Tranche 3 Phase 2, Day 1
2 February 2026

The Undercover Policing Inquiry (UCPI) resumed for a new set of hearings on Monday 2 February 2026. Designated as ‘Tranche 3 Phase 2’, these hearings examine the final 15 years of the Special Demonstration Squad (1993-2008).

This opening day was devoted to questioning Joe Batty, a trade unionist, socialist and anti-fascist activist who was spied on by undercover police officer HN104 Carlo Soracchi, cover name ‘Carlo Neri’, who was deployed 2000-2006.

Batty has provided a written witness statement to the Inquiry [UCPI0000037742].

The UCPI is an independent, judge-led inquiry into undercover policing in England and Wales. Its main focus is the activity of two units who deployed long-term undercover officers into a variety of political groups: the Special Demonstration Squad (SDS, 1968-2008) and the National Public Order Intelligence Unit (NPOIU, 1999-2011). Spycops from these units lived as activists for years at a time, spying on more than 1,000 groups.

Batty was questioned by Tim Salisbury, Deputy First Junior Counsel to the Inquiry.

BACKGROUND

Batty grew up in Greater Manchester in the 1970s and was first politicised by the National Front leafleting his school. He and some friends made counter-leaflets to distribute to pupils. He went to some Anti-Nazi League meetings but did not become a member or activist with any group at the time.

As a young adult, he got a supermarket job and joined the GMB, as membership of the union was mandatory at his workplace. This involvement drew him to socialist politics and he became a GMB branch president, representing workers in disputes and negotiating with employers and government officials.

He went to Oxford University’s Ruskin College, and on to the University of Kent for a degree in British labour history and modern politics. While there, he became friends with Dan Gillman, who gave evidence to the Inquiry in November 2025.

The pair held office in the university’s Labour Club and significantly built up its membership. They also organised coach travel to the large demonstration against the British National Party (BNP) in Welling, South London, on 16 October 1993. Batty and Gillman took responsibility for stewarding the people they’d brought to the protest.

In response to the rise in far-right activity, including attacks on local people, they created Kent Anti-Fascist Action Committee:

‘When I was at Ruskin College and at the University of Kent, I studied fascism. It wasn’t something new to me. I understood what it meant.

I also understood the history of fascism in the UK and what it had done over the historical period. So it was natural that I would want to make sure that it didn’t go off the political agenda.’

In 1993, Batty began working in homelessness, first in Cheltenham and then in London. He remained an active trade unionist, and also helped Youth Against Racism in Europe with stewarding of meetings and protests.

Over the next couple of years, fascist activity died down, yet Batty did not reduce his antifascist activity:

‘Myself and Dan and others recognised that history tells us when the far right is no longer successful electorally, it retrenches to violence.

You know what, I hate to say I am right, but that’s literally what they did, with the bombings that Copeland and his cohort – because I don’t believe he acted alone – were involved in.’

NO PLATFORM

At the end of the 1990s, Batty helped to found No Platform. As we’ve heard so many activists do at the Inquiry (with debatable levels of success), Batty explained that it was wrong to think of his group as a formal organisation:

‘There were about a dozen people or so who may have been the mainstays of it, but it really wasn’t a static organisation with cards and the constitution.

So we drew from people who were interested in being involved in one thing and one thing only, and that was stopping the far right having control of communities in the streets.’

These people had a variety of social backgrounds and political perspectives, united by that sole criterion.

We’re shown a police report by Carlo Soracchi [MPS-0003710], dated 1 August 2000:

‘Frank Smith, a member of the Socialist Party away team has helped to form a new anti-fascist organisation entitled No Platform. The group comprises disaffected members of London Anti-Fascist Action and members from the away team…

The aim of the group is to provide a powerful stewarding arm for left wing public order protests and to undertake the targeting of right wing individuals.’

For so few words, this elicits quite a lot of unpacking by Batty. Firstly, it shows that the spycops, even more than the Inquiry, can only think of groups as regimented and hierarchically structured institutions with official membership. This is not how most activist groups work.

Batty flatly rejects the allegation of targeting right-wing individuals. He also questions the use of ‘away team’ as denoting a formal group, saying it’s only become familiar to him recently from seeing the paperwork at the Inquiry. It was a loose term used occasionally to describe event stewards, yet spycops talk like it was some defined loyal gang of hardened hooligans.

Batty adds that there were indeed some people in No Platform who’d done Anti-Fascist Action work, but ‘disaffected members’ is another inaccurate description.

The group was named No Platform after an existing strategic understanding, aiming to deny the far right legitimacy by preventing them from speaking on public platforms or becoming part of the regular discourse.

STOPPING THE FASCISTS GATHERING

Batty gives examples of the work: shutting down gigs of fascist bands, and occupying the ‘redirection points’ where fascists met prior to going to meetings at secret locations.

He says there would be ‘handbags at paces’ – posturing and taunting – but he doesn’t remember any physical violence.

Often the police would see potential conflict and clear the area entirely, which No Platform were happy about as it meant the fascists couldn’t meet up.

He stresses that they wanted to avoid violence as it would be counterproductive in a community they were trying to defend, and to make it clear that the fascists were the troublemakers.

Simply by turning up at the secret meeting point, No Platform made it apparent to the fascists that they had informers in their midst. This sowed distrust and helped the groups to disintegrate.

Batty is emphatic that these tactics prevented the spread of far-right activity. He points out that when anti-fascists stopped being active in Barking and Dagenham there was a groundswell of far-right support and soon afterwards a BNP presence on the local council, leading to a concerted effort by the party to get their leader Nick Griffin elected there.

He adds that the majority of No Platform work was just stewarding events and involved no confrontation at all.

Batty worked with No Platform on about thirty events over the space of five years until he left London around 2005. The work would generally involve being aware of meetings or protests that might be attacked by fascists and making sure that they had proper stewarding to ensure things happened safely.

Soracchi joined the stewarding groups and befriended Batty. Soracchi’s witness statement to the Inquiry [UCPI0000035550] describes Batty as the ‘main organiser’ for both No Platform and the Socialist Party away team. Batty says the latter is absolutely untrue.

As for Batty’s position within No Platform, a Soracchi report [MPS-0010730] says that Gillman has stepped down and Batty is now its ‘leading activist’. Batty again highlights the fundamental misunderstanding in the phrase, and explains that there was no leadership at all, just people who were consistently available, organising together.

The Inquiry showed a spycop report, presumably Soracchi’s [MPS-0005753], about an anti-fascist counter-demonstration in central London on 14 April 2001:

‘Current No Platform tactics are to locate the meeting point for fascists and then to attack them before they get anywhere near the location of the march.’

Batty hasn’t seen the document before. With the Inquiry now rushing, it is no longer providing witnesses with all the relevant documents, and it has started hearing evidence even though the hearing bundles are incomplete, undermining the potential for getting considered answers.

Batty takes issue with the report’s incendiary terms, saying that they would go to disrupt the meet-up by being at the meeting point, but this is a long way from ‘attacking’, something he declares impossible anyway as No Platform would have only had a dozen people at most.

Some of No Platform’s information about fascist activity came from Searchlight, a group that specialised in gathering intelligence about the far-right.

This exchange was done on an informal basis, though Soracchi’s reports [MPS-0009903] characteristically misrepresent it as being much more formal, as if Batty and Smith had organised delegations to some kind of Searchlight briefing meetings, and furthermore [MPS-0010590] were ‘relishing’ the prospect of going to occupy fascist meeting points.

Batty is clear that the work was not something done with glee or as a fun leisure activity:

‘That would make you sound like you were waiting and willing for some sort of action and that we were addicted to fighting with the fascists. I have to tell you, I have never been particularly a great fan of fighting with anybody.’

EXAGGERATION OF VIOLENCE AND DANGER

After Soracchi’s deployment ended, he compiled a timeline of his activity [MPS-0071194]. In it, he described how No Platform would put stickers and posters up in an area where fascists were present, and would then target fascist election canvassers.

Once again, Batty recognises some of the descriptions but rejects Soracchi’s claims of deliberately seeking aggression and violence. This isn’t just a No Platform principle or about trying to avoid arrest and its impacts on employment and personal lives; he points out that it would be counter-productive too:

‘If we were to engage in assaulting candidates, that would then turn into a huge political issue that would, I am sure, garner sympathy for the very people we were campaigning against. So as a tactic, it’s just not right.’

Pressing the point, Counsel shows another Soracchi report that the Inquiry had failed to disclose to Batty in advance, dated 18 June 2001 [MPS-0006121]. It specifies a plan to target the BNP in Bethnal Green. Batty is aghast and dismayed:

‘I don’t know where to begin with this statement. I don’t know where he comes up with this sometimes. I mean, I spent literally hours with Carlo… talking through the political processes as to why violence of this ilk is just counter-productive…

The legitimate process, which I have said time and time again now, is occupying spaces for a defensive purpose to enable the community to feel safe and to enable us to feel safe about going about our business.’

He explains that attacking fascist candidates’ homes would provoke retaliation on their own homes. It would create more fear and violence in the community, the exact thing that they were seeking to dispel.

He points out that part of Soracchi’s backstory was that he’d been involved in the Italian Red Brigades, a group notorious for kidnappings, kneecappings and other serious crime. Batty and others had repeatedly explained to Soracchi that such things have no commonality with the British socialist movement.

Counsel asked about No Platform’s disruption of the BNP’s ‘Red White and Blue festival’ in 2001, a neo-Nazi event held on BNP leader Nick Griffin’s land in Wales [MPS-0006469].

No Platform did not intend to attack the event in any way (apart from anything else, they were outnumbered and they feared the violent neo-Nazi group Combat 18 would be providing security). The plan was simply to picket the entrances, to show that there was opposition to fascism that would be present wherever fascists gathered.

They didn’t manage it because they were turned back by police. Batty is scathing about this acceptance of fascist action with the police stymieing opposition. There were racist attacks and bombings in London, and the BNP spawned National Action, a group that was eventually proscribed under the Terrorism Act, yet the police targeted the antifascists.

The Inquiry took a break, during which Tom Fowler made this video of summary and analysis with Dan Gillman:

Early in his undercover deployment, Soracchi shared a flat in Homerton with another SDS officer, HN77 ‘Jackie Anderson’. Soracchi says that his comrades believed he and ‘Anderson’ were in a relationship, but Batty has no memory of her at all. Anderson was deployed 2000-2005, infiltrating anarchist groups such as the W.O.M.B.L.E.S. and Earth First! (EF!), and worked alongside NPOIU officer Mark Kennedy.

Both EF! and the W.O.M.B.L.E.S. have applied to be included as core participants in this Inquiry, but so far that has been refused. It seems that neither the police nor the Inquiry have been able to contact Anderson at all since the Inquiry began.

FIRST CONTACT

Soracchi’s deployment timeline [MPS-0071194] records that he first made contact with Batty and others on an asylum seekers’ rights march in central London in June 2000.

Batty’s first memory of Soracchi is a social visit to the second flat Soracchi had while undercover, on Narrow Way in Hackney.

Whistleblower spycop HN43 Peter Francis has described how, before being deployed, an officer would be briefed on particular people they wanted to get close to. These people would often be respected activists, targeted because their acceptance of the spycop would make others in the group more likely to be immediately welcoming and trusting.

The briefing would include details of the targeted person’s personal taste outside politics. By pretending to share their interests, likes, and dislikes, the spycop manipulated an instant bond of affinity into existence, encouraging friendship beyond being just another comrade.

Over the course of the Inquiry and in the books written by women deceived into relationships, we’ve seen a lot of evidence that this was standard spycop tradecraft.

Batty says he initially bonded with Soracchi over a shared passion for cycling, and Soracchi had a bike on a trainer treadmill in his flat.

Soracchi was a welcome addition to the social group and their stewarding of events:

‘Having a steward on a demonstration who is, you know, heavy and heavily set, is an asset because you don’t want the group to be attacked. So it’s another barrier between us and trouble.’

We moved on to a report by Soracchi from nearly 18 months later, 26 November 2001 [MPS-0007391], in which he describes a No Platform meeting and names ten people and their formal roles in the organisation.

He is not only, yet again, making it sound much more formal and rigid than it really was, he also lists himself as having been appointed as ‘volunteer to assist with communications’.

Batty is baffled by it, saying that the meeting happened but that the details are wholly false.

THE INDISPENSABLE DRIVER

Batty adds that Soracchi did have a specific responsibility for transport, as he was the only person there with a large, reliable vehicle.

This too is standard spycop tradecraft. Sometimes (as with Soracchi) it was an estate car, but more commonly it was a van. This was SDS practice as early as HN354 Vince Miller ‘Vince Harvey’ who was deployed in 1976, and it continued all the way through to EN12 Mark Kennedy ‘Mark Stone’ (2003-2009). HN2 Andy Coles was so useful with his that he was known among those he spied on as ‘Andy Van’.

Activists were generally not well off, so a dependable functioning vehicle was very useful. The driver would be the one of the first to be told about any plans for which travel was needed. They would pick people up and drop them off, thus learning all the home addresses.

More than one SDS officer deliberately dropped a target off last in order to spend time alone with them and get more information. HN10 Bob Lambert ‘Bob Robinson’ did that with ‘Jacqui’, and other officers are also known to have done this as a way of initiating intimate and sexual relationships.

Beyond all this, having a vehicle and being involved in logistics gave spycops a subject to talk about in detail that didn’t require any political understanding.

Batty says Soracchi was diligent about attending meetings, which were then reported on, but less motivated to attend events. As the group was so small, around a dozen pepople at most, Soracchi inevitably helped to influence and steer its direction.

Soracchi’s written witness statement to the Inquiry [UCPI0000035550] claims that the groups he spied on were criminal, including committing Actual Bodily Harm and Grievous Bodily Harm. Batty rejects this outright.

Counsel seemingly enjoys collecting rebuttals on the exact same topic and returns to a report of Soracchi’s [MPS-0010730] which claims Batty wants to make No Platform into a secret terrorist organisation:

‘Batty is aware that London No Platform needs a successful public action to attract numbers to the group, but is very much taken by the notion of a small committed cadre carrying out raids ‘in the living rooms’ of the far right.

He is aware that the state might well regard such acts as terrorism and react accordingly, but the recent rise in popularity and street presence of the extreme right wing might, he believes, leave anti-fascists with no other option.’

Batty patiently reiterates to Counsel that not only is it untrue but – as he’d also explained to Soracchi at the time – on a tactical level it would undermine the purpose of the group because such activity invites reaction in kind, including attacks on his and his comrades’ families, something he wanted to avoid at all costs.

‘It is just a nonsense. It looks like he’s justifying his placement within No Platform and within the left wing in general.

I really don’t recognise that statement and I take offence at it being written about me.’

THE COCK TAVERN INCIDENT

Counsel moved on to discuss a series of Soracchi’s reports. The first of these was about disorder at The Cock Tavern on 16 December 2000. It was a venue used by the left wing and the Irish community, and the National Front held a demonstration at it.

Batty describes a callout among left wing and antifascist groups who had a sizeable turnout outside the pub. Temporary steel barriers separated them from the fascists over the road, with police ensuring the two were kept apart.

Batty is clear that this wasn’t some kind of difference of legitimate opinion, but rather one group that was seeking to destroy community cohesion, challenged by another that felt a civic duty to defend the community from hatred and division.

Batty and around ten others went round the back of the fascists, intending to create a noise and make the police feel it was too difficult to keep the fascists isolated and so make them disperse.

He’s clear that they weren’t going to attack in any way as there would be hardened fascist thugs present as well as police. The plan worked.

Soracchi has said he was there, but Batty is pretty sure that’s not true. A spycop report from Soracchi’s information [MPS-0004904] says Batty was ‘satisfied’ with the event because of the ‘attack’ on the fascists. He corrects the version again – ‘attack’ has a number of meanings and implies physical interaction, which wasn’t the plan and did not happen.

The police did arrest a number of antifascists, but none were convicted and one received compensation from the Met for wrongful arrest.

However, the personal details of those arrested were published in far-right journal The Flag. The only way this could have happened was that someone with fascist sympathies at the police station took the information and passed it on.

This is not the first time we have heard evidence of the police passing anti-fascist activists’ details to the far right. Activist Mark Metcalf told the Inquiry how he provided a bail address that was a school, which later appeared in a far-right newspaper even though the only people who could possibly have that address for him were the police.

MORE LIES

Counsel shows another Soracchi report that they failed to disclose to Batty in advance [MPS-0005529]. It’s about No Platform’s response to the BNP standing for election in Beckton, East London, in March 2001. Soracchi reports that No Platform were going to attend the vote count:

‘Activists are intending to single out the British National Party security team for attack.’

Batty is now weary of repeating the same point:

‘I have explained already pretty much ad nauseam that we are not against the electoral system, we are against the far right, and we wouldn’t attack anybody standing in an election.

There was instances of the far-right attacking canvassers in Barking and Dagenham and it was really not a good look.

It doesn’t help the legitimate candidates who are standing to have people who often are supporting them beating people up in front of the count. It just doesn’t make sense. It’s not what we would do.’

Batty does recall a separate occasion where antifascist leafleters bumped into BNP canvassers. They had a verbal exchange but nothing physical. And certainly, it was not a premeditated ‘attack’ of the kind that Soracchi repeatedly claimed they were planning.

Moving on to two documents that refer to No Platform in the Bradford Riots of July 2001 [MPS-0006264 and MPS-0029169], Batty explains that while there were people in Bradford using the name of No Platform, they weren’t a branch of a national organisation. There was no ownership of the name, it was used by anyone of roughly the same standpoint.

In March 2001, Batty and several friends went for a couple of sessions at a gym, Batty reviving an earlier interest in boxing. They only went a couple of times and it did not become a habit. Despite this, Soracchi reported on it through his ever-present lens of imagined political violence [MPS-0005536]:

‘The group has been in training for the past four weeks and believes it will be useful in any confrontation with the fascists.’

Soracchi reported [MPS-0527773] that Batty and Dan Gillman had invited him to accompany them to a Socialist Party event in Leuven, Belgium in July 2001, and then go on to Genoa in Italy to join large protests against the G8 summit. Soracchi, unusually, specifically says the group did not intend to get involved in any confrontation in Genoa.

But Batty says that he wouldn’t have been able to go for any reason. It was hard enough to get time off work for the Leuven trip, an extra week would not have been possible for him even if he’d wanted it.

DEFENCE IS NO OFFENCE

The Inquiry showed Soracchi’s quarterly review for the end of 2001 [MPS-0007737] which describes the target group:

‘No Platform was formed in late 2000 and is in effect a coming together of militant anti-fascist street fighters whose common link is the willingness to carry out violent assault on individuals or groups belonging to the extreme right wing.

Although activists are drawn from differing strands of the far left and anarchist tradition, they are united in the belief that violent confrontation is a key strategic element in beating fascism.

To that end, No Platform has on a number of occasions in the past year put that belief into violent action against members of the National Front and also police officers acting to prevent disorder.’

Batty totally rejects this description, both of No Platform and of himself personally:

‘I have already said it previous times. This is always a defensive action. The way it is being worded “street fighters”, “militant”, “attacking”, “far left”. I never considered myself far left. I never considered myself a street fighter. I never considered I was particularly militant…

I don’t understand where this sort of characterisation comes from. Unless you are trying to legitimise an ongoing situation of undercover policing when you can’t actually report on anything of substance.’

He adds that none of them were ever arrested for anything like this, which would be very odd if they really were a group who were running about maiming police officers.

It’s notable that Soracchi, like many spycops before him who made stuff up, says his group has been involved in serious crime yet is unable to provide specific examples.

Jumping ahead to 27 October 2003, Soracchi reported on No Platform’s supposed plans for the protests against the visit of US President George W. Bush [MPS-0029555]:

‘They see the visit as the first opportunity in a very long time for a situation where mass public disorder can develop.

Most of the group are not strangers to protests of this kind and have experience of being able to agitate and aggravate a developing situation.

Joe Batty and Frank Smith are particularly good in these situations.’

No Platform weren’t relevant to Bush’s visit. On the day, Batty and others stewarded the Socialist Party section of the protest. In stark contrast to Soracchi’s fanciful imaginings, it all went off peacefully.

Batty adds that the only times he’s seen real violence on a protest were the Poll Tax protest of March 1990, and the anti-BNP march in Welling in October 1993. He adds that both of these demonstrations were turned into riots by police action.

Finally on this topic, we were shown a document authorising the continuation of Soracchi’s deployment [MPS-0526932]. As one might expect from something that decides whether he could continue in the role he enjoyed, Soracchi employed some extra-special made up exaggeration, referring to ‘leading Antifa activist Joe Batty’.

DECEIVING WOMEN INTO RELATIONSHIPS

Counsel then moved on to what Batty knew of Soracchi deceiving women into relationships.

In 2001, Soracchi initiated a relationship with ‘Lindsey’. Batty knew Lindsey beforehand, and thought of her as personable and intelligent. She was a Socialist Party member but was not involved in No Platform.

He remembers the relationship going on for some time, and that it was certainly known to the wider social group.

He became concerned at Soracchi’s poor treatment of Lindsey towards the end of the relationship. He spoke to Soracchi about it repeatedly and at length at the time – of course, being wholly unaware of the truth. Lindsey is due to give evidence to the Inquiry on 25 February 2026.

In September 2002, Soracchi was stewarding an anti-war march where he met Donna McLean. As with Lindsey, Batty knew McLean, though not especially well. She was a good friend of his comrade Dan Gillman, and they all had jobs in related work. Soracchi instigated a whirlwind romance and, just three months later, at a New Year’s Eve party at McLean’s, they got engaged. In reality, Soracchi was already married.

In 2023, McLean published a book about her experience, Small Town Girl: Love, Lies and the Undercover Police. She is due to give evidence to the Undercover Policing Inquiry on 24 February 2026.

INCITEMENT TO ARSON

At the same New Year’s party, Soracchi told Batty and several others that a nearby charity shop was actually a front for Roberto Fiore, a notorious Italian fascist widely believed to be involved in the 1980 bombing of Bologna railway station that killed 85 people.

Soracchi suggested firebombing the shop. Several of them – though not Soracchi himself, as far as Batty remembers – took a drunken walk to the location. Batty banged on the window and they lost interest and went back to the party.

A few days later Soracchi gave Batty a lift and drove past the shop, pointing it out.

‘I can remember telling him that there is a philosophical reason why we are not involved in terrorism. It is really simple. It alienates everybody and wins no arguments.

So I am not sure if that part of his legend was he wanted to try and persuade us in a different direction, but it really disappointed me that he never actually picked up on that.’

Nothing further happened with the shop.

The Inquiry took a lunch break, during which Tom Fowler made a summary and analysis video with antifascist and blacklisted trade unionist Dave Smith:

In November 2002, Soracchi and Batty were among a group of five who planned a trip to Florence for the European Social Forum, a conference of anti-capitalist groups. Soracchi reported on it a few weeks beforehand [MPS-0010591], and the timeline created at the end of Soracchi’s deployment [MPS-0071194] describes it in more detail.

Batty remembers a huge march in Florence and Soracchi pointing out that they were passing the home of Dario Fo, Nobel Prize winning playwright, author of Can’t Pay? Won’t Pay! and Accidental Death of an Anarchist. Fo was waving to the crowd, and even though he was exactly the kind of person the SDS would view as dangerously subversive and warranting spying on, Soracchi’s write-up for internal police use described the venerable writer as a genius.

Soracchi’s reporting says he stayed in a squat with an anarchist he knew, and reported on ‘an emerging connection between UK and Italian extremists’. Batty doesn’t remember anything that fits this description.

THINGS THAT NEVER HAPPENED

Soracchi filed a report [MPS-0062785] claiming that Socialist Party activists were closely involved in the campaign for justice for Jean Charles de Menezes. Batty does not remember this being the case at all.

Jean Charles de Menezes was a Brazilian electrician who was shot dead by police at Stockwell tube station in July 2005 after being mistaken for a possible Islamist suicide bomber.

Rather than try to establish and admit the truth, police sought to take the minimum of blame for the killing, and gave off-the-record briefings to journalists.

The public were told that de Menezes was wearing a bulky jacket on a hot day, that his jacket had wires sticking out, that he vaulted the barrier at the tube station, that he ran down the escalator, and ignored police shouts to stop; that he was in the country illegally and that he was a sex offender. Not one of these things was true.

De Menezes was living with his cousin at the time, Patricia da Silva Armani, and she has campaigned for truth and justice ever since. She is due to give evidence to the Inquiry on 12 March 2026.

This became another justice campaign that the police regarded as hostile and sent spycops to spy on. In claiming that his target group was actively included in the campaign, Soracchi knew he was delivering what his managers wanted to hear.

In his witness statement [UCPI0000035550], Soracchi also claims to have been arrested (but not charged) after violence between No Platform and the BNP at Gants Hill. Batty has no memory of the event or arrest, nor can he remember Soracchi ever being involved in any political violence or other criminal activity.

There was one incident of violence but it wasn’t political. Batty and a friend had been out drinking with Soracchi. It was late in the evening and, as Batty phrased it, ‘we were towards the end of our sobriety’ when they were attacked in the street for no apparent reason. There was an altercation but no arrests were made and nothing came of it after.

Batty agrees with Soracchi’s description [MPS-0010097], apart from taking issue with the officer’s drastic underestimate of the level of drinking.

CLOSE FRIENDSHIP

Batty describes how he was close friends with Soracchi for more than four years from late 2000, spending a lot of recreational time together:

‘Steam baths, dinners, meals, going out for drinks. Drinking absinthe. You get the scene. We were going out socialising properly.’

Soracchi arranged for Batty and his partner to visit Bologna where they were met by someone they believed to be a relative of Soracchi’s, though they now realise it was probably a police officer.

Batty describes Soracchi as the instigator of many of the social activities, and the glue that held the friendship group together. Soracchi also helped Batty move to Manchester, and while doing so he stayed at Batty’s parents’ house:

‘My mum, being my mum, really made him welcome. She loved the fact he was Italian, was always going on about food and all this sort of stuff, so she enjoyed his company.’

While Batty was away in Manchester for about four months, he arranged for Soracchi to be able to stay in his London flat. We’re shown the documents making the arrangements with the City of London Corporation, including the receipt of a deposit paid by ‘Carlo Neri’ [MPS-0527068].

On 26 August 2004, while paying the rent on Batty’s London flat, Soracchi filed an entire report on Batty’s marriage titled ‘Joe Batty experiencing marital problems’ [MPS-0036399]. In it, Soracchi says that Batty’s partner, ‘Fawzia’, has not enjoyed living in Manchester and wants to leave:

‘Batty is very pessimistic about the current situation. He feels that his partner has not given the move a chance and is very upset about her behaviour.

“Fawzia” has always been the more dominant part of the relationship, but if Batty is pushed too far he will become extremely intractable, the future does not look rosy for the relationship, even if both were to return to London.’

Batty confirms that there was some discussion about staying in Manchester permanently, but it was nothing like the loggerheads described (and indeed he and Fawzia are still together). He wasn’t in touch with Soracchi at the time, so has no idea where the information would have come from.

He is affronted at Soracchi’s level of invasiveness:

‘He really had no right. And the Met had no right to try and weave a narrative of what is going on in people’s homes with what they are doing in their political life.

I am offended by this, and I am also offended by the fact that I had never seen that. I have not had my police record, I never had anything. So I didn’t know until this was made available very recently that this had been said.

And I think it’s a violation. That’s what it is. I feel violated, and I feel quite viscerally about that.’

INVENTING ABUSE FOR SYMPATHY

Like many spycops, Soracchi had invented a backstory featuring distressing details of abuse in his family.

Doing this serves several purposes. It creates a sense of trust for the person the spycop was telling, and that would likely be reciprocated.

Trusting the officer on confidential matters of activism, but also with intimate personal matters, made the target activist easier to influence and manipulate.

These stories of abuse or childhood hardship also gave the spycop good reason for not introducing people to their family, and for sometimes acting in inexplicable ways or ‘needing time away alone’ (when they are visiting their real family).

This pretence of a troubled mind also leads to people being ready to accept the standard story at the end of a spycop’s deployment, where they feign a mental breakdown and say they’re permanently moving somewhere far away.

Soracchi told Batty and others that after his mother had died, his sister had told him that their father had been sexually abusing her. Soracchi showed Batty a photo of his supposed perpetrator father.

The friendship group were all concerned for Soracchi, and they collected money to help him with incidental costs of the aftermath of his mother’s supposed death:

‘Our friendship was such that towards the end of his time with No Platform I felt I could counsel him when he confided in me about personal issues.

I believed at the time that his sister had been a victim of sexual abuse and that this had surfaced around the period when his mother was either dying or had just passed away.

I remember spending a lot of time talking to him about these issues, offering empathy and support…

A lot of the work that I did with rough sleepers was about trauma, and so I wanted to be there for somebody who has obviously gone through trauma – his mum passing away, which as you know is no easy thing for anybody – and then to find out this revelation at that pretty painful time was something that I thought he wanted to talk about.

So we talked about it. We spent a lot of time talking about it.’

We’re shown a document from 2 January 2006, late in Soracchi’s deployment, where he methodically lists the activists he spies on, the kind of contact he has with them, and how frequent it is [MPS-0704577].

Batty is second on the list, and seems primarily perplexed by the reason for the spying to be happening at all when his activism was open and public.

PERSONAL INTRUSION

On at least ten occasions, Soracchi reported personal details about Batty, including personal and work contact details and domestic living arrangements. He also reported in April 2004 [MPS-0034066] that Batty had lost his job and wages owed when his employer went into liquidation. Batty describes confiding in the man he thought was a trusted friend:

‘What I was expecting had all gone. I had a domestic situation with my mum being unwell. There was a lot of things that happened at the same time. Of course it was deeply personal.

The liquidation by the way was a fraud, and I would rather the police had investigated the fraud than me, but there you go.’

When the Independent Police Complaints Commission was established, Batty and a friend applied for jobs there. Soracchi reported on this in alarmed terms on 29 March 2004 [MPS-0032327]:

‘It is viewed as an opportunity as to really cause damage to the Met Police.’

It’s the same police conflation of accountability with hostility that led them to infiltrate and undermine various justice campaigns.

Batty never even received a reply to his application and laments a missed opportunity.

‘I wanted to use my experience – and I know another person wanted to use their experience – in working with vulnerable adults to ensure that they were also getting justice or were heard. So by inferring that we were doing it for nefarious reasons, it undermines us doing it.’

BETRAYAL AND ONGOING MISTRUST

In concluding, Batty reflects on how his working life with homeless people necessitated a lot of positive working with police. But since learning about the spycops and how he was personally spied on, his feeling towards working with the police have soured:

‘I brought that forward, what had happened, and the experience of what had happened, to my last job, which I worked for eight years with the community of North Kensington that was affected by the Grenfell fire.

And throughout the period that I was involved in that, I really, really, really, struggled to not say to people in their campaign groups, “you really ought to be careful, because the police will be sitting in your meetings, recording the things you do and invading your personal life”.

And that for me was really horrible, and I told them, just as I will say now, that I hope you get justice from your inquiry system, just like I hope that this will provide justice for people.

Because if not, why do people at the bottom end of the scale believe there is ever going to be any justice? And that, for me, it really hurt me. It hurts me now.’

At the end of the hearing, the Inquiry’s Chair, Sir John Mitting, spoke to Batty. His manner was markedly different from the way in which he’s treated other left-wing witnesses. He seemed to regard Batty as something akin to an equal. Perhaps Batty’s mention of being a Freeman of the City of London had some effect.

Mitting asked Batty about his personal history. Batty detailed a long and impressive career working with vulnerable people, particularly rough sleepers. It involved working with numerous agencies, and giving direct help and advice as well as designing management strategies to improve the lives of those affected.

He says this leads him to the conclusion that his employment chances at the Independent Police Complaints Commission were deliberately stymied:

‘I just outlined my CV, as it were, and that makes me a really good candidate for a number of those areas because I understand the milieu of working with people who are vulnerable when they interface with the police or drugs services or the other.

So the fact that I never got a response to being able to be an interface between the community and people who have complaints about the police does show me that somebody definitely sat on it.’

Mitting expresses thanks to Batty, saying that the testimony was especially welcome as the Inquiry has had a huge amount of testimony about the personal impacts on women who were deceived into relationships by spycops, but far less about the people who were close platonic friends. With that, the hearing finished.

Immediately afterwards, Tom Fowler made this summary and reaction video with Zoe Young from Campaign Opposing Police Surveillance:

Carlo soracchi is due to giveevidence to the Inqruity on 2-5 March 2026.

Tranche 3 Phase 2, Day 3
4 February 2026

On the afternoon of Wednesday 4 February 2026, the Undercover Policing Inquiry (UCPI) heard from a person known at the Inquiry as ‘GRD’. He was a hunt saboteur and London Greenpeace activist who was spied on by undercover officer HN14 Jim Boyling ‘Jim Sutton’ in the 1990s.

GRD has been granted core participant status at the Inquiry, and also a significant degree of anonymity. He is referred to only by the intials, and his evidence was broadcast audio-only, without his face being seen.

The UCPI is an independent, judge-led inquiry into undercover policing in England and Wales. Its main focus is the activity of two units who deployed long-term undercover officers into a variety of political groups: the Special Demonstration Squad (SDS, 1968-2008) and the National Public Order Intelligence Unit (NPOIU, 1999-2011). Spycops from these units lived as activists for years at a time, spying on more than 1,000 groups.

GRD was questioned by Don Ramble as Counsel to the Inquiry.

GRD has produced a written statement for the Inquiry [UCPI0000037735], which was read into the evidence.

Additionally, he is a signatory to the Good Easter hunt sab group witness statement, a case that appears to be a miscarriage of justice due to spycop Jim Boyling’s involvement and his evidence being withheld from the subsequent court case.

However, GRD was not present for the events involving Boyling on that day, and Ramble made clear they would not be asking about that statement in this hearing.

In sharp contrast to Roger Geffen’s evidence earlier in the day, GRD’s answers were short and to the point. It was clear that he had little time for the Inquiry asking nonsense questions that sought to justify the deployment of undercover cops.

HUNT SABBING AND VIOLENCE

GRD first met SDS officer Jim Boyling with the East London hunt saboteurs in 1995 when they travelled together in a minibus. They really got to know each other on 17 February 1996 on a large sabotage of the Duke of Beaufort hunt, when they became separated from the rest of their group:

‘It was right at the beginning of the meet. And I don’t think either of us realised how many riders and supporters there were with this particular hunt.

So, we were holding the gate closed for a very long time and the whole field, as it’s referred to, kind of rode over us…

You get spat on, getting hit with whip and sworn at… And that’s the first time I kind of really had any real connection with him.’

GRD didn’t see Boyling again after that incident until more than a year later, in the summer of 1997. Nevertheless, Ramble asks him a series of questions about his activities while sabbing and any possible justifications for police spies targeting the hunt sabs.

GRD got involved in the Harlow hunt sabs in 1992. He started the North London hunt sab group a year or two later and remained involved until 2006. He is clear that the only violence he ever saw while sabbing was by hunters, hunt supporters and the police – especially in Essex:

‘We would generally not sab them. It was too dangerous, too risky…

It’s just too violent, you’d get your vehicle smashed up or the police operation would be so considerable that you’d all be arrested by midday.’

This was was exactly what happened on the day of the Good Easter arrests, 10 February 1996. GRD witnessed the arrest of a fellow core participant at the Inquiry, Brendan Mee, but not the arrests of Ben Leamy, Brendan Delaney and Simon Taylor who were with Boyling that day.

The Inquiry will need to ask Boyling about his role in those arrests and also his offer to act as a witness on behalf of the defendants whose lawyer was Keir Starmer, a name that just keeps coming up in the Inquiry files.

GRD is also asked about links between the hunt sabs and the Animal Liberation Front (ALF). The ALF was a clandestine group that broke into farms and laboratories, liberating animals and damaging property. They were seen by the police as the apex of the animal rights movement, and were portrayed as something akin to terrorists.

A document recording Boyling’s initial deployment into the East London hunt sabs said that he ‘will be following an essential and authentic route towards acceptance by ALF activists’.

The targeting strategy document for SDS officer HN16 James Thomson ‘James Straven’ [MPS-0526929], whose was deployed into hunt sabs slightly later, further refers to Boyling’s deployment as follows:

‘originally earmarked for long-term deployment in the ALF and he has provided first rate intelligence on violent hunt saboteurs based in East London and Essex and indeed valuable assistance to Operation GANT and SO-13 investigation into a series of crude ALF incendiaries in East London.’

GRD says that doesn’t make sense, he doesn’t know any sabs who associated with the ALF and the hunt sabs never used, or planned to use, incendiary devices. He rejects the idea that sending an officer to infiltrate the hunt sabs was justified.

MCLIBEL SUPPORT GROUP

In 1990, McDonald’s brought legal proceedings against London Greenpeace for the claims made in a factsheet titled ‘What’s Wrong With McDonald’s?’ that detailed the company’s appalling environmental, employment, animal welfare and marketing practices.

The ensuing court case took seven years, with the defendants attracting huge support and backfiring badly on McDonald’s. It was revealed that McDonald’s had sent two separate lots of private detectives to infiltrate London Greenpeace who were unaware of one another.

The court did not learn that multiple SDS officers also infiltrated the group, and indeed the factsheet at the core of the court case was co-written by an SDS infiltrator, HN10 Bob Lambert ‘Bob Robinson’.

GRD first became involved in the McLibel support campaign in 1995 due to fellow hunt sabs being involved in the McSpotlight website. The McLibel Support Group office ended up being in GRD’s flat at one point. He says it was mostly a storage headache, as storing all the T-shirts and other merchandise took up space.

He met Boyling again while he was running a McLibel Support Campaign stall at the 1997 Glastonbury festival.

‘He was there with Reclaim The Streets and they were on the other side of the Green Futures Field… it had a lot of activism, eco-activism, and animal rights campaigns, veganism, vegetarianism…

Jim used to come over and hang out in the McLibel Support stall, tent as it was, for most of the days, from my memory.’

GRD hadn’t seen Boyling since they were attacked by hunters together in early 1996, but after Glastonbury they continued to bump into each other at squats and events around London.

The last time GRD saw Boyling was in a squat in December 1999. The intense experience they had together as hunt sabs meant that GRD considered Boyling a friend. He trusted him and they would socialise together.

GRD describes these encounters in his written statement:

‘We were a little bitchy about other activists and like to take the mickey out of them, but not to their face. We had a laugh together like mates.’

Looking back on this he finds it depressing and feels betrayed. He also points out that this piss-taking could be weaponised as a means of sowing division.

Boyling claims he had no inside knowledge of the McLibel matter, but GRD says that’s untrue. After Glastonbury 1997 he would have had access to all the materials which were often scattered around GRD’s flat:

‘I was uploading daily material onto the McSpotlight website… So I’d have stuff all over the place. I’d have correspondence, and I would have you know other stuff associated with the campaign.’

LONDON GREENPEACE

London Greenpeace (a small group unrelated to Greenpeace International) campaigned on a broad range of environmental and social justice issues. GRD describes himself as a key London Greenpeace activist and he ended up running the office, because he lived very nearby.

We are shown an intelligence report by Boyling [MPS-040634] dated 31 October 1997, which refers to a meeting to ‘relaunch’ of London Greenpeace.

GRD says that Boyling would have been aware that London Greenpeace was restarting from the conversations they had at Glastonbury festival in 1997. The ‘source comment’ from Boyling on the report ironically notes that the relaunch will include all the old members ‘though presumably not the private detectives’.

This seems to be the only one of Boyling’s reports that references GRD, something he found surprising. He would have thought he’d be mentioned more, given his long-term involvement with Boyling.

EARTH FIRST! AND GENETIC MODIFICATION

In 1998 Jim Boyling and others gathered at GRD’s squat in King’s Cross to discuss the feasibility of liberating ‘Dolly’, the world’s first genetically modified sheep.

Looking back, GRD says he thinks Jim was trying to get him on board for future plans he might have had. In his reporting, Boyling describes GRD as a hunt sab organiser in North London, and a McLibel and occasional Earth First! activist.

GRD says only the first two are correct. He was also active in the Genetic Engineering Network (GEN) between 1997 and 2002. There was some crossover between GEN and Earth First! Nevertheless, his only connection to Earth First! was through things that Jim Boyling organised.

Around the same time as the meeting about Dolly the sheep, GRD recalls that Boyling asked him to drive Boyling to collect some Reclaim the Streets posters from the printers. When he got home his flat had been burgled. A camera and some two-way radios used for hunt sabbing were taken, along with some pictures, some cash, and GRD’s turntables.

‘There was only one person knew that I was going to be out all day, and that was Jim.’

Another action Boyling was involved in organising was the first ever destruction of a field of genetically modified crops in Ireland. Ramble tells GRD that the Inquiry is not interested in what happened in Ireland as it falls outside of the Inquiry’s Terms of Reference, which are limited to events in England and Wales. However, this is certainly an interesting and significant action nonetheless.

In his written statement to the Inquiry [UCPI0000036294], Boyling says he destroyed a genetically modified crop in Ireland when he had no other option than to participate or being exposed.

GRD says this is not true, and that the action in Ireland would not have happened if Boyling had not done the planning and logistics, both in the UK before travelling and in Ireland, pushing the group to do it.

GRD is very clear that Boyling would have found it very easy to back out of the genetics action, even once they were in Ireland. The UK group wasn’t even meant to carry out the action, and there were too many people in the van so it would have been easier, logistically, to have fewer people.

RECLAIM THE STREETS

Although GRD attended a great number of Reclaim The Streets (RTS) public events, he only attended two of the group’s meetings.

Boyling, in contrast, claims to have been involved in the core organising group. He insists he walked a fine line, as an undercover officer, taking part in meetings without suggesting or proposing any specific action. GRD says this is completely false and contradicts his experience of Boyling.

Boyling approached GRD in 1999 and asked if he could hold an important meeting at GRD’s flat. It was about driving vehicles into the city of London for the J18 Carnival Against Capitalism to be held on 18 June 1999.

There were four people present, Boyling, GRD and two others, and Boyling set out his plan, which was to use cars to block two roads. This was entirely Boyling’s idea, and no one else in the meeting had been involved in coming up with it.

After the meeting they got in a vehicle and drove the routes the cars would take. Boyling encouraged them all to wear hi-vis jackets and walk the routes regularly to memorise them.

Boyling said he had purchased four cars and four pay-as-you-go-phones with enough credit for use on the day. He handed them all a phone.

The night before ‘J18’, each of the drivers stayed in new and unknown locations organised for them by Boyling in order to prevent police following them on the day. They were directed by Boyling to park the cars at specific car parks prior to driving them to the action.

On the day, GRD and another activist blocked the road by crashing the cars together at one end of the street, while Boyling and one other did the same at the other end of the street.

GRD is very clear he would have never been involved in the car action if he had not been approached by Boyling. He wasn’t really involved in Reclaim The Streets at the time. He says once he had completed his mission of crashing the cars, he spent the rest of J18 partying.

The Inquiry played footage of the J18 Carnival Against Capitalism, featuring the cars Boyling organised to block the road.

Ramble listed titbits of events that happened on the day, most of which GRD only heard about afterwards, and there were lots of happy memories for those of us in the public gallery.

Ramble then put it to GRD that is was justified to deploy Boyling into the groups organising J18. GRD replies that Boyling himself was integral to the organising of J18.

On 21 June 1999, Boyling filed a report titled ‘Debrief – Stop The City – June 18’ [MPS-0302210] which says the organisers were pleased with the outcome. GRD says he can’t say he was an organiser, but it was very good day.

It is very frustrating that none of the people who did organise the event have been asked to give oral evidence by the Inquiry.

‘JASON BISHOP’ AND MAYDAY 2000

GRD is also asked about another SDS officer, HN3 ‘Jason Bishop’, who was deployed 1998-2005.

GRD says he met him in the Reclaim the Streets office, and saw him around at RTS parties and activist events. Bishop also borrowed GRD’s van twice.

Most significantly, on 1 May 2000, Bishop was arrested in GRD’s van. He was stopped while transporting manure and seeds on his way to the Reclaim The Streets ‘guerrilla gardening’ event in Parliament Square.

The van was seized by police, and GRD describes getting it back:

‘I just packed my kit in it, loaded it up and then drove off to Hampshire… driving down the motorway, [the wheels] just felt odd and a bit weird…

The vehicle was in a very good condition when lent to HN3. It is possible the wheels were loosened during its time in the Met Police pound.

The experience left me distressed as I thought I was not going to be able to turn up for my first big event with the new lighting company… it was a very well maintained Mercedes panel van. It’s not usual for a considerable amount of the wheel nuts to be loose all at the same time.’

IMPACT

GRD says it was always Boyling who approached him to take part in actions, not the other way around, and he would have never suspected he was a cop.

He was shocked to hear that there was even a suggestion that ‘Jim Sutton’ had been an undercover officer. He didn’t believe it at first – activists can be paranoid – but it turns out they were right.

He had found Boyling convincing because of the human connection they had. He trusted him, and he feels set up and used. He has developed trust issues as a result, and he says it is difficult to put it into words. He feels cheated.

Asked if there is anything else he would like to tell the inquiry, GRD is characteristically succinct:

‘I’m alright, thanks.’

The Inquiry’s Chair, Sir John Mitting, thanked GRD for giving evidence and the hearing closed for the day.

Tranche 3 Phase 2, Day 4
4 February 2026

Roger Geffen gave evidence to the Undercover Policing Inquiry (UCPI) on the morning of Wednesday 4 February 2026.

Geffen is a long-standing environmental campaigner who was involved in the anti-roads movements and groups like Earth First! and Reclaim the Streets from their inception in the early 1990s, as well as more conventional campaigning for the rights of cyclists and sustainable transport.

His campaigning activities led to him being awarded an MBE for services to cycling. They also led to him being spied on by SDS officer HN14 Andrew James Boyling ‘Jim Sutton’, NPOIU officer EN12 Mark Kennedy ‘Mark Stone’, and probably other undercover officers over the past thirty years.

The UCPI is an independent, judge-led inquiry into undercover policing in England and Wales. Its main focus is the activity of two units who deployed long-term undercover officers (or ‘spycops’) into a variety of political groups: the Special Demonstration Squad (SDS, 1968-2008) and the National Public Order Intelligence Unit (NPOIU, 1999-2011). Spycops from these units lived as activists for years at a time, spying on more than 1,000 groups.

INQUIRY CHAOS

The barrister acting for the Inquiry (known as the Counsel to the Inquiry) who questioned Geffen was Lennart Poulsen, who appeared to be very unprepared.

That is not entirely surprising as the Inquiry has gone ahead with these hearings when they have barely processed the evidence. In his Opening Statement to this phase of hearings, David Barr KC (lead Counsel to the Inquiry) noted:

‘Numerous and considerable challenges have led to the preparation of the T3P2 Hearing Bundle taking longer than planned.

We recognise that this has meant that documents have not been circulated to core participants as soon as we would have wished and that the process of circulating documents to core participants and publishing them on our website is taking place over an extended period.’

As is so often the case with public statements by the Inquiry about its work, this actually significantly understates the utter chaos surrounding disclosure, where much of the evidence has not yet been circulated to Core Participants preparing their evidence, and that has evidently also impacted on the ability of the Inquiry’s own barristers to prepare.

