 in a report which Smith says is littered with inaccuracies, then filed at least ten more reports about Smith over the following three years.

Thomas points out that the SDS’s reporting on the HCDA, DIS and Dr Smith flew in the face of the Home Office directives that police accountability groups were strictly off-limits, and this reporting was entirely unjustified and improper.

There are lots of questions that will need to be put to Jenner when he appears during the week 15-18 December.

Dr Graham Smith is due to give evidence in person just before that, on Thursday 11 December.

MARK METCALF

Mark Metcalf has provided a personal witness statement, as well as one on behalf of the Colin Roach Centre.

Metcalf has been involved in political, community and trade union organising all his adult life. His name appears in many SDS reports, from 1986 onwards. He’s learnt that Special Branch opened a Registry File on him in 1987, marking him out as someone they were actively watching and recording.

The SDS prepared a ‘tasking strategy’ for HN15 Mark Jenner when his deployment began. According to this, his main target was supposed to be anarchists in Hackney. This document mentions Metcalf and the HCDA by name.

Metcalf says he has never been an anarchist. Despite this, Jenner admits in his statement that he set out to get close to Metcalf as a way of gaining access to a wide range of groups. Jenner then reported on every aspect of Metcalf’s life, from job applications to bank accounts.

THE COLIN ROACH CENTRE (CRC)

The Colin Roach Centre in Hackney hosted many community organisations including, as previously mentioned, the Hackney Community Defence Association and the Defendants’ Information Service.

It was named after Colin Roach, a 21 year old Black man who died of a shotgun wound inside Stoke Newington Police station on 12 January 1983.

The police claimed it was suicide, but evidence showed that he had not entered the police station with the gun, the position of the gun was inconsistent with self-use, and the police surgeon found his injuries were inconsistent with self-inflicted shotgun wounds.

In 2013, Metcalf wrote one of the earliest articles about Jenner, in which he also described HCDA’s work.

Metcalf says that the SDS’s reports suggest that the CRC and the HCDA were one and the same. Metcalf disputes this. He points out that the Centre was used as a base by many local groups – including a gay and lesbian group, support for refugees and asylum seekers, trade union work, as well as HCDA – and it provided advice of all kinds to the community.

Metcalf also disputes Jenner’s claim that his infiltration of the Colin Roach Centre had nothing to do with the work to counter police misconduct that took place there, but was for the purpose of gathering information about demonstrations for public order reasons.

Any such demonstrations that took place were well-publicised and there was no need to infiltrate the CRC to find out about them. It’s noteworthy that the police undermine their own claim: Jenner is described as having ‘unique access to a range of anti-police campaigns’ in the SDS Annual Report of 1995-96.

Jenner says he intended to use Metcalf and the CRC as ‘stepping stones’ from which to target other groups, and was particularly interested in Irish Republicans and Red Action. These weren’t groups that Metcalf got on well with, so it’s unclear why associating with him would have helped Jenner gain their trust.

Mark Metcalf is due to give evidence in person on Wednesday 10 December.

CONCLUSION

Thomas summarises the point:

‘Any decent observer knows that grieving families are not legitimate targets of covert policing. There was no disorder to quell, there was no hidden criminality to expose, only people exercising their right to demand justice.’

He ends his submissions by saying that until all the families and individual campaigners he’s talked about receive proper, meaningful, personal apologies from the Met, ‘the stain on the reputation of the Metropolitan police will endure’.

The Inquiry’s Chair, Sir John Mitting, says he was ‘delighted’ to hear Thomas quoting Sir Robert Peel, adding that Peel ‘should be in our hearts’. It is telling that he is so effusive about Peel and is not moved to say that those who have died at the hands of the police should be in our hearts and minds.

Rajiv Menon KC

Rajiv Menon KC represents Duwayne Brooks OBE. His oral submissions closely follow the content of Brooks’ written Opening Statement.

As a teenager, Duwayne Brooks grew up in South East London. He was a close friend of Stephen Lawrence, and was with him on 22 April 1993. While waiting at a bus stop that evening they were the victims of a violent racist attack, which resulted in Stephen’s murder.

Duwayne survived, traumatised by the original attack but also by the hostility and racism of the police. Rather than dealing with him sympathetically, as the vulnerable young victim of a serious crime, they treated him like a criminal suspect.

During this period, racist attacks were horrifically common in that part of London. Stephen Lawrence was not the only one to be killed. In many ways, what happened to Brooks mirrored the experiences of another young Black man whose story has been heard in this Inquiry, Nathan Adams.

Nathan’s older brother, Rolan Adams, was killed in similar circumstances to Stephen Lawrnce, while Nathan, like Duwayne, escaped and survived.

Both Adams and Brooks suffered from severe trauma, compounded by the way the police treated them immediately after these murderous attacks. They were key eye-witnesses, as well as victims in their own right, but never received any support from the police. No charges were ever brought for the attacks against them. They were both utterly failed by the police.

Institutional racism was, and appears to still be, endemic in the Metropolitan Police, as recognised by the 1999 Macpherson inquiry into the Stephen Lawrence case and more recently by Baroness Casey’s report in 2023.

It is clear that both young men were victims of police racism. They were the victims of racial stereotyping at the time, and the victims of police harassment, and covert surveillance, for years afterwards.

SPIED ON FOR SERVING SOCIETY

Duwayne Brooks has spent much of his life dealing with the aftermath of that night in April 1993. He was arrested six times in the following six years. He was repeatedly prosecuted on trumped-up charges that fell apart as soon as a court examined them. He has sought police accountability for his treatment, and finally received damages after seven years of civil proceedings.

As well as assisting the police with their murder investigation, and appearing as a witness in the 2011 murder trial, Brooks provided evidence for the private prosecution of three of the murderers brought by the Lawrences in 1996, and of course took part in Macpherson’s inquiry into the case.

Menon tells us that alongside this, Brooks has worked to expose racism and corruption in the police. He reels off a long account of Brooks’ public service, and his efforts to improve policing and race relations over the past 25 years.

Brooks knows that he, like many other campaigners for police accountability and for justice for the victims of racism, was the subject of various forms of covert surveillance, including undercover policing.

He is disturbed that the police chose to use resources for spying on people like him, rather than well-known racist criminal gangs who were committing serious violent crimes.

Menon notes that just this week, the Met have finally changed tack, and accepted that:

1. undercover officers indefensibly reported on people like Brooks, who presented no risk of criminality or public disorder
2. it would have been a better use of police resources to prevent and investigate racist violence – an issue that this Inquiry should now examine the extent of, Menon suggests

Menon moves on to address the topic of police spying on Duwayne Brooks in more depth.

He notes that not all of this spying was carried out by the SDS. For example, there is an instance of Deputy Assistant Commissioner John Grieve, who was in charge of the Stephen Lawrence murder investigation at the time, secretly recording at least one of the meetings he’d arranged to have with Brooks and his lawyers. This raises many questions, not least if this was common practice by senior police officers.

Brooks has also learnt that one of the officers employed within the Racial Incidents unit at Plumstead police station was used as a plain-clothes police ‘spotter’ during the large anti-racist demonstration in Welling in May 1993, identifying Black people he recognised for police records.

SPYING ON THE BEREAVED

Mark Ellison KC published the findings of his Stephen Lawrence Independent Review in 2014, having carried out an investigation into the possible impact of police corruption and collusion on the original murder investigation.

Some of his findings related to the role of undercover policing. He found he was unable to make definitive findings about some of the claims made by HN43 Peter Francis due to the destruction of many SDS documents. It is hoped that this Inquiry may be able to get to the truth.

Ellison discovered that in August 1998 a meeting was brokered by SDS boss HN10 Bob Lambert, bringing together one of his undercover officers who’d been spying on the Lawrence family, HN81 ‘David Hagan’, with former Special Branch Detective Inspector Richard Walton.

Walton was working with the Met’s legal team on their response to the Macpherson inquiry. Ellison said there was no justification for this meeting; it was ‘wrong headed, inappropriate and highly questionable’.

The revelation of this fact triggered Walton’s 2016 resignation from the police in order to avoid disciplinary proceedings, and Lambert’s resignation from his university posts.

Ellison’s report contained some other findings that related to Brooks personally: his arrest in May 1993 and subsequent charging; the SDS tasking Peter Francis to identify him in footage to try to discredit him; the SDS’s reporting in the years 1999-2001; and their gathering of personal information about him and his civil claim.

As Menon says, the Ellison review raised a lot of questions (these are listed in full in the written statement).

EXCUSING THE SPY

Another section of that statement addresses the evidence that has been disclosed to Brooks by this Inquiry. Much of it relates to the two undercover officers who spied on him – HN43 Peter Francis and HN81 ‘Dave Hagan’ – and their manger, known only as ‘HN86’, who has been accused of being ‘thoroughly and overtly racist’.

Duwayne Brooks has spent years waiting for this Inquiry to investigate some of these issues. Like everyone else who was spied on by HN81 ‘Dave Hagan’, he is furious that the officer has been excused from attending and answering questions. He says it’s ‘a slap in the face’ that this man will not be asked to account for his actions or explain his reporting.

HN86 has refused to give evidence too, and threatened legal action against the Chair if there is an attempt to force him to do so.

Brooks campaigned for this Inquiry to take place, but is disappointed at how it’s gone. The way that ‘Non-State’ core participants (i.e. people who were spied on) have been treated, excluded from the process and secretive ‘closed’ hearings, and denied full disclosure.

This not only defies justice and transparency. On a practical level, it impedes their ability to give best evidence and ultimately destroys any chance of the Inquiry meeting its Terms of Reference and uncovering the truth about the spycops’ operations.

Brooks says that those who were wrongly spied on deserve to be treated with respect and humanity rather than as inconvenient witnesses. He remains willing to provide oral evidence and assist the Inquiry – but not until he has received full disclosure of relevant documents with enough time to digest them before responding.

Menon notes that many of the Black core participants in this Inquiry share similar experiences of racist policing, and ends by suggesting that they were spied on:

‘precisely because they were challenging the injustice of racist policing, not because they posed any public order threat.’

DO WHAT YOU’RE TOLD

After Menon finishes, Mitting responds to say that if Brooks is unwilling to take the slot allocated to him in this Tranche, then it may not be possible to hear his oral evidence at all.

It was shocking to hear such an insensitive threat from Mitting, willing to actively exclude such an essential witness rather than simply provide him with the relevant documents in a way that should be standard for all witnesses.

Given his earlier comments about Robert Peel, it wasn’t even the first time that afternoon that Mitting had shown a gleeful bias toward police. He seems unwilling or unable to properly see the perpetrator-victim nature of his subject, and instead adds another instance of showing contempt for those who have been wronged if they dare to say anything that challenges his position.

Ifeanyi Odogwu

Ifeanyi Odogwu represents Dr Neville Lawrence OBE, father of murdered teenager Stephen Lawrence. Dr Lawrence has also supplied a written Opening Statement.

Stephen Lawrence was murdered on 22 April 1993. His parents, Neville and Doreen, immediately became the subjects of invasive police surveillance. It started with the ‘Family Liaison Officers’ (FLOs) who visited their home that evening. These officers have admitted that they recorded the names of people who visited the family after Stephen’s death.

HN43 Peter Francis says that he was handed a copy of the list compiled by these FLOs, and tasked with investigating the people on it, and their political persuasions. He says that he was also asked to gather information that could be used to alter the perception of the public about the family and its campaign, and that this intelligence-gathering was the SDS’s number one priority.

Lawrence heard what the spycops’ lawyer Oliver Sanders KC had said the previous day. Sanders attacked the credibility of Francis and his evidence about what he was tasked to do, mainly on the basis that there are no written records that back it up.

Odogwu points out that the absence of records does not prove that this didn’t happen. As the Ellison Review into spying on the Lawrences found, many instructions were oral and went unrecorded at the time. In addition, many of the records no longer exist, having been lost or deliberately destroyed.

HN78 Trevor Morris gave evidence to the Inquiry in 2024 about his part in the intrusive surveillance of the Lawrences and the volume of his reporting, admitting that the SDS reports may well have contained material capable of smearing the Lawrences. Nothing he said contradicted the evidence of Peter Francis.

TARGETING THE GRIEVING, NOT THE KILLERS

Odogwu brings up the issue of proportionality. It is clear that at this extremely sensitive time, the police’s time and resources should have been devoted to investigating Stephen’s murder and finding the killers, not putting his family under surveillance.

Neville Lawrence remains deeply troubled about this matter:

‘The implication that we were somehow the ones to watch was as perverse as it was offensive. It was as though our grief was treated as a threat, and our home as a site of suspicion, something I will never accept or forgive.’

The reports which have survived contain a great deal of subjective gossip, along with intimate details of the Lawrences’ personal lives, finances and political opinions. They also contain information about the meetings they attended and spoke at, and about their long, arduous and entirely lawful campaigning efforts.

It is clear that by December 2000, SDS reports contained legally privileged information about the family’s civil claim. There is precious little that relates to the supposed point of the SDS operation: imminent disorder, subversion or crime.

One of the results of their campaign was a public inquiry into matters arising from the death of Stephen Lawrence, announced in 1997. This was an inquiry that set out to examine the ways in which the family had been failed, so that lessons could be learnt for the future.

It concluded that there were multiple failings on the part of the Metropolitan Police and that institutional racism was at the heart of these. These findings were published in the Macpherson report in 1999.

A SPY IN THE LAWRENCE FAMILY CAMP

It is shocking to think that while the public inquiry was going on, the SDS sent another undercover officer to spy on the family and their supporters. This was HN81 ‘Dave Hagan’. The Ellison Report characterised Hagan as ‘an MPS [Metropolitan Police Service] spy in the Lawrence family camp’ (a description disputed by Hagan himself).

There is evidence that the information gathered by Hagan was sent to the legal team that represented the Met in the Macpherson Inquiry, and that a secret ‘back channel’ was set up to enable direct communication between this legal team and the SDS.

Detective Inspector Richard Walton, a former Special Branch officer, acted as a conduit for this flow of ‘valuable’ intelligence. He is said to have received ad-hoc off-the-record briefings from the undercover unit.

This collusion was not disclosed to the Macpherson inquiry at the time. Neither was the fact that the police had used undercover officers to spy on the Lawrences after Stephen’s death. Peter Francis says he saw that inquiry as the time for the Met to come clean. He advocated for telling it about the SDS, but he was overruled by managers.

These things are coming to light now, with plenty of details due to be disclosed in the upcoming hearings. Odogwu refers to what we can expect to hear more evidence of: the kind of in-depth discussion that regularly took place between Walton and SDS manager HN10 Bob Lambert, and about the great interest that Commissioner Paul Condon took in Hagan’s ‘invaluable reporting’.

He notes that Hagan was congratulated by Condon, and subsequently received a Commendation for his work. Condon has since denied all knowledge of the SDS.

NO QUESTIONING THE SPY

Having waited so long for this Inquiry to get going, so he could discover the truth of the SDS spying on his family, Dr Lawrence is extremely disappointed that Hagan has been excused from giving evidence in person.

This means that he cannot be asked to account for his actions, explain anything or answer questions. His written evidence will not be ‘tested’ and like many other core participants, Dr Lawrence believes that this is a serious problem.

It’s worth noting that HN86, the SDS manager who was responsible for Peter Francis’ tasking, will probably not be appearing either. He is refusing to travel to the UK to give evidence, or to do so online.

The Lawrence family were campaigning for legal justice following the racist murder of their son. They did not cause public disorder, or work with any groups who caused disorder, and Odogwu submits that there was no possible justification for the intrusion they suffered.

Even the Met have now accepted that the SDS reporting on Dr Lawrence was wholly indefensible and would have rightly prompted public outrage if the public had actually known about it.

EXPOSING THE RACISM

One of the most important issues which this Inquiry must investigate and get to the truth of is the part played by race, and racial discrimination, in the undercover policing operations suffered by the Lawrences and other families.

Were they treated worse than a white family would have been? Were they the victims of unconscious (and conscious) bias?

Black-led campaign groups and anti-racist organisers were almost always treated with suspicion. They were the subjects of systematic police infiltration, reporting and harassment.

During this Inquiry we have heard about a long list of campaigns and groups who fought against racism and in support of those who were victims of it, who were deemed ‘subversive’ and therefore deserving of surveillance.

In contrast, racist white gangs did not attract the same levels of intrusion. There is no evidence of the SDS targeting the many violent, far-right, racist organisations that were active during its existence with anything other than a few very short undercover deployments.

These groups caused huge harm to communities, and often presented public order problems for the police, but were not subject to the kind of intrusion aimed at the Lawrences over the course of many years.

The Inquiry has already heard contradictory excuses for this from spycops. HN298 ‘Mike Scott’ said:

‘There weren’t any right-wing groups who were demonstrating, or causing any problems as far as I can recall.’

But HN56 ‘Alan Nicholson’ said that, on the contrary, the far-right was such a big problem that it would have been too dangerous for him to infiltrate a particular group.

The police knew about the problems caused by right-wing groups but didn’t do anything, instead pouring resources into countering those who would simply illuminate the police’s endemic racism.

We have heard far too many examples of overt racism on the part of individual police officers during this time. The fact that racist language and attitudes went unchallenged and undisciplined is further evidence of discrimination within the force. Race influenced every aspect of the SDS’s work; their targeting, tasking and reporting. Their reports include many examples of racial profiling and categorisation.

In 1999, Sir William Macpherson’s inquiry into Stephen Lawrence’s murder found that the Met suffered from ‘institutional racism’. Baroness Casey reached the same conclusion in the 2023 Casey Review.

Odogwu submits that this problem is ‘rooted in culture and systems’.

Dr Lawrence’s opening statement ended with an invitation to the Inquiry to examine these issues carefully, with the prospect of a finding of race discrimination.

Dave Morris

The day’s final Opening Statement comes courtesy of Dave Morris, one of the two McLibel case defendants. He has also submitted a written version.

The other defendant in the McLibel case was Helen Steel, and she is preparing her own witness statement on wider issues, including the shocking extent of the SDS’s impact on her life.

Morris was the subject of SDS reporting for decades and so has already appeared as a witness in this Inquiry:

• Opening Statement, Tranche 1 Phase 2, 23 April 2021
• Opening Statement, Tranche 1 Phase 3, 11 May 2022
• Live evidence, Tranche 2 Phase 1, 8 July 2024
• Live evidence, Tranche 2 Phase 2, 5 & 7 November 2024

He has not been invited to give oral evidence in these Tranche 3 Phase 1 hearings, but is allowed to make an Opening Statement so seized his chance to have a say!

Before getting underway, Morris makes some remarks of solidarity with the other ‘Non-State’ core participants (the people significantly spied upon).

The Interim Report published by this Inquiry in 2023 concluded that the SDS should have been closed down decades earlier than it was, and Morris points out that if only this had happened, the human toll, and the impact on all of those whose stories of being spied upon we have heard, would have been far less. He notes that even the Metropolitan Police now admit that this was ‘a dysfunctional unit’.

THE MCLIBEL TRIAL

Morris explains the McLibel case. Activists in London Greenpeace had distributed a leaflet highlighting McDonald’s many harmful practices. The burger corporation threatened to sue for libel, presumably expecting the skint activists to back down. But they didn’t.

The two of them spent 15 years embroiled in this legal battle, the longest trial in English history, followed by lengthy appeals, and then by a ground-breaking victory in the European Court of Human Rights. They did not receive legal aid, and relied on the support of volunteers, including a young and seemingly principled Keir Starmer.

Morris says this Inquiry has begun to shine a light on a dark and highly significant secret, referring to the two-way collusion that went on between the Metropolitan Police and the McDonald’s corporation.

In his written statement, he has provided more detail about some of the facts that have already come to light. Prime among these is the fact that both the Head of McDonald’s security team, Sid Nicholson, and his deputy, Terry Carroll, had previously been senior police officers, based in Brixton. Nicholson boasted that McDonald’s security were all ex-police, and this meant they had plenty of contacts who were still serving officers, and could supply them with information.

POLICE IN THE CASE

London Greenpeace was infiltrated and reported on by several undercover officers, including HN10 Bob Lambert ‘Bob Robinson’, who actually helped to write the ‘What’s wrong with McDonald’s?’ leaflet that sparked the libel action.

Lambert returned to run the SDS as its Inspector in 1993, by which time the McLibel trial was underway, but his part in making this ‘libel’ was never disclosed during the trial.

In order to find out the names of the activists who were campaigning against them, and allegedly libelling them, McDonald’s hired private spies to infiltrate London Greenpeace. Their libel writ was then served on five named individuals.

Although HN5 John Dines ‘John Barker’ was very active in campaigning and distributing leaflets, his name was omitted from the writs because McDonald’s knew about the SDS and that he was an undercover police officer, not a genuine activist. Dines was concerned that this omission might raise his targets’ suspicions.

Dines knew about the private spies. So did the Security Service, who asked the SDS to provide a report. And so did another SDS officer, HN67 ‘Alan Bond’, who told Dines that he had known about the McDonald’s spying operation from the outset.

Dines received information about the company’s plans. He knew in advance about the writs, even the date they were due to be served. Carroll spoke of receiving assessments from Special Branch. It is evident that information flowed in both directions.

As well as infiltrating London Greenpeace’s activities and attending its open meetings, Dines engineered a long-term intimate relationship with Steel. This meant that he was privy to the strategy discussions that took place amongst the five people who originally received writs. He had the opportunity to steer their thinking.

He reported on a ‘closed meeting’ held early in this phase of the campaign, and many subsequent legal meetings, and has admitted that he was relaying the legal advice to his bosses in the SDS.

This is a clear violation of the principle of legal privilege, that a lawyer and client’s communications should be confidential and sacrosanct. Once again, rather than upholding the law, police officers are violating the law in order to maximise corporate power and profit.

STYMIE THE SEARCH, HIDE THE TRUTH

Helen Steel spent years looking for Dines after he disappeared from her life. Lambert and the SDS management were so worried that she might locate him that they launched a major operation to stop her.

In 2002, Steel tracked Dines down to his new life in New Zealand. The Met had been following her moves and spent a large amount of taxpayers’ money relocating their ex-employee to a different country so Steel wouldn’t find him.

As the unit’s boss by this time, Lambert was concerned about the possibility of Dines (or the Met’s Commissioner) being forced to give evidence in the McLibel case, and the risk of the unit’s existence being revealed.

We haven’t seen all the SDS reporting; much of it has been ‘lost’ or destroyed. However, during this set of hearings, the Inquiry will have the opportunity to question two former senior officers who had oversight of the unit, and may well be able to answer some of the many questions Morris has.

The main questions are:

• Who knew about these matters?
• How long did it go on for?
• How was the collusion conducted?
• How high up was the authorisation given?
• Who liaised with McDonald’s?
• What was the role of Bob Lambert?
• What was the role of the Security Service?
• Why was it allowed to happen?

Various former SDS managers told the Inquiry last year that any collusion between the SDS and McDonald’s would have had to be authorised by officers who were more senior than them.

Morris notes that one of these men, HN143 Commander Dennis ‘Ben’ Gunn, is due to give evidence on Monday 20 October. He also notes that Gunn produced a ‘position paper’ regarding the Special Branch having established excellent links with commercial and industrial organisations including through delivering presentations and briefings, and offering what he termed a ‘consultancy service’.

WHO WILL TAKE RESPONSIBILITY?

Morris keeps his biggest question for the end:

’Who is now going to take the responsibility and apologise unreservedly for this scandal?’

He acknowledges that various apologies have now been made by the Met for the serious wrong-doing of the SDS.

But he notes that the Home Office still haven’t provided this Inquiry with a full witness statement, and that no Home Secretary – of the nine politicians who have occupied that position since this Inquiry was first announced – has ever issued an apology.

These secret political policing deployments were ultimately signed off at the very highest level, by successive Governments from the start of the SDS in 1968 onwards, and that needs to be apologised for too.

Tranche 3, Phase 1, Day 3

15 October 2025

INTRODUCTION

On Wednesday 15 October 2025, the Undercover Policing Inquiry concluded the opening statements for its latest round of hearings.

Evidence hearings will run from October 2025 to July 2026 (with two breaks), examining the final 15 years of the Metropolitan Police’s Special Demonstration Squad, 1993-2008. The Inquiry has limited the focus of these Opening Statement to the six deployments about which we will hear evidence in this first phase of hearings (October – December 2025). Nevertheless, they offer an opportunity for those who are significantly involved in those events to set out what they expect to see in the hearings.

The Undercover Policing Inquiry (UCPI) is an independent, judge-led inquiry into undercover policing in England and Wales. Its main focus is the activity of two units who deployed long-term undercover officers into a variety of political groups: the Special Demonstration Squad (SDS, 1968-2008) and the National Public Order Intelligence Unit (NPOIU, 1999-2011). Spycops from these units lived as activists for years at a time, spying on more than 1,000 groups.

The Inquiry website’s page for the day has a transcript.

This is quite a long report, use the links to jump to a specific speaker:

Imran Khan KC
Representing anti-racist campaigners, family justice campaigns, blacklisted workers and a fellow lawyer.

James Wood KC
Representing anti-racist campaigners and bereaved families whose justice campaigns were spied on

James Scobie KC
Representing socialist anti-racist campaigners who were spied on

Kirsten Heaven
Representing the ‘non-police non-state core participant group’ (lots of people who were spied on)

Imran Khan KC

First of all, we heard from Imran Khan KC, representing people spied on for their anti-racist campaigning and blacklisted workers, namely:

• Baroness Doreen Lawrence OBE
• Dan Gillman
• Dave Smith
• Frank Smith
• Lisa Teuscher
• Steve Acheson
• Steve Hedley
• Suresh Grover

Khan starts with a powerful, first-person explanation of why people in London have had to campaign for police accountability, and support the victims of police racism:

‘We are led to believe that the policing of citizens in the UK rests on a profound principle, that police serve by consent. It is a principle at the very heart of a mature democracy. The UK’s Black communities have never been afforded this right.

‘When it comes to alleged crimes by us, we are over policed, suffering actions that lead to criminalisation and brutal violence. Crimes against us are under policed and under-resourced, lacking a professional and robust approach.’

SURESH GROVER & THE MONITORING GROUP

Suresh Grover has been involved in this kind of work in Southall, and across the city, since 1976. He set up the Southall Monitoring Group, now called The Monitoring Group (TMG).

‘By uncovering injustice and scrutinising public bodies Mr Grover and The Monitoring Group have shone a light where the police prefer darkness.’

Grover worked closely with Doreen and Neville Lawrence after the murder of their son Stephen, supporting them with their private prosecution, the inquest and then the public inquiry. The police chose to subject Grover to intrusive surveillance, and chose not to monitor far-right extremism, even though the racists caused much more violence and harm to communities.

Khan points out that only now, and far too late, are the police acknowledging that they could have done better. People like Grover are still waiting for an actual apology from them.

Grover has now received some disclosure from this Inquiry, but the reports only begin in
1998, even though it is obvious that he has been spied on for much longer. Some of the reports about him refer to earlier intelligence that we’re not being shown.

Khan says it’s vital that the Inquiry recognises the structural nature of the institutional racism that still exists in the Metropolitan Police. Though the Met admitted in their opening statement that the SDS was ‘a dysfunctional unit’, Khan says it was just one unit within a dysfunctional force.

He asserts that institutional racism was entrenched in every aspect of these undercover police operations – the management, authorisation and oversight of the spycops– and that this Inquiry’s
final report must adopt the definition of institutional racism given in 1999 by the Macpherson inquiry into Stephen Lawrence’s murder.

TMG and Grover believe that they continued to be under police surveillance, long after the demise of the SDS in 2008.

At this point the Inquiry’s Chair, Sir John Mitting, interjected to recite the Macpherson definition of institutional racism:

‘The collective failure of an organisation to provide an appropriate and professional service to people because of their colour, culture or ethnic origin.’

He then demonstrated a shocking lack of understanding of institutional racism, expressing his belief that the term cannot apply to the SDS because they were not directly interacting with the public to provide a service.

Khan patiently explained that it’s about recognising the disproportionate impact on Black individuals and family campaigns. However the exchange raises significant doubts about Mitting’s suitability to investigate racism in undercover policing. Core Participants have been calling for him to be assisted by a panel of experts in matters like institutional racism for years, however he has consistently refused.

BLACKLISTED WORKERS

For decades, most major construction firms were involved in illegal blacklisting of politically active workers. They fed information to The Consulting Association, which maintained an illegal central database. Workers applying for jobs would be checked to see if they had a Consulting Association file and, if they did, they weren’t given a job.

When the Information Commissioners Office raided the Consulting Association in 2009, they found the names of more than 3,200 people who had been blacklisted. Some people were on the list for complaining about unsafe workplaces or unpaid wages. Others, who had never worked in the industry, were on it for anti-fascist campaigning.

In 2012 David Clancy, the Information Commissioners Office investigations manager, said:

‘There is information on the Consulting Association files that I believe could only be supplied by the police or the security services.’

The Independent Police Complaints Commission later confirmed that every constabulary’s Special Branch routinely passed information to the blacklist. In 2018, the Met admitted that their Special Branch had done so, and that it was a crime that could have led to officers being prosecuted (although none have been). This wasn’t police officers upholding the law, this was police officers breaking the law to maximise corporate profit.

It went far beyond blacklisting. Spycops infiltrated and spied on a wide range of trade unions, reporting on their meetings and campaigns, on individual trade union activists and industrial disputes. This issue affects many hundreds of thousands of people, not just the small number granted core participant status in the UCPI.

We know that intelligence gathered by Special Branch and its spycops was sent to MI5 and government departments. Whistleblower officer HN43 Peter Francis ‘Peter Daley/ Johnson/ Black’ has said intelligence he supplied was put in the Consulting Association files.

However to date this Inquiry’s investigation of this matter has been ‘superficial at best’. There is no mention of it at all in the Inquiry’s 2023 interim report. Only a couple of the former spycops have even been asked about it.

Khan is blunt about this failure:

‘Any conclusions based on extrapolating from fragmentary documentary evidence and the failing memories of a small number of police officers would be entirely insufficient.

Sir, the failure to fully investigate blacklisting is either a remarkable lack of curiosity or an intentional self-imposed restriction.’

It is in the public interest to get to the truth of this issue, and crucial if this Inquiry is to fulfil its purpose.

In the coming weeks, the Inquiry will hear from undercover officers HN43 Peter Francis, HN15 Mark Jenner  ‘Mark Cassidy’ and HN104 Carlo Soracchi ‘Carlo Neri’, all of who reported on lawful trade union activity.

These three officers alone compiled reports on members of, among others:
• Union of Construction, Allied Trades and Technicians (UCATT)
• Transport and General Workers’ Union (TGWU)
• Communication Workers’ Union (CWU)
• National Union of Journalists (NUJ)
• National Union of Rail, Maritime and Transport Workers (RMT)
• Fire Brigades’ Union (FBU)
• National Union of Teachers (NUT)
• UNISON
• Public and Commercial Services Union (PCS)

They reported on internal union elections and internal union factions. They reported on specific issues such as the Building Workers Group, the Brian Higgins Defence Campaign and the Building Workers Safety Campaign. These were everyday examples of industrial action to save jobs or recover unpaid wages. They could never be equated with attempts at sabotaging the economy or overthrowing parliamentary democracy.

This spying wasn’t just the SDS officers being overzealous, either. Regarding unions as subversive was standard across Special Branch and ongoing spying on union activists was normal. Peter Francis said:

‘In any political grouping, I would expect the members of trade unions to have a political file’

There is no doubt that blacklisted worker Dave Smith is the pre-eminent authority on the subject. He literally wrote the book about it. He was granted core participant status at the Inquiry, solely because of his blacklisting. Yet the Inquiry says it does not intend to call him to give evidence.

Outraged, Smith has initiated legal proceedings to challenge Mitting’s decision to exclude him.

DOREEN LAWRENCE

Baroness Casey’s 2023 report into the internal culture of the Met found it to be institutionally racist, misogynist, and homophobic. This came two years after the independent inquiry into the murder of Daniel Morgan found the Met was institutionally corrupt.

Khan notes that current Met chief Mark Rowley has refused to accept Casey’s conclusions.

Since Casey’s findings, the BBC has broadcast shocking footage of current officers exhibiting extreme racism and misogyny; and literally the day after the Inquiry heard Khan’s opening statement, news broke of an independent consultancy’s report finding the Met had racism ‘baked in’ to its recruitment, promotion and grievance processes, affecting Black staff specifically – and that senior officers had suppressed the report, refusing to make it public or even share it with the National Black Police Association.

This all shows nothing has significantly changed since the 1999 Macpherson report into the murder of Stephen Lawrence found that the Met was institutionally racist.

It was a result of a wider racism that is woven into British culture, as Khan elaborated:

‘The history of the UK is clear. Black people have been subjected to centuries of slavery, decades of second-class citizenship, widespread legal discrimination, economic persecution, educational deprivation and cultural stigmatisation.

Black people have been bought, sold, killed, beaten, raped, excluded, exploited, shamed and scorned for a very long time. The word ‘racism’ is hardly an adequate description of that experience. And that experience continues to this day. It was no different in 1993 when Stephen was killed.’

Khan cited the Met’s hostility to those who would hold them to account for their racism, something documented at the very highest levels. He quoted a memo to Commissioner Paul Condon in September 1993 from Deputy Assistant Commissioner David Osland:

‘Our patience is wearing thin on 3 Area [south-east London], not only with the Lawrence family and their representatives, but also with self-appointed public and media commentators.’

Baroness Lawrence asked a lot of questions of this Inquiry at its outset and now, as she prepares to give evidence in person many years later, she is bitterly disappointed at the lack of answers.

Khan notes that far too many officers have been allowed to hide behind the anonymity:

‘Many – indeed, key – police officers such as HN81 Hagan and HN86 who should face the full glare of public scrutiny and who [Baroness Lawrence] wants to confront as she did officers at the Macpherson Inquiry – will be able to hide – in cowardly fashion – behind anonymity, not appear at all or, most shameful of all, take the Inquiry to court for trying to force them to give evidence. This is in her view utterly disgraceful’

Khan has since made submissions challenging the decision to excuse HN81 from giving evidence, and the Inquiry will hold a hearing on 3 November.

The impact of Stephen Lawrence’s murder on his mother has been massive, on her entire family, her marriage and her life ever since.

She now knows that the police were spying on her instead of doing what they should have done.

APPROVED AT THE TOP

The spying suffered by Baroness Lawrence was sanctioned by those at the very top of the Met, and beyond in the Home Office. Shortly after the Undercover Policing Inquiry was announced in 2014, Lawrence was contacted by a former Home Secretary who wanted to emphatically assure her that they had nothing to do with the any of the alleged activities. It was a highly suspicious thing to do.

We have already seen how the Home Office, which set up the SDS, directly funded it for decades and received its annual reports, managed to ensure it did not retain a single document about any of it. She is considering whether to name the ex-Home Secretary in question.

Lawrence recently discovered from the phone tapping scandal that she has also been a victim of unlawful spying by the media as well, specifically the Daily Mail, which may well have been perpetrated with the connivance of police officers.

She wants to know why nobody from the Met bothered to contact her personally to let her know about the spying, or to apologise to her. She says that the ‘apology’ made on behalf of the Commissioner during Monday’s hearing was insensitive and impersonal.

In recent weeks, Lawrence and Khan attended the Parole Board hearing of one of Stephen’s killers. What she heard from him has echoes of what she’s heard from the Met; that they’re no longer racist, everything they inflicted was an accident – and she doesn’t believe them. She says Stephens’s killer and the Met are cowardly racist liars.

Lawrence also found the opening statement of whistleblower spycop HN43 Peter Francis jarring. He talked about the impacts on himself, he lacked empathy and understanding of the impact his actions had on others.

Indeed, throughout this inquiry there has been a pattern of the spycops seemingly considering themselves to be the real victims.

Khan concluded his representations for Lawrence with a potent and horrifying litany of loss and injustice:

‘She lost her son. She lost her husband. She lost her privacy. She lost the future she should have had and only last week she was having to hear more lies and fantasy from one of her son’s murderers.

She has been failed repeatedly by the Metropolitan Police Service, when they failed to deliver justice for the murder of Stephen, then when they spied on her and then when they were involved with the press in doing the same.

She has been failed by the press, who have outwardly supported her by publishing sensational headlines, at the same time as spying on her.

She has been failed by the Independent Office for Police Conduct and the Crown Prosecution Service in not taking action against officers, who should have been charged and/or disciplined.
She’s fed up with these failures.

During all of this she has had to fight – fight the police and fight sections of the press. She is tired of doing so. For once in her life, she wants to believe that she need not fight and that justice will be delivered.’

Imran Khan’s written Opening Statement

MICHAEL MANSFIELD

Khan moves on to speak on behalf of Michael Mansfield KC. It is clear that Khan has a great deal of respect for Mansfield, as a legendary lawyer who has inspired him personally and professionally.

Mansfield has been at the heart of many important, high-profile legal cases, including miscarriages of justice and other cases of state misfeasance or negligence.

Described by spycops as ‘the devil incarnate’, Mansfield was the subject of surveillance for many years. Unsurprisingly, he is quite cynical about the likely outcomes of this Inquiry!

Khan delivers a heartfelt speech on the importance of protecting lawyers and their role in any democracy, which includes challenging the draconian powers of the State.

‘It is beyond perverse for the police to label a lawyer engaged in his professional duties in challenging their unlawful acts as subversive and for them to then go on to unlawfully spy on him. It would be laughable if it were not so serious.’

There was fierce criticism of the Inquiry for not compelling HN81 ‘David Hagan’ to give evidence.

‘It is said that HN81 suffers from mental health. Well, so do many of the core participants in all these other inquiries and indeed at this Inquiry, including many non-state core participants, but also Peter Francis.

In refusing HN81, the Inquiry has failed to consider that an inquiry is almost invariably set up as a result of tragedy, with countless victims having suffered unimaginable loss, and yet in these circumstances the victims do and will give evidence and are and will be deeply affected by reliving their trauma.

HN81 should have been required to give evidence in person. His absence is inexcusable.’

Expecting traumatised victims to testify while excusing a perpetrator is an obscene stain on the Inquiry.

Khan concludes by observing how we look in horror at the new authoritarianism in the USA, but protest here is increasingly criminalised, and spycops are given immunity from prosecution. The legal profession itself is being targeted. Lawyers should never suffer adverse consequences for representing clients. But it’s been happening here for decades.

 

James Wood KC

Next we heard from James Wood KC, representing Alex Owolade, Karen Doyle, Sukhdev and Tish Reel, and two members of Michael Menson’s family, MSS and MWS.

Wood echoes Khan’s comments about institutional racism within the Met:

‘It permeated the force and all its activities.’

Racism was therefore entrenched in the SDS and its targeting of people like his clients.

Wood says the SDS was a:

‘racist, undemocratic, political policing unit that was wasteful of public resources and should never have existed.’

He moves on to give summaries of each of his clients.

MICHAEL MENSON

Michael Tachie-Menson died in horrific circumstances in January 1997, the victim of an extremely violent racist attack which included him being set on fire. The police repeatedly suggested he must have done it to himself.

Michael’s family faced police indifference, and a refusal to investigate his death properly. The media were fed with misinformation, including smears about Michael’s mental health, by officers.

Eventually, an inquest reached a verdict of ‘unlawful killing’. Despite this, senior police officers continued to insist that Michael’s injuries were self-inflicted and that the coroner was wrong.

Menson is described as a gentle, caring man with strong faith and high values. He was a talented and successful musician with Double Trouble who released their own music and produced hits for others such as Rebel MC’s Street Tuff.

Menson had some mental health problems in his late 20s, and received treatment. He was 30 when he was attacked and killed. He told four family members about the attack. The police repeatedly insisted that his injuries were self-inflicted and refused to take evidence from Menson before he died.

The family began a campaign for justice, contacting MPs and the media. They kept finding that the police had contacted the journalists first and spun their false narrative of self-harm and suicide.

As with so many justice campaigns, police resources that should have been spent catching killers were diverted to discrediting bereaved people who only wanted the truth.

At the inquest in September 1998, the Met aggressively asserted that it was suicide. Investigating officers behind the scene passed information to the coroner with this narrative, and said that this was a family of troublemakers.

Nevertheless, the jury ruled it to be an Unlawful Killing. The Met hurriedly issued a statement, saying that they regretted that they had treated his death as self-inflicted in the first 12 hours, but making no mention of their racist failure to investigate and their wilful misleading afterwards.

We were shown a clip from that evening’s Channel 4 News with a Police Federation representative who hadn’t been at the inquest or heard the evidence still insisting that it was suicide and claiming that the family’s supporters had ‘crowded out’ the courtroom and intimidated the jury into delivering a wrong verdict.

It is just one of many instances of the Met doubling down on a narrative to serve their reputational aims at the expense of truth and justice, letting killers walk free rather than admit they got anything wrong.

As the family always knew, it was murder. Three men were later arrested and convicted, two for murder and one for manslaughter.

The family made a formal complaint which was investigated by the Chief Constable of Cambridgeshire. In 2002 it published its findings. The Met investigation was found to be unprofessional, uncoordinated, in part negligent, at best inept. Evidence of racism was abundant, with one officer referring to Menson as ‘a fucking black schizophrenic’.

By coincidence, the investigating Chief Constable, HN143 Dennis ‘Ben’ Gunn, had previously been a Met Special Branch commander. He gave evidence to the Inquiry on 17 October.

RICKY REEL

Ricky Reel was Sukhdev and Balwant Reel’s second child. He grew up in a happy family with three siblings.

It is now 28 years since Ricky Reel went missing, after a night out, on 14 October 1997. When his parents filed a missing persons report, the officer suggested that he must’ve run away because he was either avoiding an arranged marriage and/or was gay.

His body was found in the Thames a week later. Sukhdev visited her son at the mortuary and was handed his clothing.

When she got home, she noticed a significant tear in the brand new shirt that he had been wearing on the night of his disappearance. She raised this with the police who said that she had done it herself. The family later worked out that the tear corresponded to the location of marks on Ricky’s body, identified at his post-mortem.

He had been the victim of a racist attack. The police spoke to his friends who confirmed it, yet the police failed to investigate this, maintaining that his death must have been accidental. The Met were hostile to the family and secured an open verdict at the inquest.

Wood moves on to talk about the Reel family, and what they went through in the aftermath of Ricky’s death.

They were forced to start campaigning for justice for Ricky, after it became clear that the police were not bothering to look for his killers. Instead, as with the Menson family, the Met put their resources into subjecting the Reels to intrusive surveillance, while telling the family that cost restrictions limited their capacity to investigate Ricky’s death further.

One of the spycops who targeted them was HN81 ‘David Hagan’ who also spied on the Lawrence family. He reported on candlelit vigils, and on Reel family members attending the Lawrence inquiry.

HN81 told investigators in 2014 that he once gave Sukhdev Reel a lift home, after a Movement for Justice meeting, presumably seeking information to discredit family. Yet he did not mention this in his reports. This raises the question: what other inexcusable things did he do that went undocumented?

Wood then went on to speak about missing evidence. We know that many of the spycops’ reports and records have been deliberately destroyed over the years. This continued even after the UCPI was announced and all records should have been retained. This destruction of evidence, coupled with the use of verbal briefings to avoid paper trails, means we will never get the full truth about the SDS.

The Reel family see the Met’s new apology as a merely pragmatic decision in face of new unassailable evidence, and they do not accept it. They are still seeking answers.

MOVEMENT FOR JUSTICE

The Movement for Justice (MFJ) began in the 1995, stemming from the Kingsway College anti-fascist group set up following a vicious racist attack against Kingsway student Shah Alam.

They met every week and campaigned tirelessly about issues from immigration and asylum through to countering police racism. MFJ was not a ‘subversive’ organisation, and the spycops’ intrusion cannot be justified, says Wood. He suggests that this was a ‘convenient’ place to plant spycops to monitor feelings about the police in the wider community.

MFJ was spied on by HN43 Peter Francis and HN81 ‘David Hagan’. The officers’ reports were extremely detailed, and the level of intrusion into Alex Olowade’s personal life particularly striking. Francis actually enrolled at Kingsway College as part of his strategy to befriend members and infiltrate the group.

MFJ was a straightforward anti-racist campaign that used marches, campaigned for legislative changes that were harmful to asylum seekers, by marching, petitions and contacting MPs as its tactics. It did not by any measure threaten violence and disorder, nor was it ‘subversive’ and seeking to overthrow parliamentary democracy. But by opposing racism and highlighting police failings, the Met saw it as somehow equivalent to those things.

Wood notes that a spycops report wrongly describes the MFJ as ‘exclusively black’, as if this makes it more of a threat. Peter Francis reports that the n-word was frequently used in the SDS, including by senior managers.

Wood’s clients have been horrified to learn about the spycops’ infiltration of their campaigns, and just how much was spent on these operations, while they were being told that the police lacked the resources to respond to or adequately investigate serious racist attacks, including those that caused the deaths of their relatives.

POLITICAL POLICING

It is clear that the Met used spycops to surveil, undermine and attack those who criticised police actions, most of whom were engaged in using legal channels such as vigils, civil claims, and inquests to campaign for justice, with no suggestion of any criminality or public order issues.

There’s been no suggestion that any criminality or public disorder was being carried out by people like Sukhdev Reel or the Lawrences. As is well established, HN81 ‘David Hagan’ infiltrated their campaigns with the intention of gleaning info that the police could use against them.

The 2014 Ellison Report, which triggered the setting up of the UCPI, found:

‘N81 was, at the time, an MPS [Metropolitan Police Service] spy in the Lawrence family camp during the course of judicial proceedings in which the family was the primary party in opposition to the MPS.’

There are many parallels between the experiences of these different families, all of whom were the victims of police racism and police failings, while grieving the loss of their loved ones at the hands of racist killers.

The Menson campaign’s police complaints investigation found that the police had carried out Special Branch checks on them. It indicates a belief that anyone who questions the police, even about demonstrable failings, is motivated by a subversive ideology.

HN81 reports referred to the Reel family’s activity as a ‘campaign against the police’. They were specifically monitoring the Reel family in case they began to get huge support like the Lawrences. This was not, as they’ve tried to claim, ‘collateral intrusion’, it was direct spying because they feared that the truth might be exposed.

Wood cited a report [MPS-0738094] which records a meeting on 18 August 2014 between HN81 ‘David Hagan’, Assistant Commissioner Martin Hewitt (who was leading the Met’s response to the Undercover Policing Inquiry) and Detective Superintendent Craddock, a senior investigating officer with the police’s own self-investigation into spycops, Operation Herne. This was five months after the Undercover Policing Inquiry had been announced.

At this meeting, they discussed how HN81 had told Herne that he had met Sukhdev Reel and given her a lift home. They realised this was inconsistent with their public denials. They agreed on a line that:

‘no documentation has been identified detailing any targeting or infiltration by the SDS into any family member or any justice campaign or those justice campaigns themselves.’

The senior officers decided not to look any further or change what they told the public. When faced with evidence that cast them in a bad light, they decided, as usual, not to come clean but to ignore the evidence and spin the facts to cast them in the best light, a light they plainly did not deserve.

There is an institutional failing to admit wrongdoing even when they proof is in front of them. This is yet another high-level cover-up, lying until outside investigations force them to admit the truth.

Wood accuses the Met of institutional racism, institutional sexism, and institutional homophobia, and also of denial and defensiveness. It does not tend to accept criticism or own its failures, instead looking for and latching onto small flaws in any criticism as a way to dismiss the whole complaint.

He says this toxic culture has endured, right up to the present day. In comparison, the non-state core participants at the Inquiry (those who were spied upon) have participated fully even though this has meant reliving all sorts of trauma. They deserve the truth.

James Wood’s written opening statement

James Scobie KC

Next we heard from James Scobie KC, representing Lois Austin and Hannah Sell, who were part of Youth Against Racism in Europe (YRE), a campaign that stemmed from Militant Labour (now called the Socialist Party), and Militant Labour member Dave Nellist who was Labour MP for Coventry South East from 1983 to 1992.

They were primarily spied on by HN43 Peter Francis ‘Peter Daley/ Johnson/ Black’. Francis’ whistleblowing on the SDS was one of the key moments in the exposure of the spycops scandal. He gave an interview to the Observer in 2010 and then after the scandal drew huge public interest in 2011 he gave a huge amount of information to the Guardian.

After an avalanche of revelations from many sources, it was Francis’s revelation of spying on the Lawrence family that finally caused the Home Secretary to order the Ellison Review and follow that with the full scale public inquiry we now have.

However, Scobie contrasted all this seemingly public-spirited action with a description of a very different Peter Francis: self-serving, troubled, and deeply attached to his identity as a Special Branch spycop.

Scobie says Francis has given differing accounts of his career, some of which must not be true, and we must only accept what can be corroborated.

Francis’s own accounts show he wanted to be respected as among the best ever SDS officers. He wanted to emulate his manager Bob Lambert’s undercover activity, which he had said was:

‘hands down regarded as the best tour of duty ever.’

He had to be, in the unit’s parlance, a ‘deep swimmer’. Scobie explained that depth was judged by risk. The officer must be close to public disorder, violence and/or crime. They must have very close relationships with those they spy on: the greater the deception of their target, the greater their status in the unit.

They should take positions of responsibility in their organisations, the more central the better. And of course, they had to avoid ‘compromise’, never being suspected and ensuring the existence of spycops remained unknown.

Management judged undercover officers on these things, rather than the value of the intelligence that was the supposed purpose of the deployment.

There was one more key aspect – the length of the deployment. Francis failed here. He was withdrawn against his will in September 1993, much earlier than he wanted. A usual deployment was five years, Francis wanted to do seven, yet his job was terminated after only three years.

He was furious. He was signed off sick in October 1999, medically retired in April 2001, and then sued for psychiatric damages in 2003.

He didn’t just want compensation and support, but also respect and a commendation. His statement in 2003 sought to demonstrate that he had fulfilled all the criteria, and done all that was asked of him. He signed that document for court proceedings yet it contains numerous provable falsehoods. He ignored this statement completely in his opening statement to the Inquiry this week. Such unreliability puts all his other evidence into doubt.

Nevertheless, many of his allegations about tradecraft have been proved. The police wanted to cover up tasking and tradecraft, and the Met settled with him in 2006. Francis admitted misconduct including deceiving women into relationships relationships, yet he got the apology and commendation he sought.

Guests at his presentation included some of the most deplorable spycops such as HN10 Bob Lambert ‘Bob Robinson’ and HN78 Trevor Morris ‘Anthony Lewis’. He said he had protected the unit. He was told he’d be invited to its fortieth anniversary party following year.

But there had been comeback. His 2003 statement meant those at the top of the SDS could no longer deny what the unit really did. Francis was told he was seen as disloyal for having filed the civil claim, and so he wasn’t invited.

He contacted journalist Tony Thompson the very next day, beginning a swathe of bold revelations to the public that exposed the SDS. However, Scobie said, for 11 years after his deployment his whole motivation was to be re-included in the unit and seen as the best spycop.

He had been withdrawn because, although he was dedicated and obedient, he had nothing of value to report. Even by SDS standards, his deployment was pointless. If his targets were – as he still maintains is true – very violent and causing public order problems, he wouldn’t have been withdrawn.

Exaggerating risk is a key feature of SDS reporting, describing a false sense of jeopardy. It not only justifies the unit’s existence, it’s also an effective disguise to cover up deployments that exist for other reasons, such as spying on Stephen Lawrence’s family.

Pretending spycops were doing dangerous things made the undercover officers and their mangers look good, and gave them an excuse for the excessive fear of exposure. That last factor really came from a fear of having their inexcusable targeting and tradecraft exposed (as described in some detail in the Met’s 2009 internal closing report when shutting the unit down).

So when Francis now exaggerates his danger, his managers won’t contradict him, because they need to perpetuate that image too.

Francis was told Youth Against Racism in Europe was a new and violent group. The illusion of risk was central to his deployment and his self image. He has toned it down over the years, though, as a number of his claims are simply not true:

1. He spoke of how HN297 Richard Clark ‘Rick Gibson’ had been confronted by the people he spied on who’d found that he had stolen the identity of a dead child. Francis’s claim that Clark had to jump from a second floor window to escape, and thus being exposed might bring instant violent retribution and possibly death, is untrue. Clark simply walked away.
2. His claim that he was the first SDS officer to go abroad is untrue – a number had done it before. HN326 ‘Doug Edwards’ and HN340 ‘Andy Bailey’ / ‘Alan Nixon’ had done so in 1970, soon after the SDS was founded. Francis claimed he’d lain awake at the camp in Germany in fear at a camp guarded by people with AK47s, yet we also see that he had time for a sexual relationship and a disco.
3. The dawn raids on Nazis that he describes simply did not happen.

His reporting at the time doesn’t support his subsequent claims on violence. He now claims his groups were instigating violence with the British National Party (BNP), but then in the same statement says they were only violent in self-defence. That is lawful, and did happen: Combat 18 and BNP supporters did attack and they fought back.

Yet Francis only actually recalled two instances of violence involving activists, of which he only reported on one at the time. As for the second, the 1993 anti-BNP protest at Welling, he says the only harm he saw was two women injured by police.

Francis wrote reports on people saying they were violent, but gave no evidence. Meanwhile, the SDS desire for risk created actual risk; Lois Austin from YRE was one of a group subjected to a premeditated attacked by uniformed officers at Earls Court.

As at Welling, the police were excessively violent because they were acting on intelligence provided by Francis and others. After Earls Court, Austin and others successfully sued the police for the assault.

In the period 1994-98 there was a decline in fascist violence, correlating with a decline in anti-fascist activity: if they’re not attacking, there is no need for us to defend. Anti-fascist community protection prevents fascist violence and crime.

Many of Francis’ reports concern Militant Labour. Dave Nellist served as an MP for South East Coventry, and despite their claims not to spy on elected officials, we know that Special Branch opened a file on Nellist in 1983, the same year he became an MP. His constituency office was also spied on.

The Security Service continued to take a great deal of interest in Militant and trade unionists even after they decided that many other target groups were no longer considered ‘subversive’ enough to monitor to the same degree.

Many of Francis’ reports would have been of interest to other ‘customers’, i.e. government and private companies. The spycops were anti-democratic rather than ‘counter-subversive’.

Francis has sought to portray his undercover persona ‘Pete Black’ as someone who had casual sexual encounters, and seems to have started a rumour that one of these was with Judy Beishon. In 2013 this came to the attention of Operation Herne, the police’s internal investigation into the spycops scandal. From there, the rumour spread through the Met.

However, Herne made what Scobie terms an ‘appalling decision’ not to bother contacting Beishon to find out if it was true. She only learnt about this false allegation in 2024, and utterly rebuts it.

Peter Francis claimed to have done successful work infiltrating Black family justice campaigns. However it is evident that he only reported on a few such groups, and didn’t actually manage to get that close to them.

He had treated the MFJ group at Kingsway college as a ‘gateway’ to YRE/ Militant. When Special Branch decided that they needed more information about Black justice campaigns, he had moved on from MFJ and was no longer involved. HN81 ‘David Hagan’ was tasked with infiltrating the MFJ instead.

Scobie ends by saying:

‘Far from being the best as he sought portray himself, Francis was emblematic of the worst aspects of the SDS, self-aggrandising and exaggerating his own risk and the intelligence he provided.

Instead of providing meaningful intelligence about the activities of the Youth Against Racism in Europe or Militant Labour, his accounts were so poor and meaningless that they undermined the confidence in the SDS and the unlawful edifice of political policing as a whole.’

The Inquiry’s Chair, Sir John Mitting, responds to say that Beishon has provided a written statement to the Inquiry utterly denying any sexual contact with Peter Francis. He has not invited her to give evidence in person because he has no doubt that she is telling the truth.

James Scobie’s written opening statement

Kirsten Heaven KC

Kirsten Heaven represents the entire ‘co-operating group’ of Non State, Non Police core participants, the people involved because they were significantly spied on. They have collated a joint Opening Statement.

She opened with some key questions:

• Has the Met gone far enough in this inquiry?
• Who exactly, at the highest levels of the police, was directing the spycops operations?
• How much of the spycops activity was led or directed by the Home Office?
• Why are there no admissions or apologies from former or current Met Commissioners?

Sir Paul Condon, Commissioner 1993-2000, has pretended not to know about the existence of the SDS. However we now know that he personally paid a visit to the spycops’ safe house after the 1993 anti-fascist protest in Welling to individually thank them for their work. HN81 ‘David Hagan’ testifies that his manager told him that his reports went to Condon’s desk, and that the Commissioner was grateful for the information.

We also know that senior figures within the Met were ‘customers’ of the intelligence supplied by the spycops. This is confirmed in spycops’ Annual Performance Reviews.

HN72 told the police’s internal spycops inquiry Operation Herne that it was Deputy Commissioner John Stevens who would have given the go-ahead to HN81 being tasked to report on the Stephen Lawrence campaign.

In addition, Deputy Assistant Commissioner John Grieve is known to have covertly recorded meetings between him and the legal team of Duwayne Brooks, the prime witeness to Stephen Lawrence’s murder.

The Home Secretary has chosen to remain silent on the role of the Home Office in the spycops scandal. It has confirmed that the Inquiry has not asked it for a witness statement. Surely departments of State should now be asked to provide corporate statements?

We have also learnt that the Cabinet Office was interested in the reports being filed by HN104 Carlo Soracchi ‘Carlo Neri’, who was deployed 2000-2006. Will the Inquiry explore this further?

HN26 ‘Christine Green’, who infiltrated animal rights groups 1995-2000, is not giving evidence to the Inquiry as she is ‘out of the jurisdiction’ (the Inquiry is said to have no power to compel witnesses who are outside the United Kingdom, something that’s currently the subject of legal argument).

She is not the only one of the former spycops who appear to have left the country until this Inquiry no longer has an interest in them.

We are concerned about the non-appearance of HN81 ‘David Hagan’ especially in light of his central role in spying on the Stephen Lawrence campaign amongst others.

HN86, who was head of the SDS 1993-1996, is now refusing to give oral evidence. He was the manager who directed spycops to report on justice campaigns, and serious allegations of racism have been made against him by Francis.

NEW RULES TO IGNORE

Two major pieces of relevant legislation were introduced in the Tranche 3 period (1993-2008): the Human Rights Act (HRA) and the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act (RIPA).

However the SDS continued to operate much as it had before, a secret unit:

‘marred by a culture of exceptionalism and impunity’.

It simply ignored both RIPA and the idea of human rights, and breached them both.

A second major spycops unit, the National Public Order Intelligence Unit (NPOIU), was established in 1999 and did the same. This inquiry should examine how much SDS tradecraft was exported around the country by NPOIU officers. The NPOIU will be the subject of Tranche 4, with hearings expected to start in late 2027 and/or early 2028.

Many SDS managers were former undercover officers, who were probably responsible for the spycops unit’s continuing culture of criminality, institutional racism, misogyny, abuse of women, etc.

New and abhorrent tradecraft was developed by the SDS during this time. There was more use of cover vehicles, including minibuses, and more international travel. The spycops went to new lengths to create their cover identities, e.g. enrolling in college, and there was an expansion of the use of deceitful sexual relationships

We’ve learnt that the spycops were allocated somewhat disturbing codenames at this time for each of their deployments:
• HN104 Carlo Soracchi ‘Carlo Neri’: Craggy Island
• HN81 ‘David Hagan’: Windmill Tilter
• HN5 John Dines ‘John Barker’: Hawke’s Bay
• HN3 ‘Jason Bishop’: Red Herring and Quill Feather
• HN14 Jim Boyling ‘Jim Sutton’: Psycho Dream
• HN15 Mark Jenner ‘Mark Cassidy’: Touchy Subject
• HN16 James Thomson ‘James Straven’/ ‘Kevin Crossland’: Magenta Triangle

Individual officers like HN16 James Thomson ‘James Straven’ / ‘Kevin Crossland’ seem to have taken full advantage of the slack attitudes of the spycops managers, and the complete lack of effective supervision or scrutiny.

Thomson has a track record of lying to this Inquiry (during the anonymity process) and has now admitted to deceiving two women into sexual relationships. He also lied to his managers and frequently acted without their authorisation.

He made fraudulent expenses claims and got away with doing very little work, producing very little intelligence. It’s impossible to see how his deployment could have been justified in any way, even by the internal standards of the unit.

He managed to extend his time in the field by supplying his managers with false information – claiming that his targets were involved in deals with firearms in France – and they weren’t paying enough attention to notice that this was all a complete fabrication on his part.

HN26 ‘Christine Green’ who infiltrated the animal rights movement. In 1998, she took part in an action at Crow Hill mink farm in Hampshire which released 6,000 mink into the wild. Like Thomson, she failed to gain proper authorisation for her participation in crime. The Met didn’t tell Hampshire police, who investigated but never brought any charges.

The Met only informed Hampshire police in 2014. The Met have now admitted that this was a failure of management, and that they should have informed Hampshire police of her involvement.

By the Tranche 3 period, the infiltration of family justice campaigns was standard SDS practice, and this is obvious from reading the unit’s Annual Reports. The Inquiry should not accept that there was any public order reason for spycops officers like HN15 Mark Jenner ‘Mark Cassidy’ to report on such campaigns. These groups were specifically targeted because they were critical of police failures.

At this time, the SDS was desperately fighting for its survival. There was no way they could keep justifying deployments into the far left. The Inquiry must explore the strategies adopted by the managers at this time. They seem to have been eager to expand their ‘customer’ base and increase their ‘marketability’ at this time. Just who were they promoting SDS intelligence-gathering services to?

The SDS was eventually closed down, between October 2007 and February 2008. The Closing Report, published by the Inquiry this week, was scathing to the point of vitriolic. It described how there was precious little oversight of the SDS, and it sought to insulate itself from any external review. Its budget had become less transparent than ever before, even though the spycops’ expenses grew ever more extravagant.

In addition to Christmas parties, the SDS often took officers on jollies. These included repeated trips to Amsterdam, paint-balling in Birmingham, and ‘team bonding’ in Las Vegas. It appear that ‘overtime’ payments were made automatically whether the officer worked extra hours or not. The police’s Covert Finance Unit’s review in 2007 identified 23 areas of concern when it came to SDS finances.

There were a number of occasions when the SDS was reviewed. Superintendent Peter Finnemore visited as part of a HM Inspectorate of Constabulary inspection in 1999. He was allowed to meet a few specially selected, pre-briefed undercovers.

There was also an ‘internal audit’ and review carried out by DS Crane in 2004. This made a long list of recommendations for the unit. One of them was that the Code of Conduct be updated to meet the new legal requirements of RIPA. However the SDS disregarded Crane’s suggestions, calling his work ‘shoddy’, and stubbornly refused to reform itself.

It is inconceivable that senior Met officers would have been unaware of the outcome of a review that they themselves had commissioned. Why did it take them another three years to close down the unit?

The SDS managers tended to react to problems; they were not proactive about introducing improvements or managing the field officers more effectively.

The scenarios created for the unit’s recruitment process illustrate that their thinking hadn’t changed much from what we heard in Tranche 2 (covering the SDS 1983-1992). The SDS didn’t see any need to conform with legal frameworks or change how they operated.

Undercover officers appear to have had little respect for ‘shallow paddlers’, and managers who hadn’t been deployed themselves. HN52 told Operation Herne that the field officers never let him into their ‘inner circle’. HN67 ‘Alan Bond’ described similar problems with the ‘cliques’ within the SDS.

In comparison, HN10 Bob Lambert ‘Bob Robinson’, the deepest of deep swimmers who personally committed all of the unit’s catalogue of outrages as though it were a bingo card, is described as ‘the lynchpin’ of the SDS.

The unit was always run informally. There was very little ‘discipline’, and serious misconduct went unpunished. The undercovers’ lavish expenses, paid without question, took their salaries up to the same level as Inspectors, making it unsurprising that they had an insubordinate attitude towards their managers and handlers.

The Closing Report criticised inappropriate reporting on justice campaigns. But the Met, ever keen to avoid scrutiny and criticism, did not tell any of the people affected.

Lambert and others have nonetheless insisted that the unit did good work. We reject this.

The SDS was always run by white men, and there was an obvious culture of racism and misogyny – as acknowledged even by James Thomson.

Vulnerable individuals (including minors) were often targeted and interfered with by spycops, and their vulnerability was given very little consideration by anyone in the SDS.

The SDS seemingly had no concerns about the ethics of spycops committing crimes while they were undercover. When speaking to Operation Herne, Chief Superintendent HN84 Ray Parker referred to an SDS document from 1991, which left him with the impression that it provided ‘rules of engagement’ for agent provocateur, activity that was expressly forbidden. He was said to have been ‘amazed’ by this. This document has not come to light. We ask the Inquiry to investigate its disappearance.

In his evidence, HN81 ‘David Hagan’ recalls that when he was being recruited he was asked what he would do in a scenario where his targets began racially abusing an inter-racial couple. He told them that he would join in with the abuse, in order to maintain his cover. It is telling that the result of this interview was that he was recruited to the unit and sent to target groups of racial justice campaigns, despite having said that he would commit a hate crime in the hypothetical scenario.

We heard about spycops breaching the rules around ‘legal professional privilege’ in previous tranches, and it is clear that this continued in T3. They routinely spied on lawyers and clients (including Imran Khan KC and Michael Mansfield KC as we heard earlier in the day) and on elected Members of Parliament.

Trade unionists and their activities were reported on as a matter of course, with the spycops continuing to join union branches as part of their ‘cover’. It seems that the gathering and passing on intelligence for vetting and blacklisting purposes may actually have increased during this period.

The impact of this blacklisting cannot be underestimated. This unlawful practice destroyed people’s relationships, families, employment prospects, careers and lives.

The Inquiry must be mindful of the authorities’ ‘duty of candour’. It is hoped that the Metropolitan Police Service, Home Office, Security Service and every other arm of the State involved will fully and candidly account for what happened in the period under examination.

Non State, Non Police core participants’ written opening statement

Tranche 3, Phase 1, Day 1

13 October 2025

INTRODUCTION

The Undercover Policing Inquiry kicked off ‘Tranche 3’, examining the final 15 years of the Special Demonstration Squad 1993-2008, on Monday 13 October 2025.

This is quite a long report, use the links to jumpt to specific speakers:
• David Barr KC – Counsel to the Inquiry (the Inquiry’s main lawyer who’ll question witnesses)
• Peter Skelton KC – Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis (the Metropolitan Police as an institution)
• Neil Sheldon KC – Home Office (government ministry in charge of police and the Inquiry)
• Oliver Sanders KC – Designated Officers (the majority of undercover officers invovled)

Additionally there was a dramatic end to the day:

• HN86 refusing to testify

The Inquiry’s Chair, Sir John Mitting, opened the hearing, saying that T3 will continue until the end of July next year.

Tranche 3 has been divided into 3 ‘phases’. Phases 1 and 2 will consist of evidence from undercover officers (UCOs) and civilian witnesses.

Phase 3 (currently scheduled to take place in June-July 2026) will examine evidence of the unit’s management – hearing not just from the SDS (Special Demonstration Squad, later called the Special Duties Squad) managers, but from those higher up the senior chain of command, those with oversight of the spycops’ operations. We hope to finally hear from the Home Office, who despite setting up the SDS and directly funding it, have been notably silent in this Inquiry to date.

The dates are:

• Tranche 3 Phase 1 hearings, SDS officers and relevant civilians 1993-2008 part 1: 13 October 2025 – approx 18 December 2025
• Tranche 3 Phase 2 hearings, SDS officers and relevant civilians 1993-2008 part 2: 2 February 2026 – approx 26 March 2026
• Tranche 3 Phase 3 hearings, SDS managers: 15 June 2026 – approx 30 July 2026
We believe there will also be ‘closed’ (secret – not open to the public, or to those spied upon) hearings taking place in 2026. Everyone involved in Tranche 3 will then be invited to make Closing Statements in early 2027.

Mitting is due to produce a report, detailing his findings about the SDS, before he retires later in 2027. A new Chair will then be found to oversee the remainder of the Inquiry.

It is important to note that this week’s Opening Statements refer only to what is being called ‘Tranche 3, Phase 1’ (T3P1). Despite having delayed the start of the tranche by eight months, supposedly in order to ensure everyone would have a chance to review the evidence before it began, the Inquiry has yet again failed to get the Hearing Bundle of documents ready on time.

Around 300 people and organisations heavily involved in the spycops scandal have been designated as Core Participants by the Inquiry (mostly people who were spied on). They have so far only received the witness statements and evidence in relation to the six officers that will be examined in this first set of hearings.

Of those six, only HN16 James Thomson ‘James Straven’ / Kevin Crossland’, HN15 Mark Jenner ‘Mark Cassidy’, and HN43 Peter Francis ‘Peter Black/ Daley/ Johnson’ will give evidence in person.

In relation to the others, Barr told us that HN81 ‘David Hagan’:

‘cannot give oral evidence for health reasons, but he has provided the Inquiry with a detailed witness statement.’

HN26 ‘Christine Green’ is understood to be:

‘outside the jurisdiction. She is legally represented but has declined to provide a witness statement’.

This is understood to mean that the Inquiry does not have the power to compel witnesses to give evidence if they live outside England and Wales.

HN123:

‘is unrepresented and ceased responding to the Inquiry’s correspondence some time ago. Despite significant efforts by the Inquiry to find him since then, we have been unable to do so. He has not provided the Inquiry with a witness statement but he did make a witness statement for the purposes of civil litigation against the Commissioner in 2003’.

We note that HN123 is not the only T3 officer to have gone AWOL in this way and we will be questioning the Inquiry’s apparent intention to continue giving those officers anonymity, despite their obvious bad faith.

Evidence relating to the remaining 19 officers from T3 is yet to be released to Core Participants. ‘Phase 2’ (T3P2) hearings are expected to start in February 2026 and continue until at least the end of March.

In his statement, Barr gave a relatively long rundown of the legal, political and administrative changes that affected the SDS during the T3 period (which runs from 1993 until the SDS was disbanded in early 2008) and of the evidence the Inquiry will be hearing.

In the afternoon we heard from lawyers representing the Home Office, Metropolitan Police Service (MPS) and some of the officers (undercovers and their managers). They each gave fairly short statements, effectively blaming each other for the scandal of what they are now calling ‘a dysfunctional unit’.

Before reading the reports of their statements below, we encourage you to remember that throughout the history of the SDS they were all saying how brilliant it was, and commendations were being handed down from on high to SDS officers like confetti.

The Inquiry’s page for the day has video of the hearing, a transcript, and many of the documents referred to.

Live evidence (questioning witnesses in person) starts on Friday 17 October.

David Barr KC (Counsel to the Inquiry)

Barr’s written Opening Statement has been published on the Inquiry’s website.

There are over 100 pages of Annexes, including a list of all 15 ‘open’ undercover officers (UCOs), and 10 ‘closed’ UCOs (whose real and cover names are being kept anonymous).

Barr began by highlighting some important changes that took place during the T3 era, 1993-2008, and key themes of these T3P1 hearings.

With the end of the Cold War, there was a diminishing interest in ‘subversion’ on the part of the Security Service (aka MI5).

It decided to stop identifying rank and file members of groups considered ‘subversive’ in October 1992.

However, Barr noted an increased threat of terrorism in the UK during the T3 period, citing a number of major terrorist attacks:

‘9 September 2001, or “9/11”, when Al-Qaeda terrorists attacked the United States occasioning very serious loss of life, including 67 British citizens’; and ‘the appalling “7/7” attacks, in 2005, which claimed the lives of 52 innocent people as well as those of the suicide bombers’.

It is hard to comprehend the relevance of these attacks to the work of the SDS.

On Barr’s account, it came when:

‘in a case of mistaken identity, police shot dead Jean Charles De Menezes, at Stockwell underground station, wrongly believing an innocent man to be another suicide bomber’

The SDS proceeded to spy on the family of this innocent victim, and their Justice4Jean campaign.

Barr also mentioned spying on campaigns against the Second Gulf War (including ‘what is generally accepted to have been the largest political demonstration in Britain of all time’ in February 2003). Barr explained that the Inquiry will be examining whether reporting on the Stop the War Coalition, Disarm DSEI and other anti-war, or anti-arms trade campaigners, was justified.

Barr also mentioned the 2006 Lebanon War and ‘long-running problems in the Levant’, as background to spycop HN18 Rob Hastings ‘Rob Harrison’ spying on the International Solidarity Movement, a Palestinian solidarity group. We note that this is the first time this officer’s real identity has been mentioned in public.

Other movements spied on in this period included the climate movement, especially Camp for Climate Action. This will be examined in detail in Tranche 4, which will examine the second spycop unit, the National Public Order Intelligence Unit, which deployed EN12 Mark Kennedy ‘Mark Stone’.

But we now know that these events were also attended and reported on by SDS officers. We were told that HN66/EN327 ‘Dave Jones’ was targeted against the 2006 Camp for Climate Action held close to the Drax power station in North Yorkshire.

Both HN118 ‘Simon Wellings’ and HN18 Rob Hastings ‘Rob Harrison’ appear to have attended the 2007 Camp for Climate Action at Heathrow Airport.

Barr described extensive reporting on other environmental groups, and non-violent direct action against genetically modified crops, road building and the proliferation of motor vehicles generally, with groups such as Earth First! and Reclaim the Streets being specifically targeted by the SDS.

However, none of these deployments will be looked at in detail until ‘Phase 2’ hearings beginning in February 2026, and the bundle of documents and evidence about these officers has not yet been disclosed to us.

Animal rights activism continued to be targeted by the SDS throughout the T3 era. A footnote to Barr’s statement notes that spycops HN26 ‘Christine Green’, HN14 Jim Boyling ‘Jim Sutton’, HN16 James Thomson ‘James Straven’ / ‘Kevin Crossland’, and HN60 ‘Dave Evans’ were all targeted in the animal rights field, Green and Thomson exclusively so.

Barr explained that ‘a wide range of animal rights activism was infiltrated’ including hunt sabs.

He notes that a:

‘landmark event was the Hunting Act 2004 which, subject to certain exemptions, rendered unlawful hunting wild mammals with dogs. It came into force on February 2005.’

IRELAND

Barr’s list of key events in the period included the 1992

‘transfer of lead responsibility for Irish Republican terrorism on the mainland from the Metropolitan Police Special Branch, or MPSB, to the Security Service’

He also cited the radical changes to ‘both the political and policing landscape’ brought about by the signing of the Good Friday Agreement in April 1998.

Nevertheless, he went on to describe SDS activity in the 1990s (notably that of HN15 Mark Jenner – see below) which suggests the unit still considered this part of its remit.

RACIST POLICING

This will be a primary focus of the evidence we are going to hear in these ‘Phase 1’ hearings. Barr noted that there was considerable racist violence within the Metropolitan Police District in the early 1990s, particularly in South East London, which prompted large anti-racist protests, for example the two that took place in Welling in 1993.

He highlighted the fact that:

‘Racism within the MPS [Metropolitan Police Service] was also an issue. Numerous racial justice campaigns arose often from deaths in custody, miscarriages of justice or failures to bring the perpetrators of racist attacks to justice.’

After the murder of Black teenager Stephen Lawrence in 1993 and the racist police investigation, a public inquiry was announced in July 1997 and reported in February 1999. It famously found that:

‘the Metropolitan Police Service was institutionally racist.’

Barr continued:

‘We have been investigating SDS reporting on Black justice campaigns and attitudes to race within the unit from the outset of the Inquiry. There have been many examples in Tranches 1 and 2 of racist content within SDS reporting. We have found much reporting on those campaigning for racial justice.

There were deployments into far-left wing groups campaigning for racial justice, such as that of HN106 “Barry Tompkins” in Tranche 1… HN88 [‘Timothy Spence’], in Tranche 2, [deployed to Stoke Newington and Hackney], where he reported on racial justice campaigners and those seeking to hold the police to account.’

We have already heard a great deal of harrowing evidence about the racism at the core of the police, and how it related to the SDS operation, from a host of witnesses: John Burke-Monerville, Sharon Grant OBE, Diane Abbott MP, Richard Adams, and Stafford Scott. (Scott has provided an additional witness statement for this Tranche, which will be published in due course).

This provides important contextual background about the attitudes and practices found within the SDS and amongst the ‘consumers’ of the intelligence it gathered.

Barr made it clear that the issue of race will be particularly prominent in T3P1:

‘There is a great deal of SDS reporting on a large number of racial justice campaigns during this era’.

Much of it came from the deployments of HN43 Peter Francis, HN81 ‘David Hagan’, and HN15 Mark Jenner.

A large number of civilians affected by SDS reporting on racial justice campaigns or race related issues have provided witness statements, including:

• Baroness Doreen Lawrence OBE
• Dr Neville Lawrence OBE
• Duwayne Brooks OBE
• Bernard Renwick
• Lee Lawrence
• ‘MSS’ (family of Michael Menson)
• ‘MWS’(family of Michael Menson)
• Myrna Simpson
• Patricia Armani Da Silva
• Sukhdev Reel
• Tish Reel
• Winston Silcott

Barr noted:

‘The traumas experienced by each of these people are clearly set out in their deeply moving, at times harrowing, evidence. So too are their complaints about the police, many of which have already been held to be justified.’

Others who advised or closely supported those at the heart of such campaigns and were themselves reported on or directly targeted have also made statements, including:

• Michael Mansfield KC
• Suresh Grover of The Monitoring Group;
• Asad Rehman of Newham Monitoring Project
• Marc Wadsworth of the Anti-Racist Alliance
• Mark Metcalf and ‘Alison’ of the Colin Roach Centre
• Dr Graham Smith of the Hackney Community Defence Association
• Hannah Sell and Lois Austin of Youth Against Racism in Europe
• Alex Owolade, Karen Doyle, Antonia Bright and ‘Lewis’ of the Movement for Justice

The Inquiry intends to look for evidence of conscious and subconscious racism in the SDS deployments, and examine the way that Black justice campaigns were reported on. Was this a case of what is termed ‘collateral intrusion’ when mainly spying on someone else, or were they deliberately targeted by Special Branch? What was this reporting used for?

BLACKLISTING

It is well established by police and their satellite bodies that Special Branch officers routinely, illegally, supplied personal details of people to an illegal employment blacklisting organisation, The Consulting Association. Thousands of people were denied work merely for entirely lawful trade union and workplace activity.

Barr informed us that:

‘The Consulting Association continued to be involved in blacklisting throughout the Tranche 3 era. We will continue, as we have to date, to look for evidence of any links between SDS intelligence and those blacklisted’.

However we note that blacklisted union activist, COPS campaigner and Secretary of the Blacklist Support Group, Dave Smith, has not been called to give oral evidence, despite his expertise and unique understanding of the blacklisting scandal.

Smith has applied for a Judicial Review of the unreasonable and irrational decision by Sir John Mitting not to call him at these hearings, saying:

‘The inquiry’s intention to restrict the evidence of blacklisted workers, means they are relying only on police accounts. It is against natural justice and the public interest and it makes the inquiry look like an establishment cover-up’.

KEY LEGAL DEVELOPMENTS

T3 saw some very significant legal changes, most notably the enactment of the Human Rights Act 1998 (HRA) on 2 October 2000. From then onwards, unjustified interference with private life through undercover policing, and inhuman or degrading treatment at the hands of undercover officers, both constituted Human Rights breaches enforceable in the UK domestic courts.

The Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 (referred to as ‘RIPA’) introduced a statutory regime with specific regulations for all deployments of undercover police officers, supposedly to ensure that these complied with the requirements of the HRA.

It introduced new systems for the authorisation, review, record keeping and oversight of undercover deployments which Barr noted:

‘should have focused minds on the justification for deploying SDS UCOs, including proportionality, as well as the need to manage and limit collateral intrusion.’

Barr made it clear that this Inquiry is prohibited from ruling on civil or criminal liability, but
that its terms of reference allow it to establish the extent to which managers considered and followed the laws which were designed to prevent problems of precisely the kind which beset the SDS.

In addition to the HRA and RIPA, other relevant legal changes that took place in the T3 period included the Criminal Procedure and Investigations Act 1996, the Police (Conduct) Regulations 1997/30, the Data Protection Act 1998, the Greater London Authority Act 1999, the Race Relations (Amendment) Act 2000 and the Police (Conduct) Regulations 2004/645, the Management of Health and Safety at Work Regulations 1999, and the Police (Health and Safety) Regulations 1999.

Barr pointed out that these last two are relevant to:

‘the extent to which the MPS sought to protect its officers, and those affected by their actions, from avoidable psychiatric harm’.

He also observed that the Inquiry will examine:

‘a great deal of evidence in this tranche about the harm done not only to members of the public but also undercover officers as a result of SDS operations’.

ORGANISATION OF THE SPECIAL DEMONSTRATION SQUAD

The Inquiry has now published a timeline and explanatory note for Tranche 3. This sets out the dates different officers served in the unit and some of the organisational changes that took place.

Barr described how in 1992, Special Branch’s ‘C’ and ‘E’ Squads merged into ‘CE Squad’ which commanded the SDS until approximately January 1995. Command was then transferred to ‘S’ Squad.

He also mentioned the 2006 merger of the Met’s Special Branch (‘SO12’) and Anti-Terrorist Branch (‘SO13’) into Counter Terrorism Command (‘SO15’).

In 1997 or 1998, the meaning of the SDS acronym also changed, from ‘Special Demonstration Squad’ to ‘Special Duties Section’.

The SDS itself was headed by a Detective Chief Inspector (DCI), supported by a Detective Inspector (DI) and two or three Sergeants.

A civilian administrator was added in 1995, and a Detective Constable joined the back office team in 2003. Nominally, the SDS was supposed to have 12 undercover officers deployed at any one time, but in practice there were often fewer than that.

Many aspects of the SDS operation appear to have remained largely the same in the T3 era. They continued to recruit officers exclusively from within Special Branch. Training continued to be informal, in the back office and on the job.

The deeply problematic SDS Tradecraft Manual appears to have been in use throughout this period. The unit continued to conduct twice weekly meetings at safe houses, and undercover officers continued to use cover accommodation, cover employment, cover documents and cover vehicles.

Other practices changed. The back office was moved to covert premises in 1997 or 1998 and
undercover officers were given (frankly ludicrous and disturbing) code names.

The SDS computerised its administration in 1995 and the Inquiry has worked from electronic documents in this Tranche. (Full details of their methodology and sources can be found in the Tranche 3 Disclosure Note).

In Tranche 2, examining the SDS 1983-1992, we heard how the selection process was changed after the ‘Scutt affair’. T3 saw further changes, with the introduction of psychometric testing (according to the SDS Annual Report of 1993-94).

The practice of peer mentoring continued, but was not without its problems. There is evidence that when HN86 was in charge of the unit, he sought to improve the support available for UCOs, with psychological support apparently on offer from around 2001 onwards. However, the extent to which his reforms were actually put into practice and maintained is in doubt.

By 2005, the unit’s recruitment process seems to have included:

‘an informal meeting, an interview, psychometric testing, a psychological interview, a structured interview, a home visit and then final selection.’

The selection process, according to Barr:

‘sought, amongst other things, to assess moral and ethical boundaries… Dilemmas on themes of “racial violence”, “racial issues” and “sex, drugs and rock ’n’ roll”, amongst others, appear to have been used’…

The titles alone seem to confirm that these were areas which either were, or should have been, of concern for management’.

However, despite all the legal and organisational changes, much of the behaviour of the SDS remained the same. There is considerable evidence that sexual relationships were still known about and talked about within the unit during T3.

Keeping the unit’s existence and methods secret continued to be a ‘paramount consideration’, and this influenced the way that misconduct of all kinds was dealt with, or not, and the unit’s attitude to the civil and criminal justice systems.

Barr outlined key questions for the Inquiry, a list which bears quoting in full:

‘who took targeting decisions, what decisions were made, why, how, whether they were justified, whether they were kept under review and, if they were justified initially, whether they remained so?’

He went on to say:

‘We will be taking a particular interest in how targeting was dealt with once the provisions of RIPA came into force. What difference did formal statutory processes make? To what extent did they achieve the aims which the legislation intended and, where they fell short, why?

It is self-evident that the introduction of RIPA did not act as a panacea for problems of the kind that we have been investigating. But understanding why that was the case may be very important to recommendations for the future of undercover policing. Especially if the answer is cultural, involving ingrained attitudes, behaviours and practices’.

DECEASED CHILDREN’S IDENTITIES

The SDS officially stopped stealing the identities of dead children early in T3, and HN43 Peter Francis was the last of the ‘open’ UCOs to base his cover identity on a dead child.

However, the Inquiry has learnt that HN16 James Thomson made supposedly unauthorised use of the identity ‘Kevin Crossland’. Barr explained:

‘Kevin Crossland lost his life, aged 5, in an aeroplane crash in the early hours of 1 September 1966. His mother and sister also perished in the crash but his father, David, survived albeit with serious injuries.’

The Inquiry will consider evidence of family members and will hear oral evidence from Liisa Crossland, about the impact of Thomson’s conduct and concerns about the management of the SDS.

Thomson will be questioned about how and why he used Kevin’s identity, seemingly for his own ends. Barr noted:

‘By the time the issue came to the attention of SDS managers, DS Thomson had registered Kevin to vote, obtained a mobile phone in his name and obtained a driving licence in this name.’

SDS ANNUAL REPORTS

The SDS produced annual reports until at least 1996-97. These reports were published in T2. Three further documents have now been published, including what appears to have been some discarded text from the 1995-96 report, a signed copy of the 1996-97 report with associated minute sheet, and either an incomplete draft, or part of a report, for 1997-98.

Barr noted that no complete report for 1997-98 nor any subsequent SDS annual reports have been found amongst surviving SDS records.

We can see from the minute sheet accompanying the 1996-97 report that it was definitely seen by a number of senior officers, including the then Commissioner, Sir Paul Condon, and the then Assistant Commissioner (Special Operations), Sir David Veness.

Dated 14 October 1997 is a comment from Condon:

‘Please convey my appreciation to all concerned for another year of outstanding courage and professionalism’.

This fact should be coupled with spycops describing Condon visiting their safe house to personally congratulate them. It shows that when, in the early days of the spycops scandal and the Met were in denial mode, Condon was lying when he said he’d never even heard of the SDS.

The incomplete 1997-98 report evidences a wish, on behalf of SDS management, to trumpet to their superiors about the work of HN81 ‘David Hagan’, his infiltration of the Movement for Justice and reporting on the group’s alleged actions in relation to the Stephen Lawrence Inquiry.

Questions need to be asked about the senior chain of Met command’s knowledge and involvement with the SDS, and the Inquiry will be investigating this at hearings in summer 2026.

THE DEMISE OF THE SDS

The SDS was shut down at the very start of 2008. The Inquiry will examine the events around the unit’s demise in detail at the T3P3 hearings in summer 2026.

According to Barr, in these T3P1 hearings, they will start exploring the apparent ‘clash of cultures’ that occurred towards the end:

‘It manifested itself in considerable tensions between managers with backgrounds outside Special Branch and UCOs recruited from within Special Branch. The former sought to effect significant changes to the way in which the SDS was run. They were met with considerable resistance to their efforts.’

The Inquiry has just published an explosive report for the SDS [MPS-0722622] which was written by Detective Sergeant HN273 in 2009, following the closure of the unit, at the behest of DCI Flood.

Barr describes it as:

‘a significant early critique of the SDS operation. Amongst other things it recognised the considerable legacy of risk which the unit was leaving behind. For example, because of the way in which courts had not been properly informed of SDS activity.

An important question is why more was not done at that time to act upon the recognition that there were likely to have been miscarriages of justice and deceitful sexual relationships’.

HOW EVIDENCE WILL BE ‘ADDUCED’

Barr addressed the Inquiry’s evidence process for this Tranche. He made a point of insisting that the Inquiry’s approach ‘will remain the same as it was in Tranche 2’, claiming that the vast majority of evidence was only ‘adduced’ in writing, rather than being heard orally.

This was something of a dog whistle on Barr’s part, as there is significant controversy over the fact that the Inquiry does not intend to call many non-police non-State witnesses in this Tranche, even where there are significant disagreements.

He specifically defended those decisions, telling the Chair:

‘Not every dispute of fact arising on the face of the written evidence will need to be resolved in order for you, Sir, to discharge the terms of reference. For this reason, it is not necessary to call some witnesses even though their evidence conflicts with that of other witnesses. Nor is it necessary to question every witness who is giving oral evidence about every dispute.’

He also explained that non-police non-State witnesses would continue to give evidence first, before the officers that spied on them.

This means that a large number of these witnesses will be expected to give evidence in ‘Phase 1’, about officers whose witness statements have not been disclosed and whose oral evidence will not be heard until next year.

(A full list of the non-State witnesses can be found at Annex E to the written version of Barr’s Opening Statement and the Inquiry has uploaded a provisional schedule of the T3P1 hearings).

Barr then made a very important point, reminding the Chair that:

‘the boundaries between our tranches and the phases within them are entirely administrative boundaries used by the Inquiry to organise the conduct of our necessarily complex and lengthy investigation. The ground truth was a continuum and there is considerable overlap between tranches and phases in places.

For example, some members of the public were reported on by both SDS and NPOIU UCOs during the period that both units co-existed. Some were affected by both Tranche 3 Phase 1 and Tranche 3 Phase 2 UCOs.’

One such example is that of the civilian witnesses who will be called to appear in these hearings but can also provide important evidence about HN104 Carlo Soracchi ‘Carlo Neri’, who won’t appear until ‘Phase 2’.

This understated comment was a significant moment: the Inquiry has behaved quite ridiculously when it comes to Soracchi, and although his real name has been public knowledge for years, this was the first time anyone from the Inquiry has publicly said it.

Finally, Barr summarised the police witnesses who will be giving evidence in ‘Phase 1’, and about whom others will give evidence, in the coming weeks:

1. HN143 Dennis ‘Ben’ Gunn
Gunn is actually a senior manager from T2 who is giving evidence out of turn, early next week because ‘it is expedient to do so now rather than wait until next summer’s senior management
hearing.’ Gunn served as Commander (Operations) in the Met’s Special Branch (MPSB) between approximately February 1988 and November 1991.

2. HN587 Peter Phelan
Barr noted that the Inquiry plans to call another senior manager ‘at some point during the Phase 1 hearing’. Peter Phelan was supposed to give evidence on Thursday 16 October but he cancelled unexpectedly. He served as Commander (Operations) in MPSB from the late summer of 1983 until December 1987 and thereafter as Deputy Assistant Commissioner (Security) from January 1988 until December 1991.

3. HN16 James Thomson, ‘James Straven’/ ‘Kevin Crossland’
Detective Sergeant James Thomson was deployed from February 1997 until March 2002 under the fictional cover name ‘James Straven’. He infiltrated the animal rights movement, specifically targeting the Brixton Hunt Saboteurs and the Croydon Hunt Saboteurs, and Barr added that:

‘He also appears to have mixed with at least some people who were believed to be committing offences under the banner of the ALF.’

Barr noted that Thomson’s deployment into Brixton Hunt Sabs was short lived. The reason he cites: ‘it was felt they were too unpredictable to be a source of reliable advance intelligence.’

It is worth noting that this seems improbable. It is far more likely that Thomson just failed to win the trust of the group, one which evidence from T2 suggests the SDS were extremely interested in.

Barr notes that Thomson claims to have ‘assessed the Croydon Hunt Saboteurs to be more organised and consistently led’.

Thomson’s reporting for the first three years of his deployment is described as: ‘a mixture of intrusive personal reporting of the kind with which we are now familiar but also reports about activities which, on their face, appear to have some policing value’. Thomson’s managers
were seemingly pleased with his performance.

However, Barr states:

‘In fact, all was not well. There are very many troubling aspects of DS Thomson’s deployment and conduct. Despite investigation by his immediate managers towards the end of his deployment, investigation by [police internal spycops investigation] Operation Herne and our work to date it is still not entirely clear where the truth lies…

One thing is certain: Mr Thomson has, on his own admission, told many lies to date. He has lied not only to those he mixed with whilst deployed but also to his managers and to the Inquiry. His credibility is very much an issue.’

HN16 JAMES THOMSON ABUSING WOMEN

Thomson’s misdeeds include deceiving several women into sexual relationships (something which he no longer denies).

‘Sara’ joined the Croydon Hunt Saboteurs, soon after meeting the man she knew as ‘James Straven’, in the autumn of 1998. She liked him. A relationship developed and became sexual. He told her that he loved her at the Glastonbury festival in 1999.

She felt a strong connection to him and would have married him had he asked. Over Christmas 1999 she could not contact him. She challenged him and he came to see her with a letter in which he claimed to have experienced sexual abuse when at school, asking her not to tell anyone about this. She is now very angry with the way in which she was manipulated.

Barr stated:

‘I shall not attempt, in this brief opening, to do justice to “Sara’s” evidence about the impact of DS Thomson’s deceit. But her counsel, Ms Kilroy KC, will be speaking on her behalf tomorrow.’

Sara will be the first T3P1 witness to give evidence, doing so on Friday 17 October.

‘Ellie’ was not an activist but was and is an animal lover. She volunteered and later worked at a local animal hospital. Her relationship with the man she knew as ‘James Straven’ began in early 2001.

He had asked her close friend, who we are calling ‘Wendy’, to set them up. Ellie was 21 years old at the time and vulnerable. He said he was 33. He was in fact 37. ‘James Straven’ was Ellie’s first real love and first serious boyfriend.

They went on holiday together to Indonesia and Singapore. Around the start of 2002, Ellie recalls ‘Straven’ telling her that he was going to move to the United States because his ex-wife and children were moving there. About a month later he told her he would be moving sooner than he thought. This was all part of Thomson’s exfiltration plan from his deployment.

For an extraordinary sixteen years after Thomson’s deployment ended, he kept in touch with ‘Ellie’ and met up with her periodically. ‘Ellie’ has provided exhibits to the Inquiry, including some of the loving and emotional communications that passed between them over the years. In one, Thomson asked for photographs of her in lingerie.

In June 2015, thirteen years after his deployment ended, after this Inquiry was announced and just a month before its formal opening, ‘Ellie’ had sex with the man she still knew as ‘James Straven’.

Eventually, in April 2018, after Thomson knew that he was going to lose his anonymity in the Inquiry, he told Ellie he had been an undercover police officer. By this stage, Barr noted:

‘We may need to explore in more detail what was said in this conversation. Amongst other things, “Ellie” states that Mr Thomson told her that a lot of former UCOs were leaving the country until the Inquiry had blown over.’

Such prolonged contact, over so many years, had a significant impact on ‘Ellie’. She was never able to move on and get over him, and the discovery that ‘Straven’ was an undercover police officer has had a profound impact upon her.

Ellie will be giving evidence on 23 October and 3 November.

‘Wendy’ was deceived into a long-term friendship by ‘Straven’ which lasted for over twenty years. from 1997 until she discovered the truth about who he was in 2018.

She volunteered and then worked at the same animal hospital as ‘Ellie’. She was an animal rights activist, who became a hunt saboteur in 1997, aged 17.

‘Straven’ supported her in 2000 and 2001 when her mother was dying, at a time when her mental health was very poor. She recounts how Thomson encouraged her to continue hunt sabbing at this time and facilitated her doing so.

‘Sara’ and ‘Ellie’ were close friends and Wendy is now troubled by the role she played in encouraging Thomson’s sexual relationships with them both. Thomson’s deception has had a significant impact upon her which she articulates in her witness statement.

One particularly disturbing aspect of his interference in her life is a passage in an internal SDS document about her which reads:

‘Recently moved into an address… which she has bought since the death of her mother, attempts to disrupt this purchase having failed. It is impossible to predict how long she will remain here’.

Why on earth did the spycops want to stymie her buying a house? Barr agreed in his statement that ‘this passage calls for an explanation.’

SDS managers first developed serious concerns about Thomson in 2001, when he told them he would travel to France on annual leave (from 26 September to 5 October 2001). They discovered he had in fact deliberately disobeyed instructions and gone to Indonesia with ‘Ellie’.

Barr explained that from then on, more and more problems with Thomson’s conduct emerged.

He had multiple credit cards and bank accounts in his ‘James Straven’ identity, and more than one passport, some with pages removed, apparently to conceal unauthorised travel.

He had multiple driving licences at various addresses, and managers believed he must have broken the law to obtain some of them.

‘Perhaps most troubling of all, DS Thomson was found to be developing another false and unauthorised persona. It was based on a deceased child’s identity: that of Kevin Crossland…

There was, and is, considerable suspicion about the financial propriety of DS Thomson’s conduct during his deployment.’

Barr then recounted an especially serious incident in Thomson’s deployment which will be examined in detail by the Inquiry.

As part of his supposed infiltration of the Animal Liberation Front, Thomson reported on a plot to travel to France to obtain a firearm and black powder from an animal rights activist. This supposed plot was allowed to go ahead in order to be disrupted by the police.

Barr explained:

‘DS Thomson appears to have driven to Marseille in his cover Land Rover Discovery with an activist known as ‘L3’. He seems to have left the vehicle where it could be, and was, recovered by [SDS manager] HN58 who made it appear like a theft.

A semi-automatic large calibre handgun was found in the vehicle, together with ammunition and black powder. DS Thomson hired a car and drove to Bordeaux where “Sara” recalls meeting him.’

However, SDS managers became suspicious that the plot might in fact have been a self-
aggrandising tale designed to prolong Thomson’s deployment. There has been no independent corroboration of the plot, and it appears that another UCO – who has full anonymity in this Inquiry – told his manager HN36 Michael Dell that Thomson was in possession of a firearm, given to him as a gift while on protective duties.

Thomson allegedly sought permission to keep the gun as a gratuity, and when that was refused, did not return it but instead took it to France and stored it in a ‘deposit box’.

Barr bluntly asks:

‘Was there a genuine plot which DS Thomson’s intelligence and actions thwarted, or was it all a deception on his part?’

SDS managers noted that the volume of Thomson’s reporting was much lower than might have been expected, and on analysis it proved to be of little value, so what was he doing? During his deployment, he was spending time with ‘Ellie’ and ‘Wendy’ and found the time to study for numerous qualifications from the Open University.

Barr told us that the SDS managers suspected that Thomson was overly ‘engrossed’ in his unusual cover employment. HN36 Michael Dell even commented in a File Note that Thomson’s activities in the film industry were almost the only topic of conversation at field officers’ meetings.

Barr displayed a screenshot from the British Film Institute’s website for the 1998 television drama, ‘Coming Home’, noting:

‘It is certainly an extraordinary feature of this deployment that the cover name of an SDS UCO features in the credits for a wartime period drama.’

The evidence is that managers knew about Thomson’s relationships. His phone records revealed a suspiciously large number of calls to ‘Sara’, ‘Ellie’ and ‘Wendy’.

In his witness statement, Thomson claims that when he was interviewed by Detective Chief Superintendent Black, he admitted to having a relationship with ‘Sara’.

Barr noted that:

‘it appears that an opportunity might have been missed to prevent, or reduce, the protracted deceptions of both “Ellie” and “Wendy” which continued until 2018. In the result, “Sara”, “Ellie”, “Wendy” and the Crosslands did not find out what DS Thomson had done until this inquiry’s processes brought his conduct to light.’

Barr made it clear that the Inquiry has a lot of questions about how the case of Thomson was handled by SDS management. According to him:

‘Both SDS and more senior MPSB managers faced a by now familiar quandary. Should they discipline Thomson or might that risk leading to a chain of events that would compromise the operational security of the SDS?’

Thomson doesn’t seem to have faced any formal disciplinary process, just some ‘stern words from DCS Colin Black’. His undercover deployment was ended, his security vetting reduced and his firearms authorisation revoked, but these last two were reinstated a few years later, and Thomson continued working as a police officer until his retirement in June 2014, upon completion of 30 years’ service.

It is striking to see that managers being interviewed in 2012 (i.e. after concerns about the SDS had become public) are recorded as saying that they have ‘every faith in JT who has shown unquestionable integrity over the last decade’, thanking him ‘for his dedication, commitment and value over the last 11 years through some extremely stressful operations that have been performed in an exemplary way throughout’ and adding that they do not wish DS Thomson to finish his career ‘thinking he is under a cloud’.

Barr concluded his account with the comment:

‘As to why DS Thomson behaved as he did, we understand him to be conveying in his witness statement that he lost his sense of identity and effectively became James Straven. He suggests that he was suffering from Dissociative Identity Disorder.

You may need to decide, Sir, whether Mr Thomson lost his grip on who he really was or whether his conduct, over the course of many years, has in fact been motivated throughout by amoral self-interest.’

HN43 PETER FRANCIS ‘PETER JOHNSON / BLACK / DALEY’

Peter Francis joined the SDS in January 1993 and was deployed between September 1993 and September 1997. He stole the identity of a dead child, Peter David Johnson. Barr noted that there are some questions about how this was done.

He also used other names,‘Pete Black’ and ‘Pete Daley’, but without any false documentation to support them. He secured cover employment at a special needs school in West London, which allowed him to have school holidays with his real family.

Of his early deployment Barr notes that:

‘whilst in the back office, preparing to deploy, he regularly drove the then head of the SDS, HN86, to and from work. Doing so enabled him to get to know HN86 well and led to conversations about the unit.’

Francis’ evidence says HN86 was thoroughly and overtly racist. In particular, Francis says he was instructed by HN86 to seek out intelligence that could be used to undermine, discredit and destroy
Black family justice campaigns, particularly that of Stephen Lawrence.

HN86 denies these allegations, and the Inquiry intends to look at them very closely indeed.

Barr notes:

‘On the one hand there is evidence of overt racism, in the chain of command, relating to HN593 Detective Chief Supt. Robert Potter and HN86.

There is also evidence of racist content in SDS reporting, considerable emphasis on Black justice campaigns, evidence of critical police comments to the media in other cases, following the deaths of Black people as a result of the use of force by police, and broader findings about racism within the MPS, not least the findings of the Stephen Lawrence Inquiry itself…

On the other hand, none of Mr Francis’ SDS contemporaries corroborate his account of a tasking to undermine the Lawrences. Nor is there any written SDS record of any such tasking.’

Barr also noted that several other witnesses question Francis’ credibility.

Francis’ account states that when he was working in the SDS back office, HN86 gave him a list of names of people visiting the Lawrence family home in the wake of Stephen’s murder, and asked him to find out if any of them had particular political affiliations and were known to the SDS.

Family Liaison Officers (FLOs) who visited the Lawrences’ home in the aftermath of the murder did make a list of visitors to the house, and the FLOs are being asked to provide further evidence.

Barr insists that:

‘Our exploration of the evidence in Tranche 3 will not be narrowly confined to whether or not events occurred precisely as described by Mr Francis. The Inquiry is seeking to establish the full truth about what happened in relation not only to the Lawrence family and Stephen Lawrence Campaign, but also Duwayne Brooks and other family justice campaigns.

We will be exploring whether relevant SDS deployments were tainted by either conscious or subconscious racism, taking into account all relevant contextual evidence.’

Francis’ first targets included the Kingsway Anti-Fascist Group (KAFG) and ‘Lewis’, a member of that group who is due to give evidence on 12 November. Barr notes that: ‘There are significant disputes of fact between members of KAFG and Mr Francis’ for the Inquiry to investigate.

Very early in his deployment, Francis attended a demonstration at the British National Party’s headquarters in Welling, held on 16 October 1993.Through his infiltration of KAFG, he made contacts within both Youth Against Racism in Europe (YRE) and Militant Labour (ML, called the Socialist Party since December 1996).

Francis held a number of official roles within YRE and Militant, some of which he discussed with managers. However, yet again, Barr notes that:

‘There are considerable differences between Mr Francis’ accounts and the accounts of those he mixed with from YRE and ML. There are also conflicts between Mr Francis’ evidence and that of his managers and fellow UCOs’.