Geffen has produced a witness statement [UCPI0000038772] and he also contributed to the Reclaim the Streets (RTS) witness statement [UCPI0000038295]. Both were read into the evidence at the start of the hearing, and you can hear Geffen and other core participants involved in drafting the RTS witness statement talking about that process in episode 47 of the Spycops Info podcast:

Geffen’s evidence began with how he became involved in environmental activism. After leaving university he began working as a classical music record producer. He moved to South East London in the late 1980s and became a cyclist.

London traffic was wildly congested and dangerous at that time and he became involved in the London Cycling Campaign, and later a campaign against plans to build a road through Oxleas Wood, a piece of 8000-year-old ancient woodland close to where he lived.

‘This was an interesting time in environmental politics because the year after I got involved in London Cycling Campaign in 1989, was the year at that climate change really first came into public consciousness when the then Prime Minister, Margaret Thatcher, went to the United Nations Summit and declared that, as a scientist, she was convinced of the need to take action on climate change, but her government then announced what they called “the biggest road-building programme since the Romans”.’

Poulsen asks how Geffen became involved in direct action and he answers, explaining that he was influenced by Gandhi:

‘I’d seen the film Gandhi earlier in my teens and the idea was that there are times when you do need to break the law in order for justice to prevail.’

He also explains what direct action meant to him:

‘When the system of democracy and public input and all the rest of it breaks down… you just have to effectively take action directly… to highlight the problem to confront it directly and thus push for a resolution… you look to confront the root causes of the problem directly’

TWYFORD DOWN

One of the first schemes from the government’s 1989 road programme to start construction was the joining up of two sections of the M3 through Twyford Down, a heavily protected area of chalk downland just outside Winchester in southern England.

Protesters had set up a small camp on the route of the road, which Geffen visited in December 1992.

Twyford was a defining experience for Geffen. He began organising minibuses to take people from London to support the campaign and his first ever arrest occurred while taking action there.

He explains how that experience empowered him to take direct action:

‘I realised that the world hadn’t ended… and I felt proud of what I had done.’

He has seen very little reporting about the Twyford Down campaign, however he points out that the Inquiry’s disclosure of police documents indicates a Special Branch Registry File was opened on him in 1993, which coincided with his actions at Twyford Down and the early months of No M11 Link Road campaign.

He points out that neither he nor anyone else involved in this Inquiry has received sight of those Special Branch Registry Files, and it is evident that there is more to be discovered about the extent of the spying than is apparent on the face of the disclosure he has seen.

Geffen therefore poses a number of questions for the Inquiry:

His name was on the Consulting Association’s ‘green list’ (an illegal employment blacklist of environmental campaigners). It is known that a private detective firm, Bray’s, was employed to spy on protesters at Twyford Down – filming and keeping files on those regularly taking part.

Geffen asks the Inquiry to consider what kind of collaboration existed between private companies like Bray’s or the Consulting Association and the Special Demonstration Squad at this time.

Geffen also points out that the Secretary of State applied for an injunction against a large number of activists, seeking to prevent them from trespassing on the worksite at Twyford Down. What role did the SDS play in that process? Or in the proposed civil action, suing protestors for damages, which should theoretically have followed on from the injunction but which the Government never pursued.

Here, Poulsen points out that six activists were jailed for breaking that injunction. Geffen agrees and talks us through the appeal of those injunction breakers against the length of their sentence:

‘It was before Lord Justice Hoffman and he came out with a wonderful quote … that really kind of solidified my own understanding of what I doing.

He talked about “the honourable tradition of civil disobedience in this country” and he added that “those who take part in it may well be vindicated by history”…

It wasn’t my words, but I think that very much crystallises the philosophy that led me to do what I was doing.’

Indeed, the road protesters of the 1990s certainly were vindicated by history. In Geffen’s words:

‘Twyford Down ended up being a noisy defeat for the direct action movement, and Oxleas Wood became one of the first of a large number of quiet victories.’

Two-thirds of the government’s proposed new roads were ultimately dropped, and it is clear that Geffen is still very proud of the role he played in those campaigns.

NO M11 LINK ROAD

After Twyford Down, Geffen and others’ campaigning focus shifted back to London, and the campaign against the M11 Link Road.

Geffen describes this as a ‘Cinderella project’ because unlike Twyford Down, Oxleas Wood, or the later Newbury Bypass, this was not a road that was set to destroy precious natural habitats. Instead it was being run through a residential community that had been purposefully run down by government compulsory purchase of the houses.

As such, the No M11 Link Road campaign moved the debate about road building on. Rather than just being about protecting the natural environment, it also became focused on the destruction of communities and the choices we make about the use of our urban space.

Geffen talks the Inquiry through a number of the actions and strategies that the campaign used, such as ‘Operation Roadblock’ and the squatting of Claremont Road.

Operation Roadblock was a plan to hold daily direct action on the worksites of the M11 Link Road, coordinating people coming from all over the country. Each day was preceded by a brief training session on the principles, practicalities and legal implications of non-violent direct action. This enabled and empowered people to make informed decisions about how far they were prepared to go to stop the diggers:

‘We were exhausted by the end.’

Claremont Road was the last fully intact street on the route. All the houses on the street had been compulsorily purchased, bar one.

Dolly Watson was 93 years old. She had been born in that street and she wanted to die there. One by one, protesters squatted the homes around her, creating a little self-contained car-free community, and she welcomed them into her road. Geffen explained:

‘Defending Claremont Road would be strategically crucial.’

With the homes being decorated and children playing in the street, it became a rolling street party that lasted for six months, and something of a prototype for the concept of Reclaim The Streets.

Poulsen was not very interested in the power of the community campaign, however, and instead pressed Geffen about any possibility of criminality, asking him about the times he was arrested.

Geffen very sensibly wrote his own statements about these arrests at the time, to support his defence. He has exhibited these to his statement to the Inquiry and is able to take Poulsen through the reasons why he considers them wrongful arrests. When charges were brought at all, he was found ‘not guilty’ over and over again.

A Special Branch report [MPS-0739546] describes one of the arrests, and Poulsen asks Geffen about the mood of the security guards on the day.

Geffen explains that some were very confrontational, while others were sympathetic and were just doing a job.

Protesters made friends with some of the security, but sadly it was the aggressive and confrontational guards who got promoted, so the make-up of the security team got worse over time.

Poulsen points out that the SDS report that ‘police conduct in the circumstances was restrained’. Asked if he agrees, Geffen’s short, dry, understated, ‘no’ was met with laughter from those in the public gallery who had been at present at the protests.

Geffen did a great deal of police liaison throughout the M11 campaign and says the police sergeant in question was quite honest in how he portrayed the campaign, in sharp contrast to the much of the SDS’s ‘intelligence’.

‘Q. Neither he nor other officers involved in the last phase of the M11 campaign tried to present you as anything but peaceful. Is that right?

A. Yes.

Q. And do you accept that those officers’ observations contrast with some of the SDS reports about you and the group’s actions?

A. Absolutely… and I think that would be a really good question to put to the SDS’s management. Why was it that they were so out to smear us, tarnish us with this label of being violent when we absolutely were not?’

Poulsen exhibited a flyer from the No M11 Link Road campaign, for an action on 22 January 1994. The image appeared on two dozen computer monitors all over the room, creating a beautiful juxtaposition between the raw energy of the campaigns Geffen was talking about and the sterility of the hearing room.

However, Poulsen’s concern is that fliers like these might have encouraged ‘activists of a more militant and violent persuasion’ to get involved.

Geffen points out that things like that may or may not have been discussed at the time, but the key point is that it never happened.

The next exhibit was an iconic image of a banner action on the roof of the home of the then Transport Secretary, John MacGregor.

‘While we were out taking direct action on one of their work sites [the contractors] effectively came behind our backs and took the roof off one of the houses on Claremont Road…

We had this conversation where somebody kind of laughing said, “Oh, we should go and smash up the roof of John MacGregor”.

They weren’t serious, but you know it kind of prompted this idea that we should do that symbolically, by painting this banner that you can see there that effectively showed a road going through John MacGregor’s own home.

So, yeah, this was a piece of direct action that worked incredibly well in in media terms… peaceful direct action on the roof of the Transport Secretary on whose behalf bailiffs were smashing up other people’s homes um to really just highlight the injustice of what the Transport Secretary was doing.’

Poulsen asks how Geffen knew the address of John MacGregor and suggests that he was creating a security issue for the Transport Secretary’s family.

Geffen points out that the action was a peaceful protest that called attention to the very real violence being faced by the residents of communities affected by the M11 Link Road.

‘After all, cabinet level secretaries are expected to have a certain amount of thick skin and they’ve got the weight of the state behind them to protect them, whereas the residents of Claremont Road had nothing of the sort.’

Poulsen again tries to suggest the action was reckless:

‘What steps did you take to ensure no one would destroy his property?’

He suggests to Geffen that this action was ‘going too far’. However, again, Geffen simply points to what actually happened on the day. Although those arrested were charged with causing alarm, harassment and distress, they were found not guilty, because:

‘This had been an entirely peaceful protest that had been conducted safely, precautions had been taken, and this was again in that “honourable tradition of civil disobedience”, confronting the root cause of the problem in a peaceful way.’

Geffen also describes another similar protest against the Criminal Justice Act, which took place in the garden of the then Home Secretary, Michael Howard, noting that both actions attracted very positive media coverage, and stressing that:

‘Our networks were very solid on that common philosophy of believing in non-violent direct action.’

QUESTIONS ABOUT VIOLENCE

Nevertheless, Poulson repeatedly presses Geffen on the question of violence, in between reprimanding him for giving overly complex answers to what are in fact very open questions about topics like the philosophy of direct action, attitudes towards breaking the law, violence and non-violence, and even whether activists ‘wasting’ the government’s road building budget had considered the affect that might have on the public purse.

Geffen points out in answer to this last question that, although additional policing and security was estimated to cost around £2m, they actually helped save the public purse around £18bn as a result of road building schemes being cancelled, not to mention the additional carbon emissions that were prevented as a result.

Poulsen asks a number of direct questions about ‘attitudes towards violence’ in Earth First! and Reclaim the Streets, and about Geffen’s own belief in the rule of law, before delivering what he appears to think is a ‘gotcha’ moment, saying that despite claiming to believe in the law, Geffen has supported people who have broken it.

Geffen is unfazed by these questions and simply explains again:

‘I believe that the rule of law is an important principle, but I also believe – and I do not believe there is a contradiction – that there are times when when the rule and the process of law and of public inquiries ultimately fails and that bad laws sometimes need to be broken.’

Poulsen continues to complain that Geffen’s answers are too long, and observers in the public gallery began to wonder whether the problem is that Poulsen lacks the attention to listen to long answers.

He is certainly doing the Inquiry no favours with this approach, and the overall impression is of a barrister tied to his list of questions, unable to adapt to thoughtful answers to what are obviously complex questions, instead just asking the same questions over and over again in different forms.

We are well into the questioning by this point, but Poulsen has not asked a single question about the undercover police infiltration of these groups or the behaviour of the spycops.

EARTH FIRST!

The Earth First! (EF!) network was very prominent at Twyford Down, where the focus was on the defence of beautiful landscapes and ancient woodlands.

As a group, EF! was infiltrated by a great number of undercover officers, including:

• HN2 Andy Coles, who claims to have been a ‘founder member’
• HN14 Jim Boyling
• HN3 ‘Jason Bishop’
• EN32/HN596 ‘Rod Richardson’
• EN12 Mark Kennedy
• EN1/HN519 ‘Marco Jacobs’
• EN34 ‘Lynn Watson’

EF! applied for Core Participant status in this Inquiry but it was refused, and the group has not been given disclosure in this Tranche. Poulsen nevertheless asks Geffen not only about his own role in EF! but also about the wider attitudes and actions of the network.

Geffen offers a short history of how Earth First! came to be launched in the UK and the close relationship with Reclaim the Streets, saying is was often the same people wearing different hats. He explains both groups were non-violent.

RECLAIM THE STREETS

Geffen first met with Reclaim the Streets (RTS) in 1992 when they were planning a sit-down protest on Waterloo Bridge in London. He attended this action, but didn’t feel confident enough to sit down in the road and face arrest.

There were a number of actions after that, including stunts at the Birmingham and London motor shows and painting cycle lanes onto roads in Lambeth where the council had neglected to do so.

Geffen explains the aims of some of these actions:

‘to highlight the problems of a society that is overdominated by dependence on motor vehicles and lacks sustainable transport alternatives to enable people to get around without depending on motor vehicles…

alternatives that would be better for our health, better for our air quality, better for our climate, better for social justice, better in so many ways, and yet the motor manufacturers sell us this dream that we all have to depend on our cars…

[while the way] the government spends its transport budget is contingent on perpetuating car culture rather than providing the alternatives.’

Geffen explains that Reclaim the Streets paused its activities in summer 1993 to focus on the No M11 Link Road campaign, but re-emerged in 1995.

At this point, Poulsen finally asks his first question about an undercover officer, establishing that Jim Boyling attended his first weekly meeting of Reclaim the Streets in November 1995.

Geffen rejects Boyling’s claim that these meetings were closed, and is very clear that they were open to anyone to attend. He suggests Boyling be questioned about this when the Inquiry brgins the spycop in for questioning.

During a break in the hearing, Tom Fowler made this reaction video:

In the early 1990s, the Metropolitan Police started deploying Forward Intelligence Teams, groups of officers with very high quality film and video camera who would document people attending political events.

We hear how Geffen was followed by members of the Met’s Forward Intelligence Team to his workplace. They then arrested him there on a dubious pretext, so they could offer him the opportunity to become a police informant.

This was shortly before Boyling began attending RTS meetings and Geffen suggests the Inquiry investigate the relationship between this failed attempt to recruit him as an informant and the decision to deploy Boyling into the group.

Geffen points out there were other police informants in the movement, and asks what the relationship was between them and the undercover police.

Geffen talks us through the tactics used by RTS, such as taking two old cars to be crashed into each other to block the street and make it safe for party-goers. RTS parties were incredible, vibrant, family-friendly events.

However, on a number of occasions they were attacked by riot police late in the day when people began to disperse. Poulsen incredibly asked Geffen whether he accepts that the police had a duty to ‘pick a fight’ with RTS in order to reopen the road.

Geffen disagrees, pointing to the nature of the events and the disproportionate levels of violence used by the police:

‘With hindsight, one of the things we learnt was that we should have made sure we had a plan for how how to end without allowing the police to do that.’

He adds that in fact that is exactly what RTS did at the next street party event on the M41.

Poulsen nevertheless asks (for the sixth time!) whether Reclaim the Streets street parties were violent or disorderly. He uses the fact that RTS would warn party-goers about the possibility of police violence or arrest, as though that somehow demonstrated that they were not themselves peaceful. It was incredibly frustrating to listen to, but each time these questions are asked, Geffen offered a sensible, detailed and patient response.

HN14 JIM BOYLING IN RECLAIM THE STREETS

It is remarkable how few questions Poulsen asked Geffen about the role of the undercover officer Jim Boyling who, using the name ‘Jim Sutton’, was tasked to spy on Reclaim the Streets.

Poulsen did refer to some of Boyling’s reporting and Geffen sets out in detail how inaccurate some of it was, highlighting ‘sexed up’ intelligence which pretended that RTS were attempting far more dangerous or disruptive actions than was in fact the case.

Geffen also points out how Boyling exaggerated disputes within RTS, noting that the spycops seemed obsessed with trying to drive wedges within the movement.

One example of this is a report claiming that Geffen was ‘excluded’ from a meeting about the Selar open cast coal mine.

Geffen says he has no recollection of this, but would have had no interest in attending that meeting if he had known about it, as he had no local knowledge to contribute to the discussion.

This is pattern also emerged in the evidence of ‘Monica’, with Boyling’s reports emphasising and exaggerating divisions within the group that the genuine people who were there simply do not recognise.

Boyling was far from unique among spycops. The Inquiry has seen that one spycop after another exaggerated the danger they were in, and exaggerated or simply invented the plans of the infiltrated group. These lies were further exaggerated by office staff who collated the reports, which in turn were exaggerated to an even greater degree by managers seeking to impress the Met’s top brass and the Home Office.

RTS IN LATER YEARS

Asked about anti-capitalist activism in the late 1990s, Geffen explains how as time went on, Reclaim The Streets sought to widen the agenda from car culture to the fossil fuel economy and capitalism more generally.

It forged links between the environmental direct action movement and related workers’ struggles such as the striking Liverpool dockers, or London Underground workers campaigning against the privatisation of the tube.

However, Geffen stresses that he himself was not very involved in those later years. He points out that while he is grateful for the opportunity to give evidence, he feels that the Inquiry has failed to call the people who are best positioned to speak about that period when SDS spying on the group was at its most intense.

We do get to hear about yet another wrongful arrest though, when Geffen and two others received several thousand pounds in compensation after being arrested while preparing to distribute a spoof newspaper, the ‘Evading Standards’, on the eve of the March for Social Justice, shortly before the 1997 general election.

All 10,000 copies of the paper were seized and destroyed by police, and Geffen points out the seriousness of the police taking this kind of action simply to prevent a political group distributing its ideas.

‘It does look like another act of political policing – not the only one in Reclaim the Streets’ history – where the purpose of the arrest seems to have been to prevent us from getting our message out, rather than to prevent disorder.’

Poulsen seeks to ask Geffen about preparations for ‘J18’, the Carnival Against Capitalism in the City of London on June 18 1999, and Boyling’s role in it, including the purchase of several cars that were crashed to block the street. But Geffen again points out that he is not the correct witness to talk about this.

The Inquiry should be asking Jay Jordan, one of Geffen’s co-authors of the RTS witness statement to the Inquiry, who has important evidence to give about a number of issues.

Jordan worked on the production of the ‘Evading Standards’ newspaper, they were arrested and prosecuted alongside Boyling (who was using his false name ‘Jim Sutton’, even in court!) and they worked closely alongside Boyling throughout 1998 and 1999 on the planning of J18. It is hard to comprehend why Jordan has not been called to give evidence.

Nevertheless, we will undoubtedly hear more about SDS spying during those later years of RTS when questions are put to Boyling himself.

MARK KENNEDY AND CLIMATE CAMP

Mark Kennedy’s deployment will not be investigated until the Inquiry examines the SDS’s parallel unit, the National Public Order Intelligence Unit. These hearings, ‘Tranche 4’, have no date set but are not expected until the second half of 2027 at the earliest.

It is unusual for the Inquiry to question witnesses about other tranches. Nonetheless, Poulsen does ask some questions about Geffen’s role in the Climate Camp (or Camp for Climate Action, to give it its proper name), and his interactions with Kennedy there.

Geffen offers a potted history of the progression towards the Climate Camp, setting out how J18 influenced anti-capitalist movements targeting the summit meetings of global capitalist institutions like the International Monetary Fund, World Trade Organization and the G8, leading to the camp against the 2005 G8 meeting in Scotland.

In turn, that experience led to action camps being adopted as as tactic by climate change campaigners, and Camps for Climate Action took place outside Drax Power Station (2006), Heathrow Airport (2007), Kingsnorth Power Station (2008), the financial centre of London (2009) and the Royal Bank Of Scotland’s headquarters (2010).

The early Climate Camps were in fact targeted by officers from both the SDS and the NPOIU, and the Climate Camp legal team is a core participant in the Inquiry, and has submitted a witness statement for Tranche 3.

Geffen is just asked about NPOIU officer Mark Kennedy, then known to everyone at the Camps as ‘Mark Stone’. Kennedy was involved in the Climate Camp’s land group, the core secret subgroup that identified sites for the camps. Geffen says he was unaware of this at the time.

Kennedy was based in Nottingham while Geffen was based in London, so he did not know Kennedy well beyond being a familiar face.

Geffen was part of the Climate Camp legal team at the inaugural Drax camp in North Yorkshire, taking care of anyone arrested at the event. Kennedy was part of a large group of people at an action a long way away, at Hartlepool nuclear power station.

Kennedy had locked himself to the gates and was among those arrested. They were released very late at night, and Geffen organised the transport to get them all back.

Geffen says it is highly likely Kennedy was party to conversations between activists about their arrests:

‘Particularly given that he was arrested himself at this action… I’ve little doubt that he was party to conversations with his co-arrestees about the circumstances of their arrest.

And I would really urge the Inquiry to ask him what information he gleaned from conversations like that because I’ve little doubt that would have taken place.’

When they arrived back at the camp from Hartlepool, Kennedy was driving, and he drove the van straight at a police officer standing in the gateway, forcing him to run out of the way for his own safety.

Geffen says he didn’t confront Kennedy over his behaviour, but it did strike him as odd.

‘It just struck me as: he is showing off…

he was known for regularly wanting to kind of incite more disorder, a more confrontational attitude, and this was just a part of a pattern of Mark Kennedy’s behaviour.’

Like Boyling, Kennedy’s traits were not unique. The Inquiry has heard numerous descriptions of undercover officers being more aggressive than the rest of the group, and being disparaging about those who are less bellicose.

Geffen is also asked about the second Climate Camp, which took place at Heathrow in 2007. BAA, the owners of the airport, took out an injunction, which Geffen describes as:

‘another example of a strategic law suit against public participation…

it included injuncting people and organisations who were involved… which included groups like the National Trust – Patron, the Queen.

It would have ultimately meant that the Queen was not allowed to travel on the Piccadilly line to Heathrow…

It was that absurd in the scope of what was prohibited under the injunction.’

This use of civil law and injunctions to prevent protest is an important theme that emerges in the Inquiry’s Tranche 3 era (1993-2008), and non-state Core Participants have asked the Inquiry to really look at the appropriateness of any role undercover officers might have played in these processes.

Finally, Poulsen asked Geffen about the raid of school in Nottinghamshire where 114 people had assembled for a briefing, prior to a planned action at Ratcliffe-on-Soar Power station.

Geffen was arrested there, alongside spycop Mark Kennedy, and 112 others.

Geffen points out that most of these people were not charged with anything, presumably to hide that fact that one of the arrestees was a police officer – prosecuting him would have presented problems for the police so, despite his key role, Kennedy was not charged.

Twenty people were convicted though, but their convictions were later quashed when it emerged that the prosecution had deliberately withheld recordings made at the briefing by Kennedy. These would have supported their defence that they were genuinely seeking to prevent carbon dioxide emissions by shutting down the power station.

It is noteworthy that the Director of Public Prosecutions at the time was Keir Starmer, who helped ensure that CPS staff and spycops avoided accountability for orchestrating these wrongful convictions – a number of core participants, including Geffen, have called for Starmer to give evidence to the Inquiry.

A significant number of core participants were arrested at Ratcliffe and it is likely to be a significant issue for the Inquiry in when it covers Kennedy’s deployment in Tranche 4.

OTHER QUESTIONS

Geffen is asked a number of other questions, such as whether he knew undercover officer HN78 Trevor Morris. Geffen has no memory of him, however it is evident that Morris reported on him, including recording his bank details.

This prompted Geffen to ask further questions about whether there is other relevant reporting from other spycops such as Morris, HN2 Andy Coles or HN43 Peter Francis that the Inquiry has not shown him.

Poulsen also asks about a spycop’s report stating that Geffen once gave the judge a Nazi salute in court. He explains that this was a reaction to an abuse of process where the magistrate repeatedly extended their bail conditions, and questions why this petty anecdote is being raised at all:

‘I do wonder firstly, why is that question relevant to an inquiry on police spying? Was a rather silly gesture of contempt for the magistrate a justification for undercover policing?

And secondly, who was the police officer who recorded the intelligence about that and… what legally privileged information he might also have been party to on that occasion.’

Asked whether he ever used pseudonyms, Geffen explains that it was common practice for pseudonyms to be used when talking to the media in order to avoid stories becoming personalised or focusing on the individuals rather than the issues.

Finally, Geffen is asked about the impact of being spied on. He explains that it’s unsettling, especially knowing that they were right at the heart of our social networks, and again he wonders why some of the people who were much more closely affected have not been called to give evidence.

CLOSING SPEECH

At the end of his evidence Geffen delivers a very eloquent speech setting out all the questions he feels the Inquiry has not addressed, which we encourage you to watch in full:

He talks about police informers, particularly the convicted paedophile Edward Nicholas Gratwick who infiltrated environmental campaigns in the 1990s and 2000s. Geffen asks how much the police knew about the child abuse offences their employee was engaged in.

He asks the Inquiry to investigate the police tactic of confiscating huge numbers of leaflets, not only in the Evading Standards incident, but also in the run up to Reclaim the Streets’ Mayday 2000 demonstration where disclosure of police fiels reveals a detailed police plot to harass and specifically target RTS’s printed material, even contemplating raiding the print shop where the material was being produced.

Geffen asks why the police created so much disruption and discord, and why the police repeatedly tried to conflate Reclaim the Streets with terrorism, citing an incident where police planted an incendiary devices on an activist which went off in his home, following a protest against the Terrorism Bill.

The media were given detailed, entirely fabricated, stories along these lines. The Sunday Times reported that, ahead of a protest on 30 November 1999:

‘At least 34 containers of CS gas and four stun guns capable of delivering a 50,000 volt electric shock were purchased by Reclaim the Streets.’

RTS took the issue to the Press Complaints Commission who agreed there was no basis for the story but, as RTS wasn’t a formal organisation, it couldn’t be defamed and so rejected the complaint.

Geffen also sets out the evidence (examined in more detail in the RTS witness statement to the Inquiry) that the police were actually using the intelligence gathered by the SDS to make disorder more likely.

Why was evidence collected by Boyling about the plan for J18 not passed on to City of London police who were responsible for public order policing on the ground?

Geffen asks the Inquiry to call police force commanders of the time, such as Anthony Speed and Perry Nove from the Met and City of London police respectively, to explain what happened.

Geffen concludes by saying that there was simply no justification at all for what the SDS did. They knew the intentions of the RTS to hold family-friendly events, yet they acted as agent provocateurs and painted us as terrorists.

He points out that only a week ago the government had to publish a report from its own national security services about the grave security implications of the current climate and ecological crisis – a report that the government had balked at publishing due to the severity of the facts, and had been forced into releasing a redacted version by concerned citizens using a Freedom of Information process.

Geffen asserts that the real threat to national security was the SDS who went to such lengths for so long to prevent us from getting our message across.

The Inquiry’s Chair, Sir John Mitting, rather awkwardly thanks Roger Geffen for attending, adding:

‘We’re a free country. Um, despite all the difficulties that, uh, I am examining. Thank you.’

This was met with laughter from the public gallery.

Immediately after the hearing concluded, Geffen spoke to Tom Fowler:

Tranche 3 Phase 1, Days 9-11
5-10 November 2025

INTRODUCTION

Special Demonstration Squad officer HN16 James Thomson ‘James Straven’ was deployed 1997-2002, infiltrating London-based animal rights groups. He deceived several women into long-term intimate relationships.

He gave evidence to the Undercover Policing Inquiry over three days: 5, 6 and 10 November 2025. His evidence was broadcast audio-only in order to protect his privacy.

It is not clear why the Inquiry chose to pander to the desires of this abusive perpetrator and deny the public video access to important evidence, despite Thomson’s relatively recent photo and real name being in the public domain.

The Undercover Policing Inquiry (UCPI) is an independent, judge-led inquiry into undercover policing in England and Wales. Its main focus is the activity of two units who deployed long-term undercover officers into a variety of political groups: the Special Demonstration Squad (SDS, 1968-2008) and the National Public Order Intelligence Unit (NPOIU, 1999-2011). Spycops from these units lived as activists for years at a time, spying on more than 1,000 groups.

This hearing was part of the Inquiry’s ‘Tranche 3 Phase 1’, which is examining the final 15 years of the Special Demonstration Squad, 1993-2008.

Thomson was questioned by Counsel to the Inquiry, David Barr KC. The full transcripts and audio for each day can be found on the Inquiry’s hearing pages for 5 November, 6 November, 10 November.

As there is no video from the hearings, it is important to report that spectators in the public gallery described Thomson answering many of the initial questions with a smirk or a wry smile. From his body language, he appeared to be enjoying himself, being asked about his time as an undercover officer.

But later on, as the questioning moved on to the many serious matters of his multiple wrongdoings, his demeanour changed, and he became visibly less comfortable. This is the kind of important detail the public misses when the Inquiry refuses to broadcast video of the spycops giving their evidence.

When specific documents are mentioned in this report, we give their Inquiry reference numbers. If the Inquiry has published them, the numbers are hyperlinked.

However, at the time of publication, three months after the hearings, the majority of the 67 documents we cite in this report are still unpublished. It is absurd that the Inquiry thinks it is fulfilling its purpose when it hasn’t got round to publishing the evidence it is citing.

Questioning went back and forth on topics a lot over the three days, so this report has been organised according to themes in the evidence rather than going through it day by day.

This is a long report. Use the links below to jump to a particular topic.

A Known Liar
The major lies told before the hearing began

Misuse of Fake Identities
Stealing Kevin Crossland’s identity long before Thomson was undercover, fraudulent use of documents

Abusive Relationships
Sara, Wendy and Ellie; harassment and manipulation after his deployment ended

Targeting and Deployment
Hunt saboteurs, Shamrock Farm, the growing remit of the NPOIU

Participation in Crime
Public disorder and ‘Operation Lime’ – the gunpowder plot

Foreign Travel
Going abroad with and without authorisation

Intelligence and Tradecraft
Low value reports, racism, sexism, and violation of legal privilege

HN26 ‘Christine Green’
Thomson’s contemporary who left the police to marry a hunt sab

Management Accountability & Post-Deployment Dishonesty
Introduction of RIPA regulations, withdrawal and disciplinary action, claims about mental health

Conclusions
The absence of conscience, remorse and credibility

A Known Liar

At the start of this set of hearings in October 2025, David Barr KC’s opening statement to Tranche 3 gave a summary of what would be heard in the following weeks. He singled out Thomson’s dishonesty:

‘One thing is certain: Mr Thomson has, on his own admission, told many lies to date. He has lied not only to those he mixed with whilst deployed but also to his managers and to the Inquiry. His credibility is very much an issue.’

Now that Thomson was at the Inquiry in person, Barr began by reading Thomson’s witness statement into the evidence. He specified:

‘You have provided a witness statement to the Inquiry, in fact a series of witness statements. I am referring to the last and the longest of those witness statements.’ [UCPI0000035553].

Barr later noted that several of Thomson’s written statements were retractions of lies he had told in previous statements, offering excuses for his mendacious behaviour.

Thomson was questioned about many issues that arose from the evidence of ‘Sara’, ‘Ellie’, ‘Wendy’, ‘L3’, and Liisa Crossland who we heard from in previous hearings.

Barr went on to explore those lies with him in more detail on the last day of questioning. We were shown Thomson’s October 2017 witness statement to the Inquiry [UCPI0000035199]. In it, he asserted that he never had inappropriate relationships with Sara, Ellie or Wendy, and even claimed to have never heard Ellie’s name.

Thomson admitted these were bare-faced lies, and that he deliberately and dishonestly sought to mislead the Inquiry. He claims this was to avoid being exposed as having conducted deceitful sexual relationships and losing his anonymity, and tries to suggest it was only ever intended to be a temporary lie.

We were then shown a statement he made in April 2018 [UCPI0000035223]. In it, Thomson states:

‘This statement is intended to correct parts of the account I submitted to the Inquiry immediately before the closed hearing on 17th October 2017, held to consider my application for anonymity, and as importantly to allow me to apologise to the Inquiry for my comments in particular, and my approach in general.’

Barr asked Thomson why he made that apology:

‘Q. Was it also to try to give the impression to the Inquiry that you were contrite and now coming clean?

A. I was contrite.

Q. And coming clean?

A. I hope so.

Q. Let’s have a look at that.’

In the second statement Thomson admitted he did have relationships with Sara and Ellie, but described the former as ‘a brief sexual relationship over a few weeks’ and the latter as ‘lasting a number of months’. There is no mention that he had sex with Ellie as late as 2015, fifteen years after the relationship began.

Barr pointed out that the apology came after the Inquiry had written to Thomson to inform him that his cover name would be made public. It was only a matter of time before Ellie and Sara would be able to tell the Inquiry about the relationships themselves.

The fact that Thomson has repeatedly told proven lies to the Inquiry in the past clearly framed Barr’s approach to his answers during the hearings, and set the tone for all of the evidence we heard over the three days.

Misuse of Fake Identities

Thomson committed a dizzying list of deceitful, fraudulent and illegal acts while undercover, involving the creation of false identities and the manipulation of ID documents.

Thomson used the official cover name ‘James Straven’. He says that creating an undercover persona by stealing a dead child’s identity was briefly mentioned to him when he was first sounded out for joining the SDS, but he never spoke again to any other SDS officers about how to do it.

The practice was no longer in use when he joined. When he was creating his ‘legend’ he was directly told by his managers HN216 Keith Edmondson and HN10 Bob Lambert not to steal a dead child’s identity.

‘James Straven’ was a fictitious identity, not based on any real individual, and he is not aware of anyone ever researching or testing the ‘James Straven’ legend.

KEVIN CROSSLAND

Despite this, Thomson did use an alternative (and seemingly unauthorised) identity, ‘Kevin Crossland’, which he stole from a dead child.

The real Kevin Crossland died in a plane crash in Ljubljana, Yugoslavia in 1966, when he was 5 years old. We heard evidence from Liisa Crossland on 4 November about Kevin’s life and the damage Thomson has caused her family.

One extremely striking feature of Thomson’s theft of Kevin Crossland’s identity is that he seemingly obtained the birth certificate in 1991, five years before he joined the SDS. This strongly suggests that he was already corrupt and criminally minded, even before he became an undercover officer.

A copy of Kevin’s birth certificate [MPS-0526867] was made on 9 July 1991. Barr pointed out that it bears a Special Branch reference number, SB/309/476.

Thomson claims he does not know what that number is, but states that he would have made the copy as a fairly junior operative in Special Branch, insisting he doesn’t remember how he came across it, nor how he still had it in his possession when he joined the SDS five years later.

We were then shown Kevin’s death certificate [UCPI0000038350] which records the death occurring in a plane crash in Ljubljana. In his witness statement, Thomson says he knew Kevin had died abroad, but in his oral evidence he claimed this may be the first time he had seen the death certificate and that he couldn’t remember whether he knew that Kevin died in a plane crash.

Thomson says he wants to apologise again to Liisa Crossland and knows how hard it must have been for her to give evidence. However, his apology was significantly undermined by the evidence we then heard about his extensive and apparently criminal misuse of Kevin’s identity.

We were shown an Experian search for electoral roll information [MPS-0722300]. It shows two names registered at James Thomson’s cover address: James Straven and Kevin Crossland. Neither man existed, both were fake identities being used by Thomson.

Thomson says he knew it was wrong and illegal to register Crossland’s name on the electoral roll, and that he did this so he could use the Crossland identity if he was ever arrested, to do bail checks.

However, the one time we know he was arrested, he gave the name ‘James Straven’.

We were shown records of both ‘James Straven’ and James Thomson making payments to what appear to be private detective agencies [MPS-0719722] (Thomson claims this is a mistake and he was in fact buying flagstones for his garden).

However, he does not deny that, by the time of his SDS deployment ending in early 2002, he had applied for a driving licence and attempted to open a bank account in the name of Kevin Crossland.

We were shown a letter from London Electricity saying Kevin Crossland had been the registered customer at James Thomson’s cover address since 28 January 2001, and a letter from British Telecom about registering a phone line in the name of Kevin Crossland.

Crossland was also the name on council tax bills and water bills for Thomson’s cover address (all these utility documents are in MPS-0526867).

Thomson agrees that he knew at the time that all of this was illegal. It never occurred to him that it was immoral, but he says he realises that now.

Thomson’s theft of the Crossland identity was uncovered by his managers and he was challenged on it in early 2002. A meeting note from 19 March 2002 [MPS-0745388] records Thomson claiming he had stolen Kevin Crossland’s identity for ‘operational safety’. Thomson now says this claim was a lie.

He says he struggled with management generally, and that he cannot rationalise now what his plans were for the Crossland identity.

He admits that he wanted to retain James Straven’s life – the people, the sexual relationships, and the liberated lifestyle – which was completely at odds with the ‘buttoned-down Met Police existence’.

He was expecting to be sacked from the police and was building the Crossland identity as a backup.

FRAUDULENT USE OF DOCUMENTS

In addition to his illegal misuse of Kevin Crossland’s identity, Thomson obtained numerous passports in his ‘James Straven’ identity. He admits to removing pages from them to conceal unauthorised travel from his managers, which we explore in more detail in the section on Foreign Travel.

We were shown a report dated 8 March 2002 [MPS-0719569] which says that Thomson also had four driving licences in his ‘Straven’ identity. He accepts this. They are listed as the original, two replacements he obtained himself, and a fourth he asked the office to get.

The fourth licence is registered to the address of an activist, and an internal SDS debrief document explains the ruse [MPS-0722282]:

‘In conversation with the SDS office it was established that if his address was so remote that public transport was ineffective and he would be unemployable without a vehicle, a court would be disposed, under existing European guidelines, to merely fine him and put points on his (thus far clean) licence.

As a result a new licence was obtained showing JS resident at one of his weary’s addresses in deepest Sussex. This had the added benefit of having the ungodly involved in a small deceit against authority, which further enhanced JS’s legend.

Again the office was aware and seemed to agree it was a frightfully good wheeze. In the event the prosecution, like two before it, failed (more because JS, unlike JT, enjoyed the luck of the devil than because of any strategic thinking).’

From this it is clear that Thomson was prosecuted at least three times for traffic offences in his Straven identity, and supportive SDS management thought that committing fraud to deceive the courts was a ‘frightfully good wheeze’.

Another curious aspect of Thomson’s deployment is that, unlike most of the spycops we have heard about so far, he really did do the ‘cover job’, the employment he told activists that he had.

As James Straven, Thomson was a location finder for film and television. He actually gets credits in several productions, including the 1998 TV drama Coming Home, which starred Joanna Lumley and Peter O’Toole.

Throughout his deployment, Thomson was visiting his cover employment’s office one or two days a week. During filming, he would sometimes spend two full weeks on a set.

He says that he found the cover employment interesting. It included some travel, and he got to meet famous people like O’Toole and Lumley. It also meant he was receiving money over and above his overtime-inflated Metropolitan Police salary.

Thomson says he spent the wages he received from his cover employment in his ‘Straven’ identity. He had multiple credit cards and bank accounts, which he used for anything he would prefer his management not to know about.

The overall picture we are left with is of a deeply deceitful and duplicitous man who had significant criminal tendencies well before he started working for the SDS.

Abusive Relationships

Thomson has now admitted to conducting two deceitful sexual relationships while undercover. He acknowledges that neither of the women he deceived would have consented to have sex with him if they had known his true identity.

Thomson says he was divorced when he was recruited into the SDS and was in a new ‘off and on’ relationship. He says that managers preferred ‘a stable background’, but that their investigation into the stability of his relationship was limited.

He and his partner went through short-term breakups that he did not report to his managers, although he was expected to do so. He was concerned they would terminate his deployment if they knew his real relationship was on the rocks.

Significantly, Thomson recalls speaking to a number of former undercover officers whilst he was working in the back office, preparing to deploy.

He was mentored by ex-undercover officer HN1 ‘Matt Rayner’. We heard from Liz Fuller in the Inquiry’s Tranche 2 hearings about how she was deceived into abusive sexual relationship by HN1.

Thomson claims HN1 never talked to him about sexual activity during deployments, but did give him advice on how to infiltrate animal rights activism:

‘He described them and their world quite accurately. He described sort of, I would say, the type of people… what was acceptable, what wasn’t.’

He was asked if he spoke to HN2 Andy Coles, who groomed a vulnerable teenager into a sexual relationship while he was undercover, and went on to author the notorious ‘SDS Tradecraft Manual’ [MPS-0527597]). Thomson says he cannot remember talking to Coles, but it is likely that he did.

Barr also asked Thomson about the Tradecraft Manual itself, which offers deeply unpleasant advice to officers about deceiving women into sex, and advocates ‘fleeting and disastrous relationships’.

Thomson says the manual was regularly consulted for meetings with deployed officers. This is in contrast to the claims of other officers who say they never saw it at all. However, Thomson says neither he nor anyone else ever discussed the passage on sexual relationships.

Thomson says he knew his contemporary HN14 Jim Boyling well. Boyling deceived at least three women in his target group into sexual relationships, before going on to have children with one of them. Thomson recalls ‘chatter’ within the SDS about the fact that Boyling’s partner, ‘Rosa’ was trying to find him after his deployment ended and had got hold of a phone number for the SDS office.

Thomson remembers speaking to his manager Bob Lambert about the work. But again, he claims these conversations were never about sex.

‘He was a Detective Inspector, as you said, so sort of more general advice as well. A lot more on the process, about how slow to take it and so on…

Lots of stuff about cover employment, back story. So what bits of legend work and don’t work, what that should look like…

Q. Any advice about how close to get to the activists you were seeking to report on?

A. I think as close as you could.’

Lambert’s earlier period as an undercover officer in the 1980s is one of the most controversial deployments. He gave evidence over seven days in 2024, including about how he deceived four women into sexual relationships, and fathered a child with ‘Jacqui’.

Lambert is expected to return to the Inquiry in 2026 to give evidence about his time as a manager of the SDS, including his oversight of Thomson.

The upshot of all this is that the newly recruited Thomson was introduced to the job by HN1, Coles, Boyling and Lambert, all of them known abusers.

It really brings it home that, by the late 1990s, the SDS resembled a predatory grooming gang, with the worst offenders being promoted and put in charge of initiating new members. It is therefore unsurprising that Thomson’s would become one of the most disturbing deployments to date.

THE RELATIONSHIP WITH SARA

‘Sara’ joined the Croydon hunt saboteurs in 1998. She met Thomson on one of her first hunts, in the autumn of that year. Her evidence is that Thomson asked her out to dinner.

‘Q. You got on well?

A. Yes.

Q. And you called her?

A. Mm-hm.

Q. What caused you to call her?

A. I can’t actually remember calling her. I don’t dispute that’s what happened.

Q. This is calling her to ask her out for dinner?

A. Mm-hm.’

This kind of evasive response is very common from officers like Thomson when they are asked about the details of their abusive behaviour. They don’t deny the facts, but neither do they properly admit them. It is dismissive and offensive. Their identical claims to have no memory of events (without disputing the woman’s account) are made so often and consistently that they lose all credibility.

Asked why he asked Sara out for dinner, Thomson replies:

‘Beyond the obvious attraction, various other things, my own psyche, loneliness, I don’t know… Sexual attraction, certainly…

Q. Can we take it this was done purely for your sexual gratification?

A. No, I think that’s unfair. I think it was a genuine relationship.’

Describing their abusive, deceitful and sexually exploitative behaviour as ‘genuine relationships’ is another offensive SDS trope we have seen time and time again. Like other sexually abusive officers at the Inquiry, Thomson has conceded that he understands that she would never have let him near her if she’d known who he was, and yet is unwilling to admit what that really means.

Thomson claims that he and Sara had a ‘strong connection’, although he also claims not to have known that she wanted the relationship to become long-term. He accepts that he saw Sara about twice a week, and that their relationship was well known within the small social circle they were moving in.

‘Q. You told her that you loved her in 1999, didn’t you?

A. I accept that…

Q. Why did you tell her that you loved her?

A. Because I did.

Q. There was an elephant in the room though, wasn’t there?

A. Certainly.

Q. You were not who you said you were?

A. Correct.

Q. You were a serving police officer?

A. Yes.

Q. On duty?

A. Yes.

Q. She wouldn’t have consented to the relationship or to sex if she had known who you really were, would she?

A. I think not. Sorry, I know not.’

Thomson seemed visibly uncomfortable during questioning about Sara. He gave mostly monosyllabic yes/no answers, not disputing Sara’s account but claiming not to remember or not to know what his thoughts and motivations were at the time.

He says he can’t remember telling Sara that his ex-partner had tricked him into having a child, but agrees that he probably said it because the ages of his children would have meant he had them very young.

This is because Thomson was lying to Sara about his age, claiming to be several years younger than he really was; another trait so common among SDS officers that it was surely training and tradecraft.

REPORTING ON SARA

The first mention of Sara in Thomson’s reporting is from March 1999 [MPS-0001923]. It is an intelligence report about an animal sanctuary that claims Sara works there part time, and Croydon hunt saboteurs are forging close ties with the sanctuary:

‘In the near future the entire sab group will be attending the sanctuary to assist in the construction of a duck pond.’

In addition to the total absurdity of a police intelligence report about a duck pond, Barr pointed out that the report is inaccurate. In fact, the only link between the sab group and the sanctuary was that Wendy and Sara were involved in both. Thomson reported Sara as being employed by the sanctuary, which wasn’t true.

‘Q. That’s not really close ties between the group and the sanctuary, is it? It is more the fact that two animal lovers are both hunt saboteurs and work at an animal sanctuary?

A. No, but it was a link across to the hunt saboteurs.

Q. “Sara” didn’t work there, did she?

A. No.

Q. So this information is wrong… Were you trying to place “Sara” at the sanctuary, making the connection with Croydon hunt saboteurs to justify reporting on “Sara” and spending time at the animal sanctuary?…

Doesn’t the phrase “entire sab group will be attending the sanctuary” overstate the position?…

A. Yes, I would agree with that.’

BREAKING UP WITH SARA, PARTIALLY

Sara’s account of the breakup of her relationship with Thomson was that he disappeared over the Christmas period in 1999. She couldn’t contact him for about two weeks.

He says he assumes he was with his family, and answered all further questions about the breakup with ‘I accept that’ whilst saying he cannot remember.

In fact, Thomson spun Sara a cruel story about experiences of childhood rape and sexual abuse that he used as an excuse to end the sexual relationship. Asked why he did that, he dismissively said:

‘That was in my legend anyway… The abuse and so on.’

Barr noted that there is no written record of any mention of child abuse in James Thomson’s legend.

Despite this, Thomson claims he’s sure it was not something he invented just to tell Sara. He insisted that his managers were fully aware that a history of child sexual abuse made up part of his false identity, and he remembers talking to Detective Sergeant Webb about it.

He says he cannot recall giving any thought to how any of this might affect Sara, and he tries to deny how manipulative it was.

‘Q. If it wasn’t highly manipulative, what was it?

A. I am not disputing that it wasn’t, I just didn’t see it like that. I saw it as a continuation of a genuine friendship.

Q. How could it be a genuine friendship when it was so deceitful from your side?

A. As I said, that was my perspective. I fully accept it can’t have been, and yet I believed it was.

Q. An extremely selfish way to behave?

A. Certainly.’

Thomson alternately claims that he cared about Sara whilst also admitting that he never thought about her feelings or how his behaviour might affect her. By now, he seems a lot less relaxed about the questions.

Thomson remained close to Sara and very shortly after their breakup, in early 2000, he travelled out to Goa, India to meet her there and visit an animal sanctuary. Again, he claims he has no memory of this:

‘I can’t remember it. I don’t dispute it might have happened.

Q. Assuming it happened, unauthorised?

A. I presume so.’

This is just one of many highly controversial trips abroad taken by Thomson which are dealt with below. Sara was also persuaded to join Thomson in France on holiday during what now turns out to have been the extraordinary ‘Operation Lime’ plan to fit up hunt sabs on firearms charges.

Sara moved abroad, and Thomson encouraged her to do so, giving no thought whatsoever to how he was influencing her important life choices. Thomson admits he stayed in contact with Sara by email long after she left the country.

We were also shown his phone’s call logs [MPS-0719722], which show 48 calls to Sara, who is described as the ‘ex-girlfriend of L1’. Thomson accepts Sara had never been L1’s girlfriend.