Francis was also involved in anti-racist activism, reporting widely on a number of single issue and racial justice campaigns, including the Winston Silcott Defence Campaign, the Brian Douglas Campaign and the Wayne Douglas Campaign.

Francis reported on trade unionists, whom he believed fell into the ‘subversives’ category. Examples include:

• Frank Smith (trade unionist and member of the Militant Away Team)
• Alex Owolade (member of UNISON, as well as the Revolutionary Internationalist League, and then Movement for Justice (MFJ)
• Tony Gard (member of the National Union of Teachers as well as the MFJ)
• Matt Wrack (member of the Fire Brigades Union)

Francis claims that his intelligence was of interest both to Special Branch and to the Security Service, and was likely disseminated to the Branch’s building trade contacts, and potentially used for ‘blacklisting’ purposes.

Similarly, he reported on Militant members getting involved in unions and associated campaigns, such as the National Union for Teachers’ Campaign Against Vouchers in Education.

By November 1996, the Security Service was no longer required information on such ‘subversive groups’. In any event, it was decided to end Francis’ deployment in 1997. An exfiltration strategy was put in motion in December 1996, and became a long and convoluted process.

Francis finally withdrew from the field in September 1997, using the pretence of a sick mother, who then died. This prompted sympathy cards and offers of support from his targets.

He asserts that his deployment in fact ended due to the actions of his then wife who raised concerns about his mental health with his manager, HN10 Bob Lambert.

Francis says he argued forcefully for the Macpherson Inquiry into Stephen Lawrence’s murder to be informed of his involvement, but his superiors were against this.

He feels he was failed by SDS management. He was medically retired from the Met in 2001 and then brought a civil claim for damages against them, which was settled out of court.

Francis says managers Lambert and HN67 ‘Alan Bond’ advised him always to use condoms when having sex undercover. He describes two occasions when the Squad travelled to Amsterdam where many of the officers, he implies, enjoyed all the city had to offer.

He says he had a number of sexual encounters during his deployment (some of which he referred to in the civil claim he brought in 2003, which management would have seen). Barr elaborates:

‘He portrays a unit in which such conduct was well known and accepted as part of the job. He states that managers HN86 and HN67 told him that the SDS went “where MI5 feared to go”, the inference being that MI5 agents could not engage in sexual activity but SDS officers could’.

Barr also noted:

‘All three of the open former UCOs being called to give oral evidence in Phase 1 sexually deceived women. Three of the five who we will be hearing from in Phase 2 are also known to have done so.’

Despite raising doubts about Francis’ credibility as a witness, Barr acknowledged that he is a whistleblower:

‘He made a very significant contribution to the series of events which led to the establishment of this inquiry.’

HN81 ‘DAVID HAGAN’

HN81 ‘David Hagan’ joined the SDS in January 1996 and was deployed on undercover operations in June of that year. He used the cover name ‘David Steven Hagan’ and was assigned the codename ‘Windmill Tilter’.

He infiltrated the Socialist Workers Party (SWP) in Hammersmith and later Fulham. He has provided the Inquiry with a lengthy witness statement but is not attending to give oral evidence due to complex post-traumatic stress disorder.

Barr describes his operation as:

‘a relatively fruitless exercise as far as public order intelligence was concerned. The SWP was not engaging in what is euphemistically described in police documents as “street activity”.’

HN81 sought redirection, which took him South of the Thames to Brixton. There he refocused his attention on Class War, an anarchist political organisation that had been involved in the Poll Tax riots of 1990.

His involvement with this group led him to Movement Against the Monarchy (or ‘MA’M’). He was not specifically tasked to infiltrate Class War or ‘MA’M’. His managers had directed him to go to Brixton, outlining his general targeting strategy as a “roving public order brief” with a broad discretion as to direction.’

Barr questions why he was sent with such a wide brief to ‘a racially diverse part of London’ and notes that ‘he found little by way of serious public order to report on’.

Within a year of his deployment starting, HN81 sought to infiltrate the Movement for Justice (MFJ), a group involved in a number of campaigns focussed on issues of racism and immigration. These included the police’s use of stop and search powers, CS spray, and deaths in custody (all of which disproportionately affected young Black men), often supporting family justice campaigns.

Issues of race became a feature of HN81’s reporting, and he remained a member of MFJ until his deployment ended in the summer of 2021.

Barr explained:

‘The extent to which members of MFJ, including ‘David Hagan’, were, or were not, involved in the Stephen Lawrence Campaign, the Stephen Lawrence Public Support Group (or with the Lawrence family or other supportive groups) is a matter that will need our close attention. A significant number of the documents relating to HN81’s deployment refer to the Stephen Lawrence Campaign and, indeed, the Stephen Lawrence Inquiry.

HN81 was present at Hannibal House, above the Elephant and Castle shopping centre, on a number of occasions when that inquiry was sitting there. Not least on the day that the five murder suspects attended. He accepts being involved in the public disorder surrounding that event.’

The Stephen Lawrence family campaign always advocated for order and calm. Yet on that day, 29 June 1998, Hagan describes shouting and aggressive posturing, and admits to joining in with the pushing and shoving that began when the suspects emerged from the building.

We were shown a long and compelling extract from ‘The Murder that Changed a Nation’, a BBC documentary showing scenes of the community’s protests as well as the police’s behaviour that day.

Barr cited the feelings of Stephen’s father, Dr Neville Lawrence, who finds it:

‘particularly troubling that an officer who sought to justify surveillance on the grounds of public disorder actively contributed to it’.

He also noted the observation of Baroness Doreen Lawrence, Stephen’s mother:

‘HN81’s presence at campaign meetings and events was purposeful and his involvement suggests more than incidental involvement; the effects of his actions amounted to surveillance and intrusion into their family and the campaign for justice.’

Barr revealed that:

‘There is written evidence that the SDS, through HN81 and his manager DI Robert Lambert, fed directly into the MPS Stephen Lawrence Review Team (or SLRT). They provided oral briefings to A/DI Richard Walton around August 1998 at a time when the Commissioner’s legal team were preparing his submission to the Macpherson Inquiry. There was a meeting at which A/DI Walton, DI Lambert and HN86 were present which was held in DI Lambert’s back garden.

It is our understanding that [Chair of the Lawrence inquiry] Sir William Macpherson was not made aware of such channels of intelligence…

Who knew what about HN81’s operation must also be established. There is evidence suggesting that it went to the top of the MPS, eliciting praise from Commissioner Sir Paul Condon at the height of the Macpherson Inquiry…

In a summary of HN81’s withdrawal strategy, HN129 DS Noel Warr notes (I quote), “[Windmill Tilter] is quite candid in admitting that he was largely responsible for their adoption of the Stephen Lawrence case, and the rest, as they say, is history”.’

It is important to note that that this kind of interference in legal processes is by no means an isolated incident, and Barr specifically stated that:

‘The legal and ethical basis for the MPS resorting to undercover intelligence in the context of legal affairs is a wider topic that this inquiry will investigate’.

Through MFJ, Hagan also came into contact with the family of Lakhvinder ‘Ricky’ Reel, who died after a racist attack in Kingston-Upon-Thames. The police insisted it was an accident and the family started a campaign for justice:

‘His mother, Sukhdev Reel, has stated that she was horrified to learn that HN81 had been reporting on their personal lives, and had driven her home following a meeting one evening.’

HN81’s deployment ended in 2001. He believes that his service as an undercover officer has had an enduring effect on his mental health and that of his family.

HN15 MARK JENNER ‘MARK CASSIDY’

Mark Jenner was deployed between February 1995 and April 2000. He first infiltrated the Colin Roach Centre (CRC) and the Hackney Community Defence Association (HCDA). He then targeted Anti-Fascist Action and Red Action.

From late 1995 onwards, Jenner was reporting on Republican Forum and Republican Sinn Féin, and SDS records from 1997 show that he was ordered to focus on London-based Irish Republican activists. His targeting specifically included two named individuals, Mark Metcalf of the CRC and Norman Blair. The former he got very close to, but not the latter.

Barr explained that the Inquiry will investigate whether there was any justification for spying on the CRC and HCDA:

‘There are serious differences between the portrayal of the CRC and HCDA by the SDS and the descriptions provided by these witnesses.’

However it is agreed that the CRC campaigned against racism and the HCDA was involved in police accountability work, including cases with a racial dimension.

Barr further noted:

‘There is also an issue as to how DC Jenner conducted himself, including whether he was violent in his undercover identity and, if so, whether his use of violence was appropriate or authorised?’

Witnesses Mark Metcalf, ‘Alison’, Steve Hedley, Dr Graham Smith, and Jenner’s now ex-wife (known as ‘S’) will all give evidence about his deployment.

Barr noted that Jenner was arrested on suspicion of obstruction of the highway at a counter demonstration against the National Front in Dover on 28 February 1998. He showed news footage of that event, commenting that it:

‘gives a flavour of the kind of public disorder in which DC Jenner found himself during the course of his deployment. He is wearing a black bomber jacket, black woollen hat and gloves and can be seen prominently at the end of the piece, apparently mouthing “come on” to opposing demonstrators.’

Barr also noted that Jenner assumed a number of positions of responsibility during his deployment and that a cause of considerable concern is

‘the extremely prolonged sexual and emotional deception that DC Jenner practised on “Alison”.’

Jenner began a sexual relationship with ‘Alison’ very early in his deployment, and soon moved into her flat. The relationship lasted almost five years and they cohabitated for more than four years.

Jenner became very deeply involved in her life, attending family weddings, birthdays and religious celebrations and holidays in the United Kingdom, Greece, Israel, Vietnam and the Netherlands.

Barr noted:

‘A particularly cruel feature of DC Jenner’s deception of “Alison” is that she wanted to start a family. The man she knew as “Mark Cassidy” told her he wanted to have children with her, but “just not yet”. Her written evidence explains that she persuaded him to go to couples counselling for between 12 to 18 months in an attempt to resolve that impasse.’

Jenner implemented his exfiltration plan after Christmas 1999, by feigning depression and paranoia.

On 15 March 2000, he abruptly moved out of the flat, returning for two periods over the following weeks, before finally disappearing for good on 11 April 2000, leaving a note explaining he had left to travel to Germany. ‘Alison’ was utterly devastated by his sudden departure.

She made extensive efforts to locate him, but these yielded nothing.

She learned through an unofficial search that Mark Cassidy’s passport was recorded as stored in ‘CE’. Further enquiries with a private detective led her to believe that Mark had been living under a false identity.

Eventually, a meeting with Helen Steel and a discussion surrounding her own experience with HN5 John Dines ‘John Barker’ convinced Alison that Mark Cassidy had been a Special Branch officer.

She didn’t receive any confirmation of this until 2011 (and the Met continued to ‘Neither Confirm Nor Deny’ his identity for years after that).

Barr said:

‘An extraordinary and valuable element of the evidence that we have is video footage
of DC Jenner during the course of the relationship. It was filmed by “Alison”…. It vividly depicts the deception in ways that words cannot.’

We will also hear from ‘S’, Jenner’s wife at that time, who Barr recognises as a ‘female victim of his deployment’.

Her evidence describes the sacrifices made by her family during and after the deployment, including being forced to move house, and the other impacts of Jenner’s behaviour. She is critical of SDS management, asserting that there was a lack of oversight, information, and support.

Barr lists a number of issues the Inquiry will wish to investigate in relation to Jenner’s deployment, including management knowledge of the sexual relationship and the extent to which the chain of command was aware of the nature of his target groups.

He cites a memo written by HN127 Tiddy dated 10 October 2000, which was circulated at the time to all of the unit’s managers (i.e. DCI HN53, DI HN58, DS HN52 Greaney and DS Warr):

‘Partnerships in the left-wing field are by and large confined to the parties that they are members of. For example, there are a large number of cohabiting partners/relationships within the SWP and SP and anyone who enjoys single status over a certain period may invite unwanted suspicion.

The most difficult of this type of enquiry is generally instigated from an attached female who may be taking soundings on behalf of one of her friends. The female antennae is a difficult creature to subdue and whereas, as a rule, they applaud monogamy they do possess the ability to unearth doubts about perceived relationships.

There have been recent operations e.g. Touchy Subject [Jenner] and Psycho Dream [Boyling] where, due to the lifestyle employed by the operatives their bona fides were considered unimpeachable.

This is patently not the case in every operation and consideration should now be given to providing additional operational support to field officers.’

This strongly suggests managers knew about the long-term intimate relationships these officers were having and knew exactly how they were spending their time. Beyond that, it indicates that managers saw such long-term relationships positively as a way to reinforce a deployment.

HN26 ‘CHRISTINE GREEN’

HN26 ‘Christine Green’ spied on animal rights activists from November 1994 to November 1999. She was based in South and West London, but also operated outside the city. She reported principally on London Animal Action, South London Animal Action, Brixton Hunt Sabs and what Barr describes as ‘persons involved in actions which fell under the ALF [Animal Liberation Front] banner’.

He commented that:

‘Her reporting covers a great variety of activism in the cause of animal rights, some of it lawful and some of it decidedly unlawful’.

However, it wasn’t clear whether he meant the activism or the reporting was unlawful, because he went on to say that:

‘Amongst reporting on individuals of a kind that was usual for the SDS is a report on a planned meeting to discuss making civil claims against the Commissioner. It is yet another example of reporting on civil litigation, or the potential for it’.

Barr made reference to a watershed in her reporting, around the spring of 1998. Following complaints from managers that she wasn’t producing good enough intelligence, there seems to have been a sudden increase in reporting on Animal Liberation Front (ALF) type activity, focussed on a man named Thomas Frampton, who was widely known as ‘Joe Tex’ or ‘Joe Tax’. An SDS File Note described him as ‘the leader of a London based ALF cell’.

In fact, Green became intimately involved with Mr Frampton and eventually resigned from the police to be his permanent partner.

There is some dispute about when that intimate relationship began, but in Tranche 2 hearings, Paul Gravett and ‘Walter’ gave evidence to the effect that it began during her deployment, and this might explain the sudden change in her intelligence product.

Barr commented:

‘Far fewer women than men served as undercover police officers in the SDS. But HN26’s case illustrates clearly that the risk of undercover police officers becoming involved in sexual relationships with those they mix with undercover is not confined to men.’

It is, however, striking that, far from the cruel and degrading ways in which male officers behaved towards the women they deceived, Green seemingly told Frampton the truth about her identity, and ultimately left her husband for him. They were understood to still be together when the facts became public in 2018.

Barr highlighted a key question of particular concern to the Inquiry: Green’s involvement in the high-profile animal liberation action which resulted in up to 6000 mink being released into the wild from Crow Hill Farm in Ringwood, Hampshire on the night of 8 August 1998:

‘She was authorised by her SDS managers to participate. The focus of our investigation, when managers are questioned next summer, will concern the circumstances in which she was so authorised, the level of that authority, and why local police were not informed either before or afterwards when the crime was being investigated.’

HN123

Barr told us HN123 infiltrated the Socialist Workers Party (SWP) and the Anti-Nazi League in the mid-1990s, adding the cryptic comment ‘He later targeted another group which was involved in violence.’

Barr highlighted three aspects of HN123’s written evidence that are of particular significance:

1. He has stated that he reported on the Stephen Lawrence Campaign whilst he was infiltrating the Anti-Nazi League.

2. His partner wrote a letter of complaint to Assistant Commissioner David Veness in August 2002, in which she referred to officers boasting about undercover activity, including their sexual relationships and the extra-marital affairs. She recalled AC Veness himself referring to the SDS as a ‘cowboy outfit’. Her main concern was the failure of the SDS to protect the welfare of its officers and the stable family relationships they relied on.

This was an attempt to bring the issue of sexual misconduct to the attention of a very senior officer: ACSO Veness was second only to Lord Stevens in the SDS’ chain of command at that time. Mr Veness will have an opportunity to respond next summer when the Inquiry’s attention turns to the unit’s management.

3. HN123 joined in with Peter Francis in bringing a claim for damages for personal injury to his mental health against the Met’s Commissioner. This was settled out of court.

CONCLUSION

Barr ended by saying that the Inquiry ‘continues to be a Herculean task’, and thanked all the people who have worked to prepare for these hearings, often to tight deadlines. He also said how ‘daunting and stressful’ the prospect of giving evidence will be for many, and advertised the fact that the Inquiry now has a Vulnerable Witness Policy, encouraging people to read it and seek the support it offers.

 

Peter Skelton KC (on behalf of the Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis)

Skelton spoke for only thirty minutes, representing the Metropolitan Police as an institution.

His statement was basically a long list of the mistakes the police had made, peppered with negative superlatives and apologies, suggesting that the MPS no longer have the will to defend the indefensible.

He acknowledged from the outset that there was serious wrongdoing by ‘some UCOs’, and specified that it was ‘not only in hindsight but by the standards at the time.’

He then listed seven specific failings:

1. Managers should not have allowed reporting on family justice and police accountability campaigns

He stressed that these groups presented no risk of crime and no risk of disorder, and families like the Lawrences tended to actively discourage such behaviour.

He referred to senior officers having ‘legitimate concerns’ about a lack of trust in the police and some public disorder resulting from this, but accepted that the use of undercovers was not justified. The police’s time and resources would have been better spent on community engagement and relationship repair, and responding more effectively to racist violence.

He denied that the SDS gathered information about the Lawrences with a view to smearing the family, as alleged by whistleblower officer Peter Francis.

He expects managers and more senior officers to be questioned about exactly what they knew about such reporting, and what they authorised, or failed to question, acknowledging that there was a ‘collective failure to exercise ethical judgement’, and also a failure on the part of the most senior officers to get rid of an unhealthy ‘us against them’ culture within the Met.

APOLOGY 1

He delivered an apology at this point to ‘the family of Stephen Lawrence, Duwayne Brookes OBE the family of Ricky Reel and the other individuals, families and family members who were the subject of this improper reporting during the T3 period’.

2. Sexual relationships were wrong

APOLOGY 2

Skelton began by citing the Met’s apology made in 2015, describing these relationships as ‘a gross violation of privacy and human rights. They were abusive, deceitful, manipulative and wrong’, adding that they were a serious failing ‘by the standards of any time.’

He stressed that who knew what about these sexual relationships will be a matter for Phase 3, but admitted that they were ‘facilitated by poor management’ and that there is considerable evidence that managers within the SDS and Special Branch either knew, or should have known, of at least some of them.

He pointed out that the attitude of managers towards sexual relationships was exemplified by the ‘inadequate, misguided, sexist and offensive’ guidance in the SDS’s Tradecraft manual.

He described its focus as ‘self-serving’, and ’predicated on the false premise’ that rather than the undercovers, it would be their civilian targets and ‘associates’ who would want and initiate these relationships. UCOs were allowed and encouraged ‘to abrogate responsibility for their own predatory actions’.

He went on to say:

‘senior police officers in the MPS and other police services would now be expected to recognise sexual misconduct as an abuse of power and to understand the significant effects that it has on the people who are manipulated and deceived.’

This is not due to some sudden developoemnt of conscience within the Met, but the reaction to the investigative and campaigning efforts of women who were deceived into sexual relationships by officers from both spycops units.

Skelton ended by saying:

‘It is a matter of deep regret that such recognition and understanding was not part of the prevailing culture within the MPS during the 1990s and 2000s. Therefore, no consideration was given at that time – as it would now be today – to contacting the individual women to inform them that they had been deceived’.

We note that if that is the case, it was a very long time coming, as women deceived into relationships in the 1990s and 2000s were still finding out about it as late as 2017 for ‘Jessica’, 2018 for ‘Ellie’, and 2019 for ‘Maya’.

3. Participation in Crime

Managers failed to ensure that any participation of SDS officers in criminal activities was fully compliant with Home Office guidelines (Home Office Circular No. 35/1986 ‘Consolidated Circular to the Police on Crime and Kindred Matters’), specifically citing the Crow Hill mink farm incident and multiple examples of officers misleading the courts.

The Home Office had already issued unequivocal instructions in 1969, a year after the SDS was founded, saying that if the use of any kind of informant might lead to a court being misled, they should be exposed or withdrawn. No spycops should ever have gone to court without the court’s full knowledge.

4. Failure to discipline UCOs for misconduct

He referred to a ‘general failure on the part of the SDS’s management to impose discipline on UCOs’:

‘Officers who behaved unprofessionally or dishonestly were not subject to misconduct proceedings and there was no proper recognition that their lack of professionalism and integrity created security risks which made them unsuitable for further sensitive work within Special Branch or elsewhere in the MPS.

This led to a culture in which misconduct was tolerated wrongly in order to protect the continuation of the secret work of the unit… the handling of Detective Sergeant Thomson’s misconduct exemplifies this failure.’

5. Deceased Children

Skelton described the move from using dead children to fictional identities as ‘prompted by computerisation not ethical concerns’ and repeated the apologies made in T2, extending them to the Crossland family and other families affected in T3:

APOLOGY 3

‘The MPS accepts that the managers of the SDS failed to recognise the hurt, distress, and anger that the use of deceased children’s identities would cause the families of the children, and the public concern that would result if the practice had been revealed.

It apologises unreservedly to the families for this. It also wishes to acknowledge that their distress will have been compounded by the revelation that some SDS officers behaved indefensibly while using their children’s names’.

He went on to say that there was ‘no justification whatsoever’ for DS Thomson’s misuse of Kevin Crossland’s identity.

6. Welfare of UCOs

Skelton described how the T3 period saw an increasing awareness, both within Special Branch and in the wider intelligence community, of the unique stresses and risks to mental health that could be caused by undercover work.

He noted that the ‘operational security of the unit’ was too often prioritised over the welfare of the UCOs, with professional psychological support not being made compulsory until 2001.

The ‘psychological effects of living in a false identity and, for some, the direct experience of physical violence or the chronic fear of being exposed and physically attacked’ went unrecognised. The Met now acknowledges that some SDS officers suffered ‘significant psychological harm as a result of their work’.

One of those officers, Peter Francis, was mentioned by name at this point, in a way that seemed a rather nasty back-handed attack on his credibility and mental health.

7. Spouses, partners and families of UCOs

Finally, the MPS added to the long list of grovelling apologies they have been forced to issue in the course of this Inquiry, this time to the UCOs’ partners and families.

Skelton noted that SDS deployments led to particular stresses on the undercovers. They spent a lot of time living in their false identities, for years on end, most of them only intermittently returning home to their families and their ‘real’ lives. Security risks and fear of exposure meant that some UCOs and their families had to undergo the upheaval of relocating their homes and lives.

The failure of the unit’s managers to ‘provide sufficient support and psychological welfare’, and their failure to prevent sexual misconduct (and therefore sexual infidelity) from taking place contributed to the harm done to UCOs’ families.

Skelton noted that ‘S’, the former wife of Mark Jenner, will be giving evidence and stated:

APOLOGY 4

‘The MPS wishes to apologise unreservedly to them, and to all the partners and former partners of SDS UCOs, for its failure to better protect them from the effects of the SDS’s work and the misconduct of its officers’

Conclusions

After all of that, Skelton added the police’s standard mitigating point:

‘Undercover policing is an extremely valuable means of gathering intelligence for the purposes of protecting national security, preventing serious crime, preserving public order, and other important policing purposes.’

He acknowledged that it is ‘exceptionally invasive’, and there was a risk of officers abusing their power, saying that ‘high standards of conduct, ethics and governance’ were needed for any undercover operations.
He insisted that ‘some of the SDS’s targeting was justifiable’ and some of the intelligence they gathered was ‘valuable’, but offered no examples, and admitted that some of those they spied on should never have been the subject of undercover reporting.

His closing comments were damning:

‘In short, the SDS became a dysfunctional undercover unit. The human toll of the SDS’s dysfunction has been severe and wide-ranging: misuse of deceased people’s identities, wrongful intrusion into individuals’ private and political lives, grievous sexual exploitation, damaged relationships, broken families, and widespread anger, distress and psychological harm – including to some of the officers themselves.

The MPS recognises how important it is to understand the damage that the SDS has caused, to hear directly from the people who have been affected, and for the Inquiry to hold those responsible to account.’

 

Neil Sheldon KC (Home Office)

The Home Office has submitted a written Opening Statement.

Neil Sheldon KC spoke on behalf of the Secretary of State of the Home Department (the Home Secretary), in her capacity as a Core Participant (rather than as the sponsor and funder of the Inquiry).

These are the first submissions to be made by the current Home Secretary, Shabana Mahmood – the ninth person to hold the office since the Inquiry began – so he took the opportunity to say on her behalf that she is appalled by these ‘historical allegations’, and that it is vital that this Inquiry uncovers the truth and lessons are learnt for the future.

However, Sheldon then defended the use of undercover operations as a tool for tackling crime. He did stress that there ‘never can be any excuse or justification for the type of conduct at the heart of the Inquiry’, noting that it irreparably damaged lives, and that it must be subjected to ‘unsparing public scrutiny’. Nevertheless there was an obvious attempt to distance the SDS from any other policing operations.

NOTHING TO DO WITH US, HONEST

The rest of the statement was an exercise in distancing the Home Office from any responsibility for what happened.

Sheldon said ‘direct involvement of the Home Office in this T3P1 is limited’, pointing out that the Inquiry has not yet requested any witness evidence from the Home Office in any Tranche, as though this were somehow evidence of their innocence, rather than a serious oversight on the part of the Inquiry.

Core Participants have pressed for the Home Office to be required to provide a witness statement and respond candidly to questions about their role.

We would also remind the Home Secretary that her Government has just introduced a Bill to Parliament (the ‘Hillsborough Law’) which would make attempts by the Home Office to cover up their role in the spycops scandal a criminal offence.

Sheldon admitted that the Home Office was ‘a recipient of indirect SDS intelligence’, but repeatedly claimed that there was no ‘cogent evidence’ that they had anything to do with the SDS’s tasking.

He said that only one State witness claimed otherwise in either of the earlier Tranches, and cast doubt upon the credibility of that particular former officer (HN78 Trevor Morris ‘Anthony Lewis’ gave evidence to the effect that the Home Secretary deemed the SWP to be a ‘subversive organisation’).

He made a plea that the Inquiry should ‘rigorously’ test any such allegations in this Tranche, and that people should take care not to lump all branches of ‘the Government’ together, or refer to ‘the Home Office’ when they actually mean another branch of the State or the Security Service.

He went on to assert that the Home Office have not seen any evidence to suggest that anyone there had any knowledge of UCO misconduct, specifically their involvement in criminality, theft of dead children’s identities, sexual misconduct, or actions which may have led to miscarriages of justice.

He stressed that:

‘it is important that everyone keeps in mind what the evidence does, and perhaps more importantly, does not demonstrate in this regard.’

This is very reminiscent of the police defence in the Investigatory Powers Tribunal proceedings Wilson v MPS, where the MPS insisted on admitting only to what could be demonstrated by the written evidence, and declined to ask any of their employees who were present at the time what they did or did not know.

The Home Office set up the SDS, and documents at the time show that they were terrified of the embarrassment it would cause the Home Secretary if its existence were ever made public. The Home Office directly funded the SDS for 20 years, renewing funding annually after reviewing its activity over the year.

After the spycops scandal broke, a search of all Home Office archives failed to find a single document about the SDS. The Undercover Plolicing Inquiry is exactly the kind of thing the Home Office must have had in mind when they ensured there was no paper trail leading to them.

REGULATORY REFORMS

Sheldon then moved on to mention the ‘radical reform’ that took place in the T3period, a reference to the fundamental change in the way that undercover policing operations were supposed to be authorised and regulated, with new statutory standards and requirements being introduced.

For example, according to the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 (RIPA), deployments could only be authorised if three requirements were met: necessity, proportionality and oversight.

There was also the Police Act 1997, and new Police (Conduct) Regulations which came into force in 1999. These brought in new regulations that the police were supposed to follow, and an improved complaints procedure.

Included was a new Code of Conduct for all police officers to follow at all times

‘It is of paramount importance that the public has faith in the honesty and integrity of police officers. Officers should therefore be open and truthful in their dealings; avoid being improperly beholden to any person or institution; and discharge their duties with integrity…

Whether on or off duty, police officers should not behave in a way which is likely to bring discredit upon the police service’.

The ‘CHIS Code’ (or to give it its full name, the ‘Covert Human Intelligence Sources: Code of Practice 2002’) provided guidance on all aspects of undercover operations. It aimed to ensure that such policing was done in a way that complied with RIPA, other relevant legislation and human rights. It outlined the procedures that should be followed by authorising officers, and those handling intelligence from undercover sources, including a duty to consider the risk of collateral intrusion.

Finally, he quoted at length from the 2004 ‘Home Office Guidelines on the Work of a Special Branch in Great Britain’. In short, Special Branch staff were expected to comply with all of the new legislation that had been introduced, including the Human Rights Act 1998 (which came into force in October 2000). They were reminded that, just like every other branch of the police service, they were also: ‘subject to the provisions contained within the Data Protection Act 1998 and, more recently, the Freedom of Information Act 2000’.

At no point did Sheldon acknowledge that the SDS simply ignored all of this ‘radical reform’ and didn’t bother to comply with the new legislative ‘landscape’.

The other spycops unit, the NPOIU, was established during the T3 period, and it is clear from what we already know about their operations that the same forms of malpractice continued in it. Both units saw themselves as beyond the law.

Sheldon went to some pains to state that none of these reforms were the result of legislators or anyone at the Home Office becoming aware of misconduct or malpractice on the part of any police officers.

IN CONCLUSION

Sheldon finished by saying that the Home Secretary supports the Inquiry’s aims and is committed to her department ‘continuing to cooperate fully with its investigations’. She awaits its findings and recommendations with interest, including the ‘interim report’ which Mitting has promised to deliver in 2027, before he finally retires. Sheldon then took the opportunity to acknowledge, on behalf of Mahmood, Mitting’s ‘many years of hard work’ as Chair of this Inquiry.

Mitting thanked him for his ‘kind words’.

Oliver Sanders KC (Designated Officers)

Sanders represents the ‘designated lawyer officers’, 114 mostly ex- (though some current) spycops.

They are predominantly from the Special Demonstration Squad, but some from the later National Public Order Intelligence Unit, and they include both undercover and back room staff. Some of them became managers later. In total, it’s around 60% of all SDS staff (around 70% of those still alive).

None of his clients are due to give evidence in this Phase of hearings (Jenner, Francis and Thomson have all chosen to be represented by other lawyers).

HN81 is a client of Sanders, but he will not give oral evidence. Neither does he represent managers Gunn and Phelan (who are T2 witnesses giving evidence out of turn),

Sanders therefore only wanted to raise a few ‘short matters’ today; his written Opening Statement goes into more detail.

THE SUCCESSES OF THE SDS

He pointed out that there are more ‘closed’ officers (who won’t be known to the public), and therefore more ‘closed’ (secret) hearings in Tranche 3 than any of the previous tranches. He claimed that during this era, the SDS ‘did some of its most challenging and valuable work’, basically suggesting that although we will hear lots of damning evidence, we won’t hear about a lot of the background and how successful the SDS really was.

He alluded to the unit’s managers having a lot ‘on their plate’, which we (the public, who are excluded from the ‘closed’ hearings) can never fully understand, and claimed that they made lots of improvements to the way the unit was run and started to ‘modernise’ it before RIPA was enacted, with a whole list of innovations being introduced at this time.

These included:

‘psychometric testing for new recruits; psychiatric or psychological support for undercover officers and former undercover officers; the introduction of a mentoring scheme; the introduction of performance indicators and customer feedback surveys; the introduction of designated cover officers for specific undercover officers; and changes to the way in which undercover identities were made.’

Like Sheldon, he glossed over the fact that none of these ‘reforms’ prevented officer misconduct or mismanagement or had any discernable impact on the toxic culture of the SDS.

THE PROBLEMS OF HN43 PETER FRANCIS

Sanders dedicated a significant chunk of time to discussing, or rather, seeking to undermine, the evidence of Peter Francis, whilst claiming to make ‘no comment on his sincerity or motivations’.

He advised Mitting to be ‘cautious’ about accepting the claims made by Francis, saying that many of them are uncorroborated, and at one point referring to his evidence as ‘a mixture of fact, fiction and fantasy’.

In particular, he highlighted Francis’ claim that there were ‘high-level concerns’ within the SDS and Special Branch, about the ‘risk of “race riots”’, and/or of public disorder connected in some way to Black family justice groups, including the Lawrence family.

Sanders claimed that this could not possibly have been the case, because there’s no written evidence of these concerns in any of the surviving reports and records that the Inquiry has been able to unearth.

As he well knows, the SDS avoided written records on some sensitive subject, as well as destroying a lot of its paper archives when it was closed down, and the wider Met is known to have deliberately shredded many more shortly after this Inquiry was announced.

Similarly, Sanders dismissed three other claims made by Francis.

The first: that the SDS was keen to find out who visited the Lawrences’ home in the immediate aftermath of Stephen’s murder, again pointing to a lack of any proof of this. Yet in his statement earlier in the day, Counsel to the Inquiry David Barr KC pointed out the existence of evidence that police ‘Family Liaison Officers’ did in fact make lists of such visitors.

Secondly: Francis has also claimed that there was an attempt to ‘smear’ the Lawrences and their campaign. Sanders attempted to suggest that this would have been ‘an extraordinary and unprecedented tasking’, completely inconsistent with what the SDS did. He claimed that this would entailed ‘an extraordinary degree of bad faith’.

It is doubtful that any of the Non-State core participants had any difficulty in believing that this was indeed something that the SDS were capable of doing, and not ‘extraordinary’ at all. Sanders is underestimating the documented extent of the bad faith with which the institutionally racist and institutionally corrupt Met approached Black families like the Lawrences at the time.

Stephen Lawrence’s friend Duwayne Brooks, the main witness to the murder, was persecuted by the Met for years. He was prosecuted on charges so trumped up that the judge threw it out without Brooks saying a word, designating it an abuise of process.

Then the Met did it again. There is no other person known to have ever had two cases thrown out as abuse of process. So yes, the Met undoubtedly did have an extraordinary degree of bad faith towards those invovled in the Lawrence campaign.

Francis has also stated that he believes that intelligence gathered by the SDS around the time of Stephen’s murder was retained and passed on to other officers (specifically Richard Walton) years later, at the time of the 1998 Macpherson Inquiry into Stephen Lawrence’s murder. Sanders flatly states that this is ‘not true’ but offers no reasons for this opinion, and claims there are inconsistencies in what Francis has said about this over the years.

It is well established that SDS manager HN10 Bob Lambert brokered a meeting between his officer HN81 ‘Dave Hagan’ and Richard Walton, a senior officer crafting the Met’s defensive response to the Macpherson inquiry. Lambert would not have done that unless HN81 ‘Dave Hagan’ was the best officer to report on the Lawrences.

HN81 ‘DAVID HAGAN’

He finished his submissions with a rebuttal on behalf of one of his clients, HN81 ‘David Hagan’.

Since the Ellison Review of the Stephen Lawrence case came out in 2014, he has been referred to as ‘a spy in the Lawrence family camp’ and, according to Sanders, this has had ‘a devastating and unfair impact on him’.

Hagan denies ever meeting or speaking to the Lawrences, and says the organisation he infiltrated – the Revolutionary Internationalist League, and what he called its ‘front’ Movement For Justice – was not close to the Lawrence family, who shunned most political parties.

We note that this unrepentant and self-pitying statement completely ignores the fact that Hagan admitted that he did meet, speak to and even drive Sukhdev Reel, the mother of murdered Asian teenager Ricky Reel, to her home, a fact that has caused that family significant distress.

The Inquiry’s decision to delay seeking evidence from Hagan for over 10 years, by which time he was apparently too ‘ill’ to provide it, is one that will not be easily forgiven by many core participants.

HN86 refusing to testify

After Sanders had reached the end of what he wanted to say, the Chair, Sir John Mitting, intervened with an unexpected bit of drama.

He explained that he had made a Restriction Order in July 2018 granting anonymity over both the real and cover names of HN86.

He read at length from the anonymity application received from the ‘Designated Lawyers’ at the time, which stressed that it was in the public interest to grant HN86’s request, as this would enable him to participate as fully as possible in the Inquiry, by mitigating any risks to his health and welfare. The inference was that he was willing to co-operate and give evidence, provided his identity was protected.

Mitting stressed that the Inquiry is willing to take whatever measures are needed for HN86 to give his evidence, for example he could do so remotely. He is keen to find out what HN86 has to say, especially about some of the evidence provided by Peter Francis.

HN86 was deployed undercover as well as serving as an SDS manager. However it seems that he has now declared that he has no intention of giving any oral evidence. There are no medical grounds for this refusal. He just doesn’t want to.

Mitting then dropped the news that he had decided to serve notice under Section 21 of the 2005 Inquiries Act, to compel HN86 to give evidence, and notified him of this via his lawyers. HN86’s lawyers are now seeking to challenge that decision with a Judicial Review.

Mitting pointed out that HN86’s decision to bring legal proceedings will mean three different groups will need to reflect on the situation, and what happens next:

1. The Mayor’s Office for Policing and Crime will have to consider whether they should allow public money to be used to fund these proceedings, which are not designed to enable the Inquiry to continue its purpose but on the contrary, will make it more difficult.

2. If HN86 cannot be persuaded to provide oral evidence, then Mitting and his team will have to reconsider his anonymity, and maybe revoke the Restriction Order on his name that was granted in 2018.

3. The ‘Designated Lawyers’ themselves may have to reflect on whether it would be proper of them to bring proceedings ‘that aim to frustrate the purpose indicated in their application’ for that Restriction Order.

Sanders responded to the Chair’s unusually public airing of this kind of grievance by pointing out that this is actually the third such judicial review the firm has brought against the Inquiry’s decisions on the public dime, and he sees no reason why the taxpayer shouldn’t pay him to do this one too.

The unfairness of this is particularly stark, as Non-State core participant) Dave Smith, the country’s leading expert on employment blacklisting, is also currently seeking to bring a judicial review. In contrast to HN86, Smith is going to court in order to be able to give – rather than withhold – vital evidence to the Inquiry, and is having to pay for this out of his own pocket.

Sanders noted that HN86 is getting older (unlklike the rest of us?) and ‘doesn’t feel able to give evidence’.

According to him, the judicial review questions whether or not this Inquiry actually has any legal power to compel someone like HN86, who lives overseas, to return to the UK and give oral evidence, or even just to give it remotely.

Sanders described this question as ‘a live issue’ and ‘arguable’, adding that he ‘appreciates it is a disappointment for you and the Inquiry and others’, and almost shrugging his shoulders as he says ‘all I can do is advise him and take his instructions and represent him’.

He continues:

‘It is our position that the Inquiry has no power to compel overseas witnesses, and there is no point us trying to litigate it now’.

We can agree that the issue is an important one, as it raises questions about why this power was not used to compel HN5 John Dines to give evidence in T2 and whether it could be used to compel HN26 ‘Christine Green’ to give evidence in T3. The Inquiry had started the day by saying that Green will simply be left alone because she is ‘outside the jurisdiction’.

It was also striking that Mitting chose to air this conversation in public, and although he was very polite about it and couched it all in careful legalese, the overall impression we got was that he really is quite cross.

Peter Skelton KC was invited to comment about this development on behalf of the Commissioner, but he protested that he could not say anything at the stage about the Met’s position as he had not had time to take any instructions from them. Mitting asked that Skelton let the Inquiry know when he has received such instructions.

Special Demonstration Squad manager HN69 Malcolm MacLeod gave two days of evidence to the Undercover Policing Inquiry on Monday 10 and Tuesday 11 February 2025.

MacLeod spent just under a year in charge of the Special Demonstration Squad (SDS), between November 1986 and September 1987. He was a newly-promoted Detective Chief Inspector who was the overall boss of the spycops unit, with Detective Inspectors under him running the day-to-day details of deployments.

Prior to joining the SDS, MacLeod worked on Special Branch C Squad’s ‘alternatives’ desk which monitored animal rights and anarchist groups like London Greenpeace. Although his tenure was short, it was at a time of special interest to the Inquiry. This was the period when HN10 Bob Lambert ‘Bob Robinson’ was infiltrating an Animal Liberation Front cell that planted timed incendiary devices in shops that sold fur.

Lambert has strenuously denied planting any devices, but numerous witnesses and all the circumstantial evidence shows he was responsible for the one in the Harrow branch of Debenhams department store.

Lambert’s managers – not just MacLeod but others who testified like HN32 Michael Couch and HN39 Eric Docker – have all claimed to have been so useless at management that they didn’t know what Lambert was doing. Nor did they notice the mysterious long gap in Lambert’s reports to them during the weeks leading up to the Harrow store being targeted.

There’s more to this than Lambert, too. The managers all give significant insight into how the SDS was organised, and how its lack of oversight and accountability led to horrendous abuses such as sexual violation of women and the engineering of miscarriages of justice.

MacLeod was questioned for the Inquiry by Emma Gargitter.

This is a long report, use the links to jump to specific sections:

Joining the SDS
MacLeod’s background and what he found in the SDS

Recruitment and training
‘Pretty piss poor’ system for hiring, stealing identities of dead children, what to do undercover.

Pitfalls and problems
Breaching judicial principles, no personal support, officers going awry, MI5 muscling in

Relationships in principle
A range of responses to the idea of whether officers could and should have been prevented from deceiving women into relationships

Specific relationships
Mike Chitty, John Dines, John Lipscomb, and Bob Lambert

Spycops committing crimes
How far should they go, and how would they know?

Bob Lambert in the Animal Liberation Front
The largest section of this report, covering the incendiary device campaigns and ensuing court cases

Targets
Why were spycops spying on the Trevor Monerville justice campaign, MPs, the McLibel campaign, and the women’s peace movement?

The UCPI is an independent, judge-led inquiry into undercover policing in England and Wales. Its main focus is the activity of two units who deployed long-term undercover officers into a variety of political groups: the Special Demonstration Squad (SDS, 1968-2008) and the National Public Order Intelligence Unit (NPOIU, 1999-2011). Spycops from these units lived as activists for years at a time, spying on more than 1,000 groups.

This hearing was part of the Inquiry’s ‘Tranche 2 Phase 2’, which mainly concentrated on examining the animal rights-focused activities of the SDS from 1983-92.

Click here for the first day’s page on the Inquiry website.
Click here for the second day’s page on the Inquiry website.

JOINING THE SDS

MacLeod joined the Met’s Special Branch in 1969, and had learned of the SDS’s existence from his Branch colleagues. He says he was aware this was a covert operation funded by the Home Office to obtain intelligence about political activists.

He knew that many of the intelligence reports that he saw on the ‘alternatives’ desk at C Squad came from the SDS spycops. C Squad was one of the main ‘customers’ for SDS reports. We see an example of an SDS report, dated 27 August 1986 [MPS-0742828]. It’s been annotated by MacLeod at C Squad, showing who he wanted it disseminating to.

MacLeod says that ‘the majority of the reports went to ARNI’ (the Animal Rights National Index). He goes on to explain that this unit was begun by the Essex police, who collated information about animal rights activists. The Home Office then established a national organisation so that intelligence could be shared between different constabularies.

MacLeod says this was the first time that police forces around the country effectively shared intelligence of this kind with each other. There was an ARNI office in Scotland Yard. Those who saw the spycops’ intelligence wouldn’t always have been aware of how it had been gathered.

In his witness statement to the Inquiry [MPS-0748808], MacLeod recalls that while he was at C Squad he had at least one phone conversation with an SDS manager. He additionally had a meeting with SDS staff HN39 Eric Docker, HN10 Bob Lambert and HN11 Mike Chitty in a pub so they could brief him on animal rights campaigners.

MacLeod’s statement describes the relationship between ARNI and the SDS as ‘excellent’ and said that information flowed both ways. He explains that after he took charge of the SDS, he was ‘routinely provided’ with information about animal rights activism and would pass it on to the rest of the spycops unit.

After about 10 months in charge of the SDS, MacLeod returned to C Squad around September 1987. He became a Detective Superintendent. He says he remained aware of the work being done by the spycops. It’s extraordinarily rapid promotion, two ranks in the space of a year. Senior officers must surely have felt his time at the SDS was a great success.

GETTING STARTED

MacLeod had never been an undercover officer, and had no first-hand experience of the deployment of undercover officers when he became Detective Chief Inspector of the spycops unit. His DI, Eric Docker, had only been in his role for seven months and says he’d had no handover from his predecessor. Despite this, MacLeod says of Docker:

‘He seemed to me at the time to be fairly bedded in.’

In contrast to Docker, MacLeod says he did have a handover from his predecessor, HN115 Tony Wait. Wait provided him with a pen portrait of each of the spycops officers and their performance, but he doesn’t remember Bob Lambert being singled out.

Tony Wait told the Inquiry that Lambert had told him that he’d ‘got a girl into trouble’ while undercover. He had deceived four women into intimate relationships and had deliberately had a child with one of them.

MacLeod says that Wait definitely didn’t mention this to him, and had he known he’d have been concerned it could significantly affect Lambert’s deployment and the whole squad:

‘I would have to take into account the possible repercussions it would have, not just for the individual but for the operation… I would almost certainly have raised it with the Commander…

Common sense would tell you that something would have to be done if you have an officer who has erred and it’s something that could impact on the operation itself.’

In his statement, MacLeod said it ‘was an honour’ to be asked to head up the spycops unit, a point he elaborated on at the Inquiry:

‘it was quite a unique group of people, who volunteered to serve undercover. They were making great sacrifices in being away from their family for various lengths of time. They chose to do this job out of a sense of duty.

I felt they were an admirable bunch of guys and girls, and to me it was quite an insight, having been for the best part of my career involved in general Special Branch work, this was quite a different ball game altogether.

From Day 1, and from talking to them during the weekly briefings, meetings, you do get a sense of what the sorts of characters are, and why they are doing what they are doing. It is quite a sacrifice of these officers. So, yes it was an honour for me to have been their boss.’

After this effusive praise, he confirms that his view was changed by the knowledge that his officers had deceived women into intimate relationships:

‘It was totally unacceptable behaviour, to the point of being disreputable.’

The SDS Annual Report 1987 [MPS-0728976] describes a visit to the spycops’ safe-house by two senior officers: John Dellow, Assistant Commissioner of Specialist Operations, and Simon Crawshaw, Deputy Assistant of Special Branch.

MacLeod says this was a chance for them to hear directly from the undercovers and learn more about the work they were doing, and appreciate its value. Officers would have said what groups they spied on and mention perceived successes, but not gone into detail about their methods to the illustrious visitors.

‘They sent a very gracious note, a memo, afterwards thanking us for the opportunity to address the meeting.’

This tallies with numerous reports we’ve heard at the Inquiry of extremely high-ranking officers visiting and congratulating the spycops. It demolishes the Met’s desperate claims that the SDS was a super-secret unit practically unknown to the rest of the force.

RECRUITMENT AND TRAINING

MacLeod chaired the SDS selection panel that appointed new recruits.

In his statement to the Inquiry, MacLeod said that SDS spycops were recruited by DCIs of various Special Branch squads putting forward candidates. Gargitter asks him, if the work of the SDS was not widely known, how would they know to put people forward to join it?

MacLeod floundered around, stopping and starting, before arriving at the idea that the managers could give their personal opinion on someone’s suitability to gather intelligence.

But, Gargitter says, if they didn’t know about the role then they couldn’t know about someone’s suitability for it. MacLeod replied:

‘Well, I mean, yes, that has to be said, yes. That is true.’

Either this obvious conundrum didn’t occur to MacLeod and his colleagues at the time, or else he’s lying and the bosses of other squads were much more aware of what an SDS undercover’s work involved.

In his statement, MacLeod says the ignorance extended beyond the squad’s managers, and even claims that applicants themselves weren’t really aware of what they were applying for:

‘the candidates were asked what they believed the role to entail, its disadvantages and advantages.’

FAMILY INVOLVEMENT – MARRIED MEN PREFERRED

He said that, before deployment, it was imperative to meet the new officer’s spouse and talk about the pressures that would come with the role:

‘It’s a long time, four and a half years, working in circumstances that the families would be unacquainted with, and the pressures that brings on the individual officer.

So the families can only have a sort of brief understanding of what the work is going to entail. It’s only when they get into the job they realise the length of time they are going to be spending away from the family home.’

There were no checks made with families to monitor their welfare, and it would be up to the officers themselves to sort such problems out.

Asked if there were any provisions in place that the families could access or use if they had any concerns whilst their family member was deployed undercover, MacLeod says:

‘Sadly not.’

Why ‘sadly’? MacLeod flounders once more, eventually saying:

‘It’s very difficult to give an answer to that’

He confirms that there was no way for a family to check if their spycop was safe.

MacLeod clearly remembers that at the time it was thought that married officers would make better undercovers:

‘I do believe it does help to form, if you like, an anchor with their real lives. And I think that probably holds a lot of sway when you compare it with, perhaps, a single officer, who doesn’t have that home life or that stability, if you like, to keep him on the straight and narrow.’

Why would that apply to spouses but not parents or siblings, though? Was the difference that a married man was believed to be less likely to enter into a sexual relationship while undercover?

‘That was the received wisdom at the time.’

It is clear that Malcolm MacLeod is finding it difficult to give evidence. He is perhaps the most believable user of forgetful mannerisms among former spycops and managers, occasionally losing his way on what the question was as he answers.

‘PRETTY PISS POOR’

In 2012, MacLeod was interviewed by Operation Herne, an internal police investigation into spycops. In his statement to them [MPS-0726640] he described the SDS selection process as ‘pretty piss poor’.

Do you stand by that description now? After apologising for the language he used, he agrees that yes, he does.

MacLeod’s view is that some kind of aptitude test could have been used to weed out the likes of HN11 Mike Chitty ‘Mike Blake’ from becoming a spycop in the first place. After his deployment ended, Chitty secretly returned to his social life among the people he had spied on.

MacLeod says they could have used some form of psychometric or aptitude testing, as has subsequently been implemented. He didn’t actually recommend it to his superiors at the time though, nor any other improvements.

While he was running the unit, three undercover officers were recruited: HN5 John Dines ‘John Barker’, HN87 ‘John Lipscomb’ and HN25 ‘Kevin Douglas’. We now know that at least two of these three men deceived women into relationships while undercover.

MacLeod responds:

‘You know, with a bit of a hindsight, perhaps something should have been done…

If somebody is so minded to stray like that, it’s pretty abhorrent, but I am not really sure there would be an effective way of preventing that, apart from warning them and making sure that this is just totally unacceptable.’

This answer set a pattern we see throughout MacLeod’s evidence – conceding abuses were wrong yet not only admitting he didn’t do anything to prevent them, but claiming that there was nothing he could have done.

In his statement, he mentioned a binder kept in the SDS office. This was an internal binder, which he read through, full of advice and guidance for members of the spycops unit, about how to build up their ‘legends’ (cover identities and back stories).

He says it wasn’t formally composed but ‘was more organic’, with officers adding advice from their own experiences.

Other officers who were his contemporaries, such as Michael Couch, have testified that there was no such binder.

MacLeod says the advice was mostly about how to build a cover identity, and that new recruits would certainly have been shown it:

‘This is information that’s critical to their deployment.’

In 1993, HN2 Andy Coles ‘Andy Davey’ had just finished his deployment and updated the binder, which has been published by the Inquiry as the SDS Tradecraft Manual.

WHERE ARE THE BOUNDARIES?

MacLeod told the Operation Herne team that the spycops ‘all knew the boundaries’. Asked to explain what he meant by this, he said in his written statement:

‘They were adults and they should know the dictates of moral and common sense: there are certain things you do and do not do. There are fundamental principles that you adhere to whatever role you are in. These include moral principles – decency and probity were qualities we looked for in officers.’

We should remember that he is referring to a unit whose entire activity was unlawful. They stole the identities of dead children, violated fundamental human rights, engineered miscarriages of justice, sexually abused women, and then joked about it all with one another.

His witness statement adds:

‘I did not satisfy myself in the case of every individual officer that they knew all the boundaries, but felt that I could safely assume it to be true.’

If you didn’t discuss lines or boundaries with the spycops officers, how would they have known where these lay? MacLeod accepts that in the absence of any clear guidance, officers would be left to make their own personal and subjective judgement.

He admits that he didn’t sit them down and spell out such guidance when they first joined the spycops unit:

‘I keep coming back to this 20/20 hindsight. Had I known then what I know now, yes, should have done.’

It’s amazing how many of these officers say that with hindsight their actions weren’t justifiable, but then they still try to justify it all.

And on the occasions when, as with this question, they admit to it being unjustifiable, they use phrases like ‘20/20 hindsight’ to imply that only unattainable perfection could have moved them to act any differently at the time.

DRINK-DRIVER SPYCOPS

In his statement, MacLeod described what he learned from his time running the SDS:

‘It opened my eyes to the risks associated with undercover work, such as risk of compromise and risk of abhorrent behaviour (eg with alcohol). It was a salutary lesson in terms of human frailty.’

MacLeod clarifies that he’s only referring to one officer who had an alcohol problem and was arrested for drink-driving.

MacLeod claims that he learned about the ‘root causes’ which led the officer to drink to excess, and the ways in which he could have perhaps have picked up on clues about their officer’s state of mind.

He then, again, goes on to contradict himself and say he doesn’t see how he could have done anything differently, so absolving himself of any blame:

‘I don’t think there’s very much more that really I could have done, if you like, to ameliorate or to prevent this sort of thing happening… No, I am quite relaxed about it.’

As generations of spied-on activists can attest, many other spycops were problem drinkers too. And, just like the officer MacLeod knew, an earlier spycop HN339 ‘Stewart Goodman’ crashed his car while drunk and was arrested. Goodman broke protocol by admitting his real identity and job to the uniformed officers who attended, and was convicted for drink-driving under his false name.

MacLeod refuses to accept that he should have provided more guidance to the spycops:

‘They are grown men, they should know better. They know right from wrong. You know, there is only so much you can do to sort of wet nurse them’

It’s horrendous that he can admit to gross failings of officers, and then dismiss any suggestion that he should have properly acted as their manager, speaking as if doing so would have been somehow infantilising them.

Emma Gargitter challenges him on his claim that ‘they know right from wrong’ and, not for the first time, MacLeod crumbles and contradicts himself:

Q: A number of the officers under your command don’t appear to have been able to identify right from wrong or if they did, were willing to do the wrong thing?

MacLeod: Yes, I am afraid, sadly.

He is very clear that he does not consider the sexual deceit to be a result of any ‘human frailty’ under discussion, and those abuses were instead a case of the spycops exploiting an opportunity.

IDENTITY THEFT

We hear about the method used by spycops to create their cover identities: stealing the name of a deceased child. New recruits would spend six to eight months working in the unit’s back office, during which time they would find the birth and death certificates of a child whose identity they would steal.

MacLeod says he only learned about this practice after he joined the unit.

He says it never occurred to him to question whether this identity theft was legal, and he says he didn’t ask any superiors about it. He says he felt uncomfortable with ‘the very idea’, but:

‘It was designed to provide maximum protection for the undercover officers in building up their legend. So, no, although I had some personal qualms about it, I just accepted that that was how things were done.’

It wasn’t the most secure tactic though. If they simply made up an identity and someone in the officer’s target group became suspicious and investigated, there would be no birth certificate to find. However, that could be explained away (born abroad, adopted, etc). Whereas with a stolen identity there would be a death certificate that cannot be explained for someone who isn’t actually dead. It would prove the person was some sort of spy.

This is exactly what happened to HN297 Rick Clark ‘Rick Gibson’ in 1976, only a couple of years after the spycops started the identity theft method.

MacLeod says he knew Clark later. He knew Clark had been an SDS officer in the 1970s, and that he was known as ‘a ladies’ man’. However, MacLeod claims it wasn’t until long after he left the police that he heard about the incident that ended Clark’s deployment when he’d been confronted with ‘his’ death certificate.

He says he only realised how ‘abhorrent’ the situation was when the spycops story ‘hit the media’ and he learned how the families of these deceased children felt about this identity theft. He says it didn’t occur to him at the time.

This is the man who just said how officers knew right from wrong, yet not only admits they all did something wrong, but that at the time he was essentially oblivious to the fact that it was wrong.

Neither did the possibility of any impacts on the families occur to him (e.g. the spycops getting a criminal record and violating citizens in their loved ones’ name, or people investigating the spycop and turning up at the family’s home looking for their dead relative).

He doesn’t remember any officer checking to see where the remaining family were, or visiting the area where they lived. However, numerous officers have testified that they did this, and MacLeod says he would have viewed that as legitimate and necessary at the time.

WRITING THE REPORTS

In his statement to the Inquiry, MacLeod said that SDS officers were given no instructions about what to include – and what to omit – in their intelligence reports.

He says it was something they should have picked up on the job based on what they had learned during their time in Special Branch; they didn’t need any specific instruction when they became spycops, and would get six to eight months in the SDS back office processing other officers’ reports before making any of their own.

It’s pointed out that full-time undercover officers would come across a huge amount of information about the people and groups they spied on, far too much to report, and so would inevitably have to decide what to include. MacLeod says this was entirely left up to the officer and they were never given any guidance.

He says he cannot remember ever telling an officer that something they reported was unhelpful, irrelevant or inappropriate in any way.

In his witness statement, MacLeod says he took a keen interest in the form and contents of the reports:

‘I made a conscious effort to read as much of the reporting as I could, though I could not read all the reports. Obviously the team would flag anything of particular significance as a priority for me.

It is not only useful to get an insight into what was happening but also some sense of the effort that each undercover officer put into their report-writing, style, credibility, et cetera.’

MacLeod says it was Eric Docker who would read all the reports and pass on the important ones.

This squarely contradicts what Docker told the Inquiry. He tried to dodge accountability by saying that he only gave reports a cursory check for grammar and spelling, and didn’t pay ‘great attention’ to the actual contents of the reports that he signed off.

It’s also something MacLeod himself contradicts later on, claiming not to have seen reports on important events he claims to be unaware of.

MacLeod’s written statement also says that spycops reports were typed up by Detective Sergeants. He is unaware of any editorial control taking place at this stage and wouldn’t have expected any, apart from alterations to grammar rather than the substance.

This is an important point. The managers all say this, and reports do seem to have distinctive voices of the authors, yet numerous undercovers have tried to avoid culpability for particular parts of their reports by suggesting that managers had inserted or omitted certain details at the typing-up stage.

MISOGYNY

We were shown a report by spycop HN95 Stefan Scutt ‘Stefan Wesalowski’ [UCPI0000020148] dated 22 April 1987. It had been written in response to a request from the Security Service (aka MI5) about the Hackney South branch of the Socialist Workers Party.

Scutt refers to a woman as ‘plump build, pretty face’. MacLeod denies that this is offensive or misogynistic. He does, however, accept that it’s derogatory, subjective, and unnecessary.

Asked if it’s indicative of the culture of the SDS, MacLeod replies:

‘It’s more of a comment on the time, in the 1980s when language like this was probably seen to be acceptable.’

He goes on to claim it wasn’t common to hear SDS officers comment on women’s attractiveness and in fact he never heard any other officers do so.

In his written statement, MacLeod said:

‘People today have got higher expectations of public bodies and the police are open to greater public scrutiny than they were.’

Gargitter draws this point out. If public scrutiny keeps the police on the straight and narrow, then the high levels of secrecy around the SDS effectively gave them a cloak for behaviour that, in more public areas of work, might have been called out.

MacLeod agrees with this. He admits that at the time he wasn’t concerned about the level of intrusion, or the kind of reports the spycops produced.

PITFALLS AND PROBLEMS

LEGAL PROFESSIONAL PRIVILEGE

Spycops reported on people’s legal strategies and were in meetings that activists held with their lawyers, often because they themselves had been arrested and were defendants in cases. This breached the principle of ‘legal professional privilege’, a fundamental part of the judicial system where lawyers and clients should be able to discuss matters in confidence.

Beyond this, many spycops went to court under false identities, swore to tell ‘the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth’ and then from the very first question asking their name, they lied. This is perjury.

Additionally, courts have a duty to ensure all material is available to the defence. By withholding the truth about spycops and their reports, the SDS misled courts. This means the trials were unfair and any resulting convictions were miscarriages of justice.

MacLeod says he was aware of legal professional privilege from courses he’d been on before he was in the SDS:

‘I would be uncomfortable with sanctioning anything that troubled me as being legally privileged. I would prefer to have it removed from the report. If it smacked of breach of legal privilege, I would have been very uneasy. There would be reputational repercussions if it became known…

It would be fundamentally wrong. In fact, it would be breaking the law.’

Spycops routinely committed crimes like identity theft and perjury, as well as encouraging and participating in criminal acts among the groups they spied on. The entire SDS operation was unlawful. The idea of ‘reputational repercussions if it became known’ should have set alarm bells ringing long before this point.

Despite his current assertion that he would have removed any privileged information from reports, MacLeod can’t remember ever actually doing so:

‘There was no policy, instruction or guidance concerning officers coming into possession of legally privileged information.’

SPYCOPS MEETINGS

The spycops met twice a week at their safe-houses. The whole unit would meet, including Eric Docker and the sergeants who did the admin work. MacLeod would brief them on issues and events in the wider policing world. Each officer would speak in turn about their deployment. It would be detailed, naming individuals who were spied on and discussing what they’d done.

MacLeod explains the value of these meetings for the unit:

‘Just the camaraderie alone, and talking with colleagues, talking in police language…

Because bear in mind they are away from their place of work. They are not mixing with police officers, their colleagues. And it’s a safety valve for them. So it was a very valuable sort of exercise, and that’s why we had meetings twice a week.’

After the communal go-round there would be ‘side meetings’, and MacLeod confirms that he and Docker had more of these with Bob Lambert than with other officers.

MacLeod’s 2012 written statement to Operation Herne is shown [MPS-0726827], in which he says that spycops officers would drink alcohol and play pool and darts after the safe house meetings. He would usually stay with them for a few hours, drinking beers:

‘It was a great opportunity for these guys and girls to actually sort of find some space, because living cheek by jowl with the activists can be a bit tiresome and a bit tedious’

Asked if any of the banter during the social sessions was sexist, MacLeod admits:

‘It may have been.. you have to turn the clock back all those years, living in a different age. Being brutally frank, there wasn’t the same awareness at the time about sexism and so forth.’

He denies that there was any discussion of the attractiveness of women, or that anything racist was ever said.

NO PERSONAL SUPPORT

The spycops were ‘a very difficult bunch of officers’ because of the strains they were living under as part of their role, especially concerning their real lives away from deployment.

MacLeod says he felt strongly about their welfare while undercover, but again admits these meetings were the only way to monitor it, that it was reliant on the officers, and – using his ‘20/20 hindsight’ phrase again to absolve himself – says he did nothing to improve the arrangement.

Managers had no other sources of insight, and there was no professional mental health support in those days. He says that the spycops would have benefited from having access to a military psychiatrist, as did happen later.

MacLeod says in his statement that if proper post-deployment counselling had been available:

‘I’d have jumped on it.’

INFORMAL MENTOR FOR EX-SPYCOPS

Shortly before MacLeod’s arrival at the SDS, HN115 Tony Wait had set up a spycops ‘buddy-buddy’ informal mentoring scheme, in which an experienced ex-undercover officer would keep in touch with an SDS officer for around six months after their deployment ended and they adjusted back into their old life.

MacLeod says only one officer did this while he was running the unit. In his statement he has written in glowing terms about HN68 ‘Sean Lynch’, who provided a sympathetic ear to other spycops.

HN68 ‘Sean Lynch’ had been undercover 1968-1974 infiltrating the Vietnam Solidarity Campaign, Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association, Irish Civil Rights Solidarity Campaign and Sinn Féin (London), then returned to the SDS as a manager from 1982 to 1984.

MacLeod confirms that the buddy-buddy system didn’t amount to much beyond having the phone number for Lynch, but says he ‘would expect’ other officers to have done it afterwards.

Asked if there was any consideration of the suitability of a former spycops officer for taking on a mentor role for current SDS officers, MacLeod confirms that there were no checks or assessments.

He concedes that it would have been problematic for someone like Bob Lambert to do it. Yet, at the time, Lambert was feted and decorated, then put in charge of the unit. Officers he oversaw were told that his had been ‘hands down the best tour of duty ever’. He would surely have been seen as ideal.

MacLeod says he felt it was part of his role to detect when officers were under stress. But under questioning, he admits that his only opportunity to look was at the twice-weekly group meetings:

‘The thing is, it’s not that easy to detect, unless there’s some manifestly obvious behaviour. There’s no way of knowing.’

He also admitted that he wasn’t at the SDS long enough to get to know spycops to sufficiently assess their stress or competence.

ERRANT OFFICER MIKE CHITTY

A post-deployment psychiatric report of HN11 Mike Chitty ‘Mike Blake’ said he was ‘psychologically unsuited to this type of work’.

MacLeod said in his witness statement that both he and Docker agreed with that assessment:

‘We had some concerns but I cannot now recall the substance. I did not trust him but cannot tell you [now] why that was. I did not provide him with any emotional supervision and/or support during his deployment…

It’s not something you can easily pinpoint. The word ‘shifty’ comes to mind. There are some people who you take a liking to and others you do not. Perhaps we can call this a copper’s instinct.’

Chitty’s spycops deployment was due to end soon. MacLeod didn’t take any action to speed up his withdrawal, saying it didn’t occur to him that he could do this.

But once again, his position crumbled under questioning. Asked why he didn’t do anything to monitor what Chitty was up to, he admitted:

MacLeod: I suppose my comments are based on what I was told about his behaviour.

Q: Do you mean told at the time or told subsequently?

MacLeod: Subsequently, yes.

Q: So there is an element of retrospective analysis, is there?

MacLeod: There is.

Chitty is known to have kept and continued using his fake cover identity documents after leaving the SDS. He returned to the people he’d been spying on and continued his social life with them, deceiving a woman there into a relationship.

Hewas only caught because he was claiming petrol expenses from the place he’d been spying, which he had no reason to visit on duty.

MacLeod says he’s shocked that Chitty retained his fake identity documents, but that there was no rigid process in place to collect them from spycops at the end of deployments. Not even ones who had a negative response from their manager’s intuition.

In his written statement, MacLeod said of Chitty:

‘I cannot honestly remember if he got any counseling. If he did not, he should have.’

But, once more, when questioned he admits that’s a retrospective opinion, and when he was Chitty’s manager he did not do anything to make it happen.

ERRANT OFFICER STEFAN SCUTT

We moved on to discuss HN95 Stefan Scutt ‘Stefan Wesalowski’, an officer under MacLeod’s command whose deployment went awry and had to be withdrawn.

We’re shown an Annual Qualification Review (AQR, the personal appraisal) written by Eric Docker in April 1987 [MPS-0746943], praising Scutt’s work:

‘A thoroughly sound and practical officer, ideally suited to his present duty where his quantities of initiative, self-discipline and experience are put to excellent use. Consistently produces work of the very highest quality.’

It concludes with a recommendation that Scutt be promoted.

Asked if he agreed with the sentiments, MacLeod replied:

‘I am not sure. I would say no.’

But, yet again, when questioned he admits that he’s backcasting his current opinion on to his past. He says he can’t remember what he thought of it at the time. When offered the explanation of Docker writing it without MacLeod ever seeing it, he grasps it with both hands and says that’s the most likely thing.

Next, we see at note to MacLeod from the Security Service dated 16 July 1987, thanking him for a meeting with Scutt [UCPI0000024603]. MacLeod says he can’t remember it. He is asked if he is surprised by it, and says he doesn’t know.

We are shown a report about a Security Service visit to the SDS on 16 September 1987 [UCPI0000022281]. Docker was there, MacLeod wasn’t. It says Scutt has:

‘Two years to go and continues to do very well.’

MacLeod doesn’t agree with this description either, but once again admits this is based on what he knows now. He says he can’t remember what he thought at the time, though:

‘I remember there were issues, but I can’t remember specifically what these issues were.’

It is pointed out there is nothing to suggest any dissatisfaction from him about Scutt in the paperwork from the time. Asked if he agrees with that, he oddly responds:

‘No, I can’t comment.’

Gargitter asks for more documents to be shown, saying to MacLeod:

‘Let’s see if we can jog any memory that you might have.’

THE SECURITY SERVICE

Next, we see a Security Service note of a meeting they held with MacLeod and Scutt on 13 February 1987 [UCPI0000024630].

It details Scutt being invited to work inside the headquarters of the Socialist Workers Party (SWP). This is described by the Security Service as a ‘unique honour’ for someone who hasn’t been a member of the Party for very long.

MacLeod says he cannot recall it.

The Security Service think Scutt taking up the role could provide them with lots of valuable intelligence, but the Met veto the idea, and give multiple reasons.

MacLeod says he agrees that ‘this is a police operation’ and that he would not be comfortable with letting the Security Service have too much say. He can’t recall any discussion of this with anyone further up the chain.

He agrees that there would have been a concern about SDS officers straying too far from their role. The note also reports that:

‘HN 95 arrived before MacLeod and was able to share with us the disappointment raised by the refusal of his masters to allow him to take up the job in Socialist Workers Party administration which he has been offered.’

MacLeod doesn’t recall this either. He says it wasn’t normal for such direct communication to take place between the Security Service and individual spycops – he says if he’d known, he would have reminded them to go through the management.

About a year later, Scutt had his deployment prematurely terminated. MacLeod says he cannot remember anything about concerns over losing control of Scutt. He doesn’t admit to remembering very much about Scutt at all.

MacLeod reported to Chief Superintendent HN84 Ray Parker. It seems that, shortly after Scutt’s interactions, in the summer of 1987 Parker reiterated to the Security Service that any arrangements to meet with SDS officers had go through him, and be requested in writing.

In his statement, MacLeod has written about the influence the Security Service sought to exert over the SDS, saying it ‘bordered on control’, as well as its ‘informal influence’:

‘The Security Service actively tried to maintain good relations with the SDS management, including by providing corporate hospitality.’

He agrees with the evidence we recently heard from Eric Docker: the flow of information tended to go in one direction only, from the spycops to the Security Service.

SCUTT’S MISOGYNY

Another document shows that Docker and Scutt had a further meeting with the Security Service in July 1987 – complete with a sandwich lunch – at which Scutt complained about the Socialist Workers Party [UCPI0000022317].

He called the women ‘ugly’ and described the Party members as ‘boring’ and too ideological (i.e. they weren’t interested in football and didn’t tell funny stories).

In another of Scutt’s reports [UCPI0000022350], a woman SWP activist is described as ‘fat and ugly’.

MacLeod doesn’t remember Scutt using this type of language verbally. But, yet again at the Inquiry, we either have to think that these men weren’t bigoted in casual company but somehow turned it on when writing official reports, or else they did in fact talk like this.

Q: Is it possible, Mr MacLeod, that that sort of language to describe women was commonplace at the time, and so it didn’t stand out to you? … Did you hear it with some level of frequency within the SDS?

MacLeod: Well, that’s the thing. I may have done, may not have done. I am inclined to err on the side not to have done. Just, I mean, that kind of language is just unnecessary apart from anything else.

Given the instances of this type of language in the reports, alongside all manner of reporting that was unnecessary, this really isn’t the defence that MacLeod thinks it is.

RELATIONSHIPS IN PRINCIPLE

In his witness statement, MacLeod has been very clear about his context for spycops deceiving women into intimate relationships:

‘The majority of officers were stalwart professionals, and I feel strongly that their achievements should not be retrospectively underappreciated or overshadowed by the misconduct of a few.’

He says that such relationships did constitute misconduct. Specifically questioned, he confirms that in his witness statement, he said if he were asked to make a moral judgement, he would be disapproving of such conduct.

Gargitter then reads from the notes made by Operation Herne, a police investigation into spycops, when they interviewed MacLeod in 2012:

‘Although MacLeod did not specifically say that sexual relationships between field officers and their targets were permitted, he made it quite clear that they went on, and to some degree were a part of the job.

In summary, he stated that if a field officer had a close relationship with a target and a sexual relationship was a likely progression of that relationship, and the officer refused or made excuses, then this could have caused unwanted attention and possibly lead to the officer being identified as a police officer.

“The closer a field officer got the better.” MacLeod said that his objective was to get the intelligence, not to make moral judgments.’

It’s clear he’s been lying to the Inquiry all day long. This bluntly says that the relationships were good for getting intelligence which, after all, was the entire purpose of the SDS. They didn’t care, and thought they’d never get caught. He’s been exposed by his own words.

MacLeod: Yes, that’s regrettable. I withdraw that.

Q: Sorry, did you say you withdraw that?

MacLeod: Yes.

Q: And what part, precisely, do you withdraw?

MacLeod: All of it.

MacLeod then interrupts the next question to claim that he did not actually know that spycops officers had deceived women into sexual relationships when he spoke to Operation Herne in 2012 and told them it was part of the job:

‘I had no knowledge of it going on. Hypothetically, I said that, and it’s not right.’

He is flapping wildly in his answers.

Q: So you may have said that to Operation Herne, but it was inaccurate when you said it?

MacLeod: Yes.

Q: Can you think of why you might have told Operation Herne that relationships went on and to some degree were part of the job if that was not your state of knowledge when you managed the unit?

MacLeod: That’s not the state of knowledge that I had.

Q: Why would you have said that to Operation Herne then?

MacLeod: No. I can’t be, I can’t be sure.

‘IT HAS TO BE ACCEPTED’

Gargitter is in full ‘skewering’ mode with MacLeod. She shows him his signed statement to Operation Herne in November 2012 [MPS-0726827]. In it, he said:

‘In terms of relationships between a field officer and their compatriots within their target groups, it is obvious that the closer a field officer got to the key people, the better the intelligence was likely to be.

There may be occasions where relationships formed with women within the group and sexual relationships followed. This is not something a field officer would discuss with his supervising officers, but it has to be accepted that such liaisons will form.’

Further exposed as a liar by his own words, MacLeod desperately grabs on to anything other than the truth. It’s like watching a five year old with chocolate all over their face and hands saying they don’t know where the Maltesers went:

‘It doesn’t mean to say that I am approving of it. Not at all. I think it’s a question of facing up to reality that these things do happen in the world.’

But if the situation is that it wasn’t something that you approved of, and you appreciated there was a risk of it happening, surely it was part of your role as a Detective Chief Inspector to take steps to try to prevent it.

It was at this point that MacLeod could no longer conceal the resentment spycops feel at being exposed, blaming those who seek to bring the truth to light rather than themselves for having such despicable secrets:

‘Well, up until that point, and until the exposé occurred in whenever it is, when Caroline Lucas made a statement to the Commons and exposed everything, until then it hadn’t been an issue. Was I surprised? Perhaps we shouldn’t have been surprised that something like this would happen.’

As with other managers at the Inquiry before him, he says that if he’d asked undercovers about intimate relationships they’d only have lied to him.

Not long before this, he told us that these were men of integrity and probity who always knew right from wrong without needing any discussion or guidance. Now he’s saying that a significant proportion of them were sexually abusing women and would have lied to colleagues and management about it. This doesn’t add up. It seems clear that management knew full well and saw it as part of the deployment.

MacLeod goes on:

‘I think we just have to face up to it. It’s an unpalatable fact but this is what happens when you put people in this kind of proximity to each other.’

That perspective portrays it as if it’s a both-sides fault, rather than the truth: this is what happens when you put misogynist liars in proximity to women they can abuse.

‘Maybe, in retrospect, looking back, there should have been ways in which we might have been able to maybe prevent or counter that from happening. We didn’t.’

He says it was made clear to the spycops at the start of their deployments that such relationships were unacceptable. This isn’t the get-out he thinks it is; it’s an admission that he knew of the likelihood and risk yet he claims he did nothing at all to monitor it.

MacLeod’s next graphene-slender excuse for not raising the subject of relationships with officers is that most of them had been recruited by someone else.

He adds that he was only in the spycops unit a short time and that most SDS officers had been serving for years before he joined the unit, as if this somehow absolves him from running the unit, or from setting and enforcing rules as its manager.

He suddenly claims that the ring-binder of informal tips from previous officers included material saying sexual relationships were prohibited:

‘It was in the manual. I mean it’s how much do you – how far do you go in trying to preach to individuals what they should and shouldn’t do?’

‘Preach’, like his earlier use of ‘wet-nurse’, is a way to make it sound as if managers shouldn’t actually manage, and that doing so would be excessive and pompous.

‘All of this has just come about as a result of the 2015 – or whatever it was – exposé.’

This makes no sense on any level. Lucas naming Lambert as the planter of an incendiary device was well after the spycops scandal broke in January 2011. She did so in June 2012. MacLeod then told Operation Herne these relationships were inevitable and useful five months later.

More to the point, it doesn’t matter what date you get discovered violating fundamental human rights. The violation is the thing that should draw anger, not the exposure of it. But, as one who was handsomely paid for facilitating the perpetrators, MacLeod is desperate not to see it that way:

‘Let’s not forget that these behaviours were of a minority when you look at the size of the unit over the years. So it is relatively small.’

In fact, it was endemic and continuous. For almost the entire lifespan of the SDS, there were multiple officers deceiving women into relationships.

Before the afternoon break, we hear the most honest thing MacLeod says all day:

‘You know, it’s in circumstances like this, it’s really, really difficult to defend the indefensible.’

He doesn’t explain why he feels compelled to try.

HN25 ‘Kevin Douglas’ joined the SDS in May 1987, recruited by MacLeod. He told Operation Herne that the spycops were ‘under pressure’ to deliver intelligence, and there were only loose guidelines before the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 (RIPA), and no clear directions about whether they should form sexual relationships with those they spied on.

MacLeod accepts that:

‘In retrospect they should have found another way around it’.

He says that things have changed since the introduction of RIPA (which is odd, because every one of the spycops’ abuses continued unabated after RIPA).

‘I DO NOT BELIEVE THAT WE SHOULD BE SETTING A MORAL CODE’

MacLeod says his style of management wasn’t about turning a blind eye, but that the sexual relationships by spycops weren’t known about in the management team.

His 2012 Operation Herne statement is shown again, with a section that wasn’t read out earlier:

‘The field officers all knew the boundaries and were left to use their common sense when deployed. Extra-marital relations occur in all walks of life and field officers are no exception. I do not believe that we should be setting a moral code for one specific group of police officers to the exclusion of others. This has to be a personal judgment by the officers.’

Gargitter walks him through his statement. He says it’s ‘not a good choice of words’, twice.

These were not extra-marital affairs. They were calculated abuse of women, deceiving them into sex for which they did not give informed consent. The word for that, as many of the women themselves have said, is rape.

It was, in the Met’s own words:

‘abusive, deceitful, manipulative and wrong… a violation of the women’s human rights, an abuse of police power and caused significant trauma.’

Gargitter asks MacLeod if he can see the difference between a police officer conducting an affair in their real identity, and an undercover officer forming a sexual relationship with a target using their cover identity? It appears that he now can.

MacLeod says there was no point in him trying to find out because the spycops would never tell management.

But Bob Lambert has told the Inquiry that he told Detective Inspector HN22 Mike Barber about a relationship he had while undercover. Detective Chief Inspector HN115 Tony Wait recalls hearing from Lambert that he’d had sex with ‘Jacqui’ and thought she was pregnant.

MacLeod absolutely insists that there is nothing more he could have done to prevent his officers deceiving women into relationships. He is asked about his written statement in which he says:

‘There was certainly wrongdoing within the SDS, but it should be seen in the wider context of serious wrongdoing in the target organisations and in the context of the public benefit the SDS provided.’

Asked if he means the sexual relationships here, he’s flummoxed and wants to avoid the obvious answer but can’t think of an alternative that gets him off the hook:

‘I can’t remember. Well, I see it here but “wrongdoing,” I don’t know what I am drawing from that.’

So Gargitter just asks him the same question again. Does it mean it was OK for spycops to do bad things to those who were deemed to be bad people?

‘No, I don’t think I meant that at all. But that’s how it reads.’

SPECIFIC RELATIONSHIPS

HN5 John Dines ‘John Barker’ has made a witness statement in which he has told the Inquiry he made it clear from the outset of his deployment that he intended to get close to Helen Steel, who he did deceive into a relationship.

Dines was recruited by MacLeod and working in the SDS back office while MacLeod was in charge, deploying just after he left. MacLeod says he simply doesn’t remember him in the back office or ever mentioning Steel.

MacLeod says he was aware of Mike Chitty having a sexual relationship with ‘Lizzie’. He confirms that it was probably Eric Docker who told him, after his time in charge of the SDS. But clearly, that means Docker had been told. So managers did know, then. He’s contradicting himself (and Docker) again.

John Dines feigned a mental breakdown at the end of his deployment and disappeared from Helen Steel’s life. Bob Lambert, who’d risen to be one of the spycops unit’s DIs in the early 1990s, has said that he was aware of Steel’s efforts to look for Dines after he left her.

MacLeod was back in C Squad at the time, one of the main recipients of SDS reports. However, he doesn’t seem to have heard about Steel visiting Dines’s parents’ address.

MacLeod says he remembers hearing about Steel tracking Dines down in Australia, maybe from Eric Docker. He says he is certain that there was no discussion about why Steel might be doing all this.

JOHN LIPSCOMB

HN87 ‘John Lipscomb’ (aka ‘Hippy John’) was deployed in May 1987, under MacLeod’s management, until December 1990. He said in his witness statement that he didn’t think he needed to tell the spycops unit’s managers about the sexual activity he took part in while undercover, unless it became ‘serious’ in some way:

‘I do not think that I told management at the time about any of the above incidents. I managed the situations as well as I could in the circumstances… I did not think it was necessary to tell them. I would have informed them if anything had become more serious.’

MacLeod addressed this claim in his own statement, saying that he didn’t know anything about Lipscomb’s sexual activity. In his view the managers should have been informed of any such behaviour in an undercover identity.

MacLeod has also said in his witness statement that he wasn’t aware of Lipscomb’s habit of staying overnight in activists’ homes, and that managers should have been informed of spycops doing this too. When asked, he says he can’t remember why he said that now.

MacLeod is so desperate to distance himself from all this, he can’t keep up with his own lies, let along gauge whether they’re plausible. He flip-flops again.

Q: You were aware, weren’t you, that officers, including HN87, might be drinking alcohol whilst in their cover identities?

MacLeod: No, I wasn’t aware.

Q: You said in your witness statement that you were “aware that HN87 would drink with the members of his target group. This was, and is, a common way to socialise.” So that suggests you had some awareness that HN87 and perhaps other undercover officers would drink alcohol commonly whilst deployed, is that right?

Q: Yes.

MacLeod accepts there’s an increased likelihood of spycops engaging in sexual activity when drinking with activists and staying the night, but says spycops couldn’t leave such circumstances without risking being exposed as police officers. It apparently:

‘possibly could affect their cover story if they all of a sudden disappeared at an earlier hour and whatever the activist might think, if it’s a female, about leaving a party early. And if there was a relationship.

No, I just, once again we come back to this. I mean this really is something that should be left to the individual’s judgment.’

Wouldn’t it have been a good idea to warn them not to get into situations which might lead to sex?

‘You could but what’s to say they are going to obey it? You wouldn’t know.’

This is the case with any guidance on any other subject though. MacLeod accepts that fact, and pivots from saying there was no point in doing it to saying there was a point after all, but it never occurred to him to give such guidance.

MacLeod: It would be something you would pick up at the next meeting.

Q: But did you ever pick it up at the next meeting?

MacLeod: No, I didn’t.

BOB LAMBERT AND JACQUI

Next, Gargitter brings up the case of ‘Jacqui’. Bob Lambert, in his undercover identity ‘Bob Robinson’, fathered a child with Jacqui.

The son is known as TBS, born in the autumn of 1985. Lambert continued to act as father to the boy throughout the time that MacLeod was the Detective Chief Inspector of the unit.

MacLeod says he had no knowledge of the relationship or the pregnancy. He says he didn’t hear about Lambert ‘bragging’ about this, as spycop Mike Chitty has described. He says he didn’t know that Lambert was frequently visiting Jacqui in Dagenham and giving her money, seemingly from SDS expenses.

He seems a bit shocked to hear about Lambert taking ‘TBS’ along to activist events, uttering the word ‘extraordinary’ at this point.

In his November 2012 interview with the Operation Herne officers, MacLeod spoke about how Lambert:

‘“outed himself” as a UCO [undercover officer] due to the fact that he lost two children to a rare congenital condition, and as he [Bob Lambert] bore a child from a relationship whilst a field officer, he wanted to contact the mother of the child in order that the child could have tests for the condition.’

MacLeod is wholly wrong about this. Lambert’s children had died but he made no attempt to contact Jacqui. He was outed on 15 October 2011 and it was in the national media the next day. Even then, despite no longer having the secrecy of the SDS to protect, he made no attempt to contact Jacqui.

She came across the truth by chance in a Daily Mail article in June 2012. She tracked Lambert down and his wife later told her about the medical condition.

MacLeod is adamant that he didn’t know about this child when he last saw Lambert in person, at the latter’s retirement party in 2007.

MacLeod says in his Operation Herne statement [MPS-0736832] that he was hugely disappointed that Bob Lambert, unlike other spycops officers, had chosen to speak out. He repeats that he is more disappointed in Lambert speaking publicly about his deceptions of women than in his actually doing it.

LAMBERT AND BELINDA

Lambert met Belinda Harvey in April 1987 – again, while MacLeod was running the unit. Like other spycops, he was using a cover identity much younger than his real age. As a result, she didn’t know the age-gap between them was as big as it was.

MacLeod claims not to have realised that many spycops pretended to be much younger than they really were.

The Inquiry has heard that Lambert spent most nights at Belinda’s house in Forest Gate. MacLeod says he didn’t know this, but that Lambert should have told them that he was not staying in his cover flat.

MacLeod says that, due to this Inquiry, he has recently heard that a photo of Lambert and a woman may have been uncovered during a police search of this cover flat.

He is asked if he should have done more at the time:

‘We perhaps could have been a bit more vigilant and proactive.’

HN19 ‘Malcolm Shearing’ gave his evidence to the Inquiry last summer. He said that he accompanied SDS manager HN115 Tony Wait to an event (hosted by the Security Service) back in 1985 and witnessed Wait making a ‘joke in poor taste’ about one of the spycops fathering a child. MacLeod denies hearing about this, or anything similar, ever.

MacLeod’s evidence continued on Tuesday 11 February 2025.

In his witness statement to the Inquiry, MacLeod defined ‘discreditable conduct’ as an officer:

‘behaving in a way that is morally wrong or generally regarded as bad behaviour and where the undercover officer could not show that the conduct was a necessary part of their behaviour in role.’

He cites an officer arrested for drink-driving but says it is also clear that, to him, deceitful relationships, fathering children and committing crimes fall into this category.

Asked about the commission of crimes, he readily affirms his position. But then he backtracks a bit:

‘There may be extenuating circumstances on occasions where it may not be applicable.’

SPYCOPS COMMITTING CRIMES

In his witness statement, MacLeod said:

‘Public order offences were an occupational hazard for undercover officers. They often got caught up in arrests for such offences although I know of no convictions. Public order offences were low level offences, like obstructing the street in demonstrations.

However, there is a distinction to be drawn between low-level public order offences and other acts of criminality, e.g. damage to property (common in the Animal Liberation Front). The latter is a step too far.’

He confirms that this is still his clear, well-defined line about what is and isn’t acceptable for a spycop. He also claims he never told any of his officers about it.

He’s described how different the SDS was to other policing, and how officers applying for the job wouldn’t have known what it actually entailed until after they were chosen. Despite this, he says it was up to them to magically know about his simple rule about which crimes were allowed:

‘Well, I suppose a lot of that is just by intuition. I can’t foresee how one could sit down and have a discussion of what is permissible and what is not. I mean, they are trained police officers. They know right from wrong. There is a limit to how far one can go in terms of wet-nursing mature officers.’

There he is again with ‘wet-nursing’ – any instruction to officers would somehow be demeaning to all parties. And yet yesterday he said he accepted that some of the spycops weren’t very good at knowing right from wrong, or deliberately chose to do wrong. It’s absolutely bizarre that a manager claims that he cannot imagine how one could get officers together and tell them what the rules are.

Gargitter examines the distinction MacLeod makes about spycops being able to break the law in some situations but not others. She says a normal police officer wouldn’t be arrested at all, whereas the spycops might be arrested for public order offences. As they’re going to cross the line into criminality, this surely makes it important to specify how far they should go.

MacLeod blusters a lot of stuff about being caught up in the unplanned moment of a public order situation. Gargitter brings him back to the actual topic, premeditated crimes that he’s said are wrong.

He veers back to saying that managers can’t call workers together to explain how their job works and what the rules are:

‘They have to live by their wits. Once again, it’s perhaps easy to, in hindsight, to state that something should be done to prevent this from happening.’

It would also have been easy to do something at the time, if managers had actually wanted to prevent it. It’s clear that they didn’t.

MacLeod says in his witness statement that animal rights infiltration carried a higher risk of arrest than other deployments.

He says that HN5 John Dines and HN87 ‘John Lipscomb’, officers he hired to be deployed into animal rights, ‘ought to have been’ told about the risk of arrest and what to do. But he claims he can’t remember ‘minutiae’ such as whether he actually did tell them.

He confirms that the arresting officers would not be made aware that they had an undercover police officer in custody. He explains that if the spycops’ identities were disclosed they would need to be withdrawn from the field, at huge expense to the police. Never mind perverting the course of justice, think about the money.

If an officer came to court, MacLeod said he thinks the court should be informed of the spycops’ real identity. He clarifies that he thinks a court is more likely to keep the truth secret, whereas uniformed police are more likely to give the identity away. Not a lot of faith in his uniformed colleagues, there.

SPYCOP JOHN DINES ARRESTED

We’re shown a report of 14 March 1989, after MacLeod had returned to C Squad, which he signed off [MPS-0526792].

SDS officer John Dines was one of a group of people arrested in December 1988 at a protest outside a poultry processing plant in Hereford. They were all released without charge, and a number of them brought a complaint against the police for wrongful arrest.

The report says:

‘It is Detective Sergeant Dines’s intention to keep the details surrounding the incident sufficiently vague as to reduce the likelihood of further action against the West Mercia Constabulary.’

There then followed another MacLeod flip-flop.

Q: Would that course of action, if followed by John Dines, not have had the effect at least potentially of frustrating a legitimate complaint against the arresting force?

MacLeod: No, I am not sure.

Then, after one minute of being shown that it was a document he was involved with and signed, he reversed his opinion:

Q: Does it trouble you at all that an SDS officer was being advised to take a course of action which could have the effect of thwarting a legitimate complaint against the police?

MacLeod: Yes, I think it would, yes. Yes. I have to agree with that.

SPYCOP BOB LAMBERT’S ARREST

We’re shown a report dated March 1987 [MPS-0526789] about another specific arrest, one which happened while MacLeod was in charge of the SDS. Bob Lambert was arrested hunt saboteuring in Crawley on 28 February 1987. The report is written by Docker, who had gone along on the day seemingly in readiness for Lambert’s arrest.

MacLeod claims he doesn’t remember it, but says ‘there is always a risk of a fracas occurring’ with hunt sabs.

He is yet another cop who sees hunt sabs as instigators of violence. But Docker’s report of the day describes how the sabs came across a police roadblock, and decamped into fields. They were all chased and arrested despite not having committed any crime:

‘However, it soon became apparent that most of those arrested (including Detective Sergeant Lambert) had not committed any substantive offence and therefore, after about two hours in police custody, Detective Sergeant Lambert was released without charge.’

Docker goes on to say that it was seen as being positive for Lambert:

‘Although the arrest of an SDS officer is always an unwelcome experience, I consider that, on this occasion, the matter has proved beneficial. Detective Sergeant Lambert’s standing within his group has been enhanced, further useful intelligence has been obtained and, above all, our operation has not been compromised in any way at all.’

It’s unclear whether this means that getting arrested was a premeditated plan for the day, or whether Docker is trying to spin a negative event as something good. It is perhaps the latter, as there’s no indication of what the ‘further useful intelligence’ might have been.

MacLeod agrees the arrest was good. He says that gathering intelligence was the top priority. Being arrested and deceiving uniformed officers was merely an ‘occupational hazard’.

He explains that, though arrest might bolster an officer’s standing in a group, he’s certain they should never get arrested deliberately.

Gargitter asks him about the dilemma faced by the spycops who tried to infiltrate the Animal Liberation Front (ALF). How could they possibly get close enough to criminals to gather useful intelligence about them unless they took part in crimes with them?

‘Well, from my recollection, and I am quite clear on this, they were aware of the provisions of agent provocateur and they would not be encouraged to take this one step further. It would be crossing the line between what’s acceptable and what is not.’

He’s saying they were told that it was OK to cross a first line of spontaneous public disorder and get arrested, but not a second line of premeditated criminal damage. It’s only 20 minutes since he told the Inquiry that he didn’t tell them this, couldn’t imagine how it would even have been possible to tell them, and that doing so would be ‘wet-nursing’ them.

He insists that he would never have encouraged spycops to commit criminal acts. He sees the quandary they were in, but says he expected the spycops to find a way around that, to somehow observe without taking part.

Gargitter points out that always standing by the sidelines of very secretive groups committing criminal acts probably means never actually getting to observe.

BOB LAMBERT IN THE ANIMAL LIBERATION FRONT

We moved on specifically to Lambert’s infiltration of an Animal Liberation Front cell and his part in placing timed incendiary devices in branches of Debenhams department store that sold fur.

In 2016, MacLeod was interviewed by Operation Sparkler, the internal police investigation into the Debenhams attacks. He told them that Lambert could not have known about the incendiary device incident in advance as there’s no way he could have got inside a small ALF cell:

‘It would be entirely out of character for him and it would carry an enormous risk with no conceivable benefit.’

Except that:

• it’s already established that Lambert had participated in crimes before this one
• there’s no way he could have got the intelligence he reported without being in the ALF cell
• the ‘conceivable benefit’ is that he supplied the kind of reports his bosses wanted to see, secured convictions for the incendiary devices, got a commendation, and was promoted

MacLeod is surely aware of all this.

MacLeod agrees that ALF cells were very secretive and didn’t share information with those outside. He claims that he never had any discussions with Lambert about how he would actually be able to obtain intelligence without being part of it.

Asked if he was ever concerned that Lambert was getting too involved, he was blunt:

‘No. His role, after all, is to obtain intelligence and to prevent crime.’

In his witness statement, he is clear about Lambert:

‘His tasking was precisely to insinuate himself as close as possible to the cell.’

What could this mean if not participating? MacLeod says it meant being popular and hearing about ALF plans in ‘casual conversations’. Gargitter points out what MacLeod had just said, that there was no casual talk with anyone outside the cells.

MacLeod agrees it was clear that Lambert was privy to what was said within the ALF cell, and that the ALF cells didn’t talk to outsiders, but still refuses to admit the obvious conclusion.

We see a 13 January 1993 document [MPS-0730597] which discusses the issue of participation in crime. This is several years after MacLeod left the SDS. It says:

‘The higher risk ‘fields’ for involvement in crime are anti-fascist activity, anarchism and animal rights. In the last mentioned field, in order to gain full acceptance and trust, participation in ‘illegal’ activities is essential.’

MacLeod is asked if he agreed with this when he was in charge. He waffles a lot about moral dilemmas and fine lines. He is asked the same question again and eventually says that yes, he would have agreed with it as a manager:

‘It’s the lesser of two evils.’

Gargitter gets him to specifically say that, although the document post-dates his time, in his era he held the same view. There are circumstances in which he would have balanced considerations and come to the conclusion that a spycop’s criminal activity was in fact essential:

‘Well, I have to stand by that. Yes.’

This is a few minutes after he said that officers were told never to do it, which in turn was a few minutes after he said it was impossible to tell officers never to do it. His contradictions are really stacking up on each other here.

The document lays out an escalating scale of criminal activities, from visiting premises without actually committing an offence, all the way up to arson and incendiary devices. MacLeod says he would draw the line at arson or a threat to life.

LAMBERT’S CRIMINAL DAMAGE

We next see a document [MPS-0742726] detailing how, on 28 November 1986 (just after MacLeod joined the SDS), a vehicle belonging to a director of vivisection company Biorex was damaged with paint-stripper in North London.

The Inquiry has heard that Lambert was responsible for this action. Might Lambert have been authorised to do this? MacLeod retorts:

‘He shouldn’t have been… Robert Lambert is well familiar with the law, and would know that that is going one step too far’

This is just after MacLeod had confirmed that property damage with no fire or threat to life was not, in fact, a step too far for spycops infiltrating animal rights campaigns. The contradiction is put to him and he replies:

‘It is indeed a very fine line, I accept that. No, this is acts of vandalism against property… I think we have to draw a line here. I think we draw the line at that.’

This is another flip-flop on whether it was justified to be involved in more serious crime. It seems clear that MacLeod thought it was justified at the time and still thinks so now, but knows that he shouldn’t admit that.

He desperately tries to add a few more layers of insulation between himself and accountability:

‘I wouldn’t have known about it. In fact, this is the first I have become aware of this. Of course it is outside my time period anyway.’

It’s pointed out that no, it actually was during the time when he was running the SDS.

INCENDIARY PLAN

The next report we see is dated 9 June 1987 [MPS-0740088], about secret meetings of ALF activists from across the UK. It says that the ALF plans to carry out attacks on London department stores which still sell fur. They will use timed incendiary devices to set off the shops’ sprinkler systems in the dead of night and cause damage by flooding. Lambert has told the Inquiry he was at one of the meetings in Manchester.

MacLeod says he is certain Lambert didn’t tell him about going, even though it’s the kind of thing he should have reported. Asked if it shows that Lambert was ‘inappropriately close’ to those who were planning these attacks, MacLeod once more washes his own hands of it and dodges condemnation of Lambert:

‘Field officers are expected to use their initiative. Once again, we have to allow a certain degree of latitude. They are mature officers, they know what they are doing.’

The irony of saying this in response to a question about Lambert not doing what he’s supposed to was apparently unintentional.

MacLeod starting waxing lyrical about Lambert again, about what a successful spycop he was, how he is a very intelligent man, full of common sense. It is pointed out that Lambert was deceptive towards Jacqui and the SDS, so perhaps his judgement on committing crimes was equally poor.

MacLeod is clear that pouring paint stripper on a car is far worse than sexually abusing women and having a son he knew he’d abandon when his deployment ended:

‘I am not sure you can compare the two. These are moral judgments only he can make. I don’t think we can conflate the two, between the illicit relationship with this lady and the planting of devices.’

Returning to Lambert’s report, it mentions the long custodial sentences meted out to those who’d been convicted of planting incendiary devices:

‘Accordingly, the use of incendiary devices is restricted to the most dedicated activists, who are forced to observe strict security even amongst their comrades in the animal rights movement. Such activists always pay due regard to the prospect of surveillance and infiltration even though they may not always be expert at countering it.’

MacLeod says he never knew about any of this.

The report is dated 9 June 1987. The incendiary devices in Debenhams stores went off on the night of 11 July 1987. The Inquiry has not been able to find any further reporting from Lambert in the intervening five weeks, even though he was spying on an active ALF cell about to plant devices.

WHY AREN’T THERE ANY REPORTS?

MacLeod says that Lambert was a ‘prolific reporter’, but claims that he never noticed at the time that Lambert had suddenly stopped producing any reports at all for more than a month before the Debenhams attacks.

He’s not the first of Lambert’s managers to make this claim. Perhaps we believe that they wouldn’t notice Lambert just stopping his reporting for five weeks straight. Or perhaps they’re lying and they either agreed to him not giving written reports because they didn’t want a paper trail about what he was doing, or else he made reports but they’ve been destroyed.

In his witness statement, MacLeod said:

‘There were no changes in the pattern and focus of Lambert’s reporting in the six months preceding the Debenhams attack such that I had reason to doubt whether he was reporting all of the information/intelligence that he obtained during this period.

I would point out that in paragraph 6 of his report dated 9 June 1987 he promises to report any planned attacks. I would have had faith that he would do so.’

This indeed sounds a lot like there were reports but they’ve subsequently gone missing, or else there were reports only made orally.

MacLeod’s witness statement also says that ‘hot intelligence’ shared by Lambert in one-to-one meetings with the managers would ‘most certainly have been documented’. Lambert, on the other hand, claims he had lots of his conversations with spycops managers in the five-week period, and much of the content did not result in any kind of written report.

MacLeod says he doesn’t remember that. However, he has no suggestion as to why there’s a huge gap in reporting at such a key time. He specifically rejects Eric Docker’s claim that Lambert was simply so busy for five weeks that he didn’t have time to make any reports.

In his statement, MacLeod said he was not surprised to learn that during this period Lambert had regular outdoor meetings with Geoff Sheppard, a fellow member of the ALF cell. Surely that shows Lambert was part of the cell. MacLeod halfway agrees:

‘He was certainly close to the centre.’

MacLeod’s witness statement also addresses a claim Lambert made to Operation Herne, that he saw Special Branch surveillance teams watching him and his target group over the two months before the Debenhams attacks.

MacLeod says that, from his experience working in Special Branch’s S Squad, he is very aware of how much demand there is for surveillance team time. He says it’s ‘slightly implausible’ that a team would have been allocated to this for such a long period unless there was going to be action to thwart a planned crime.

Animal rights activist Paul Gravett says he and Lambert organised a fundraising gig for the Debenhams incendiary devices. MacLeod says he was unaware of that, but adds that he didn’t see a problem with a spycop raising funds for the ALF to make incendiary devices. Again, he seems to veer wildly about what he thinks was acceptable activity for an undercover officer.

AFTER THE ATTACKS

Conveniently, MacLeod was off on annual leave for two weeks in the summer of 1987, so wasn’t at work when the Debenhams attacks took place. He says Eric Docker would have dealt with things in his absence.

We see notes [MPS-0735357] from a meeting on 14 July, just a few days after the Debenhams attacks. Andrew Clarke’s name is reported prominently as being responsible for the incendiary devices. It says that Anti-Terrorist Branch police will be gathering evidence to be used in prosecution. This is something of a departure for the SDS to be around, they usually deal in intelligence rather than evidence.

Lambert’s report of 17 July [MPS-0735387] says the devices were assembled at Clarke’s home address, and this is:

‘information which is currently known to only a few activists.’

MacLeod agrees that it is very swift of Lambert to already have the name of the culprit, and to be stating it with utter certainty. But he says it never occurred to them to ask how he managed to achieve this:

‘I think we just accepted Bob Lambert’s assessment. We didn’t see any reason to question it any further.’

Gargitter reminds him that he’s described how secretive and security-conscious the ALF’s cells were. How could Lambert have known if he wasn’t personally involved?

‘Well, it’s only in recent times that you begin to question whether in fact that was the case.’

We see a list of names and addresses of possible suspects, drawn up for the Met’s Anti-Terrorist Branch to investigate. MacLeod says Lambert will have compiled the list. ‘Bob Robinson’ – Lambert’s own cover name – is on it.

MacLeod insists that this doesn’t prove that Lambert was involved in planting any devices, just that leaving him off might make people suspect he was an infiltrator. But surely nobody would think he should have his house searched unless they also thought he was likely to have been part of the plan.

MacLeod admits that ‘it’s odd’ that the name of Geoff Sheppard – who was actually one of those responsible, and was very well known to Lambert – is not on the list.

We next see a Security Service ‘loose minute’ of 14 July 1987 [UCPI0000031267] about possible culprits for the Debenhams attacks. It’s based on intelligence that seems to have been sent to them from officer TN67 of Special Branch’s C Squad, one of the main recipients of SDS reports. It names just four suspects, including Andrew Clarke, but still not Geoff Sheppard.

It would seem that they were aware which names on Lambert’s long list given to the Anti-Terrorist Branch were extraneous, and also that there was a deliberate ploy by Lambert not to name Sheppard.