‘Q. Might it have been that you were deliberately trying to misrepresent events to throw managers off the scent of your own misconduct?

A. Entirely possible.’

Sara then became the focus of additional secret police attention. We were told that management documents exist that talk about ‘protecting’ Thomson from Sara, because she lived close to his ex-wife and children, and so there was a risk of her seeing him in his real life.

Thomson admits that he knew where Sara lived when he started the sexual relationship. He knew this put his deployment at risk and says it was stupidity that led him to put his sexual gratification ahead of basic security.

This is part of another pattern we have seen: entirely innocent people met SDS officers in their undercover roles and were then placed under intensive surveillance, simply because they lived near the officers’ real homes.

People were physically followed in order to establish patterns in their lives. There is evidence that attempts were made to influence where they lived (for example Wendy’s house purchase, examined below).

THE RELATIONSHIP WITH WENDY

The first of Thomson’s intelligence reports to mention Wendy is dated 22 August 1998 and refers to the Old Burstow Hunt’s first cubbing meeting of the 1998-1999 season [MPS-0247867].

Wendy gave live evidence to the Inquiry on 23 October 2025, during which she made clear that she is sure she met Thomson long before the Old Burstow Hunt event.

Thomson accepts that he met her early in his deployment, in 1997, when she was just 17 years old and lived at home with her mother. He became part of her intimate circle of friends, but tries to play their relationship down in his evidence:

‘Q. You became very close friends, didn’t you?

A. We were certainly friends, yes…

Q. To say that you were a close associate would be to understate the position, the reality was you were very close friends?

A. In which case I will accept that.’

In fact, Thomson supported Wendy during her mother’s long illness and death. Thomson says he can’t remember that, although he added:

‘I accept that if I had that opportunity I would have taken it, yes…

Q. You don’t remember the protracted course of somebody dying who is close to one of the people you are mixing with?

A. No.

Q. Why do you think that is?

A. I don’t know.

Q. Is it because you just didn’t care?

A. I hope not.’

Thomson also advised Wendy to split up with her then-boyfriend.

YOU WEREN’T MEANT TO FIND OUT

We were shown an intelligence report where Thomson mentions that breakup, along with the personal lives and sexuality of several members of the Croydon hunt sab group, in flippant and disrespectful terms [MPS-0003413].

Thomson defended the deeply personal nature of the reporting:

‘As I say, I reported anything. They were obviously always intended for the very small audience anyway, and certainly not for the subject to ever read it. So I can only apologise for that.

Q. Was there generally a culture of being disparaging about activists?

A. Yes, I suppose that’s fair.’

Wendy encouraged Sara, and later Ellie, to have relationships with this man who she believed was her good friend. She also recalls a number of instances where Thomson tried to create a sexual frisson in his relationship with her. Thomson denies this but adds ‘there’s lots of things I can’t see myself doing that I have done.’

He is asked whether he is trying to claim Wendy posed a physical threat or was a violent activist. Thomson says no, but then claims that ‘she had a temper and she was a committed activist’. His evidence in this section was frankly all over the place.

The most shocking evidence we heard about Thomson’s friendship with Wendy concerned the fact that, after her mother died, she bought a house very close to where Thomson’s ex-wife and children lived. We were shown a management document [MPS-0719701] which refers to ‘attempts to disrupt this purchase having failed’.

Thomson claims not to remember what he and his managers did. He is sure he tried to put her off, though he claims this was limited to telling her there were better areas to live.

However, Wendy recalls significant issues with probate. Her solicitor told her probate sometimes took up to six months, but with her mother’s simple uncontested will it would be much swifter. But it took six months to the day. She nearly lost the home she’d set her heart on.

This all indicates that the SDS actually tried to interfere with the will and the house-buying process.

THE RELATIONSHIP WITH ELLIE

Thomson started a relationship with Ellie very soon after Sara moved abroad.

Ellie wasn’t an animal rights activist, she was a friend of Wendy’s who worked at the same animal sanctuary. Thomson asked Wendy to set them up.

Again, he claims he can’t remember that, but he accepts it. Ellie was 21 at the time. Thomson told her he was 33. In fact he was 37.

‘Q. For a 37-year-old serving police officer undercover to initiate a sexual relationship with a 21-year old woman is an aggravating feature of your deception of her, isn’t it?

A. Yes…

Q. A very conscious deception of “Ellie” as to your real age?

A. Yes, it was all a deception.’

Thomson’s replies became quite petulant and defensive during Barr’s questioning about Ellie.

Asked why he started a sexual relationship with her, Thomson replied:

‘I don’t know that I did start a sexual relationship with “Ellie”. I think I started a relationship that became sexual, which is not quite the same thing.

Q. Why did you start an intimate relationship with “Ellie”?

A. I liked her. I liked her.

Q. So, again, your own sexual gratification?

A. In amongst the other parts of “like”, yes.’

At the time, Ellie had lost her job following sexual harassment by her boss. She was homeless, and unemployed.

‘Q. To take advantage sexually of a woman who was not only vastly younger than you, but also vulnerable, young and naive was a further aggravating feature of your deception of “Ellie”, wasn’t it?

A. I agree that it was. I am not sure I saw her as vulnerable.

Q. Is that because you really weren’t thinking about her feelings at all?

A. Entirely possible.

Q. Thinking entirely about yourself and your own sexual gratification?

A. Yes. I don’t like the word “entirely”, but I won’t dispute it.’

Thomson was Ellie’s first boyfriend and her first love. He accepts that he knew that. She thought it was a committed monogamous relationship, but he was actually in a relationship with someone else. Thomson did not use condoms and he got Ellie to use to use other contraception to avoid pregnancy.

Barr asked Thomson about his use of ‘mirroring’ – reflecting a person’s interests, feelings and personality back at them in order to make them feel a connection – and other manipulation of Ellie, to which Thomson replied:

‘You are reading a lot into it. I don’t think that’s fair.’

Yet all these elements are strikingly similar to how other women had been deceived by earlier SDS officers who were Thomson’s superiors. Identifying a vulnerable, much younger woman, and then grooming her into a relationship is exactly what Bob Lambert had done with Jacqui, and Andy Coles with Jessica. As with the lying about age, it seems too much of a coincidence.

Thomson took Ellie on holiday to Indonesia and Singapore during another of his unauthorised trips abroad, which are examined in more detail below.

BREAKING UP WITH ELLIE, PARTIALLY

Ellie had been with Thomson for about ten months when he told her, in January 2002, that he had to move to the United States because his ex-wife and children were moving there.

That was supposed to be part of a longer exit strategy from his deployment, but Thomson’s managers had, by then, begun to uncover the extent of his extensive fraud and other misconduct, and his deployment was brought to a rapid end.

Thomson had to tell Ellie he was leaving sooner than expected, and he pretended to leave the UK in March 2002. He maintained the sexual relationship right up until he supposedly left. He accepts that there was no real ending of the relationship, because he immediately began to deliberately lay the ground for it to continue.

‘Q. You didn’t want your deployment to end, did you?

A. I didn’t.

Q. And you were a man who ignored your managers when you didn’t like what they had to say, and you were going to stay in touch with “Ellie” despite being withdrawn, weren’t you?

A. Yes.’

HARASSMENT AND MANIPULATION AFTER HIS DEPLOYMENT ENDED

Thomson remained in contact with both Ellie and Wendy for sixteen years after his deployment ended, from 2002 to 2018, by email, phone and meeting up in person. This continued even after the spycops scandal broke and after the Undercover Policing Inquiry had been announced.

We were shown an email to Wendy that he sent on 30 March 2014 [UCPI0000038209]. In it he lies about his life, claiming to be in Canada and returning home to LA (in fact he was still a police officer, living in London). He says he is in an airport sat opposite the Victoria’s Secret store watching rolling adverts of women in lingerie for hours:

‘Let me know if you think that’s sad at all won’t you – even I might get a little jaded by the time I fly’

His regular emails asked about her life and the other activists he had targeted while undercover. He claims that this was ‘just because they were people I knew and had liked.’

Thomson says he doesn’t know if he would have ever ended his contact with Ellie and Wendy if his real identity hadn’t been exposed. He admits that his conduct was extremely harmful and unnecessary.

In her appearance at the Inquiry two weeks before Thomson’s, Ellie gave detailed evidence about the ongoing contact.

Thomson claims not to remember details, but does not dispute anything Ellie has said. He admits he always enjoyed seeing her, and they were ‘like a couple’. He accepts that he prolonged the romantic relationship, picking up where they had left off.

We were then shown some of his emails to her. Barr systematically went through the sexualised comments, including repeated references to sexual frustration, to ‘drooling’ about her ‘in entirely inappropriate ways’, references to a ‘uniform fetish’, and Thomson fantasising about Ellie naked in his office – which is particularly worrying considering where he worked.

We saw an email from October 2011 that is very heavy emotionally and includes him complaining about how sexually frustrated he was, having recently seen her but not had sex.

It is remarkable that he was still sending these emails even after spycop EN12 Mark Kennedy had been uncovered and the scandal of undercover relationships was front page news. Thomson says he didn’t make a connection between himself and these things.

In another email, dated 13 September 2011, Thomson asked Ellie to send photos of herself in lingerie to help with his sexual frustration. Thomson tries to claim he was not being serious, and yet he repeated it in later emails. He claims the persistent requests were not pressurising her, and tries to characterise it as a ‘running joke’.

He often projected their relationship into the future, describing how it will be fun to meet up when Ellie is ‘old and grey’, and he is ‘a ghost’. He admits that he was stringing her along.

Ellie has said that she never got over the relationship with ‘James Straven’, because real men couldn’t measure up to his fabricated persona. He accepts he manipulated her emotions, and affected her ability to have real world relationships.

On 24 June 2015, Thomson met up with Ellie and they did have sex. It is pointed out that this sex with Ellie was soon after the start of the Inquiry. He, incredibly, claims that in his mind he did not connect the two things.

In December 2017, the Inquiry ruled that it would release Thomson’s cover name, ‘James Straven’. In 2018, Thomson finally told Ellie that he was an undercover officer. He didn’t tell her his real name during the call. He didn’t apologise.

He now says he didn’t realise that he hadn’t apologised. He says he never gave Ellie ‘the right sort’ of thought at all, and never once considered her feelings, because his conduct has always been directed by his own self-interest.

This extreme self-centred thinking, not just during deployments but afterwards, is yet another running theme among spycops officers.

Targeting and deployment

INFILTRATING THE HUNT SABS

It is notable that although Thomson was initially deployed into the Brixton hunt saboteurs, most of his infiltration was into the Croydon hunt sabs. He sought to defend that in his evidence by claiming they were more or less one and the same:

‘The organisational end was the Croydon bit by that time. Brixton hunt saboteurs sort of turned up.

Q. Would it be fair then in the light of that answer to say that you deployed into both Brixton and Croydon hunt saboteurs from the outset, or was there a progression from Brixton to Croydon?

A. I can’t remember the exact order, but certainly it was close.’

However, he went on to differentiate between the two groups, claiming that Brixton hunt sabs were more likely to attack the hunters, whereas Croydon would focus on saving the fox.

‘Brixton would sort of kind of turn up for the ruckus and they would tend to go towards hunt supporters and the people running the hunt and the hunt itself…

Insult them, spit at them, try and get people off horses. Try and basically start a confrontation. Just encourage and then join in a fight.’

However, when asked exactly how the sabs would get people off their horses, it became clear that this was more like an act of self-defence against mounted attackers with whips:

‘If they tried to swing a crop, obviously that gave an opportunity to grab that and pull and so on.’

In fact, Thomson accepted that he only ever witnessed minor criminal damage and minor assaults by hunt sabs. Barr says he gets the impression it was more a question of goading by sabs and violence by hunters:

‘Q. Did you see hunt saboteurs throwing the first punch?

A. I am not sure. I can’t remember a specific incidence of that.’

Thomson also said that sabbing got more violent over the course of his deployment. Again, he was asked who would have committed the first violent acts in that escalation:

‘I wouldn’t like to say. I think I am probably biased, because I would say the hunt were more likely to, and I was on the other side.’

We were shown his first report, dated 22 February 1997, about upcoming animal rights protests [MPS-0000168]. He said he doesn’t know if the information in his first report was publicly available or not, but he accepts that at that stage, his infiltration was limited:

‘I would have turned up at a couple of sabs’.

Barr points out that this demonstrates that a very superficial shallow infiltration was all that was needed to get that kind of information.

GOING DEEPER

In May 1997, a file note [MPS-0247080] written by his manager HN10 Bob Lambert, just four months into Thomson’s deployment, recorded that:

‘The activists seem to have been impressed by [Thomson’s] ability to handle himself and face up to violent threats from hunt supporters and the like.’

Thomson agreed that this is probably accurate, although again, he cannot recall a specific incident.

Thomson claims that he doesn’t remember ever being known by the nicknames ‘Posh Sab’ or ‘James Blonde’ whilst he was deployed.

He claims he ‘would have noticed’. All the civilian witnesses he spied on insist that they remember calling him these names to his face.

The May 1997 file note also describes:

‘On Monday, 5 May he received his first in-depth grilling from his new associates. He appears to have handled this well.’

Asked about this, Thomson says:

‘It was a back room in a pub in south London. And just lots and lots of questions… My interest, vegetarianism, veganism, a little bit about where I had been, why I hadn’t been on sabs before.
That sort of thing…

Q. As to the demeanour, were these threatening questions or were they just gentle inquisition?

A. I felt slightly under pressure, as far as I can recall. I didn’t feel physically at risk. I wasn’t looking at the windows or anything that I can remember…

Q. If you had not satisfied your questioners, what do you think would have happened?… Was your feeling that you would have been under any physical threat?

A. Yes. They were naturally violent, or some of them, to be fair. Some of them were naturally violent…

Q. Might that have been a subjective fear rather than one with an objective basis?

A. Absolutely.’

One spycop after another infiltrated hunt sabs and described them as seriously violent. Under examination, none of the officers can cite any instances, but vividly describe serious violence from hunters and supporters. HN2 Andy Coles even wrote in the SDS Tradecraft Manual [MPS-0527597]:

‘I know that in the future I will have nothing but contempt for fox hunters and in particular their terriermen.’

Despite all this, the SDS did not infiltrate hunts, and even now they insist that sabs were a deserving target for spying. This proves that the SDS wasn’t focused on the risk of violence and disorder, but rather on threats to established social hierarchies.

ACTUAL DANGER AND VIOLENCE

We were then shown an SDS memo dated 8 August 1997 [MPS-0247206] which records that Thomson was in fact hospitalised in his cover identity on 10 July 1997, with a fractured collar bone and jaw.

But it was not the hunt sabs who caused those injuries: he was attacked by hunt supporters on a Countryside Alliance march.

Asked about the incident, he says his managers were sympathetic. However, Thomson himself cannot remember how it happened as he was concussed and suffered amnesia.

This was not the only instance where Thomson was injured. A file note dated 21 November 1998 [MPS-0001577] records serious injuries to Thomson’s jaw, back and legs after being attacked by hunt supporters with golf clubs when sabotaging a hunt in Kent.

Thomson claims he cannot remember who else was there when he was attacked. The file states that the attack left Thomson:

‘in cheerful mood and upbeat about his increased credibility.’

A further injury report was filed on 18 November 1999 [MPS-0002618], when Thomson slipped a disc, which made it harder for him to participate in sabbing. He said it slowed him down.

Despite the SDS’s own files showing overwhelming evidence of violence coming predominantly from the hunters, we were shown an intelligence report from 4 August 1997 [MPS-0000483] in which Thomson claims southern England hunt sab groups had ‘hard reputations’.

Questioned about it, he admits that numerically there would almost invariably been far more hunt supporters than sabs. He further admits that it was common for sabs to be unfairly arrested by police:

‘I don’t know what powers they were using. You would be sort of stuck somewhere and quite likely released once the hunt had finished or gone.’

The report claimed that saboteurs were being asked to wear similar black clothing to make identification and post-hunt arrests more difficult. However, Thomson said he was never asked to help identify sabs from photographs, even if there had been incidents of violence, stating:

‘I was there for intelligence, not evidence.’

We were then shown a series of Thomson’s reports from the 1998-1999 hunt season. One report from 23 March 1998 [MPS-0000959] describes the hunt supporters coming off ‘second best’ to the sabs and being attacked while they hid with the police.

Barr was obviously quite struck by this report:

‘Wouldn’t that have been quite a striking and memorable incident.. one which certainly, as depicted here, is violence perpetrated by hunt saboteurs that goes well beyond lawful self-defence?’

Thomson seemed unimpressed, and claims to have no memory of the incident. Despite this, he denies any possibility that he might have exaggerated his report:

‘If I have reported it, then it happened.’

Given the fantastical nature of such a lot of SDS reporting (including the staggering claims made by Thomson about Operation Lime) this statement is meaningless in terms of establishing historical accuracy. Nonetheless, it offers an interesting insight into the SDS mindset and the way they approached intelligence: if we reported it, then it happened (and not the other way around).

MORE NON-SPECIFIC ALLEGATIONS OF VIOLENCE

Another report, which is undated but which the Inquiry has placed within this period, refers to Croydon hunt sabs supposedly planning an attack on a local fascist [MPS-0001541]. Barr points out this is an unusual report:

‘It is not about animal rights, is it? It’s about an alleged plot by the Croydon hunt saboteurs physically to attack a man for his far, or perceived far, right political views…

Did that actually happen?… Why would the Croydon hunt saboteurs, an animal rights group, plan an attack on a fascist?’

Thomson is characteristically vague in his responses, claiming that sabs were very anarchic and that:

‘The right wing were the enemy… across sabbing and animal rights generally.’

He claims he cannot remember whether anything came of the supposed plan. He accepts that if a man had been attacked he would have reported it, but then immediately adds more vague allegations of the same kind:

‘I mean attacks in that area did happen, especially after drink. But they tended to be spontaneous ones.’

The justification for Thomson’s spying on the hunt sabs seems tenuous at best. By then, hunting was on the way to being made illegal, and we saw notes from a strategy meeting dated 2 January 2000 [MPS-0003394]:

‘Sabbing will remain an important area, particularly as the ground is prepared for the anti-hunt bill to be presented in Parliament.’

Barr then showed us a document claiming that Thomson had close contact with activists from the Animal Liberation Front (ALF). The ALF was one of the SDS’s main bogeymen at the time, regarded as the most extreme tier of animal rights activism.

The document is a file note dated 22 May 2000 [MPS-0003403], signed by HN58, the Detective Chief Inspector in charge of the SDS 1997-2001. It refers to Thomson ‘having forged close links with active ALF types.’

However, there is no real evidence to suggest Thomson ever had any links to the ALF, only to the Croydon hunt sabs.

It appears to be another example of the spycops exaggerating their work to the managers, then the managers exaggerating further, an effect repeated as the information went up the chain of intelligence to the higher echelons of the police and Home Office.

Indeed, not only were there no reports from Thomson about the ALF but also, Barr pointed out, the Inquiry actually has very little reporting from Thomson at all in this period.

Asked how much sabbing he actually did in the 2000-2001 and 2001-2002 hunting seasons, Thomson replies:

‘A. I don’t think there was any drop off particularly…

Q. There is reporting about the injury suffered by L4 and responses to that which we will be coming to in due course. But we do not see, as we have done to date, a stream of reporting about hunt sabotage.’

It appears, from the evidence, that Thomson’s decreased reporting about sabbing events may have been due to the changing relationship between the SDS and a new spycop unit, the NPOIU, which we will look at in more detail below.

SHAMROCK FARM

We saw significant reporting by Thomson throughout 1999 about the campaign against Shamrock Farm monkey breeders, Europe’s largest supplier of primates for vivisection.

Thomson reported on large, public and ‘fairly orderly’ demonstrations near the farm, describing them as ‘fairly well, if not heavily, policed.’

His reports also mention ‘home visits’, with activists protesting at the homes of people who owned Shamrock Farm, informing their neighbours of who they lived near. Thomson said he attended a lot of them.

It was put to him that, at the time, home visits could have been legal, but he disputed that fact:

‘The objective was to frighten the people there, or their associates, to make them in turn stop doing what they were doing, or drop the links they had to whichever company it was, depending on the association.

Q. What is the basis for your saying that the intention was to frighten, as opposed to make a point and disagree with what that person was doing by way of legitimate process?

A. I suppose that’s how I remember it.’

In fact, there was no law preventing these kinds of protests until the Criminal Justice & Police Act 2001, something which Thomson, as a serving policing officer working in the animal rights field, really ought to have been aware of.

Thomson’s claim that the aim of the visits was ‘intimidation’ is further undermined by the fact that, despite saying he had attended many of them, he could only recall one instance of criminal damage (a broken window) and one instance where there was an altercation with a neighbour of the targeted house.

It was clear from the documents we saw that, although Thomson was taking part in the actions, he didn’t actually report much specific or pre-emptive intelligence about these protests at all.

Shamrock Farm closed down in 2000. Barr commented:

‘Whether or not that was because of the campaigning may be a separate question… there was some suggestion it may have been because of financial improprieties at Shamrock Farm, but there is another report… [MPS-0003412] dated 25 May 2000.

It says a person, whose name we are protecting, “has discovered, through an employee of the firm, that the arson on [privacy]’s garage was the final ‘straw’ that led to the closure of the premises”.’

It says a lot about the questionable quality of the SDS intelligence we have seen over the past five years of this Inquiry that Barr’s next question was:

‘Do you know whether or not that in fact occurred?’

Thomson can’t remember, and there are no intelligence reports about such an incident. So, Thomson was deep undercover, spying on the Shamrock Farm campaign, but is unable to provide any useful information at all about an arson attack that he alleges got the place closed down. It’s simply not believable.

THE GROWING REMIT OF THE NPOIU

We saw a file note about targeting strategy which recorded a meeting between Thomson and Lambert dated 30 January 1998 [MPS-0247069].

It explores an out-of-London tasking, specifically going down to Hastings, which it describes as ‘an emerging centre of ALF activity’.

Thomson was asked whether there was there any boundary drawn between the Metropolitan Police district and out-of-area activities:

‘Not that I can ever remember, no.

Q. Was a matter of geography ever raised by your managers with you?

A. No… When you say “matter of geography”, I think at the very end of my deployment that was raised, but not at this point.’

Thomson was not specific about what he meant by saying it was raised at the end of his deployment. However, it seems it may well be to do with the formation of a new undercover policing unit.

The National Public Order Intelligence Unit (NPOIU) was established in 1999, using undercover officers in the same way as the SDS, and targeting the same sort of activities. But unlike the SDS, who, as a Met unit, were restricted to London, the NPOIU had a national remit.

There was a sizeable degree of crossover between the two units. It’s established that SDS Tradecraft Manual author HN2 Andy Coles trained the early NPOIU recruits, and there’s a mysterious gap in HN10 Bob Lambert’s CV at exactly that time.

A file note dated 22 May 2000 [MPS-0003403] reviewing Thomson’s operation states:

‘In view of NPOIU’s ever-expanding remit it is becoming increasingly difficult for SDS to operate effectively outside London on anything other than an occasional basis.’

Most, if not all, fox hunts would have taken place outside of the Metropolitan Police district, and Thomson’s decreased participation in and reporting on hunt sabbing from 2000-2002 may well have been related to that as much as his slipped disc.

Thomson claims not to know about this:

‘I was aware of them. But clearly there is something else going on in terms of who is responsible for what there that I wasn’t really cognisant of.

Q. Was there a feeling, that you were aware of, of the SDS’s work being encroached upon by the National Public Order Intelligence Unit?

A. Not that I can ever remember feeling…

Q. Did you have any direct contact with the National Public Order Intelligence Unit?

A. No.’

SDS AND NPOIU CROSSOVER

There are a number of SDS reports made on NPOIU forms. For example, in November 2025, during the Inquiry’s questioning of trade unionist Frank Smith, we saw that SDS spycop HN104 Carlo Soracci ‘Carlo Neri’ had filed a report on 29 January 2002 on NPOIU forms [MPS-0007725].

It’s unclear whether this was actually the NPOIU also spying on Smith, or whether Soracchi was using their forms for some reason.

Either way, it shows a significant degree of overlap between the two units.

Thomson was also asked about the earlier relationship between the SDS and the Animal Rights National Index (ARNI, which was later subsumed into the NPOIU), specifically whether ARNI was a customer for SDS intelligence. Yet again he was vague and said it didn’t really come up.

However, the impact of that relationship was certainly greater than Thomson is letting on.

Because of the changing remits and the growing role of the NPOIU, SDS manager HN58 suggested that Thomson should begin looking at a withdrawal strategy in May 2000, with early 2001 as a finish date for his deployment (this may be what Thomson meant by the matter of geography coming up at the end).

‘Q. You are recorded as expressing some disappointment at that, and the reasons are then set out.
Is it right that you were disappointed at the prospect of ending your deployment in early 2001?

A. Yes, I am sure it was.

Q. Is that something you felt really pretty strongly about?

A. I suspect so, yes.

Q. Would it be fair to say that your cooperation with this plan was rather begrudging?

A. Yes, I imagine so.’

Thomson’s resistance to the plan to shut down his operation in early 2001, and his desperation to find an excuse to continue, form the backdrop for what subsequently became Operation Lime: his trip to France with a bizarre plot alleging hunt sabs were buying a gun.

Participation in Crime

Asked about participation in crime, Thomson says his manager HN10 Bob Lambert spoke to him about this:

‘We certainly discussed the reporting of it, how that was managed, advance information. We discussed some sort of bits on spontaneous violence and how you deal with them…

Q. Did you discuss the gravity of offence that you might become involved in?

A. Certainly as a relative thing, i.e. you’re there to prevent and mitigate harm. So that’s what you do. In terms of is there an absolute limit, no, I think that was always part of the context.

Q. Were you told that you needed to get advance authority to participate in crime?

A. I was certainly aware of that where possible, yes.

Q. And where not possible?

A. Then you prevent harm, report later.’

Thomson described the process for getting authority to participate in crime:

‘I think I would always have expected it starts with a conversation with the person who is handling you and then they will then decide what sort of level authority it might need.’

Barr pointed out that there is no evidence of a paper trail or any prior authority for any of the crimes Thomson was involved in, with the exception of Operation Lime, which we look at below.

Thomson claimed that he and Lambert did not discuss any specific examples, but that these conversations about participation in crime made up a significant part of the conversations he had with Lambert.

‘I think we discussed scenarios, rather than examples…

What would you do if the group you’re with see someone and decide to attack them, for example. What would you do if they suddenly decide they are going to commit an arson, et cetera.’

This is obviously significant as Lambert himself is accused of having organised and participated in arson attacks against Debenhams department stores. Sadly, Thomson was silent on exactly what Lambert said he should do if his group decided to commit arson.

Barr also asked whether the Home Office guidelines on participation in crime [MPS-0727104] formed the basis for Thomson’s discussions with Detective Inspector Lambert, to which Thomson replied ‘I am sure they were. I am sure they were,’ before admitting:

‘I am not that familiar with them, I can’t remember ever actually looking at that at the time.’

The guidelines expressly forbid misleading courts, though Thomson not only did this but had his managers’ blessing too.

PUBLIC DISORDER

The evidence is that Thomson participated in crime on multiple occasions. We were shown an intelligence report from 12 April 1997 [MPS-0000303] about the March For Social Justice, which Thomson attended with the hunt sab groups he had infiltrated.

The report describes some serious public disorder, and Barr asked him about that:

‘Q. Were you anywhere near that public disorder?

A. I assume so.

Q. What do you recall of it?

A. I can’t recall anything specific. There were a lot of these at that time. Not necessarily labelled March For Social Justice, but serious public disorder in central London…

Q. Were any of the people who you were attending this demonstration with violent?

A. Yes.

Q. On this occasion?

A. I don’t know about this occasion.

Q. Are you able to help us with whether any of them broke the law on this occasion?

A. No, not specifically this occasion. I couldn’t say that.’

These kinds of generalised allegations of serious criminality, violence or disorder without being able to offer any specifics is typical of SDS evidence, and came up very frequently during Thomson’s oral evidence.

While Thomson didn’t know if he was disorderly or not on the March For Social Justice, he says he was active in disorder in ‘these sorts of events’:

‘Q. As a matter of generality, how disorderly were you at this sort of event?

A. I was certainly active… obviously I had been the other side of the shields sort of thing, so I knew that you could go and kick a shield for as long as you like and it didn’t do any harm. So that sort of thing, I would certainly have done that. Yeah, I suppose I just worked within those sort of limits.

Q. In order to demonstrate your activist credentials, how forward were you in this activity?

A. I would have been in and amongst.

Q. Would you be the first to kick the shield?

A. No, I don’t think I would ever have been the first.

Q. Amongst the first?

A. Amongst the first is probably fair.’

We were then shown a file note written by Lambert from 6 May 1997 [MPS-0247080], about the March For Social Justice and a protest at Consort Beagles in Ross on Wye, a breeder of dogs for vivisection, where Thomson was injured by riot police.

In it, Lambert refers to the Consort Beagles protest as ‘an ALF demo’.

As we saw with SDS manager HN58’s reference to Thomson having close contact with the Animal Liberation Front, this seems to be another instance of management exaggerating Thomson’s activity, upgrading him from hunt sab to a group viewed as more dangerous.

Asked about the difference between an animal rights demo and an ALF demo, Thomson replies:

‘I don’t know that there is one. I suspect ALF is a bit of a shorthand.’

This confirms what we saw in evidence in the Inquiry’s Tranche 2 hearings, that the SDS used the term ‘ALF’ as a catch-all, leading to sloppy and inaccurate reporting that sought to justify spying on everyone and anyone with an interest in animal rights.

HUNT SAB ‘MASS HIT’

Thomson was also questioned about an incident on 13 December 1997, about a ‘mass hit’ against a hunt.

A ‘mass hit’ was when one hunt sab group called for others from further afield to come and join them. They often happened after an incident of extreme violence by hunters, as a way of showing that sabs would not be easily cowed, and to discourage hunters from violence in future because it only made sabbing increase.

A report [MPS-0000736] described hunters’ cars being damaged and a fight with hunt supporters. Thomson accepts that he was there but he can’t recall much, nor give any real reason why he was there:

‘My mental image is actually the windows. That’s why I think I was there, I have got a mental image of the breaking of windows, car windows. And after that I sort of am in it and wouldn’t be able to sort of look up…

Q. When you say words to the effect you had your head down after the first window was smashed or words to that effect, was that because you were participating in this affray?

A. I was there.

Q. Were you participating in any of the violence against property?

A. Not that I can remember, no. I don’t believe so…

Q. At an event like this, what did you see your role as being?

A. To the extent I had a role, a useful role at all by that stage, just mitigate harm to the extent I could…

Q. You have seen the report. It is a long report, but it doesn’t identify any individuals, does it?

A. Mm-hm. No, it doesn’t.

Q. Can you recall whether or not you did intervene to mitigate the criminality that was ongoing?

A. I can’t.’

ARRESTING THE SPYCOP

Thomson was arrested on 29 August 1998, for obstructing police, as part of a sit-down protest on the A1 near Huntingdon Life Sciences vivisection facility. He was bailed but ultimately not required to return.

Minutes from an SDS strategy meeting from 27 January 2000 [MPS-0003394] refer to the Mayday 2000 protests organised by Reclaim the Streets, which Thomson attended.

He claims that members of the group he was with took part in physical violence that day, fighting with the police in Whitehall. But, yet again, he can’t make an allegation of any specific violent act.

He claims he reported it at the time, but there is no sign of that report.

Thomson admits that he provided night vision equipment to the sabs, and that his intention was that it would be used for illegal activity.

‘Q. So you were facilitating crime?

A. I accept that.’

He defended providing the equipment, claiming doing so would improve his credibility with the group. In fact, the sabs mostly used it for wildlife watching at night.

Thomson also admits to committing criminal damage by destroying badger traps on a regular basis. He says his SDS managers were aware of this and content for him to do it.

However, the most extreme instance of Thomson’s managers allowing him to participate in crime is the story of ‘Operation Lime’.

OPERATION LIME – THE GUNPOWDER PLOT

Operation Lime is an astonishingly complicated police plot which eventually involved Thomson travelling in his cover identity to Turkey, Indonesia, Singapore and twice to France, ostensibly as part of a conspiracy to acquire a firearm, ammunition and (inexplicably) a bag of ‘black powder’.

The supposed plan was to buy those items in France, traffic them to the UK and use them to murder a supporter of the Surrey and Burstow hunt. There is no evidence of this plot ever existing, apart from Thomson saying it did.

The beginnings of Operation Lime came shortly after Thomson was told, in May 2000, that his deployment would be brought to an end by early 2001. It was recorded at the time that he was very unhappy about that decision. It seems he came up with the gun plot as a way to extend his deployment.

On 1 September 2000, a member of the Croydon hunt sabs, known in the Inquiry as ‘L4’, who Thomson had befriended during his deployment, was almost killed by a hunt supporter who ran him over with a Land Rover.

Thomson was not there when it happened, however he filed a report that same day [MPS-0003867] which claimed:

‘There has been immediate talk of reprisals, but no definite plan has yet been formulated.’

Barr asked him who was talking of reprisals at that stage:

‘I can’t remember who I spoke to. I think everyone. It was a truly shocking thing… I mean everyone was very, very angry…

Q. But no indication that that anger would translate at that stage into action?

A. No.’

There was a demonstration at the hunt’s kennels the following day, 2 September, and another a few days later on 6 September. Barr went over Thomson’s reports about those events.

‘Q. I am not asking whether it had completely finished the saga, but was your impression that there had been a venting of anger?

A. No, I don’t think so.’

THE FRENCH CONNECTION

We were then shown a report entitled ‘The French Connection’ dated 31 October 2000 [MPS-0004388]. It is about a plot to obtain a firearm and a strategy to disrupt it.

‘Q. Is it right that your managers’ belief that there was a plot to obtain a firearm was the result of your telling them that?

A. I would presume so, yes…

Q. Were you ever told there was any other source?

A. No.’

The sole source of information about this uncorroborated plot was therefore, at all times, the word of Thomson himself.

The ‘French Connection’ report says the objective is:

‘to gain intelligence on the activities of L2 or L3 … leading to their arrest or disruption, without compromising the source and other long-term SDS operations. A requirement for source to give evidence in court will lead to compromise.’

On the same day, 31 October 2000, HN58 the Detective Chief Inspector then in charge of the SDS, sent a minute to the Commander Special Branch recommending disrupting or frustrating of the plot, rather than making arrests. He also requests authority for Thomson to take part in what is described as a ‘dry run’.

The resulting plan was absurdly convoluted. The police decided to allow the supposed purchase of a gun to take place, on foreign soil. The plan described:

‘a possible opportunity to disrupt in France. Having discussed with MT [‘Magenta Triangle’, code name for Thomson], the theft of his vehicle with ordnance inside could be engineered. This would take the ordnance away from the conspirators and severely disrupt any future plans.

The problem with this scheme is that Roger Pearce probably could not authorise it, particularly as the substantive ‘offences’ are taking place in France.

However, MT feels confident he that he could engineer a position whereby his vehicle could be “stolen”.’

The police plan for Operation Lime included the following steps:

‘MT + Companion depart for France
MT picks up ordnance and secretes in car
MT books into hotel or goes to restaurant
Vehicle gets stolen and ordnance removed’

There are further steps to the plan, but they have been redacted. The Inquiry has not said why.

A PLOT WITHOUT PLOTTERS

The detail of the police’s plan is quite striking. Firstly, because the document suggests that it is Thomson himself who is acquiring the ‘ordnance’, the activists seem to play little or no role. Secondly, because the document asserts that the activists have not actually planned anything:

‘Nothing has been planned so far; the intelligence has come from a number of conversations between interested parties.’

Barr asked Thomson to clarify:

‘In the period between 1 September 2000, when L4 was run over, and 31 October when this document is generated, what conversations had been held between which interested parties?’

Thomson pointed to L2, L3 and himself, but hedged his bets about whether anyone else was involved.

‘Q. Just the three of you?

A. I can’t say that exclusively.

Q. Well, who else?

A. I don’t know…

Q. It is quite a big deal, conspiring to either shoot or murder somebody, isn’t it?

A. Of course.

Q. And one would be pretty careful about who one entered into a conspiracy with to do that?

A. Certainly.

Q. Is it really the case that you are not sure who was party to the conspiracy at this stage?

A. I only know the people I was talking to.’

It was very noticeable that Barr wanted concrete details about who, where and how the plot came into being, while Thomson seemed to be intentionally vague.

A NEW CONSPIRATOR

It seemed that Thomson was making up this gun plot as he went along, and there were audible laughs from the public gallery as he failed to answer any of Barr’s direct questions.

He eventually, begrudgingly, named four people: L1, L2, L3, and a fourth person who had not been previously mentioned at all. They have now been ciphered as L6.

Like L3, L6 had no part in this Inquiry until Thomson suddenly named him in his evidence. L6 has since made a written witness statement (we don’t have a reference number for this and it seems to be another document that the Inquiry hasn’t published yet).

Barr drew Thomson’s attention to the fact that in 2001 the authority to travel abroad [MPS-0006714] recorded only two people being part of this supposed conspiracy:

‘Q. Why has two in a document generated in 2001 become four in your evidence before the Inquiry today?

A. I think it’s a larger number. I do not think that’s accurate.’

Barr asked Thomson about the nature of the conversations he had with L1, L2, L3 and L6, but he was unable to give any specific examples of what was said.

Barr also dug deep into why Thomson thought this supposed murder plot was real:

‘Q. These are people you have described as being involved in essentially minor criminality to advance the cause of animal liberation… Murder is an entirely different ball game… What made you think that any of these four people was capable of that?

A. Because what you describe as minor, they had an ability, a desire, to visit real harm on people and to take satisfaction from it…

Q. Can you give the Inquiry an example of L1 inflicting physical harm on another human being and taking satisfaction from doing that?

A. On a specific day, date, time, place, no…

Q What’s the most specific recollection you have that would support the assertion that you have just made?

A. Home visits, I think…

Q. How many times did you witness L1 being violent in this way?

A. I don’t know.

Q. Why don’t we have any reporting of that?

A. I don’t know.’

Barr asked similar questions about all four of the activists Thomson had named, trying to establish why he believed them to be violent. Thomson was completely unable to cite any real incidents.

He answered all Barr’s questions about specifics with a nebulous refusal to be pinned to any certainty: ‘I can’t remember’; ‘if there was it would have been reported’ and even ‘sorry, I have forgotten the question’. He was visibly uncomfortable by this point.

Barr pointed out there are no (or at least, no surviving) intelligence reports at all about the conversations leading up to this incident. All we have are the management notes.

‘Q. Was there any discussion with your managers about whether or not this should be written up?

A. Not that I can remember.’

This is problematic for Thomson because, while we have internal SDS records that show him telling his managers that this plan existed and them building this incredibly tortuous operation around it, there is no contemporary record at all of any of these supposed conversations taking place between the activists, and no first-hand accounts at all of the meetings and conversations they are supposed to have had.

The only meetings about this plan on record are those held by the police. This fits with the activists’ version of events, as they say it simply didn’t happen, there were no such discussions, and the first they have heard of this plot was very recently, when it was described in the Opening Statements to this Inquiry.

ALWAYS FRANCE FROM THE START

Many aspects of this supposed plot clearly trouble Barr. He asks about when France was first mentioned as the destination for the arms deal. Thomson replied that it was later on, ‘after this report, when things began to firm up’.

However, that makes no sense. Although the 31 October note specifically states that nothing has been planned yet, the title of the document is ‘the French Connection’, and it mentions the possibility of jurisdictional problems in France.

Another internal note from just a week later, dated 6 November [MPS-0004441], seeks authorisation for Thomson to travel to Istanbul. We look at that trip in more detail in the section on foreign travel. Importantly, the note also states:

‘There is a plan to obtain black powder and a gun from France through a French animal rights activist.’

Thomson eventually concedes that France must indeed have come up earlier.

Another document [MPS-0009484] records a meeting on 10 November 2000 between Thomson and two of his managers, Bernie Greaney and Noel Warr, which took place at Thomson’s home.

Thomson says that kind of informal meeting at home was not unusual. It was common SDS practice, and he doesn’t seem to think it posed any kind of security risk. This particular meeting was about events on 9 November – the so-called ‘dry run’ to Calais.

True to form, Thomson says he cannot really remember anything about the trip. He took a long time to answer many of the questions, but he did eventually admit that he travelled to Calais with L1 and L1’s girlfriend.

Thomson claims the purpose of the trip was to see what security was like at the port, and that they were in fact stopped and searched whilst going through customs. His answers were unconvincing, using hedging phrases like ‘I presume I was’ to imply that he has no reliable memory of this at all.

The meeting’s notes record that Thomson told his managers he would actively reassure L1 and his girlfriend that, despite the stop and search, the plan to secure a firearm from France was still sound.

He says that he did do that, which is completely ludicrous for someone whose supposed mission was to prevent the acquisition, as Barr pointed out:

‘You are a serving undercover police officer trying to encourage L1, L2 and L3 to continue with a plot to obtain an illegal firearm with the intent to kill or seriously harm another human being…

In terms of participation in crime, isn’t seeking to reassure your fellow conspirators to continue with the plot at a moment of uncertainty the wrong thing to do?’

Thomson answers that he doesn’t really know now why he did it, but he is nonetheless somehow sure that it was the right thing to do, and that he was always in control of the situation.

He denies L3’s suggestion that the first trip to France was just a ‘booze cruise’ to buy cheap alcohol.

Moving on to the second trip to France, the note of the meeting with Greaney and Warr records:

‘MT has obtained a vegan guidebook for France and has identified a couple of restaurants and hotels in the Marseille area which he will try and use, and which can be researched by us on the recce.’

From this it is clear that Thomson was telling his handlers the destination for the plot was Marseille as early as 10 November. Barr points out that buying the guide book also suggests Thomson was really running the show:

‘You were not only in the driving seat of the vehicle but also in the driving seat of decisions as to where you stopped and where you ate?’

Thomson accepts this, but claims it was L2 who told him Marseille was where they could meet a man to buy a gun. However, he cannot provide any details, and he asks Barr if there is a report about it he could see in order to jog his memory. Barr pointedly says there isn’t:

‘Q. As we discussed yesterday, there is a remarkable dearth of intelligence reports.

A. Mm-hm.’

Like Lambert answering the Inquiry’s questions about his involvement in placing timed incendiary devices in Debenhams’ shops, Thomson is in full ‘I can’t remember’ mode about this plot.

‘Q. When you came back from the day trip to France, did you speak to anyone?…

A. Not that I can remember…

Q. You must have talked to somebody about reassuring the group over the next few days… Wouldn’t there have been a meeting to discuss whether the plot was viable?

A. There may well have been.

Q. Well, you were there. Was there?

A. I can’t remember anything that specific. I would have reported it at the time.’

Thomson also can’t remember who paid for the Channel crossing, the accommodation or the food on the trip, nor where the supposed £700 came from for buying the gun, or even whether they knew the price in advance.

‘Q. Is it right that L3 was not a man who could have afforded this trip on his own?

A. I would suspect so…

Q. And that from a financial point of view, your paying for the accommodation and the transport enabled him to go on the trip?

A. Yes, I suppose that’s true.’

So far, despite answering ‘I can’t remember’ to most of the questions, Thomson has admitted to encouraging the plot and ensuring it went ahead, planning the trip, where they would stay and where they would eat, paying for the travel and accommodation, and possibly even paying for the gun itself.

Had this plot been real, he would certainly have been playing far more than a minor role.

RECONNAISSANCE IN MARSEILLE, NOT BORDEAUX

Finally, six days after the Calais trip, from 14-16 November 2000, Thomson and his managers travelled to Marseille on a recce.

Barr read from a document which notes:

‘“MT’s vegan restaurant guide was well received, however, and he is confident that he will be able to steer his entourage towards the sites agreed during the recce.”

The phrase “the sites agreed during the recce”, suggests that during the reconnaissance, you and your managers made decisions about where you wanted the stops and the meals to take place.’

So, what about Bordeaux, which he had told his superiors would be the first stop before going to buy the gun in Marseille?

‘Q. Did you go to Bordeaux on the recce?

A. No.

Q. Why didn’t you go to Bordeaux on the recce?

A. Because it wasn’t where the operational bit was happening.’

This question about Bordeaux is important. Thomson told his managers the plan was to go to Bordeaux and then on to Marseille, some 400 miles away. He claims it was changed at the very last minute, too late for him to let anyone know.

They instead went to Marseille first and Bordeaux later. Yet he had somehow previously arranged for his then-girlfriend, ‘Sara‘, to fly out and meet them in Bordeaux at the correct time.

Barr points out that if the plan really had been to meet her in Bordeaux and then travel down to Marseille together, and then back from Marseille to Calais, then he was planning to have her travelling with them when they bought the gun.

‘Q. So, as I am understanding your evidence, you were planning to have L3 and “Sara” in your car with an unlawful firearm?

A. Yes…

Q. I think it is common ground that L3 likes wine and that Bordeaux is obviously a wine lover’s paradise?

A. Yes.

Q. And so on a trip to France to take the opportunity to visit Bordeaux in good company is an attractive one?

A. Certainly.

Q. But if one is in the business of purchasing an unlawful firearm with the intention to kill or seriously injure another human being, then a digression to Bordeaux and bringing along non-conspirators in the vehicle would be a surprising thing to want to do, isn’t it?

A. I don’t think so particularly. No.

Q. One would have to be remarkably relaxed about the operation of obtaining an illegal firearm to be planning it in these rather casual terms…

Is it your evidence that L3 had any previous experience in unlawfully obtaining firearms?

A. I have no idea…

Q. Did it strike you as odd that L3 was seeking to add this diversion and add these passengers to a serious criminal endeavour?

A. No.’

It obviously is odd, but Thomson stuck to his guns (so to speak).

‘Q. On the face of the report in front of us, you have had a conversation with L3, who has suggested a diversion to Bordeaux. There is absolutely no mention here of the availability of the supplier of the firearm…

If you were in fact going to pick up a firearm, one would have thought a central question to the itinerary and the timing is when that weapon was going to be available to you… an itinerary would need to revolve around when the weapon would be available?

A. Presumably.

Q. Yet there is no mention of that in this note or in any intelligence reporting?

A. I am sure there is. I mean not in this note, but I am sure there is reporting on that.’

There is none to be found in any of the material the Inquiry has seen.

THE REAL TRIP – STRAIGHT TO MARSEILLE

The actual trip took place in January 2001 and a memo [MPS-0005257] records the movements of Detective Sergeants Warr and Greaney who travelled to Marseille and rented a gîte in the Avignon area on 6 January. It also details the movements of Thomson and L3 who, the report states, travelled from Dover to Calais on 8 January, and then ‘drove towards Bordeaux’.

However, Thomson admits in his evidence that that is not what they actually did. Barr read aloud from the document:

‘During the course of this journey MT had contacted Detective Sergeant Greaney and indicated that he was OK but due to security was unable to say where he was located.’

Detective Chief Inspector HN58 travelled to Bordeaux on 9 January, completely pointlessly, as it turns out, because Thomson was not there. Thomson and L3 had driven straight to Marseille.

HN58 arrived in Bordeaux at 4:30pm but had to leave again at 5:30pm and hot foot it to Marseille, arriving at 11:30pm, long after the alleged arms deal had already taken place.