The next report from Lambert is dated 24 July 1987 [MPS-0735386]:

‘Clarke and his trusted comrades are agreed that Debenhams should be given until 1st October 1987 to remove furs from all their stores. In the meantime, he plans to have devices ready for use against other retail outlets for the fur trade. Provisionally, it would appear that the most likely targets will be Harrods of Knightsbridge and C&A in Oxford Street, W1.’

MacLeod, as usual, says he has no memory of any of this. He says he would remember it if he had seen it at the time. He has no suggestion as to why the ‘trusted comrades’ weren’t named, and he is certain that they never discussed how Lambert was positioned to get such inside information.

He agrees that the absence of Sheppard’s name on these reports suggests that Lambert had not shared it with his managers at this point.

CLOSING IN ON CLARKE

Also on 24 July, a ‘briefing note’ was sent to Commander Ops [MPS-0735358]. It is reported that Andrew Clarke is responsible for manufacturing these devices, and that agreement has been reached not to search his or any other addresses until more investigations have been carried out and evidence gathered.

It includes an assurance that as soon as Clarke has found a new address the ‘source’ – Lambert – will be able to establish it ‘at an early stage’. MacLeod says he doesn’t know who provided this assurance, but accepts it could have been Lambert.

A note recording a meeting of senior officers on 7 August 1987 [MPS-0735360] says police have launched a surveillance operation in order to ‘pin point’ Clarke’s new address. MacLeod says he has no memory of this, but the minutes show he was at the meeting.

Why would they use surveillance if Lambert could provide this intelligence? MacLeod says he can remember some discussions about this and had the impression that Lambert was ‘quite confident’ he’d get it. But the investigation would be carried out by the Anti-Terrorist Branch.

An SDS intelligence report of Lambert’s from four days later, 11 August 1987 [MPS-0735383], provides more detail. Clarke is reported to have planted the devices in the Luton store (where, because the sprinkler system was not turned on, fire spread and caused millions of pounds worth of damage).

MacLeod reiterates that it didn’t occur to him to ask how Lambert could be so trusted by those responsible. Asked what he now thinks it indicates, he dodges the question entirely, going on an extended ramble about how his memory is faint – ‘genuinely so’ – and that at the time he just didn’t think about it.

The report says that Clarke has read a publication called ‘Without a Trace’ and so understands the forensic science methods police use in the investigation of serious crime:

‘In his own judgment, a minute search of his bedroom might still reveal sufficient traces of manufacture to link him to the crime. In particular he is aware that testing devices in his fireplace may well have left indelible marks.

However, in relation to the devices recovered by police – intact or in part – at the three department stores, he is confident that they will not provide any clues.

He is also aware that the next action carried out by his small cell will have to be planned and executed with an even greater regard for security.’

MacLeod agrees that this information has been reported to help the team who would search Clarke’s address. Despite this wealth of fine detail about Clarke, the report says:

‘Two close and trusted comrades were responsible for planting devices at the Harrow and Romford branches. Their identity is not known at present.’

These comrades were Lambert and Sheppard respectively. Asked if it was odd that Lambert didn’t name either of the two other culprits, MacLeod admits:

‘Yes, I guess it probably is a bit surprising.’

We’ve lost count of the times that Gargitter has put it to MacLeod that the document in front of him essentially shows Lambert was an active part of the ALF cell. She does it once again and MacLeod admits for a second time that it’s possible:

‘Whether he was part of the cell or just an insider who just happens to be in a position to obtain this kind of – he’s gained the confidence of the activist. Yes, he probably was very close. I don’t think there is any doubt about that. But whether or not he went one step further, I am – I can’t be certain in that.’

NEXT ATTACK PLAN

The report goes on to give a date for the next attack. The target won’t be Debenhams, and Clarke is looking into experimenting with a new kind of device described as a ‘lethal fireball’.

MacLeod once again says it didn’t make him wonder if Lambert was actively involved:

‘No, I didn’t. Because at that point there was no reason to… Whether he participated in it or not is a moot point… he might have been an onlooker’

Gargitter points out that, over a month after the Debenhams attacks, there is still no mention of Geoff Sheppard in any of Bob Lambert’s spycops reports. Sheppard was part of the cell, and Lambert has testified to the Inquiry that Sheppard was his main source of information, so why wasn’t he named?

Next we see a report of 18 August 1987 [MPS-0735382] about secret meetings of an active ALF cell:

‘An active London cell of the Animal Liberation Front held secret meetings in North and East London. Only four people were present.’

It gives a huge level of detail about forthcoming incendiary device plans. The four are not named, only Clarke. Lambert clearly has to be one of the four people in the cell in order to have written the report. Right, Malcolm?

‘Yes, I – yes, I guess so.’

Gargitter, having finally won this level of admission, continues:

Q: It appears, doesn’t it, from this report – if not the earlier ones – that he is part of a small cell making plans for planting incendiary devices?

MacLeod: That’s what it looks like, yes.

This late admission is suspect, though – it implies he didn’t know at the time. How on earth could he have thought Lambert was getting the information any other way? By far the most plausible explanation is that the managers knew full well. Claiming ignorance and incompetence now is the way to ensure they don’t get held accountable.

BELATEDLY NAMING SHEPPARD

The report describes new security measures. It says that although Clarke had planted the device in Luton last time, this time he would only manufacture. The planting would be left to others, some of whom would have no knowledge of him.

‘It was also agreed that he would be assisted in the process of manufacture by Geoff Sheppard… Sheppard was responsible for planting two devices at the Romford branch of Debenhams’

This is the first time Sheppard’s mentioned in connection with the whole affair. MacLeod is asked why this was. He desperately flaps about looking for something that might sound halfway plausible before failing and giving up:

‘I can’t explain why. But I can see where you are coming from. It would be speculation on my part to suggest that there was something untoward in this. It might have been that – again, he might have got so close – no, I can’t – you know, I can’t add any more to it than that.’

Gargitter points out that Lambert has told the Inquiry that Sheppard was his source of information from mid July, so there really is no credible excuse for him not mentioning it until late August.

We move on to see a Special Branch minute of 18 August 1987 by Chief Superintendent HN99 Nigel ‘Dave’ Short [MPS-0735361]. He wants to start surveillance on Sheppard in order to be led to Clarke’s address. He also wants to meet with Eric Docker from the SDS in order to ensure the surveillance protects Lambert, ensuring his presence is not recorded.

In the same document, a minute from 24 August, six days later, shows Special Branch officer TN42 reporting to the Assistant Commander of Operations. He’s learned from Lambert’s intelligence about new plans, as Gargitter explains:

‘Despite what was said in earlier reports about Clarke and Sheppard discussing detailed arrangements only between themselves, that Mr Lambert is able to report that the target has changed and that the arrangements for manufacture have also changed’

The information is being used to prepare an Anti-Terrorist Branch team to raid the address where the devices will be made and make arrests.

MacLeod says he can’t remember any of this, and is pretty sure he didn’t know at the time either. But why on earth would he not have been told?

‘There may have been a good reason but I can’t think of [one].’

We hear about another briefing note from Special Branch officer TN42 [MPS-0735381], written on the same day as the last one, 24 August 1987.

He records what he’s told DI Gray, the Anti-Terrorist Branch officer leading the investigation and the raids. The plans have changed again. There will now be three separate targets. Clarke has collected components from an address in Hackney and taken them to Sheppard’s address.

There was a plan in place for a specially selected team to ‘search’ Lambert’s cover address. MacLeod says that would be to allay any suspicions and maintain Lambert’s credibility. But, it’s pointed out, he would only need that if he were considered to be an integral part of the plot and not an ‘onlooker’ as MacLeod keeps trying to suggest. MacLeod accepts that.

NEW MANUFACTURE PLANS

The next Special Branch ‘minute’ by TN42 [MPS-0735362] is from two days later, 26 August. It goes into more detail about the activists involved and their abilities, saying that Sheppard would be unable to manufacture any devices by himself. MacLeod admits that this shows Lambert had a deep knowledge of the cell’s members and their skills.

This information from Lambert doesn’t appear in any SDS report. MacLeod has no explanation for this, and once again says he can’t remember anything about it or even whether he knew it at the time. It’s another indicator that the SDS knew and any report Lambert made to them was either oral or destroyed.

A spycops report by Lambert on 28 August 1987 [MPS-0735376] has more changes of plans:

‘It has also transpired that Clarke’s girlfriend, Helen Steel, has recently taken delivery of 200 ‘liberated’ rats at her home address; Clarke has therefore decided that these animals should be found safe homes before his next campaign commences, and he has therefore decided that the earliest date for his next action will be Friday, 11th September 1987.’

MacLeod says he’s absolutely certain he knew nothing of this at the time. Gargitter shows him several internal spycops documents with the details that he might have seen, but MacLeod is steadfast he didn’t know at all.

MacLeod is asked if he remembers the importance of removing the rats from Steel’s address so that the cell could continue with its plans. Asked about Lambert’s involvement – he drove the rats away somewhere in his van, thus triggering the manufacture, making it happen sooner and to a schedule of the police’s choosing – MacLeod claims not to know about it.

On 4 September, TN42 sent another Special Branch ‘minute’ to Commander Ops [MPS-0735364] following a conversation with MacLeod. He reports that the attacks have now been scheduled for 11 September, and the activists will be engaged in manufacturing five new devices on 9-10 September.

This detail is another one that doesn’t appear in any SDS report. MacLeod says it should have done and offers no explanation for why it didn’t. This further shows Lambert was reporting his activity but that the SDS was either not typing up reports, or else they have gone missing.

MacLeod says he doesn’t remember this new higher number of devices either. It’s now five, previously it was meant to be four. He does admit that this document proves he was talking to Lambert about it all.

Gargitter, sounding weary from making this point so often, asks if any of this made him wonder about how Lambert was getting such intricately detailed secret information:

‘Well, frankly, it never occurred to me to question it. Perhaps I should have. But it didn’t.’

The briefing note explains the exact days of the manufacture of the incendiary devices. MacLeod says he doesn’t recall. The same information is in a spycops report the next day though, which MacLeod has signed.

An even higher level of detail appears in the next TN42 briefing note, dated Sunday 6 September 1987 [MPS-0735375].

Docker had rung TN42 on a Sunday morning to tell him about a change of plan for the making and placing of the next set of incendiary devices. Clarke and Sheppard were reported as experimenting with a new design, and there was a date set for testing. This includes details of the ‘ignition chemical’ the cell plan to use and the location in which they’ll test it out.

This was important information – important enough for Docker to ring TN42 on a Sunday morning. MacLeod says he doesn’t remember any of this. It’s pointed out to him that the information was put into an SDS report the next day which he signed [MPS-0735373].

That report of Lambert’s contains a huge amount of detail about the cell’s internal discussions and their exact plans for the time and place of manufacture. He says it came from private conversations which took place between Clarke and Sheppard at a noisy benefit gig on 5 September. It is obvious that, to hear it all, Lambert must have been part of the conversation.

Asked, yet again, if it bothered him that Lambert was so involved, MacLeod gives yet another different answer:

‘Well, obviously it didn’t concern me then – and I don’t think it would have concerned me now… if that’s the only option he had to get that information, to get that intelligence’

Would he have expected Lambert to have had to present himself as someone willing to take part in the planning?

‘Well, that’s taking a step too far. I am not so sure I would want to comment to that. Because I simply don’t know.’

He’s had more flip-flops than a Brazilian beach. He is simply not a credible witness. Primarily, he is desperate not to be accountable for Lambert’s deeds, and secondarily he wants to avoid making Lambert himself responsible.

ALWAYS IN THE KNOW

The report includes a list of components currently at the manufacturing address. Lambert must have seen them there, or else been told in enormous detail by Clarke or Sheppard.

Lambert has been providing updates over time. This isn’t one piece of knowledge – he’s reported on changes in plans for the date, the types of devices, who had the components, where the manufacture would take place. To keep so updated can only mean he was considered part of the cell.

MacLeod still refuses to say he even considered it:

‘No, it didn’t occur to me. I thought at the time the most important thing was to disrupt the operation and carry out the arrests. That was the main focus. I am afraid, a surprise it may be to you, but, I mean, that wasn’t the primary focus.’

But looking back now, it must surely seem likely that Lambert was considered part of the cell:

‘It doesn’t seem likely to me, no.’

Gargitter brings up what Eric Docker told Operation Herne in July 2014 [MPS-0738106]. Lambert arranged with Docker that he would call the SDS office once Clarke and Sheppard had been in the house for a few hours, so they could be caught red-handed.

Docker told Herne of a difference of opinion about Lambert with CI Short, who allegedly told Docker that ‘the man’s out of control, you’ve lost him’. MacLeod denies hearing anything about this from anyone. He describes Lambert as:

‘a hard-working undercover officer who produced intelligence reports in a timely fashion.’

And yet he’d supposedly gone five weeks without making a report and nobody noticed.

ARREST AND WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS

We’re shown a note from 9 September 1987 [MPS-0735371] describing the arrests of Clarke and Sheppard. MacLeod claims he can’t remember where he was or whether he even spoke to Lambert about this monumental event.

Helen Steel’s address was later raided by the search team. So was the cover flat of ‘Bob Robinson’. MacLeod claims not to know any details about the raid at all.

He says he doesn’t know who applied for the search warrant or what they told the issuing court, nor whether they misled the court about the true reason for this search.

Hearing that ex-SDS officer Michael Couch was present at the search of Lambert’s bedsit, MacLeod says he doesn’t understand what he was doing there. In his witness statement he said he didn’t believe it had happened. However, there’s clear evidence that Couch was indeed present.

Couch himself told the Inquiry he was appointed to be a welfare officer, yet also says didn’t communicate with Lambert in any way during the raid. Once again, spycops’ excuses and stories at the Inquiry aren’t just implausible, they often actually make no sense.

Clarke and Sheppard were prosecuted and convicted. MacLeod agrees this was, in large part, due to Lambert’s actions. He says he was not privy to any discussions about making the trial’s prosecution aware of Lambert’s involvement. This was never disclosed to the defence either.

This is a severe violation of a fundamental judicial principle, that the defence must see all evidence. It seems clear that the convictions were a miscarriage of justice. They are currently being appealed. There have already been more than 50 other convictions quashed due to the involvement of spycops.

MacLeod says the courts should have been informed about Lambert. He accepts that it was part of his role as Detective Chief Superintendent of the SDS to ensure it happened, and yet for some reason he didn’t do it. Instead, he orchestrated wrongful convictions.

A LAW UNTO THEMSELVES

In his witness statement, MacLeod says he can’t recall whether there were ever any discussions about whether Lambert’s actions amounted to agent provocateur, because it wasn’t up to them to decide, only the individual spycops:

MacLeod: I would have expected him to be knowledgeable about the agent provocateur.

Q: So you would have expected Bob Lambert to consider it for himself?

MacLeod: Well, yes.

This is such obvious nonsense that it doesn’t even warrant dissection. It’s plain that the SDS was a law unto itself – including in the judicial sense – and believed their achieving of results and continuation trumped all considerations of legality and due process. In this, they were supported by the wider Special Branch and the Met’s top brass.

In his statement, MacLeod has said that according to Geoff Sheppard’s evidence, Bob Lambert’s actions did amount to acting as an agent provocateur. And even when we just look at all the other evidence, a clear picture is there too.

MacLeod can see it but really doesn’t want to:

‘Well, clearly he put himself at peril in order to achieve a result. Perhaps he did get too close. That will be for others to decide. There is a point where you have to believe in their judgement. I’ve said this before here. But you know, they are grown adults. They don’t need to be wet nursed.’

There he is once again with ‘wet nurse’. To take any responsibility for monitoring and managing an officer would be to emasculate them. Once again, a spycop manager is making it sound like he never spoke to his undercover officers or thought about what they did. He is lying.

To declare total faith in the judgement of officers who, he claims, didn’t tell him the truth of what was going on is a patently ludicrous position for MacLeod to take. It cannot be what he actually did.

LAMBERT ‘OF REAL CONCERN’

Chief Superintendent Ray Parker was MacLeod’s superior. MacLeod said in his witness statement:

‘I would only trouble Ray if there was anything of real concern. The incident with the incendiary attacks on department stores, of course that would be the subject of consideration, discussed.’

Was this because you had concerns about Lambert?

‘I suppose in my – probably, to be honest, I think there was probably an element of truth in that. But
I couldn’t be certain… Well, just that circumstantially, his position within the target group might have got again perilously close to the borderline of crossing that line, agent provocateur.’

Realising that what he’s saying undermines his stance and points the finger at Lambert, MacLeod hastily backtracks and says he didn’t talk to Parker about Lambert’s involvement after all. He claims it was just general chat about the incendiary devices. He says that if there had been any concerns it would’ve been Parker that raised them.

But this makes no sense – how would Parker have known there were concerns to raise?

MacLeod flaps around like a fish out of water. Despite having seen two days of evidence about Lambert’s part in the ALF cell, he says there is no evidence:

‘If there was a hint that there might have been some wrongdoing, yes. But there was no evidence that that was the case. It’s only just individual surmising that he may have been more involved in the execution of that attack. So it’s a question of who knew what when. I think if he acted – he probably acted in very good faith.’

What does ‘good faith’ even mean in this context? It’s blatantly one of the incidents of an officer knowing right from wrong and choosing wrong. There’s no other analysis that makes any sense here. Yet still, MacLeod feels compelled to say Lambert and the SDS were all somehow on the side of what is right and good. His ability to avoid self-examination is quite incredible, he’s a psychiatrist’s thesis in waiting.

In his witness statement, MacLeod said he and Parker would only talk if there was something of real concern, then says ‘examples were’ but only gives one example: ‘the incendiary attacks on department stores.’

Though the solitary example is there in his own words, in front of him in black and white, MacLeod is desperate to reimagine it:

MacLeod: Yes, well, perhaps it’s wrongly worded. As things go, it was a major event. It was a major crime. And the way it’s written here, it sounds like it’s because of that that I had concerns about Bob Lambert.

Q: I was simply asking the question whether the concern that you might have had was connected to Bob Lambert’s conduct and that might have been why you troubled Ray Parker about that event.

MacLeod: It is not a question of troubling Ray Parker about it… We never did discuss specifically whether Bob Lambert may have crossed the line or not. That wasn’t discussed.

WHO BURNED HARROW?

Gargitter points out that we now know the identity of the two people who planted simultaneous devices at the Debenhams stores in Luton and Romford, but not the third one in Harrow. It’s a glaring omission.

This person was never found. There’s no other likely explanation apart from: it was Lambert.

Did he ever ask Lambert who was responsible for that one?

‘I never asked him that’

We now know that there was CCTV footage seized from the Harrow store after the incendiary device action. That footage was then seized by Special Branch. It’s never been found either. Records indicate it was destroyed without being watched.

MacLeod agrees that the footage should have been shown to the SDS and Lambert to assist the investigation. He has no suggestions as to why this didn’t happen.

It was usual for the ALF to claim responsibility for their actions. Sure enough, a phone call was made to police about the Debenhams devices. But there are no records of Lambert ever being asked to listen to the recording, and MacLeod says he has no memory of it happening either.

WHO BURNED PLYMOUTH?

We see a handwritten statement MacLeod provided to Operation Sparkler in 2018 [MPS-0736884]. In it he mentions a fourth Debenhams store being targeted ‘in the West Country’. He says he’s ‘pretty certain’ that this was on the same date as the other three:

‘I can’t remember whether it was in Plymouth, Exeter – it was certainly in the West Country. And we had Special Branch officers come up to the Yard to discuss it with us. So we were looking at multiple attacks. Three in the Home Counties and one in Plymouth.’

There was indeed an attack on Dingles, a Plymouth department store that sold fur, albeit some time later – 20 December 1988. A journalist suggested in 2017 that it might have been the work of spycops.

During these Inquiry hearings we’ve learned that one of Lambert’s ALF cell’s incendiary devices was unaccounted for. We’ve also learned that Lambert was in Dorset at the time the Plymouth store was burned.

It’s odd that Plymouth sticks in the memory of his managers, given that it wasn’t actually part of the reported campaign. Why else would they link it in their minds, unless they knew that Lambert intended to go there later and do it?

TARGETS

Finally, MacLeod was asked about several specific groups targeted by the SDS.

TREVOR MONERVILLE

It was reported on 13 March 1987 [MPS-0740393] that a Socialist Workers Party (SWP) member, Honey Rosenberg, had joined the Trevor Monerville campaign’s organising committee. This was a family campaigning for justice for their son who had been left brain damaged by a police assault. They were using lawful means to highlight the problems of racist policing and to take legal action.

MacLeod says he doesn’t know anything about it and has never heard of the Monervilles before. He says that if it was a peaceful organisation then it presented no public order issues.

So was it legitimate for the SDS to spy on them?

‘Well, my question before I answer that is to ask: is this a legitimate campaign? Or does it form part of the Socialist Workers Party, for whom the Branch had a remit to monitor? So if they were Socialist Workers Party, whatever the cause might be on the day, if we are talking about the trust gates then whatever the cause might be, there is a legitimate interest of peace.’

The report makes it very clear that this is an independent campaign set up by Trevor’s parents, and it says that it has one SWP member who has no real sway:

‘The Socialist Workers Party has little influence over the policy or direction of the campaign. Indeed, Rosenberg has already become somewhat isolated on the committee; the SWP has very little influence over what they do.’

Once again, MacLeod seems to start from the premise that the SDS are right, and that anything near the SWP is wrong, and then tries to figure if the facts can be bent to fit around that:

‘Well, it’s a difficult one, because there is the Socialist Workers Party – although it has little influence, they are always on the wing looking for new members and – I am talking aloud here, trying to rationalise why.’

Eventually he concedes:

‘I don’t think that the Branch remit for the monitoring the Socialist Workers Party would necessarily kick in there, because they were clearly not approved or supported by the family.’

SPYING ON MPs

MacLeod is next asked about reporting on elected politicians. He remembers that the police were not supposed to record information about them – he would have condemned any officer who did it, and remembers an edict coming round warning them not to do it.

This contradicts what Eric Docker told the Inquiry, who defended the SDS’ extensive reporting on MPs, and said there had been no criticism of it by his superior officers.

MacLeod says it didn’t happen during his time in the spycops unit. But the example that was shown to Docker [UCPI0000023760] was from December 1987, only two months after MacLeod left.

McLIBEL

Gargitter shows a report from October 1986 [MPS-0742720] – so just before MacLeod joined the SDS – ostensibly about the Animal Liberation Front. It mentions the printer of the London Greenpeace fact-sheet about McDonald’s, which is described as ‘clearly libellous’.

‘One of his first orders is from London Greenpeace for the printing of a new ‘McDonald fact sheet’, a clearly libellous publication certain to be of interest to the lawyers of this worldwide hamburger chain.’

Whether it is actually libellous is not for the police to say, it’s a matter for the civil courts to decide (and, after the longest trial in English history, they found that parts of it were but other parts weren’t). More to the point, Bob Lambert encouraged and part-wrote the fact-sheet, so Lambert is also responsible for any unlawful results.

It looks a lot like Lambert made sure this was written in a certain way, then passed to McDonald’s. As with the incendiary devices he was later involved in planting, he’s drumming up business for his unit, like a glazier sneaking round bricking windows then coming over the next day to see if anyone wants them fixing.

MacLeod goes on an uncharacteristic run of definite answers, denying all knowledge of this topic. He says he had no contact with McDonald’s.

He claims he wasn’t aware of Lambert’s contributions to the fact-sheet. He doesn’t know the names Sid Nicholson or Terry Carroll, former Met officers who’d gone on to work as security for McDonald’s. At the McLibel trial they told the court that the McDonald’s security department was entirely staffed by former police officers who readily exchanged information with friends who were still on the force.

MacLeod says he’s certain that he didn’t know that McDonald’s had put private spies into London Greenpeace (even though the SDS knew full well and John Dines mentioned it in reports). He has no problem with this, though:

‘McDonald’s are entitled to do what they see fit to do. Provided that there was no sort of collusion with Lambert.’

WOMEN’S PEACE MOVEMENT

HN33 ‘Kathryn “Lee” Bonser’ was a spycops officer who was deployed 1983-87 to spy on Lambeth Women for Peace and the Greenham Common women’s peace camp. She was coming to the end of her deployment when MacLeod took over the running of the SDS.

MacLeod’s written in his statement about the ‘maverick side’ of the peace movement, and referred to the threat that peace camps and activism posed to the Establishment and the US military. He says it would have affected relations between Britain and the United States.

Asked how much the American factor was involved in the decision to target the Greenham Common women, MacLeod ignores the question and talks about the public order issues.

He continues:

‘There was a body of opinion that the CND should not be monitored. And I think most sensible people would agree with that. But as far as the monitoring the activities of the activists at Greenham Common, I think it was perfectly legitimate.’

Asked the same question about hunt saboteurs, he says the police didn’t take instructions from the government.

As for hunt sabs:

‘They created a lot of harm and injury – physical, mental – to people who got in their way. So they were a nasty bunch of people that had to be monitored.’

With that, the questioning ended.

The Inquiry’s Chair, Sir John Mitting, thanked MacLeod for his evidence.

MacLeod: I see that as part of my duty to do so.

Mitting: What a very pleasing and I fear now old-fashioned view about duty.

This was sickening, given that MacLeod just spent two days relentlessly ignoring his duty to be candid and honest, as well as his oath to tell the whole truth.

There then followed a short hearing for the Non State Core Participants’ lawyers to make some submissions to Mitting about the arrangements for closing statements to be made at the end of the current ‘Tranche’ of hearings.

On Thursday 28 November 2024 the Undercover Policing Inquiry took evidence from a woman known as ‘Jacqui’.

She was an animal rights activist in the 1980s and was deceived into a relationship by undercover officer HN10 Bob Lambert ‘Bob Robinson’. They had a child together, even though Lambert knew he’d abandon them both when his deployment ended a couple of years later.

Jacqui was questioned by Daisy Monahan for the Inquiry.

This is a long report. You can use the links below to jump to specific sections:

Activism
Leafleting and hunt sabbing, the ALF’s Wickham raid, Lambert creating division and suspicion

Meeting Lambert
Lambert’s activism and undercover persona, their relationship, his other secret relationships, Jacqui’s employment

Parenthood
Their planned baby, the birth, Lambert avoiding being named as father, their move to Dagenham, and the relationship’s end

Debenhams
The plan, the arrests, Lambert leaving

Impact
The effects of Lambert’s desertion, hardship, discovery of the truth and untold ire for the Met

The UCPI is an independent, judge-led inquiry into undercover policing in England and Wales. Its main focus is the activity of two units who deployed long-term undercover officers into a variety of political groups: the Special Demonstration Squad (SDS, 1968-2008) and the National Public Order Intelligence Unit (NPOIU, 1999-2011). Spycops from these units lived as activists for years at a time, spying on more than 1,000 groups.

This hearing was part of the Inquiry’s ‘Tranche 2 Phase 2’, which mainly concentrated on examining the animal rights-focused activities of the SDS from 1983-92.

Click here for the day’s page on the Inquiry website.

ACTIVISM

Jacqui was inspired to become active in animal rights campaigning when she saw The Animals Film on Channel 4 in 1982. She was 20 years old and living alone in Hackney, East London.

The animal rights movement was growing at the time, with lots of young people getting involved. Jacqui recalls going to protests at several places around London.

One was an open market in Club Row, off Petticoat Lane, where puppies and kittens were sold. There was also the Leyden Street chicken slaughterhouse nearby, where customers selected their own bird and watched it being killed.

She met people who had been campaigning for years, and one of them told her about East London Animal Rights (ELAR) and hunt sabbing.

EAST LONDON ANIMAL RIGHTS

ELAR was a small, informal group. Meetings were ad-hoc and held at people’s homes. They would usually be attended by fewer than ten people, mostly women. Those involved understood that their aims were to let people know about how animals were treated. They often gave out leaflets in shopping centres.

Asked about her membership of these groups she explained that it wasn’t so formal – ‘you didn’t sign in!’ -they were loose aggregations of people who did different things together.

Jacqui stresses that she went to numerous meetings, and they were so informal that they often didn’t have a group name. This runs contrary to the police reports in which officers, from their uniquely regimented perspective, named and described groups and the supposed hierarchies within.

In his witness statement to the Inquiry, Lambert described Jacqui as ‘a leading member of ELAR’, but she says this isn’t true at all:

‘I was one of six or whatever that turned up. No. There wasn’t an East London Animal Rights to be a leading member [of]…

It’s like they are trying to put a square peg into round holes and they are forcing it in to make it fit their narrative. Because, yes, news to me. This is all news to me, that we belonged to East London Animal Rights.’

Asked if there was any sort of group mission statement she scoffs:

‘Mission statement? It was more like Carry On Animal Rights.’

As well as her day job in the City, Jacqui worked in pubs a few nights a week in order to make ends meet:

‘Different pubs I have worked in. I got sacked from every single one of them. I am not good at customer service.

And, yes, so I used to do two or three nights in a pub. Because working in a pub, you could usually get someone to buy you – this is how bad, this is what I am talking about – is that you could usually get somebody to take you out. That means you get to eat that night. And yes, that was the point.’

Jacqui became very committed to animal rights, and would prioritise hunt sabs and demos over casual shifts in the pub, even if it meant she got sacked for refusing work.

Asked to describe the demos outside Leyden Street slaughterhouse, Jacqui recalls that by the time she joined in, these protests had been going on for years – she says there were maybe 10-20 protesters there. They would be chanting and shouting slogans at customers.

She found the slaughterhouse profoundly distressing:

‘I used to end up in bits – really, really upset’

There was no violence or police presence, although the slaughterhouse staff would wave their knives and threaten them for putting off customers.

They were usually there on Sunday mornings for a few hours until the market closed at lunchtime.

This controversial slaughterhouse was eventually closed down. The council shut down the sale of puppies and kittens in Club Row too.

Asked if ELAR ever did ‘oversee or organise any sort of direct action’ – the Inquiry still not grasping the nature of these activists – Jacqui was clear that there was no liberating of animals, nor serious criminal damage.

She did admit she ‘might’ have sprayed graffiti on occasion, recounting one time she was passing a railway line in Hornsey:

‘Lots of advertising hoardings on it, but then there was a great big blank space where they had not renewed the advertising thing. And I thought, blank space. So I must have had, or someone must have had spray, I really can’t remember…

We would have done the A with the circle, something like that. I have only recently found out that the A means anarchist. I used to think it meant animals.’

In her statement to the Inquiry, Jacqui describes the animal rights activist movement she worked with:

‘It comprised compassionate tender-hearted people who simply had a deep fondness for animals. They would take in stray dogs or do other animal rescue work. Some were middle-aged or elderly women who would get together for tea and cake. Others were harmless eccentrics. None of them posed any threat to the state.’

Sylvia Martin used to host some of the meetings. She was older, around her 60s. An ex-actress and model, Jacqui remembers her as glamorous, flamboyant, posh, outspoken, and absolutely no danger to anyone.

Jacqui laughs at the description of Sylvia’s Fur Action Group as an ‘offshoot’ of ELAR:

‘You are talking as if we were a corporation, you know, with a financial officer and – alright, call it an offshoot. Or a cell. Sometimes you call them cells, don’t you? We were a cell.’

This drew much laughter from the public gallery.

FUR ACTION GROUP

We’re shown a spycops report written by HN11 Mike Chitty ‘Mike Blake’, dated 12 December 1984 [UCPI0000014820] about the activities of the Fur Action Group.

It names Jacqui as one of a number of people who had protested at the Leyden Street market and then, having seen a newspaper article about a fur fashion show at the Cafe Royal, went there and held a sit-in.

Asked if it was peaceful, she says she can’t clearly remember it so, given that disorder would have stuck in her mind, she’s confident it won’t have gone beyond ‘a bit of verbal’.

Chitty reported on Jacqui numerous times. Despite her now seeing contemporaneous photos, she doesn’t remember him at all.

He’s described one of the women on the demo as ‘attractive’.

Jacqui mentions that she herself is described as ‘reasonably attractive’ in another report and, after an aside to say she was actually gorgeous at the time, she is blunt:

‘I am angry that women are described by the way they look. And when they get to a certain age they are invisible. So you are either a bit of totty or you are invisible. Otherwise, you have no role.’

HUNT SABOTEURS

Like many young animal rights activists, Jacqui became a hunt saboteur:

‘You can do something direct, and obviously I am on the right side of history because hunting is illegal now, or it is supposed to be.’

Her prime motivation was to save foxes, but she also highlighted the mistreatment of hunting hounds.

She was part of a group that targeted the Surrey Union hunts which she said rarely caught foxes. It seemed that trying to fight hunt sabs was more of a sport to its supporters and terriermen:

‘It come as a shock to me how physical it is. How you are running really, really, round big swathes of land and those swathes of land might have posts, they might have hedges.

You have to get across those, and obviously you have loads of horses coming towards you, which is quite scary and therefore, yes, you got to be fit – and I quite liked that out in the countryside. Yes, I really liked it.’

SOUTH EAST ANIMAL LIBERATION LEAGUE

She went out sabbing with South East Animal Liberation League (SEALL), and says that they – another loose group of about ten people who were good friends, not ‘members’ as such – were more focussed on direct action than ELAR. As well as sabbing they would liberate animals:

‘I didn’t consider myself a member of any group. It’s the way you have structured it in terms of for the Inquiry is to put them into groups. But I would never have described myself as I am sort of a ‘member of’ this – it’s not like being member of a knitting circle or a member of the Women’s Institute or something like that. It wasn’t like that.’

Jacqui went sabbing most Saturdays from 1982 to 1985, until she was heavily pregnant.

She was wholeheartedly committed to helping the animals, but she also spoke movingly about how the social aspect was meaningful too, especially for someone who had been estranged from her family since she was 17:

‘Suddenly I had a group, and a group of friends who cared about and had the same values as me. So, when you sort of feel like you’re the only person who thinks like that, so there must be something wrong with you, because no one else seems to care, you give out these leaflets and they just get dropped on the floor. No one seems to really care. You try to make them aware of what’s going on and they are not interested.

And then you meet a group of friends, of like-minded people, similar age, and from that it’s going to be a social life attached to it.

So I was like this little urchin, sort of – I was completely solo from 17, with no education whatsoever. I didn’t go to school when I was after 15… I didn’t have any education to back me up, to progress in any way. And they filled a void for me, yes. They were friends.’

She says there was little in the way of security precautions among the group. There wasn’t much to hide – and they couldn’t bug her phone because she didn’t have one. Anyway, hunt sabbing was public and lawful:

‘I hadn’t been to law school at that time, like I have now… I think we all sort of assumed it was legal. You wouldn’t believe it by the way we were treated by the police, even when we were assaulted.’

She remembers the sabs making up spray bottles of citronella and using this to put the hounds off the scent of the fox.

She says the hunts’ terriermen were the ‘real muscle’ – intimidating, violent ‘meat-heads’ whose role was to send dogs down holes after foxes (and sometimes badgers, which were supposed to be a protected species) and ‘tear them to pieces’.

Jacqui described with revulsion the hunting tradition of ‘blooding’ – when a child first goes on a hunt, the blood of the killed animal is wiped on the child’s face.

Sabs were ‘seen as the plebs, scumbags’ whereas the hunters were part of the Establishment, which succeeded in delaying the hunting ban for years.

VIOLENCE AGAINST HUNT SABS

The hunt sabs were frequently threatened by hunt supporters. Women hunt sabs were threatened with sexual assault – she recalls that this always ‘loomed over you’. Supporters would also drive vehicles directly at hunt sabs.

She recalls one incident when she was caught. One of the hunters fell from his horse. The sabs saw hunt supporters pointing at them, and ran away. Jacqui was separated from the others and caught by at least four of these men. There was more than one on each limb and they threw her into a lake.

It was a freezing winter’s day, the deep water was so cold that it stung on contact, and the men who threw her didn’t even know if she could swim. She couldn’t get out and the men just walked off laughing.

She was rescued by other sabs. Soaking wet, she walked with them back to the pub where the hunt had started from. The landlord told her that she deserved it, so they had to walk on to find somewhere to shelter. It was a long journey home to London.

‘It was part of a game to them… there was quite a few times that they never killed a fox. But sometimes that was because they was concentrating on hunting us. So it is almost like they sort of enjoyed it. They used to have a big smile on their face when we turned up.

She said sabs were constantly attacked, frequently with horse whips that left physical injuries. She notes that almost every attack she can think of happened to a woman sab.

‘I was whipped loads of times. They got a thing about whipping, those sorts of people. Strange, isn’t it? Public schoolboys and their whips.’

Asked if she reported it to the police, she patiently explained that police were never interested in violence against sabs:

‘We were the baddies, according to them.’

She explained that the police would be on good terms with their local well-to-do hunters. She would see police mingling with hunters as they convened. It was plain that they were firmly on one side:

Q: The police didn’t come to your aid, is that right?

Jacqui: Well, Bob did. But I didn’t know he was a policeman until 2012.

Asked if sabs were ever violent to hunters, Jacqui points out the impracticality of taking on mounted shotgun owners:

‘They were on great big hunting horses that are bred especially for that! Have you seen the size of them? They are on those and we are not.’

THE SECRET ORGANISER

As to whether the sabs ever brought weapons or organising violence, she refers to ‘He Who Can’t Be Named’ (someone who came to sab the Surrey Union Hunt, whose identity is protected by the Inquiry) getting hold of walkie talkies for the sabs to communicate with each other. Those and the bottles of citronella, that was as organised as they got.

She got to know ‘He Who Cannot Be Named’. She describes him as intelligent, charismatic, and with an air of authority.

He gave evidence to the Inquiry and said he only went to the Surrey Union hunt two or three times. Jacqui incredulously dismisses his claim:

Jacqui: Sorry, I was going to swear then. Rubbish.

Q: How many times did you see him?

Jacqui: Every time. He’s the one that got the walkie-talkies and everything. As if we’d be organised enough to do that!

She says he was the ‘self-appointed’ press officer of SEALL, arranging their demonstrations, sabs, and raids to liberate animals:

‘If you wanted to have arrangements for something then he was the person who had all the arrangements and he’d be the one organising it. So if you had a question about it, he was the person you would go to.’

Jacqui was friends with his girlfriend, and they tended to each have one of the group’s walkie talkies. As an illustration of how seriously he took everything, she recalled him angrily telling her off for not saying ‘roger and out’ when ending a walkie-talkie conversation.

She remembers Ronnie Lee – an animal rights activist who’d received a long jail sentence – wasn’t around at this time, and He Who Cannot Be Named said he wanted to ‘take it further than what Ronnie Lee did’.

In his evidence to the Inquiry, He Who Cannot Be Named said his role spearheading SEALL’s actions was earlier, in 1983 and early 1984. However, Jacqui remembers introducing him to Bob Lambert, and she only met Lambert in the summer of 1984.

At the time, Lambert was in a relationship with a woman known as CTS, which ended when CTS went to university in September 1984.

Just like He Who Cannot Be Named, Lambert has his own version of the timing too – he says he first met Jacqui later, at a demo in the winter at the end of 1984! She’s absolutely certain this isn’t true either. Not only was CTS gone in September, but she can remember she was wearing summer clothes when they met.

As for He Who Cannot Be Named, Jacqui is confident he was sabbing much later than he claims:

‘I would put him there until I stopped going, which would have been some time in mid-1985’

She can pinpoint that date as she stopped due to being pregnant with Lambert’s child, known as TBS.

Jacqui is sure that she introduced He Who Cannot Be Named to Lambert, but says the two men didn’t become friends. He knew she and Lambert were a couple, and he regarded her as a friend.

In both his written statement and his live evidence, He Who Cannot Be Named says he has no recollection of Jacqui whatsoever. Is she surprised about this?

‘Oh, no, no, no! I am not surprised. Because he says he doesn’t remember anything about anything about anything!’

THE WICKHAM RAID

Though she’s confident she introduced Lambert to He Who Cannot Be Named, there’s an element of doubting her own memory because of the extent of Lambert’s deceit and abuse:

‘That’s what I have always believed. But remember there is a lot of things I believed and they are complete and utter bollocks.’

She elaborates that the fact of having TBS and, since they discovered Lambert’s true identity in 2012, supporting TBS in his desire to get to know Lambert means that she’s had her memory altered by more recent discussions:

‘I still see Bob Lambert now. And I have seen him since 2012. So obviously we have had lots and lots and lots and lots, hours and hours and hours of conversations about things then. So that can mean sometimes your memory – there is the memory of what I have from back in the 1980s but then that is obviously going to be tainted…

So sometimes it can be almost like a false memory, because what you are remembering is what you know now, really.’

Jacqui was approached on a hunt sab by someone who was recruiting for a raid on Wickham Laboratories, an animal research and testing facility in Hampshire. It was what she’d yearned to do all along:

‘I wanted to rescue animals. That’s it. You know, I am completely non-violent and I’ve just got this empathy for children and animals that are just like, yes, vulnerable. So, yes, I would have been up for it.’

We’re shown a Lambert police report, dated 23 October 1984 [UCPI0000014858]. It says that He Who Cannot Be Named is organising an unspecified action for 28 October, and Jacqui will be participating. This is the Wickham raid, which became notorious for the severity of sentences meted out to its participants.

He Who Cannot Be Named has told the Inquiry he may have known that an action would happen at Wickham, but he had no part in organising it. Jacqui says that on the contrary, this is nonsense and the information in Lambert’s report is correct.

As for He Who Cannot Be Named, she says:

‘I am a bit scared of him actually… If anything happens to me from now on, you all know
where to look. If something happens to me.’

Lambert’s police report says that Jacqui planned to travel with a friend who had a car, after further briefing from He Who Cannot Be Named. She was invited to a meeting point, but she wouldn’t have known the target location, and wouldn’t have asked, and knew not to tell anyone. This security culture was well established. As a ‘foot soldier’ she wouldn’t expect to know where she was going until she actually got there.

It seems that Lambert’s report may have been based on information Jacqui had given him. She’s distraught at the possibility that she might have inadvertently aided the imprisonment of people she cared about, who were taking action she supported.

She says she has talked with Lambert about it and he’s told her this is not the case:

‘He assured me that there was so many spycops out there. He said it was the sort of leakiest operation ever. There were so many reports that this was going to happen, that he didn’t need to be the person. But he might have been saying that to try to make me feel better…

It is the reason why they were with us, was to get information, and unknowingly we were giving information because we were in intimate relationships with them.’

She explains that Lambert was older than her. He was manipulating her trust and therefore she wanted to share things with him. She feels that she probably did give him the information about Wickham. She says sorry. Monahan, the lawyer representing the Inquiry, tells her not to worry, but she replies:

‘No, I meant sorry to all the activists.’

LAMBERT’S REACTION AND ESCALATION

Asked about Lambert’s reaction at the time to her telling him about the plan, she gives significant insight into his undercover persona:

‘Well, he didn’t go “Ooh, I am a cop”. Obviously, he reacted how he had been trained to react…

He would have wanted to get involved. He would have liked all that stuff. Because he used to mock that all I did was going to those meetings… that, you know, bunny hugging wasn’t going to get anywhere. And also he said he was an anarchist and, therefore, he didn’t believe in the system.’

At the time, she countered by highlighting to him the Labour Party’s promise to ban fox hunting (which it eventually did). But Lambert retorted that it wouldn’t affect vivisection or other forms of animal abuse:

‘I thought he lived off the grid and at that sort of time I would have been passionate about him then. I thought he was wonderful. Especially as he was that much older than me. And I have never had a good father/daughter relationship.’

This dynamic, combined with Lambert’s overt exhortations, encouraged her to feel she was ready to participate in more radical action. She says He Who Cannot Be Named had a similar effect on her too.

We’re shown a police note of a phone message from Lambert on the morning 26 October 1984 [MPS-0746925], two days before the raid, saying Jacqui and her friend were withdrawing from the action.

RAID CONFUSION

Jacqui says that she’d long believed she was on the Wickham raid:

‘I always thought I was on Wickham, you know. I always, in my memory, until 2012, I thought I was on Wickham. And I obviously was getting that mixed up with something else that I was on. Because Bob assures me he made sure I didn’t go on Wickham.

He said he can’t remember what, but he made sure that he distracted me with something else so that I didn’t go near Wickham because he knew that it was going to be – the police knew about it…

‘And I did ask him what – how did you manage to do that? Because I was passionate about it. And it would have been my first proper action, apart from sabbing. So, yes, I asked him what and obviously he can’t remember. Bob’s got a lot of plates to spin as we now know.’

It does sound like it might be Lambert rewriting her memories but, as she describes the event, it becomes clear that she is confusing Wickham with an abortive raid she went on:

‘I was on an action where you meet and then you go to one place and then you go to another place and all that. And I was. And we finally got to our final destination. I can’t even remember what part of the country. As I have said, I have gone all these years thinking it was Wickham…

We got to this place which was apparently a laboratory. I thought I would rescue animals but there was no animals in there. But what there was, was some sort of equipment that like that scientists use where they put their hands in like gloves and I suppose handle the animals. It was like a glass thing where I suppose you would have animals in there and you do your procedures on it…

I found it really chilling, just seeing the equipment even though there was not any animals there. And I think we damaged the equipment. But an alarm went off… then we all had to leg it’

This description of an empty lab cannot be Wickham, which was very much an active vivisection laboratory at the time.

We’re next shown a Lambert report dated 20 November 1984 [UCPI0000014769]. It encloses a SEALL leaflet asking people to donate to the Wickham defence fund, helping families to visit imprisoned activists and to buy them vegan food.

Jacqui remembers fund-raising by going around the pubs collecting:

‘Men would say I’ll give you money for a kiss’.

OSTRACISING AN ACTIVIST

Lambert’s report goes on to say that several activists think there was a security problem, and that one person is accused of giving names to the police:

‘A hitherto energetic and respected campaigner is now shunned by the whole animal rights movement.’

Regarding the same person, a further Lambert report dated 3 December 1984 [UCPI0000014790] says:

‘Defending himself against the charge of giving names to the police, he claims that police officers obtained names of animal rights activists from private correspondence seized at his home address at the time of his arrest.

However, he is a demoralised man, much frightened by the prospect of a prison sentence, unlikely to return to the position of trust and respect with which he was once held.’

Jacqui is still really distraught by the man’s plight:

‘This is shameful… he was just the loveliest gentlest man. He probably wasn’t very bright. Very vulnerable. And he was just a really lovely empathetic man and he wanted to please and he certainly thought Bob was wonderful.

I was just quite close to him because he was so gentle and such a sort of honest soul, you know. A beautiful soul.’

She says that Lambert told her at the time this man’s address book had got everyone arrested, that he was an informer and that she wasn’t to speak to him anymore. She then told others the same story.

Now she wonders whether there even was an address book, or whether it was Lambert covering his tracks as the mole, and sowing discord among a group the spycops didn’t like:

‘We were served up a patsy’

She really liked the man and didn’t think he would have spoken to the police. She trusted him with a key to her flat, and the feeding of her cats – ‘they were like my babies at the time’ – and she also saw that his compassion for animals, shared with the group, was his social life as well as his moral concern.

She says that when she found out the truth about Lambert in 2012, concern for this man was among her first thoughts.

Jacqui says he was a broken man, completely devastated. People were horrible to him, it was the worst accusation possible. Lambert would have known all this. She is very, very angry.

CREATING DIVISION

In her witness statement she says it’s just one example of Lambert fostering division among the activists. Asked about other instances of him sowing such discord, she says:

‘He was always telling me that some people couldn’t be trusted. So he sort of made me paranoid. He would always tell me that this person was a wrong ‘un, and this person wasn’t right, and you are too trusting, and you know – he was always stirring the pot.

It’s why loads of groups broke up, because when you get to the root of it, these cops were there and they were making us paranoid that people that we thought could be trusted couldn’t be trusted, and no one could be trusted.’

She reflects on the extent of the spying on her, and the exaggeration and tone of the police reports:

‘You read some of this stuff, it makes me sound like I am Mr Big on top of a big cocaine ring, you know, organised crime group. You know, I am second in line in ISIS or something. I was just a dopey bird, right? A dopey bird who was doing her best and trying to survive in a world full of sharks. Full of male sharks.’

MEETING LAMBERT

We’re shown the first Lambert report that mentions Jacqui, dated 19 October 1984 [UCPI0000020318]. Jacqui confirms she was in a relationship with Lambert by this time (though he claims it happened later).

He says that through her work at a financial company she got hold of secret financial information about multinational chemical firm ICI and passed it to the Animal Liberation Front, enabling a raid on an ICI research centre.

Jacqui dismisses the claim as ‘ridiculous’:

‘Look at my age and what a junior position I would have had! I worked for temp agencies, so if I was there at this place I was there as a temp. You know, they didn’t invite me in and start showing me all their financial documents.’

She says she might have said something like it to try to impress Lambert but if she did, he should have known full well that she wasn’t going to be privy to such information.

As for passing it on, the Inquiry asks whether it has anything to do with an April 1984 raid on an ICI facility in Alderley Edge, Cheshire, claimed by the Northern Animal Rights League:

‘Never heard of them.’

She points out that she didn’t even have a phone at the time. When Monahan inquires further about whether she would have been in communication with the group, Jacqui interrupts:

‘What would I have had? Crystal balls?’

LAMBERT’S TWO PARTNERS

‘CTS’ and Jacqui were around the same age as each other at the time, 19 or 20. Lambert didn’t tell Jacqui he was in a relationship with CTS:

‘Well, he’s not going to tell me the truth, is he? Because he was sniffing around me at the time. So he’s not going to be telling me that.’

Lambert says there was no overlap and he met Jacqui later, at a demo outside Hackney Town Hall, and describes Jacqui wearing an Avis car rental worker’s outfit. She says that happened, but wasn’t their first meeting.

‘I met him on the Essex hunt sabbing. But he tells me, no, it was that. And you know how truthful he is’

We are shown a Lambert report dated 20 November 1984 [UCPI0000014938] about a planned protest at the Hackney Town Hall, where Jacqui is reported to have told people to bring banners about the fur trade. Jacqui says that was a different event.

There is also a Lambert report of 3 December 1984 [UCPI0000014790] about demo outside a full council meeting at Hackney Town Hall, about the proposal that they adopt an ‘animal charter’ bringing in a number of measures such as a ban on animal circuses. Islington councillor Jeremy Corbyn had worked hard to get that passed in his borough, and they were hoping to get it replicated in Hackney – which indeed it was.

Jacqui is certain this is the one Lambert’s referring to. And she’s just as certain that she already knew him well before that.

She says that she only knew about his simultaneous relationship with CTS via other people.

LAMBERT AND BELINDA HARVEY

She hadn’t even known about the existence of Belinda Harvey, with whom Lambert had an additional relationship, until after the whole scandal came to light in 2012:

‘Never heard of her, nothing. Never mentioned it. Even though she had been to my house and I didn’t know, even though she had been with my son and I didn’t know.’

Once the spycops scandal was exposed, CTS came forward and made herself known to the lawyers representing women deceived into relationships. However, she has not taken any legal action, nor participated in the Inquiry.

‘She didn’t want to join the other women as an action, because obviously years ago, she’s got on with her life. She lives abroad now, she has a family and all the rest of it. She doesn’t want anything to do with it.

To tell you the truth, if I didn’t have TBS nor would I. I wouldn’t have put myself through all this for nothing. Because it certainly isn’t for money. The only reason I thought was because I have six foot of Bob Lambert’s DNA walking around who wants to be reunited with him.’

We break for lunch. Jacqui has been giving it both barrels all morning. It’s been impressive to hear her, she has no filter and is not holding back anything as she speaks very frankly and directly. And despite the horrendous subject matter, she’s introduced numerous notes of wit and humour too.

FIRST DATES

Jacqui is very clear when she went on her first dates with Lambert, and it was not in the winter as he claims:

‘I remember seeing him dressed for the summer… Not the first time, but like a date that I went on to a restaurant with him and things like that. I was definitely dressed for the summer’

Monahan points out that Jacqui’s witness statement says that, since speaking to Lambert in recent years, she’s come to believe they did meet that day in November outside Hackney Town Hall.

Monahan asks if Lambert has influenced her memory of when they first met.

Jacqui responds, very slowly saying:

‘I suspect he’s influenced me more than I will ever know about things, but yes… He still influences me. But yes. He still influences me.’

Lambert has told the Inquiry he became an active hunt sab in 1985, but Jacqui is certain he was involved before that:

‘He just suddenly started appearing everywhere. So I don’t know whether that was because of me or whatever.’

Monahan asks if Lambert was enthusiastic:

‘About sabbing or about me?’

Monahan is amused and says ‘good question’. Jacqui clarifies that it was both.

She never saw him get assaulted while sabbing, but he was a big man and hunters tended to go for women – and indeed, Lambert saw Jacqui being assaulted by hunters.

LAMBERT’S ACTIVISM

Lambert seemed to be very knowledgeable about London Greenpeace.

Jacqui knew that he wrote some of the group’s leaflets and she thought he was very well-read about anarchism and the civil war in Spain, and ‘he seemed to be all up on the theory’.

She got the impression he was the brains of the group, though this was purely based on what he told her. She found him eloquent and persuasive.

She remembers being in awe of Helen Steel. She had heard about her reputation before meeting her, and saw her as some kind of ‘senior figure’ in the movement.

She went out leafleting with Lambert a number of times, outside the McDonald’s in the Strand. She recalls that Lambert didn’t just co-write the anti-McDonald’s leaflet, he wrote other animal rights leaflets too. She has a clear memory of one of these: the leaflet used for the demo at Murray’s Meat Market in Brixton, which featured an image of a human baby in a butcher’s shop.

She says that Lambert produced printed material for a number of Animal Liberation Front type of things.

Established animal welfare organisation British Union for the Abolition of Vivisection (now called Cruelty Free International) had a printer and would let other activists use it. Jacqui remembers that in return they used to help with the group’s admin and office tasks.

Much later, she followed the McLibel case from a very unlikely perspective:

‘I ended up working for the solicitors that were the lawyers for McDonald’s…

So I knew, it wasn’t just the McLibel case; anybody, no matter how famous they were, if they said something – obviously I know the names of people, really famous people, pop stars or whatever – if they basically said anything about McDonald’s, that’s it, you would get a desist letter straight away.

And I remember that everybody, no matter how wealthy they were, they would say sorry and desist. So they were really powerful.’

She has no idea how she managed to get that job – it may have been He Who Cannot Be Named or Lambert using their influence to ease her path.

Jacqui only went to one London Greenpeace meeting with Lambert, in 1984. He told her she’d find it interesting because there was lots of animal rights discussion:

‘That’s when he said the bunny-hugging thing. And he said if you come along to London Greenpeace, you can get properly involved because there’s a lot goes down there.’

She knew of London Greenpeace but hadn’t felt any affinity with it, and the meeting didn’t change that:

‘I had seen all that anarchist scene and it wasn’t for me. They were mainly quite sort of upper class. Well, they weren’t upper class. You got to remember, my mum and dad, underclass, right. So to me they seemed like they were just playing at it a bit.’

It was clear to her that Lambert was very involved and respected among the group.

RELATIONSHIP

Asked about her sexual relationship with Lambert, Jacqui is not able to pin down the exact date it started. He used to ‘make a beeline for me’ at events, she says.

Asked if she was a vulnerable person when Lambert targeted her, Jacqui deftly makes the distinction between how she felt then and a clearer, more objective view she has now:

Q: Would you have described yourself as vulnerable at that time?

Jacqui: No. I thought I had it all sussed. Like most young people do, I thought I had it all sussed.

Q: Looking back now, would you describe yourself as vulnerable then?

Jacqui: Yes.

She explains that she left home at 17 and was estranged from her family, with no support network. She lived in bedsits, lying about her age as she could only sign tenancies and get jobs if she said she was 18.

She said Lambert’s advances were appealing to her:

‘Because he was older. And because he seemed quite educated. I found that really attractive. It didn’t bother me about the money thing until later on.

And also, I thought I could change him. I thought, once he has a baby, he’ll settle down and he’ll get a proper job. And the amount of times I told him about getting a proper job.’

She points out the irony of her being unaware that he had the proper job of being a detective sergeant spying on her.

She doesn’t remember the chemistry between them, but says starting a sexual relationship felt mutual.

Jacqui describes Lambert as captivating when he talked to her about anarchism. He came across as an intellectual, and was different from other men she knew, who were only interested in making money.

Lambert dropped Jacqui off last when giving lifts home to a group of people. He might have asked her out then, it was all very quick, it might have been a day or two later at most.

They went to a Lebanese restaurant in Stoke Newington High Street which served vegan food (the same place Belinda describes him taking her, presumably). He was friendly with the owner.

Jacqui says that Lambert was a committed vegan, and she is repulsed at the idea of a relationship with a meat eater:

‘God, no! They sweat it and everything. No!’

In his witness statement, Lambert says the sexual relationship began after she invited him back to hers.

She confirms ‘might have done,’ with a smile.

Interviewed in 2013 by Operation Herne [MPS-0722577], an internal police investigation into spycops, Lambert is very cagey indeed and fumbles his language about the first date:

‘I think that people that knew me at the time say if anything I was probably a little bit reticent, you know. But again, you know, one thing leads to another, you know, you go to the pub and then oh well, erm, you know, especially the things like, you know, having a lift home’

Jacqui guffaws:

‘I take back what I said about he’s articulate and educated! I think my bulldog could have written that if you sat him at a computer for long enough!’

As for the substance of his rambling, that it was Jacqui who initiated the relationship:

‘I was such a scarlet woman, I was… No, he was like a rat up a drainpipe!’

LAMBERT’S LIFESTYLE

He told her about doing cash-in-hand work as a gardener and tree surgeon, working for rich people in Hampstead. He said he did enough to run his van and not much more because a frugal lifestyle fitted with his unmaterialistic ethos and left him more time to devote to activism.

She knew he was 32 years old. She visited his (cover) address in Highgate. She found his flat sparse, but not suspiciously so. He had a sizeable record collection, all of it at variance with her soul preferences:

‘He liked Leonard Cohen, which I used to call music to commit suicide by. He used to like all that.

And he also saw himself as Van Morrison. He loved Van Morrison. And if you look at what he looked like back in the day, there is a similarity. That’s kind of what he thought he was, cool and all that. So he had all his music there. He played The Doors. Not my sort of music.’

She asked about his name – why would your parents call you Robert Robinson?

He explained that Robert was his middle name, he was actually Mark Robert Robinson. In truth, Mark Robert Charles Robinson had died aged seven of a heart condition, and Lambert had stolen his identity.

Shortly afterwards, she saw his driving license in the name of Mark R Robinson:

‘Probably in hindsight he left it out for me to see. I didn’t think at the time, I thought I was a right secret squirrel and I found it…

I didn’t mention that I had seen it. I thought oh, he was telling me the truth. He already said to me that was his real name and I thought, having seen the driving licence.’

She now realises it was him dealing with her querying his name.

Lambert told her that he already had another child, living in Australia. This was one of a number of lies he told that made her feel sorry for him. He also told her that his mother had died of cancer when he was seven years old.

This story of a troubled upbringing is common among spycops. It not only gives them a reason why their partners can’t meet their parents, it also makes their partners feel trusted and intimate.

Jacqui later learned that Lambert’s mother actually lived till old age.

Additionally, Lambert told her that his dad had dementia and wouldn’t recognise him, and that he was in a care home in Cumbria:

‘I don’t know if there was anything in Cumbria or that was just him disappearing to his family. I have no idea.’

The dementia was later used as an excuse to refuse Jacqui’s requests to meet her son’s grandfather, as his condition was supposedly too advanced and meeting her and TBS would only confuse him.

Jacqui offers a bit of advice to make sure you meet someone’s family and friends before you have a baby with them:

‘If they have no friends and they have no roots, there is a reason for that.’

Jacqui says that when she would nag Lambert for money or other things, he would look sad and defeated like a scolded puppy. Her mum told her this was because he’d never had a mother figure, and that she should go easy on him.

Lambert is ten years older than Jacqui, and Jacqui’s mum wasn’t much older than that, so they were close in age and would talk and connect. She told Jacqui to make allowances for him. It’s easy to imagine this is what Lambert intended from the conversations.

RELATIONSHIP ESCALATION

When it’s suggested that the relationship got intense quite quickly, Jacqui disagrees:

‘I wouldn’t say that. I always thought that he was more into me than I was him. You know there is always like an imbalance, even if people won’t admit it. And I always thought that I had the upper hand. I know that is odd now, but I always thought that I held that balance of power.’

They spent about half their nights together, and they were openly a couple among friends, displaying affection. He declared love for her and she reciprocated.

She believed they were in an exclusive relationship. She didn’t think he had the time to see someone else because they spent so much time together:

‘You didn’t keep track on people remember, like you do now. You didn’t have apps where you could see where someone was and things like that. I wish I did. I so much wish. I wish I hired a cab and said follow that car, follow that van, and found out where he went. But I didn’t.’

She recalls being a little envious of Lambert’s good friend and fellow London Greenpeace activist CTS. She believed that the pair were very bonded intellectually and didn’t want to believe they were in a sexual relationship. Lambert also downplayed any indications of the truth.

He told her that CTS returned to London some time later and met up with him, ‘to say goodbye’. It was when Jacqui was pregnant, and they had just been to an antenatal clinic. He told her ‘I want to be totally honest with you’ – Jacqui cracks up laughing at this, incredulously repeating the phrase twice.

Even then, he assured her it wasn’t sexual with CTS. Jacqui remembers feeling insecure, and him being very emphatic about it.

PICKING A PET TOGETHER

Lambert said he knew the person who was running a local cat rescue. They went there together and got Winston:

‘I picked him out, because he only had one eye and I felt a bit sorry for him. And also I thought she was going to have real trouble homing him because he wasn’t really friendly or anything like that. And he was really skittish, because I don’t know what had happened, I don’t know if he was semi feral or whatever.

I said which one, and Bob said as well, pick the one that no one else is going to want, because, you know, we will be all right. And that’s what we did… so we got Winnie Woo. Winston was his name, but Winnie Woo, we used to call him.’

A while later, Winston was hit by a car. The vet said the necessary surgery would cost £350.

‘He might have said it was going to be a million. I had no chance.’

But Lambert said he would pay the bill:

‘I was really worried because I thought if he’s finding that, that’s going to come out of something else we are going to need… I asked him loads of times where it was, but he said, just going “don’t worry about it, look just don’t worry about it”, and he wanted the conversation to finish. He didn’t want me to keep on about it.’

In hindsight, Jacqui realises that Lambert was never short of money.

JACQUI’S EMPLOYMENT

Jacqui worked as a waitress at a restaurant called School Dinners in Chancery Lane:

‘They had on the menu things like jam roly-poly, things that posh boys would have got at boarding school… around that time in the 80s, there was a lot of judges and everything – sorry! – ‘

She interjects the apology, realising the hearing is chaired by a former High Court judge, Sir John Mitting.

‘I did all sorts of jobs like that. I was a hostess at one point. I have done all sorts of jobs. I have been horribly exploited by old white rich men since I was 17. How do you think I survived? It wasn’t sex work. Never ever. I was a waitress’

She says Lambert knew about this work and seemed to find it titillating:

‘At the time I would never have said I was being exploited. I thought I had the upper hand. I thought, god, these blokes! The amount of tips I was getting and things like that, this is brilliant. These stupid fools giving me all this money just for caning them. My thinking has now been turned round and I can see that I was being exploited.’

This is especially distressing to hear, coming so soon after her comments about how she thought she held the power when Lambert deceived her into a relationship.

As the hearing takes a break, Mitting, has a brief word with Jacqui about her job caning men of his profession, assuring her that he hadn’t been one of her clients:

‘Don’t worry about legal London in the 1980s, I wasn’t here then.’

PARENTHOOD

In her witness statement, Jacqui has said that she talked to Lambert many times in detail about how much she wanted to have a baby, and how worried she was about not being able to conceive.

She didn’t use any contraception until after TBS was born, and Lambert never suggested doing so either.

TBS was not a mistake and Jacqui was elated when she found out she was pregnant.

Jacqui now knows that Lambert told Belinda that he’d been tricked into this pregnancy by Jacqui. Belinda says he claimed Jacqui had lied and told him she was on the pill.

Belinda’s friend Simon Turmaine has given a witness statement to the Inquiry [MPS-0723092] testifying that Lambert told him the same thing.

Additionally, whistleblower spycop Peter Francis – one of the officers Lambert oversaw as a manager – also says Lambert would refer to a prior instance of an undercover officer being tricked into fatherhood.

In his witness statement to the Inquiry, Lambert denies ever saying this. However, Jacqui believes Belinda and seems angry with Lambert:

‘He said to me he would never say anything like that about me.’

She also says Lambert wasn’t unique in this abdication of responsibility:

‘It’s something men say sometimes. They will say that, you know. They just do, to excuse what – to make the girlfriend they are with, I don’t know, feel better. So even in normal life, not spycops life, that sort of happens.’

Jacqui says that Lambert appeared to share her joy at becoming pregnant.

Lambert told Jacqui he didn’t believe in marriage and that married people were conforming to a patriarchal society. This hadn’t been as part of any discussion about them, just him holding forth on his supposed views.

He’d also said that he didn’t believe in having pets, despite taking Jacqui to get a cat. And indeed, having another cat with the woman he was patriarchy-conformingly married to.

Jacqui says that she shared his view on marriage, but then reconsiders and speaks movingly of her journey and her shifts in perspective:

‘Nor did I, really, though – well, I don’t know. Perhaps I did. Perhaps I did want that security, perhaps I did really, but obviously I wanted to please him. I was pregnant with his child and therefore, yes.

You have to remember a completely different person sits here… I absolutely see things completely different. Because for a while, I would have preferred to have believed his version than Belinda’s. And I have done a complete 180 on that…

I did think “he must have loved me, there must have been something there”. Almost like he was forced into this situation that he found himself in… I was proper angry with him. Like I proper wanted to tie him to something and torture him until he told me the truth.

But that is so negative. All it does is sort of like poisons me. So I don’t feel anything like that any more. But I am really angry about this whole situation, the whole situation. Especially when an innocent child was involved.’

Although she wasn’t seeking marriage, she did want TBS to have his father’s supposed surname ‘Robinson’. She squirms as she says this. She thought she would be with them both long-term as a family.

We are shown Lambert’s 2013 statement to Operation Herne about Jacqui [MPS-0722588]. He claims he told Jacqui on learning of her pregnancy that, while he would provide support, he would not ‘be with her in any sense as a partner’.

‘News to me,’ says Jacqui, who then detailed how Lambert came with her to all her antenatal appointments.

She also recounted how he’d lovingly reassured her that he’d told CTS he wasn’t single any more because he’d made his choice, he’d been clear that he was with Jacqui and she was pregnant with his child. He acted in every way like he was a committed partner ready to be a father.

BIRTH

Just before Jacqui’s due date, Lambert suddenly announced that he had to go away to Cumbria where his father was supposedly in care. She believed him, but didn’t understand why – given that he said his dad didn’t recognise him anymore, what could be so urgent?

Also, not having given birth before, she didn’t realise how intense an experience it was and thought she’d breeze through it, so didn’t mind him leaving.

Jacqui says she got back in contact with her parents once she was pregnant with TBS, and her mum was excited at the prospect of being a grandmother. When Lambert decided to go away suddenly, he called Jacqui’s mum to come down in case she went into labour. Jacqui remembers that her parents were unimpressed about him going off like this.

Lambert had told Jacqui that he would be back on the Sunday night, so her mum left during the daytime on Sunday. She could see Jacqui wasn’t alright and wanted to stay, but Jacqui’s father pressurised her to go. Jacqui went into labour when she was alone.

She wasn’t too worried; she had her friend Sylvia nearby, who hadn’t had children but did have lots of experience of helping cats give birth to kittens, so thought she’d know what to do!

‘I have never known pain like it. I thought I was dying. Everyone told me it would be bad period pain. It’s not. I thought I was dying. I thought why didn’t anyone tell me the truth?’

She got to Sylvia’s house and the two of them went to hospital in an ambulance. Sylvia ensured there was a message left at Jacqui’s for Lambert. Somewhere in her fourteen and a half hour labour, Lambert arrived at the hospital.

He held Jacqui’s hand and was supportive through the difficult birth. He cut the umbilical cord himself:

‘He was there for it all. When you go to have a baby, you leave your dignity on the doorstep and you pick it up on the way out, don’t you? You don’t expect a man there sharing that really important part of womanhood, especially your first, and there is all that yuck all over the place.’

Jacqui lost so much blood that she was given a transfusion.

She gave birth at lunchtime on the Monday. Her parents visited that evening. Lambert stayed throughout:

‘I thought he had a child that had gone to Australia and that he thought this was his next chance at fatherhood and he was absolutely [there], yes. Shaking the hands of the obstetricians afterwards and all that, afterwards, they were saying to him “well done”.’

The Inquiry have a photo her mum took of Lambert holding TBS. Jacqui asks them not to show it. She gave it to the Guardian to use and is upset that it has since then been reused in so many media articles. In the photo, Lambert is holding TBS and looking very happy:

‘I was obviously trying to get some sleep and all the rest of it. And, you know, all the time I was like that, he was holding TBS, alright. And bonding with TBS. Because I was like out of it. He was bonding with TBS. Cuddling him. Swaddling him, doing all the things that you do.’

Later on, Lambert told her he told her he was going off to meet some London Greenpeace friends to ‘wet the baby’s head’ with a few pints, then feed their cats, and would come back the next day. He was every inch the devoted new father.

NAMING THE FATHER

It was important to Jacqui that TBS’s birth certificate listed the names of both parents – she didn’t want the father part being left blank. At first Lambert acted like this was not a problem, but when the registrar came round, he disappeared.

She found out that, as they weren’t married, she couldn’t put his name down without him being present.

They had 42 days to get TBS registered, so she tried to arrange this. Lambert agreed to meet at the registry. It was quite a mission for Jacqui:

‘I had to get ready, get baby ready, get on the bus, get all the stuff. Make sure I have the bag with the nappy change and everything in it, and all the rest of it. And I was breast feeding and in those days you didn’t just get it out anywhere’

She waited outside the office for over an hour in the cold. Lambert didn’t show up.

She was furious. Lambert gave an excuse – she can’t remember but thinks it was something about rescuing some animals so she’d empathise – and they set a new date. He did it again.

Jacqui was livid. She pushed for them to go together in his van but he made excuses.

On the 42nd day’s deadline, she went and registered TBS by herself. The people at the office told her not to worry – it could be changed later if she came back with the father:

‘And then that is when he sort of made me feel like I was the one making a big fuss over a piece of paper. He didn’t agree with all that, people registered and things like that. That wasn’t the way he lived.’

He pointed out that, as the registrar had said, he could go back any time and sort it out. But he never did.

She says he was a good father to TBS, before he left. He was hands-on and confident with the baby, readily changing nappies. She now knows it was because he already had children with his wife.

He brought thoughtful gifts, and got someone from London Greenpeace to do an extensive astrological chart for the boy.

When she became a mother, her life completely changed. She wanted the best for her baby son. She decided that, though she couldn’t have weekends free or risk arrest, she could contribute to the animal rights movement in other ways. From mid-1985 to around 1987 she helped the Animal Liberation Front Supporters Group (ALFSG).

She understood it to be raising money for rehoming liberated animals, supporting prisoners, and for direct action. On that last point Jacqui is clear she doesn’t mean hurting people but, in line with the Animal Liberation Front principles, of committing criminal damage as economic sabotage:

‘Get them where it hurts, in their pockets! They love money so much they would stoop to that level, let them! Let them pay for it!’

She’s unsure whether the work the ALFSG did was legal or illegal.

MOVE TO DAGENHAM

In the spring of 1986, when their son was about six months old, Lambert took Jacqui and her possessions to move into her nan’s house in Dagenham. Her nan had moved out, Jacqui would claim housing benefit and pay it to her dad, but not have to pay any rent of her own.

The plan was that the young family would live there together. Lambert was supposedly a poor cash-in-hand gardener. The arrangement seemed ideal.

She says the house was quite basic and unmodernised, but far better than where she’d been living. It had a garden and seemed a much more secure place to bring up their son.

Lambert gave Jacqui frequent payments. There was no set amount, there would occasionally be more if she had a particular bill to pay.

Lambert says these payments were made by cheque but Jacqui scoffs at the very notion of it:

‘He didn’t even believe in birth certificates! How about chequebooks? Chequebooks? …

It doesn’t fit in, does it, with the anarchists. But anyway, no. Absolutely I would have fallen over in shock if he had said, I have a cheque, with a bank. Because he was so against all that.’

She is certain that he gave her regular payments in cash. It’s notable that the Special
Demonstration Squad expenses were paid out to officers in cash, and this may be the source of the money.

She thought he was a loving, present and committed father. She trusted him to take TBS out to animal sanctuaries and other places. She trusted Lambert not to take him anywhere risky, and that the people at animal sanctuaries were compassionate and loving.

There are photos showing TBS with Lambert and other activists at Hopefield Animal Sanctuary. Jacqui describes one Lambert had taken for her of TBS on a Shetland pony.

Jacqui went away to Italy for a week with a friend, and left TBS with Lambert. She is still mystified about how this worked – he had a child for a week, he surely must have stayed away from work and his family the whole time, presumably being paid overtime.

She was increasingly bothered by his apparent immaturity and deliberately living in poverty, something she’d had no choice about growing up in:

‘I thought he needed to get a proper job. You know, I thought, God, you’re like 30 – how long is this going to go on for, you living like this? And things that I found romantic and this like Van Morrison thing, I found irritating.’

As their relationship they deteriorated, they argued more. Lambert would tend to walk away and Jacqui would feel very guilty, as it seemed like she was letting her son down by pushing his father away.

Jacqui would get annoyed by Lambert’s apparent aimlessness. They would argue and he would leave. She would go back to him, and the cycle would then repeat.

ENDING

She ended their relationship at the start of 1987, or possibly earlier:

‘It didn’t suddenly stop. There was no big row or anything like that. It was like a damp squib really.’

She was keenly aware of the difficulties and stigma faced by single mothers – they were a favourite tabloid bogeyman at the time, relentlessly portrayed as a feckless drain on society – and this is why she didn’t end it sooner.

Jacqui says Lambert seemed very distraught by it ending and yet also resigned to it. He said ‘it had happened again’, a reference to his story about having another ex-partner and child living in Australia.

Jacqui was very clear that she wanted him to stay in his child’s life, and that he was always welcome to be in contact, whatever else happened in future.

Lambert would pick TBS up from nursery or Jacqui’s parents and take care of him.

Lambert and Jacqui still had a sexual relationship after this split. He would offer to babysit TBS while she went out with friends:

‘And then, obviously, I had had a drink, there was one double bed. I would get in the bed and, well, you can make up your own – it just sort of happened. And I might regret it the next day, but that’s how it happened.’

Other times, Lambert would offer to bring round a takeaway and she understood this to mean that he would turn up with an Indian meal and a bottle of wine, then stay overnight.

LAMBERT AND BELINDA

Lambert met Belinda Harvey in April 1987 and they soon began a sexual relationship.

Jacqui assumed that he was seeing other people by this time:

‘I sort of guessed. I was as well.’

However, she didn’t know of Belinda’s existence until the truth all came out in 2012. She says she wouldn’t have been jealous of Belinda at all:

‘I wouldn’t have been angry that my son’s father was seeing another woman. I have had other children since and I have split up, and those men have gone on to make new relationships and I have always been happy – I have always tried to love my children more than I hate whatever it is with their dad.’

Beyond her personal feeling, she wouldn’t have had any jealousy about Belinda spending time with TBS, either:

‘I would have been more relieved with that than that he was with some of the activists!’

Belinda gave evidence to the Inquiry in November 2024, the same week as Jacqui.

DEBENHAMS

We move on to the subject of the Debenhams attacks. In July 1987, an Animal Liberation Front cell that Lambert was infiltrating planted three timed incendiary devices in Debenhams department stores in protest at their sale of fur. They were designed to go off late at night and cause just enough smoke to set off the sprinkler systems, and ruin stock with the water damage.

At one store, in Luton, the sprinkler system wasn’t working so the fire took hold and caused extensive damage.

Before we even start discussing it, Jacqui is weary of the topic:

‘Bloody Debenhams. Debenhams is used as an excuse for all this. Never has so much been discussed and money spent on so much to do with something that nobody was hurt.’

By this time, Lambert and Jacqui were no longer a couple but they were still co-parenting their son:

‘Looking back now I think Bob was keeping me out the way. For obvious reasons. Because things that I know about, that – he doesn’t seem to have reported on me. I mean there is no reports on me after TBS is born.’

This is true even when she was with him at events he reported on, such as a picket in the Wapping printers’ dispute. She assumes this is because if she was arrested and imprisoned like other activists there wouldn’t have been anyone to look after their son.

He occasionally brought activists to the house, mostly when she was out at work. He had always had a key.

She knew some of them – she saw Geoff Sheppard and Paul Gravett there, who are confirmed as being part of the cell. She remembers that Lambert really liked Sheppard and spent a lot of time with him, but she found this ‘bromance’ puzzling.

She thought that Sheppard and Gravett both looked up to Lambert, who appeared to ‘be the brains’ of the group.

SHE KNEW THE PLAN

Jacqui knew that Debenhams had been given a warning not to sell furs, and she knew that the plan was to set incendiary devices in the shops to set the sprinkler systems off.

Asked who she heard it from, she goes uncharacteristically quiet, and says she helped the ALF Supporters Group, and also heard things from activists back in Hackney via Lambert who was still living among the activists.

Though Jacqui approved of the Debenhams campaign, she wasn’t happy about the cell having meetings in her house. She was worried, partly because of the prison sentences being given to animal rights activists and partly because she didn’t want her son to be anywhere near where devices were being manufactured:

‘I didn’t want TBS around them, because he was a toddler, yes, and he was coming up to two. And I didn’t want him around where things like that were being made. Because he’s a toddler. He could just grab something, right. They can just grab a hot cup of tea and that is it, they are scalded for the rest of their life.

So although I was supportive, I didn’t want TBS around it. And I didn’t want Bob, the risk of Bob, and he assured me that he wouldn’t be. Although Bob was helping with the organisation and things like that, he wouldn’t do it and he says he didn’t do it.’

So if she was insisting on such assurances from Lambert, it means she knew that he was involved in making these devices?

‘I must have done.’

SUPPORTING THE ACTION

Jacqui makes it clear that she is ‘proper anti-violence’ and would never have been supportive of any action that would harm anyone. She supported the action against Debenhams because it was an attempt to stop them selling fur coats. And it worked!

Lambert told her he was significantly involved in organising the campaign but assured her that he wasn’t ‘stupid enough to get nicked’. She presumed that he would just be driving, and points out that she wasn’t aware at the time that he would still be guilty of conspiracy.

Pushed on this point by Monahan, Jacqui pushes back because Lambert has subsequently told his account to her and may have altered her memory:

‘I can’t force a memory because I now have all my “2012 memories” where obviously I have had this discussion.’

Asked why she never tried to talk Lambert out of it, Jacqui bluntly says she supported the action. Responding to whether she was impressed by Lambert, she considers her later career and elaborates:

‘I admire all the animal rights people that have done prison sentences for what they did. Because the prison sentence is completely disproportionate to the sort of sentences that I was dealing with when I was doing child protection and child abusers. Completely disproportionate. So I am impressed with them and I would try to do my best to send money to supporters’ funds and everything like that’

Asked who was in the cell, she confirms the names Lambert told her – Sheppard, Gravett, Andrew Clarke and Helen Steel, who Lambert frequently reported as being involved in things she had nothing to do with. She says she saw all of them meeting at her house except Steel.

She’s said that people didn’t usually talk about their involvement in ALF actions:

‘But I was the mother of his child and I thought I was trusted.’

She knew the three stores that would be targeted, but says she only heard about the fourth one more recently (Paul Gravett told the Inquiry that he was assigned to Debenhams in Reading but, due to train delays, had been unable to get there before closing time so dumped his devices in a canal).

On the day of the attacks, Jacqui remembers that Sylvia Martin rang and told her to turn on her ‘wireless’, saying ‘it’s happened’. This implies Sylvia knew about it in advance too.

One of the stores was Jacqui’s local Debenhams, in Romford, only ten minutes away from her house. She raises the possibility that perhaps that’s why it was chosen, because it was convenient for Lambert to evaluate.

As soon as she learned that the Luton store had been seriously damaged because the sprinklers weren’t working and the fire had spread, she feared there might be serious repercussions for the activists.

She says she was ‘frantic’ and ‘desperate’ to get hold of Lambert, but couldn’t. He eventually arrived at Jacqui’s:

‘It was weird. He was sort of cool really. He wasn’t like flustered. He was sort of confident.’

Asked what Lambert specifically said to her, Jacqui responds haltingly:

‘That he, that, that – that it wasn’t him.

He just assured me that I had nothing to worry about. Nothing was going to come back to me or TBS. We weren’t in the thick of it where the police might start knocking down doors and things like that… he said it in such a way that I just assumed it was the truth.’

AFTERMATH – PREPARING TO LEAVE

Jacqui says Lambert wasn’t the same man after Debenhams. It seems he moved into the phase near the end of a spycops’ deployment where they feign a breakdown as a prelude to having a plausible reason to move away forever:

‘He was having a breakdown and I weren’t noticing it, that’s how I would have said it now. Obviously he had to make me more aware to get my attention.’

He was always telling her that he was troubled, and he’d never do anything to put her or TBS at risk. He’d suddenly look off into the distance, and when asked what was wrong, he’d talk in a very slow and stuttery way, saying his head was all over the place.

He told her about doors being kicked down in police raids. But never his own, she didn’t even know about his Graham Road address that was raided.

He still came round two or three times a week to take care of TBS. However, there was a period when he didn’t show up for a couple of weeks. She remembers her mother – usually a meek person – having a go at him for this, saying it was a very long time in the life of a toddler. But TBS was very pleased to see his dad and ran over for a cuddle.

She notes that TBS wasn’t talking yet, and that will have made things easier for Lambert:

‘I expect now in hindsight it was getting to the stage where that was going to change. TBS would like start telling me he had been to Belinda’s, or he had been there. He would start telling me things he [Lambert] didn’t want me to know.’

The Inquiry Chair, Sir John Mitting, asks Jacqui to be specific about how she knew Lambert was involved in the incendiary device campaign:

‘Because he told me.’

Mitting wants her to explain how she can be so certain:

‘That is what we would talk about, when we finished talking about TBS or whatever else was going on. I still saw it as his – obviously I didn’t know he was a police officer – but I used to see it as that was sort of his job.

It was the reason why everything that had happened in our relationship, including not being there to register our son’s birth, was because he was so committed to activism, namely anarchism and animal rights.

So therefore, it would have been – I mean, to me he seemed to have given up me and almost his son for it. So I just knew that was something he was passionate about. So I would ask him about it. Like partners ask each other about hobbies or whatever, and I was interested to know. And he knew that.’

Speaking about Lambert’s role, Jacqui once again stumbles to say it to the end:

‘He did lead me to believe that he was not – not – because he named who was. He was not – that it was going to be three shops.’

Mitting draws her back and asks her to say it in full, which she does:

‘He was not going to be the person planting the devices…

And I, you know, it’s irrelevant, but I still sort of, I still believe that. But then obviously I could have been gaslit.’

Monahan picks up this point, asking Jacqui about her discussions with Lambert since finding out the truth in 2012:

‘I can only say what he told me. And you know, we are talking about a professional liar.

Since 2012, he has promised me over and over again, and in the presence of his wife, with both of us interrogating him, right… But he’s said he’s been truthful. And that’s it. But I do know he’s a very skilful liar. Obviously, I am not that stupid…

I am no good judge of character, look what has happened to me… But things that he said and the way he said it, I believe him.’

She says Lambert has not rowed back on admitting his organisational involvement in the Debenhams attacks.

But if he didn’t plant the Harrow device, who did? There would have to be another mystery member of the cell that nobody has mentioned at all.

AFTER THE ARRESTS, ABANDONMENT

Geoff Sheppard and Andrew Clarke were arrested for the Debenhams attacks on 9 September 1987.

Jacqui recalls that, in mid-October, Lambert had taken TBS out and said he wanted to talk to Jacqui when he got back. He told her he was leaving because people were being arrested for the Debenhams campaign and it was only a matter of time before they came for him. She said that he shouldn’t worry because he hadn’t planted the devices, but he said ‘the police will fit you up’.

Lambert told Jacqui that he had lots of anarchist contacts in Spain. She got the impression it was Barcelona, though a letter later arrived from Valencia. He told her he was going on the run immediately:

‘My mindset was everyone was making a big fuss over nothing. Right. It wasn’t their fault that the store burnt down. Their sprinkler system should have been working…

I never thought for one second he would cut himself off from TBS. I never, ever thought. If he distanced himself from me a bit, it almost like at that point was sort of oh, that’s good, I wouldn’t have him bothering me. I honestly thought that he would, because that’s what he told me, he would lay low for a little while and then he would appear.’

She says this would only be an extension of what was already happening:

‘I could never get in contact with him anyway. He was always missing. He was always missing, by that time. Because he was a busy boy, wasn’t he? He had all these others. He had Belinda.’

When he last saw Jacqui, he left her a contact address:

‘He gave me an address where, if there was an emergency – and I expect he meant an emergency with TBS – that someone from there would be able to contact him and obviously if it was like a life and death emergency, I assume he would appear. But I always thought he was going to appear anyway. But, yes, he gave me this address.’

It was the Seaton Point flat, where he lived with Belinda Harvey for several more months.

Lambert’s witness statement to the Inquiry says:

‘The payment, ie the regular contributions, continued until about October 1987. In October 1987 I received a letter from ‘Jacqui’ in which she told me that she was getting married and that she and her husband-to-be wanted to bring up the child as their own. I was asked if I would consent to her husband adopting the child and I agreed. It was after this that I stopped making the monthly payment with ‘Jacqui’s’ agreement.’

Jacqui says it’s total nonsense. She didn’t even meet her future husband until February 1988.

She also describes how the adoption took a lot of time and effort because the biological father had not given permission and a huge investigation took place to try to find him.

Mitting interjects to assure her that there’s no dispute over who’s telling the truth here:

‘Plainly you know the details of your own life. Of course you do.’

IMPACT

It was devastating for her and TBS. She tried hard to find ‘Bob Robinson’ over the years. Some while later, after her husband died and TBS lost a second father figure, the boy developed a deep yearning to find his biological father.

The law firm she worked for used ex-cop private detectives in personal injury claims, and she got one of them to look for ‘Robinson’, believed to be among Barcelona anarchists.

The detective told her there was a European arrest warrant out for ‘Robinson’ which made it impossible to track him down.

Monahan pushes on this point, confirming Jacqui’s certainty, as it seems to be the first anyone’s heard of such a thing and it would have meant the police misleading the warrant’s authorities about the identity of ‘Robinson’. Perhaps they did that, or perhaps it’s just something Special Branch told the detective to keep him from looking further.

DISCOVERY

Helen Steel was one of those who’d exposed Lambert in October 2011. She tried to find Jacqui to tell her, but found no leads. Shortly after his exposure, Lambert made a public apology to London Greenpeace and a woman he had a relationship with, but not to Jacqui. He did not contact her himself.

By 2012, Jacqui had long since graduated from law school and was teaching. She was approaching her 50th birthday, her kids were more or less grown up, she saw some peace coming. Then everything was shattered again:

‘14 June 2012 at about 4 o’clock when I got home from work. As it was June, it was nice, and I saw his picture in the paper and that was him. And that’s the first I heard.

Nobody from the police had contacted me to say this was out there and this was going to happen, and everything. No one let me down gently.’

She was on her own. She rang her parents who got the same newspaper. They dug out their photos of TBS and found the ones with TBS and Lambert, and confirmed it was him.

The newspaper article had been prompted by Caroline Lucas MP naming Lambert as being behind the burning of Harrow Debenhams.

Jacqui tried to phone Lucas at the Houses of Parliament.

She googled Lambert and saw he was a lecturer at London Metropolitan and St Andrews universities. She watched videos of his recent talks on Islamophobia. It was undeniably her man.

Jacqui didn’t sleep the night she found out.

The next morning, she rang the University of St Andrews and spoke to Lambert’s office. Ten minutes later he rang her back. ‘How’s it going?’ was his opening gambit.

Asked how finding out the truth about Lambert affected her, Jacqui describes:

‘A big boot coming down from heaven and just destroying everything. Because I had been through the trauma of being widowed so young.’

Though she knows rationally she did nothing wrong, emotionally she feels like she’s failed her kids by choosing fathers who didn’t stay around.

WHY DIDN’T THEY ADMIT IT?

Jacqui is furious with the Met for trying to have TBS’s claim against them struck out, adding further distress at huge public expense to try to deny what everyone knew was true. The physical similarity of TBS and Lambert was so plain to see in court:

‘All the times we have been dragged through courts because the Metropolitan Police had tried to get it struck out, and even though my son was on Legal Aid, because he was a student, the Metropolitan Police brought the big guns in, the KCs to try to say we were talking rubbish.

To get it struck out twice before the High Court and then they appealed. So we were dragged along. But all the lawyers in the court could see, looking at him, people were going “Bloody hell, don’t they – they do, they really, really look alike”.’

At this point the hearing was reminded that the building was about to close. Mitting says that Jacqui had already written eloquently about the impact of finding out the truth in her witness statement, so needn’t continue.

But Jacqui isn’t finished. She wants to know how long she was spied on after Lambert disappeared from her life. She said Lambert knew things from after his deployment ended. He knew her married name, and that her husband had died, which didn’t happen until 1993. It seems he hasn’t told Jacqui how he knew these things.

She saw this in emails he’d sent to Guardian journalists who were covering the spycops scandal. Lambert’s son had died six months earlier of a genetic condition and he was asking the journalists to help trace TBS to warn him to get tested for the condition.

It’s worth mentioning that Lambert could have hired a private detective who would do a better job than newspaper reporters, and that he’d had six months to do so.

WHY DIDN’T THEY EVEN TELL HER?

Jacqui launches into an electrifying impassioned plea for truth:

‘But no one bothered to come and find me. This was out for months and months and months and nobody – it really wasn’t the journalist’s job to do that. At no time. It was the Metropolitan Police’s job to do that and not to let me find out and to let TBS find out that way as well. It wasn’t just me…

Everything about my life has just been absolutely ruined. I will never get over it. I don’t really have a life any more…

I want to know who knew at the Metropolitan Police, and who was organising this. Now I have asked Bob and he always says nothing – everything he did was authorised. And all he will say, he won’t obviously give me names because he’s signed the Official Secrets Act or whatever. He said it went to the highest level. And I can work out for myself what that, but, he knew. He just knew.

He was spying on me. He must have. Because how does he know these things? He may not have been doing it himself, but someone was in the Metropolitan Police. So why couldn’t someone have contacted me when this all started to hit the press in 2011 and allow me to find out the way I did? That’s my question.’

Sir John Mitting points out a representative of the Metropolitan Police is in the room. He tells her to answer Jacqui’s question. The lawyer says it will take some time.

This wasn’t enough to placate Jacqui:

‘Why didn’t they bring it out in the high court then? Why did they try to strike it off? Why didn’t your KC -’

But Mitting interrupts her, saying ‘we can’t conduct an exchange of this kind’. He assures Jacqui that he knows the Met lawyer is a person of integrity and that answers will be forthcoming.

He thanks Jacqui for her long day of evidence and the hearing is over.

---

Lambert’s undercover deployment was regarded very highly by the Metropolitan Police. After it ended, he was promoted to running the SDS. One of the officers he deployed, HN43 Peter Francis, said Lambert ‘did what is hands down regarded as the best tour of duty ever’.

Lambert received a commendation, and an MBE for ‘services to policing’. He then went on to hold academic positions at two universities. After the truth about his role as a spycop was revealed, he resigned both posts in 2015.

Animal rights activist Paul Gravett returned for a second appearance at the Inquiry. He previously appeared on 13 November 2024, but was only asked to give evidence about HN10 Bob Lambert’s infiltration of London Greenpeace and involvement in an incendiary device campaign that aimed to dissuade Debenhams department stores from selling fur.

Gravett was also reported on by a number of other Special Demonstration Squad officers, including HN5 John Dines ‘John Barker’, HN2 Andy Coles ‘Andy Davey’, and HN1 ‘Matt Rayner’ who stole the identity of Kaden Blake’s brother, Matthew Rayner, to create his undercover persona.

The real name of HN1 is not being disclosed to any of his victims, not even the woman he deceived into a sexual relationship during his deployment. This is despite the Inquiry’s earlier promises that these women would always be given the real name of the spycops who abused their rights in this way.

Although Gravett provided a witness statement and over 40 exhibits to the Inquiry last year, but despite the Inquiry’s policies and assurances, at the tmie of writng these still have not been published. However, you can read the transcript of this second hearing.

He was questioned by John Warrington, Deputy First Junior Counsel to the Inquiry.

RECAP

This was the Monday of the ninth week of ‘Tranche 2 Phase 2’, the new round of hearings of the Undercover Policing Inquiry (UCPI). This Phase mainly concentrates on examining the animal rights-focused activities of the Metropolitan Police’s secret political unit, the Special Demonstration Squad, from 1983-92.

The UCPI is an independent, judge-led inquiry into undercover policing in England and Wales. Its main focus is the activity of two units who deployed long-term undercover officers into a variety of political groups; the Special Demonstration Squad (SDS, 1968-2008) and the National Public Order Intelligence Unit (NPOIU, 1999-2011). Spycops from these units lived as activists for years at a time, spying on more than 1,000 groups.

Click here for the day’s page on the Inquiry website which should have video, transcripts and written evidence.

ISLINGTON ANIMAL RIGHTS

Gravett was involved in the Islington Animal Rights group, later known as the Hackney and Islington Animal Rights campaign (HIARC), from its formation in 1982 until its disbanding in 1993.

HN5 John Dines described Gravett and Denise Bennett as two of the ‘leading members’ of the group in a 1990 report, a description which Gravett accepts. He says he got more involved in things like producing the group’s newsletter towards the end of the 1980s.

All of HIARC’s activities were lawful. They did a lot of leafleting locally, and attended animal rights demos together. They held monthly public meetings, and also planning meetings (sometimes at the same venue, sometimes at people’s homes). Gravett recalls that most of the group had jobs. He and other members took part in various kinds of direct action, but as individuals, not as HIARC.

The Inquiry heard about some of the demos the group organised. HN10 Bob Lambert had reported that the group organised an entirely peaceful demo outside a central London hotel in September 1986 following reports of mistreatment of a cat. In his report, Lambert said that although most of those who attended were supporters of Animal Aid, ‘a handful of ALF activists were also in attendance’.

In this first report, Lambert claimed that they discussed committing criminal damage at the hotel. Gravett says he does not remember this.

In another report, detailing a HIARC meeting held shortly after this demo, Lambert claimed that Bennett asked everyone else to write letters of complaint and phone the hotel to jam its switchboard. Gravett remembers that they often wrote letters of complaint, but doesn’t recall anything about jamming the switchboard.

He points out that Lambert lied a lot in his reports, and did in fact invite people like Bennett to go out fly-posting with him.

A third Lambert report, dated 1988, lists five pickets planned by the group over the following month. Gravett points out that none of these resulted in arrests.

By 1988, the group was demonstrating at a variety of places, including fur shops, fried chicken outlets and butchers’ shops. The only trouble that ever occurred was when the activists were attacked – for example a woman was head-butted by one of the butchers.

Gravett has a clear memory of another incident, which took place at the same location in May 1988:

‘someone trying to chuck a bucket of blood over you is not something you really forget, even 30 or 40 years later’

HN5 John Dines wrote in his reports about protestors from HIARC repeatedly being on the ‘receiving end of physical attack’ from members of staff at Maldor Furs in Hackney. Gravett remembers that the police were generally very unsympathetic when animal rights activists reported such attacks, and didn’t usually take action against those responsible.

In his reports, Lambert seems to have been keen to highlight any disagreements within groups. He claimed that Gravett was often ‘out on a limb’ because of his ‘uncompromising stance on direct action’, and that one couple of ‘former ALF activists’, disillusioned with the type of actions being taken against the fur trade, resigned from HIARC in early 1988 as a result.

Gravett is clear that there were a ‘variety of opinions’ within HIARC, but says they tended to try to work together on the local issues they could agree on. He says the two individuals named in Lambert’s reports were only part of the group for a short time, and moved on to a different group.

He denies that there was a push to make the group more supportive of, or involved in, direct action at this time. He does remember the group discussing (and agreeing to support) animal rights prisoners. One such prisoner was Geoff Sheppard, a good friend of Gravett’s who was imprisoned thanks to a wrongful conviction secured by Lambert.

Gravett explained that local laboratory Biorex, infamous for carrying out animal experimentation, closed down in 1989. It had been a focus for the group’s campaigning efforts, and after it closed ‘the group started to lose its direction a bit’.

LONDON BOOTS ACTION GROUP

In 1991, HN5 John Dines reported that Gravett was planning to set up a new grass-roots campaigning group, with a focus: London Boots Action Group (LBAG). HN2 Andy Coles attended the inaugural meeting that November. HN1 ‘Matt Rayner’ was also involved from the outset.

Gravett explains that this group used ‘civil disobedience’ tactics with the aim of persuading the public not to buy from Boots and therefore reducing the company’s profits.

They held pickets outside the Camden Town branch of Boots every single Sunday, and at other branches mosrt Saturdays, handing out leaflets. These were usually entirely peaceful demos. Arrests were uncommon, but sometimes happened for things like obstruction of the highway.

Those who were part of LBAG sometimes went to other animal rights demos together – the Inquiry was given the example of a demo against live exports at Dover in 1992.

LBAG’s July-August 1992 newsletter was attached to a report by Rayner. On the front page are photographs of six named Boots directors. Gravett cheerfully admits ‘that’s my work’, and points out that these details were publicly available.

John Warrington, the Inquiry’s barrister, asked why these men’s details were included in the group’s newsletter. Gravett explained that these were the men responsible for running Boots, and therefore for the way animals were being abused. He says it was:

‘important to know who is responsible for the company’s actions. There are people behind it. It’s not a faceless, vast faceless corporation. There are real people there. But also you have to put it in context that this was to publicise a picket of the Boots Annual General Meeting.’

Warrington asks if publishing these individual senior directors’ details was done in order to enable people to take personal action against them. Gravett rejects this suggestion and says if LBAG had intended to ‘take it to that level’ they would have found out and published their addresses as well, but never did.

Rayner claimed that the Boots AGM would be ‘a golden opportunity for animal liberationists to express their anger and revulsion’. His next report said that 100 protestors turned up on the day.

They were described as spending two hours hurling abuse outside the meeting. One activist, Brendan McNally, as a Boots shareholder, was able to get inside to ask the company awkward questions.

In 1994, Rayner reported that McNally had now acquired 50 shares in Boots and distributed them so that around 20 activists were able to get inside the AGM that year and disrupt it with a ‘continuous barrage of questions’, despite Boots’ efforts to prevent this.

However, there seems to be no SDS report of the 1993 Boots AGM, even though there was more disruption at this one than at the other two in the years either side of it. Gravett remembers that AGM well, and recalls that ‘tensions were running high’.

Boots had just been forced to withdraw a new drug, Manoplax, due to its side-effects including ‘a significantly increased risk of death’, proving the unreliability of animal testing when it came to safety. The company was having financial difficulties as a result. It wasn’t just the animal rights shareholders who were unhappy with the company and heckling at the meeting.

Gravett remembers that 12-15 LBAG activists were ejected from the meeting, including him. The AGM received a lot of press coverage, and it’s strange that there is no Special Demonstration Squad report of the event. Weren’t ‘Andy Davey’ and ‘Matt Rayner’ there? Gravett says ‘it would be remarkable if they weren’t there’ – this annual demo was the main focus of LBAG.

Anti-Boots demos also took place outside of London. The Inquiry was told about a march and rally in Nottingham which included a visit to the company’s laboratories, where some campaigners reported climbed up to the roof and got inside through a first floor window. Gravett says this wasn’t something that happened at LBAG’s demos in London and was ‘very rare’.

In May 1993, Rayner reported that LBAG were planning a demo at the home of one the Boots directors. Gravett disputes this. ‘Home visits’ were a perfectly lawful style of demonstration in those days, but he says LBAG did not adopt this tactic till much later, when it was part of ‘London Animal Action’ (LAA).

Gravett reminded the Inquiry that ‘Matt Rayner’ did take part in a ‘home visit’ to a director of Selfridges, and Bob Lambert is also known to have attended such demos.

Gravett explained LBAG’s ethos and aims, and what were considered appropriate tactics for the group to discuss and use. The group held lawful demonstrations against Boots, and their policy was to only discuss lawful or ‘low-level unlawful’ activities at LBAG meetings which were after all open to the public, and often included new people.

If any individuals wanted to take other forms of direct action, the expectation was that they would only discuss these with people they knew and trusted, outside of the group’s meetings.

Gravett goes on to explain that LBAG’s ethos was to support ‘ALF-style direct action’ but not carry it out. He explains that this ‘support’ might take the form of carrying reports of ALF actions in the newsletter, putting ALF Supporters Group leaflets on a stall or inviting people like Robin Webb, the ALF press officer, to speak at meetings.

LONDON ANIMAL RIGHTS COALITION

Another new group, the London Animal Rights Coalition (LARC), held at least three meetings in 1994. A police report says 75-100 people attended its inaugural meeting on 13 February of that year.

Robin Lane, ‘EAB’, ‘Andy Davey’ and others are described in reports as ‘organisers’ of LARC. Gravett confirms that ‘Andy Davey’ – now known to be spycop HN2 Andy Coles – was indeed one of the founders of the group.

LARC met in May 1994, then again in August. According to the SDS reports of that month, there was lots of discussion (and some unresolved disagreement) within the animal rights movement about the future of LARC and LBAG. Some people, including Gravett, had suggested amalgamating them, rather than having two separate groups doing pretty much the same thing.

According to one of these reports, someone called ‘Andy’ was said to be responsible for producing both groups’ newsletters, and the proposal to merge the two. Although it described him as ‘SNU’, meaning ‘surname unknown’, the report later suggested that this was in fact ‘Andy Davey’.

LONDON ANIMAL ACTION

Following an LBAG planning meeting in September, Rayner reported that the group had decided to adopt a new name which more accurately reflected their activities and aims: ‘London Animal Action’ (LAA). This enabled them to incorporate the London Anti Fur Campaign (LAFC). The first LAA demo would be a picket of Noble Furs on 3 October.

Like LBAG, LAA held open, public meetings every month. Gravett helped find a venue for these meetings after the Endsleigh Street building was sold off. He also arranged for the group to use the same Caledonian Road office as London Greenpeace.

A year later, LAA was described in a police report as remaining ‘a motivated and coherent group’, with ‘30-50 regular activists’ (and 150 members ‘on paper’).

According to Rayner’s report, the group is well-equipped, and still has over £1000 in the bank thanks to subscriptions and donations at stalls. It goes on to describe LAA as a ‘potent and effective force’ in the national animal rights movement.

Boots sold off its pharmaceutical division to another company in 1995, which meant the end of its direct involvement in vivisection. Gravett attended the AGM that year, to check that this was actually the case. He confirms that on that day, he was approached personally by the Chairman of Boots, James Blyth, who was keen to make sure that this move would signal the end of the animal rights campaigning against the company.

Gravett was LAA’s treasurer. The group’s finances were described in a December 1994 police report as ‘remarkably healthy’. After making a donation to the ALF Supporters Group (ALF-SG) they still had £3000, £1000 of which would be ‘returned to LAFC’.Up to £1000 was to be used for printing and computer equipment (something that many grassroots groups didn’t have in those days).