Thomson tries to say that, despite having a mobile phone, there was no way he could communicate a change of plan to his managers because it was so last minute, claiming:

‘I told them what I could, when I could…

Q. There was, in truth, no reason whatsoever, was there, why you could not have told your managers on Monday, 8 January that you were in fact heading straight to the South of France?

A. I can only disagree with that. I think there was a reason…

Q. Was it because you were trying to make it as difficult as possible for your managers to follow what you were doing whilst you were in Marseille…

You could have told Greaney by phone, by text message or voice message, on both the 8th and the 9th that the plan had changed and you were going to Marseille?

A. I accept that’s your opinion.

Q. It’s not my opinion. It’s a fact, isn’t it?’

Barr was uncompromising on this point, reminding Thomson that he didn’t tell his managers anything until he absolutely had to, which was at 5.07pm on 9 January, when the gun was in the vehicle, ready for them to fake the ‘theft’.

The Inquiry’s Chair, Sir John Mitting, was also troubled by this. Mitting brought Thomson back to the question at the end of the three days of hearings, asking him to confirm that the plan was always to travel to Bordeaux first, and when that plan changed.

Thomson tries to claim that it was altered at the very last minute, but Mitting astutely pointed out that the nature of the French motorway network means that they would have had to make a choice about their route – heading to the east or the west of the country – in Calais, a full two days before arriving in Marseille.

Thomson looks utterly ridiculous as he fails to explain why he didn’t inform his managers. He claims he ‘doesn’t have a memory’ but then shifts to suggesting that in fact he tried to tell them, but HN58 had misunderstood a coded message and gone to the wrong place.

‘BUYING THE GUN’

Finally, Barr asks Thomson about the actual purchase of the gun.

Thomson asks if he can have the document in front of him whilst answering questions about what he did in Marseille, but Barr doesn’t want him sticking to the script and tells him he must use his memory. That doesn’t bode well, as Thomson has not remembered much about any of this so far. So much so that Barr points out:

‘Q. Disrupting a plot to procure a firearm with which to murder or seriously injury another human being is quite a significant event, isn’t it?

A. It’s fairly significant, yes.

Q. Can you help us with why your recollection of events is so hazy for such an important matter?

A. It’s 25 years later and an awful lot of other things have happened.’

When it came to the actual purchase, Thomson does claim to remember a meeting in a cafe in Marseille, somewhere near the main station.

‘We go in, we are recognised straight away. We are there for sort of two minutes, which is a sort of: “Are you?”
“Yes, we are.”
“Do you have this, do you have that?”
“Do we do it here?”
“No, we don’t.”
I felt uncomfortable with it. Certainly in the cafe and around it. We get back in the cars…

There’s a brief discussion about exchanging there, which includes handing money over. I don’t feel comfortable with that. We say we will go somewhere else.

We get in the cars, we move away… There was certainly a bag. I don’t know if we looked in it.’

Despite saying that the reconnaissance trip to Marseille with managers had been to agree locations for the purchase, Thomson says that on the day they just drove at random and he told them to stop the car, also at random, near a housing block, where they exchanged money for the bag containing the gun, bullets and black powder.

‘Q. You randomly drive away from a cafe that you had not been to before and you just find somewhere to stop in Marseille?

A. Essentially, yes…

Q. Then what happened?

A. Just exchanged money. Got the bag, in a bag, looked in it…

Q. What did you see inside the bag?

A. The shape of a firearm.

Q. You said a moment ago that there was a bag within a bag?…

A. This is when the inner bag comes out and it is looking in the inner bag, which is just a plastic bag.

Q. Did you see any ammunition in the bag?

A. I can’t remember it particularly, but I only caught a glance… At that point I couldn’t tell you, it was bags of something.

Q. As I am understanding it you are describing a very cursory check?

A. Mine was fairly cursory, certainly…

Q. Then what happens?

A. Money changes hands. The seller gets out of the car. Walks away, we drive away.’

Barr pressed him on whether they did anything more than just look in the bag.

‘Q. Did you at any time do anything further to check whether or not this was a real weapon?’

Thomson is adamant that they did not. They just handed over £700 for some stuff in bags inside a plastic bag inside another bag. Then they hid it in the Land Rover and went to get food. A totally ordinary arms deal.

‘STEALING THE CAR’

At 5.07pm, Thomson informed his managers that the car was ready for collection. The next morning, he went out and checked that the vehicle had gone, then went back to the hotel and told L3 it had been stolen.

You would think that losing a car just after having stashed an illegal firearm under the seat would have generated some alarm, but Thomson claims that L3 did not to consider himself at any risk.

They reported the theft to the French police and hired a car to continue their holiday in Bordeaux. He claims all of this was discussed with L3. However, L3 says he woke up and Thomson was gone, leaving a note saying that the car had been stolen and he had gone to report it to the police.

Thomson accepts that it is possible he left a note but he doesn’t remember it, and admits he went to the French police station alone to report it.

Thomson also took charge of hiring the new vehicle, which he organised through his cover employers (though he did it in L3’s name). He claims to have no memory of how this happened nor where they collected the car.

We were shown police photographs of what was found inside the ‘stolen’ vehicle by Thomson’s managers. Black powder inside two plastic bags, a gun, and some bullets that were stuffed inside a torch.

Thomson says he can’t remember taking any precautions in handling the firearm or the bullets. It appears that, apart from taking the photographs we are seeing, no other tests or investigation were carried out on the gun by Thomson’s managers. What was ultimately done with all of it has been redacted in the files.

There are obvious questions to be asked about what on earth the French police were doing while all this was going on. However, the Inquiry appears not to have addressed that at all, at least as far as we can see.

SO WHERE DID THE GUN COME FROM?

Barr also asked Thomson about his own access to firearms. This is particularly relevant because in his Opening Statement to the Inquiry on 13 October 2025, Barr noted:

‘There has been no independent corroboration of the plot. Suspicions can only have been heightened by a disclosure made to HN36 Detective Chief Inspector Michael Dell by an undercover officer who has full anonymity in this Inquiry, to the effect that Detective Sergeant Thomson had been in possession of a firearm, given to him as a gift, while he was on protection duties.

Detective Sergeant Thomson was alleged to have sought permission to keep it as a gratuity but to have been refused. It was further alleged that he did not return the gun but instead took it to France and stored it in a deposit box.’

Thomson denies ever receiving any firearms. However, as an explanation for how a gun came to be found in Thomson’s car, this is far more credible than the convoluted story he told during the course of Operation Lime.

He was also asked if he had access to ‘black powder’. He mentions having ‘crow scarers’ that could have contained black powder, but claims he never took them apart.

Black powder is mentioned alongside the gun in even the earliest reports about the supposed plot, and it proved to be a significant bone of contention, since nobody seems to have any idea what it was for.

‘Q. When was there first mention of black powder?

A. I can’t remember.

Q. Why was there mention of black powder?

A. Again, I don’t know. I am not sure what you would do with it.

Q. Did you ever get an answer to that question?

A. No, I don’t think so.

Q. Did you ever ask?

A. I must have done…

Q. What was the answer?

A. I don’t think I ever got an answer.’

Mitting was clearly troubled by this. He intervened at the end of the three days of evidence to ask Thomson a number of questions about Operation Lime, including some detailed questions about the black powder:

‘I am trying to think of any remotely sensible reason why someone in the underworld in Marseille would supply powder of a kind which could be obtained without difficulty in England, or France for that matter, together with a lethal weapon and bullets?’

Thomson simply repeated that he doesn’t know what it was going to be used for, ignoring the substance of the question: why an item easily available over the counter was being supplied at all. It’s a bit like going to an arms dealer and asking for a gun, some bullets and a kilo of carrots.

WHO THOUGHT OF IT?

Quite how Thomson came up with the gun plot can only be a matter for speculation. However, it’s notable that his manager, who he speaks of as being supportive, was Bob Lambert.

 

Lambert’s Debenhams plot when he was an undercover officer also involved committing serious crime to go beyond the SDS’s remit of gathering intelligence, and attempting to secure convictions for the people being spied on.

The Debenhams plan worked. Two men received substantial custodial sentences and Lambert got away with it. It’s not beyond the bounds of possibility that Thomson was emulating the strategy, perhaps even with Lambert’s input and support.

In the aftermath of Thomson’s trip to France, a document dated 8 February 2001, headed ‘Operation Lime’ [MPS-0005282] reports about the operation.

It claims:

‘In the immediate aftermath of the incident and in the ensuing months there have been a number of revenge attacks against members/associates of the hunt.

All members and supporters of the hunt concerned are now considered to be at risk, although the driver of the vehicle would be a particularly attractive target.’

Barr asked Thomson for details of these attacks, but, yet again, he was unable to cite a single incident:

‘There was a constant drum beat of that in and around sabs and at other times as well.

Q. You say “drum beat of that”. If “that” is revenge attacks, what I am asking is not whether there was tension, but whether there were, to your knowledge, actual attacks?

A. Outside of demonstrations and sabs, I can’t remember any…

Q. We have no reporting in this period of any such attacks… Can you help us with where the author of this document, who was Detective Chief Inspector HN58, obtained the impression that there had been a number of revenge attacks?

A. I presume he was reading the reporting that was coming in.

Q. That’s an assumption on your part?…

A. I can’t remember with HN58 particularly. I think it was a constant theme when I was talking to my handler.

Q. How could it be a constant theme if you hadn’t personally witnessed any?

A. Because they are happening, there was a lot of violence. It was part of that.’

Thomson clearly kept this idea of revenge attacks, and the potential for ‘extreme violence’, alive in order to prolong his deployment.

A report of a meeting between Thomson and his SDS managers [MPS-0719571] dated 12 October 2001 (more than nine months after Operation Lime) records legal advice given to L4, the sab who’d been run over, about seeking redress for his injuries through the courts. It says that ‘L2 and L3 favoured causing L5 [the driver who ran over L4] at least the most severe harm’.

‘Q. Essentially here you are communicating to your managers that despite the fact that advice is being taken on pursuing legal redress, there is another plot afoot and you need to be out there on the ground ready to deal with it…

A. Yes, I think it’s too strong to say “another plot’s afoot”, but essentially that’s correct.

Q. But by this stage you are clearly pushing for your deployment to continue, aren’t you?

A. I believe so, yes.’

It is important to stress that it is not that Thomson has forgotten about all the violent revenge attacks that happened: no such revenge attacks ever took place.

Foreign Travel

It is hardly surprising that Thomson wanted to prolong his deployment. He was having a whale of a time.

Apart from the sexual relationships, and claiming all that SDS overtime, he was also getting paid for his ‘cover employment’ as a film and TV location scout, and he was travelling all over the world.

We heard evidence about trips to France, Turkey, the Netherlands, India, Indonesia, Singapore and the USA as part of his deployment.

Some of these were authorised, but it is also clear that Thomson did a significant amount of unauthorised foreign travel in his cover identity.

The full extent is unclear, as by the time his deployment ended he held several passports in his cover name and he had removed pages from a number of them in order to conceal entry and exit stamps from his handlers.

We have evidence of the following trips:

Leiden and Amsterdam, The Netherlands, 1998 & 2000
In addition attending the Animal Rights gathering in Leiden with HN26 ‘Christine Green’ in 1998 (we cover his links with HN26 in more detail below). Thomson admits he travelled to Amsterdam at least once in his cover identity.

We saw a document written by HN58 [MPS-0748499] requesting authorisation for Thomson to travel to Amsterdam with L2, L3 and L4 in 2001 but he cannot remember whether he went on that occasion or at a different time.

Goa, India, 1999 & 2000
Thomson went to Goa twice, once on an authorised trip, from 21 January to 4 February 1999, and once more with Sara in January 2000. There is no reporting from the first trip. Thomson claims there should be but accepts that there was no criminal activity while they were there and cannot remember what he would have reported.

He argues that the trip was justified because ‘a large part of it was credibility and burnishing animal rights credibility’. He claims to have no memory at all of the second, unauthorised trip, but adds ‘I don’t dispute it might have happened’.

Istanbul, Turkey, 2000
Thomson’s manager, HN53, granted authority for Thomson travel to Istanbul with L4 from 20-27 November 2000 [MPS-0527650], as part of the elaborate preparations for Operation Lime.

The authorisation, using Thomson’s code name of Magenta Triangle, refers to the:

‘probable intelligence dividend to be gained from L4 about the longer-term intentions … More particularly, however, the cementing of the relationship between Magenta Triangle and the most high-profile animal rights ‘martyr’ will greatly enhance his credibility.’

It is quite offensive that they refer to L4 as a martyr. He was the victim of attempted murder and suffered life-changing injuries as a result of that very serious assault.

The police should have been trying to prosecute the perpetrator; instead they were spying on L4 and interfering with his support network. Thomson was a serving police officer, posing as L4’s friend at a very vulnerable time.

‘Q. Given the gravity of the injuries, he presumably was not yet fully recovered?

A. Oh, he certainly was not fully recovered, no.

Q. What did L4 tell you of intelligence value whilst you were in Turkey?

A. I can’t remember particularly. I would have reported it at the time…

Q. There is no reporting of the trip to Istanbul, why is that?

A. I don’t know. There would have been.’

Calais, Marseille and Bordeaux, France 2000 & 2001
Thomson made at least two trips to France in his cover identity, the second of which allegedly involved meeting a member of the Marseille underworld to buy a gun. We look at these trips in detail in the section on Operation Lime above.

Indonesia & Singapore, 2001
We were shown an ‘authority to travel abroad’, dated 10 September 2001 [MPS-0006714], which illustrates that Thomson further used his claims about a murder plot to justify travel to South East Asia. L4 was in Jakarta at the time.

The document talks about the attack on L4, and states:

‘The dropping of charges by the Crown Prosecution Service following the imprisonment for unrelated offences of the main prosecution witness, has incensed activists and caused two of their number to express a desire to kill L4’s assailant.

Magenta Triangle [Thomson’s code name], a close field associate of L4 has agreed to travel to Djakarta to seek his views. He will obviously wish to report to the activists that L4 does not countenance violence against his assailant.’

Again, Barr asked for specific details about what plans existed to kill the assailant L5, what actual conversations took place? Where did they happen? Anything?

Thomson cannot remember any details at all.

‘Q. Was a reason why you were very keen to go because it would be a nice holiday to an exotic part of the world paid for by the taxpayer?

A. I can’t dispute that might have entered into my thinking, but I can’t remember it as such…

Q. Why did you ask “Ellie” to go with you?… Because you were in a sexual relationship with her at the time? And this would have been a very enjoyable holiday for the two of you to go on as a couple?

A. Indeed.’

Like the previous year’s trip to Turkey, Thomson went to Indonesia to visit L4 and support him during a difficult time. As prosecutors had just dropped all charges against L5, L4’s friends were worried about his state of mind.

‘Q. What was L4’s state of mind after the prosecution against L5 failed… Was he in a bad place mentally?

A. I think that’s probably fair. He had been a very physical bloke and was much diminished, essentially.

Q. You did go out to see him, didn’t you… Did you give any consideration to whether it was appropriate for an undercover officer to go and provide support to a man who was in a bad way mentally, as opposed to one of his genuine friends?

A. No, I think I regarded myself as a genuine friend.

Q. But you weren’t, were you?

A. I was an undercover police officer.’

DEFYING ORDERS

In fact, the authority to travel to Indonesia was quickly withdrawn, because of the 9/11 Al-Qaeda attacks in New York, which happened the next day.

Thomson’s managers took the view that tensions in the region presented too much of a risk, but Thomson disobeyed their orders and went anyway.

There are significant questions about who paid for his travel. The evidence from the activists is that the trip was funded by L4’s girlfriend who was very worried about L4 and wanted someone to go out there to support him.

Thomson denies this, and Barr points out that SDS records [MPS-0006850] show that he bought a ticket which he supposedly cancelled in exchange for a ‘partial refund’, and that he claimed the remaining cost back on expenses.

Thomson says does not recall whether he did cancel the ticket. He certainly did travel to Indonesia somehow, and he admits he paid for Ellie’s travel and accommodation as well, although where the money came from remains a big question.

Thomson’s answers only muddied the waters further:

‘Q. Who paid for your tickets ultimately?

A. I did.

Q. With what funds?

A. My own.

Q. When you say your own, could you be specific, please?

A. No, I don’t think I could. It would be my money from somewhere.

Q. From your real life personal accounts in your real name?

A. Possibly.

Q. Possibly?

A. I might have moved money from there, or taken money from a hole in the wall or whatever it was. It could easily have come from there or several places. I don’t know.

Q. What other places might it have come from?

A. The “James Straven” account.’

We were shown photographs of Thomson with Ellie in Singapore on holiday [UCPI0000038286, UCPI0000038287].

‘Q. Did you go and see L4?

A. Yes, we were staying with L4.

Q. What did you speak to L4 about?

A. Everything…

Q. Can you be a little bit more specific by what you mean when you say “everything”?

A. We were staying with him, so we had lots of conversations. Including his health, how he was feeling and how he was feeling about the case in the UK…

I remember him being sort of cynically resigned. Much less engaged about it than I thought he would be. Just tired, really.

Q. No desire to murder anybody?

A. No.

Q. But you didn’t report that, because you weren’t supposed to be there?

A. Because I wasn’t supposed to be there, mm-hm.’

Barr also pointed out that Thomson selfishly took Ellie to Indonesia even though his managers had assessed it was too dangerous to go, without any regard for the risk he might be exposing her to.

THE BEGINNING OF THE END

It appears that this unauthorised trip to Indonesia and Singapore on his false passport was the catalyst that led to Thomson’s many transgressions beginning to unravel.

He says he ‘threw a wobbly’, lost his temper and self-control, and threw his passport in his manager’s face. He can’t remember why, just says it was ‘all coming on top’, and his management were expressing a loss of confidence in him.

We were shown a file note written by SDS manager HN53 [MPS-0719783]. It is dated 28 February 2002.

‘MT pulled me aside after today’s meeting (re his withdrawal) to say that he had a problem with his passport.

Somewhat shamefacedly, he told me that he had removed two pages from the document in the immediate aftermath of the Indonesia denouement in an effort to avoid detection. The pages related to his entry and exit visa stamps for that trip…

Clearly it would be operationally improper to countenance MT’s next trip to the USA with a defective passport, particularly in view of his place of birth (Muscat).

The fact that he chose to risk using it on last week’s trip to Los Angeles (and got away with it) must be borne in mind.’

USA, 2001 & 2002
Thomson admits that he did travel to Los Angeles on his defective passport, on an authorised 10-day trip to prepare for his exfiltration, which included telling activists he was moving to the USA.

However, we were shown a file note written by Detective Inspector HN53 [MPS-0719722] dealing with what he describes as an unauthorised USA trip:

‘As detailed in a separate file note, Detective Sergeant Thomson’s second “Straven” passport showed that he had entered the USA on 4 February 2001. This was an unauthorised visit which has yet to be explained.’

Thomson continues to deny this trip ever happened, despite the entry stamp and a number of credit card transactions in Hollywood on 6, 8 and 11 February 2001.

DECEPTION AROUND FOREIGN TRAVEL

Thomson accepts that he ripped pages out of one of his ‘James Straven’ passports to hide the fact that he had been on unauthorised trips. It is clear from the evidence that this wasn’t just the two pages with the stamps from Indonesia.

He mentioned Jakarta and Amsterdam, but then says that he cannot say these were all his unauthorised trips. He may have gone to France too. He ‘can’t remember’ and wants to leave it open.

Barr asks if it is really the truth that he can’t remember what he was trying to hide from his managers. Clearly, when you’re on foreign holidays as often as Thomson, it gets hard to remember which trip is which. Nevertheless, it seems likely he is lying, and hedging his bets in case more evidence comes to light.

Thomson was also issued a second passport in his cover identity of James Straven, after reporting his first passport as stolen to his managers. It hadn’t been stolen, so he had two passports. He says he knew this was illegal. He says he presumes he did it so he could travel without authorisation.

Possessing multiple passports and removing pages from them is just one example of Thomson’s fraudulent behaviour which we examine in more detail above.

Intelligence and Tradecraft

Thomson says that by the time he joined the SDS, reports were computerised. Handlers would meet with field officers and hand-write reports, then the staff in the back office would type them up.

In his witness statement, Thomson described his own practice of reporting:

‘My personal practice of how I provided my intelligence developed quite early on in my deployment.

I would write notes either as bullet points for discussion or as things I felt should be reported and needed to remember, for example car registration numbers.

I would write this on a computer and save on to a floppy disk which I would then put in an envelope with a doctor’s name on it to disguise it, and carry it to the twice-weekly meeting.

The handler would then put the disk in a computer at the office and go through the items with me.

The handler would pull out details and discuss this with me which helped me provide more information and make notes of this discussion.’

Asked if this was common practice, Thomson accepts that it was not:

‘I actually had a computer. A lot wouldn’t have done. It was very early days for them at the time. It was just something that worked for me. I was more comfortable with that than bits of paper.’

His witness statement also refers to the process of sanitising the intelligence:

‘My understanding was that the handler would subsequently assess what was relevant and worthy of reporting.

They would then compile a formal intelligence report that obscured the original source so far as possible, by adding in more general information from sources I would not have known about.’

It is notable that he prefaces this description with ‘my understanding was…’ and ends it by saying he would not have known about the other sources.

Barr pressed him on this and he accepted that it was speculation on his part. Understanding this process of sanitising the intelligence reports is very important in order to be able to interpret the documentary evidence.

Police witnesses are generally very cagey about how intelligence reports were produced, who was responsible for the intelligence they contained, where they were circulated, and who would have seen them.

Asked about the twice-weekly meetings at the safe house, he explained that they took place in small groups and a larger plenary session. He said that security problems, participation in crime, and larger demonstrations would be brought up at these plenary sessions, and that some officers were more detailed than others.

He claimed HN43 Peter Francis would speak a lot at these meetings, chronologically going through every aspect of his deployment. He says that SDS officers would also get together for occasional social events.

That pattern changed over time. Towards the end of his deployment those collective debriefings became less common, leaving only meetings with handlers:

‘The plenary everyone together disappeared, as did the sort of everyone on a three-line whip get together for social events once or twice a year.

The field stuff remained and they became a sort of individual element as well. So there was much more just you dealing with your particular operation.’

Over the course of the three days of his evidence, we saw a number of reports (which were dealt with by Barr in more or less chronological order). These touched on the now familiar themes of SDS reporting: sexism, racism, reporting that violated legal professional privilege, unprofessional language, and reporting that served no useful purpose.

LOW VALUE REPORTING

It was noted several times during questioning that contemporary records show that Thomson produced very little intelligence at all, especially towards the end of his deployment. Barr also sought to establish how useful the reports he did produce had been.

Thomson said he would be asked to identify suspects from photographs after demonstrations, but can’t remember if he was ever successful at doing so.

‘Q. Can I reasonably infer from that answer that so far as identifying offenders in the midst of public order is concerned, your deployment was of limited value?

A. It’s not for me to judge that.’

Barr highlighted another example of the limited value of Thomson’s reporting, a report from 15 December 1997 about an affray in a car park [MPS-0000736]:

‘Q. In short, despite the fact that you had produced some very specific intelligence about this event, it didn’t prevent a nasty episode of criminal damage and physical violence, did it?

A. No.’

In fact, Thomson himself took part in the fight in the car park, which is dealt with in the section on participation in crime above.

UNPROFESSIONAL LANGUAGE

As Barr went through Thomson’s reporting, he highlighted the language used. Thomson accepted that the tone of a report dated 26 May 2000 [MPS-0003413] was flippant and disrespectful and that reporting on an activist’s sexuality had no relevance to policing.

Thomson said he never addressed his mind to the tone and language of his reporting:

‘They were obviously always intended for the very small audience anyway, and certainly not for the subject to ever read it. So I can only apologise for that bit.

Q. Can I take it from that answer that the nature of the audience influenced how you wrote?

A. Yes, I guess so.

Q. Was there generally a culture of being disparaging about activists?

A. Yes, I suppose that’s fair.’

In another report, [MPS-0247867] Thomson describes a stand-off with ‘local scum’.

‘Q. Am I right to understand that the people you are referring to as the “local scum” are people who were supporting the hunt?

A. Yes, that is how they were known.

Q. That’s not a very professional way to refer to people, is it?

A. No, I agree. It shouldn’t have gone into a report.

Q. Were you by this stage becoming aligned to the world view of your target group?

A. Yes.’

This report is dated August 1998, suggesting there was evidence in Thomson’s reporting that he might have been becoming supportive of his targets a full four years before his deployment was brought to an end.

Then again, anybody seeing how hunt sabs were treated by hunters and uniformed police would have sympathy. Thomson was far from the first spycop to feel this way.

Thomson insists that he cannot recall any reaction from managers to this or any of the other unprofessional language found in his reporting.

SEXISM

An intelligence report of 27 October 1997 [MPS-0000614], written by Thomson about a woman hunt sab, records her as ‘surname unknown’, but described her as ‘a part time concubine’ of another activist, about whom there are no further details.

Thomson admitted he had no good reason to write that, and falls back on another ex-SDS trope:

‘This was the 1990s. The idioms and social norms were different.’

Like other spycops, Thomson was given to describing women as ‘girls’.

Another report of Thomson’s from 9 February 1998 [MPS-0000843] about Croydon hunt sabs animal rights activity states:

‘Ms SNU (17 years) recently commenced a career in the modelling field specialising in tasteful poses for gentlemen’s magazines.’

Asked why he reported that about someone whose surname he seemingly didn’t even know, and who was a child at the time, he replied frankly:

‘That probably is prurient… and sexist.’

Asked the purpose of recording such things in intelligence reports, he reiterated what we have now heard from many former SDS officers; that all information is good because it may somehow prove relevant to public order or anti-subversion policing:

‘I didn’t really think about, nor should I have thought about, the purposes for it. Because it may have meant something to someone else, down the line. And it may have been useful to someone else down the line.’

RACISM

Asked about racism in the SDS, Thomson says he received no training on the issue. He had no understanding of subconscious racism or indirect racism, and says that the topic ‘wasn’t important’ in the SDS.

Nevertheless, like other officers we have seen on the witness stand, he ludicrously claims that while he remembers overt racism from his time in uniform, he cannot recall any in Special Branch.

He was not aware that Detective Chief Inspector Bob Potter behaved in a racist manner, and he didn’t witness any overt racism from HN86 (he also says he didn’t have many dealings with HN86).

He claims not to remember anything about the SDS targeting the Stephen Lawrence family justice campaign, and Barr was clearly quite sceptical about this:

‘You essentially make a witness statement which is helpful to the SDS in relation to those allegations… in which you are continuing to portray the SDS as a unit with a moral compass… when you knew that so far as your own conduct is concerned, there had been no moral compass, and when, by that stage, considerable evidence had come out of great concern relating to the unit?…

How could you be sure of the truth of the evidence you gave in those circumstances?’

Thomson’s answers were vague, referring to a general feeling in the unit, things that were ‘broadly discussed in the plenary sessions,’ and echoing the view that the Lawrence campaign was ‘anti-police’.

‘Anything that was racially sensitive could easily become a big issue. So there were other things that happened and continued to happen. Which then flare up into anti-police and anti-authority-type, depending on who else comes along with them. I think that was generally true of that period.

Q. And bad for the reputation of the MPS?

A. Almost always.’

Like all the ex-officers discussing this issue, he completely misses the point that all these justice campaigns were asking the police to properly do their job.

LEGAL PROFESSIONAL PRIVILEGE

Thomson’s reports repeatedly breached legal professional privilege, the principle that conversations between lawyers and clients should be confidential.

A report dated 27 October 1997 [MPS-0000615] records that an activist has postponed his holiday:

‘This follows the advice of his optimistic but ungifted solicitor who believes [the activist] will be acquitted at court when he stands trial for assaulting a BTP [British Transport Police] officer.’

Another report dated 11 May 1999 [MPS-0002072] states:

‘[Privacy] is holding meetings with solicitors to discuss taking action against Sussex Constabulary following his arrest in Brighton on 24 April at the Shamrock Farm march. [Privacy] is collating video, photographic and medical evidence to support his case.’

Like other spycops have done, Thomson justified this reporting on privileged legal advice and a possible civil litigation simply by saying that he reported all the information he came across, and that he never received any criticism from management for that. He admits that he did know about the concept of legal professional privilege, but in the SDS context he ignored it.

He was shown the SDS Code of Practice [MPS-0526760], which refers to journalistic and legal professional privilege. The Code also says that, whether or not it engages those privileges, trespass to property will only be authorised in accordance with part 111 of the Police Act 1997 (which came into force in February 1999).

James Thomson says he has no memory of ever having seen the Code of Practice, nor of any instructions about the circumstances in which he could lawfully enter someone’s home, although his deployment straddled the Act coming into force. He does not remember any change to the procedure on trespass.

SLOPPY TRADECRAFT

The quality of James Thomson’s tradecraft merited a line of questioning all to itself. We were shown a document summarising management inquiries into his behaviour, dated 5 July 2002, shortly after his deployment ended. It was produced by SDS manager HN53 [MPS-0719722].

The report shows how Thomson mixed his cover and real identities, with sections entitled ‘Contamination of Thomson/“Straven” banking facilities’ and ‘Contaminated calls’.

Barr pointed out that his tradecraft was ‘very sloppy’ and asked whether this was because the people he was mixing with posed no physical threat.

Thomson denied this, insisting that he was in danger (demonstrating that exaggerated sense of personal threat we have seen in so many ex-SDS officers) and suggesting that he was just being reckless:

‘I am not sure I still cared.’

The document includes a log of Thomson’s phone calls for that year. We see from the analysis that he spent a lot more time on the phone with Ellie and Wendy than he did with any of his supposed targets.

‘Q. As well as being evidence which made your managers suspicious about your contact with women, undercover, this gives us some indication, doesn’t it, of how you were spending your time.

You were concentrating more on “Ellie” and “Wendy” than L3 and L4?…

Was that because the reality was you were far more interested in living the life that you have described as liking, than you were in policing animal rights activism?

A. No, I think that’s taking it too far. But I certainly did.

Q. This is at a time when there is extremely little reporting coming from you?’

Thomson disputes the allegation that he was hardly producing any reports by the end of his deployment. However, a contemporary document from July records him having submitted only 21 reports in two and half years.

For comparison, two other undercover officers delivered 222 and 170 reports respectively in the same period. Thomson claims the report is lying.

Thomson was also asked how much time he spent with his wife and children, and in his real life, whilst he was deployed. He was vague in his answer but it appeared to have been less and less towards the end. He claims he did spend time in his real life, but he spent it alone. He took a part time course with the Open University, which took about six years.

HN26 ‘Christine Green’

HN26 ‘Christine Green’ is a controversial officer who will not be giving evidence as she is living outside the UK, so the Inquiry has no legal power to compel her to attend.

Her deployment was 1994-1999, slightly earlier than Thomson’s but with 2-3 years overlap. She too was spying on hunt sabs.

Her name came up a number of times during Thomson’s evidence. It is clear from her reporting that she and Thomson both attended a European animal rights gathering in the Netherlands from 9-16 April 1998, at Eurodusnie, a squatted school in Leiden.

Thomson accepts that he, ‘Green’ and Thomas Frampton would all have stayed in the squat, however he claims to have had no knowledge that Frampton and Green were in an intimate relationship.

‘They would have been in their group, which is a separate sabbing group altogether, and I don’t think I knew them in the field at all.’

Thomson recalls that he and Green would have come across each other on several other occasions during his deployment.

‘Q. Did you ever see any sign at any point during your deployment that Thomas Frampton and HN26 were or might have been in a sexually intimate relationship…

A. I can’t help you on that issue. We kept very separate, for obvious reasons.’

Green left her husband and the police, confessed her real identity to Frampton and moved in with him. As far as we know, they are still together and living in Sweden.

Documents show she was relatively close with Thomson. One dated 26 September 2000 [MPS-0746307] records that Green was planning to leave the UK and live abroad, and that she ‘wanted as little contact as possible with the SDS office in particular and the Met in general’.

It says she told an officer (ciphered as TN0021) that she wanted to distance herself from the organisation and ‘put the whole thing behind her’. A handwritten note on the document says ‘need to speak to JT.’

A few weeks later, a file note from November 2000 [MPS-0009494] expresses SDS concerns that Green had left the country and they had lost touch with her, but says that she was still in contact with Thomson.

Thomson claims he cannot remember any of the conversations from that time. It is clear that Thomson and Green are still in touch with each other two decades later.

Management Accountability & Post-Deployment Dishonesty

As was standard protocol for SDS undercovers, Thomson was required to phone the SDS office twice a day, which he says he did when he could. He says he would mostly tell his managers where he was sleeping, although he claims he didn’t tell them when he was sleeping with Sara or Ellie, as he knew it was wrong.

Thomson also met Assistant Commissioner David Veness during his time undercover, when Veness visited the unit on 3 July 1998.

Documents reveal this was a 90-minute planned visit with chats between the ‘Assistant Commissioner Specialist Operations’ and groups of approximately three members of the SDS, each for 15 to 20 minutes.

Thomson said he does remember the event and that the feedback they got was a general ‘he’s very pleased’.

Thomson says only general information was given, regarding things that would be of interest to broader policing such as larger demonstrations in London.

When asked whether sexual relationships between undercover police officers and members of the public was touched upon, even in jest, he is categorical that it would not have been mentioned. He concedes that it’s because it would have been a confession of wrongdoing.

THE INTRODUCTION OF RIPA

The SDS code of conduct was introduced in January 2000 [MPS-0018359]. It contains a section about ‘collateral intrusion’, the incidental spying on people because they’re close to the real targets. The code makes loose claims that measures will be taken to avoid such intrusion.

Thomson says he hasn’t seen it and doesn’t remember even hearing the concept of ‘collateral intrusion’ back then. He points out that it would have been a near impossible task to avoid it, and he doesn’t recall it ever even being talked about. There was no change in operations when this code of conduct was introduced.

Other matters raised in the SDS code of conduct include the stipulation that authorisations should last no longer than three months before being reviewed.

Again, Thomson says this never happened. We were shown authorisation and review documents for Thomson and a number of other officers, seemingly identical wihtout consideration for what the officers were actually doing.

‘Q. It looks as if the cut and paste function has been mastered, doesn’t it?

A. It does look like they had found that on the computer by then.’

The final authorisation for Thomson’s deployment ran from 2 October 2001 to 1 October 2002 [MPS-0526929]. It was compiled by HN36 Detective Chief Inspector Michael Dell and signed by HN85 Commander Roger Pearce.

Under the heading ‘Consideration has been given to any adverse impact on community confidence that may result from the use or conduct of a source, or information obtained from that source,’ it states:

‘The positive effects of the use or conduct of the source in this arena, and the information emanating therefrom, are likely to far outweigh the negligible negative impact on the few supporters of extremist animal rights activity within the community.’

The next heading is: ‘Details of who will be affected, including collateral intrusion’. The response is:

‘Anarchists and animal rights activists who are involved in public disorder, criminal damage and serious assaults. Only information regarding those involved in such activity will be sought and actioned.’

It is evident from the reporting we have seen that information was routinely recorded about people who were not involved in any such activity, and that the negative impacts of these deployments was by no means negligible nor was it limited to a few supporters of ‘extremist animal rights activity’.

‘Q. In order to make the judgement that the positive effects of the information would far outweigh the negligible negative impacts on the few supporters of extremist animal rights activity, are you able to assist us any further as to what evidential basis Detective Chief Inspector Dell had to come to that conclusion?

A. I would presume he’s basing it on the reporting thus far in the deployment.’

Thomson is clear that his managers never discussed any of these questions with him.

MAKING SPYCOPS LAWFUL

Reviewing authorities every three months and limiting collateral intrusion were just some of the checks and balances that became statutory obligations on 25 September 2000, when the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act (RIPA) came into force, right in the middle of Thomson’s deployment.

The aim of RIPA was to make undercover deployments lawful under the Human Rights Act 1998.

‘Q. Can you recall any discussion or any practical effects of the implementation of that Act of Parliament?

A. No.

Q. Would it be fair to say within the SDS everything continued just as it had always?

A. I think probably yes, but while there was no specific guidance, whether the way management managed might have changed.

Q. Save that some paperwork was generated?

A. Perhaps. Yeah, I don’t know.’

Barr’s questions on this point were very dry, however the implications are huge: if nothing changed after the introduction of RIPA, collateral intrusion was completely disregarded, and authorities were filled out using copy-and-paste, then SDS deployments were unlawful under human rights law.

WITHDRAWAL & DISCIPLINARY ACTION

Thomson was told in May 2000 that his deployment would be wound up in January 2001. He subsequently created the Operation Lime murder plot (dealt with in detail above). As a result of Operation Lime, Thomson’s deployment was extended for a further year. It looks a lot like he invented the plot as a way to continue his cushy life.

We were shown an exfiltration plan proposed by Thomson himself in October 2001. It suggested a very long and drawn out process that would have taken a very long time. He says that this was because he would have done anything to prolong his deployment. He admits that he was very begrudging about any plan to withdraw him.

Thomson told Ellie he would be moving to the USA in January 2002 and his actual exfiltration took place in March 2002, by which time he was under investigation by his managers.

Thomson claims not to remember much about his withdrawal. However, it was clearly a period of significant conflict with his managers that continued after his deployment was over.

A file note from 22 March 2002 [MPS-0719665] records that SDS manager Bob Lambert contacted fellow manager HN53 to say he’d received a call from Thomson, asking for a meeting.

Thomson says he can’t remember what he was thinking, but he thought Lambert would be an ‘understanding ear’. He tells Barr that Lambert already knew about his relationships and didn’t seem shocked or fazed by it.

Tellingly, Thomson says that if Lambert had handled his exfiltration, it would have been far more understanding and less of a disciplinary matter.

However, knowledge of Thomson’s behaviour was not limited to Lambert. Another document from 27 May 2002 records a meeting between Thomson’s mentor HN1 ‘Matt Rayner’ and SDS manager HN53:

‘[Thomson] also told him [HN1] that he believed that most of the current suspicions about his operation stemmed from SDS management disapproval of field officers becoming involved in romantic relationships during the course of their operation.’

Thomson agreed with this:

‘I thought it was sort of hypocritical and sort of retrospective.’

By this stage he claims he wasn’t talking to his managers. In fact, it looks like Thomson tried to put pressure on them in the context of what he felt was a disciplinary process. This included him threatening to leave the force.

Barr points out that in fact he never was subjected to the Met’s formal disciplinary process. As with other errant spycops before him, he was immune to disciplinary or criminal charges because, above all, the SDS prized its secrecy and couldn’t risk a disgruntled officer letting the public know the unit existed.

This reason was stated explicitly in the record of an interview on 18 September 2002, with Detective Chief Superintendent Black and Detective Superintendent McLachlan [MPS-0722289]:

‘I have told him that he has come very close to central discipline and criminal investigations and that, if it were not for the secret nature of the operation and the need to protect his colleagues, he would be long gone.’

It is a shocking admission. Fraud, violation of citizens, lying in court and other crime, all committed with impunity, thus allowing those who follow to do the same and more. It is the very opposite of the stated purpose of policing.

SACKED AS A SPYCOP BUT STILL WELCOME

The final cancellation of the authorisation for Thomson’s deployment was signed off in July 2002 [MPS-0526929]. It states that it was made clear to him that he was no longer a ‘source’ and had no authority to continue to contact his targets (an instruction he completely ignored).

Despite his betrayal of his managers, his unit, his role and his oath, Thomson was not expelled from the police force, nor did he choose to leave.

He wrote a remarkable debrief [MPS-0722282] which included an apology for his behaviour. Barr points out that, just like now, he was apologising for:

‘only what had been discovered and was capable of being proved against you.’

Thomson agrees with that assessment.

At the interview with Black and McLachlan, Thomson was asked outright whether he had sexual relationships with Sara and Ellie, and he said that he admitted then that he did. He claims the question of whether he was still in touch with them never came up.

Finally, we were shown a record of a meeting in 2012 between Thomson and Commander Peter Spindler, the Met’s Director of Professional Standards [UCPI0000035555].

The document states that the purpose of the meeting is to ‘manage potential risk’ to the Met. It appears to be a damage limitation exercise by the police, after the breaking of the spycops scandal.

Commander Spindler was clearly very supportive, reassuring Thomson that this was not a reinvestigation:

‘PS explains that he does not wish JT to finish his career thinking he is under a cloud. The purpose of this process is to protect the officer and the organisation.

Describes that both BS and the Deputy Assistant Commissioner hold JT in high regard and value his commitment and dedication to his role – and is hopeful that in a few months time there will be a clearer picture of the SDS review and that we can respond positively to media interest…

PS explains that the main thrust of the review is to protect the ‘troops’ whilst examining SDS management.

Moves on to say that he wants to instil in JT that he still enjoys the full confidence of the organisation but that is not to say in the future as the review unfolds he may be called to question.’

In fact, Thomson and other SDS officers were later investigated by a large internal police inquiry, Operation Herne.

We were shown Thomson’s statement to Herne [MPS-0721959], in which he describes the ‘moral compass’ of the SDS. Barr’s questions about this were understandably incredulous.

Thomson insists, despite overwhelming evidence to the contrary, that the unit as a whole did have a moral compass and held the moral high ground.

He does concede that his own behaviour was immoral and that he has deliberately and dishonestly misled both Operation Herne and the Inquiry on numerous occasions.

THOMSON’S CLAIMS ABOUT MENTAL HEALTH

In both his witness statement and his oral evidence Thomson has sought to claim he suffers from mental illness, including dissociative identity disorder, in order to explain his behaviour:

‘I appreciate there is a dichotomy here, how I was living two different lives, basically…

I need to be specific and I am trying to explain a state of mind which I alluded to…

I think those reasons are important and relevant… to your understanding and certainly to any lessons learnt.’

Barr pointedly challenged him about this:

‘Q. [Are you alluding] to an assertion that you suffered from dissociative identity disorder? Were you ever formally diagnosed with that psychiatric condition?

A. That came from a meeting with a psychiatrist some years after my deployment and one meeting.
It was something he suggested.

Q. “Suggested” is precisely the word you use in your witness statement… That falls some way short of “diagnosed”, doesn’t it?’

Barr went on to point out that Thomson was assessed by psychiatrists on a number of occasions while he was serving.

‘Q. You have said that you were seen by the Chief Medical Officer for the MPS [Metropolitan Police Service] and then by a specialist who dealt with special forces issues?… Neither prevented you continuing to serve in the Metropolitan Police Service?

A. No.

Q. Part of the assessment for developed vetting includes your mental health, doesn’t it?

A. Mm-hm, yes…

Q. Presumably there was no medical issue to stop you continuing to serve not only in the Metropolitan Police Service but in Metropolitan Police Special Branch at a very high level of security clearance?… The reason you were downgraded was because of your conduct, wasn’t it?

A. Yes.’

Barr further pointed out that Thomson’s attempts to imply that he was mentally ill pose some significant issues in relation to his claims about Operation Lime:

‘Q. You were acting as a police officer doing very dangerous work preventing a probable murder…but if the contrary account is true, then it is consciously spun deception for self-serving purposes to impress your bosses, pay for a holiday and to remain undercover?

A. Yes.

Q. All very calculated?

A. Indeed.’

There is some indication that there were concerns about Thomson’s mental health at the time that his deployment was ending. We were shown a file note of his expense claims from early 2002 [MPS-0719684] which recorded:

‘He said that yesterday, after his interview with Detective Chief Superintendent Black and me, he had, “spent two hours at Beachy Head” and now acknowledged the need to see our consultant psychiatrist… “I need to see Mary Piper”.

We agreed that he would keep the appointment to see her on 27 March and that he did not wish to accept my offer of arranging an immediate meeting.’

However, the document also records that Thomson claimed £19.98 in petrol expenses for his quasi-suicidal trip to Beachy Head, and subsequently refused to attend the meeting with the psychiatrist until the internal investigation was over.

Thomson insists that he was genuinely distressed and not simply trying to portray himself as a man in distress so that management would exonerate him of his wrongdoing.

Nevertheless, a document from April 2005 [MPS-0748497], several years after his SDS undercover deployment, records Thomson being furious and ‘considering his legal position’ because his manager HN53 had raised the topic of him being suicidal as a concern about his suitability to be restored to firearms status.

Thomson accepts this might have been a legitimate concern, but says:

‘I think it should have been earlier. It was the timing that so annoyed me.’

Essentially, he only thinks his mental health is relevant when he is trying to avoid being held accountable for wrongdoing.

In any case, despite his claims to have suffered (and to still be suffering) from dissociative identity disorder and other mental illness, Thomson was successfully vetted for firearms duty and security clearance several times after his deployment ended, and remained in the Metropolitan Police Service until 2014.

Either he is lying about it, or the police are worryingly lax about who they allow to carry guns.

Conclusions

Open questioning ended at lunchtime on 10 December, and was followed by a short ‘closed’ hearing where Thomson was questioned by the Inquiry in secret, to protect people’s privacy.

Only his own legal team, the team representing the women he deceived into sexual relationships, and the lawyers for the Metropolitan Police were allowed to be present.

Thomson’s deployment, and his evidence, is among the most gobsmacking this Inquiry has examined. He has admitted to a staggeringly varied array of misconduct, seemingly without remorse:

‘Q. Most people who accept that something is wrong will, at some point, stop… You don’t appear to have done that… Why not?

A. I have no good answer for that.

Q. Save for a complete lack of morality?

A. I would accept that.’

The Inquiry has seen evidence of ill intentions going back years before he even joined the SDS – such as acquiring the birth certificate of a dead child in order to steal their identity – and continuing long after his deployment ended, as he maintained contact with women he deceived for over two decades, even after the SDS had been exposed.

It is clear that Thomson has discussed the Inquiry with other ex-SDS officers. When he told Ellie he was an undercover officer he also told her that many ex-spycops were leaving the UK in order to avoid being questioned by the Inquiry.

He wrote down all the officers he has discussed the Inquiry with since it was announced. We were not told the full extent of the list, but we do know that Lambert, Boyling and HN26 ‘Christine Green’ were all on it.

The Inquiry’s Chair, Sir John Mitting, ended the three days of questioning with a warning for Thomson:

‘I am going to have to think very hard about whether what you have told me about what occurred in Marseille is true, or whether what L3 has told me about what occurred in Marseille and on the way to Marseille is true. And about what objectively occurred and was recorded and verified at the time.

Is there anything other than your own assertion which could persuade me of the account that you have given is correct, and not that which has been given by L3 and which corresponds with the contemporaneous documents?’

Thomson seemingly did answer that question, but his words have been tantalisingly redacted from the transcripts. We will have to wait for Mitting to publish his interim report on the SDS, which is expected around mid 2027.

However, Mitting’s scepticism about Thomson’s evidence is clear from his closing questions. Most noticeably, he did not thank James Thomson for his time.

Press release issued by COPS on 2 February 2026, as a new tranche of Undercover Policing Inquiry hearings begins.

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE – 2 FEBRUARY 2026

Spycops hearings resume today

Victims set out their positions on the next phase of evidence

Today, the Undercover Policing Inquiry began hearing live evidence, in Central London. Five former undercovers from the notorious Special Demonstration Squad deployed between 1992 and 2007 will be giving evidence over the next two months. A series of ‘position statements’ by participants were published today on behalf of numerous participants including the Commissioner
for the Metropolitan Police and victims of abusive undercover policing.