It is clear that the Inquiry wishes to explore the issue of the ALF-SG’s funding. Gravett is adamant that by the 1990s, there was a very clear policy of keeping the ALF-SG and its funds completely separate from the ALF’s actions.

The donations given by LAA would have been used primarily to support prisoners, and also for the production of the ALF-SG newsletter and promotional materials.

Lots of different people were involved in LAA, and Gravett says that although the group never carried out ‘ALF style direct action’ itself, there was broad support for such activity.
LAA did organise ‘home visits’.

Gravett is then asked about another action, reportedly carried out by two ‘ALF activists’ who poured paint stripper on a car owned by a fur dealer in 1996. Supposedly they saw his address listed in an LAA newsletter. He is asked if LAA ‘appreciated’ that publishing such details meant there was a risk of such actions. Gravett responded by saying that this was someone who made a living out of the ‘torture and murder of millions of animals’.

TARGETING THE ANIMAL RIGHTS MOVEMENT

In his witness statement, Gravett lists the various animal rights groups that he was involved in, all of which were infiltrated by undercovers. He said:

‘I’m not surprised the State took an interest in the animal rights movement…

‘There were huge vested interests in animal exploitation, in its continuation, and we were a threat to that. I don’t mean a threat in terms of violence; I mean the ideas of animal liberation’

He stood for the idea that animals have inherent worth, and are not merely objects to be used, and pointed out that this species-ist ideology ‘underpins our society’.

Gravett says he was not prepared for the extent to which these groups were infiltrated, spied upon and reported on. He conceded:

‘Maybe I was a little bit naive’

The undercover officers that he knew personally all carried out unlawful actions.

‘These people lived with us and amongst us for years.’

Gravett was involved in organising and setting up many of these groups, and so feels guilty that he therefore played a part in enabling the spycops to make contact with genuine activists.

He is aware of the horrendous impact that both HN1 ‘Matt Rayner’ and HN2 Andy Coles had on such people as ‘Jessica’, Geoff Sheppard and Liz Fuller, and says this continues to ‘weigh heavily’ on him.

HN5 JOHN DINES & LONDON GREENPEACE

In the afternoon, the hearing learned more about HN5 John Dines, who stole the identity of John Barker, an eight year old child who died of leukaemia, as the basis of his undercover persona.

Like the other spycops Gravett encountered, Dines formed a sexual relationship with a woman while undercover.

Gravett thinks he first met Dines around 1987 when they were both active in London Greenpeace as well as animal rights and the wider anarchist scene.

In May 1991, Dines reported the details of London Greenpeace’s bank accounts. At the time, Gravett was responsible for the group’s finances – he recalls that Dines was also a signatory on one of these accounts.

Though it’s alarming to think of spycops taking on such a pivotal active position in a group, it had long been standard tradecraft to be treasurer. A few years later, in 1995, a Matt Rayner report (MPS-0741078) gives details of a London Animal Action account on which he and Gravett are signatories.

Gravett remembers that Dines was ‘one of the more active members’ of London Greenpeace. He attended their regular meetings, helped run stalls at events and even organised two benefit gigs for the group in November 1989.

The first-ever Anti-McDonalds Fayre took place in 1988, at Conway Hall. John Dines put his name down on the venue’s ‘contract hire form’ as a contact for the group. Gravett says this illustrates how quickly he had risen to a position of trust.

Gravett did most of the work to organise this first Fayre, but other people helped on the day.

Another exhibit is a list of key tasks, and the names of those responsible for them. Gravett points out that of these six people, two are spies (Dines and a private spy employed by McDonald’s); two are in relationships with spies; and only two (himself and one other activist) are not.

Dines dabbled in graphic design, and it’s possible that he helped produce publicity for the 1989 Fayre.

He produced a flyer for an anti-poll tax demo which took place at Scotland Yard in October 1990, but his most famous poster was the one he made after the 1990 poll tax riot, with the words ‘Disarm Authority – Arm Your Desires’.

How much influence did Dines have in the group? Gravett said Dines was definitely someone whose views would have been listened to:

‘I respected him.’

He recounts how Dines visited him at his home (when he still lived with his parents, and again later), and says they were quite close. Dines entered into a relationship with a friend of Gravett’s, Helen Steel, and socialised with activists.

‘I’d say he was a popular guy. People seemed to like him. He was level-headed, for an anarchist’

Dines often spoke in favour of direct action. He used his van to give people lifts to actions, like grouse shooting in Yorkshire, as well as helping people move house.

In 1989, Dines reported that a booklet called ‘Business as Usual’ was being put together by Gravett and others. This would be similar to the ‘Diary of Action’ that the ALF-SG had previously published, but listing all kinds of direct action rather than being limited to animal rights, and with more incitement than the ALF-SG ever included.

In his witness statement to the Inquiry, Dines has described it as a ‘crude’ and ‘pretty basic’ publication, and claimed his only contribution towards it was the supply of press cuttings relating to animal rights actions. He added that he felt his role was so ‘trivial’ that he didn’t bother telling his SDS managers about it.

This is another example of the now-familiar pattern – spycops who exaggerated things in their police reports because they thought nobody outside the Squad would ever see it, and then understate things in their statements to the Inquiry in order to try to wriggle out of being accountable as liars and agents provocateur.

At the time, the ALF-SG paid for a press cuttings service (which would regularly send press cuttings related to ALF-style actions all over the UK) and Gravett had access to these.

He remembers Dines asking him for this information, and says that as far as he knew, Dines was entirely responsible for the publication – there wasn’t anyone else involved in producing ‘Business As Usual’.

‘He’s underplaying it. As far as I remember, it was his brainchild’

There are other examples of Dines reporting on what Gravett and other activists were doing in those days. Gravett rejects the allegation that he was promoting the use of etching fluid on windows in 1989:

‘He was doing it to make stuff up, wasn’t he? He was just making things up to present people as more threatening or dangerous than they really were. In that case it was me. It could be someone else another time’.

We moved on to hear about the McLibel case, in which the burger corporation sued London Greenpeace for their leaflet ‘What’s Wrong With McDonald’s?’.

Spycop Bob Lambert had helped to write the leaflet, Dines had distributed it, yet neither was named in the writs.

Gravett was served with a writ, but eventually made the decision to back down and apologise to the corporation rather than trying to fight them legally.

Having done this, he was forced to take a deliberate step back from any overt involvement in the campaign, so he is certain that he was not involved in organising public demos in support of the ‘McLibel Two’ (Helen Steel and Dave Morris) in April 1991 – something Dines claimed in his reports.

He believes that it may well have been Dines who organised the demos. Certainly, we’ve seen that Lambert frequently organised things and then wrote police reports attributing his actions to other activists.

Gravett recalls that John Dines was a ‘trusted comrade’, present at many of the conversations and early court hearings. This explains why he was able to report on the legal advice they received and other developments in the case. He had deceived Helen Steel into a relationship and was soon living with her, giving him the closest possible insight into her thinking and strategy for the case.

Later in 1991, some animal rights activists had their homes raided by the police following allegations that there was a plan to contaminate bottles of Lucozade (which was made by pharmaceutical firm SmithKline Beecham in those days).

Gravett remembers that nobody was prosecuted for this. Charges were dropped and some people received compensation as a result. Was it a genuine plan or was it a hoax?

Gravett says he thinks there was ‘some sort of hoax involved’ and believes it’s possible that the whole story was invented by Dines.

Also in 1991, Geoff Sheppard was arrested at a demo outside the Horse and Hound Ball. He was accused of throwing a bag of flour at one of the ball’s attendees, and convicted for this. Gravett knew that he was innocent – the flour had actually been thrown by Dines.
He watched Dines give evidence in court as ‘John Barker’, stating in Sheppard’s defence that someone else had thrown the flour, but not admitting to doing it himself.

Gravett was asked why he and Sheppard didn’t tell the police or Crown Prosecution Service who had actually been responsible. He makes it very clear that neither of them would ever have grassed up a fellow activist.

Like other spycops, Dines included all kinds of sensitive information about people’s personal lives in his reports. One example provided by the Inquiry relates to the accidental death of an animal rights campaigner in 1991. His report lists the names of those who attended her cremation and funeral. This was someone Gravett knew well, and he condemns the reporting as ‘disgusting’.

Dines also reported on Gravett’s personal relationships. Asked how it feels to know that details of his private life had been reported, Gravett says it feels ‘a bit uncomfortable, and ‘a bit invasive’, but points out that

‘what’s happened to me is nothing compared to some of the other people targeted’.

As already mentioned, one of those people was his long-time friend and comrade, Helen Steel, who Dines deceived into a relationship.

Gravett remembers them living together as a couple, happy, affectionate and ‘at ease with each other’. He and his girlfriend went round for dinner at their place.

He also remembers Dines and Steel saying they were going to live in Yorkshire (maybe in late 1991) and going up there to visit them in 1992. However, John wasn’t there. He’d supposedly gone off somewhere, suffering from ‘mental health issues’.

Gravett says he was concerned to hear about this ‘breakdown’, and felt sorry for him. This was someone he liked, trusted and considered a friend.

Dines had presented himself as someone with radical politics, who wanted to change society and take direct action, who got very involved in organising campaigns, and then suddenly vanished.

HN2 ANDY COLES ‘ANDY DAVEY’

Gravett says that in LBAG’s early days he was responsible for running the group and producing its newsletter himself. However, by the summer of 1993, he had a part-time job and was planning to start a university course so decided it would be good to get more people involved. He remembers that Coles offered to help at this time.

He’s recently come across a copy of one of the issues produced by Coles (having lent his own set to a journalist who never returned them). He says it’s noticeable how different it is to the ones he’d made himself in the past. Though it looked a bit more ‘professional’, having been produced on Coles’ computer, Gravett described the content as ‘fairly dull’ and ‘pedestrian’, lacking the ‘buzz’ and ‘excitement’ of earlier issues.

‘If you want to put it in a musical analogy, my newsletter would be more Chumbawamba, his would be more Coldplay!’

In his statement to the Inquiry, Coles has claimed that he didn’t produce this newsletter, but just wrote a couple of articles for it. He says he tried to make them as ‘boring as possible’.

Gravett insists that after the last issue he put out (July-August 1993) Coles was responsible for producing at least four or five issues, and points out that they weren’t well-designed, using an illegibly small font size. But he doesn’t disagree about the content being ‘boring’!

Coles owned a personal computer, and kept it in his bedsit. Gravett recalls spending ‘most of a day’ there in 1994, computerising the LBAG membership list. He says he can’t remember whether Coles suggested doing this, or if he asked Coles to help do it. Either way, the entire list (with everyone’s joining dates as well as their contact info) made it into an SDS report that August.

Coles has also claimed to have been involved in London Animal Action, in producing its newsletter, helping with its membership list, and even organising its meetings. However, his deployment ended soon after LAA began, so Gravett thinks he’s mixed the two groups up.

Coles even produced a report about his alter ego, ‘Andy Davey’, at the end of 1992. Gravett is asked if it’s accurate. He says he was ‘quietish’ in meetings but more talkative outside of them, giving the impression of being ‘too eager to please’.

Also known as ‘Andy Van’, because he had a vehicle, Coles once helped Gravett move house, and so visited two of his homes. He also gave people lifts to protests and actions, which was useful, but the only one Gravett can remember attending was a ‘low level’ action at London Zoo, carried out under the banner of the ‘Animal Liberation Investigation Unit’.

Gravett didn’t particularly like Coles. He remembers feeling sorry for him, and says they weren’t all that close. He didn’t go to the cinema with him or socialise with him in the way that he did with other undercovers that spied on him, and says that, in contrast to HN1 ‘Matt Rayner’, Coles was distinctly unpopular.

When Coles announced his departure from the animal rights scene, he invited people to join him for a farewell dinner in a restaurant. Gravett was the only one who turned up.

THE CREEPY REPUTATION OF ANDY COLES

Gravett remembers meeting ‘Jessica’ when she and a friend came along to a meeting – this was probably in late 1990 or early 1991, he thinks. She was around 18 at the time, and quite shy, but he got to know her and they became friends; he liked her. (Jessica gave evidence to the Inquiry in December.)

Gravett wasn’t aware of her being in a relationship with ‘Andy Van’. However, Geoff Sheppard knew about it because of a letter she’d sent him while he was in prison.

After the undercover policing scandal broke in 2010, activists uncovered more and more spycops. Coles was unmasked in 2017 and Gravett made contact with Jessica via social media. They met up in person to talk more.

He remembers her being in a state of shock, saying ‘he was my first proper boyfriend’ (something he hadn’t realised) and her being ‘very, very, very upset’.

Back in the 1990s, another woman activist had confided in him about an experience that she had with Coles. She’d described him turning up at her flat one night and trying to sexually assault her. This was shocking to Gravett at the time, this kind of behaviour was not normal in the circles they moved in.

‘I regret not knowing more about him at the time’

He says if he’d known about this incident before Coles left, he wouldn’t have gone to the farewell meal, or felt sorry for him at all. As it was, at the time he didn’t feel like he was losing a ‘friend, or anyone who was important to me in that sense’.

He adds that the way Coles has conducted himself

‘since he was outed, has just been totally reprehensible. It’s disgusting’.

HN1 ‘MATT RAYNER’

HN1 ‘Matt Rayner’ was deployed from 1992-96, and infiltrated all of the groups that Gravett has spoken about at this hearing.

Gravett remembers exactly when he first encountered HN1. This was 19 November 1991, the very first meeting of LBAG. Gravett has a very clear memory of ‘Matt Rayner’ writing his name down on the attendance sheet along with an unusual location (Salisbury).

He also recalls the same ‘Matt’ turning up to help at an animal rights stall that Gravett was running in Brixton Town Hall, on 7 December 1991.

For the Inquiry, John Warrington asks if he is sure about this, as the Inquiry has some documents which suggest his deployment didn’t start until January 1992. Gravett is extremely clear about the dates.

‘Absolutely, 100%. No doubt.’

When a bank account was opened for London Animal Action in the autumn of 1994 Gravett asked Rayner to be a signatory on it. He continued acting as a signatory until he left the group ‘to go abroad’ in 1996.

‘I got along well with him, I liked him, trusted him. You know, I think we were close friends and we did socialise outside the group as well’.

Gravett recalls trips to the cinema, theatre, and a football match, as well as going to the pub together.

He remembers the farewell party the group held when he left London. They chipped in to buy him a camera, which Gravett presented. He made a speech, and hosted an after-party at his flat. Rayner was there till the morning.

Rayner had a vehicle, and would give people lifts to demos and meetings across the country. Gravett remembers an animal rights meeting in Bristol and a circus protest in Kent.

There was also a trip to Liverpool in 1993, for the Grand National in Aintree. Gravett had talked about this at an LBAG meeting a month earlier, saying there had been a national call-out. He recalls that Rayner’s hand ‘shot up’ to volunteer to go, and a group of eight or nine activists travelled there together in his van.

‘By then he’d been around a long time, one of those people you sort of trusted’.

There was a lot of discussion during the journey about the group’s plans to take direct action in order to disrupt the race. They planned to get inside and run onto the course.

In his witness statement to the Inquiry, Rayner has denied knowing that activists planned to disrupt the race. Gravett says he’s lying. Why else would they be going there?!

Gravett decided he didn’t want to get arrested, and Rayner said he also wanted to avoid arrest as he was driving, so they both stayed outside the track, at the entrance.

There were a number of false starts, then the race was eventually abandoned completely. It’s the only time this has happened due to animal rights protests. It’s been estimated that this action cost the racing / betting industry around £75 million. This was due to the presence of activists from London, who had travelled there in a van provided and paid for by the Special Demonstration Squad.

Those who invaded the course were arrested, but not charged, as what they’d done was only a civil offence. Gravett remembers being in the van with Rayner and another activist, listening to the radio reports and laughing with glee. Gravett has written about the day on his blog.

Gravett didn’t go to demonstrate against the Grand National the following year, but knows that two SDS officers, Rayner and Coles, drove people there. This has been confirmed to him by some of those they drove, and by a woman activist who hosted them locally.

In his witness statement to the Inquiry, Rayner lies about this too, claiming he only went there in 1993.

In 1995, Rayner was arrested in Yorkshire, having travelled there to disrupt grouse-shooting on the ‘Glorious 12th’ of August when the season starts. This time he was driving a car, and its passengers included Gravett and three others from London. They were part of a convoy of dozens of hunt sabs from all over the south of England. Sabs from the north of England were simultaneously targeting grouse-shooting in Cumbria.

Gravett witnessed this arrest, out on the moors. He remembers Rayner getting very involved in ‘a sort of melee’ between the sabs and the local police, quite late in the day. Gravett was the only one of the remaining four who could drive, but he’d never driven this car before. He recalls that it wasn’t easy to reverse off the moor back onto the road, but he managed and drove it to the police station to wait for Rayner’s release.

In his written statement to the Inquiry, Rayner claims that:

(a) because he was the driver, he did not ‘decamp’ from the car
(b) he didn’t get involved in any ‘physical or violent confrontation’
(c) he got ‘caught up in a crowd’, and that everyone present was arrested
(d) he thinks the local police must have driven his car off the moor
(e) he doesn’t know where the activists who he’d given a lift to ended up, or how they got back home to London.

Gravett almost laughs at this series of obvious lies.

He remembers that there was pushing and shoving going on, that Rayner was an active participant in this and it most certainly was a ‘physical’ confrontation. Only a small number of sabs were arrested. He is adamant that they waited for Rayner at the police station and then he drove them back to London very late that night.

GEOFF SHEPPARD’S ARREST

Gravett confirms that he knew fellow animal rights activist Geoff Sheppard well (Sheppard gave evidence to the Inquiry in November 2024, covered in these two reports).

The two had been friends for many years, but Gravett knew nothing about him being in possession of a shotgun or ammunition before he was arrested for this in 1995.

He adds that he wasn’t surprised that Sheppard hadn’t told him about this:

‘He wouldn’t think it right to tell me anything unless I needed to know it’.

He remembers a conversation they’d had years earlier, soon after Sheppard was released from prison in 1990 for his involvement in the Debenhams incendiary device campaign. He said something about being offered a shotgun by someone he’d met inside, but it was a very theoretical conversation; neither of them had any plans to use such an item.

In his statement, Rayner claims that he found out about this shotgun in 1995, and tried (unsuccessfully) to persuade Sheppard to get rid of it. Gravett doesn’t believe this is true.

He points out that Rayner knew what close friends he and Sheppard were, so if he was truly serious about persuading him, he would have spoken to Gravett and asked him to help.

It was Rayner who told Gravett in the summer of 1995 that Sheppard had been arrested. Sheppard was sentenced to a further seven years in prison as a result of this arrest.

Gravett visited him on remand and after sentencing. He thinks Rayner probably visited him too – pointing out that it ‘would have been odd’ if he hadn’t – but they didn’t go to the prison together.

Rayner’s reports also go into detail about Gravett’s love life in 1995. He comments now that the spycops didn’t just report on activists’ personal lives but sometimes interfered in them, including his own.

Gravett first met Liz Fuller in the early days of LBAG. She was quite involved in the group.
He remembers seeing her and Rayner together at a Boots demo in October 1992. He knew for sure that they were a couple in early 1993.

He wasn’t close to them so didn’t know if they lived together or not. Liz has told him they were still together in May 1995, so he believes this sexual relationship with her lasted for more than two years, not the one year Rayner eventually admitted to.

RAYNER’S DEPARTURE WASN’T THE END

The ending of Rayner’s deployment was extremely elaborate and took about 18 months to execute. It began in the summer of 1995 when he said he’d changed jobs and started working for a wine company. A year later, he told a few close friends of his growing disillusionment with activism after being raided by the police and the breakdown of the relationship with his girlfriend.

Then in the autumn of 1996 he said he was moving to Bordeaux, France where his supposed employer had a branch. He undertook a tour of the country saying goodbye to comrades.

After he left, letters arrived from him, postmarked Bordeaux. He suggested to Gravett that he could visit him in France (a possibility noted at the time by Bob Lambert, who by then was an SDS manager) and wrote to him at least three times after leaving London.

Some time later he pretended to move again for work, to Argentina. The letters kept coming.

Gravett says now that he believes these letters, sent from both countries in 1996 and 1997, served various purposes.

‘He was writing to me obviously for the reason that we were close, and he felt he had to do it because it might have seemed strange if he hadn’t. But at the same time those letters were also a method of keeping me under surveillance from afar. And they were also, in them, hints that Special Branch was still watching me.

‘One of them, I think it’s the final one, makes reference to an arrest of some matter with me, non-animal rights’

In that letter posted from Argentina, Rayner said:

‘I was pretty shocked especially when I heard that both you and I think Brendan had been arrested. I haven’t yet heard about what happened at court but obviously I hope you all got off…

‘And what’s this about you being arrested for GBH and mistaken identity? Sounds like you’re becoming a really dangerous person Paul – best you come out here and cool down in Argentina!’

This was a year after Rayner had left London. It’s a lot of effort for the police to go to. Knowing that Rayner was actually a spycop, the details about other arrests do indeed take on a sinister tone and show he was still being watched.

When Gravett first learnt about the existence of the SDS, he wondered about ‘Matt Rayner’. He still had his diaries from that era, which included the dates of his birthday parties, so was able to search for him using this date of birth.

After finding a death certificate for the real Matthew Rayner, he made contact with Liz in 2013 or 2014.

He remembers that ‘she was surprised’.

He had previously found Rayner ‘a very credible person’ and he even stood up for him once, when another activist voiced suspicions about him. He says this person (‘George’) was someone he ‘was inclined not to believe’, who couldn’t provide any evidence to back up their claim that Matt was ‘dodgy’.

Gravett talked about how the impact of finding out that someone he liked and considered a good friend for such a long time was in fact spying on him. He points out that although he now knows the real names of the other undercovers who reported on him, he still doesn’t know the real name of ‘Matt Rayner’. He strongly believes that this should be made public.

HN26 ‘CHRISTINE GREEN’

HN26 used the cover name ‘Christine Green’. Gravett knew her too. She was also very active in LAA, going to demos and meetings. After Rayner left London, Gravett actually asked her to become a signatory on the group’s bank account. He points out that of the five signatories the group had, two were police officers and a third was a private spy.

Green also had a relationship with an activist, albeit one that didn’t follow the trajectory of those of her male colleagues. Thomas Frampton was a hunt sab and, around 1998, drove a coach load of activists to a demo at Hillgrove Farm, a notorious breeder of cats for vivisection.

Gravett knew him, and that he also used the name Joe Tax. He knew that he was in love with Christine, and says ‘it was common knowledge that they were a couple’, and that they often attended LAA meetings together.

Green left the police and is understood to have continued her relationship with Joe as ongoing life partners.

HATEMAIL

There were a few more questions for Gravett before the hearing ended.

Asked how he’d have reacted if he’d discovered at the time that his comrades in the animal rights movement were police officers, he responded:

‘Good question. We’d have thrown them out. I don’t think there would’ve been violence, but they would’ve been excluded’.

He says he obviously can’t speak for everyone, and points out that people’s lives were ‘ruined’ by these undercovers’ actions so it’s impossible to say how everyone would have reacted.

Gravett adds that it’s obvious from the evidence he’s given that he was in routine contact with spycops for most of his adult life, and that their infiltration extended to his private life, not just his public, campaigning life.

He goes on to add that there’s one more issue he raised in his statement, to do with SDS management. In 1994 he had a relationship with a woman activist, which they kept secret, and didn’t tell anyone about. She received an envelope containing a second envelope addressed to him – this contained an anonymous letter signed ‘Friends of the Burger’.

At the time he was nonplussed and had no idea where or who this might have come from. He almost threw it away but is now glad that he didn’t.

He points out that the tone is ‘mocking’, it says ‘long time, no see’ and this, along with the burger reference, has convinced him that it was sent ‘as some sort of sick joke’ by Bob Lambert, who was by then an SDS manager.

He and his partner were both very upset by it at the time.

With his questioning over, Gravett was given the opportunity by his own barrister to add anything else. He urged the Inquiry’s Chair, Sir John Mitting, to allow core participants to see HN1 ‘Matt Rayner’ give evidence. He added that even if nobody else is allowed to see him then Liz Fuller, as someone so personally deceived into a relationship by him, should be allowed to.

Mitting says that he will be hearing submissions about it afterwards.

It is as yet still unclear if Gravett will be invited back to give more evidence in Tranche 3 (examining the Special Demonstration Squad 1993-2008), even though he was spied on during this time.

At the Undercover Policing Inquiry, Monday 9 December 2024 was devoted to the evidence of two witnesses, ‘Callum’ and ‘Walter’, who had been involved in hunt saboteur activity in the 1980s.

There were a lot of restrictions on what could be reported in order to protect the identity of the witnesses. They were in the hearing room behind a screen. We’re doing separate reports for them.

RECAP

This was the Monday of the seventh week of ‘Tranche 2 Phase 2’, the new round of hearings of the Undercover Policing Inquiry (UCPI). This Phase mainly concentrates on examining the animal rights-focused activities of the Metropolitan Police’s secret political unit, the Special Demonstration Squad, from 1983-92.

The UCPI is an independent, judge-led inquiry into undercover policing in England and Wales. Its main focus is the activity of two units who deployed long-term undercover officers into a variety of political groups; the Special Demonstration Squad (SDS, 1968-2008) and the National Public Order Intelligence Unit (NPOIU, 1999-2011). Spycops from these units lived as activists for years at a time, spying on more than 1,000 groups.

Click here for the day’s page on the Inquiry website which should have video, transcripts and written evidence.

‘WALTER’

After hearing from ‘Callum’ in the morning, the Inquiry took evidence from another hunt saboteur, ‘Walter’, in the afternoon. His voice was modulated to disguise it.

Walter has provided the Inquiry with a lengthy witness statement and 60 exhibits. Despite the Inquiry’s stated policy of publishing documents as soon as a witness gives evidence, and despite it being months since he gave evidence, at the time of writing Walter’s documents are still unpublished.

Junior Counsel Rachel Naylor asked him questions on behalf of the Inquiry.

Walter said he was brought up to care about animals, and to side with the underdog. He recalls attending some meetings in Brighton and learning about the cruelty being done to wild animals by hunting them.

He first went hunt sabbing in 1984 and moved to Lewisham, in South London, the following year. He has been active in a number of different local hunt sab groups over the years, including the Brixton hunt sab group.

Asked about ‘non-violent direct action’, he explained that he means intervening in some way to keep the dogs away from whichever wild animal is being hunted at the time, and help it to escape. He emphasised that sabs would avoid physical confrontation whenever possible. They would use self-defence when it was the ‘only option’.

THE HUNT SABOTEURS ASSOCIATION

As well as local sab groups, he also played an active part in the Hunt Saboteurs Association (HSA), a national organisation that has existed since 1963. It has always held Annual General Meetings, had an (unpaid) executive committee, and – as even spycop Bob Lambert admitted – had been ‘entirely lawful’ in pursuit of its aims: to promote the use of non-violent direct action to protect wildlife, and lobby for legal change.

The HSA relies on donations from the public, and most local sab groups are self-funded. The HSA’s magazine, Howl, comes out several times a year and is sent to individual subscribers and local groups. HSA membership was and is open to everyone opposed to hunting, not just those actively engaged in sabbing.

TACTICS

The HSA have always published booklets of tactics that could be used to sabotage different types of hunting. Walter provided the Inquiry with a copy of the 1988 edition [UCPI 0000037140].

Many of these tactics involved using things that would put the hounds off the scent of the animal they were chasing – for example: spray bottles of diluted citronella essential oil, things like ‘Anti-Mate’ (an aerosol spray designed to deter the unwanted attention of male dogs), and ‘scent dullers’.

In the early 1980s some sabs experimented with using dried blood to set false trails, or ‘drags’. Sabs also carried hunting horns and whistles, and used calls to distract or misdirect the hounds.

Walter listed some other items that would be used – for example things to tie up gates and slow down the hunters, CB radios (so the sabs could communicate with each other – there were no mobile phones!).

He explained that some of the tools listed – including ‘rookies’, rook scarers – would only be used in limited circumstances. The sabs took care not to do anything that would scare or harm the horses and hounds. The booklet advised hunt sabs to follow the Countryside Code at all times.

It also recommended that sabs:

‘chat to supporters – do not antagonise them… Avoid tactics which do not directly help the hunted animal, such as interfering with the supporters’ cars, etc’.

Walter thinks that was to avoid any ‘flashpoints’ being created, recalling that:

‘sometimes just our presence could be seen as provocative to the hunt’s people’.

The booklet suggests that it’s best to be polite towards the police – ‘annoying them does not help’ – but always take a note of their numbers.

It advises keeping together and walking away if confronted by the hunt’s heavies:

‘running only encourages them (it probably reminds them of the chase!)’

He considered self defence to be acceptable, and believed that you should do whatever you needed to do to get out of a situation safely.

We learnt that ‘pre-beating’ and ‘pre-spraying’ referred to other tactics adopted by sabs, to either encourage wild animals to leave an area before the hunt began, or to lay scents that would distract the dogs when they showed up.

According to Walter, sometimes a press release would go out, for example before the start of the hunting season or before a big event in the calendar (like the Boxing Day meets), but sab groups didn’t usually advertise their regular actions, just report on them afterwards.

As a broad and lawful organisation, there was little in the way of security precautions. In those days the office was usually in someone’s house. Walter admitted:

‘It was very lax, to be honest’

REPORTING ON THE SABS

Much of the hearing was spent examining secret police reports. As we’ve seen in so many other hearings, undercover officers frequently exaggerated activity in order to make it sound like they were spying on serious criminal plotting.

Walter had been reported on by several spycops. One them, HN87 ‘John Lipscomb’ (known as ‘Hippy John’), said that Walter was wary of speaking openly on the phone, and often used public phone boxes. Walter explained that this wasn’t just to protect him, it was sometimes because of the risks faced by people in the hunting community who shared information with him.

Another of the spycops, HN10 Bob Lambert, reported [MPS-0740065] in 1987 that ‘sixteen Animal Liberation Front (ALF) activists’ had met at someone’s home in Kent on 25 January. This report claimed that ‘all present enjoy a dual role’, and that as well as being ‘leading members’ of various local sab groups, are involved in a ‘criminal campaign’.

Walter flatly rejected the suggestion that he was an ALF activist.

According to Lambert’s report, the HSA was virtually bankrupt at this time and those present agreed that its only useful purpose was ‘in terms of publicity’. Walter says that in those (pre-internet) days the organisation served a vital function in terms of communication between the different local groups.

There was mention of a new ‘South East Anti-Hunt Alliance’ being formed. Why was a ‘regional alliance’ needed? Walter said maybe there were ‘some local politics at play there’.

It’s reported that the sabs were planning to combine forces for a ‘joint hit’ on the ‘infamous Crawley and Horsham Hunt’, as a way to counter the increasing violence of its hired heavies. The date of this coordinated action (28 February 1987) would only be communicated by word of mouth, so the hunt and police were taken by surprise.

Walter is clear that entering into pitched battles is not what sabbing was about, although in the case of this, known as ‘the most volatile hunt in the South’, sabs had to be ready to defend themselves.

In this report Lambert admitted that however ‘determined’ the sabs are, they

‘are unlikely ever to initiate violence, and, secretly, would be extremely pleased to encounter no opposition on the day in question’

In the report Lambert submitted after the event it is clear that there was no violence on the day. Walter recalls that the sabs were all kept away from the hunt by the police (who deployed a roadblock and even a helicopter against the sabs’ convoy of vehicles).

In another report [MPS-0740567], HN87 John Lipscomb alleges that Walter has drawn up a list of names and phone numbers of three individuals attached to the British Field Sports Society and distributed this to other animal rights activists ‘for special attention’. Walter says this is simply not true. He was ‘surprised’ to see this allegation amongst the material disclosed to him by the Inquiry.

The report specifies what is meant by ‘special attention’:

‘making abusive telephone calls, sending unsolicited mail and in some instances, causing criminal damage to property’

Walter recalls that this went both ways – hunt supporters often did these things to hunt sab groups.

THE LEGENDARY BRIXTON HUNT SABS

Walter was involved with the Brixton hunt sab group from 1992-1997. He remembers them as ‘legendary’.

It’s clear that they successfully created a legend about themselves and their reputation often went before them. He says they were effective and ‘tactically aware’ – they tried to get to the hounds – rather than just trouble-makers.

The Inquiry has already heard from Brixton hunt sab ‘AFJ’ that the group didn’t ‘proactively pursue’ violence, but were prepared to deal with it if it erupted. Walter says that’s a fair description, the Brixton sabs were ‘robust’.

According to another of the spycops, HN2 Andy Coles, the Brixton group had a ‘fearsome reputation for being violent’. Walter says they weren’t necessarily violent but they did have ‘a fearsome reputation’ and that was that they were ‘not to be messed with’.

Coles has also accused the HSA of being a public order problem and involved in criminality. Walter strongly rejected this suggestion.

(We have illustrated this report with photographs by renowned documentary photographer Andrew Testa, who spent time in the field with the Brixton sab group.)

HN1 ‘Matt Rayner’ also reported on hunt sabs in this period, and mentioned confrontations taking place between the ‘harder end’ of the movement and terriermen.

Walter says that there was a mixture of people involved in hunt sabbing. Terriermen considered that they had a ‘carte blanche’ to do what they liked to sabs (and foxes) and the police used to turn a blind eye.

Walter says that the people he knew were prepared to defend themselves, but did not go out looking for violence:

‘at the end of the day they’re there to save the fox’

He recalls ‘running around in fields all day’, getting wet and covered in mud, and points out that nobody joined hunt sab groups and went through all that just in the hope of a punch-up.

DID HUNT SABBING OFFER A ‘GATEWAY’ TO THE ALF?

The Inquiry moved on to examine the relationship between hunt sabs and the Animal Liberation Front (ALF) in more detail.

In one report [MPS-0742170] Lambert has written about an incendiary attack on the home of a prominent member of the Crawley and Horsham hunt, and claimed that all such criminal actions against hunters were the work of hunt sabs, even if carried out under the name of the ALF or the ‘Anti Hunt Militia’.

Walter remembers seeing this attack reported in the media at the time (December 1986). He had no idea who was responsible, and doesn’t see how Bob Lambert could have known either.

This same incident is also mentioned in the other 1987 Lambert report we saw earlier [MPS-0740065]. It contains the names of two individuals who Lambert suspects of being involved. According to him, they were keen to see more actions of this kind, and circulated the addresses of other possible targets. One of the hunt’s heavies is said to be considered a ‘prime target for some form of criminal damage’.

However, Walter was at this meeting, and says he was not aware of people talking about targeting this man’s home address, and if he had, ‘would not have been comfortable’ it.

He goes on to say that he doesn’t remember such addresses and details being circulated at any meeting he attended, or any discussion of committing criminal damage at the Parham racecourse used by the hunt for their ‘point to point’ races. He doesn’t know of anyone operating under the banner of the ALF.

WALTER’S HOUSE

HN87 John Lipscomb had provided a ‘pen portrait’ of Walter in an August 1988 report [MPS-0742609].

This describes him as ‘one of the most respected animal rights activists in South East London’, and claims he is involved in various other movements, ‘notably squatting’.

Walter isn’t sure why it says this. His house had been a squat in the past, but when he lived there it was managed by a housing association. He knew a fair few squatters, but wasn’t one himself. Again, this seems like a spycop’s exaggeration and lies to make activists seem more detached from mainstream society and acting on the fringes of the law.

Lipscomb’s report also claims that his house is ‘regarded as an open house to activists requiring accommodation’, and ‘has the potential for operating as an ALF cell on its own, as three of its occupants are active campaigners’.

Walter rejects this allegation – yes, it was a vegan household, and they sometimes hosted activists from overseas, but nobody was doing ALF actions from there.

Lipscomb also claimed [MPS-0744157] that it was ‘common practice’ for hunt sabs to give false details to the police if they were stopped or arrested, and they would often use the addresses of Walter’s house and a squat in Sudbourne Road, Brixton for this. Walter says they were generally happy for people to use their address in order to get bail, but this wasn’t as organised (with lists of names being provided to the houses) as Lipscomb alleged.

In the SDS Annual Report of 1995-96 [MPS-0728967], there’s a mention of ‘organised hunt sabotage’ and a special police unit called the Animal Rights National Index. It says the ‘penetration’ of hunt sab groups ‘continues to pay dividends’ and suggests that the intelligence gathered is useful for other police forces, as well as for identifying ALF activists.

Walter says he is aware that the SDS used these reports to try to justify their funding for the following year – this is one of the main reasons they were written. He says it was no secret that the police took an interest in hunt sabs.

HORSE AND HOUND BALL

The Inquiry was then told about a demo at the Grosvenor House Hotel in London, where the annual Horse and Hound Ball was being held, on 5 March 1992.

According to a report by HN2 Andy Coles [MPS-0730957], 80-100 people turned up to demonstrate their opposition to hunting. He claimed the demo had been organised by the HSA. Walter says it definitely wasn’t, as they focussed on direct action, i.e. hunt sabbing, not this kind of demo.

He says he took part in some demos at these balls but is not sure if he was at this particular one. He is surprised at the high number of people who are said to have attended. According to the report, several bags of flour were thrown towards attendees of the ball. There were some scuffles and some of the activists (including ‘Jessica’ and Andrea McGann) were arrested.

The next Coles report [MPS-0742251] is of a meeting held at the end of April to prepare for the forthcoming trial of Jessica and one other person. Besides these two defendants, another five people are listed as attending, including Walter, although he doesn’t remember being there then.

In his witness statement [UCPI 0000035074] Coles claims that the group ‘spent the evening working out how best to prepare a defence’ and discussed:

‘how to concoct matching stories of what they could claim to be eye witness testimony where they could contradict police evidence and establish both activists’ innocence of the charges’

Coles says he told the group that he hadn’t seen anything, as he’d been injured himself (hit with a police radio) so was able to avoid acting as a defence witness in the court case.

Walter points out the inconsistencies in Coles’s story – for example, if there had been a lawyer present, it’s highly unlikely that anyone would have talked about concocting false evidence, and in any case this wasn’t commonly done.

CRIMINAL INJUSTICE ACT

Andy Coles was arrested at a hunt sab at Good Easter in Essex, just a few weeks after the enactment of the Criminal Justice Act & Public Order Act in November 1994.

This new law criminalised a lot of sab activity – it became a criminal offence to trespass if interfering with a landowner’s activity, and an offence to fail to leave land when directed to do so.

Walter recalls that the Essex police had a reputation for being particularly ‘anti-sab’ so it was assumed that they would be keen to enforce the new Act at the earliest opportunity.

The sabs wanted to show that they planned to continue sabbing and would not be deterred by the introduction of the new crime of ‘aggravated trespass’. They anticipated violence from the hunt and obstruction from the police, and wanted to turn up in mass numbers.

We saw the ‘intelligence’ submitted by Coles after the event [MPS-0745541]. Walter doesn’t agree entirely with its contents: he says the mood was ‘expectant’ rather than ‘confrontational’, and thinks the number of sabs reported as attending (22 from Brixton plus another 350) is inaccurate.

According to the report, Walter was driving one of the Brixton sabs’ vehicles that day. Coles has also claimed that he was driving a Land Rover belonging to the group. Walter says they had a number of Land Rovers, so this is possibly true.

Walter recalls that the Brixton sabs covered their vehicles’ windows with grilles to stop them being broken by hunt supporters. Despite having this small fleet, they often had more people wanting to go out than they had spaces for.

According to the report, the Brixton sabs got out of their vehicle at some point and were arrested almost immediately, among them ‘AFJ’ (who gave evidence to the Inquiry the week after Walter). Walter says on the day ‘it was just ridiculous’, with people getting nicked as soon as they left the highway.

The report claims that two of the sabs had beaten a police officer and taken his telescopic truncheon off him. Walter says that this doesn’t sound accurate and he remembers things differently:

‘People were very much thrown by the level of aggression from the police. There wasn’t any pretence of warning going on. They had their truncheons out straight away and were hitting people all over the legs and upper body all the time. It certainly wasn’t my experience that people were singling officers out. Because ultimately they are the police. They are always going to win in those sorts of situations.’

Spycop Andy Coles was arrested that day under his false name of Andy Davey. He gave a false address (Plato Road) as well as a false false name (Chris Jones)!

Walter is asked if he knew the real Chris Jones (who worked at 56a Info-shop) at the time?

‘I may have known them but I wouldn’t have known necessarily their surname’

He recalls that the Brixton sabs faced ‘relentless police interest’, and arrests were almost a ‘daily occurrence’.

‘HIPPY JOHN’ THE SPYCOP

HN87 John Lipscomb was deployed from June 1987 to November 1990. Most of those he spied on knew him as ‘Hippy John’. He went out sabbing with Walter’s local group, and sometimes was among those from the group who slept over at Walter’s house the night before. Walter says most of those involved were in their late teens to early 20s (HN87 was in his 30s).

Asked about the impact this undercover had on his sab group, Walter recalls him putting a vehicle out of action, ‘either by ineptitude or by design’, by borrowing it to take to Cropredy Folk Festival and not topping up its oil and water.

Walter explains that ‘it was useful to have drivers’. It tended to be the older members of the group who drove, as they were more likely to have licences, and the insurance only covered over-25s.

Asked if Lipscomb just drove or also took part in sabbing, Walter replied that he thinks it was both.

The undercover boasted of sitting in a fox-hole and blocking the terriermen from reaching the fox, in order to impress Walter. It seems to have worked – Walter agrees this was a brave thing to do.

He says that another sab, someone from Dartford, had a very close, platonic, friendship with ‘Hippy John’ and was ‘devastated’ to discover that this man had in fact been spying on him. According to Walter, that person is now far less ‘easy going’ than he used to be, and far more suspicious of people.

Walter isn’t sure about how much time ‘Hippy John’ spent at the Sudbourne Road squat in Brixton, or how often he slept there.

Asked if he knows of Lipscomb having sexual relationships while undercover, he mentions ‘ELQ’, a woman who was in her early 20s back then. Walter says she was a ‘positive member of the group’, and a good friend of ‘Hippy John’.

Walter reached out to her in the last year for what he describes as ‘a very awkward conversation’. He was concerned that she might still have been unaware of Lipscomb’s true identity, and suspected that they may have been more than just friends. She confirmed that Lipscomb slept over at her house, but he still doesn’t know if anything more happened between them.

Walter says there were various social situations when Lipscomb ‘seemed to be with certain individuals in the group’ – mostly young women – but he doesn’t know for sure what happened between them.

He goes on to add that there were rumours about John and one particularly young woman, but he never spoke to her about these at the time. He recalls that she was very young, maybe under 16, and there were issues around taking her out sabbing, and the need for some form of parental consent.

CREEPY COLES

Then there’s HN2 Andy Coles, undercover as ‘Andy Davey’ but known as ‘Andy Van’ by most of the sabs.

Coles claims that he was ‘close friends’ with Walter. Walter says he struggles to recognise him from any of the numerous published pictures.

He’s aware that ‘Andy Van’ existed but only has a ‘sketchy’ recollection of him and finds it hard to think of any memories. He says the Brixton sabs were quite cliquey, and Andy was not in their clique.

He recalls hearing about Coles driving when some chickens were liberated, and the van being stopped by the police but then let go. This prompted some discussion about how lucky the activists involved were.

He says it was very rare that they ever heard about illegal activity committed by activists. He knew that Andy was the driver but not much else about his role in it. He didn’t realise that Jessica was involved in that liberation action until more recently.

He knew Jessica from around 1991 onwards. He remembers that she was friends with someone that he knew well.

Walter was asked how well he knew her in 1992-1993, and if he knew about her being in a relationship with ‘Andy Van’.

He repeated that he wasn’t in the habit of discussing people’s relationships. His clique was ‘rather insular’ and he didn’t tend to socialise much outside of it. He says he was a ‘bit aloof’ and didn’t tend to know much about anyone’s relationship status.

About Coles, he recalls that there were:

‘a number of people who basically thought he was a bit creepy and were uncomfortable around him’.

One of these was Andrea McGann.

After the Inquiry finished asking him questions, his own lawyer, James Wood KC, had a few more. In response, Walter was able to confirm that ‘Andy Van’ also used his own van for sabbing, and took other people in it. But on 19 November 1994, the date when ‘AFJ’ and Coles were both arrested, he drove a vehicle belonging to the Brixton hunt sab group.

OTHER UNDERCOVERS

The Inquiry also heard about HN5 John Dines, who used the cover name ‘John Barker’ (deployed 1987-1991). Walter has provided a photo that shows him at a hunt. He is able to describe his physical build and ‘statement’ haircut.

Walter doesn’t remember seeing Dines defend himself physically, but remembers that hunt supporters tended to avoid him ‘because he looked like he could defend himself’.

Walter also remembers HN1 ‘Matt Rayner’ (deployed 1991-1996). He doesn’t know if Rayner or Dines drove sabs around as they were involved in other groups, not his.

Finally, he also remembers HN26 ‘Christine Green’ (deployed 1995-1999), both as a ‘fellow sab’ and as the partner of a hunt sab who was a friend of his.

He knew that she was in a relationship with Thomas Frampton (also known as Joe Tax) and recalls them turning up together. He thinks this may have been in late 1996, but isn’t certain. He remembers her asking people lots of questions:

‘She was always inquisitive.’

He described her taking an active part in sabbing as part of the West London sab group, and doesn’t think she stood out much or would have had much impact on the actions of this group.

‘Christine Green’ was involved in a controversial raid at Cross Hill mink farm in the New Forest in August 1998. In 2018, the Met apologised to Hampshire police for letting it go ahead and withholding details of those responsible in order to protect Green. Green, in turn, says it’s ‘scandalous’ of the Met to identify her but not the superior officers who did the things they’re apologising for.

Walter heard about ‘Bob Robinson’ – spycop HN10 Bob Lambert – many years ago, and recognised him as someone who had been sabbing. Once he’d been made aware of Lambert’s true identity, he and others quickly realised that there were likely to be other officers from the spycops units who’d infiltrated hunt sab groups.

He was surprised to learn of the extent of this police operation. He has now seen how much information about him (including details of his employment, his shift patterns etc) was collected and recorded.

He believes that he was ‘on the right side of history’ and this is ‘an outrage’; he’s angrier now than he was before.

THE BRITISH ESTABLISHMENT

The Inquiry has heard a lot about the Crawley and Horsham Hunt and how it operated, and how violent it was towards hunt sabs. Walter recalls them hiring thugs from the local rugby club to act as ‘security’ for them. He wryly noted:

‘It was open season on saboteurs’

He recalls that the senior Master of this hunt was an extremely influential member of the Establishment, a personal friend of Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, and a senior member of the Freemasons.

He knows that Thatcher took a great deal of interest in the work of Special Branch and he wants to know if she was involved in the tasking of the spycops at all. It strikes him that the hunt sabs were disrupting a favourite hobby of many of her friends.

The spying also affected Walter personally. It’s long been established that every constabulary’s Special Branch passed personal details of ‘subversives’ to secret employment blacklisting organisations. This wasn’t police upholding the law, it was police breaking the law to maximise corporate profit.

When the largest such organisation, the Economic League, was uncovered in the early 1990s, the list of people that had been blacklisted became known. Walter was shown the list by investigative journalist Paul Foot – his name was on it.

He recalls going for an interview for a librarian role in the 1980s and being asked about his views on hunting. This seemed suspicious at the time, and he has wondered since about Special Branch’s links with the hunting fraternity and their involvement in blacklisting.

He wasn’t offered the job – he says there ‘was a breakdown in trust’ and he walked out of the interview.

He goes on to say that as hunt saboteurs, they always knew that ‘two tier policing’ existed. Hunt sabs were ‘vilified by the Establishment’, frequently attacked, and routinely arrested by the police. The spycops witnessed a great deal of violence suffered by sabs and other activists and did nothing to challenge it.

He talked about the ‘disgusting’ behaviour of the police, and pays tribute to all his fellow hunt sabs, who he calls ‘the bravest, most ingenious, genuine people’.

He went on, even more strongly:

‘The injustice, the rape, and the abuse that the police carried out undercover is a disgrace, one they never thought they would have to answer for.’

Ahead of three days of questioning spycop HN2 Andy Coles, the Undercover Policing Inquiry spent a day taking evidence from ‘Jessica‘ who Coles groomed into a year-long relationship when she was a vulnerable teenage animal rights activist in the 1990s.

Over the past few weeks, a lot of evidence has been held back due to privacy issues, but Jessica insisted that an audio stream of her evidence be made publicly available to the public, so you can hear both the morning and afternoon sessions on YouTube.

She did not ask for any of the painful details to be held back, because she wants to ensure that there are no restrictions on the evidence given by Coles. He does not deserve and should not get privacy protection when he gives his evidence.

‘Jessica’ was questioned by Emma Gargitter for the Inquiry. She has produced a written statement [UCPI 37092] which was introduced into the evidence.

RECAP

This was the Thursday of the seventh week of ‘Tranche 2 Phase 2’, the new round of hearings of the Undercover Policing Inquiry (UCPI). This Phase mainly concentrates on examining the animal rights-focused activities of the Metropolitan Police’s secret political unit, the Special Demonstration Squad, from 1983-92.

The UCPI is an independent, judge-led inquiry into undercover policing in England and Wales. Its main focus is the activity of two units who deployed long-term undercover officers into a variety of political groups; the Special Demonstration Squad (SDS, 1968-2008) and the National Public Order Intelligence Unit (NPOIU, 1999-2011).

Spycops from these units lived as activists for years at a time, spying on more than 1,000 groups.

Click here for the day’s video, transcripts and written evidence

EARLY LIFE

Emma Gargitter began with questions about Jessica’s early life and involvement in animal welfare. She was adopted as a baby and she was bullied as a result. She recalled how every time she fell out with her friend he would bring it up, saying:

‘what’s wrong with you, even your own mother didn’t want you.’

We were shown a Special Branch report about Jessica from after she met Coles that describes her as

‘first coming to the attention of this Branch in June 1992 when secret information received, reported she is an animal activist.’

That same report notes that they had tried, and failed, to trace her birth details. It was clearly very distressing to her that they tried to do this.

She had an older brother who was killed tragically by a drunk driver while out on his bike. She was 11 years old.

‘It changed everything for all of us… my family was never the same. It destroyed our family…and I had to find my own way through that… Kids can be horrible. I was then bullied because my brother had died.’

Gargitter asked how well 11-year-old Jessica was able to find her own way through that. Jessica replied that, up until more recently, she thought she had kind of done OK. But looking forward to events when she met Coles, she realises how damaged she was.

Would teenage Jessica have appeared vulnerable or more robust? She said that at the time she thought she appeared quite OK. She had learnt that if you seem weak you get bullied more, so she would pretend things didn’t bother her, but looking back she says,

‘I don’t think I was fooling anybody.’

Following the death of her brother she suffered a series of family bereavements that made her very insecure:

‘I didn’t know who would be next. I thought I would die at the same age my brother had. I didn’t want to get close to people because it would be worse when they died. That was my attitude.’

Then she had a breakdown in college. She described suffering from severe social anxiety, she couldn’t go into a room if there were too many people there, and then she was humiliated by a maths teacher for answering a question too quietly.

That she was bullied by an adult was just too much. She stopped going to classes and they threatened to kick her out of school, so she went to the doctor and was given medication. She managed to finish school, but she needed that help.

ANIMAL RIGHTS & HUNT SABBING

Jessica explained that she had lots of pets as a child and she started volunteering at weekends and after school at an animal rescue centre when she was about 13.

She would go to demos with people from the rescue centre and heard people from groups like the British Union Against Vivisection (now known as Cruelty Free International) speak at those demonstrations.

She had seen leaflets from the Hunt Saboteurs Association about hunting and she thought it was appalling. She went hunt sabbing for the first time when she was 13 or 14, to a Boxing Day hunt meet.

She was by far the youngest person there, and she didn’t enjoy it. She felt sick, thinking something was going to get killed, and she was angry at these people who were hell bent on ripping some defenceless animal to bits. Saving that animal was an immediate and worthwhile thing.

After the hunt, the other sabs told her she shouldn’t come back until she was a bit older:

‘No one would take responsibility for me… I was maybe a bit lairy… I had a lot to say for myself.’

However, she returned to sabbing when she was 17 or 18, through her involvement in the Islington Animal Rights Group. She learned to drive when she was 17 and saved up for a car. She had a red Mini and she would pick people up to go sabbing. If there was no one else going she would go alone. Once she and just one other person sabbed the Surrey Union hunt.

In the beginning they used citronella in aerosols or spray bottles to mask the fox’s scent. You would see where the animal ran and then spray across the track to confuse the hounds and give the fox a chance to get away. They also had hunting horns, and the ‘gizmo’ that would play the sound of hounds in cry:

‘You could play it in a field and the whole pack would come running.’

The reaction of the hunters was not good. There was a lot of violence and she has been in quite a few scrapes. Just being there could lead to unprovoked attacks. The worst threat was the riders riding hard at you. One particular rider could make her horse kick, and she would make it rear up and kick people. Jessica saw one woman have her arm broken like that.

One of her friends was ridden down and taken away in an ambulance with broken ribs. The Surry Union hunt master was charged with ABH for riding someone down and causing lacerations to his head. There were a lot of injuries. This was also around the time Mike Hill was killed. The threat was always there.

She pointed out that the sabs never carried weapons. You knew you would be stopped and searched by police, and anything that could be considered a weapon would be taken away.

‘It really wasn’t us who caused it. It got in the way of sabbing. You didn’t want to be fighting with somebody while the hounds were killing.’

Q. Did you ever see a sab react?

‘Yes, I’ve responded myself.’

She explained that the last thing any of them would do is to go out intentionally looking for it, but that just standing there and letting yourself be hit made it worse. She had a friend who was a pacifist and he got a kicking every time.

Gargitter then asked about the Brixton hunt sabs. Coles reported that Brixton had a reputation for being violent. Were they more robust defending themselves?

Jessica said that they weren’t violent. It was mostly about numbers: there were a lot of them, they were city people and they wouldn’t be pushed around. She explained that a lot of it was about reputation.

‘We used to say “what time are Brixton going to get here?” because that would make the hunt worry.’

On a mass hit – where several different sab groups went to the same hunt – you’d get a lot of people showing up and they were all supposedly ‘Brixton’.

HN87 ‘John Lipscomb’ described Brixton sabs damaging hunters’ vehicles. Jessica never saw or knew about anything like that.

SPYCOPS – HN1 ‘MATT RAYNER’

Jessica says she had good friends in the West London hunt sab group, and would sometimes go out sabbing with them. HN1 ‘Matt Rayner’ (real name restricted) usually went out sabbing with them too. She remembers being driven in his van, and that he was known by the nickname ‘Chiswick’, but she doesn’t recall anything specific that he did.

Her address book from this time contains Rayner’s name and number. She thinks she probably got his details in order to arrange to be picked up for hut sabs, but is not sure that she ever called him.

She also knew him from London Boots Action Group pickets, handing out leaflets and holding the banner. He wasn’t memorable, he was just one of the group, but she did recall being told not to trust him once. Nothing specific, just ‘be careful, don’t trust him’.

She doesn’t recall thinking he was a police officer, just ‘dodgy’. She thinks she even called him that to his face once. She doesn’t believe he was ever confronted with the suspicion, and the longer he was there, with time, it died down.

She was away working in France when Rayner drove a vanload of animal rights activists to the Grand National horse race. Despite many other years trying, this is the one time activists actually stopped the race – all thanks to a spycop being an agent provocateur!

She also describes some other chicken raids (e.g. Leyden Street where people ran in during a demo and grabbed chickens), saying that both Rayner and Coles may have been involved in these events. Jessica wasn’t involved herself, but people called her to help rehome the chickens.

HN26 ‘CHRISTINE GREEN’

Jessica also came into contact with HN26 ‘Christine Green’ (real name restricted), but not until 2017, after she found out about Coles. Joe Tax (Christine’s partner) was a close friend of Jessica’s and she went to see him to talk about what she had discovered. She hadn’t seen him in years.

She had heard, from other hunt sabs, that Joe and his girlfriend had split up and he’d started a new relationship with a woman who then moved to Spain. Joe went to Spain to find her in around 1997-98. Asked if this was common knowledge Jessica replied

‘If I would’ve known I think anyone would have known.’

She had no idea that ‘Christine’ had been an undercover cop. Joe and ‘Christine’ were still together in 2017.

HN2 ANDY COLES ‘ANDY DAVEY’

Jessica left her parents’ home in early 1992, aged 19. She moved into a shared house in East London with her friend and lived there for about six months. She had the front top bedroom, which was furnished with a small table, and two single divan beds, only one of which had a mattress.

She acquired a dog while she was living there, in August 1992 from the Deptford Urban Free Festival.

‘We went to the festival with one dog, and we came back with two dogs and a pigeon’.

A number of dogs appeared in the reports and photographs, and Jessica told the Inquiry that, if needed, she could still name them all. She also described how she and her housemates would pool their unemployment benefits to feed the cats.

Her friend had the room directly below hers where there was a portable black and white TV. That room became a kind of communal room where people would gather and watch TV even when her friend wasn’t there.

Coles claims there was a TV room in the house, but Jessica thinks he’s actually referring to her friend’s bedroom. There was no spare room, as all the rooms in the house were occupied.

Jessica knew Coles as ‘Andy Van’ as (like numerous spycops) he had a van and was generous in giving lifts. Everyone called him that. She met him in late 1991 whilst she was still living with her parents, but ‘he was just a face in the crowd’.

She started to notice him when he began coming round to her East London address. The house always had people coming and going, but he would come round alone, and always later in the evening.

Jessica had just left home. She was unemployed, money was tight, and neither she nor her friend drank alcohol. Occasionally they would go to the pub and have a lemonade, but mostly they just hung out at home and watched telly, so the chances of finding them at home were high. Coles showed up quite frequently for several weeks, so often that there was a collective sense of ‘here we go again’.

It was inconvenient, because he came round late and stayed for quite a long time so it could be quite awkward. She recalls discussing it among the housemates: who invited him? And it turned out nobody did.

Jessica had no sense that he was romantically interested in her. It just wasn’t something that was on her radar. So, when he kissed her it came completely out of the blue. They were alone, watching TV and

‘I either turned to him or he said something which made me turn to him and then he just lunged straight at me and kissed me…

‘It was so awkward. Had he said something at any point, I would have been able to say I don’t think about you like that, but it was the shock and just the unexpectedness of it.’

It was excruciating hearing Jessica describe something almost all women will recognise from awkward and awful sexual experiences when we were young:

‘My overriding feeling was that I didn’t want to hurt his feelings…

‘I’d like to say now that I would have slapped him. But when I think about it, even now, I still get that awful, awkward feeling. I wish it had been different. I wish that I had done something different’.

After that first kiss, he would stay over, and when he did so it was in her room, in her bed. She never went to his place and didn’t know where he lived. She can’t remember when they first had sex, but she is sure it would have been him that initiated it. She was, and still is, very uncomfortable with physical intimacy.

Coles lied to Jessica about his age, telling her he was 24. In real life he was 32 and married. It never occurred to her that he was older than he said he was.

Jessica described herself as a ‘young 19 year old’:

‘I was naive and quite stupid, to be perfectly honest.’

In his cover identity, Coles was supposed to be 28. Jessica was 19 and looked younger. The fact that he told her he was 24, and told his bosses she was 20-25, shows deliberate effort to cover the age gap. What other reason can there be for him to do this, apart from that he knew it wasn’t right and was trying not to alarm those around him?

Had she known Coles was in his 30s, would she have reacted differently?

‘Yes… that’s not right… there’s no reason to be trying to go out with someone that much younger… it’s creepy. It’s inappropriate… it sounds terrible to say, but, you know, old age… at 19 someone like that is old.’

Coles was Jessica’s first boyfriend. She didn’t talk to her friends about him much. She was embarrassed by him: he was unpopular and awkward and a bit odd.

She says there wasn’t much emotional intimacy either:

‘I can’t remember very much about him. I think I was a pretty awful girlfriend… It was not love’s young dream… it wasn’t how I expected it to be.’

She explained that Coles always used condoms. They did have a conversation about it once:

‘I didn’t quite know what my expectations were of a sexual relationship, I don’t know, I think I just imagined that it would be different and I think I wondered if maybe it was because he was wearing condoms.’

She suggested they try without, but he told her he had to wear them because he had already had one child and wouldn’t risk having another. He told her his daughter was called Sophie, she was around two years old, and he wasn’t allowed to see her.

Jessica was shocked and she had a lot of strong feelings about this. At first she was relieved that he didn’t see his daughter, and then she felt bad because if he wanted to see her, that was sad.

Coles has denied all of this. He claims he stayed over at Jessica’s house, one time on the sofa and then she offered him a mattress in her room (where he stayed 3-4 times). Jessica replied: that never happened. He stayed more than 3-4 times and always in her bed.

Coles also tries to claim that Jessica flirted with him, chased him, and that she once said ‘you can fuck me if you like’. On this she was very clear:

‘He is a liar. An absolute liar… I don’t talk like that. It’s awkward, but also, it’s crass… I wasn’t upset with him, I didn’t throw myself at him, I didn’t chase him. That is lies.’

THE ANIMAL LIBERATON FRONT

Coles has said that Jessica was identified to him as ‘an ALF girl’ by another activist, ciphered as ‘JRA’.

Jessica points out how unlikely this is, and how stupid and dangerous it would be to describe someone as ‘an ALF girl’, even if they were (which she wasn’t). The ALF was involved in illegal activity so there was a culture of secrecy. Activists didn’t brag about it or identify themselves to others.

She says she didn’t really know JRA, although they were on ‘nodding terms’. Asked how she would define the ALF she replied:

‘Someone that regularly breaks the law to rescue animals or sort of non-violent direct action to shops and places that sell fur.’

Jessica doesn’t believe she was associated with people involved in ALF actions. The house where she lived received the ALF Supporters Groups newsletter, so she knew some of the names, but Geoff Sheppard (who had been to prison for planting incendiary devices in Debenhams shops) was the only one she knew personally.

Yet, Coles claims he got close to Jessica because he thought it would get him closer to an ALF cell.

Q. If a police officer was looking to find individuals involved in the ALF, would befriending you be likely to get him access to those people?

‘No.’

Q. Did you have contacts with animal liberationists elsewhere in the UK, outside of London?

‘He’s mischaracterising it. I had friends who were interested in animal rights that were from other places. He’s tarting it up.’

She and a friend got involved in Hackney an Islington Animal Rights, through an advert in Time Out. They went to London to go to the meeting and met Paul Gravett. He was friendly.

She explained that they were younger than everyone else, and most of the older members treated them as kids, but Paul and Geoff always gave them the time of day.

They took part in London Boots Action Group picketing shops protesting against the company’s vivisection, distributing leaflets and sometimes holding a banner, chanting ‘Boots torture beagles’.

They might get in trouble for obstructing the public highway, but basically they were walking up and down outside the shop handing out leaflets. She doesn’t think it was a front for people who wanted to get involved in ALF activity:

‘You would go, and hand out leaflets for hours and then go to the pub.’

We were shown a report from June 1992 that says Jessica had ‘expressed an interest in ALF-style liberations’ and claims that ‘now that she has moved to London and is living with other animal rights activists she is likely to commit criminal acts.’

Coles alleges in his report that she has a ‘radio telephone’ from her dad. She said this is inaccurate. There was a device, an early model carphone, that was used on hunt sabs, but it had nothing to do with her father, and was never at her house. She says she doesn’t think she did express an interest in ALF-style liberations, but she do one once.

THE GREAT HOOKLEY FARM CHICKEN RAID

‘He created a “cell”, if that’s what you want to call it, that I was in…

‘I had to be persuaded to do it. It was nerve wracking and it is nothing I would have done if it weren’t for him.’

Coles organised the action. He was the driver; it was his vehicle; and he asked a lot of people to be involved. He called a meeting, and there were too many people at it so lots of them thought it was silly and dropped out.

‘You wouldn’t do something like that with a big group of people some of whom you didn’t know. But I was in a relationship with him so I and my friend ended up going.’

People wore face coverings, and the aim was not to be discovered. They were given instructions, and told to pass the chickens in bags along a line, in a human chain.

‘I was scared to death… Everything about it is scary, getting caught, doing it, I am quite an anxious person and I was really anxious about everything’

Asked if Coles appeared anxious, she said ‘No’.

We were then shown an article about the action, written Andy Coles, and a photo in which Jessica can be seen liberating chickens. Coles says she is the person on the right, but she clarifies:

‘No I’m the one on the left. I know that because I was the only person stupid enough to wear my favourite jeans… That balaclava is made from a pair of socks.’

She told us how they grabbed chickens and put them in bags and poultry crates until no one could carry any more. Coles claims he was only the driver and photographer on that action (as though that would mean he wasn’t involved).

Jessica explains that is nonsense. Everyone mucked in, because the more hands you had, the more birds you could save. The chickens were loaded into Coles’ van, which was always the plan.

On the way home, they were pulled over by the police, with load of people and about 80 loose chickens in the back. Everyone was panicking and the chickens are making a racket so she and others started coughing in an ill-considered ineffectual attempt to cover it up.

Coles talked to the police, who could clearly see it was a van full of people and chickens, but they let them go.

‘We thought luck was on our side.’

We were shown a report from 4 December 1992 that claims people named in the report were old school friends of Jessica and that they got her involved in the action. Jessica denies this, she says they were not old school friends and it was Coles who got her involved in the action.

THE PRINCESS OF MONACO

In the summer of 1992, Jessica had been in a relationship with Coles for a few months when she received a job offer to to move to France and take care of dogs and cats for the Princess of Monaco. It was a fantastic opportunity.

She consulted with Coles before taking the job, because they were in a relationship.

‘I felt he had a say. I asked him “what do you think I should do?”’

He told her she should go.

‘That may be the one decent thing that he did.’

As far as Jessica understood, they were a couple at that time. The arrangement was that he would come and visit her there, and she can’t remember any formal goodbye.

While she was in France they had a long-distance relationship. They spoke occasionally on the phone, although they didn’t have much to say to each other, and wrote each other letters.

She remembers one his letters was mostly ordinary, about what he had been doing, but it had one line at the bottom that was odd and totally out of character, about oral sex.

‘I remember thinking: “Am I meant to think that’s sexy? ‘Cause it’s not.”’

While Jessica was in France, in September 1992, Special Branch created a Registry File on her, something done for people that are deemed to be worth monitoring in an ongoing way.

The only ALF action she had ever done was Coles’s chicken farm raid. A police note, dated October 1992, says that the photo on file is no longer a good likeness as ‘she now has very short hair and is much less feminine in appearance’.

She points out that this is untrue. She has photos from the time that show her hair was half way down her back, but more importantly, why is Special Branch reporting about a hair cut she never had? It is ridiculous. She wasn’t even in the country at the time. It doesn’t really make sense, unless oles was just trying to find something to report irrespective of whether it was true.

Coles started to complain about her being away and suggested that they ‘start seeing other people’. This made her angry. He wasn’t suggesting that they split up, just that they see other people.

She went back to the UK in December 1992 to see him and stayed at his place in Stanthorpe Road, Streatham for a week. She felt she was being unfair to him by being away:

‘It sounds so gross to say it but it was like he’s a man and it’s not fair on him and he has needs.’

Q. Did he ever say anything that caused you to feel that?

‘I think he had to have done… I couldn’t have come to that by myself.’

We were shown letters Jessica wrote from France to her best friend. One says, ‘it’s really weird but I’m still going out with Andy’.

In another, she tells her friend about how Andy had suggested that they should see other people because otherwise ‘he wouldn’t be getting enough sex.’ It appears to have been over between them by then.

In May 1993 Jessica was injured in France and she returned to the UK in June after spending some time in hospital. Again, she stayed at Coles’s place in Streatham, which she described as quite boring, a bit of an empty box.

In August 1993 her French job ended. She thinks that by then it was over between her and Andy.

She met someone else (at Coles’s house), identified to the Inquiry as ‘NM’. Suddenly she was looking forward to being with someone. There was some kind of chemistry and spark with this new man, and it highlighted for her that it wasn’t right between her and Coles. She told Coles, and he just agreed.

It was a very amicable ending, and she thought they were so grown up. A report of Coles’s from 1993 describes her as having a ‘romantic liaison’ with ‘NM’. Asked how she felt reading that in a police report she replied:

‘What purpose did it serve? It’s just… none of his business.’

A report from March 1994 describes her as ‘NM’’s girlfriend. It suggests that he was involved in ‘illegal ALF activity’. Jessica points out that there is no other reference to this and nothing specific in the report at all:

‘it’s all so vague… it’s just speculation’.

She makes clear that the only activities she and her new partner were involved in were demonstrations and hunt sabotage. Nevertheless, their house was raided by the police after someone who didn’t live there supposedly gave their address when they were arrested on an action they didn’t attend:

‘half a dozen guys in hazmat suits with masks on and like a policeman at the door and like police vans everywhere and they came in and lifted up the floorboards in some rooms… it always felt like there was something a bit suspicious about it.’

They broke things and took items away, including a housemate’s computer with her dissertation on it.

She speculates that it may have been Coles who gave the police their address. He certainly reports on their reactions to it.

THE HORSE & HOUND BALL

The report says the protest was organised by the Hunt Saboteurs Association, that there were 80-100 people in attendance, and that it was ‘loud and aggressive’.

Jessica disagrees with most of what the report says. The HSA didn’t organise things like that. It was a London Animal Rights thing, organised by word of mouth, and there were only 20-30 people there.

It was loud, but not aggressive, and they were packed into a fenced off area. A letter written by Coles at the time about being injured in the line of duty supports Jessica’s version.

He describes 30-40 people and a ‘loud and animated protest’ and describes receiving head injuries from the battery end of a police radio. Jessica doesn’t recall him being there.

Someone threw a bag of flour at people getting out of a limousine, echoing events from the previous year’s ball, where flour was thrown by undercover officer John Dines, leading to the arrest and wrongful conviction of someone else.

Jessica was violently arrested. She recalls being dragged over a crowd-control barrier and landing on her head, then being marched with her arm twisted up behind her back to a van. She doesn’t know what happened. She can only remember the pain. She thought the officer had broken her arm.

She asked to see the police surgeon. He turned up in a tuxedo, having been at the ball. After her release she went to A&E and was diagnosed with torn ligaments in her shoulder, elbow and wrist, and a broken collar bone. In the tradition of people assaulted by police officers, she was charged with assaulting a police officer.

In the run up to her trial, Coles filed reports about their defence strategy, Jessica’s intention to plead not guilty, and a meeting she had with potential witnesses that he describes as being ‘to concoct evidence’. It seems quite common for spycops to be reporting on defence strategies to the prosecution.

In court, she was found guilty and received a suspended sentence. She was told it was a good result that she wasn’t going to prison. However, it was the first time she had appeared in court, she couldn’t believe that the police had blatantly and deliberately lied under oath, and she couldn’t let it go. Despite being given no penalty by the court, the injustice of it outraged her. She appealed her conviction and was acquitted.

REACTION

Asked about her reaction to the discovery in 2017 that Coles had been an undercover police officer, she explained that Paul Gravett alerted her to a report about the infiltration of the groups they were in. Ten minutes after discovering that spycops even existed she found a picture of Andy Coles:

‘It made a lot of sense of our relationship. I didn’t doubt it.’

Asked how it felt:

‘There’s no feeling like it. Huge parts of my life… I didn’t have the control and the agency over them that I thought I did. I’d been steered and manipulated into a relationship that wasn’t really what I wanted but I went along with.’

Jessica broke down at this point.

‘The worst part… was my age, to know that at that age, someone so much older not who he said he was… it made me feel disgusting… it’s disgusting… I can’t come to terms with it properly.’

It has had a significant impact on her mental health that continues to this day.

Jessica has since discovered that her then housemate (now deceased) Andrea McGann and three other women all had unpleasant experiences with Andy. Three of the women describe him ‘lunging’ at them to kiss them, and one woman, peace activist Emily Johns, described him showing up at her house late at night, apparently angling to be invited to stay over for sex.

Robin Lane has also told her, and the Inquiry, that he had set Andy up with one of his friends for a one-night stand, and she described him being ‘a bit rough’.

Jessica pointed out how awful it is that Coles completely denies the entire relationship.

It exacerbates everything, having to prove that she is not lying:

‘Why would anyone want to do this? I have had to sit here. I’ve had to completely humiliate myself… I’m not lying about it. Why would I?’

The fact of him being a school governor and Conservative councillor in a position of power also made it worse:

‘It felt like my responsibility to warn people what he is like… I don’t want anyone else to feel the way that I have felt since finding out.’

After she had finished giving her evidence to the Inquiry, she was thanked by the Chair, Sir John Mitting, who said:

‘Thank you for attending today and giving evidence in circumstances that I know are not easy for you. And that I am aware is a considerable understatement. I know that yesterday’s arrangements were uncoupled and that increased your difficulty. Thank you for surmounting them and giving evidence as clearly as you have done.’

The ‘uncoupled arrangements’ is a reference to the fact that Bob Lambert’s evidence ran over so much that yesterday it was unclear whether Jessica would be able to give her evidence today, and Mitting even threatened not to hear it at all if she didn’t comply with whatever new timetable they same up with. This is as close to an apology as this Inquiry gets.

By the end of the day on Thursday, Jessica was very upset, and when she was asked if there was anything she wanted to add, she replied ‘I just want to get out of here’.

However, by Wednesday of the following week she was feeling a little better and she returned to make her final points.

She began by noting:

‘I found the Inquiry very re-traumatising it’s opened an awful lot of old wounds and personally it’s been quite damaging’

She explained that she has persevered, engaging with the process, and assisting the Inquiry,

‘because we need to know the truth.’

She told the Inquiry that she wishes to see her Special Branch ‘Reference File’. (Those who were spied on have been asking to see their files ever since this process began, and pages from Jessica’s file was referred to on several occasions by Gargitter in her questioning, yet Jessica has not seen the whole file.

Jessica then highlighted Coles’ attitude towards the theft of dead children’ identities. She reminded the Inquiry that her own family lost a child, and read some of the most awful sections of Coles’ Tradecraft Manual, on stealing dead children’s identities, noting ‘that perfectly describes my brother’.

She made the point that one of his recommendations – that it would be best to use the identity of someone who had been adopted and then died in childhood. She notes that Coles passed on his ‘tradecraft’ to futures officers. She noted that Jim Boyling’s identity was based on an adopted child and that Mark Jenner claimed that his father had been killed by a drunk driver, and she specifically asked Mitting to find out whether her brother’s identity ever was used by an undercover officer.

Finally, she told the Inquiry that the Metropolitan Police have accepted there is credible evidence that the sexual relationship between her and Andy Coles did happen.

The Met have apologised to Jessica, and said Coles would be facing the most serious disciplinary charges if he were still a serving officer. Coles refused to answer questions when interviewed under caution, and subsequently told the Peterborough Telegraph that the Met had actually exonerated him.

Jessica ended her evidence to the Inquiry by pointing out that the only person who still disputes the relationship took place is Andy Coles:

‘and he is a liar.’

Jessica has been to Peterborough to give talks and distribute leaflets about Coles’s spycop career and his ongoing denial of the facts.

After spycop Bob Lambert finally finished his seventh day of questioning, it was the turn of activist Claire Hildreth.

Testifying to the Inquiry is particularly impactful for those who were spied on, having to come into a public forum and painfully examine some of the worst things that ever happened to them.

It takes a lot of mental preparation, and Lambert’s stalling tactics meant that for most of the day Hildreth was unsure whether she’d even get to take the stand.

Even now, the spycops are doing what gives them personal advantage and don’t care about the negative consequences for others who’ve done nothing wrong.

RECAP

This was the Wednesday of the seventh week of ‘Tranche 2 Phase 2’, the new round of hearings of the Undercover Policing Inquiry (UCPI). This Phase mainly concentrates on examining the animal rights-focused activities of the Metropolitan Police’s secret political unit, the Special Demonstration Squad, from 1983-92.

The UCPI is an independent, judge-led inquiry into undercover policing in England and Wales. Its main focus is the activity of two units who deployed long-term undercover officers into a variety of political groups; the Special Demonstration Squad (SDS, 1968-2008) and the National Public Order Intelligence Unit (NPOIU, 1999-2011).

Spycops from these units lived as activists for years at a time, spying on more than 1,000 groups.

Click here for the day’s video, transcripts and written evidence

OVERVIEW

Hildreth was active in the London animal rights movement in the early 1990s, and was spied on primarily by Special Demonstration Squad officers HN1 ‘Matt Rayner’ and HN2 Andy Coles ‘Andy Davey’.

Hildreth moved to London in 1991. In Jan 1992, she moved to North Kensington as a housing support worker. A colleague took her to a World Day For Laboratory Animals event where she picked up a London Boots Action Group (LBAG) leaflet which called for a boycott of the chain of chemists due to their use of vivisection.

Hildreth was part of the group, whose main activity was leafleting outside Boots shops, until she left London in 1996. She is still committed to the causes of animal welfare, environmentalism and social justice.

SPYCOPS EXAGGERATING AND LYING, AGAIN

Andy Coles infiltrated LBAG, and attended their meetings. One of his reports, dated 16 July 1993, says a new LBAG committee had been formed. Hildreth is named as part of this ‘committee’, title its newsletter officer, assisted by Coles. Hildreth says the term ‘committee’ is overstating the case, it was just basic admin, and the group was essentially self-organising, and they would share tasks like chairing meetings.

Coles claims in his witness statement to the Inquiry that he volunteered to assist, as he had access to the Animal Liberation Front’s computer and also produced their newsletter. Hildreth says there was no ALF computer, and he didn’t create the newsletter. She adds that his report’s mention of Paul Gravett being involved is wrong too.

Coles claimed to run the membership list of LBAG. Hildreth says that’s another lie. She doesn’t remember Coles being involved much at all. He was based in South London and didn’t really come North much.

A report by HN1 ‘Matt Rayner’ says Coles was a ‘formal member’ of LBAG, but Hildreth says there was no such thing as formal membership.

However, she says that Rayner, in contrast, was very active. As was standard for Special Demonstration Squad (SDS) officers, Rayner and Coles had been equipped with vans. Rayner made himself useful driving people to demonstrations and related errands.

LONDON ANIMAL ACTION

Hildreth was involved in London Animal Action (LAA) from the group’s founding in October 1994. The group was founded to campaign on all aspects of animal abuse, not just Boots as the previous group had done. Rayner reported on 8 August 1995 says LAA members are ‘openly supportive of ALF action and many are involved’. She says this isn’t true.

At the request of the Inquiry’s Chair, Sr John Mitting, Hildreth defined ALF activity as breaking the law, largely by criminal damage, to draw attention to animal abuse or to liberate animals. Mitting complimented her on being so concise and accurate.

Rayner reported that the LAA attended events over a wide geographical area (because he drove them, Hildreth points out), and that LAA’s presence increased the chance of an ’emotional and confrontational’ response at an event. She says he’s being ludicrously over-dramatic.

LAA shared an office with London Greenpeace, and Rayner reported that Hildreth co-managed the office. Once again, she took issue with the mischaracterisation, as if everything was formalised and regimented. She says the office wasn’t really ‘managed’ as such, LAA would use it, and not much more than that.

Rayner singled Hildreth out in a report as a ‘capable, aggressive and dynamic’ LAA activist who ‘can be considered an ALF activist’. She took especial umbrage at this, explaining that she never threatened anyone, and that being a bit loud isn’t the same thing as being aggressive. Furthermore, she explained, it’s misogynist, he wouldn’t say that about a man with the same disposition.

She added that she wasn’t ALF either. Clearly, the ALF was such a bogeyman to the spycops and the wider establishment that officers were keen to say they’d found the activists.

LIVE ANIMAL EXPORTS

From January to October 1995 the port of Brightlingsea was the scene of large and sustained protests against the export of live animals. A Rayner report on an LAA monthly planning meeting in March of that year described their active support for the protests, and that a rota of drivers had been drawn up to take members there.

One of the listed drivers is Rayner, another is HN26 ‘Christine Green’. Hildreth says she mostly remembers Rayner doing it, and that she can’t really remember Green.

 

Rayner says he was an LAA bank account signatory. Hildreth says she can’t remember if that’s true, but says it’s likely, it fits with what he was like.

We’ve seen from earlier Inquiry hearings that spycops would often take on the role of treasurer in a group. It gave them access to information about who was donating money, and often to subscription and membership lists, along with people’s bank account details. Also, like the van driving, it was a practical role that didn’t require any political knowledge or insight.

The Inquiry showed two reports containing details of Hildreth’s living arrangements . One, from May 1993, said she was about to go on holiday for a month and plans to live in a squat afterwards. She says it’s not true, and indeed it wasn’t something she could have done because she had a residential job at the time. She went on holiday, but not for a month.

That detail and the squat reference seem to be gratuitously making her look like a slacker. Rayner absolutely knew the truth about her address as, ever helpful with his van, he had helped her move house. She points out that as well as being untrue, none of this reporting had any relevance to animal rights.

MISOGYNIST AND LIAR

Andy Coles’ recent witness statement to the Inquiry (para 172) reiterates his claim that he was LAA organiser and newsletter author, shared with Hildreth and one other person. She says he didn’t do either of those things and had minimal involvement in the group. She wouldn’t want to work with him anyway, she tried to avoid him, so it’s possible he did things when she wasn’t there.

Coles also says he held the LAA membership and subscription list. This is yet another exaggeration, Hildreth explains. He had no formal role but, like anyone who spent time in the office, he did have opportunity to get hold of copies of the lists.

Hildreth says she went hunt sabbing with Coles once, but never felt comfortable around him. He was a bit odd, and would say odd things, e.g. a story about his dog: that its original owner had died and the dog had started eating its owner’s body.

She said Coles was a misogynist, and that his witness statement to the Inquiry this year shows he still is. At the time, she warned other women who knew him that he couldn’t be trusted around them.

She was much closer to Rayner, and told him that Coles gave her the creeps and was less respectful of women than other men. Rayner seemed unsurprised. In his witness statement of 2022, he recalls her saying at the time that Coles was creepy; ‘it felt like she described him with a shudder’

Hildreth remembers a night out in Camden with seven or eight other women and them talking about Coles and how unsafe he made them feel.

Asked about ‘Jessica’, who was deceived into a relationship by Coles at the time, Hildreth knew her as a campaigner rather than as a friend. It was clear Jessica was young, in her late teens. Hildreth said it was also clear that Jessica was in a relationship with Coles but she was never close enough a friend to have discussed it.

The Inquiry brought up Hildreth’s 2018 statement to police, in which she said it wasn’t obvious to her that Jessica and Coles were a couple, and suggest her memory has been influenced by subsequent knowledge. Hildreth seemed to concede the point.

Regarding other relationships, a Rayner report of 11 May 1993 said Hildreth had consoled Liz after a traumatic life event. His participation in that was the beginning of his deceiving Liz into a relationship. However, Hildreth can’t remember this at all.

MISSING MATT

Rayner was already in LBAG when Hildreth joined. He was always a generous person and she looked forward to time with him. Beyond their activism, he spent a lot of time with her at her home, and they socialised together.

Rayner’s departure from his deployment was perhaps the most elaborate of any known spycop.

He said he was moving to France and, after a farewell party with comrades in November 1996, took two activists with him to the port, where they saw him get stopped and questioned by Special Branch officers. Presumably this was a stunt to lend credibility to his emigration.

As with other spycops, letters arrived to old friends from the new country, but Rayner kept it up for a year, including a move to Argentina from where a letter arrived saying he had found a new partner. In reality, of course, he’d been back at Scotland Yard the whole time.

Seeing the secret police reports now, Hildreth says it goes far beyond what’s justifiable. After the unmasking of Mark Kennedy in 2010, the first spycop to be publicly exposed, she started to wonder about Rayner. She eventually found out it was true but still couldn’t accept it and was in denial for a long time. It made her feel stupid for being fooled.

Hildreth had missed her friend. She used to Google him, in vain, but always hoped he was doing well and that she’d see him again.

At this point in her testimony, Hildreth stopped, in tears. She then said that Rayner’s recent disclosure, seeing the horrible things he said about people he spied on, had finally made her fully accept the truth.

It was difficult to hear that final part of Hildreth’s evidence, not just for her pain at but because it is so similar to what we’ve heard from other people who were spied on. Whether it was sexual relationships or close friendships, the spycops deliberately created personal bonds that had nothing to do with gathering intelligence.

Finding out someone you were close to was an undercover officer is devastating. It’s a peculiar form of bereavement, the person you loved isn’t just gone but they never actually existed. The person who was actually in your life was only ever a paid actor, tasked to undermine what you hold most dear.

Even more troubling than hearing from people who were spied on describing their loss, we’ve heard one officer after another testify on this and it is clear that it didn’t occur to them what it would do to people when they disappeared. They still seem unable to conceive of what it’s like to genuinely care about someone other than yourself.

Hildreth told the Inquiry that the personal impact is hard to explain to those who haven’t experienced it. Reliving it for the Inquiry has intensified that. The emotional impact is huge. The betrayal of friendship and trust, it’s unacceptable. Truth and the Inquiry have taken a toll on her mental health.

CONCLUSIONS

The Inquiry Chair, Sir John Mitting, said that they’re learning that retelling these experiences in such a forum is hard for people in her position. He complimented her for being so clear.

With that, Hildreth’s evidence was complete. Her testimony took less than two hours. Lambert had taken a cumulative six days, and Mitting’s final comments alluded to this:

‘If everybody gave answers as directly and in as straightforward a manner as you… my task would be a great deal easier’.

If Mitting wants succinct direct answers then maybe he should stop indulging the tactical ditherers playing Anti Just A Minute wasting hours with hesitation, repetition and deviation. If he interjected more, as other inquiry chairs do, it would keep the whole thing on course.

Rayner is due to give evidence to the Inquiry 15-17 January 2025.

Coles is scheduled for 18-20 December 2024.

At the Undercover Policing Inquiry, Monday 9 December was devoted to the evidence of two witnesses, ‘Callum’ and ‘Walter’, who had been involved in hunt saboteur activity in the 1980s.

There were a lot of restrictions on what could be reported in order to protect the identity of the witnesses. They were in the hearing room behind a screen. We’re doing separate reports for them.

RECAP

This was the Monday of the seventh week of ‘Tranche 2 Phase 2’, the new round of hearings of the Undercover Policing Inquiry (UCPI). This Phase mainly concentrates on examining the animal rights-focused activities of the Metropolitan Police’s secret political unit, the Special Demonstration Squad, from 1983-92.

The UCPI is an independent, judge-led inquiry into undercover policing in England and Wales. Its main focus is the activity of two units who deployed long-term undercover officers into a variety of political groups; the Special Demonstration Squad (SDS, 1968-2008) and the National Public Order Intelligence Unit (NPOIU, 1999-2011). Spycops from these units lived as activists for years at a time, spying on more than 1,000 groups.

Click here for the day’s video, transcripts and written evidence

WHICH SPYCOPS

Callum has submitted a 74 page witness statement and 14 exhibits (photos, etc) to the Inquiry.

He started by saying that has been involved in animal rights and hunt sabbing since the early 1980s. Additionally, he was part of the anti poll tax campaign in 1990.

Callum was mostly spied on by officer HN2 Andy Coles, but was also reported on by HN10 Bob Lambert, HN5 John Dines, HN87 ‘John Lipscomb’, and HN17.

HUNT SABBING

He started hunt sabbing aged 17, having seen a Hunt Saboteurs Association (HSA) advert in the Daily Mirror and then joining his local group.

The HSA was the first animal rights organisation, founded in 1963. It aimed to centralise the movement and share tactics. It was a time long before social media, and the mainstream media didn’t report on it, so street stalls, leaflets, gigs, and zines were the main methods of communication.

The HSA published a magazine, Howl, mostly discussing tactics. The organisation was always very democratic.

Callum explained how sabs would use various methods to distract the hunters’ hounds, such as hunting horns, sprays to cover scent, and recording of hounds in cry to distract.

Sabs did not want to get into confrontations with hunters – to do so would distract from saving the animals. The idea was to stay away from the hunt and observe, so they could accurately judge where to intervene between the hunt and the fox.

Hunters, on the other hand, were often violent to sabs (something that continues to the present day). Callum described how they’d be charged down by horses and whipped. Sometimes hunters would get off and assault sabs. Their terriermen would try to corner sabs and attack them. Hunt supporters also used to get involved, blocking, assaulting, and sometimes hiring people to come and attack sabs.

Callum never saw sabs initiate violence. He was also clear that self defence isn’t violence.

After particularly serious violence or egregious behaviour by a hunt, sabs would call for a ‘joint hit’ – the next time the hunt met, sab groups would come from far and wide to show that such attacks would only mean greater disruption to the hunt.

Sabs didn’t want the police to know their plans in advance because police were invariably on the hunters’ side, and after the Criminal Justice Act 1994 introduced the offence of aggravated trespass, sabs would get pre-emptively arrested.

Callum used to get phone calls from police officers on a Friday telling him if he turned up to a certain hunt that weekend he would be arrested just for being there. This illustrates his point that it wasn’t about what was legal, but that the police took the side of the hunters irrespective of the law.

In private documents the police are clearly aware of which side is the violent one, but all the stuff written for external consumption demonises the sabs. The Special Demonstration Squad’s annual reports to the Home Office talk about ‘serious violence’ happening, implying it’s the sabs committing it rather than the other side.

We’ve already heard from spycop Bob Lambert that the HSA was actually ‘entirely lawful’.

LIPSCOMB’S LIES

Callum and other hunt sabs were spied on by HN87 ‘John Lipscomb,’ and we were shown a report submitted by him [MPS0743621], of a discussion of tactics that took place between around 35 hunt sabs in April 1988.

Under the subheading ‘Violence’, the report says that ‘many of the saboteurs present had recently received a trashing from farm hands hired by the Surrey and Burstow Hunt. Callu advocated that all saboteurs should arm themselves with heavy tsicks every time they entered a wood’.

It goes on to note that Callum ‘frequently carries a 12 inch spanner tucked inside his boot’. Callum dismissed the suggestion of the spanner outright, saying ‘the idea is ridiculous’.

He confirmed that he did recommend carrying sticks when going into woods though. He explained that in open country you can see the hunters and avoid them – ‘get at least a fence between you and them’, he advised – but in woodland you can’t tell if people are close by. Entering unarmed and facing the prospect of coming up against a group of terriermen armed with spades, sabs would be less likely to be attacked if carrying a piece of wood.

Having been hospitalised, had bones broken, been stabbed and shot at by hunters and their supporters, Callum was keen to deter further violence. He re-emphasised that seeking confrontation would only have distracted from the point of being there, to save the hunted animals. Avoidance is the first tactic, a fight is bad tactics.

Lipscomb also wrote an end of season summary of hunt sabbing for Special Branch’s C Squad [MPS0743655, 14 May 1989]. In it, he talks about the decline of one hunt sab group as a ‘boost, from the police point of view’.

The report talks of discord between groups, attributed to Callum’s violence. In fact, Callum explained, one person at another group had done a deal with police not wear masks or carry hound whips to steer hounds. Callum’s group didn’t see the benefit, and anyway no group can make agreements on behalf of others. His group still worked with many others.

Lipscomb’s witness statement to the Inquiry says the group sought out violence and were a public order issue wherever they went.

Callum dismissed the claim. He recalled that the sabs needed to find ways to reduce the hunts’ violence, so they would try to counter the impression that all sabs were weedy, feeble vegans, incapable of defending themselves.

They got camouflage jackets and masks to look identical, which didn’t just make them look a bit more intimidating, it also meant the hunters couldn’t easily tell which sabs were women, and they were reluctant to hit women so would err on the side of caution. It also made it hard to identify individual sabs for arrest.

He recounted one incident of him being badly wounded by masked hunt supporters. The police arrived and even the ambulance driver had to tell them to leave Callum alone. The police didn’t take any action or even investigate, until Callum wrote to his MP about this matter.

Callum had seen the unmasked face of one of these attacker, someone he recognised as one of two ‘whippers in’ employed by a Hunt. The police brought the other whipper-in to an identity parade. Callum addressed the man by name and explained why he was innocent. He named the guilty man, but nothing happened. The police never arrested anyone, let alone charged them.

BRIXTON HUNT SABS

Brixton sabs were renowned for their supposed aggression in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Other groups used this reputation, telling sketchy hunters that Brixton were coming, and it made the hunters back off. They were trying to reduce violence, and it worked.

HN87 ‘John Lipscomb’ says in his witness statement that Brixton sabs would trash cars and were a constant threat to public order because of their hatred of rich people and the hunt, and general desire for violence.

Callum scoffed at this. If those things happened it would have been reported, yet there are no such press reports. He says it was all ‘smoke and mirrors’.

In reality, it was just another hunt sab group, no different from the rest. But the word ‘Brixton’ had resonances for hunters. It implied criminality, drugs, city living, Black people – all things that scared rural bigots.

ALF

Hunt sabs were described by police as ‘the link’ between the animal rights movement in general and the Animal Liberation Front.

Callum says there was certainly a link, animal rights was a new community and quite amorphous. Sabbing wasn’t a gateway to the ALF though. One again at the Inquiry, it’s clear the police see movements as being like them, with specialist units and assigned ranked roles. Activism isn’t like that at all.

We were shown a Special Demonstration Squad briefing note written by HN2 Andy Coles, possibly with contributions from others [MPS0245213]. It claims most ALF activists come through the HSA because sabbing is a ‘fertile training ground for militant activism’.

Yet Callum was the only sab in his ALF group, so it’s really not much of a ‘fertile ground’.

He said that his motivation was to save animals and change people minds. He saw ALF raids – going into farms or labs in the dead of night and taking animals away – were very effective. His first two arrests had been for simply leafleting. Being peaceful and law abiding didn’t preclude arrest, so he thought he might as well do more radical action, directly saving lives and with less risk of arrest.

Callum emphasised that it was non-violent. They did the minimum damage to get access, rescued as many animals as they had homes for, then went back in and did graffiti and damage as ‘economic sabotage’. He said that if that counts as ‘violence ‘then the RSPCA kicking a door in to save a trapped dog is also violence.

If they had just taken animals and not done the graffiti as well, a battery chicken farmer might not even have noticed the 100 missing chickens from the thousands at the farm, and it would be no loss as they were only worth pennies each.

They never confronted anyone, if they saw security patrols then they called it all off.

POLL TAX IMPRISONMENT

Callum said that, frustrated at the police’s refusal to act against a hunter who’d severely assaulted him, he intended to use incendiary devices to damage the hunter’s vehicle in the dead of night. This plan would later prove to be his undoing.

The Poll Tax was one of the most unfair and hated policies of the Thatcher government. The Prime Minister had called it her ‘flagship policy’. It replaced local council rates – taxation based on property value – and replaced them with a fixed charge per person. A family of four adults in a terraced house would pay four times as much as a single person living in a mansion.

A police report on the huge protest against the Poll Tax in March 1990 says Brixton hunt sabs were there having ‘opportunist’ involvement in fighting with police.

Callum says it’s just further demonisation of the Brixton group. Again, the police are thinking regimentally. In reality, he was there on his own, not with sabs. He remembers the march as well-mannered. But at Trafalgar Square police surrounded the protesters and closed in.

HN5 John Dines – who was arrested undercover on the day – says people were punching, kicking and throwing stuff before the police waded in. Callum laughed at the gall of the claim, it’s well established that the police provoked the protesters, and he pointed out that a BBC documentary had proved that.

The police were doing snatch squads, darting into crowds and pulling someone out for arrest, attacking those nearby with truncheons. Callum saw a sergeant knock a woman to the ground and continue to beat her.

Callum got between them, the officer swung for Callum, who punched him back. In the ensuing retaliation and arrest Callum sustained a bruised head and cut hand. He was not arrested on the Poll Tax march, but was arrested months later at home. His home was searched and the incendiary devices found. Like so many arrested for the Poll Tax protest, he was given a lengthy prison sentence.

HN87 ‘John Lipscomb’ thinks he identified Callum from photos of the protest he was shown at an SDS meeting. We were shown the SDS annual report 1990-91 that claims that it was evidence from their officers that led to the arrest.

Callum says the spycops’ reporting on him would have had a significant impact on his sentencing, if that had been revealed in court. One again, police withheld evidence from a court case that the defence had a right to see. This is a miscarriage of justice.

AFTER PRISON

He remembers getting a lot of mail sent to him when he was inside, ten letters a day, books and magazines, and a massive pile of Christmas cards. That feeling of solidarity was essential for his mental health.

After getting out, his natural instinct was to ‘pay back’ this support by helping others in the same way.

He pointed out that if you look at any progressive movement there is always some illegality. Even if you don’t agree 100% with what someone’s done, it’s important for their movement to look after them when they’re in prison.

Callum says he has never done anything illegal since coming out of prison. He had a son, and started a career. He wanted to pay back the support he had in prison, so started helping out with the ALF Supporters Group (ALFSG).

He explained that the ALFSG was fundamentally about supporting ALF prisoners. Sections of the constitution were read aloud that make that clear. They tried to raise enough money to support animal rights prisoners in a wide range of ways, such as helping them access vegan food and toiletries while they were inside, money for travel expenses, phone calls, postage, etc.

The £24 a year membership was a lot at the time, so most of their members were older people with good jobs.

They produced a newsletter, but had it carefully vetted by lawyers to ensure there was nothing that could be seen as incitement.

HN2 ANDY COLES

Callum has supplied a photo of a party held to celebrate his release from prison. HN2 Andy Coles is in the photo, and Callum thinks this is the first time they met. However he doesn’t recall speaking to him on this occasion.

Callum first spoke to Coles on an animal rights info stall when Coles, as was standard for spycops, had a van and offered the use of it as a way to ingratiate himself. Callum said this was very useful transporting all the merchandise for stalls, or making the lengthy trip to London to collect the ALFSG newsletter from the printer.

We were shown a report by Coles [MPS0745986] saying Callum had returned to hunt sabbing now his probation over, and he was ‘itching to have a go at hunt heavies’ and wants to be generally violent.

Coles’s witness statement to the Inquiry [UCPI035074 page 106, para 224] said he ‘slogged his guts out’ to become second in command of the ALFSG, doing the admin and keeping the membership records with a computer bought from campaign funds.

Callum says Coles is lying about all of this. There was no hierarchy with a second in command, nor a computer bought by the Group. At most, Coles would have seen address labels when he was doing the quarterly envelope stuffing for the newsletter. That was the limit of his admin work.

Coles claims to have helped write the ALFSG newsletter, Callum says that’s nonsense. He could have submitted an article like anyone else, but doesn’t remember that he did.

It’s apparent that Coles lied about other things too – for example he’s reported that ALF activists informed people that they planned to do actions before actually doing them.

Callum was very clear that there was a ‘very strict security culture’ amongst animal rights activists at this time. Nobody talked about the actions they had done, never mind those they hadn’t even done yet. And those, like him, who weren’t actively involved did not need or want to know!

The ALFSG had initially been set up just to support ‘ALF’ prisoners, but mergedtheir prisoner list with the Support Animal Rights Prisoners (SARP) one, and broadened itssupport to include hunt sabs and other animal rights prisoners. The ALFSG was a public, wholly law abiding group. Coles basically spent three years watching Callum do legal activity.

‘I’m surprised he wasn’t pulled out after 12 months because it’s not telling them anything about me… I’m sort of an absence in his reports, which is odd, you know, you think he’d be saying lots about me, what I was doing, but there’s very little about me actually, because I wasn’t doing anything which could bring me to the attention of the police.’

TACTICAL EXAGGERATION AND LIES

Coles said he visited animal rights prisoner Robin Lane with Robin’s wife. It was actually Callum who went. Once again, we see undercover officers taking real events and putting the wrong name in – either claiming they did something so they appear more involved, or else doing something criminal and then attributing to others.

This is now looking like tradecraft rather than many individuals stumbling on the same tactic. Either way, it must’ve felt so easy for them, how would the bosses ever know what was true (unless a public inquiry eventually put the documents to the people involved)? Three of the officers we’ve seen who did a lot of this – Bob Lambert, Roger Pearce and Andy Coles – were promoted to Special Branch management roles where they had long and successful careers.

Coles reported a list of people contacting the ALFSG wanting to find out how to become ALF activists. Callum says this is talking as if they were applying to be members of the ALF, which is risible. He said there was only the occasional person doing anything like that, and that they used to politely decline. They couldn’t have done that even if they wanted to. Also, the enquirer’s sense of security was so poor you wouldn’t want to work with them anyway!

Coles reported that a group of people who were planning an attack on a meat facility asked if they’d have ALFSG support if they were imprisoned for it. Callum says that too was ridiculous on several levels. Firstly, they’d already know that prisoners were supported.

But more to the point, for security reasons, activists did not tell people in advance about actions. The ALFSG could only find out who did an action after it happened, if the people were arrested and imprisoned. Again, there was a very strict security culture for everybody’s sake. They didn’t want to know who did what!

Coles claims he was given an ALF spycatcher role, and talked of a prospective trip to Belfast to investigate a suspected mole. Police records show that management declined permission, saying it was too risky for him to go.

Callum says there was no ‘spycatcher’ involved in the case, let alone any chance of Coles going. In reality, eight people had been arrested for ALF action. They’d been badly abused in the cells with beatings and being burned with cigarettes. One of them had given full statement incriminating others in order to protect themselves and get a lesser sentence.

The ALFSG did not support ‘grasses’. Callum went to find out what happened and agreed the ALFSG would not support that prisoner. This person was not an ‘informer’, just someone who grassed very readily in order to protect themselves and get a lesser sentence.

Once again, a spycop exaggerates what’s going on and takes credit for someone else’s deeds in order to seem important.

Callum was frequently stopped by the police at the time, presumably because the police thought he was still an ALF activist. Coles was ideally placed to tell the police that he wasn’t, but doing so would have undermined the stories he was telling his bosses.

COLES’S RELATIONSHIPS

Callum was asked about Coles claiming at the time that he’d had a one night stand with a known animal rights activist. Callum hadn’t previously noticed Coles having any romantic or sexual interest in anyone, and he’d thought Coles might be gay. This was the only time he heard anything sexual from Coles.

Callum says Coles never told him about being any kind of ongoing relationship. He’d said he was a delivery driver, who moved around a lot, and being single fitted with his lifestyle. He didn’t seem interested in a relationship.

Here’s an officer spying for years who didn’t appear to Callum to ever have a relationship, and Callum thought that was fine. So much for other officers saying having relationships was vital to establish credibility and acceptance.

FAMILY INTRUSION

Coles visited Callum at his home and at his parents’ home. He says it was totally unnecessary for Coles to name and report on his young son, who was under six when Coles left. His excuse was that it was to identify Callum’s partner.

We were shown a long, hand written letter, supposedly sent from Budapest on 1 January 1996, from Andy to Callum, his partner and child.

It says he was glad to hear Callum was well, as he said he was going to leave the country with little detail.

He says he didn’t believe it when, years later, he was told Andy Coles was a spycop. Even when he was shown photos he couldn’t quite accept that this man who came over their house, walked their dog, and played with their son had been doing it all as a paid police role.

Callum highlighted the fact that Andy Coles doesn’t really report anything much about him or his partner. What was he doing in spending so much time with them? How can he justify befriending a young family for three years?

‘it’s a betrayal of a friendship… this is somebody we considered a friend, he came to our house, we walked our dogs together, he played with our son and we had no ill feelings about him whatsoever, there was nothing we can say “oh yeah Andy, he was a bit of a twat” or something, you know, it was a case of he’s a nice guy, helped us out and then went abroad…

Now it’s all tainted… it changes the view of your life.’