The Inquiry has set out some of the questions it will be asking about the justification for spying on trades unions, justice campaigns, political parties and campaign groups, including Palestinian solidarity groups, as well as the accuracy of the intelligence reporting, the officers’ abuses, including blacklisting and sexual deception, as well as the impact of it all.

Following on from previous hearings about the police’s handling of the murder of Stephen Lawrence and spying on the Lawrence family, the Inquiry will explore how the tasking of undercovers focused on protecting the reputation of the police. In 2005 Jean Charles de Menezes was shot dead in cold blood by the police, who then targeted undercover officers to spy on the campaign for justice. The Metropolitan police have proffered an apology to the family for the reporting on their campaign.

In the early 2000 this drive to protect reputations was expanded with a ‘policing’ focus on preventing embarrassment to the government, and protecting corporations and ‘UK Plc’.

The evidence is that they ran deliberate campaigns of harassment. We will hear evidence of how managers and undercover officers secretly plotted to disrupt democratic processes by targeting print shops, raiding people’s homes and deliberately harassing people, and we will hear from the victims about the psychological damage and disruption that caused.

The Inquiry will also hear from women targeted for deceitful sexual relationships where the evidence speaks of abuse and coercive control.

As with previous hearings, the Inquiry will hear about undercover officers’ roles in a number of high profile events, including the massive 2003 Stop the War demonstration against the invasion of Iraq, and the undercover officer who played a central role in planning the high profile 1999 Carnival Against Capitalism, often known as J18, which ended in widepread clashes in the City of London.

The extent of DC Jim Boyling’s role in organising the J18 event will be explored, alongside the decision by the Special Demonstration Squad to not tell the City of London Police the protestors plans, and Government claims that the police had no contact with the organisers and no way of knowing what would happen on the day. Boyling will also be questioned about his central role in
organising the first ever anti-genetic crop decontamination in Ireland.

DC Carlo Soracchi will be questioned about his attempts while undercover to encourage an arson attack on a charity shop in Maida Vale; and how he came to meet with police barristers preparing the Met’s defence in a civil case about the mass detaining of protestors, the 2001 Oxford Circus ‘kettling’, contributing to the police’s victory, and undermining the judicial process in a case which
set a major precedent.

This so-called ‘spycops’ inquiry is one of the longest and most expensive ever, and it has been plagued with delays. Nevertheless, its importance is probably best underscored by the final words of the Metropolitan Police in their position statement.

‘The human toll of the [Special Demonstration Squad]’s dysfunction has been severe and wide-ranging: misuse of deceased people’s identities, wrongful intrusion into individuals’ private and political lives, grievous sexual exploitation, damaged relationships, broken families, and widespread anger, distress and psychological harm (including to some of the officers themselves).

The MPS recognises how important it is to understand the damage that the SDS has caused, to hear directly from the people who have been affected, and for the Inquiry to hold those responsible to account.’

Hearings are taking place at the International Dispute Resolution Centre, opposite St Paul’s Cathedral. Core Participants affected by these deployments will will be available for comment at the hearing venue.

For live coverage of hearings follow @tombfowler on social media & see https://ucpi.uk/youtube/

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Notes to editors

• The UCPI was established by Theresa May in 2015 after a series of revelations exposed by campaigners and the media. It is investigating undercover policing operations including secret political policing by the SDS and NPOIU, spying on 1000 left-wing political groups and campaigns between 1968 and 2014.

• A timetable of all those due to give evidence live and in person can be accessed here: https://www.ucpi.org.uk/2025/12/23/provisional-schedule-for-the-tranche-3-phase-2-hearings/

The public can view live proceedings online from February 2, 10am. It is also possible to attend witness hearings in person, please contact the Inquiry for more information.

• The SDS operated in secret for 40 years, targeting environmental and social justice campaigns, trade unions, anti-racist groups, peace movements, left-wing MPs, and families seeking justice after deaths involving police or racist violence and a range of progressive organisations.

The spies’ abuses include:
▪ Deceiving women into long-term intimate relationships, even fathering children.
▪ Spying on grieving families of those killed by racists or police.
Colluding in the blacklisting of thousands of trade unionists.
▪ Interfering and undermining the justice system, leading to miscarriages of justice.
▪ Stealing and using the identities of deceased children, to bolster the spies’ fake personas
▪ Infiltrating anti-racist, socialist and progressive campaigns, including Youth Against Racism in Europe (YRE), the Anti-Nazi League, and multiple environmental campaigns – with the aim of monitoring, reporting on and disrupting them.
▪ Hoovering up personal details on thousands of people involved with or supporting
the campaigns targeted, passed on to MI5

• The Inquiry has already cost £114.3 million (to June 2025). The Metropolitan Police has spent an additional £70 million on protecting it’s secrets through anonymity, redactions and legal defence.

• The Inquiry published an Interim Report on 29th June 2023. https://www.ucpi.org.uk/wpcontent/uploads/2023/06/Undercover-Policing-Inquiry-Tranche-1-Interim-Report.pdf

On page 96, para 28, the Judge concludes:

“The question is whether or not the end justified the means set out above. I have come to the firm conclusion that, for a unit of a police force, it did not; and that had the use of these means been publicly known at the
time [the early 1970s], the SDS would have been brought to a rapid end.”

• The Met have also had to make a series of major public apologies, including for the targeting of women for abusive sexual relationships, for spying on black and anti-racist organisations and family justice campaigns, for the spycops routinely stealing the identities of deceased children, and for shocking failures of supervision of the covert operations. See
eg. paras 24, 29, 38, 71, and 80 in this Met statement of June 2024: www.ucpi.org.uk/wpcontent/uploads/2024/07/Commissioner-Lawyers-Opening-statement-T2P1.pdf

• Managers of the unit will also be giving evidence in Tranche 3 Phases 3 hearings, which are scheduled for June 2026. The Inquiry Chair, Sir John Mitting will then retire to produce his second Interim Report by 2027. Meanwhile a new Chair will be appointed to oversee the remaining Tranches 4 and 5.

Tranche 3 Phase 1, Day 4
17 October 2025

INTRODUCTION

The first live evidence hearing of the Undercover Policing Inquiry’s ‘Tranche 3’ hearings took place on 17 October 2025 at the International Dispute Resolution Centre in London. ‘Sara’ (not her real name) gave evidence remotely and in order to protest her privacy the live stream was audio-only.

The Inquiry’s page for the day has the audio, a transcript, and links to many of the documents referred to.

Sara has also provided the Inquiry with a written witness statement [UCPI0000038210].

Sara was deceived into an intimate relationship by undercover officer HN16 James Thomson, who used the fictional cover name ‘James Straven’ and also stole the identity of a deceased child, Kevin Crossland.

The Undercover Policing Inquiry (UCPI) is an independent, judge-led inquiry into undercover policing in England and Wales. Its main focus is the activity of two units who deployed long-term undercover officers into a variety of political groups: the Special Demonstration Squad (SDS, 1968-2008) and the National Public Order Intelligence Unit (NPOIU, 1999-2011). Spycops from these units lived as activists for years at a time, spying on more than 1,000 groups.

This hearing was part of the Inquiry’s ‘Tranche 3 Phase 1’, which is examining the final 15 years of the Special Demonstration Squad, 1993-2008.

Sara was questioned for the Inquiry by Daisy Monahan, who referred to Thomson by his cover name, ‘James Straven’ for the first hour or so. The SDS created codenames for their undercovers in this period, and various reports from the time refer to him as ‘Magenta Triangle’. However, we will be using his real name throughout: James Thomson.

SARA’S BACKGROUND

Sara started as an animal rights activist giving out leaflets in the late 1990s, and she became involved in Croydon hunt saboteurs in 1998. She volunteered at the same animal hospital as ‘Wendy’ who Thomson also deceived into an intimate relationship, and who has also given evidence to the Inquiry.

In his written witness statement to the Inquiry [UCPI0000035553], Thomson describes Sara as:

‘an occasional hunt sab interested in animal rights but not an extremist.’

Monahan began by questioning Sara about the hunt sab group – how did she get involved? What did they do? The Inquiry appears to struggle with the voluntary and ad-hoc nature of so much of the activism targeted by the spycops.

There was no recruitment process: people would just turn up and get involved. Sara explained that there was also a social scene.

They would all go to the pub together after protesting at a hunt, and the Croydon hunt sabs were a close knit group. She first met Thomson at one of those trips to the pub.

Sara told the Inquiry that she only took part in about 15 hunt sab actions, and she mostly did map reading in the van, because she wasn’t physically fit enough to keep up in the fields.

She said she stopped sabbing towards the end of 2000, before she left the country to live abroad.

EXAGGERATION AND LIES

James Thomson has described Sara as someone who was ‘prepared to risk arrest’ but not ‘fully committed to the violent struggle’ and not part of ‘any inner clique’.

His erroneous descriptions of rigid hierarchy and ready violence echo those made by other spycops. It may be due to a desire to seem like they were involved in activity that justified police interest.

Alternatively, it may be that because the police are an institution based on formal power structures imposed with the continual threat of violence, they simply project it on to everyone else.

Sara rejected the suggestion that an inner clique existed, or that anyone in the group was violent. Sara pointed out that hunt sabs were often violently attacked, and said that there was:

‘verbal shouting on either side, from us or the hunt.’

Monahan asked Sara a lot of questions about the group and what their actions were like, despite it being clear that she wasn’t actually present at most of the events she was being asked about.

For example, she never took part in any ‘home visits’ to hunt supporters (although Thomson says she did) so she said she could only imagine what they might have been like, and that people might have been ‘shouting abuse’. She never heard about anyone damaging property.

Looking at the secret police reports of the time, there is relatively little about Sara, and what there is appears to be inaccurate.

The first report highlighted by Monahan [MPS-0001923], dated 29 March 1999, mentions Sara’s work at an animal sanctuary, describing her as a ‘nurse’.

She says she wasn’t a nurse, she was an unqualified assistant. There are also two reports (including MPS-0745590, dated 8 September 1999) which claim that she’d sold her car to a hunt sab known as ‘L1’, and Sara says this isn’t true either.

Sara left the UK in 2001. She sold her flat before doing so, and says Thomson was aware of this.

However, the SDS management seem to have been told that she was renting the flat out and planned to return to it – this is detailed in an Appendix to their plan for ending his deployment,‘Magenta Triangle Extraction’ [MPS-0007389].

The same document also refers to her as a ‘one-time girlfriend’ of L1. She retorts that this was ‘absolute rubbish’. They were friends, but she was never his girlfriend.

Contrary to what Thomson said in one of his witness statements, she doesn’t believe Wendy had a sexual relationship with L1 either. This is all incredibly personal information of no obvious policing value, that the police have kept on file for almost thirty years, and they didn’t even get it right.

The SDS managers were aware that Thomson’s ex-wife and three children lived in Sutton, very close to Sara’s flat. The risk of a chance encounter is mentioned in a much earlier File Note about Thomson’s ‘extraction’ dated July 2000 [MPS-0749475], which suggests that HN58 (Thomson’s boss, a Detective Chief Inspector) was planning to research Sara’s ‘route to work etc’.

We then hear about a debrief written by Thomson after his undercover deployment was over, in which he states:

‘Due to circumstances beyond anyone’s control a peripheral member of my target group moved in around the corner from my ex-wife and children, who it had been my habit to visit regularly.

After I initially reported this I was informed that S squad would be tasked to follow the hood in question [redacted] so that we could assess the threat accurately. This was never done and the ‘follow’ was eventually performed by an ex-member of the branch.’

Sara was not the only one of Thomson’s targets to live or work in Sutton, so the Inquiry is not yet sure if she was the person trailed by a former Special Branch manager at Thomson’s behest.

She made the point:

‘The risk that he took in the first place of beginning a relationship with me when he knew that I lived two streets away from his ex and his children. That was a massive huge risk that was taken that needn’t have happened.’

In his witness statement, Thomson notes:

‘I have been referred to page 4 of what is titled ‘Magenta Triangle extraction’ … which refers to the threat posed by the proximity of “Sara” to where my “children’s mother and step-father now reside”. I am asked why, bearing in mind this “threat” did I enter into a sexual relationship with “Sara”. I can only say through stupidity.’

CROYDON HUNT SABS

Monahan then moved on, to ask Sara about Thomson’s involvement in the Croydon hunt sabs.

Sara agrees that Thomson was already ‘well-established’ in the group when she got involved, saying ‘it was clear that he had been there for a while’. She recalls that everyone knew him and liked him, and he often lent out his car.

Thomson has claimed that he was part of the ‘second tier’ of the group but not the core. He’s said that he became ‘embedded’ in the group, and ‘included in their other protest activity’, as a result of helping with planning, organisation and logistics.

During her questioning, Monahan drew heavily on the work done by the Undercover Research Group, whose profile of Thomson mentions the group’s nicknames for him: ‘Posh Sab’ and ‘James Blond’ (Thomson has denied being aware of these nicknames).

Sara says she called him ‘James Blond’ to his face, so he definitely knew, but didn’t seem bothered about the name. She thinks it the name was because of his hair, not because anyone suspected him of being a spy.

According to the profile Thomson was considered a ‘strong fighter’, who didn’t shy away when the group was attacked by the police or hunt supporters.

Sara agreed that he had that reputation, and confirmed that he’d trained in some sort of martial art.

She was then asked a series of questions about her experiences of public disorder, and she recalled ‘scuffles’ and shouting, and instances of terrier men pushing sabs around, hunters using their whips to hurt sabs.

In November 1998, Thomson himself was attacked by hunt supporters armed with golf clubs and bats, who beat him around the head and body. Monahan produced an SDS File Note about this incident [MPS-0001577], and Thomson taking time off due to his injuries.

‘Wendy’ was attacked by the group too, and has described this in her written witness statement [UCPI0000038208]. However, Sara doesn’t remember this incident, and wasn’t there at the time.

We also heard about another report filed by Thomson in November 1998. In it he claims that the Croydon hunt sab group were planning to physically attack a fascist at his home.

Sara was involved in the group by this time, but says she didn’t know about this, and it doesn’t sound like the sort of thing they would do. She never saw the hunt sabs committing acts of violence, and doesn’t think that they ever carried weapons.

Thomson has made a number of claims about the group’s involvement in ‘criminal activity’ and public disorder. Sara doesn’t agree with his claim that they had ‘a broad anarchic agenda’.

She says some of them went on marches and protests for human rights as well as animal rights. She only went to one demo at Hillgrove (a farm where cats were bred for vivisection, which closed in August 1999 due to campaigning). Thomson told her that he was going to take part in some ‘home visits’, but didn’t share details of these with her.

On 1 September 2000 another Croydon hunt sab, ‘L4’, was run over by a member of the Old Surrey and Burstow hunt in a 4-wheel-drive vehicle, and very nearly killed.

His injuries were so severe that he spent months in hospital, regularly visited by Thomson, who pretended to be a good friend.

In his report of the incident, Thomson wrote about the anger felt by the hunt sabs who witnessed this deliberate attack, and claimed that there was immediate talk of ‘reprisals’.

Sara was not there that day, but remembered how upset and outraged everyone was. In her witness statement she wrote about going along to a protest at the hunt’s kennels after this incident, but leaving early because of the atmosphere. There were very few police there, but 36 animal rights activists were arrested afterwards.

OPERATION LIME

Questioning then moved on to Sara’s holiday with Thomson in Bordeaux in January 2001. This was a fairly spontaneous, last-minute trip, proposed by Thomson, supposedly because he wanted to research a business venture involving golf carts, although as far as Sara was concerned it was ‘just a jolly’, a nice little break with friends.

Thomson and another sab, known in the Inquiry as ‘L3’, drove there together. Sara flew down to meet them a few days later.

Here, Monahan read from Sara’s witness statement:

‘He arrived at Bordeaux Airport to collect me in a hire car, saying his Land Rover had been stolen in Marseille.’

He didn’t seem particularly bothered about the loss of this vehicle and everything inside it. Sara doesn’t remember Thomson saying anything about looking for it, or reporting the theft.

Unsurprisingly Sara doesn’t remember much in the way of detail about what appeared to her to be an innocuous trip to France 25 years ago:

‘Nothing stands out… I can remember we had a walk around town, went for coffee and lunch and things like that, and we went to the beach at one point for a walk. And that’s all I can remember, really. I think we went to a… whether it was an Indian or vegetarian restaurant or something we found while we were there. That’s all I can really remember.’

However, documentary evidence reveals that this ‘holiday’ was in fact ‘Operation Lime’. The ‘theft’ of the Land Rover was engineered by Thomson’s police handlers, ostensibly to disrupt the procurement of a firearm in Marseille, for £700, by ‘L3’, who allegedly had criminal contacts in France. The gun was supposedly in the vehicle when it was ‘stolen’.

Q. Were you aware at any point of any what seemed to be secretive conversations between the two of them, of them nipping off for private conversations?
A. Not that I can recall…

Q. Just for the avoidance of doubt, just to be absolutely clear on your evidence, you have no recollection on that trip of anything being said about a firearm having been obtained in Marseille?
A. No. No, not at all.
Q. Nothing about the firearm being in the vehicle?
A. Nothing, no.

We heard from David Barr KC, Counsel to the Inquiry, during Opening Statements that even at this time, SDS managers were suspicious that this ‘plot’ might in fact have been a self-aggrandising tale made up by Thomson, planting a gun he had in order to make it seem like the animal rights activists were trying to buy one.

There is evidence that Thomson owned a firearm which he kept in a ‘deposit box’ in France, and Barr has made clear that the Inquiry will be investigating whether there was ‘a genuine plot which DS Thomson’s intelligence and actions thwarted, or was it all a deception on his part?’

Sara, who was present on the trip, clearly had no notion that there was any kind of plot involved.

INTIMATE AND SEXUAL RELATIONSHIP

Monahan then moved on to ask ‘Sara’ about the things she is really here to give evidence about: the deceitful sexual relationship that James Thomson engineered with her.

Sara met Thomson in autumn 1998. She was in her early 30s at the time, and remembered:

‘We made each other laugh. I think we just had a lot… we just connected.’

She was interested in him, and discussed the idea with friends. At some point he called her, and arranged a dinner date at a vegetarian restaurant in Croydon. It went really well, and he called her almost immediately after to invite her on a day trip to France. It was clearly the start of something. They went to Calais and bought wine and cheese (she wasn’t vegan at this point).

Sara describes the relationship as affectionate, but quite chaste, for the first few weeks. They would spend the night together, but not have sex:

‘I know he was reticent that is true, at the beginning… he was holding back and wanted to wait…’

Q: Even though you weren’t having full sex with him, did you during this period of time consider yourself to be in a fully committed monogamous relationship?

‘From my point of view, yes, we were in a relationship at that point… Just the intimacy between us. I don’t mean just physically I mean in general, the connection that we had with each other.’

Like other officers, Thomson lied to Sara about his age, claiming to 33, five years younger than he really was.

Sara was specifically asked about this, as Thomson had told ‘Ellie’, a substantially younger woman he deceived into a relationship, that Sara had corrected his claim to be 33 and reminded him he was actually 36 (Ellie has also given evidence to the Inquiry).

Sara is certain this never happened:

‘No, because my understanding until I found out the truth was that he was two years younger than me, three years younger than me, I can’t remember exactly now, but he was younger than me. That would have made him older than me, so that wouldn’t have happened.’

In fact, he was neither 33 or 36 when he began his relationship with Ellie, but 37.

Thomson told Sara he was a location manager and scout for TV and films, and that meant he travelled a lot for work.

He also told her he had three children with an ex-partner, and made it clear that he was a devoted father; they were his priority.

Thomson claimed that his ex had tricked him into having the first child, and Sara says she found it odd that he had gone on to have two more children with the same woman if she had tricked him into having the first.

Not long after they became close, they did start having sex, and the relationship became more intense. They would see each other two or three times a week, generally at her house.

SOMETHING ISN’T RIGHT

Sara only stayed at Thomson’s place once. Her description is very similar to those given by numerous women deceived into relationships by other spycops:

‘It was totally not his style and it didn’t look lived in… it didn’t look like anybody lived there. I found it quite strange and I thought it was because he was travelling so much that it was just a touchdown base.’

Sara described the relationship:

‘I felt like I had met somebody who really got me, and who got my life on all levels, especially the spiritual aspect of my life that was happening, getting deeper at that time. We had a lot of fun together.

And there was just a connection… it felt for me like a soul connection, that’s the only way I can describe it, like somebody I had known a lot longer than I actually did, on some level. It was not just on the physical mental plane, there was something else for me going on there.’

They never had any rows or conflicts. She introduced him to her parents as her boyfriend. During a trip to the town of Glastonbury in the summer of 1999, he told her he loved her. She adored him.

‘It was a mutual thing for me, we just really enjoyed each other’s company and I was always over the moon to see him.’

Nevertheless, in her written statement Sara described being cautious:

‘His life was very compartmentalised. Something didn’t sit quite right. It was as if there was a part of him that was kept at bay.’

He met her friends. But she never met any of his, nor his family.

The mixed messages Sara received took up a lot of mental energy and were ultimately quite damaging to her:

‘I was very preoccupied with this, so much so that there were nights when I could not sleep and running it over in my mind and writing in my journal about it. However, I was totally in love with him and just thought that was how he was and that he was a very private person.’

She described one odd incident when he was away and she asked him for an address. She tried to send him flowers but the delivery failed. The address was a B&B and there was no James Straven known at that address.

However, he made up a complicated story about it being owned by his family and the staff not knowing he was there, and she gave him the benefit of the doubt. With hindsight she says she would always find a benign justification for the way he was behaving.

UNDERSTATEMENT AND LIES

Thomson has made several statements to the Inquiry, with differing accounts of his relationship with Sara. In his second witness statement [UCPI00000352], dated 17 April 2018, he claimed:

‘We had a brief sexual relationship over a few weeks.’

Monahan observed that ‘he’s very vague about the duration of your relationship’ and in his 2023 witness statement he says:

‘I cannot remember how long the sexual relationship lasted. We were good friends until she moved abroad.’

Sara testified that the sexual relationship had in fact lasted over a year.

It ended after Thomson had disappeared for around two weeks, during Christmas 1999:

‘At that time of year, it’s a time where, you know, intimacy can deepen or just you know you would expect to be hanging out a little bit with the person you’re in love with.

And usually if he’d gone away, if he was away with his kids or if he was away on a work assignment, I would know about it and roughly how long he would be and we were always in touch when he was away.

So the fact that he just totally disappeared, I got quite concerned about it as well, like, what’s happened to him?’

After two weeks of unexpected silence she was upset and confused, and for the first time ever, challenged him about his behaviour. His response was to show up at her house, hand-deliver a letter and leave her alone to read it.

ENDING IT

In her witness statement, Sara recalls Thomson’s stories in the letter:

‘He had difficulties maintaining intimate relationships for long periods of time due to traumatic childhood experiences. He said that when he had been at boarding school his best friend had been raped by the headmaster and had subsequently committed suicide…

He also said that his first sexual relationship had been with a 35-year old teacher from his school and that this had impacted him significantly.’

He returned to talk to her once she’d read it. He said that the trauma made sexual relationships very difficult for him.

Monahan asked Sara about her reactions to this letter, which were obviously complex. She spoke of compassion, empathy, but also some confrontation about why he had put her in that position:

‘I think there was that lot of mixed emotion going on there, because I think there was something that clicked about, “ah that makes sense”, to why he had been behaving like he had.

There was also, sure, some disappointment but there was that lot of hope also because that wasn’t the main part of our relationship.’

However Sara also pointed out:

‘That whole story was that all pre-planned so that it all made sense all the way down the line. All the jigsaw puzzle bits being put together way in advance of all of this happening.’

This degree of premeditated manipulation was not exclusive to Thomson, many spycops had elaborate stories of childhood abuse and trauma as part of the reasons why they could not continue being with people they deceived. They gave no consideration to the horrendous impacts this had.

Sara explained how Thomson asked told her not to tell anyone about the letter:

‘I have to say at this point that I did talk to people about that letter because it was necessary for me because the adjustment from going from that type of relationship to this…

One of the reasons for me that finding out [that he was a spycop] was such a relief, because I had so much guilt over that for years and I want to make it absolutely clear at this point that these relationships did not just affect us during the relationship…

Q. If this doesn’t seem like a silly question, but what was your understanding at the time of why he was asking you to keep the contents of the letter secret?

A. Probably because of… it’s not something he would have wanted widely known, that he had problems around sex.

Q. And because it was private information about painful past experiences?

A. Yes.

Q. Thinking about it now, “Sara”, do you have a view on why you think he swore you to secrecy, now you know the truth?

A. Because of the contents of that letter are outrageous. It’s an outrageous thing to have told me if that is not true. And maybe some part of him knew that it would come out at some point.

I don’t know. Maybe he wanted to have other sexual relationships and that wouldn’t have made sense. I don’t know…

Q. Again, at the risk of stating the obvious but now that you know that it was all fabricated, what is your feeling about this letter?

A. I don’t really have the words… I think you can understand how disgusted and outrageous it was to have written what he did and to put me under that sort of pressure, and a pressure that has lasted over 20 years of my life.’

In his witness statement Thomson claims:

‘The sexual relationship ended through mutual agreement. I realised it was getting serious and I recognised the difficulties that would cause for both of us.’

However Sara was adamant that there was no ‘mutual agreement’, saying:

‘It was definitely on his request that the sexual relationship ended.’

The sexual element of their relationship was over, but in the letter Thomson had written that he still wanted to spend time with Sara, and seems to have continued acting as if she was his girlfriend. She says:

‘For me, sex or no sex, it was still a very intimate and exclusive relationship.’

STAYING CLOSE

He admitted to her that he wouldn’t be happy about her getting together with someone else. They were still very close, in regular contact and emotionally intimate. He travelled to India to join her on holiday in Goa, where they shared a room. He bought her a birthday present.

Sara described her feelings about this new relationship status in her written statement:

‘After this, we continued to spend much time together for several months, although we were no longer having sex with each other. For me, it was possible to make the shift to a non-sexual relationship because our connection was so strong on so many levels.

We still delighted in each other’s company and, of course, the continued close relationship meant that I held on to a hope that he would change his mind with time or that we could somehow work it out. It was on my mind all the time.’

‘James Straven’ had been to Goa before – he’d gone there with some other hunt sabs back in 1999. That little jolly was authorised by the SDS. His handler, Sergeant Greaney, justified it in a document [MPS-0527635] claiming:

‘This trip offers him the greatest opportunity yet to bridge the final barriers and gain total acceptance into the inner sanctum and all the advantages that will entail.

In a neutral environment, away from the paranoid fears of police/state interference, it is probable that he will become privy to the past actions, present plans and future intentions of L2 and L1.’

However, it seems there was no such authorisation for the week he spent there with Sara. Asked why she thought he went, Sara replied:

‘I would say it was pleasure… we went to the beach, we travelled a bit. Yes, it was just like a fun time.’

Sara moved abroad in March 2001. Soon after she left she discovered that Thomson had started seeing ‘Ellie’.

‘Q. How did you feel when you found that out?

A. Shattered, if I am really honest. Confused, completely and utterly confused… in my mind it was like, if we were that close and it was a sexual thing that stopped the relationship, why wouldn’t he have carried on just seeing me? Why was he starting a relationship that I knew to be sexual with somebody else?…

And I also had deep concern for the fact that he was going to take somebody else down the path that he had taken me…

I emailed him about that and was like, “What the hell are you doing? It’s not fair if you are about to start down the same pathway as you did with me”.

So it caused a lot of confusion and a lot of angst… He didn’t reply and I never heard from him again.’

Sara also recounted an incident where Thomson found out about a casual relationship she had with another man months after Thomson had ended the physical relationship with her. In her written statement she describes how Thomson reacted:

‘He wrote to me when I had moved abroad and asked why I had shared a room with him in January 2000 on the Goa trip if I was seeing someone else. I was not seeing this man when I went away with him in 2000, James had the dates wrong.

In this email he basically questioned my morals, which now I know the truth I find abhorrent.’

Monahan goes even further to say that it sounds like Thomson was gaslighting Sara.

IMPACT

Sara was plagued by distressing and disturbing dreams about Thomson, long before she discovered he was an undercover officer.

Around 2013 she ended up ceremoniously burning all her journals, lots of photographs of him, the letter he’d written (in which he claimed to be a victim of sexual abuse) and anything else which related to him, in order to get him out of her system.

She eloquently explained to the Inquiry:

‘These relationships did not just affect us during the relationship and from the date we found out, that it has been ongoing in that period in between.’

It never occurred to her at the time that he was an undercover police officer. After the news broke about HN26 ‘Christine Green’, who also infiltrated hunt sab groups, somebody suggested to her that he might have been one too.

However Sara didn’t take this possibility seriously, saying ‘it sounded too far-fetched’. In the absence of concrete proof, she refused to believe it.

‘I didn’t really take it on board… It was to do with not just his closeness to me, but other people in our group as well. The fact that he was such an integrated part of our group.

And for me at that time it was, like, having had the letter about all his sexual difficulties and the abuse and everything else, it was like, well, that happens to people, and that could be why he compartmentalised sides of his life, it was a way of coping with what had happened. So for me it was like that could be completely plausible.’

The Inquiry contacted Sara for the first time in August 2018, and told her that Thomson had been an undercover police officer. She says she was shocked, angry and confused, but also relieved to realise that she wasn’t paranoid:

‘Well, you know, after years of confusion and trying to work out… it is like layers of an onion coming off, you know. It takes time to make that switch from what was to what is, it’s not overnight.

I would say it took months, years, whatever, it is still ongoing in some ways…

The psyche knows when something is off. It’s a subconscious thing. And I think there were times, you know when I burnt those journals it is like, am I nuts, why can’t I move on from this? Because it didn’t make sense. So I used to question my own like feelings and stuff around it.

I did feel crazy at times. So in a way there was a relief in finally knowing that there was a good reason why I felt like that.’

However, Sara was also very scared that she would bump into Thomson, or that he would turn up and threaten her into silence. The discovery has had a lasting impact on her:

‘It changed my behaviour. It changed my feeling of safety completely and until I moved a year ago, if ever anything disappeared in my house that I couldn’t find, my response was always “who’s been in my house?” And that is a really hard thing to live with. And something happens you just get used to it. It becomes a new norm.

And it is only when I have looked back that I realise how much of an impact that is… it’s completely and utterly annihilated any sense of trust. It’s annihilated my trust in the state, in the police, I don’t know where I would go if something happened to me…

It affected my mental health. It affected my concentration and ability to relax and that is ongoing to this day. That has never returned to the level that it was at before. And I just feel like my life has been invaded again and again and again.’

ABUSE AS TRADECRAFT

Monahan read out the now-infamous advice of HN2 Andy Coles that appears in the SDS’s ‘Tradecraft Manual’ [MPS-0527597]:

‘If you have no other option but to become involved with a weary you should try to have fleeting disastrous relationships with individuals who are not important to your sources of information.’

Sara said she found it ‘utterly misogynistic and outrageous’.

Monahan went on to explain about the SDS’s mentoring scheme. Thomson’s mentor was HN1 ‘Matt Rayner’, another officer who is now known to have deceived a woman, Denise Fuller, into a sexual relationship. (The Inquiry has granted him anonymity over his real name, despite the their earlier promises not to do so for such men).

HN1 ‘Matt Rayner’ also mentored HN14 Jim Boyling, who had three or four sexual relationships during his deployment.

In his witness statement to the Inquiry (which the Inquiry has not yet published), Boyling says that HN1 was ‘candid’ about the benefits of entering into relationships:

‘I remember him saying words to the effect that as an undercover you were never going to break through the glass ceiling of acceptance, you were never going to get the acceptance of the inner circle unless they had confidence in you and this would not be forthcoming if you were perceived to be a single man living alone. Confidence could come from seeing you in a relationship with a fellow activist.’

The Inquiry has seen evidence that HN1 ‘Matt Rayner’ knew about Boyling’s relationships, and was also aware of Thomson’s. He reported this to an SDS Inspector, HN53, in May 2002.

By then though, Thomson’s time in the field had been brought to an ignominious end. SDS managers carried out an investigation into his activities and concluded that as well as failing to deliver a decent amount of credible intelligence, he had committed a host of other disciplinary breaches, some of them criminal.

These included disobeying his managers, travelling abroad in defiance of orders, making fraudulent expenses claims, the misuse of unauthorised false identities and last but not least, some extremely shoddy tradecraft.

Following an interview in September 2002, Detective Chief Superintendent Colin Black noted in a document [MPS-0722289] that:

‘It is clear that he has entered into relationships during the course of his work which are inappropriate.’

CULTURE OF IMPUNITY

Thomson was never formally disciplined, or prosecuted, for his behaviour. The managers knew that taking action against errant officers would risk them becoming disgruntled and making the unit’s existence public.

Learning about all this now for the first time, Sara reacted:

‘For me it is just unbelievable that there was no consideration for the impact that would have on us whatsoever. There was no consideration given to their wives and partners…

[It was known] that he was having a relationship, though it was decided not to be divulged to us to protect the SDS. So for 17 years of my life earlier I could have known that and been saved quite a lot of distress…

But it seems that there is no importance given to the impact on us, whatsoever, in any of this, and I find that abhorrent and shocking.’

After Monahan had finished, Sara’s own barrister, Charlotte Kilroy KC, asked her if there was anything she wanted to add. She made a point about undercover policing today:

‘Shortly after the Sarah Everard case [a woman raped and killed by a Met officer] and there was talk about the Metropolitan Police putting undercover – I can’t even say this – they were going to put undercover officers in nightclubs to protect women.

And for me, I am like, really, please do not put those men in charge of our safety. Ever. And I just want to be clear on that. I found that so shocking, after what they have done to put them in charge of women’s safety anywhere is unthinkable.’

Sara ended with a plea on behalf of other women:

‘It has been a journey, you know, of recovery. And I thought I was getting there, but I see from today that the impact is still there, how deeply impacted my life has been…

And I am standing here for other women, and I wouldn’t be here for any other reason and please do not allow this to happen again.’

The Chair of the Inquiry, Sir John Mitting, thanked Sara for giving evidence, recognising that it has plainly been a very difficult process:

‘As I am sure you know, I am not in charge of policing and although I can make my own views clear to those who are, all I can do, like you, is to hope that your views and mine will be paid heed to.’

Tranche 3 Phase 1, Day 19
26 November 2025

On Wednesday 26 November 2025, the Undercover Policing Inquiry heard evidence from Sukhdev and Tish Reel. They are the mother and sister of Ricky Reel who died in 1997 following a racist attack.

The police did not take Ricky’s death seriously, and treated the family in a callous and overtly racist manner. The Reel family’s campaign for justice was spied on by the Special Demonstration Squad, notably officer HN81 ‘David Hagan’.

The Undercover Policing Inquiry (UCPI) is an independent, judge-led inquiry into undercover policing in England and Wales. Its main focus is the activity of two units who deployed long-term undercover officers into a variety of political groups: the Special Demonstration Squad (SDS, 1968-2008) and the National Public Order Intelligence Unit (NPOIU, 1999-2011). Spycops from these units lived as activists for years at a time, spying on more than 1,000 groups.

The Reels’ questioning is part of the Inquiry’s Tranche 3, examining the final 15 years of the Special Demonstration Squad, 1993-2008.

Sukhdev has given the Inquiry three written statements, and Tish has given one written statement.

The Inquiry’s page for the day has a transcript of the live session.

The Reels gave evidence together. They were questioned for the Inquiry by Nazmeen Imambaccus.

RICKY REEL AND HIS FAMILY

The Inquiry started by establishing who Ricky was as a person.

Lakhvinder ‘Ricky’ Reel was born on 11 July 1977, the second of four children. The family lived in West London, where his mother Sukhdev was a housing officer for the Borough of Hounslow.

We’re shown a picture of him aged 20, shortly before he died, then one of him much younger with two of his siblings. Sukhdev is near to tears as she says the photo shows the cheeky grin he always had.

Sukhdev describes Ricky as a son any mother would be proud of. At primary school, instead of going out to play during breaks, he would often be found inside assisting kids who needed help.

In secondary school, Ricky developed skills with computers and taught Sukhdev how to use one. He was the first of his siblings to pass a driving test and so would help the family out with errands.

Despite his academic commitment, education wasn’t his highest priority. When Sukhdev became ill he drove her to hospital. She told him to leave her there as he had exams the next day. He refused, telling her:

‘No, mum. I can always take exams the next year but I won’t get another mum like you.’

He enrolled at Loughborough University in the Midlands, but found he disliked being away from home so transferred to study computer science at Brunel University in Uxbridge.

Ricky’s generous disposition extended well beyond his family. After he died, Sukhdev heard from many people who described him helping others. His work placement employer realised he’d been doing more work than he needed to. A neighbour who worked nights said that Ricky would see her coming home when he was out jogging and say ‘auntie, give me your bags, I’ll walk you home’.

Sukhdev said:

‘He was a responsible child I could rely on… he had a cheeky smile that attracted everyone… but at the same time he was very shy, he wasn’t the sort of person who was going out every time.

The one day he did come out – and I encouraged him to go out, I was pleased that he was finally going out – is the day he never came back, and I carry this guilt with me that I didn’t stop him going out that night. That guilt stays with me throughout my life.’

Before Ricky went missing the family had had no dealings with the police. Sukhdev had some interactions with police in her role as a senior homelessness officer, helping clients facing great distress and sometimes violence. She thought the police were there to help and support people in trouble.

DISAPPEARANCE

Ricky went missing on 14 October 1997. He had gone out with three Asian friends to Kingston Upon Thames. They intended to go to a Diwali gig at Options nightclub. Ricky told his family he would be home by 1am.

He had never been late home before. Sukhdev spent the night waiting on the stairs. Fearing he may have been in a car accident, she rang hospitals to check if he’d been admitted.

The next morning, Sukhdev rang her local police station at West Drayton but was told that because Ricky was over the age of 18 he had to be gone for 24 hours before she could make a missing persons report.

When he still didn’t arrive home, Sukhdev contacted the police again, who sent an officer round. Sukhdev gave him the contact details for one of Ricky’s friends.

The officer spoke to the friend and was told that the group had been attacked. After they’d parked their car and were walking into Richmond town centre, two white men started shouting racial abuse at them. The men physically assaulted and punched them.

At this point, Ricky and his friends ran away, but in different directions. It was the last time Ricky’s friends saw him.

The officer then told Sukhdev what he’d heard. She asked him to investigate:

‘It’s common sense if four people are attacked, three are back at home, one’s missing, so that person is in danger.’

The officer refused to take it further, reiterating that he had to wait 24 hours to file a missing persons report.

As their local police station weren’t helping, Sukhdev’s husband and brother took Ricky’s friends to Kingston police station, as that was the nearest to the location of the attack.

Even though Ricky’s friends had visible facial injuries, they were waved away. The officer at the desk said that perhaps Ricky was running away from an arranged marriage, because that’s what Asian people do. Or perhaps he ran away because he was gay and doesn’t want his inevitably homophobic Asian family to know.

The officer then winked and suggested Ricky had a secret girlfriend that his Asian family wouldn’t approve of.

Sukhdev said the situation could not have been clearer:

‘From then on we knew a racist label was placed on our forehead. They were not interested in looking for Ricky, because Asian families in their opinion do not deserve justice, do not deserve the equal amount of investigation like anybody else.’

Realising they were on their own, the family created leaflets on Ricky’s computer and went to Kingston every day to hand them out.

They also contacted Suresh Grover of The Monitoring Group which assists families facing racial discrimination, especially those who’ve lost a loved one (Grover gave evidence to the Inquiry a week before the Reels).

‘Suresh came in, listened to us, and then he went and spoke to my MP John McDonnell. They both came in and they have been by my side ever since, and without their support I don’t think I would be sitting here today.’

This is in complete contrast to the spycop reports of the officer who spied on the Reels’ campaign, HN81 ‘Dave Hagan’, who falsely claimed that Grover’s support was inconsistent [MPS-0001370], and that Asian people didn’t like him supporting Black families [MPS-0748392].

The police appointed Family Liaison Officers who visited the family at their home. Sukhdev expected them to keep the family updated about the investigation but they never knew anything. Instead, they asked questions about exactly who else had been visiting.

In retrospect, they were spying on the family, just as the Family Liaison Officers had with Stephen Lawrence’s family a few years earlier.

Sukhdev noted that the officers had asked if they needed to take their shoes off entering an Asian household. She says it was part of the ‘othering’ that they experienced which underpinned all their dealings with the police.

‘So from very the beginning an ‘Asian woman, Asian family’ label was put on our heads, and that’s how they treated us.’

The police refused to treat the racist attack and Ricky’s disappearance as linked.

Two days later, a van of police arrived at the Reels’ house. Officers ran in and took Sukhdev’s husband Balwant into the garage to keep him out of the way while the rest of the house was searched.

Sukhdev was angry:

‘They thought we’ve hurt Ricky, we’re hiding him in our house. And then they searched the house, they searched the garage and they said “that’s fine, we’ve done our job”.’

The family were spending a lot of time leafleting in Kingston, but Sukhdev still couldn’t get officers there or at home to engage:

‘Whenever I contacted West Drayton I was told to ring Kingston, and when I rang Kingston they said, “No, it’s at West Drayton”, because each one were trying to save their resources.

And with Ricky missing, within 24 hours I was told by Kingston police that they have closed the investigation and I said, “Why? He’s still missing”. And they said, “We don’t have resources to investigate your son’s disappearance”.’

It was left to the family to get CCTV footage and search the streets. With their amateur lack of resources and equipment, the one place they couldn’t search was the river. They asked the police to do it several times, but nothing happened.

DISCOVERY

The police relented on 21 October 1997, a week after Ricky went missing, and undertook a search of the river Thames. Ricky’s body was found six minutes after the search began. Had they searched sooner, it would not only have saved a lot of anguish and effort for the Reel family, it would also have allowed police to secure better forensic evidence.

Sukhdev was with Suresh Grover at the Monitoring Group office, preparing a press release. She received a phone call saying the police had some news and were on their way. She hoped Ricky had been located in a hospital. She rang her home and spoke to her daughter, but then the line went dead.

Two police officers had entered the house and seen the children there, without their parents. Tish Reel, who was 17 at the time, recalled it:

‘The police officer pulled out the phone cord from the wall, which meant I hung up abruptly. The call was ended abruptly to my mum, which was quite distressing for both of us.

And then she turned to my siblings and I and said, quite callously and coldly without any emotion, using the exact words: “We found your brother’s body at the bottom of the river”…

Then she went to the corner of the room where I’d been sitting where the phone was, and her and the police constable were cracking jokes in the corner and laughing. I don’t know what was so humorous.

And whilst they did that I had an asthma attack, they didn’t bother to help me, I had to crawl up the stairs to go and get my asthma inhaler. My sister went into shock and my little brother was just walking around, didn’t know what to do, and my parents weren’t there.’

Back at The Monitoring Group office, the police arrived and told Sukhdev they’d found Ricky’s body. She passed out.

‘When I came round, I think it was my husband pulling me from under the table and his hands and his arms were shaking.

I was put in the car and all throughout the journey I was thinking about how I was going to break this news to my children, because I had been promising them that I will bring their brother home.

And when I got home, one look at their faces showed me that there was something wrong there.’

When Sukhdev arrived home she found the children devastated and the police inhuman:

‘The children told me what had happened, they couldn’t relate to the words used by the police to an 11-year-old child that, “The body of your brother”. “Body”…

[My son] just stood there and I went near him, he flinched, he was just like a stone standing there. My other daughter, elder daughter, was just standing there with a tray, glasses of water on a tray, didn’t know what she was doing.

And the two police officers laughing and joking as Tish told me that she had to crawl on the stairs like a dog to get her inhaler. She told the police officers where the inhaler was in her bedroom, could someone please get it, they didn’t. She would have died that day as well.

So I told them to get out of my house.’

Detective Superintendent Bob Moffat, the officer in charge of the investigation, told the press that Ricky had been found. He said the death was a tragic accident, that Ricky had unfortunately fallen into the river while urinating, and the case would be closed.

There had been no forensic examination of the scene or of Ricky’s body. Moffat told the pathologist that it had been an accident. The post-mortem did not examine Ricky’s body for signs of defensive injuries.

INVESTIGATIONS

The first investigation into Ricky’s death was performed by West Drayton and Kingston Upon Thames police stations. The police did not look at the CCTV footage from Richmond that contained clues. They took months to speak to witnesses.

On 20 November 1997, Sukhdev made a formal complaint to the Police Complaints Authority (PCA). Surrey police looked into the Met’s handling of the investigation. They also tried to do an investigation themselves but the Met refused to hand it over to them.

The PCA sent Sukhdev a letter on 15 February 1999 [UCPI0000038555] which upheld the family’s complaints:

‘There were weaknesses and flaws within the organisational structure… the investigation has found your allegations of neglect of duty in respect of Police Constable D, Police Constable H, and Detective Superintendent Moffat to be substantiated.’

Under a subheading ‘racial issues’, in classic ‘protect the guilty’ style, the letter said the failings were:

‘for the most part attributable to organisational failings, rather than to neglect on the part of any particular officer.’

Tish says the family were disgusted. Having spent over a year reliving experiences and believing they’d get redress, they were fobbed off with a letter, and were not allowed to see the PCA’s report.

Sukhdev condemns the fact that the PCA report is still under lock and key today, 28 years later. She herself has belatedly been shown a copy, but on strict condition that she does not discuss its contents with anyone, not even Tish or Balwant.

The second main investigation into Ricky’s death overlapped with the PCA complaint. It was carried out by the Met’s Racial and Violent Crime Task Force, headed by Deputy Assistant Commissioner John Grieve, and it ran from 1 November 1998 to 12 March 1999. It found that all lines of enquiry had been exhausted, with no fresh leads or investigations to pursue. Sukhdev dismisses it as ‘a paper exercise’.

Grieve and the Racial and Violent Crime Task Force also eventually handled the investigation into the death of Michael Menson, after the original investigation was condemned by the PCA. Menson’s family were also spied on.

We have seen evidence [MPS-0748390] that Grieve was kept in the loop about spying on family justice campaigns, and he was closely linked to the Met’s handling of the Macpherson Inquiry at this time.

On 8 February 2000, Sukhdev made a complaint to the PCA about that second investigation, specifically the officer in charge, Detective Chief Inspector Sue Hill. This time the PCA found that misconduct proceedings were not justified.

With the first PCA complaint against him upheld, the detective in charge of the first investigation, Detective Superintendent Bob Moffat, was now facing disciplinary proceedings. In the time-honoured manner of guilty police officers, he promptly retired from the police to avoid any charges.

RACIST TREATMENT

Sukhdev recounts some of the discouragement and racism she was subjected to by the police:

‘I took six months off and I travelled all over the country attending meetings, conferences and everything, speaking about Ricky’s case.

And I was told by the police to return to work, look after my children. Because in their view they saw an Asian woman confronting them, and in their opinion Asian woman should be tied to the kitchen.’

She refers back to Ricky’s brother being so cruelly told about Ricky’s death, and points out that we never hear of white kids being treated that way.

Tish adds:

‘My dad speaks limited English, English is very much a second language for him. My mum was the one who was communicating to the police officers, talking to them.

But whenever they spoke to my parents they always addressed my dad and it was clear that they assumed that in Asian families you address the male, because the male is the head of the family.

They would look past my mum, speak over her, literally speak over because she’s so short, and it was clear that that was because they assumed this is how Asian families operate.’

The family’s leaflets and outreach started to pay off. They got support from some local groups, including the Socialist Workers Party (SWP). Sukhdev got a phone call from someone who said she’d given the SWP a piece of paper with an address on it of racists who may be connected with Ricky’s murder.

Sukhdev told the police who went and collected the paper and said they’d investigate:

‘So when we asked them what was the outcome of this investigation, they told us – honestly, I don’t know whether to laugh or cry – they told us, “yes, we visited the address, these are white educated people, their house is clean, they can’t be racist”.

So we were dealing with this type of behaviour, which has continued even after 28 years. So that’s the reason we are here. To find out why we are here.’

CAMPAIGNING

Two weeks after Ricky died, the family set up a campaign for to find out the truth about what had happened.

Sukhdev stresses that it’s not something done on a whim, it was a commitment to a lot of work. There would be meetings, petitions, research, vigils, working with other justice campaigns. It was done out of necessity, because it had already become clear that the police were uninterested and what little information they gave couldn’t be relied upon.

Tish expands on the point:

‘We knew that the police weren’t going to investigate this beyond assuming, as Moffat did, that it was a tragic accident. We were treated in a racist way, we were treated as if we weren’t people just because we had brown skin. Just because mum was a woman.

They didn’t want to give us information. Every time we asked them to do something it was too much trouble, there was an obstacle in the way, there wasn’t enough resources to do certain lines of investigation, to carry those out.’

The police were reluctant to share information, or to receive it. They were wholly avoidant of the issue of racism, whether it be acknowledging that it was a racist murder, or the fact that the family were being treated in an overtly racist manner.

The family realised that the police were not going to properly investigate and find out what had happened to Ricky, let alone bring the people responsible to account. The investigation was only interested in portraying it as an accident and was refusing to consider the evidence to the contrary.

After the post-mortem, the family were given Ricky’s clothes. Sukhdev noticed a rip in his shirt. On the advice of Grover, McDonnell and lawyers, the family commissioned a second post-mortem, which found the rip matched injuries on Ricky’s body.

Tish explains how vital it was to have a team to find the truth:

‘Without that co-ordinated approach from other people outside of the family, which would eventually turn into what is now called the Justice for Ricky Reel campaign, we wouldn’t have that evidence, and the police wouldn’t have benefited from that evidence, and we as a family wouldn’t have benefited from that evidence.’

Sukhdev received early support from Neville Lawrence, father of murdered teenager Stephen Lawrence, whose campaign had achieved national attention by that time. They’ve shared a platform innumerable times and support each other’s campaigns to this day. They were sat together at the first hearing of the Undercover Policing Inquiry.

‘Whenever we meet we don’t ask how you are, because we know how we are. He always said to me, “I’m here for you if you need support”, and I’ve always said the same.’

At Neville’s request, Sukhdev attended almost every day of the 1998 public inquiry into Stephen’s death. She was there to support the Lawrence family, and as the evidence was heard she was astonished at the similarities in the police’s treatment of Stephen and Ricky’s murders. It was literally agonising for her and there were times that she had to leave the room to be physically sick.

She was one of several representatives of family justice campaigns who gave evidence to the second part of the Lawrence inquiry as it examined wider issues of racism and policing.

This clearly didn’t sit well with police, who expended yet more resources in the wrong place. Sukhdev noticed an audible click at the end of phone calls. It was a common experience for activists in the 1990s, seemingly part of police phone-tapping operations. Police resources that should have been spent catching killers were instead being used to spy on victims.

POLICE SPYING

The Inquiry then went through a number of secret police reports made by Special Demonstration Squad officer HN81 ‘Dave Hagan’. He had infiltrated Movement For Justice which supported a number of causes including several family justice campaigns. From this position, he reported on the Reels and the Lawrences.

By his own recent admission, he exaggerated his involvement and influence in order to impress his bosses.

On 25 June 1998, Hagan filed a report [MPS-0001147]. Though primarily about a Newham Monitoring Group meeting about the Stephen Lawrence Inquiry, he also said that Movement For Justice may be turning their attention to the Reel campaign:

‘The case is still not recognised by the police either as murder or a racial killing… [despite] the fact that there appears to be good evidence of police mismanagement and racism in it.’

Hagan is on the ground, hearing the evidence. Surely this is the stuff that intelligence should be useful for. And yet he still styles the Reels’ campaign as a ‘campaign against the police’. This is a problem endemic to the police, and beyond into their satellite bodies and supporters.

An organisation interested in justice would want to find the truth, and to root out racism in its personnel and procedures. Instead, they close ranks around proven wrongdoers and portray any complaint, no matter how valid, as an objection to policing in general and every police officer as an individual. Then they wonder why people don’t trust them.

Hagan submitted another report on 3 September 1998 [MPS-0001288]. It describes a meeting in Hackney organised by the Socialist Workers Party.

Sukhdev shared the platform with people from two other justice campaigns, Myrna Simpson (mother of Joy Gardner who had been killed by police), and George Silcott (brother of Winston Silcott who had been framed for the murder of a police officer).

The report describes Alex Owolade from Movement For Justice (MFJ) talking to Sukhdev, and the fact that she gave Owolade her mobile phone number.

Sukhdev describes the anger she felt, finding out she was being watched so closely. She says that Owolade getting her number was no accolade, she was giving it to anyone who may be able to help the campaign. She wonders if Hagan had it too.

The Inquiry turns to Sukhdev’s second, most substantial written statement [UCPI0000038548] in which she says she was wary of MFJ.

Asked about this, she recounts a public meeting with Neville Lawrence where Owolade made a contribution from the floor and Neville disliked it, saying that he could speak for himself. Like Neville, she strongly believes that family justice campaigns must be run and directed by the people at the centre.

WHO’S IN CONTROL

The Inquiry then showed a document from the same month titled ‘SDS intelligence update September 1998’ [MPS-0720946]. It was written by HN10 Bob Lambert, who was running the SDS at the time.

Lambert describes:

‘Another significant breakthrough for Movement for Justice: on Wednesday evening, 2 September they cemented good liaison contact with Sukhev Reels [sic], Ricky Reel’s mother, and are now planning to assist her in mounting a large-scale campaign against the police.

It is important to emphasise here the extent to which the Reels’s case has potential to cause police embarrassment on the same scale as the Lawrence case. Certainly, so far as Mrs Reel and the activists are concerned there are glaringly similar racist overtones between the police handling of both investigations.’

This is a thinly veiled admission of police culpability, like Hagan’s, and yet they’re trying to defend it. Like Hagan himself, Lambert characterises objection to police malpractice as ‘a campaign against the police’.

Lambert’s report talks about Suresh Grover supporting the Reel campaign, and says the campaign is putting itself under ‘the Grover banner’. It shows the police believing that their regimented and hierarchical way of organising is the only way. They see everything in terms of factions, subterfuge, power struggles, and division.

Tish condemns the entire paradigm as dehumanising. It’s not how the campaigns were at all. It’s also nothing to do with public order problems that were supposedly the reason for the spying. Instead, Tish notes, it’s a management strategy attempting to steer the campaigns.

It’s notable that Lambert spells Sukhdev Reel as ‘Sukhev Reels’. Doreen Lawrence pointed out in her evidence to the Inquiry that police reports consistently spelt Stephen’s name wrong.

The misspelling of names of people and groups happens so frequently in spycops reports that it raises questions about how they could be searched as useful intelligence, and gives rise to a suspicion that it wasn’t an accident but was an in-joke among officers, another way to denigrate their targets.

It wasn’t just MFJ that the SDS viewed with suspicion. The Inquiry shows a report of Hagan’s dated 26 October 1998 which describes a march for Ricky in Kingston [MPS-0001462]. Hagan once again insinuates that a left-wing group is trying to get control of the campaign for nefarious purposes:

‘Socialist Workers Party are attempting to court Mrs Reel. However, their efforts are meeting with little success as Mrs Reel has indicated that she has concerns over the objectives of some political groups and she has been warned specifically about the Socialist Workers Party.’

Sukhdev is affronted at the very suggestion:

‘Nobody courted me. I’m a woman who speaks my mind.’

She says it’s untrue for Hagan to say she’d been warned about the SWP, and adds that she never had concerns about any group trying to exploit her campaign for another agenda. The family knew what they were campaigning for and wouldn’t have let anyone hijack the campaign, not that anyone tried.

The report claims that Grover’s address to the march was met with a lack of interest.

‘The Movement for Justice viewpoint was that the demonstration was a pitiful reflection of a year’s campaigning and how Mrs Reel’s case is being squandered by her reliance on Grover, whose main attention lies elsewhere.’

Tish says Grover was fully committed to the campaign at the time, as he has been continually from 1997. She says if the spycop was reporting that the campaign was dwindling to negligibility, there was no reason for the surveillance to continue. And yet it did.

Hagan’s report concluded:

‘Movement For Justice have grown weary of Mrs Reel’s fear of being seen to cause trouble so do not intend to waste too much time on this case.’

This is another slur on MFJ, implying that they were agitating for gratuitous confrontation and disorder.

Tish points out that it also confirms that the campaign was entirely peaceable, using law-abiding methods. There was no reason to be spying on them, apart from the fact that they were challenging the police’s lack of investigation and racism, and challenging police activity is seen as subversive.

Asked why Hagan spoke about the campaign in such terms, Sukhdev pointedly replies:

‘I don’t know why he wrote that. No, I don’t know. I think he needs to be here and you need to ask him.’

This is a dig at the Inquiry, which is refusing to compel Hagan to give evidence because he was diagnosed with PTSD in 2015 and says testifying would make him feel worse. Many victims of spycops suffer from PTSD and other psychological impacts of the abuse they received and are attending the Inquiry and reliving their trauma, yet this perpetrator is allowed to be absent.

INQUEST

On 1 November 1999, the inquest into Ricky’s death opened. It lasted six days. The family had been denied Legal Aid and had to fund their own representation.

Sukhdev and Balwant Reel arrived with Suresh Grover and Sukhdev’s brother, who had been supporting them throughout. Grover was familiar with the process of inquests. But he and Sukhdev’s brother were told to wait in another room. Sukhdev and her husband Balwant were alone in the middle of an unfamiliar procedure.

The coroner told her that he knew she’d attended the Stephen Lawrence inquiry a year earlier, and asked her who it was there that had put the idea in her head that Ricky had been murdered. He then joked that as Ricky’s friends had gone and got kebabs in Richmond they obviously couldn’t have been significantly hurt.

Tish Reel says they’d seen the bias coming and managed to mitigate:

‘We had to lobby extremely hard to get a jury inquest and to get funding for representation at that inquest, because jury inquests were not the norm.

And the reason we lobbied so hard is because we knew already, and by this time Grieve and his team were already on board and the signs were there that even the second investigation, like the first, was flawed and was racist in its approach.’

It became obvious at the inquest that the police investigation had been dire.

The family had gone to great lengths to supply the police with all relevant material. But at the inquest, investigative officer Bob Moffat – called to give evidence even though he’d retired – kept saying that he hadn’t seen certain pertinent documents, or that the Reels hadn’t told him specific facts that were contained in the documents.

It was clear from the police’s testimony that the second investigation under the Racial and Violent Crime Task Force was actually being directed by Moffat from the first investigation, and by his narrative that Ricky’s death had been a tragic accident as he tried to urinate in the river. The police wanted a verdict of accidental death.

It was also clear that there were lines of enquiry that hadn’t been followed, potential witnesses who had been ignored. The police had simply sat on the information for two years.

Moffat had arranged for a third post-mortem to be carried out on Ricky’s body, without the family’s knowledge. He had ordered that the entirety of Ricky’s skin be removed.

The family only became aware of this third post-mortem at the inquest. Although utterly horrified and astonished, Tish said it finally made one thing make sense:

‘We always wondered why, at Ricky’s funeral, which was only three weeks after he was found, when we went to go and see him, because he’d been in cold water he looked like Ricky, but when we saw him at the open casket funeral he was unrecognisable.

I couldn’t watch, I couldn’t stand by his – I promised myself I’d stay with him and I couldn’t, because I couldn’t look at what happened. I couldn’t understand the deterioration of his body.’

Witnesses had told the inquest that they and their families had been threatened and pressured not to testify. The three friends who were with Ricky on the evening of the racial attack said they had received death threats, and one had been kidnapped and assaulted on 3 November, the day of Ricky’s funeral. This is not what anyone would expect from an accidental death involving nobody else.

Tish says:

‘We had no confidence whatsoever in the police before we went into the inquest, we had even less when we left and they asked the jury to find accidental death verdict. But fortunately, because we had a jury, that was rejected.’

The jury returned an open verdict, meaning that the death is suspicious but the jury cannot conclusively reach any of the other available verdicts.

The inquest had a lot of publicity. There was a candlelit vigil on the first day, the public gallery was packed. And yet we haven’t seen a single spycop report mentioning it. Tish draws the obvious conclusion:

‘That, to me, speaks volumes – that there are documents that existed and have been shredded or haven’t been disclosed.’

AFTER THE INQUEST

After the open verdict, the family met with the Metropolitan Police on 4 February 2000. The police said they were prepared to investigate, but only if information was brought to them. They wouldn’t be proactive. This left it to the family to find leads, despite not having the skills or technology that the police are provided with.

The head of the first investigation, Bob Moffat, took it personally that the jury had rejected his theory of Ricky’s accidental death.

Some time later, Sukhdev was contacted by a reporter asking why she had given permission for Bob Moffat to print pictures of Ricky’s body in the third post-mortem. This was the first she’d heard of it.

Tish is incensed:

‘He had taken those photographs, stripping Ricky of his dignity completely, into his retirement, kept them at home with his personal belongings, where he and his family live. And he had contacted the reporter asking her to publish those photographs.’

Moffat had gone to the Mail on Sunday with a sense of grievance.

He told them that he had been hounded out of his job because he insisted Ricky’s death was an accident, and the family just couldn’t face the truth but were being indulged because they were Asian.

It was published under the headline ‘It is political correctness gone mad’.

Despite the jury disagreeing with Moffat’s theory, the Mail published the story sympathetically to Moffat.

On seeing the article, Sukhdev had suicidal impulses. She was intensely fearful of the impacts on her children if they saw it, or if people they knew saw it.

She couldn’t believe this was being done by the people who should have been finding Ricky’s attackers, but were instead carrying out a vendetta against victims:

‘If this the type of policing in this country, then who needs police officers?’

Suresh Grover saw the photos and contacted lawyers. Police then went to Moffat’s house and found the photos, yet no charges were ever brought against him.

During the hearing’s morning break, Tom Fowler discussed the evidence so far with ‘Alison’ from Police Spies Out of Lives:

FINDING OUT ABOUT THE SPYING

On 18 July 2014, the Reels met with officers from Operation Herne, the police’s internal investigation into spycops, at the office of the Reels’ MP and ally, John McDonnell [MPS-0738102].

The family are especially angry, not just about the spying but also about the false assurances they were given at the meeting.

They were told they weren’t directly spied upon, but officers infiltrating subversive organisations such as MFJ and the SWP had incidentally reported on the Reels in about ten reports. The family later found out that was all lies: they had been directly spied on and there were many reports that proved it.

Tish says the emotional impact was colossal:

‘It was re-traumatising, it just felt like we weren’t people. The way the police treated us during the initial two investigations completely dehumanised us because we had brown skin. It felt like that was happening all over again.

We couldn’t understand why it had taken so long for this information to come out. And we felt humiliated, we felt stripped yet again of our dignity, of whatever miniscule pieces of peace we’d managed to put back together in our lives, it completely derailed all of that.

I can’t, I can’t, it’s too – it’s so difficult to put into words the impact that that had.’

The impact on Sukhdev broke something inside her; she says the room went black. When she came to, she was repeatedly assured that it was only ‘collateral intrusion’, she wasn’t spied on personally.

‘I remember there sitting with my daughter and pulling my cardigan, I thought they could see through to me, I thought I was sitting there naked because of their spying, and since that day I keep on seeing eyes everywhere. I don’t know how I got home…

I didn’t think that things like this could happen. Especially to a family who has lost a child, who has never been given a time to grieve. 28 years I’ve been sitting here attending meetings, one after another, dealing with the paperwork, hell of a paperwork this Inquiry has produced and the case and everything.

I haven’t sat down for one day in the 28 years since then, I still put his dinner plate on the table thinking he will come and eat his dinner.’

She is near to tears as she says this.

Tish said that it made it even harder to reconcile the two sides of the police’s actions. The police were the only people with the financial resources, technology, training and skills to do a proper investigation.

On the one hand, the police were saying that they didn’t investigate certain elements because of a lack of resources. On the other, they were putting teams into spying on the family and analysing what they found.

DIRECT TARGETING, FOR A WIDE AUDIENCE

When they were told about the spying in 2014, the Reels asked to see the secret reports that mentioned them. The police refused, saying they concerned secret matters regarding public disorder.

Now that the Undercover Policing Inquiry has disclosed them, it’s plain to see that they contain nothing of the sort. Mentions of public disorder are conspicuous by their complete absence. It was just another lie the police told the family in 2014, hoping that the truth wouldn’t come out. Even as they pretended to come clean, they were merely enacting the next stage of an exercise in damage limitation and reputation management.

Despite assuring the family that there was nothing personal in the reports – which Tish describes as being done ‘as if it was a professional courtesy to us, hand-holding, reassuring’ – the documents actually describe Sukhdev being very emotional and crying, and details about her personal health.

At the meeting in 2014, the family were also assured that the information was kept within Special Branch, that there were rigid barriers between them and the wider Met. That was another lie.

We now see documentation [MPS-0748390] proving that a line of communication was specifically made between Special Branch and Grieve, at the Met’s Racial and Violent Crime Task Force while the latter was conducting the second investigation into Ricky’s death.

A document from September 1998 [MPS-0720946] has a handwritten note from Colin Black, Commander of Operations for all of Special Branch including the SDS, talking about the SDS’s off-the-record briefings to Richard Walton of the Racial and Violent Crime Task Force. These briefings included details of family justice campaigns that were being spied on:

‘I have reiterated to him that it is essential that knowledge of the operation goes no further. I would not wish him to receive anything on paper.’

Tish says the deliberate avoidance of writing it down is proof of guilt:

‘They knew that their actions were not justified, they knew that this was not collateral damage, that this was a very deliberate, orchestrated chain of decision-making here, and they knew it wasn’t justified, they knew it wasn’t lawful, they knew we weren’t any threat to public disorder.’

The SDS prepared a document on 10 September 1998 [MPS-0748392] containing extensive profiles of the Stephen Lawrence and Ricky Reel campaigns. It detailed their history, personnel, allies and plans.

It stated that it was produced for the Commissioner, Deputy Assistant Commissioner Grieve, and Superintendent Thornton. This is the proof that it all went well beyond Special Branch and right to the top of the Met.

Unit manager Bob Lambert’s ‘SDS intelligence update September 1998’, mentioned earlier [MPS-0720946], not only contained details of spying on the Reels, it also said Hagan would be spying on the Reel campaign for months to come. The family definitely were directly targeted.

Sukhdev summarises the conclusion of Lambert’s report as saying to Hagan:

‘Here it is, the budget. You do what you want, make sure you destroy that campaign, make sure you do whatever you can, do whatever you want to destroy that campaign and cause as much damage as you can to the family.

That’s how it came across to me.’

THE DRIVE HOME

More than that, Hagan drove Sukhdev home from a meeting – just the two of them, alone in a car. It wasn’t necessary for him to do that, but a conscious and deliberate decision. It could scarcely be more personal and direct.

In 2013, the nation was shocked to learn that the Stephen Lawrence campaign had been spied on. The Home Secretary commissioned Mark Ellison KC to investigate. The Ellison team met with Hagan [MPS-0738122], who had spied on the Lawrences. He told them about his spying on the Reels, notably about the occasion when he drove Sukhdev home.

Hagan said that the leaders of MFJ met with Sukhdev, and he gave her a lift home afterwards. As with the rest of his description of his deployment in the interview, Hagan downplays this incident a lot.

He says he didn’t offer but was asked to do it (he doesn’t specify by who), that he ‘didn’t exploit the situation’, and that he refused her offer to come into the house because he knew that if she knew his real identity she wouldn’t want it.

Sukhdev is dismissive of this mitigated version of events. She is certain that she didn’t ask Hagan for a lift, and that he must have grasped the opportunity to get information from her.

It’s a perspective supported by Hagan’s own admissions. In another interview with Ellison in 2013 [MPS-0721973], Hagan defended reporting deeply personal information:

‘All intelligence is good.’

In his written witness statement to the Inquiry [MPS-0748738], Hagan reiterates his belief that ‘all intelligence is good’ and says he would have discussed the drive with his handler officer at the time. Yet no record of this has been located by the Inquiry.

If we don’t have a report about an event as significant as Hagan’s one-on-one conversation in the car with Sukhdev, it’s highly likely that the evidence of other key incidents is also missing.

Sukhdev talks about seeing Hagan’s admission of driving her home:

‘I don’t have the words to describe it, I really don’t. I felt sick. Humiliated. He took advantage of my vulnerability. He was writing reports that was no use to the inquiry, in the reports it was mentioned that I was relatively stressed, I had health problems, that my health was deteriorating. So he clearly knew I was vulnerable at the time…

Every time I think of this I see Sarah Everard in front of my eyes, and that’s the one thing that doesn’t let me sleep at night. She was in a police car, unmarked police car, and I think I was in a police car with a police officer who pretended to be a supporter of this campaign. Why did he not tell me who he was?’

Overcome by emotion, Sukhdev asks Tish to take over.

Tish talks of the imbalance of power, with only Hagan knowing what was really going on, and that we only have his word for it that he didn’t come into the family home that night.

Whatever the specifics, he took advantage of a vulnerable woman who was upset from talking about the death of her son and how the police had failed her. Hagan, from that same police force, chose to get Sukhdev on her own and spend time with her. They obviously will have talked about the family and the campaign. These were conscious choices on his part. It is targeted surveillance.

Finding this out has had devastating consequences for Sukhdev:

‘I invited him in. That’s what I was like before. I trusted everyone and I would say come home, and talk to people. I don’t trust anyone any more. He’s destroyed me, this Inquiry, all the revelations of what was going on, has destroyed my life, I’m not the same person anymore.’

Tish describes the horrendous damage that the spying has done to her mother:

‘I lived with her for many years after this, and I stay at her house sometimes with my children. She wakes up in her sleep screaming, and it’s kind of blood curdling and it wakes my nephew up, he lives with her and he’s seven, eight now. She screams in her sleep, but she doesn’t know she’s doing it. And one of us has to run in and wake her up.

You can hear in her sleep she’s saying, she’s talking about eyes, and when I wake her up she’s still half asleep and she’s talking about eyes following her.

And that’s the impact of this, it’s enduring, it’s not going to go away. It doesn’t impact just her, it has impacted generations – her, me, her grandson, are being impacted, still being impacted by the actions of those officers almost 25 years ago.’

If it hadn’t been for the Undercover Policing Inquiry, the Reels would have taken the ‘only incidental collateral reporting’ assurances in 2014 at face value. For 28 years, every time they’ve been told something conclusive, it’s turned out there was more to it. It makes them wonder what else there is that’s still not been disclosed.

Sukhdev’s brother remembers meeting Hagan at one of Ricky’s memorial lectures. Hagan was asking lots of questions about Ricky, the Reel family and the campaign. This is plainly direct targeting. There is no risk of public disorder. The incident is not recorded in any of the documents that the Inquiry has shown the family. What else is missing? How much more spying was there?

During the hearing’s lunchtime break, Tom Fowler discussed the eivdence so far with Dave Morris:

DESIGNED TO DECEIVE

The Operation Herne officers who met the Reels in July 2014 spoke to several families similarly spied upon. Soon afterward, Operation Herne published a report and made a public statement. It claimed that neither the Reels nor any of the other families were directly targeted.

On 18 August 2014, a month after they’d met the Reels, Operation Herne officers met Hagan [MPS-0738094]. Hagan told them that the public claim not to have directly targeted families was untrue, not least because of his drive with Sukhdev. It was something he’d already told the Ellison Review team in 2013 [MPS-0738122].

Assistant Commissioner Martin Hewitt, who would later issue the apology to women deceived into relationships by spycops, explained to Hagan that he was already aware of the driving incident, and had been careful not to make particular suggestions. The Herne officers had meticulously phrased it, saying they hadn’t seen any SDS documents about direct targeting of families.

As Hagan’s admission to Ellison was only oral, the statement was technically true. Clearly, the police were deliberately misleading the families and the public.

The Reels themselves remained unaware of Hagan’s drive with Sukhdev until they recently received documents from the Undercover Policing Inquiry.

‘For 11 years they kept us in dark, not only us but the whole public. So their lies have continued, they started lying to us in 1997 and to this day they have been lying…

We had a meeting with the police only last year, Assistant Police Commissioner, and he lied to us as well, in Scotland Yard, saying “we don’t have the files”.

So this culture of the police lying, especially to Black families, not giving them justice, it just continues and I don’t think there is a police officer in the Met Police good enough, qualified enough, decent enough to give Ricky justice. I don’t think there is.’

Sukhdev is once more welling up as she concludes:

‘And I hold my head high now to say yes, my son, I can finally look in the mirror which I haven’t been able to do for the last 28 years, I can look in the mirror and say I’ve done all I can to get you justice, but the justice has been denied to you by the police.’

APOLOGIES FROM POLICE

On 2 January 2016, the Met sent the Reels an apology for the spying. Sukhdev dismisses it as inadequate.

On 31 October 2025, the Met sent another one [UCPI0000039435]. It sets out the apology that was detailed by the Met’s lawyer at the start of this Phase of the Undercover Policing Inquiry. It added that, without having heard what was coming at this set of Inquiry hearings, ‘it was considered premature to issue a full and personal apology at this stage.’

This apology turned out to be identical to one sent the same day to Michael Menson’s family, which his sister described as a ‘cut and paste job’.

Tish and Sukhdev agree that both letters are worthless, merely a private formality issued when the police had been caught out. Tish explains:

‘An apology is meaningless; it’s the action, it’s the lessons that are learnt, it’s the change in behaviour that matters to us, and to all the people that still contact us to say that what happened to us is still happening.’

TISH’S CLOSING SPEECH

With questioning over, Tish and Sukhdev were invited to make some concluding remarks. It was as powerful as anything we’ve heard in the long history of the Undercover Policing Inquiry.

This video has Tish’s closing statement in full:

She summarised the whole story. The family’s campaign was gruelling work, and has passed trauma down generations to kids who weren’t even born when Ricky was killed. But the family need and deserve the answers that the police are so determined not to give. It has meant retelling the story over and over again, reliving the trauma.

Tish dismissed the spycops’ suggestions that the campaign was somehow secretly controlled by devious subversives. She pulls attention back to the real point. The police spied on a grieving family because they feared the truth.

The police subjected the family to racism from the day Ricky went missing, and it runs through everything right up to today.

After the police’s first post-mortem, Tish and her sister washed Ricky’s clothes and found ripping that turned out to match his injuries.

‘We were just a normal family, we didn’t know anything about forensics, nothing at all. We didn’t even know to ask the question ‘have you done forensics on these clothes?’ Why should we?…

So we washed his clothes. All the forensic evidence was lost. That was the police’s job not ours, and that’s why campaigns like ours are set up.’

Sukhdev is in tears as Tish talks of apologising to Ricky for putting him through the indignity of a second post-mortem.

The Reels discovered that anti-terrorism police had collated a map of CCTV coverage in Kingston. The family used it to secure the CCTV footage. The police they dealt with apparently didn’t know about their own map. Footage seized at the family’s behest was destroyed without being viewed.

‘We had no control over the fact that someone took Ricky’s life, but the control we could and should have had in ensuring that Ricky’s killers were brought to justice was taken away from us by police officers who were racist, incompetent, and more interested in spying on us than actually looking at who did this and will they do it again.’

She is emphatic that the police targeted them because they stood up and were a threat to police credibility. The police were particularly worried that they were being supported by others, and that similarly affected families were working together. The SDS wanted to see division between the families.

The Met claimed to have learned lessons from the Stephen Lawrence case, but they absolutely had not. Instead, they doubled down on efforts to shut down any family who called them out for being racist or incompetent.

Tish says that the victims of police spying are coming to the Inquiry at great personal cost. She isn’t here for the campaign for the truth about what happened to Ricky. This Inquiry won’t help with that at all.

But she has a responsibility to find out why it happened, to show that it wasn’t incidental collateral spying but a direct attack on a family at its lowest ebb. She’s here to try to ensure it doesn’t happen to others in future.

She points the finger at Hagan. He has refused to attend the Inquiry as he has PTSD. Tish says that many of the witnesses have severe trauma. Sukhdev lost her son, forever, and reliving it is clearly excruciating, yet she’s on the stand. If she’s at the Inquiry then Hagan should be too.

The public gallery applauded.

SUKHDEV’S CLOSING STATEMENT

After this, Sukhdev read a prepared concluding statement. This video has it in full:

She opens with a description of how the loss and the police’s actions have devastated her daily life:

‘For nearly two decades, I have lived with grief, near and constant stress. I suffer from nightmares in which I see eyes watching me all the time.

I have insomnia, panic attacks and constant anxiety. The stress contributed to serious health problems and I’m not the same person I was before 1997.’

The police targeted her because they feared the way she challenged their failures. They lied to her when the fact that she’d been spied upon was revealed. Their actions were shaped by institutional racism and institutional sexism.

She lists the others who were spied upon, not just the family justice campaigns but women deceived into relationships and social justice campaigners, all of them treated as enemies of the state. Bereaved families should have been supported; instead they were targeted and undermined.

‘I want this Inquiry to do what the police have failed to do. Tell us the truth. I want it to acknowledge that my family was targeted and infiltrated. I want it to name the officers involved and explain what happened to all the documents which are missing.

I want to know whether intelligence about us was shared with the coroner or any other bodies and I want to see those reports, please.’

She says we won’t get the change that’s so desperately needed unless the truth is established, and the Inquiry has the courage to make bold decisions, conclusions, and recommendations.

But if the Inquiry minimises the profound wrongdoing, shields those responsible, or produces a report that just gathers dust, then a dangerous message will be sent. It will tell the public that even when the police gravely abuse their power, they get away with it. It will deepen the cynicism and disillusionment that many already feel, and will be yet another betrayal.

We are at a key moment when we decide what we will tolerate from those who police us. It is time to expose the cruelties and then consign them to the past.

There were tears in the public gallery as she finished her speech:

‘Above all, I want justice for Ricky. My son was a kind young man, he deserved to live, he deserved a proper investigation, he deserved respect. So did we.

I am speaking out not only for Ricky but all the families who have been spied upon and misled. We deserve accountability and we deserve change.

I ask this Inquiry to ensure that no other parent has to carry their child’s coffin, simply when he was killed because of his colour. And no parents stand where I’m standing today.’

There was an emotional ovation from the public gallery.

When it subsided, there was a shout of ‘call Dave Hagan’. The Inquiry’s Chair, Sir John Mitting, was flummoxed by this. Then he adjourned the hearing.

It had been a hugely emotional experience for those watching.

The next day, the Inquiry heard evidence from Bernard Renwick, brother of Roger Sylvester who was killed by police in 1999, and whose campaign for justice was also spied on.

At the end of the session, Mitting commended Renwick in terms that can only be seen as a conscious insult to Sukhdev and Tish Reel:

‘Mr Renwick, thank you for taking the trouble to make a witness statement and to attend the hearing, and to give oral evidence in the calm and reasonable manner that you have.

It is invariably impressive to hear people who have gone through great personal tragedies, like you and your family, be able to speak about them in a manner that doesn’t betray bitterness and rancour and excessive emotion, but calmness and reasonableness.’

At the end of the hearing, Tom Fowler discussed the day with Suresh Grover of The Monitoring Group:

Tranche 3 Phase 1, Day 20
27 November 2025

INTRODUCTION

On the afternoon of Thursday 27 November 2025, the Undercover Policing Inquiry heard evidence from two witnesses whose names are being kept private, ‘MSS’ and ‘MWS’.

They are the sister and brother of Michael Menson, a Black musician who died in 1997 following a horrific racist attack. They are here to give evidence about the family’s subsequent campaign for justice, which was spied on by the Special Demonstration Squad.

The Undercover Policing Inquiry (UCPI) is an independent, judge-led inquiry into undercover policing in England and Wales. Its main focus is the activity of two units who deployed long-term undercover officers into a variety of political groups: the Special Demonstration Squad (SDS, 1968-2008) and the National Public Order Intelligence Unit (NPOIU, 1999-2011). Spycops from these units lived as activists for years at a time, spying on more than 1,000 groups.

MSS and MWS have made two witness statements each to the Inquiry [MSS: UCPI0000038377 and UCPI0000039437, MWS: UCPI0000038379 and UCPI0000039441]. At the time of writing the Inquiry has yet to publish any of them.

The Inquiry’s page for the day has a transcript of the live session. In order to protect the family’s privacy, the video coverage was broadcast as audio-only.

MSS and MWS were questioned together by Lennart Poulsen, acting as Counsel to the Inquiry.

MICHAEL’S PERSONALITY

Poulson began by asking about Michael’s life and his character, to understand the kind of person he was.

‘MSS: I was struck by his quietness, his gentleness… maybe as siblings we were laughing at another sibling and he was never involved in that, he would never join in any kind of teasing or anything…

Even though I was his older sister he would check in… that’s my childhood memory of him, always being thoughtful.

One of my brothers broke his leg and I remember Mike being really, you know, caring of him…

We were kind of all a bit weird and all loved school, and he enjoyed that. I remember him going to school one day when he wasn’t very well, he was just desperate to go…

He was a singer, we sang in a church choir… he often sang the solo… but was always really unassuming about that.

I remember an occasion where I was singing a solo and I had to sing the word “psalms”. And it begins with a p, and for some reason I kept reading it with the word p, and he came and helped me practise so I could get it right, just even though it would have made much more sense for him to have done it because his voice was better…

Those little things were examples of what he was like as a child and as a person…

We had a little car washing round, we’d go round with our bucket of water and wash cars for our neighbours and things, we just did gentle things.

We were quite a quiet family. We didn’t do lots of activities, but we entertained each other and played with each other… there were some traditional Ghanaian stories that we’d sometimes be told and we particularly loved and we’d rehearse them with each other.

He did well at school. He just wasn’t any trouble, ever.’

Michael became part of the music group Double Trouble who enjoyed considerable success as performers and producers, including the massive 1989 hit Street Tuff with Rebel MC. The family were surprised but delighted.

‘MSS: You could really see him come alive… We are a family of kind of quite high moral values, and a religious family, and he wanted to make sure that his music career was still in line with us as a family, and including us.

I remember myself and some of the siblings going to recordings. He was inclusive and joyful and I think to some degree he just was really grateful for the success that they had’

Michael suffered some mental health difficulties in his late 20s. The family would have to take him to hospital. He was sad and confused about it, desperate to get back on track in life, and always saying sorry. His sister says he was always determined that his mental health problems would not defeat him.

On 28 January 1997, Michael Menson was attacked by a racist gang. They robbed him, doused him in highly flammable accelerant and set him on fire. He was taken to hospital having suffered extremely severe burns.

THE FAILED POLICE INVESTIGATION

The police visited the family home that same night and told them Michael had set fire to himself. However, MWS was able to visit Michael in hospital.

‘MWS: My initial conversation with Michael was to see how he was, and I was shocked, he was lying in the hospital bed on his back, he was alert, awake, lucid…he said that he’d been attacked by some boys… near a phone box, he had tried to put himself out.

He asked “why did they do this to me?” He said he had walked to try and put himself out, he had rolled around on the ground and some people came to his aid.’

To this day, the family have not received an explanation as to why the police never took a statement from him in the two weeks before he died.

‘MWS: using the payphone at the hospital I called the Edmonton police… asked them to come to the hospital, told them what Michael had told me. And it was vastly different to what I had been told at the house… I urged them to come and investigate what was going on…

I was told that the information would be passed on to the appropriate team. I made multiple calls … sometimes multiple times in a day, in the morning or in the evening or in other parts of the day.

At all stages I was expecting them to arrive at any moment and ask Michael themselves…

Until this day I don’t understand why that opportunity wasn’t taken and I’ve not [been] provided with any adequate answer as to why that might be.’

There are police reports [UCPI0000038691 and UCPI0000038692] that say a Detective Roger Williams did visit the hospital, but he did not speak to Michael. MSW says he never saw him.

Michael lost consciousness after a week in hospital, and he died on 13 February 1997.

‘MSS: I was working overseas at the time… by the time I travelled he’d been unconscious for a few days and he never regained consciousness… I went straight to the hospital and we stayed there until he died…

Human memory isn’t perfect, but what I remember, the images that are in my mind, is coming home and… we looked on the news. It was the day that the Stephen Lawrence inquest was reported on and I remember the police coming and on that day, the next day, one of them turning to the television and then turning to me and saying, “Oh don’t worry this isn’t another Stephen Lawrence”…

I remember the first time I heard it and just looking at them and thinking we haven’t even said anything, we have been saying why on earth did you not go to the hospital to speak to Mike himself when he was lucid? And why did you not go to the hospital and speak to the staff when he was alive?’

MSS explained that when she saw the coverage of the Lawrence inquest she almost felt guilty because it meant they’d get the kind of proper police response that had been denied to the Lawrences:

‘“Guilty” isn’t quite the right word, but of course now they’re going to investigate, they’re going to redouble their efforts, they’re really going to prove the narrative wrong…

There were racial motivation for them not investigating Stephen Lawrence’s murder. I just thought there’s no human way that they won’t think, okay, “let’s show everyone wrong, let’s prove them wrong”. And I felt guilty that we were sort of benefiting from the timing. Only to find that actually it was absolutely not the case.’

The police were defensive and evasive. They suggested that the family just couldn’t accept that Michael had done this to himself, insisting there was nothing to suggest that anybody else was involved and they were running their investigation on that basis.

MWS met with DCI Scott about five times:

‘He didn’t enjoy being asked questions about how they were investigating and examining Michael’s death, what they were doing, what resources were being deployed, what information that had been received…

The meetings became extremely defensive on their part… they didn’t accept that we would dare to question them and question their authority and their assessment of what had happened.’

THE FAMILY TAKE THE INITIATIVE

We were shown a document [UCPI0000038692] that records how DCI Scott told the family that if they made a complaint it would result in the police ceasing to pursue the investigation. Officers would ‘lack motivation’ if they were criticised by the family.

‘MSS: I remember a sense of real disbelief that we were being told this, but also a real anxiety; what if this was the case, what if unintentionally we hampered things…

But in the end we decided this is insanity… And we couldn’t run the risk of just waiting, just being fobbed off by them and holding off from complaining. It was a risk that we had to take, because nothing was being done.’

They engaged a solicitor, Mike Schwarz at Bindmans, to try to make the police do their jobs and investigate Michael’s death. DCI Scott was furious. A report was sent to Assistant Commissioner Dunn describing the family of Michael Menson as ‘openly hostile’.

‘MSS: It’s shocking, but also, it’s really deeply hurtful. Rather than recognising that we were people who were asking legitimate questions in a legitimate manner, as time was running away… they chose to characterise us as hostile.

Not at any point did they do what any thoughtful sensible person will have asked, which was ask why, why is this family upset?…

It felt like they were manipulating our vulnerability and trying to make us feel afraid to speak up and to ask, to talk about it.’

The hearing took its lunch break, during which Tom Fowler discussed the evidence with Zoe Young from Campaign Opposing Police Surveillance:

MSS and MWS also gave evidence about how the police sought to undermine their family.

‘MSS: I think they intentionally tried to, you know, divide and rule, pick us off, pick me off… perhaps because I was… a public servant, maybe they thought well, this person will get it, maybe I was just gullible… the way they pulled me aside, like you’re reasonable… was incredibly manipulative.

It was only when I spoke to some of my other siblings I thought, this is absolute manipulation and we need to stand up against this…

I feel disgusted. I do absolutely admit I do feel ashamed, because it wasn’t as if instantly I thought no, this is nonsense. I did weigh it up, I contemplated, could there be any truth in this? Could we be unintentionally impeding things?…

They must just have looked at me and thought, you know, she’s a soft touch. “She’s a soft touch, we’ll pull her over on our side and we’ll get her to promulgate our narrative”. And that does not feel good.’

MEDIA APPEALS

The Menson family asked the police to appeal for witnesses, but they were told it would only hinder the investigation.

‘MSS: It became clear to us that they were more intent in getting information from us – what were we thinking, what were our concerns, what was our fears – rather than actually giving us information.

They should’ve been supporting us and updating us, but they were just trying to mine us for, sort of our position. And we saw nothing happening…

They said, “oh no, we’ll get so much, we’ll be inundated with information, it will put us off, it will squander resources, it will take us off track”

We thought, this is nonsense, they’re not doing anything, we have to take matters into our own hands.’

The family began to reach out to the media, and made their own appeal.

‘MWS: The reports in the media didn’t reflect at all what we knew. The actions of the police didn’t reflect an investigation, and so we came to the view that we would need to raise awareness, to gain information and collect any remaining available information that was out there.

And that was the sole purpose of the campaign, was to draw attention to the events of that night and to make sure that anybody who could assist us would assist us if they saw a media report or had been given a leaflet or had seen a radio interview.’

MWS says there was never any kind of political objective to the campaign. It was only ever about finding out what happened to Michael.

When the family contacted the media they discovered the police had got there before them. We were shown part of the Police Complaints Authority (PCA) report into the investigation into Michael’s death [UCPI0000038745].

The PCA concluded:

‘Deliberate steers were given to members of the media that Michael Menson had probably inflicted the injuries on himself…

Scott’s behaviour in his dealings with the family over media issues was, at best, disingenuous and, at worst, duplicitous, deceitful and untruthful…

His strategy to play the media low key for much of the first 12 months and principally to concentrate on local circulation was a serious flaw.’

MSS explained how at all times, and particularly throughout the inquest into Michael’s death, the police overtly lied to the family and kept them away from the press.

During the PCA process, Detective Chief Inspector Scott himself was interviewed about this by Cambridgeshire police for ten hours over four days, throughout which he refused to make any comment.

MSS has no doubt that DCI Scott misled and manipulated both the press and her family. She cannot understand why, as it must have been harder to do this than his actual job!

GATHERING ALLIES

The Menson family campaign was supported by Suresh Grover and The Monitoring Group, who had experience supporting families in a similar position.

‘MWS: I met with him. I examined the work that he’s been doing with other families and determined that it wasn’t political… there was caution applied to everybody we met to make sure that we weren’t derailed, either by design or by accident…

The request for information and Michael’s name was always at the forefront, because everything else was secondary…

There’s nobody else to wrest control from us, we took measures to make sure that we were the campaign. He [Suresh] introduced us to other families, which also enabled us to put into context what was happening to us… to see that we are not alone…

I attended many meetings, and I spoke at a number of meetings… Spoke with other families and saw the similarities with the problems they had, and drew energy from that to continue.’

At this point in the hearing, Poulson posed a series of those questions the Inquiry loves to ask about whether there was any disorder, confrontation or illegality involved.

This line of questioning felt particularly inappropriate in the light of the very measured evidence we had heard from the Menson family, of their genuine faith that the police would do their jobs properly and their absolute disbelief at what happened to them.

We were shown SDS reports that mischaracterised a number of justice campaigns as ‘disruptive’ [MPS-0001643], and ‘angry and confrontational’ [MPS-0001717]. The SDS described a demonstration in support of the family of Roger Sylvester who had been unlawfully killed by police in 1999:

‘The potential troublemakers were not members of any group but people from the local community and they proved impossible to control.

An example of this was when an unmarked police car was discovered, parked, with three officers inside it. It was immediately attacked by the crowd and the driver of the vehicle bid [sic] a hasty retreat. This incident highlighted the fact that the crowd were ready to attack the police, given an opportunity.’

MWS is asked what he thinks of this last report:

‘I didn’t see any attacks… I think it’s a fiction.’

In August 1997, the police submitted reports to the Met’s solicitors and the coroner which included shocking and disturbing claims about the family:

‘It has been clear from the outset of this enquiry that the Menson family will never accept any explanation other than murder.

Whether this is done to alleviate any senses of guilt for any perceived lack of family support while he was alive or is merely for future financial gain is unknown.

Without doubt though the family have attacked the police handling of the enquiry from the outset and in addition have attempted to initiate media criticism through their associates in the music and press world.’

THE INQUEST

Finally, in September 1998, there was an inquest into Michael Menson’s death. All the questioning was based on the idea that Michael had inflicted his injuries on himself. However, the jury reached a verdict of unlawful killing.

The police were incensed that they had been exposed and found wanting, and that their attempts to shape the outcome had failed.

DCI Scott refused to change his mindset. Despite all the evidence to the contrary, he said he still believed that Michael Menson had killed himself.

We were shown a Channel 4 News interview on the day of the verdict with Mike Bennett of the Police Federation [UCPI0000038704].

Bennett had not been at the inquest to hear the evidence. He criticised the coroner’s verdict, alleged the family ‘crowded out the inquest’ and ‘intimidated’ the coroner, and claimed that ‘it stinks’.

The family’s solicitor Mike Schwarz is also interviewed. He corrected Bennett, pointing out he had been proven wrong and didn’t even attend the inquest. Bennett then criticised Schwarz and insulted the family.

After the inquest, the Metropolitan Police issued a statement admitting serious mistakes had been made during the first 12 hours of the investigation.

‘MSS: This phrase “the first 12 hours”… you do nothing at all for the first 16 days and you keep harking back to the fact that there was some failings in the first 12 hours.

It’s all minimising just how inadequate the investigation was… Let’s deny how wilfully we have chosen to protect ourselves rather than to investigate this crime…

This isn’t accidental… all those choices were kind of uphill choices, they weren’t easy, they actively chose to take a certain line and then stick to it. Despite repeated evidence and outcomes, such as the inquest, outcomes to the contrary…

Language really matters. I’ve talked about ‘hostile’, I’ve talked about ‘obstructive’, but there was all sorts of language like ‘flaws, failings, inept, inadequate’, those imply sort of accidental, incompetent sort of normal human failings of a public servant.

That’s not what was seen here, there’s more than enough evidence to show that these were intentional wilful lies that were told, and for which people have not been held and brought to account.’

On 25 September 1998, Bindmans solicitors submitted a complaint to the Police Complaints Authority. The Chief Constable of Cambridgeshire, Dennis ‘Ben’ Gunn, was appointed to investigate the family’s criticisms of the police’s investigation into Michael’s death.

The result of that investigation was the damning PCA report from which we have been shown extracts throughout the hearing.

On 3 November 1998, the family was invited to meet the then Home Secretary, Jack Straw:

‘MSS: We told him… how we’d been treated, how they tried to vilify us and imply that we were either mad or just or sad or guilty, that… we were trying to hide our own guilt or whatever…

He did look visibly shocked, he did look like [he had] a sense of oh my God, I can’t believe this is happening… what I remember was kind of the visceral sense that came from his voice, which was of shock.’

The following day it was decided that Michael’s case would be taken over by John Grieve and the Met’s newly-formed Racial and Violent Crime Task Force. Grieve met with the family, and told them his unit was going to take it from there.

He also told them that, first of all, they knew this was a murder, and secondly, they knew who did it.

‘MSS: When Area Major Incident Pool took over from the local team in Edmonton, they sort of said, “it’s okay, this is what we do, we’re the professionals, step back because we’ll do it all”.

So there was a bit of a sense of oh gosh not again, but also hope, real hope… I also had a sense that, you know, there was a possibility that this may be a bit of a trophy case, you know?

But to be honest… I was willing to live with that if they kind of said, “oh look we are, sort of knights in shining armour, we’ve solved it”. I was willing to live with it if it get to the truth.’

SPYING ON THE MENSON FAMILY

It is notable that when the Undercover Policing Inquiry heard evidence from Doreen Lawrence about the SDS spying on her family, John Grieve’s name also came up.

There is a briefing note about the Macpherson inquiry into Stephen Lawrence’s death [MPS-0720946] in which Operation Commander Colin Black comments:

‘SDS is, as usual, well positioned at the focal crisis points of policing in London…

I have established a correspondence route to Deputy Assistant Commissioner Grieve via Detective Sergeant McDowell, formerly of SO12 [Special Branch], and opened an SP file for copy correspondence with CO24 [Grieve’s Racial and Violent Crime Task Force].’

From November 1998 to March 1999, Grieve also ran the second investigation into the death of Ricky Reel. This was another racist murder that the police were denying. Grieve’s investigation in that case was a whitewashing exercise that confirmed the original inadequate conclusions.

It is therefore significant that Grieve led the final investigation into Michael Menson’s murder, given that the Lawrence, Reel and Menson families were all targeted by the SDS.

Two arrests were finally made in March 1999. A third person fled to North Cyprus and was later arrested there. The court found that it had been a racially motivated attack. All three were convicted and sentenced to 10 to 14 years in prison. The family sat through the trials.

MSS explains to the hearing that her brother, MWS, stood firm because he had heard Michael say he’d been attacked. It was so much harder for her and she came close to giving up. She became very emotional describing this, and the Inquiry hearing took an unscheduled break.

MSW, Michael’s brother, first became aware that his family had been subjected to covert surveillance when it was mentioned during the trial of Michael’s murderers at the Old Bailey, in December 1999.

We were shown a Special Branch note on left wing activity in relation to the Stephen Lawrence inquiry. It mentions Michael Menson’s case, along with a handwritten note stating that John Grieve would be briefed on SDS intelligence [MPS-0748390]. This report is from some time in late 1998. It appears Grieve was being briefed by Special Branch about the family while he was investigating Michael’s case.

‘Q: How does it make you feel, at the point where you thought you were finally being taken seriously by the police, that it was seemingly the case that they were at the same time spying, or at the very least had knowledge of spying, by undercover officers on your family?

MSS: That sense of disbelief… to sweep in and say, you know, “We know it was murder, we know it was who it was”, but to conceal.

This wasn’t accidental omission, this was, you know, I’ve used the word “manipulation” so many times, but I can’t understand how this is anything other than intentional….

What if the trial hadn’t led to convictions? What if this stuff had got in the way of finding justice? … they risked so much… I cannot understand how people of this seniority think that’s okay.’

We were then shown further extracts from the PCA report, about the police’s attitude to the Menson family in March 1997.

The briefing note about Michael’s death that was prepared for Assistant Commissioner Dunn said of the family:

‘Their current attitude is now one of open hostility.’

On the same day this note was submitted, a message was entered onto HOLMES (the police internal database), which noted that Detective Superintendent Duffy had suggested that Special Branch background checks should be completed on all the Menson family prior to further interviews with them.

The PCA report notes:

‘An inference which could be drawn from that proposed line of enquiry is that the family of a murder victim were having security checks carried out on them with Special Branch to see if they had any involvement in extremist politics.

It is unclear precisely why such checks were made, but the description of the family as “hostile” may have inferred that such behaviour had some political motivation.’

Michael’s siblings are asked why they think the police put their family under surveillance.

‘MWS: This was a scheme to collect anything that can diminish us as a campaign and a family and find any information that they can use to discredit us, and use to shut down the family campaign by whatever means that they could find. That’s the conclusion I draw from that.

MSS: This has nothing to do with the case at hand, it was a diversion. We aren’t, we never have been, you know – what if we had been a family with a history as such? It still would’ve been completely irrelevant.

And what their duty was, was to investigate the crime or whatever they thought had happened, to find that out. And instead they were focusing energy and time and resources on this.’

INSTITUTIONAL RACISM

MWS explained to the Inquiry the function of the police using the word ‘hostile’ to describe the family. It dehumanised them and, by characterising them as difficult to work with, made it possible for successive police officers to dismiss them.

The PCA report notes:

‘The evidence indicates that the culture which served as the “sense-making and control mechanism” for the police officers dealing with the Menson case was one which sadly displayed the characteristics of institutional racism…

The shared belief system was evident in documents such as the draft report to the Home Office after the inquest and the failure of senior officers to challenge the views expressed.

There was an absence of the control mechanism that should have acted to check and challenge the mindset and/or behaviour of individual officers.

The organisational culture meant that essential critical questions were never asked, misrepresentations were perpetuated and initial failures were compounded rather than corrected.

In this case, it is judged that the initial racist stereotyping led inexorably to institutional discrimination.’

The police had put all their energy into smearing the family. The fact that they were a Black family played a significant role in the police response.

As awareness increased of the issues emerging from the Lawrence inquiry, instead of trying to correct the wrongs, the response became to try to discredit the Menson family in order to protect the Metropolitan Police from criticism.

The PCA report records not only institutional but also overt acts of racism. One officer is quoted as saying:

‘Why are you all making all this fuss? He’s only a fucking black schizophrenic.’

COLLATERAL INTRUSION

Neither MSS nor MWS recall knowing the spycops who reported on them (HN81 ‘Dave Hagan’ and HN43 Peter Francis). Like other grieving families, they have been told that the spying on them was ‘collateral intrusion’. MWS defined this in his witness statement as:

‘The routine gathering of private, often deeply personal information about individuals who are not suspected to have any wrongdoing.

This indiscriminate approach meant that campaigners, their families and even bystanders could find themselves under unwarranted scrutiny with little regard for their right to privacy.’

MSS says she was utterly shocked by the spycops revelations, and by this flimsy rationale for why they were spied on when they were most vulnerable.

‘It felt like a gut punch… no rationale was given to spying on us at a time when we were clearly at our most vulnerable….

It wasn’t collateral because it was targeted and intentional, there was nothing collateral about what I’ve seen.

But, secondly, that isn’t okay… if people are going to undertake undercover surveillance, there has to be a robust system to justify that it’s warranted and that it’s relevant, that it’s necessary, and that there aren’t any other routes. And none of those existed for us…

To exploit our vulnerability and to fish for anything you can use against us, it’s inhumane.’

EMPTY APOLOGIES

We were shown a letter of apology to MSS, signed by Deputy Assistant Commissioner Jon Savell, sent on 31 October 2025. It is placed alongside a letter sent to Sukhdev Reel and they are exactly the same.

MSS is furious:

‘What a copy and paste job to send to us! And 31 October, why send an apology now, in the middle of the Inquiry?

Where in the apology does it say what they are apologising for? Where in the apology does it actually give any sense of the scale of this, the who, when, why?

We know that documents were destroyed. There’s a vast amount that we know we don’t know that isn’t referred to there.

So this is a real sort of “I’m sorry you feel that way” apology, which is worse than apology, it makes absolutely no sense.’

MWS and MSS were asked about the long-term impacts of the spying on their family.

MSS explained that covert surveillance affects who you are to the core, and how you engage with the world. She felt real fear around her work, knowing the police were so intent to discredit them:

‘Would other people suffer because the Metropolitan Police Service was so intent in trying to find things to use against us?’

It took personal therapy for an extended period of time to come to terms with what was done, and to believe that people are good.

‘MSS: The costs to us individually and as a family has been huge. I’m not going to go into the detail of that because other family members haven’t been able to withstand this.

But it’s important to know that while partners, families, children, the time that we’ve spent in all of this, the impact of having to go back on this again, that impacts us, it changes, it affects who you are as a person, how you engage with people that you care for or love or are with. And that isn’t okay. That is absolutely not okay.

So yeah, to find ourselves in another inquiry, it’s hard, it’s really very, very difficult’

She also criticised the decision to allow SDS officer HN81 Dave Hagan to get out of appearing at the inquiry:

‘Why are you letting people not give evidence, people who should be called to account, not to give evidence?…

As I understand it, the reasoning is post-traumatic stress disorder. Did they not imagine we have post-traumatic stress from this whole experience that’s gone on for nearly 29 years?…

We are grateful for the invitation to appear at this Inquiry, but it was not an easy decision to make. At all…

We are here because we felt we had a really strong moral imperative to do so, to be willing to go through all of this again.’

They spoke about their expectations for the Inquiry:

MWS explained:

‘We need to know why, we need to know where, we need to know when, who authorised it, the chain of command that reviewed it, what level within the police, and who knew, who agreed it, who was happy to read those reports and who didn’t question.’

MSS said that she hopes the Inquiry is able to get to the truth to help the family come to a place of understanding:

‘One of the biggest pains that people can have is not understanding, not understanding why we as normal, quiet, publicly-minded lawful people were treated in this way…

It’s really important that this Inquiry isn’t another empty exercise. That even though records have been destroyed, even though people are allowed to say, “I’ve got post-traumatic stress, I’m not going to give evidence”, that’s not allowed to end there.

There has to be a way of ensuring that public-serving organisations learn. Nobody’s perfect, but there’s a difference between being imperfect and wilfully being harmful…

Let’s leave, all of us leave this, knowing that we’ve made a difference.’

The Inquiry’s Chair, Sir John Mitting, thanked them at the end. He said their evidence had made clear to him things which, as dramatic as they are on paper, have now been fully brought to life. He says he leaves with the hope that common humanity will eventually prevail.

At the end of the hearing, Tom Fowler discussed what had been said with Eveline Lubbers of the Undercover Research Group:

Tranche 3 Phase 1, Day 14
17 November 2025

INTRODUCTION

On the afternoon of Monday 17 November 2025, the Undercover Policing Inquiry heard evidence from Frank Smith.

Smith is a lifelong trade unionist and antifascist. His union activity got him blacklisted by an illegal employment organisation which Special Branch officers illegally supplied with personal details of trade unionists and other activists.

Smith has been given a high level of anonymity at the Inquiry. The public were excluded from the hearing, and he gave evidence with his face unseen and his voice modulated. The evidence was not given a video or audio broadcast, and no recording will be published. The only public record is a transcript published via the Inquiry’s page for the day.

The Undercover Policing Inquiry (UCPI) is an independent, judge-led inquiry into undercover policing in England and Wales. Its main focus is the activity of two units who deployed long-term undercover officers into a variety of political groups: the Special Demonstration Squad (SDS, 1968-2008) and the National Public Order Intelligence Unit (NPOIU, 1999-2011). Spycops from these units lived as activists for years at a time, spying on more than 1,000 groups.

Smith’s questioning is part of the Inquiry’s Tranche 3, examining the final 15 years of the Special Demonstration Squad, 1993-2008.

Smith has given the Inquiry a relatively short written witness statement [UCPI0000038182].

He was questioned for the Inquiry by Aphra Bruce-Jones.

BACKGROUND

Smith joined the Labour Party Young Socialists at the age of 15. In the late 1980s, dissatisfied with the Labour Party’s rightward drift, he quit and joined Militant Labour (now called the Socialist Party).

When he was 16, Smith had joined the construction workers’ union UCATT (now part of Unite). He said that unionisation was essential at the time just to secure the basic facilities workers should expect, such as a canteen, toilets, and an organised bonus system.

Smith went on to have several formal roles in the union as a shop steward, safety officer, and branch secretary.

Safety was poor in the construction industry at the time. Three workers a week were killed in London alone, and employers’ liability was merely a civil offence.

A UCATT campaign succeeded in getting the law changed so that bosses of negligent companies became criminally responsible for deaths and injuries on site.

The campaign had involved working with MPs, getting articles in the press, and picketing sites known to have unsafe practices. Smith says that sometimes pickets were physically attacked by subcontractors.

Spycop HN43 Peter Francis ‘Peter Black’ / ‘Peter Daley’ / ‘Peter Johnson’, who infiltrated left wing groups in the mid 1990s, says in his witness statement [UCPI0000036012]:

‘Frank Smith was often upsetting the building trade on behalf of his union. He certainly was not a passive worker. I understood that intelligence I reported about Frank Smith agitating within the construction unions would go onto his Special Branch file.’

Smith derides such ‘Special Branch language’, and translates it. Francis is actually describing reasonable, lawful work to get decent standards of health and safety for workers, yet talking as if it’s all a subversive threat to the state.

THE AWAY TEAM

From around the late 1990s, Smith was active in No Platform, a group opposed to allowing fascists to spread their message. He explains that, at the time, anti-racist activities were being attacked by the British National Party and neo-Nazi group Combat 18, and there was a need for self-defence.

A secret report by spycop HN104 Carlo Soracchi ‘Carlo Neri’ [MPS-0031153] describes No Platform in some detail:

‘No Platform was formed in March/April 2000 in London by a group of disenchanted Anti-Fascist Action members and the Socialist Party ‘away team’, a militant stewarding group…

Initially the group was formed in London by Dan Gillman and Frank Smith of the Socialist Party “away team”.’

Soracchi said that the group was intended to bring people together from a range of political affiliations. It was prompted by a concern that the far-right’s move away from street presence to electoral politics was only temporary, and so the capacity for effective direct confrontation needed to be maintained.

Smith says that No Platform wasn’t a formal group, there was no membership structure, it was more of a common cause with different people coming to different events.

Similarly, he says that the term ‘away team’ was a loose term, humorously used, for stewards who ensure that anti-fascist and left wing marches and events passed off safely. It wasn’t a set group, the people in the role varied from one event to another. It was largely people from a trade union background, mixed gender but mostly men.

Bruce-Jones showed a clip from a World in Action documentary, ‘Violence With Violence’, broadcast on 15 November 1993. It describes the ‘away team’ as a clandestine violent organisation of 25 people within Youth Against Racism in Europe. Smith dismisses the claim outright.

The documentary then shows the British National Party (BNP) presence in Brick Lane, a multicultural area of East London with a large Bangladeshi community, on 19 September 1993. The BNP was faced by a counter-demonstration on the far side of the road.

Smith explains that it was a few days after the BNP had achieved a shock council election victory in East London. This had come after an increase in racist violence on the streets.

Antifascists made a concerted effort to oppose the planned BNP presence in the area. Smith was there on the day, stewarding the antifascist counter-protest, ready to defend it from fascist attack.

Bruce-Jones then showed a further part of the documentary where people from the counter-protest crossed the road and confronted the fascists. This is alleged to be the work of the away team.

Smith says that on that day the away team stewards were all white men, and the footage shows a lot of women and Asian people going to the fascists. He gets the Inquiry to take the video slowly, and points out that in the bit where a fascist is being kicked, the people responsible are two Bangladeshi women.

Smith explains that the stewards had received a report of a load of Combat 18 activists up the road, so they’d gone to see and found it was true. The stewards were attacked with bottles and bricks but, being burly construction workers, they weren’t cowed and managed to see the fascists off.

As they returned to the main protest, the police saw these big white men with short hair and ushered them to the fascists’ side of the road. Approaching the fascists, Smith gave warning:

‘I shouted to them, “Oi, come on then”, to let them know who we were, and to make them run. Which most of them did. And those who didn’t run were battered by the local community, as you see in the footage.’

Smith says that three people were arrested on the day. Two were discharged and one was given a bind over. The police and courts clearly didn’t think it was serious.

This same footage was shown when Dan Gillman and Lois Austin were at the Inquiry. If a minute of people chasing fascists down the road is the worst thing they can find, then even if this had been some wholly premeditated master plan it still wouldn’t warrant long-term undercover spying.

The Inquiry treated the documentary as if it were credible, even impartial. Yet its tales of the away team as a secret unit hidden within a respectable group, yearning for street violence, is at odds with all the evidence, including the footage itself. The only thing it tallies with is the spycops’ descriptions – which suggests that Special Branch was the journalists’ source.

Smith is asked whether he was a member of Anti-Fascist Action. He, once again, tries to get the Inquiry to see beyond its model of activism being formed of regimented organisations with formal membership. He explains that much of it was loose affiliations based on previous experience at similar events.

SELF-DEFENCE

He says that his stewarding role included self-defence if the group was attacked, describing it as the stewards’ duty to those present. The majority of events passed off without incident, precisely because they had been well stewarded.

The self-defence wasn’t just against overtly fascist groups. At the huge October 1993 protest against the BNP in Welling, South London, they were attacked by police.

Smith describes the events in his written witness statement:

‘At the Welling demonstration a section of the road was blocked by riot police, who then began attacking activists. As chief steward, my role was to direct those at the front of the march to link arms in order to protect others and discourage the police from charging through the crowd.

Our actions were always focused on keeping people safe, we never initiated violence or disorder.’

The tactic worked. The police withdrew, and the protesters negotiated for the march to leave the area. Smith says this reactive, defensive approach was what kept people safe. Despite the spycops’ depiction of the stewards as ruthless terrifying street fighters, there were no pitched battles with fascists. The only times he got hurt, it was by riot police.

THE SPYCOPS

Smith was asked about the Special Demonstration Squad officers who had reported on him.

He doesn’t remember seeing HN43 Peter Francis during the undercover deployment in the 1990s.

Regarding HN15 Mark Jenner ‘Mark Cassidy’, who was deployed 1995-2000, Smith describes him as being on the fringes of antifascist activity. Smith remembers meeting him through construction workers, as Jenner’s cover story was that he was a carpenter.

‘I actually offered to get him a job! He didn’t want it. I now know why. He wasn’t a real carpenter.’

Smith knew HN104 Carlo Soracchi best, as Soracchi had befriended some of his close friends, though Smith wasn’t actually close with him.

Soracchi’s cover story was that he was a locksmith. He told many of the activists he spied on, including Smith, that their locks were inadequate and that he’d fit them free upgrades. The activists accepted, meaning that Soracchi then had keys to all their homes.

It wasn’t Soracchi’s only unethical intrusion into Smith’s life:

‘I had been arrested by the police. I was suing them for a wrongful arrest. So Carlo was always interested in how my case was going. You know, so obviously I would tell him. He was always saying, “You should settle, you know, don’t let it drag on”.’

This is by no means an isolated incident. We have seen a number of instances of SDS officers reporting on or interfering in civil lawsuits, involving either the police or private companies.

It’s also worth pointing out that, despite all the spycop reports alleging Smith to be a violent street-fighting thug who was well known to police, that wrongful arrest is the only time he has ever been arrested.

Bruce-Jones showed an SDS report on the Militant Labour national conference 1994 [MPS-0745874], attributed to Peter Francis. It lists Smith among the attendees and describes a resolution being put to the conference for the formal creation of the away team. Smith says it didn’t happen. He is certain he would remember it if it had.

This tallies with what Lois Austin said when asked about this report. It appears to be a spycop fiction invented to make the spied-upon group seem more dangerous, in order to impress the SDS’s managers.

Another report by Francis, dated 18 November 1994 [UCPI0000034521], describes 25 antifascists gathering to oppose the racist National Front laying a wreath at the Cenotaph during the Remembrance Day march in London. Francis describes ‘a skirmish’ when the fascists were ‘set upon’. He said several National Front members and two of the away team were arrested, and Frank Smith broke his ankle.

Smith says it’s more exaggeration and lies. He was there, but none of the stewards were arrested. His ankle injury hadn’t happened yet, it was a workplace accident that occurred on a later date.

In July 1995, a Special Demonstration Squad report was made [MPS-0245257] with a lot of personal details about Smith. It once again portrayed him as a keen and rugged street fighter:

‘It is guaranteed that Frank Smith will be in the forefront of any violence or disorder in which the away team is involved.

Smith lives at the above address with his current girlfriend and fellow Militant Labour activist, Lisa Teuscher.’

Smith is affronted at the inclusion of many personal details that have no policing value. He’s even more annoyed at the talk of the away team as if it’s some kind of established violent street gang.

A year later, on 1 May 1996, an updated personal profile was made [MPS-0246230]:

‘Frank Smith has been reappointed as the chief steward in charge of security at all Militant Labour youth events for the coming year.’

Smith says there was no such official position. He was chief steward at some events, but not at others.

The report continued:

‘He’s an active member of his local Militant Labour branch in Camden and he agitates within the construction unions on behalf of the party on matters related to the building trade, especially health and safety issues.’

Beyond the false image of regimentation, Smith also takes issue with the terminology; ‘agitate’ implies making trouble for its own sake, rather than being someone who, as the report itself says, is trying to ensure that the workplace is safe.

JENNER’S CARICATURE

Bruce-Jones then went through a series of five reports about Smith made by Mark Jenner, all of which portray Smith as a volatile and violent person.

The first of these reports was submitted on 8 June 1998 [MPS-0001123]. It says that an individual involved in Anti-Fascist Action (AFA) has been approached by other members, including Smith, who want to break away and form a rival organisation.

Smith says it’s complete rubbish. He was never even in AFA. It also appears to be yet another example of spycops inventing stories of division and power struggles between groups which, in real life, are actually working towards the same ends.

A few months later, on 5 November 1998, Jenner filed another report [MPS-0001506] about someone from AFA approaching Smith and members of Workers Power.

‘Thus far little is known of this alliance other than its informality and its willingness to get involved in small one-off hits. They are not capable of mounting a serious split from AFA and are content with brawling around events that would normally attract the ANL [Anti-Nazi League].’

Smith entirely dismisses this report too, saying ‘it’s nonsense’. In phrasing such as ‘content with brawling’ we see yet more of that spycop use of language; a supercilious tone with implications of the subjects being people who just want some recreational violence.

The third report was dated 2 February 1999 [MPS-0001736]. In it, Jenner describes a split in London AFA. He says a couple of members are:

‘forming a closer working relationship with the recently revamped Socialist Party away team led by Frank Smith… [and are] trying to lure other south London Anti-Fascist Action members over to their side with promises of good information and direct action…

Together with Frank Smith’s team, they are capable of being an irritant at demonstrations.’

Smith is blunt: ‘this document is a lie’.

He goes through it point by point, saying that he was not an ‘irritant at demonstrations’, and was not known to incite or engage in violence at any time while stewarding.

The spycops’ characterisation of the steward’s role is completely wrong. This is evidenced by the fact that the majority of events went off entirely peaceably, and there are no spycop reports specifying any instances of the kind of violence that the dreaded away team are supposedly so keen to engage in.

The fourth report is from six weeks later, 17 March 1999 [MPS-0001900]. Jenner cooks up a spicy story:

‘The Socialist Party’s anti-fascist group, known as the ‘away team’, are re-emerging on the anti-fascist scene following years of inactivity following the Welling riot.

This group numbers only about a dozen people, with one of the leading members being Frank Smith. In the last 12 months, the away team are believed to be responsible for attacks on members of extreme right-wing groups in Walthamstow, London Bridge, after the Bloody Sunday demo, and in Bromley following a council by-election.

They will continue to concentrate on picking off individual right wingers, particularly politically active British National Party members.’

Once again, Smith denies that anything described ever happened. Bruce-Jones checks that he really means all of it:

Q: You say everything within this that names you is inaccurate?
A: Well, yes.
Q: Is there anything that could be accurate?
A: They got my name right.

Finally, Bruce-Jones brought out another Jenner report from the same week [MPS-0001983]. Jenner, himself also a member of UCATT in his undercover identity, accurately records Smith’s trade union activity and employment status.

He then goes on to say Smith has carried out a number of attacks on far-right activists in recent months:

‘Although short in stature, Smith is extremely violent and short tempered.’

As with getting his name right, Smith agrees that he is diminutive, but rejects the rest of the characterisation:

‘I don’t recognise that. Basically the whole tone of it is trying to make out I am someone I am not.’

Jenner’s report then gives Smith’s home address and phone number. This is something that makes him wonder:

‘During that time, when I was leading the joint site committee, I would regularly get phoned up with death threats. So maybe it was him.’

Asked why he thinks Jenner’s reports consistently describe him as such a volatile, criminal character, Smith replies:

‘He can’t write, like, “nothing happened, they are all, like, nice people, Frank’s very popular, nothing to report here”. He can’t write that because he would be out of a job. So he’s got to, like, make it sound like things happen.’

SEARCHLIGHT

Bruce-Jones asks about Searchlight, the antifascist magazine that reported on what far-right organisations were doing. Smith says he was on nodding terms with a couple of the people from it. He corrects Bruce-Jones for calling Searchlight a group. Once again, he has to explain that not everything with a name is a formal organisation with membership lists.

On 3 August 2000, Carlo Soracchi filed a report [MPS-0003753]:

‘Frank Smith, a member of the Socialist Party away team, currently receives information on extreme right wingers from Gerry Gable, the editor of Searchlight, and Smith has occasionally used this information in order to carry out serious assaults on right-wing activists.

A recent example of this was the unreported assault on two members of the British National Party whilst they were canvassing in the Slade Green council election.’

Smith rejects it all. He says he’s never even met Gerry Gable, did not receive information from him, and did not assault BNP canvassers. It’s notable that on this rare occasion when a spycop describes a specific instance of violence, it’s an ‘unreported assault’ so there’s no other documentation to verify that it ever happened.

Smith says that he and other antifascists were in Slade Green though, as they’d leaflet and canvas in areas where the BNP were likely to get a significant share of the vote.

Another Soracchi report, dated 21 March 2002 [MPS-0008373], gives a list of dates on which it says No Platform intend to hunt down BNP canvassers in Slade Green and Barking. It says that if information isn’t forthcoming from Searchlight then Smith would make direct contact.

Smith says it’s all fiction too, Soracchi inventing activity to justify his job.

Later that year, on 29 August 2002, Soracchi submitted a further report [MPS-0009985] saying Smith has become No Platform’s key point of contact with Searchlight. Smith dismisses this as ‘nonsense, absolute nonsense’.

With a proven record of safe, effective stewarding, Smith and his friends would sometimes train others, or be asked to steward events. Stop the War Coalition asked them to help out with the front of the massive London demonstration against the Iraq War on 15 February 2003.

Six weeks beforehand, Soracchi reported a version of the plan [MPS-0077368]. He said that Dan Gillman ‘and his cohort’ were asked to steward the front of the march:

‘Gillman advised his Socialist Party/No Platform cohort that it was very likely that a confrontation would take place between the stewards and any militant Muslim groups who attempt to hijack the front of the demonstration, as happened in the previous anti-war demo…

Gillman and Frank Smith will be the principal stewards on the day and Smith is already looking forward to having another confrontation with Muslim extremists, after he was butted in a dispute at the last anti-war demo.’

Smith says this is yet another embellishment, a spycop inventing conflict and division where none exists. He says there was no headbutt, nor any attempt to ‘hijack the front’ by anyone. He also objects to the characterisation of Muslim groups on the march as confrontational and violent. It was, he points out, a peace protest.

PERSONAL RELATIONSHIPS

Smith’s relationship with his partner Lisa Teuscher is repeatedly mentioned in spycop reports. It’s first mentioned on 21 June 1995 [MPS-0245210], in a report which has a range of personal details about her.

Nearly seven years later, on 29 January 2002, there’s a report titled ‘Frank Smith’s Domestic Breakup’ [MPS-0007725]. It’s notable that this is not on an SDS form but is on a form from the other main spycop unit, the National Public Order Intelligence Unit. It’s unclear whether this is actually the other unit also spying on Smith, or whether Soracchi was using their forms for some reason. Either way, it shows a significant degree of overlap between the units.

The report describes the separation in quite some detail, all of which Smith rejects as untrue. He is utterly disgusted, both at the intrusion and the falsehoods.

It claimed they’d been together for a year, and that he broke it off because he found her too bourgeois and unsupportive of his political activity. In case this isn’t patronising enough, the report concludes:

‘It is important, however, to point out that Smith finds middle-class women very attractive and will soon enough find another distraction that will divert him from his true revolutionary zeal.’

It didn’t end there. At the end of the year, on 2 December 2002, Soracchi reported [MPS-0077370]:

‘Frank Smith of No Platform and the Socialist Party is in love once again. He has fallen for an American female from San Francisco and is seriously contemplating relocating to the United States…

Frank is known to have a liking for American women and the country itself, (interesting considering he is a Trotskyist revolutionary supposedly).’

Soracchi details the couple’s time together and their future plans. Smith is affronted at the invasion of privacy involved. It contains nothing that could be considered of policing value, it’s purely gossip and personal information. Smith also takes issue with the use of ‘a liking for American women’, saying that this sneering allegation of superficiality is a slur.

Soracchi made a number of reports about this relationship. One of them, dated 20 July 2003 [MPS-0022072], contains personal details of several other activists. He says that one is being tested for prostate cancer and the man concerned has only told his partner and Soracchi.

It’s a stark illustration of how spycops inveigled themselves into the very core of people’s lives and then betrayed their trust. Even if the ‘friend’ being confided in was an undercover police officer, it should be reasonable to expect that very personal information like this would be kept private.

In the report, Soracchi also says Smith’s relationship is going well, despite her parents having a very different political disposition. The report says they want to be together but aren’t sure about the upheaval:

‘He has decided that he is far too old to contemplate relocating to the USA. Their long-term relationship and future fairytale happiness hinge on her decision.’

Smith is outraged. He never knew Soracchi well and is certain that they never discussed his relationships. The reference to his partner’s family stands out, and he wonders if they were being spied on too. And, again, he is disgusted not only by the content but also the tone of the reporting.

BLACKLISTING

Smith is one of thousands of people who were on the illegal construction industry blacklist run by a company called the Consulting Association.

Most major construction firms supplied the blacklist with information on undesirable workers; those who were elected as union representatives, raised concerns about safety on site, submitted complaints to an employment tribunal, or took part in a protest.

Household names like Balfour Beatty, Laing O’Rourke, Costain, Skanska, Kier, AMEC and AMEY were all actively involved.

When a company was taking on new workers, they checked to see if the Consulting Association had a file. If so, the person was refused work.

The Consulting Association was raided by the Information Commissioner’s Office in 2009. They seized files on 3,213 people. Details in the files included not only names, addresses and National Insurance numbers, but photos, phone numbers, car registrations, and information about the subject’s medical history and family members.

To give an idea of scale, a blacklisting name-check cost £2.20. The 2009 Consulting Association invoices for Sir Robert McAlpine alone, when the company was building the Olympic Stadium, totalled £28,000. This wasn’t a few managers chatting after work, it was industrial-scale, systematic blacklisting of union activists.

The blacklist also included people who had never worked in construction, but were noted for being seen on anti-racist or environmental protests. How did they end up on the blacklist?

In 2012 David Clancy, the Information Commissioners Office investigations manager, said:

‘There is information on the Consulting Association files that I believe could only be supplied by the police or the security services.’

The Independent Police Complaints Commission later confirmed that every constabulary’s Special Branch routinely passed information to the blacklist.

In 2018, the Met finally admitted that their Special Branch had done so, and that it was a crime that could have led to officers being prosecuted (although none have been). This wasn’t police officers upholding the law, this was police officers breaking the law to maximise corporate profit.

Frank Smith was one of the blacklisted construction workers. Having seen his file, he knows that there is information in it that can only have come from the spycops. There are distinctive phrases that appear in both spycops’ reports and the file, incidents are logged that are nothing to do with construction work, and there is a note saying he is ‘under “constant watch” (officially) and seen as politically dangerous’.

In his written witness statement to the Inquiry [UCPI0000036012], spycop Peter Francis says he thinks his reporting contributed to Smith’s blacklist file. Francis is a little bit sorry about that:

‘I did not report that Frank Smith was an agitator so that he would be blacklisted. I reported on information about Frank because in my view he fitted the bill for subversion and he posed a public order threat as he was violent at the time and an organiser.’

Francis became a whistleblower on the SDS in 2010, giving a huge amount of shocking information to the media. Without him, it is very unlikely that there would be an Undercover Policing Inquiry.

Smith has since met him:

‘We had a big meeting at the House of Commons for the Blacklist Support Group. Pete Francis approached me and said “I apologise for everything I did to you”, and my reply was: “You owe me no apology. What you have done settles the score, you know”.’

But back in the 1990s, Smith went from being sought after for the calibre of his work and earning excellent money, to being unable to get steady work, or even any work at all unless he used a fake name.

It went on and on, and the stress of it directly led to the demise of his relationship with Lisa Teuscher. It wasn’t just himself that he was unable to support. Without employment, he could no longer be a shop steward.

‘I lost my ability to represent and support others in the workplace. What started with those reports ended up costing me not just a job, but also my voice and place in the movement.’

Spycops supplying information to the construction blacklist is a major scandal worthy of its own public inquiry. As Smith shows, people who had done nothing wrong were victimised, and their lives were ruined.

However, the Undercover Policing Inquiry has barely touched this topic. If, as it seems on course to do, the Inquiry ignores the blacklisting scandal in its final report then it will have failed.

Tranche 2 Phase 2, Days 43 & 44
29 & 30 January 2025

INTRODUCTION

HN109 is a former undercover police officer and manager with the Special Demonstration Squad (SDS). He has been granted full anonymity in the Undercover Policing Inquiry, we only have the cipher with which to refer to him.

HN109 gave evidence to the Inquiry on 29 and 30 January 2025 about his role as an SDS manager, a position he held from 1987 to 1990.

Due to the extent of the restriction order covering his identity, his evidence was not broadcast or open to the public. Those who attended the hearings in person were only permitted to hear his voice. Later, transcripts of the hearings were released. In support of this evidence, he had provided a second witness statement which at the time of writing has yet to be released to the public.

He had previously given evidence about his undercover work in the 1970s in the Inquiry’s Tranche 1 (covering the SDS 1968-82). This was done entirely in secret. We have no idea what he said or what his undercover deployment involved.

The Undercover Policing Inquiry (UCPI) is an independent, judge-led inquiry into undercover policing in England and Wales. Its main focus is the activity of two units who deployed long-term undercover officers into a variety of political groups: the Special Demonstration Squad (SDS, 1968-2008) and the National Public Order Intelligence Unit (NPOIU, 1999-2011). Spycops from these units lived as activists for years at a time, spying on more than 1,000 groups.

This hearing was part of the Inquiry’s ‘Tranche 2 Phase 2’, which mainly concentrated on examining the animal rights-focused activities of the SDS from 1983-92. He was questioned by Daisy Monahan, Counsel to the Inquiry.

The Inquiry’s pages for 29 January and 30 January have links to transcripts and many of the documents referred to.

It was two days of questioning, and managers cover a huge range of activity, so this is a long report. You can use the links below to jump to specific sections:

Background
What HN109 did in his police career and SDS roles

Managing the SDS
Recruitment and care of undercovers; theft of dead children’s identities and other tradecraft; visits from senior officers; trusting the spycops

Reporting
Undercovers writing reports with no way to verify; managers’ editing responsibilities; lechery in the reporting; spying on politicians, political parties, trade unions, and police accountability groups; officers contradicting each other; SDS relations with McDonald’s

Safe house meetings
How the spycops compared notes; dominant personalities; sexual and sexist banter; fear of the Inquiry

Debenhams
Spycop Bob Lambert’s involvement in placing timed incendiary devices and visiting his comrades in prison

Arrests, legal professional privilege and violence
Spycops being arrested, breaching lawyer confidentiality, and undermining justice for the wrongfully arrested

Misconduct and sexual relationships
Spycops’ special opportunities for misconduct; the women deceived into relationships by Lambert, Dines and others; HN109’s rollercoaster ride of what he’ll admit, and other officers contradicting his denials

The Scutt affair and the Cabal
The peculiar story of the spycop who fell out with HN109 and disappeared; his discovery; conspiracy with MI5 to ensure the Home Office didn’t find out; the changes to the squad that followed

Background

HN109 became a Detective Inspector for the SDS, its second in command, on 19 October 1987. He served under Chief Inspector HN39 Eric Docker until November 1988 when Docker was replaced by HN51 Martin Gray. Docker had previously been the Detective Inspector for the unit and had just been promoted to the unit head.

HN109 remained at the SDS until 2 April 1990, when he was replaced in turn by HN86. Undercovers who were in the field when he started as a manager were:

• HN10 Robert Lambert ‘Bob Robinson’
• HN95 Stefan Scutt ‘Stefan Wesolowski’
• HN87 ‘John Lipscombe’
• HN5 John Dines ‘John Barker’

He was also present for the deployment of HN25 ‘Kevin Douglas’, HN90 ‘Mark Kerry’, and HN122 ‘Neil Richardson’. He was also there when HN56 ‘Alan Nicholson’ was recruited.

As a result, he was present for events such as the Scutt affair and Dines’ targeting of Helen Steel and their subsequent long-term intimate relationship.

CAREER

HN109 joined the Metropolitan Police in the 1960s and transferred to Special Branch after five years, serving as an SDS undercover in the 1970s. Afterwards he was on various Special Branch squads including C Squad, which gathered intelligence on left-wing groups and was, along with MI5, the main recipient of SDS reports.

Though the reports were sanitised he was able to recognise which ones came from the SDS due to his experience. However, he said that there was no gossip or rumour about the existence of the SDS while he was on C Squad. They received the intelligence, and that was that; they were never questioned.

Some time after his time on the SDS, he moved to the Metropolitan Police’s Public Order Branch (then called TO20, but which previously had been A8 department). This branch was a key recipient of intelligence and threat assessments from C Squad, and because of his time in that squad, he understood how the assessments were created and the extent to which they were reliable or speculative.

HN109 states that SDS intelligence was an important component of those assessments, albeit forming less than 50% of them, but there was no question that it helped form an accurate threat assessment.

The reason SDS intelligence was more valuable than other forms was ‘because it was almost at source, if not at sources’, so easier to assess its quality than, say, a leaflet discovered by a local police commander. HN109 believed SDS intelligence was more reliable than intelligence from other sources.

Managing the SDS

GETTING RECRUITED TO THE SDS AS A MANAGER

According to his recollection, his recruitment to the SDS manager position was done informally – he was approached out of the blue by a senior officer who asked him if he wanted the role, and that they knew he had previously been undercover.

Counsel to the Inquiry pointed out a briefing note [MPS-076287] where Chief Superintendent Raymond Parker, the head of S Squad (under which the SDS sat at that time), was of the opinion that HN109 was:

‘The one man who could properly play the poacher turned gamekeeper role.’

HN109 didn’t recall this comment at the time, but on reflection, he thought it meant that ‘maybe things weren’t right on the SDS’. However, he was definite that this was not an impression he had been given at the time.

Counsel to the Inquiry noted that HN109 was considered a disciplinarian and a stickler for the rules within Special Branch. The former officer did not recall the point ever being raised with him, but conceded that he had an appetite for supervision and sticking to the rules and regulations.

He says he was happy to have been selected, as it may have shown additional confidence in his abilities. However, he says he did not see the SDS as an elite squad. It was rather that someone had recognised he had ‘the awareness and the ability to maintain [the] security’ that surrounded the SDS.

In general, he does not like the word elite being applied to the SDS and stepped away from it when it was brought up at other times.

There was no formal training for his managerial role. He notes that:

‘there was also a degree of similarity from when I was an undercover officer.’

However, his boss Eric Docker was careful to share his knowledge, albeit on an informal basis, and in an ad hoc, piecemeal fashion. He and Docker shared an office at Vincent Square, overheard each other’s phone calls, and discussed matters as they arose. This office was known as ‘the front office’ of the SDS, as opposed to the ‘back office’ where the administration sergeants and undercovers in training spent their time.

He thinks Docker would have given him a rundown on the squad as it was then and the different roles each of the staff had.

Docker was also aware that HN109 had previously been undercover, and trusted him to be able to get on with the job because of this experience. As a result, there was an element of the operational side falling to HN109 while Docker took on the more managerial and administrative aspects.

On managing the unit, HN109 said he respected Docker, who had been in HN109’s new position previously.

Therefore he was more careful than usual in making changes to the conduct of the Detective Inspector role in case it was mistaken as a criticism of the senior officer.

However, he felt that Docker appreciated that HN109’s previous experience as an undercover would bring something to the SDS that had been lacking in management terms. The changes he made were introducing promotion classes and checks on cover accommodation, which were supported by Docker.

His primary responsibility was the day-to-day running of the SDS. This involved dealing with the undercovers themselves and the back office sergeants, while Docker dealt with other matters and liaised with senior officers back at New Scotland Yard.

If an undercover was having difficulty with their operation or needed advice, the idea was that they’d turn to HN109. However, there was no strict demarcation of his and Docker’s roles, and sometimes HN109 would also liaise with senior officers and MI5. For a period, he was also the acting head of the unit. As the senior manager, though, the buck stopped with Docker.

The SDS was less formal than other Special Branch squads in that managers would be spoken to in their real names; it had a more collective, chatty aspect compared to the more formal aspects in the rest of Special Branch.

NO PROBLEMS IN THE SDS

When HN109 joined the SDS, Docker did not raise any areas within the squad that concerned him or problems to be aware of.

HN109 says he was not told that HN10 Bob Lambert, who was still serving at this point, had fathered a child with a woman he spied on. However, he would have expected to have been told about this.

HN109 says he thought Docker was a good colleague, open with him, and wouldn’t have kept such ‘important and crucial information’ from him – HN109 would be disappointed if he had.

It has been acknowledged by Lambert that he had told Docker and HN109’s predecessors that he had fathered a child – known as TBS in the Inquiry – at the time. Lambert’s contemporary HN11 Mike Chitty ‘Mike Blake’ said Lambert bragged about having the child and it was common knowledge in the SDS.

HN109 thought knowing such information was important because it was ‘very relative’ to how an undercover was doing their duty. He also said that all undercovers would have been spoken to about avoiding relationships as it was a breach of regulations:

‘everyone was told that sexual relations while they were working on the SDS was something they should not engage in.’

However, HN109 claims Docker said nothing to him about undercovers engaging in sexual relationships.

RECRUITMENT OF UNDERCOVERS

HN109 agrees with a memo from Docker that Special Branch supervising officers were on the lookout for potential SDS undercovers. The operational secrecy of the SDS meant that a more open recruitment process was not possible, but this spotting of officers was true of Special Branch more generally as well. Often it was based on evaluation of the Annual Quality Review (AQR) reports.

Undercover HN122 ‘Neil Richardson’ and back office sergeant HN29 Dave Carson both reported it was HN109 who recruited them to the unit. HN109, however, does not remember this, and thinks they would have initially been proposed by others since he did not recall knowing them beforehand.

In his statement, HN109 problematised the recruitment process as it meant former undercovers were more likely to propose candidates who conformed to their own self-image:

‘In my view, this approach to recruitment discouraged diversity and potentially introduce issues of patronage and nepotism.’

He does not recall having access to personal files as part of the recruitment process, but they would be privy to more senior officers.

According to his statement, undercovers were recruited because they stood out among a dedicated and talented group of vetted individuals. In cross-examination, he says it was not because they were the best that Special Branch had to offer, but:

‘were good and sufficiently well considered to be recruited into a specialist organisation.’

He agrees that undercovers would have seen being selected for the SDS as a vote of confidence in their abilities, and that they were going into something special (though not ‘elite’).

HN109 said that when undercovers were recruited, managers already had the officer’s target groups for infiltration in mind, which would have been a factor in selection.

HOME VISITS TO UNDERCOVERS

Visits to the home of prospective undercovers were made before they were recruited. A section from a memo written by Docker [MPS-0726998] said the purpose of these home visits was to:

‘view the home surroundings and get a feel of the relationship.’

Asked about this, HN109 said that it was to ascertain if the officer was in a stable, loving relationship and if there was stability in the home generally; a joint mortgage was a good indicator of a settled relationship. HN109 doesn’t recall any specific home visits he did, though HN122 ‘Neil Richardson’ did recall that HN109 and another officer visited his home.

Docker also wrote that:

‘It is essential, in my opinion, that the wife or fiancée understands precisely what effect SDS work will have on her home life, and I need to be assured that the officer concerned has the full backing of his partner in his proposed specialist duties.’

HN109 agreed that Richardson’s recollection of the visit was putting this aspect into practice and that HN109 would have spelled out to him and his wife the strain that would have been put on their marriage.

HN109 agreed that he had appreciated that undercover deployments were difficult for the partners of undercover officers, and it was important to see how the potential undercover’s partner reacted to that information. He also agreed that a negative reaction from a partner would have dissuaded him from recruiting an officer.

HN109 didn’t recall ever seeing such a negative reaction, but accepted that partners might be on their best behaviour during these visits, so their reaction was not a genuine one.

Docker also wrote that these visits helped establish a liaison between himself and the undercover’s partner, which could be used to clear up ambiguities or difficulties.

HN109 doesn’t recall what support was offered to an undercover officer’s partner and does not recall giving them a number to call in case of issues. Nor does he recall there being any issues caused by a disgruntled partner.

He denied that the purpose of the visits was to stop them getting cross and causing problems for the SDS.

WELFARE OF UNDERCOVERS

HN109 says he did speak to undercovers about their welfare. For him, such stresses would have included the hours they were working, including weekends being disrupted; establishing themselves in their target organisations; and the work they were carrying out.

Living a lie was stressful. They could also not engage with broader police-related social activities. He would have had these discussions with the undercovers who were new to the unit, before any of them entered the field.

He would reassure officers that if there were difficulties, such as threats or risks, they would be looked at. Difficulties would also include stresses in their home life because of arguments about never being at home. HN109 does not recall any undercover coming to confide in him because of issues in their home life.

He encouraged SDS officers to think of themselves as a team, and to see it as a welfare issue where they looked after each other, ensuring that they were thriving, not struggling.

BACK OFFICE SERGEANTS

During HN109’s tenure, these were HN61 Chris Hyde and HN108 Chris Sutcliffe, later succeeded by HN59 John Houchin and HN29 David Carson. They reported to both HN109 and Docker. Their responsibilities included processing the undercovers’ reports and expenses, maintaining a diary of forthcoming events, and also some open-source research. Knowledge of events was a way of keeping track of where an undercover might be.

At that time, most of the undercovers were sergeants, so of the same rank as the back office. HN109 agrees this could have created a sense of parity between back office sergeants and the undercovers.

The back office sergeants did not have a supervisory responsibility for the undercovers, but it was part of their role to be alive to the undercover officer’s welfare. Due to the routine daily phone calls they had more contact with the undercovers, and hence a natural conduit for familiarity, or an easy listening ear.

HN109 agrees with one such back office sergeant, HN32 Michael Couch, that the undercovers would come first to the back office with any worries, and the sergeant would then escalate that to the inspector or chief inspector.

HN109 is asked if undercovers would mention things to the back office sergeants about their undercover work that they wouldn’t say to the manager directly. The example quoted is HN5 John Dines telling the back office he was squatting, which HN109 was not aware of.

HN109 says he would have expected the back office to report that to him if it were significant. He imagined the back office had a sense of responsibility to managers such as himself, but he didn’t explicitly tell the back office to report to him or other managers anything that could be concerning or could cause problems to operational security.

DEAD CHILDREN’S IDENTITIES

HN109 said in his statement to the inquiry that stealing dead children’s identities as the basis of an undercover’s fake persona provided a more secure method than other options. He did not address his mind to whether it was legal and did not seek reassurance from senior managers about its legality.

He guessed that the practice was well known to senior Special Branch management because it had been going on for so long, but couldn’t say specifically that they knew.

He did consider the ethics of this kind of exploitation of tragedy and said he had felt discomfort with it because it was an intrusive way of getting identities. In his statement he said:

‘As there was no expectation that the practice would come to light, only very limited consideration was given to the potential impact on the deceased children’s families.’

He acknowledged the distress of families contacted by the Inquiry but believed:

‘there was sufficient justification for the practice at the time.’

When put to him, HN109 agreed that whether something was right or wrong doesn’t depend on whether or not it became public. And that the police also have a responsibility to comply with moral and ethical mores in private as well as in public.

Beyond that, he’s wrong about the security of the practice. For the first five years of the SDS, officers simply made up names. Since the mid 1990s they have done the same. But for about 20 years after it was made to look suave in the book and film The Day of The Jackal, the SDS stole dead children’s identities, which left them vulnerable to suspicious activists investigating and finding the death certificate. This is exactly what happened, as HN109 knew full well.

In 1976, the fifth officer to steal a dead child’s identity, HN297 Richard Clark ‘Rick Gibson’, had been compromised when presented with his cover identity’s death certificate.

It is raised that there was a programme of action planned around the compromise of Clark, which ought to have caused HN109 to review practices, but he doesn’t think it made him reconsider this one.

HN109 says he is not aware of him or other managers ever considering the risk to the families of dead children of being visited by activists conducting checks on identities. He says that undercovers could opt out of the strategy and that at least one or two officers did so.

Later, he said he would have left it up to an undercover if they stole a dead child’s identity or not, but that the undercover would have needed proof of identity, such as a driving license.

Attention is drawn to HN56 ‘Alan Nicholson’ who joined the back office as a trainee undercover in August 1989, and wrote that HN109 was changing procedures because of issues affecting the unit (likely the Scutt affair), and that Nicholson adopted a fictitious identity, rather than stealing a real one, as a result.

HN109 is unable to shed light on this and disagreed that he was changing procedures. Officers after Nicholson continued to steal dead children’s identities.

Some officers did not just use a dead child’s birth certificate details. They visited the child’s home town to more fully take on their identity.

In his written statement to the Inquiry, HN109 says that undercovers were encouraged to create robust identities which were proof against coincidence, but did not require them to visit the areas referenced in their cover story. However, he says they were justified in undertaking fact-checking and familiarisation visits – and he would have encouraged this.

It was not a specific requirement to check if relatives were still living in the area. HN90 ‘Mark Kerry’ noted that the back office helped out with checks, such as speaking to local special branches to see if the family of the child had come to police notice.

This does not ring any bells with HN109, but he’s not surprised that it might have happened. He does not recall an instance of this but speculates it might have caused a reconsideration of that particular identity.

Asked if he took steps to ensure the investigation of the background of the dead child was only what was necessary in terms of research into their families, he says he does not recall saying anything specifically like that.

HN109 agrees with the Metropolitan Police’s apology regarding the tactic:

‘The Metropolitan Police Service accepts that the managers of the SDS failed to recognise the hurt, distress and anger that the use of DCIs [deceased children’s identities] would cause the families of the children and the public concern that would result if the practice had been revealed…

It also wishes to acknowledge that their distress will have been compounded by the revelation that some SDS officers behaved indefensibly while using their children’s names’

HN109 had not heard that HN5 John Dines had used more than one identity stolen from dead children, and used that second identity, ‘Wayne Cadogan’, when arrested for participation in the 1990 Poll Tax Riot.

HN109 had left the SDS by then but said he ‘was staggered’ when he learned of it. He said he would not have authorised it and would have pursued the issue as the likelihood of any undercover needing a second false identity ‘was minimal’. He cannot think of circumstances under which he’d have permitted it.

Dines said having a second fake identity gave him credibility with the activists he was spying on, and such a tactic was common among them. HN109 disagreed and said he would have liked to know more about that and would have been interested:

‘if the people he was reporting on were going to the extent that he had gone to, to obtain that second ID.’

Undercovers were required to return their cover documents at the end of their deployment.

At the very end of his testimony, HN109’s own barrister, Oliver Sanders KC, asked if he had ever considered the legality of the tactic, to which he replied no, only whether it was ethical. Otherwise, he just continued the practice he had inherited.

COVER EMPLOYMENT

Former manager HN51 Martin Gray said it was preferable to have cover employment which gave officers plausible access to a van. They could then transport activists to demonstrations and overhear conversations.

It’s well established that having a van was so common among spycops that it was effectively standard practice. Activists with reliable vehicles were rare, so it meant the officer would know about any protest where transport was required.

Picking people up and dropping them off gave them the home details of those they spied on. It also made them seem generous and likeable. Several officers chose to drop people off last if they were trying to deceive them into an intimate relationship. This tactic meant they could then stay in the van talking or get invited in.

Additionally, being responsible for the group’s transport gave the spycops something to talk about with activists that didn’t require any political understanding. This last point also applies to them often taking on roles such as treasurer, and DJing.

HN109 clarified that it did not have to be a van, but any vehicle would make them useful; in some cases, a van would make them more useful, but the main thing was having a vehicle. He agreed that a van had the advantage of carrying more people and space for protest items, but also made the point that it might be harder to pick up information in a van than in a smaller vehicle.

COVER ACCOMMODATION

Undercovers were trusted to sort out a place to live for themselves. HN109 wanted to add that they would do so with the assistance of their colleagues. It was expected their colleague would guide them rather than letting the undercover ‘fly solo’.

For HN109, such assistance was a crucial part of the SDS. The need for guidance was so that the accommodation was as self-contained and anonymous as possible, meaning the undercover could come and go freely. They didn’t want the officer’s privacy impeded by cohabiting or living near those who could track their movements.

He did recall that, when he was a new manager, there was close contact between HN25 ‘Kevin Douglas’ and his landlord. It came up almost as an aside, that Douglas had been invited to the christening of the landlord’s child.

This had given rise to two concerns. One was for the officer’s security. The other was HN109’s disappointment that experienced undercovers had not directed Douglas away from forming such a relationship. HN109 expected that such advice would ‘happen almost by osmosis’.

Learning this, HN109 wanted to check out Douglas’s accommodation setup but without being intrusive with other undercovers. There was also the issue of the amount of the unit’s expenses going out on rent, so he also wanted to see rent books more generally. Doing this would give him insight into their cover accommodation situation too.

Douglas says HN109 came round to inspect his accommodation, and the landlord’s family was there. The manager does not recall this, but accepts it’s something he might have done, and that he would have been presented as a colleague from Douglas’s cover employment.

He concluded that Douglas was too close to the landlord’s family and probably said he should move, though he doesn’t recall specifically. Douglas said in his evidence that he was unhappy about the visit, but HN109 does not recall that.

HN109 believes he visited other cover accommodations to avoid singling out Douglas, but not the specifics of which. He notes in his written statement that there must have been a conversation about these visits, as undercover Stefan Scutt complained to Docker about HN109’s proposed checks.

He adds that Scutt was the only officer who made such an adverse comment. However, he accepts, when put to him, that Scutt may have been an unofficial spokesperson for others in this. For HN109, the adverse comment added to a wider concern about Scutt (of which more to come…).

Undercovers thought checks on accommodation were a security risk. HN109 did not agree this was necessarily the case, as it depended on factors such as their cover employment. The undercover would help shape the story for HN109’s visit to minimise risk, and it wouldn’t have been done without Docker’s approval. Later, HN109 notes that all rent books were checked and, as far as he can remember, were fine.

The Inquiry’s questioning did not bring up the issue of HN5 John Dines who was living in a squat, and where the money Dines was given for rent was actually going.

While the Inquiry was focused on the supposed and quite minimal risk to the undercovers, there was no attention paid to the facts that the undercovers were actually resisting their managers conducting oversight, that HN109 would have been well within his rights to do such checks, and even ought to have been doing them as standard.

In many ways, HN109’s evidence around respecting the sensitivity of the undercovers implicitly demonstrates the kid-glove treatment they received and how they were seemingly allowed to do what they wanted as long as they kept writing reports.

It also shows how claims of operational security were used to justify resistance to even the most basic checks by management. And from this, we get further insight into their resistance to the Inquiry process and the excessive demands for anonymity.

HN109 is asked if the situation with HN25’s cover accommodation revealed an issue with the method of expecting undercovers to rely on advice from their colleagues and whether that was adequate oversight. The manager dodges this issue, focusing not on managerial oversight but on that Douglas was let down by the other undercovers, even though the ‘tribal knowledge’ was there.

He does not recall there being advice on how long undercovers should spend at their cover address, but did say it should have been as little as possible as managers would have preferred them to go to their real family homes.

COVER ADDRESS – THE JOHN DINES SQUATTING ISSUE

HN109 was asked about undercovers claiming overtime for spending a night at their cover addresses, but said they couldn’t. He wouldn’t be told formally if an undercover was planning to spend the night at another address while undercover, but it was something he would want to know. Especially, how often it was occurring.

The first point of knowledge about this would probably be the daily phone calls to the back office sergeants. However, HN109 says he didn’t explicitly instruct the sergeants to feed that sort of information back to him.

From September 1988 to March 1990, HN5 John Dines was living in squats while undercover.

N109 says he was aware Dines was squatting but not to that extent. Dines had told managers he had to squat as it was in keeping with his target group, or it was too late at night to return home.

This did not cause HN109 any security concern, or concern that living in proximity to other activists could give rise to sexual activity. What did concern him was Dines’s time away from his real home, but he would have accepted it as part of Dines’ cover provided it was only occasionally.

He presumes that Dines would have maintained his cover accommodation and his rent book would have showed payments for it. HN109 does not recall Dines’ rent book but asserts that all rent books would have been checked and all of them were fine.

Later, towards the end of his evidence, HN109 agrees the main purpose of the twice daily phone calls of the undercovers to the SDS office was to ensure that they were safe. It is pointed out that he didn’t even seek to know nor instruct his back office staff to find out where the undercover spent the night. How then was he ensuring the officers were safe if he didn’t know who they were spending the night with, or where?

HN109 takes a while to understand the point, but accepts it was a blind spot at the time. He says today there’d be electronic solutions for locating an undercover. He says it was something managers had no control over without putting time and effort into following the undercovers, or having some kind of signal when they were at their cover address.

VISITS FROM SENIOR MET OFFICERS

When the spycops scandal broke in 2011, the Metropolitan Police was at pains to say that the SDS was a rogue unit, unknown to rest of the Met. The Inquiry has established that this is a lie. One Commissioner after another visited the SDS at the unit’s safe house to congratulate them on their work.

HN109 has general memories of senior officers meeting the unit, but nothing specific. The SDS team would sit in a circle with the senior officers. Individual undercovers would be asked about their work by the senior officers who had been briefed. Meetings focused on the work itself and the groups targeted. HN109 says it was without much detail and the meetings were ‘fairly short’.

He agreed with Docker that it boosted morale. Which was needed, he says, because the undercovers were doing a difficult job, isolated from their colleagues in the rest of the police, and it showed a recognition of their work. HN109 does not agree with Docker’s assessment that it was a ‘covering one’s arse’ exercise, where if the unit was exposed, Met management could not claim to be completely ignorant of it.

There were more regular visits from the management in Special Branch. The managers of S and C Squads which oversaw the SDS would visit the undercovers almost monthly. These meetings tended to be less formal but it would still be unusual for an undercover to raise an issue at them. Generally, a positive picture of life in the unit was presented but it was also for managers to get a sense of the undercovers and an opportunity to talk to them.

HN109 doesn’t recall there being a visit from a senior manager to boost morale following the Scutt Affair.

TRADECRAFT AND BEHAVIOUR

Though there was no formal training in the SDS, HN109 recalls there being a binder of accumulated information when he joined. However, he says he doesn’t recall looking at it, or even much about it, including what it might have said about sexual relationships.

He wrote up his experiences at the end of his time undercover and thought it would be a thing of good value to do generally, but says he doesn’t recall asking any undercovers to do it when he was a manager. It would have been to ‘add to informal tribal knowledge’.

It was impressed on undercovers when they first arrived at the back office that they were part of a disciplined police force and this was reinforced informally in conversations. If he didn’t think the message had landed, he would have pursued it.

For him it was self-evident that, except for slight exceptions for behaviour in role, policing regulations applied to undercovers – including those around discreditable conduct. Such conduct would include alcohol and drug abuse, sexual relations, assault, abusive language and other crimes.

There would be exceptions in his mind for minor criminality, soft drugs and minor public order offences as needed to maintain a cover.

‘I don’t recall it being spelt out. But I am sure that in general conversation those matters would’ve been fundamental. The officers should and would likely have been aware of them anyway.’

Undercovers were reminded repeatedly to not exercise too much influence on a group, formally or informally (e.g. if they didn’t have a formal position within them, but might do by force of personality). For HN109, the concern around this was not so much to do with a spycop steering a group’s direction:

‘I would’ve been more concerned about the officer becoming over-involved in something that they shouldn’t have done.’

He might have picked up on it in reading reports. He has a recollection of bringing up the issue of being an agent provocateur as something he needed to impress on undercovers, as well as not becoming involved in crime if they could avoid it. He hoped that if there was a likelihood of an undercover being involved in crime then they’d speak to managers first.

Even this seemingly upstanding approach allows the spycops too much latitude. The Home Office directive on the topic [MPS-0727104] was issued in 1969, the year after the SDS was founded. It is clear, emphatic and unequivocal. If the use of any kind of informant might lead to a court being misled, that person should be withdrawn or outed. The SDS just ignored this.

Reporting

HN109 had different levels of trust in undercovers when it came to evaluating their written reports and whether those reports got passed on to the wider Metropolitan Police. He might need to speak to an undercover directly to get a clearer picture about how the intelligence had been obtained and the risks that entailed.

MAKING IT UP

He thought some undercovers might exaggerate information or knowledge; he was asked to write those names down. Later we learned they are HN10 Bob Lambert, HN95 Stefan Scutt and an officer the Inquiry refuses to publicly identify.

In the following day’s evidence, HN109 said that it was not so much that the intelligence was wrong, but it was being elaborated on or there was a degree of theatre to it. On a number of occasions HN109:

‘felt unsure about elements of the information that was coming in.’

He didn’t follow up on this with the officers concerned and cannot say why not, adding:

‘I am now asking myself why not.’

This is at odds with many parts of his evidence where he asserts he would have followed up when something was amiss or missing regarding an undercover’s performance or behaviour. It appears clear that he didn’t think it was a big deal if an officer was exaggerating the information they reported, and it seems that he accepted it as part of the way the SDS functioned.

Counsel challenged HN109 on how he squared his statement that he believed Lambert was providing good, reliable, usable intelligence, with the assertion that he produced exaggerated intelligence. HN109’s response was that the exaggeration was in how he presented the intelligence, as opposed to the intelligence itself. He had no reason to believe the intelligence was wrong.

So, despite having rowed to the edge of criticising Lambert’s intelligence over the course of the day, HN109 reversed in order to avoid actually criticising the undercover, despite the obvious facts staring everyone in the face. Not only would criticism be a breach of team loyalty, it would also be criticism of his own management of the unit.

HN25 ‘Kevin Douglas’ said that most of the time undercovers were under pressure to deliver a certain volume and quality of intelligence while deployed. HN109 said that was not the case, as the undercovers could only go as fast as they could. If there was potential disorder somewhere, ‘we would be asking for information and we were asking all of them’. Otherwise, HN109 says they did not apply pressure.

If there was no specific flashpoint event looming, he would expect reports on individuals, organisations and events. There was no particular expectation of a given volume of reports. He also denies HN5 John Dines’ statement that he felt obliged to report intelligence he was aware had little interest or value just to keep their numbers up.

If they noticed a sudden dip in the reporting pattern of an officer they would have talked with the undercover to understand the situation better, but he doesn’t really recall this happening.

HN25 ‘Kevin Douglas’ said he was redeployed from Troops Out Movement to the Irish Freedom Movement in spring 1989, and in dealing with this he came to feel it was not really possible to have a discussion with HN109. For his part, HN109 says that is not a fair comment.

HN109 says that following the Scutt Affair and the examination of the rent books there was an ‘attitude’ towards him, but he understands the undercovers’ point of view:

‘these are good people who are working out there on their own with little communication elsewhere, and I can understand the feeling. So from that perspective I can see that he could make a comment like that.’

MANAGERS EDITING REPORTS

HN109 agrees that the style of reporting from SDS undercovers was close to the Special Branch house style; there was little need to tutor the undercovers on this, albeit there was one who indulged in:

‘over elaboration and flowery language which wasn’t necessary and detracted from the importance of intelligence.’

Any corrections were to do with style rather than substance. Undercovers in training in the back office ‘topping and tailing’ reports would have also become familiar with SDS reporting content and style.

HN109 received undercovers’ draft reports in writing and would sometimes have to review them because they lacked precision or were not convertible into intelligence. He would remove these issues from the draft before it went to be typed. It was purely editorial and he would discuss significant queries with the undercover.

In his written statement to the Inquiry [MPS-0748825], HN109 cites one undercover who he had to frequently edit as they were prone to:

‘overly literary language, judgmental comments and occasional irrelevance.’

It’s unclear if this was the same officer as the one who used ‘flowery language’. As the description fits a significant proportion of spycops reports, it may well not be.

HN109 might combine reports from several undercovers into one where a single event was being discussed, or contrasting views between groups. Sometimes he’d help out the back office with the reports. Overall, only a few ever needed any editorial improvement.

He did not see all the draft reports; many went straight to the back office sergeants. He did see reports once they were typed up, in order to sign them off for distribution. Docker also saw some.

Returning later to the point about judgemental, irrelevant or imprecise language in the handwritten reports, HN109 says he probably would have spoken to the undercover in the first instance. He would have wanted to help the undercovers improve their reporting style ‘every time’. He recalls having to speak to undercovers about this issue.

Counsel then draws his attention to a report [UCPI0000026858] by John Dines in January 1990, on activist Gary Batchelor who had recently admitted himself to a psychiatric hospital. It contains a highly judgemental assessment of Batchelor.

It is signed by HN109’s superior, HN51 Martin Gray, rather than HN109 himself. Counsel asks HN109 to address the appropriateness of the tone. He agrees that there is over-elaboration and a contemptuous tone in places.

He disagrees that it shows a problematic attitude by Dines towards those he is reporting on. Rather, he says it’s unusual, and he is surprised as Dines was precise in his writing. He says that if he’d seen the report at the time he would have pulled Dines up on it.

‘I think I would’ve certainly discussed it with him. And looked at the wording,’

LECHERY IN REPORTING

Following this we were shown a report from June 1988 [MPS-0740559] by HN87 ‘John Lipscombe’ and signed by Docker, on the family life and sexual activity of a 16 year old girl who was an animal rights and anti-apartheid activist.

Firstly, HN109 admits there are no guidelines for reporting on children. In his witness statement, he argued the report was relevant as it highlighted a lack of parental control and her unusual independence and maturity. He says that her animal rights activity makes it legitimate to report even though she’s only 16. The groups she was getting involved in, and that she was trying to establish her own group:

‘would be indications that she could well be getting involved in matters of interest to the police, including disorder.’

He is challenged about the reporting on her sex life and lesbian affairs, which he accepts had no value around subversion or public order. His justification is that they are ‘relevant as far as her character is concerned’. And having a relationship with lesbians would have been unusual at the time.

Pressed on its intelligence value, he expands:

‘well it gives an idea of what her proclivities are, and it may be of interest at a later date. And I think with intelligence, the smallest details are sometimes very important.’

This canard of a justification is one multiple SDS officers have fallen back on, but the Inquiry has yet to tease out an answer on. Not least the question of just what sort of situation would make such information relevant.

He denies it was written for the purposes of titillation, asserting that HN87 ‘John Lipscombe’ wrote accurate reports. HN109 thinks the undercover was reporting a comprehensive picture of ‘this young lady’.

The Inquiry points out that HN87 ‘John Lipscombe’ has admitted to sexual activity while undercover. HN109 says he didn’t know that. The Inquiry says this is a surprising response, given that it was made clear to HN109 when he was given information and asked to make his written statement to the Inquiry (his Rule 9 request).

Asked if such a report ought to have been a red flag about the interest HN78 ‘John Lipscombe’ had in young women, HN109 responds:

‘I would have been more satisfied of that if I’d seen more than one report that indicated that, and I can’t recall that.’

Counsel seemed ready for this, bringing up [MPS-0743663], another report by HN87 ‘John Lipscombe’ and this time signed by HN109, which reports on the attractiveness of a hunt saboteur, including calling her ‘well built’.

HN109 dodges around the obvious implications that Lipscombe is sexually attracted to the subject, but does say ‘the wording doesn’t sound healthy.’ He is unable to say why he did not excise it from the report, limply falling back on ‘norms of the time’, and suggesting that perhaps he hadn’t noticed it.

This undermines his earlier lengthy justification on how he tried to shape the reports. He wants to say he was a good manager, but claims that time and again he didn’t notice deplorable content in his officers’ reports.

It’s pretty clear that he didn’t really care at the time. It seems that sexism and lechery were acceptable and accepted parts of spycops’ behaviour. HN109 had been an SDS undercover in the 1970s and was obviously well aware of the culture of the squad.

Counsel was not finished on this point. We were shown another report [UCPI0000032060], signed off by HN109, which describes a woman as ‘turning to fat’ and as having ‘generally plain unattractive looks.’

HN109 could not say what possible intelligence value this had:

‘It makes me feel uncomfortable looking at it again.’

As before, he would like to think that in hindsight he would excise these statements from the report. The implicit point is that he didn’t.

It is put to him that a woman’s attractiveness was considered an appropriate detail at the time. HN109 pleads that ‘it’s a descriptive’. He accepts it is not a neutral description, but something very subjective.

Counsel notes that Docker said there was probably some sexual banter in the office. HN109 agrees but says he can’t recall specific instances, or whether the attractiveness of women activists was ever the subject of banter.

REPORTING ON THE SWP AND TRADE UNIONS

Attention is drawn to a 1988 report on Socialist Workers Party (SWP) involvement in militant trade union activism [MPS-0740698].

The Inquiry has already established that the SWP was probably the most infiltrated group in the history of the SDS. A significant proportion of officers got involved in their local branches, holding office and actively campaigning.

HN109 says the matters in this particular report don’t sound like subversive activity to him. The report is important, to his mind, because it shows what the SWP would be trying to do with various pressure organisations, their ‘entryism’ trying to turn the organisations extreme. He maintained that though the SWP were not subverting the organisations to their cause, it was still valid.

He can’t recall the SWP actually taking over a campaign, but relied on the fact that they could turn out in numbers. It was this which caused the fear that they could bring disorder to events.

He accepts that the reason for looking at the SWP and their involvement with other organisations was for public order intelligence, and their possible entryism; he disagrees with the positions of other managers that the reason for targeting the SWP was because they tried to hijack campaigns or trade union activity.

He is unable to explain why trade unions have Special Branch Registry Files on them, showing that trade unions were spied on in their own right. His rather weak response was that he could guess that there were individuals within those unions who have been involved in extremism or some form of subversion with the union. He is not able to answer why the unions themselves have a file, not just the individuals.

BLAIR PEACH JUSTICE CAMPAIGN

Attention is drawn to a 1988 report from HN25 ‘Kevin Douglas’ [UCPI0000026097] submitting a leaflet on upcoming events to mark the ninth anniversary of Blair Peach being killed by police at an antifascist demonstration.

An internal police report at the time found that Peach had been killed by one of six officers of one of its Special Patrol Group units.

A search of the officers’ lockers found dozens of unauthorised weapons, and a search of one of their homes revealed more weapons and Nazi memorabilia. The report was kept secret for over 30 years before being published in 2010.

In his written statement, HN109 said the leaflet gave two weeks’ notice of the anniversary commemorative event. Given the understandable sensitivities around the anniversary, careful assessment and planning would have been required.

Asked what he meant by ‘understandable sensitivities’ he replies:

‘Blair Peach was killed and there was some suggestion that there was police involvement in that death.’

Counsel to the Inquiry replied ‘more than suggestion I think’ but HN109 failed to acknowledge that point. Instead, he continued:

‘His death attracted a lot of attention from across the left wing. And I think any demonstration in respect of Blair Peach’s death would attract factions which could cause disorder.’

Pressed on the propriety of an undercover officer reporting on a commemoration of a person who was killed by the police, HN109 maintains that it was about the risk of public disorder. He makes this claim despite the fact that there was never any disorder at a Blair Peach commemoration. He accepted that it was fair to say the SDS’ remit to produce intelligence to prevent disorder was paramount, taking precedence over all other considerations.

HACKNEY COMMUNITY DEFENCE ASSOCIATION

HN25 ‘Kevin Douglas’ reported on a 1989 public meeting of the Hackney Community Defence Association with touring Sinn Fein councillors, organised by the Troops Out Movement [UCPI0000023785].

The Inquiry focuses on an address by someone from the Defence Association on police brutality and specifically named officers at Dalston Police Station.

HN25 ‘Kevin Douglas’ calls the speech a tirade and refers to the speaker’s ‘unbounded enmity for the police’. HN109 denies the description is judgemental.

The names of the officers are not given in the report. HN109 says that is not of particular interest as he would not have been able to do anything with them. So if the names are not given nor wanted, there was no intelligence purpose in mentioning that they were named – nor even in being at the meeting at all, given that it was public and lawful.

The Metropolitan Police’s opening statement to Tranche 2 of the Inquiry admitted that reporting on the Hackney Community Defence Association was unnecessary as they did not present any risk of serious public disorder and where not engaged in any criminal or subversive activity.

It admitted that undercovers should not have obtained intelligence on the individuals involved and Special Branch should not have retained the reports, especially since the Home Office had unequivocally criticised this in 1983.

HN109 says he aligns himself with this. But, just as with the sexist reporting, it’s clear that he did not do so at the time and is just trying to make himself appear more reasonable than his own documents show him to be.

KEN LIVINGSTONE

Another report from HN25 ‘Kevin Douglas’ [UCPI0000023802] is on a South London Labour Committee on Ireland public meeting in January 1988, which reports on a speech by Ken Livingstone in support of British withdrawal from Northern Ireland. Livingstone, former leader of the Greater London Council (GLC), was a Labour MP by then.

On being questioned about Livingstone being anti-establishment and having established the GLC Police Committee to monitor the Met police, HN109 denied there being any antipathy within Special Branch towards him.

HN109 says in his written witness statement that Special Branch policy was not to actively report on MPs, but there was no restriction on reporting on their attendance at events.

He justifies the level of detail that the report goes into on what Livingstone said, on the grounds that it was important to Special Branch as it could ‘engender feelings in organisations or individuals that could result in disorder’.

There was no consideration given to its propriety. HN109 says HN25 ‘Kevin Douglas’ simply detailed everything said at the meeting which could be relevant to the work of Special Branch – even though Livingstone had a wider platform already, in Parliament.

HN109’s claim is simply untenable. Numerous MPs were spied on by the SDS, and Jack Straw says his targeting began when he was Home Secretary after he ordered – against the wishes of the Met – a public inquiry into police handling of the racist murder of Stephen Lawrence.

TRESPASS

No consideration was given to the legality of undercovers entering people’s homes. HN109 says he cannot recall if any form of guidance was ever given on this. He tries to justify it by saying that in most cases they would have been invited, ignoring the obvious fact that they were operating under false identities like fraudsters who claim to be reading your gas meter as a pretext for nicking your jewellery.

HN122 ‘Neil Richardson’ said in his written statement and live evidence that he had been invited to do some carpet cleaning at an activist’s home and used the opportunity to collect the names of Revolutionary Communist Party branch members.

He couldn’t remember getting any authorisation but felt sure it happened. He said that because it was gathering intelligence rather than evidence, it was acceptable, and that:

‘Managers did not raise an issue with the way in which this information was obtained.’

HN109 thought at the time it would have been acceptable to him, though now:

‘I would say it was on the threshold for me at the minute, thinking about it.’

It is yet another instance of him showing that he accepted behaviour that he cannot defend.

HELEN STEEL IN TWO PLACES AT ONCE

Counsel to the Inquiry drew HN109’s attention to several reports relating to Helen Steel. She was a London Greenpeace activist, later one of the ‘McLibel Two’.

Bob Lambert had the habit of doing things and then reporting them by saying Steel had done them instead. It gave him things to write about while not appearing to his bosses as an agent provocateur.

A report by Lambert dated 9 September 1988 and signed by Docker [MPS-0740518], says Helen Steel was in London on 13 August 1988, waiting to meet a comrade in relation to the ALF Supporters Group.

However, John Dines made a report on 16 August 1988 [MPS-0743632] which says Steel was in North Yorkshire on 11 to 13 August 1988 with hunt saboteurs for an action against a grouse shoot.

A third report, presumably also from Dines, [MPS-0744064] says Steel was at a meeting of the Federation of Animal Rights Group in Leeds, West Yorkshire, on 14 August.

The Inquiry wants to know how Lambert and Dines place her in two locations at once. It’s clear that one officer was not telling the truth.

HN109 embarrasses himself at this point by desperately trying to imply that she could have briefly gone back to London. In the end he has to accept it is vanishingly unlikely.

HN109 also notes that Lambert’s report had a substantial time-lag, some four weeks after the events being described. This was ‘very unusual’, and there would have been mention of it at the time to understand why there was such a delay.

Counsel presses him on this, reminding HN109 that he’d said he would seek where possible to establish whether intelligence was hearsay or something the undercover had witnessed directly, and that he would consult on this if the information was significant.

She pointedly asked HN109 if he would seek to understand or address the veracity of the intelligence. HN109’s underwhelming response:

‘I would like to think I would.’

It was clear by this point, the afternoon of the first of his two days, that HN109 was trying to present the management of the SDS in a more exalted light than it deserved, and that he had no real answer for the catalogue of serious deficiencies that were steadily being listed. In such cases he simply expressed disappointment, or fudged responses like ‘I would like to think I would’.

Counsel continued to pursue the matter, asking whether he would accept that because SDS intelligence was secret and, unlike other intelligence, not subjected to rigorous testing such as happens in court, and because he had faith in his undercovers:

‘that did make it easy for perhaps a less scrupulous officer to gild the lily in terms of their intelligence.’

HN109, hedging things as ever despite his earlier admissions, responds:

‘Potentially yes.’

He did acknowledge that he did not recognise it at the time but can now do so in retrospect.

Counsel then brings up the Special Branch Guidelines [UCPI0000004538], a Home Office document setting out the role and duties of all Special Branches which was issued in 1984 following concern about Special Branch’s impingement on civil liberties.

HN109 was aware of this while in C Squad. Particularly, paragraph 17 which stresses the importance of ensuring:

‘information recorded on an individual is authenticated and does not give a false or misleading impression. Care should be taken to ensure that only necessary and relevant information is recorded and retained.’

Counsel asks HN109 if SDS management failed to comply with this. He waffles, saying he agrees with the guidelines, but:

‘I’m thinking about how we could then have gained, if you like, information of evidential value that would show that these statements were correct or otherwise.’

He ends up accepting Counsel’s proposition that the guidelines were the standard to which intelligence was recorded, but there was a systemic problem with the SDS’s intelligence gathering in that it was difficult to meet that guideline due to the very nature of the operation.

While this might seem a dry point, it is one of the key exchanges in HN109’s evidence. By building on the clearly nonsensical Lambert report on Helen Steel being in London, Counsel drew out that there was no way to check the intelligence of the undercovers, and the degree to which everything was purely taken on faith was the norm – even when the managers felt there was an issue about reliability such as the one HN109 admitted about Lambert.

There was stylistic oversight up to a point, but next to nothing about the actual content. This line of questioning clearly exposes the degree to which the SDS intelligence gathering system was open to abuse. The spycops could report whatever they wanted, their bosses had no way to check it, and their targets would never know (at least, not until now).

MCDONALD’S

McDonald’s was the subject of protests by London Greenpeace. Their leaflet ‘What’s Wrong With McDonald’s?’, which was co-written by spycop Bob Lambert, led to a prosecution for libel.

The feted McLibel trial turned out to be the longest court case in English history. Helen Steel and Dave Morris were the defendants.

The McLibel trial heard from Sid Nicholson, Vice President of McDonald’s UK and the company’s Head of Security. He had been a police officer for 31 years, starting in apartheid South Africa and retiring as a Chief Superintendent of the Met.

He said that his entire department was made up of ex-police officers which made it easy to establish a casual, two-way, illegal exchange of personal details about London Greenpeace activists.

He specifically told the court that Special Branch officers initiated contact with McDonald’s on occasion:

‘They telephoned me to ask me if I was aware that there was going to be a demonstration outside of our offices and then they indicated that they were interested in the organisation [London Greenpeace] and did I have a perch they could use, and a perch is police parlance for an observation post. I told them I was interested and… [allowed them to] make use of any facilities they wished.’

But when HN109 is asked if he had any knowledge of liaison between McDonald’s security and Special Branch or the SDS, he says absolutely not. Furthermore, he says he would have taken action to report it, if he had such knowledge.

It would have been ‘wholly inappropriate’ for anyone at the SDS to contact a private organisation and an issue for senior managers if information did need to be passed on and they disguised the fact that it came from the SDS.

Given that the facts about McDonald’s exchange of information with the police were established in court 30 years ago, it’s ridiculous that HN109 can claim such ignorance.

Spycop John Dines, who deceived Helen Steel into a long-term intimate relationship, told her on two occasions that he thought they were being followed, possibly by someone linked to McDonald’s. HN109 claims Dines never told him this.

Safe house meetings

The SDS management held twice-weekly meetings with all undercover officers at their safe house. There was no formal agenda, but they followed a routine.

Firstly, they dealt with admin, expenses and any forms that needed filling out, along with communication of police notices. This was followed by an informal round-robin where undercovers fed back what they had been doing. This helped the managers to get to know the undercovers and stay abreast of what they were up to, as well as keep an eye out for their welfare.

DOMINANT PERSONALITIES

In his written statement, HN109 noted:

‘certain key personalities dictated the tone… There was a degree to which they dominated proceedings.’

This group included HN10 Bob Lambert and HN5 John Dines. Counsel specifically excluded discussion of a third officer among these dominant personalities to focus on only on this pair.

HN109 says they were of strong character:

‘I think they were seen by some colleagues as individuals who could portray feelings or senses that were on the squad and would be happy to allow them to take the lead – which they did.’

They were self-appointed informal spokespeople for the undercovers:

‘I don’t think they were altogether representing the views or the health of the SDS.’

Asked about Lambert’s ‘strong character’, HN109 explained:

‘Bob was – he’s tall, and he was positive in what he said, how he said it, and was fairly unafraid to be frank, and I think having gained the reputation that he had in his work, I think some of the others looked up to him.’

He clarified that neither he nor his superior Eric Docker personally looked up to Lambert, though he felt that Docker’s successor, HN51 Martin Gray, might have done, as he had a willingness to engage more with Lambert. He believes Gray and Lambert had more one-to-one meetings than were being held with the other undercovers.

As for Dines, HN109 says he was quiet and serious, but appeared enthusiastic in what he did and how he did it. He was also happy to represent himself and others, but be balanced in what he said. He was a man of few words. All this combined to give the impression of someone who was confident. HN109 thinks other undercovers looked up to Dines both because of his work and his demeanour of calm assertiveness.

Asked if they ‘strutted about’, he says they did; Dines to a lesser extent, but they didn’t brag. He says Stefan Scutt was another like this. Their manner made it hard for other officers to relax because it brought an element of domination and there was an arrogance in it.

HN109 said Dines and Lambert held themselves out as setting the standard to which other undercovers should aspire. They did this not only by their attitude but also the information they were getting, which was something other undercovers would have aspired to.

Pressed on how this was conveyed, HN109 says it was through their written work that HN109 got the impression that others saw in them elements of excellence and good practice. This cannot have been the case. Undercovers wouldn’t have seen the written work of others. There is presumably something else that HN109 is not willing to go into regarding Dines and Lambert, around how they presented their achievements.

HN25 ‘Kevin Douglas’ said he thought Dines was a ‘gong-hunter’. HN109 says this is more applicable to Lambert. He says Dines and Lambert were not competitive with one other but were close.

Later, in light of the Scutt affair, HN109 will privately label this group, including Lambert and Dines, ‘the cabal’. He said they had an air of superiority and authority to the point that he feared:

‘it could get to tails wagging dogs… so an over-influence that would undermine management.’

THE REST OF THE SPYCOPS

Though HN109 skirted around issues with Lambert and Dines, he was more open about HN95 Stefan Scutt, who he said peacocked around and was a braggart.

Asked how this manifested, HN109 replies that Scutt was boastful about what he was doing and how he was doing it. Scutt engaged in self-promotion about his undercover work:

‘he took on a mantle of authority and seniority that was wholly unjustified, and also of excellence that was unjustified’.

He adds that in the round-robins, Scutt came across as quiet and unforthcoming, supporting the assertion of HN25 ‘Kevin Douglas’ that Scutt was very reticent. He notes that Scutt could be uncooperative, but that was not as evident as other characteristics.

HN25 ‘Kevin Douglas’ had also said the undercovers were siloed at the meetings and even regarded each other as a threat. HN109 is surprised to hear this. This is not necessarily contradictory, but perhaps indicative of how little control HN109 really had over the underlying dynamics, or that he was ill-equipped as a manager despite being a stickler for the rules.

HN109 says there was not a competitive atmosphere as the undercovers were not in the same groups or branches, so there was really nothing to compete on. Both he and Docker would have been against encouraging competition.

Asked about sexual activity, HN109 says the undercovers did not brag about it, and he claims it was never mentioned that Lambert had a child with a woman he spied on.

HN109 says there would have been a few one-to-one meetings with the undercovers, when they wanted to discuss specific elements of work and possible directions, or felt an issue was not right to discuss in front of the group as a whole. These meetings tended to be about operational matters rather than personal ones.

In a squad review at the time, ‘Special Demonstration Squad: Viability’, published in August 1988, unit manager Eric Docker wrote that:

‘great care is taken to establish a relaxed and convivial atmosphere where all aspects of squad work may be discussed.’

HN109 is asked how the managers sought to do that. He replies it was by having all the undercovers together in one place. The great care would come from observing what they were like, what and how they were doing at work, but also potentially socially as well.

For HN109, it was all about observing and taking in what they were doing, putting the bits together and seeing if they were OK.

‘The care I don’t think necessarily involved action to be taken.’

As with so many of HN109’s answers, he is not actually addressing the point. There is an illusion of doing something, but looked at squarely he is claiming that he, as a manager, was not actually doing anything other than convening the twice weekly meetings.

Asked if it was an opportunity to let their hair down a bit, he says yes and adds there was a lot of laughing and jokes.

SOCIALISING

HN109 doesn’t recall alcohol being consumed in the safe houses except occasionally when there might be a celebration or a longer period of time at the meetings. Alcohol was not routine in private unless it was a social event or a leaving lunch. After the meetings they would go to the pub.

An MI5 memo from 1985 [UCPI0000036109] describes their meetings with SDS managers and warns colleagues to ‘be prepared to drink lots of beer’ because of the SDS mangers’ macho drinking culture. But HN109 rejects this:

‘I think this says more about the writer than it does of the activity.’

In his written statement to the Inquiry, HN109 says that undercovers would sometimes stay over at the safe house when they’d drunk so much that they were unsafe to drive.

Questioned about this, he’s at pains to downplay it as being a very rare occurrence.

Great store was set by undercovers being sociable with each other and having good social skills. This was because it is an important characteristic for a group that was otherwise isolated from other work colleagues, and vital for their wellbeing. It was important that they could talk about ordinary stuff among their colleagues.

It is clear that HN109 did go to the pub with the undercovers. When there were problems with officer HN95 ‘Stefan Scutt’, a report by Chief Superintendent Tony Evans (S Squad line manager for SDS) [MPS-0740925] noted that Scutt:

‘did not drink and did not socialise with them, or his supervising officers, outside of the office.

In his view this was one factor which distanced him from Detective Inspector [HN109] who appeared to enjoy the thrust and parry of lively verbal exchanges; this, however, was not his style and underlined the difference in temperament between them.’

HN109 doesn’t know what is meant by this, but says he enjoyed having discussions and that these allowed them to communicate with others – and allowed managers to see how:

‘they were managing themselves in a social atmosphere, removing them or trying to remove them as much as possible from their work in what’s pretty intense and sometimes awfully intense.’

He found it noticeable that Stefan Scutt avoided such socialising, though he denied taking a dim view of this. He says drinking alcohol was not a crucial element for the social aspect, and that he’s sure other undercovers didn’t drink at social occasions. Going further, he says he wouldn’t have allowed alcohol to be the sole purpose of engagement with the squad.

However, he says because Scutt was so reticent and reserved and didn’t participate, this made it harder for HN109 to get an insight into him.

SEXUAL BANTER AND IMPLAUSIBLE DENIAL

Counsel returned to the issue of the laughter and joking. HN109 doesn’t recall if there were jokes about sexual matters. If there were, this wasn’t a significant feature, but probably reflected the social atmosphere, and was nothing that would raise suspicions with managers.

In 2016, HN109 was interviewed by Operation Sparkler, a police investigation in relation to Bob Lambert’s role in placing incendiary devices in Debenhams shops while undercover in an Animal Liberation Front cell [MPS-0737160].

In the interview, HN109 said he was unaware of undercovers deceiving women into sexual relationships, but there had been jokes about high standards of intelligence to be gained from ‘horizontal politics’. The other standing joke was that Helen Steel, who Dines had deceived into a relationship, was not very attractive.

HN109 now says the ‘horizontal politics’ line was from when he was undercover in the 1970s and he never heard it when he was a manager at the SDS.

There’s no such excuse available for the derogatory comments about the attractiveness of Steel, who wasn’t spied on until the 1980s. Faced with the report of his own words from 2016, he flounders:

‘I have no recall of that. Clearly I must have said it. And looking at it, it makes me feel uncomfortable.’

Given how often he expresses discomfort during his evidence, one gets a sense that there is a lot for him to feel uncomfortable about now he’s forced to face up to the reality of how he managed the unit and what happened on his watch. All the more so, given that he was someone who portrayed himself as focused on the unit abiding by regulations. Either a lot slipped by him or he was willing to let a lot more go than he’d like us to believe, little of which stands the test of time.

It’s a pattern we’ve seen repeated over and over at the Inquiry. Confronted with the clear evidence of what the SDS did, denials are impossible. This leaves managers having to admit either to being corrupt or to being incompetent, so they opt for the latter and say they didn’t know about anything contentious. HN109 is no exception, and immediately give us more of it.

Counsel did not let him off the issue of the ‘standing joke’ about Helen Steel, stating that it’s not even a joke, but simply a nasty comment. HN109 has to accept it’s not a joke.

He says that he thinks he was repeating to Operation Sparkler what he had been told or heard from others. He then rows back entirely:

‘I certainly can’t recall it as being a standing joke. That would sort of indicate that it was something that came up on a fairly regular basis. I don’t recall anything like that.’

He also says he can’t remember who might have ever said it. Asked about how he would have responded on hearing such a remark he says he would have felt uncomfortable, but not reprimanded the officer:

‘maybe because it would be the sort of thing that would’ve been spoken about in [the] open and forgotten. I’m not sure.’

HN109 desperately hedges himself. But the implication is clear that this sort of banter went on and the managers either turned blind eye to it or simply didn’t recognise it as cruel. He then goes on to make it worse for himself.

Counsel continued to press, making the point that even with everything he’s just said, he thought the issue of comments about Steel’s appearance was significant enough to raise with a police officer from Operation Sparkler. He’s forced to concede that he must have thought it was of significance in 2016, even though he claims he can’t remember it at all now.

Asked if such comments on perceived sexual attractiveness at the safe house or in the pub are a red flag, he responds that ‘it’s not healthy’ and admits it’s demeaning.

However, despite his 2016 citing of the ‘standing joke’ and his admission that he wouldn’t have done anything about such comments, he refuses to concede that this meant there was a problem with the SDS:

‘Because I don’t think discussion like that, demeaning discussion, took place, either on males or females. It wasn’t, you know, there was no significance, it didn’t happen a lot, it wasn’t something in the culture of the group.’

He is asked by his own barrister about Operation Sparkler reporting that he’d told them:

‘there had been jokes made about high standards of intelligence being gained from “horizontal politics”.’

Having U-turned and run away on the unattractiveness comment, he does a similar move here, with an equally low level of plausibility.

‘”horizontal politics” in my Operation Sparkler interview was not a reference to relationships between undercover officers and activists but rather to the interactions between activists themselves.

There were frequent correlations between the internal dynamics of a group or branch and the sexual relationships that formed and broke down between its members.’

He claims to have only ever heard the phrase used once or twice, by one undercover.

He also asserted that he never heard any racist language used in the SDS offices or safe houses. Asked specifically about HN86/HN1361, a manager who succeeded him and who it has been suggested was racist, HN109 unsurprisingly says he can’t remember the officer ever doing anything like that.

One spycop after another has told the Inquiry that there was no verbal racism or sexism in the squad. They’re asking us to believe that they’re so decent that they wouldn’t think it or say it, yet somehow they put it in official written reports that managers were happy with. They are insulting our intelligence and lying under oath.

GUILTY CONSCIENCE

Counsel stayed on the topic of HN109’s Operation Sparkler interview. When first approached for an interview he told them he was willing to be questioned but wanted to know if anything would go to the Undercover Policing Inquiry. He was told that if anything of relevance to the Inquiry came to notice, the investigation team would have a duty to inform overarching police investigation Operation Herne and the Inquiry.

Asked if, at the time of the Sparkler interview, he thought engaging with the Inquiry was optional, he says he thought it was, and that the meeting with Sparkler was very informal.

He was concerned about where the information would go, but he wasn’t saying he didn’t want to engage with the Inquiry. He says he had nothing to hide when he met with officers from Sparkler, and it wasn’t because he had let his guard down with them.

On the second day of HN109’s evidence there was an announcement from the Chair, Sir John Mitting, that there had been a private hearing where HN109 explained his caution about engaging with Operation Herne and the Inquiry. Mitting said he already knew the reasons and was fine with them. We, however, are not told what they are.

Debenhams

In July 1987, SDS officer HN10 Bob Lambert was undercover in an Animal Liberation Front cell that placed timed incendiary devices in branches of Debenhams department stores that sold fur. They were set to go off in the dead of night, creating just enough smoke to trigger the sprinkler system and drench the stock.

Three shops were targeted simultaneously. Andrew Clarke and Geoff Sheppard were arrested and convicted for two of them. Both they, and numerous other people who knew Lambert at the time, say Lambert planted the third incendiary device, in the Harrow shop. There is no other credible explanation for the planting of the Harrow device.

Lambert denies it, and several of his contemporaries at the Inquiry have had convenient amnesia on the issue. Lambert’s involvement was kept secret from the court. This means that the defence did not have access to all evidence in the case. Therefore the convictions of Clarke and Sheppard were a miscarriage of justice.

HN109 joined the SDS six weeks after the arrest of Sheppard and Clarke. Though not gone into in detail in HN109’s testimony, this event was the basis for questioning on a number of topics.

HN109’s understanding of the root of Lambert’s success was that the undercover had become close to the people involved.

He agreed that morale in the unit was good as a result of the success of Lambert’s role in that operation. He also agrees with the Assistant Commissioner’s assessment that the arrests were a rare tangible result for the SDS. Additionally, he agrees with Counsel to the Inquiry’s proposition that it was so celebrated because it had actually led to a criminal prosecution.

However, the secrecy of the SDS, even with Special Branch, meant that HN109 didn’t believe there was a significant focus or an ability to contribute to the prosecution of crime. The Debenhams case was the exception in this.

They couldn’t get involved in prosecutions as it would potentially expose the undercovers, and hence compromise the secrecy of the squad. As a result, he speculated that the intelligence from Lambert about Sheppard and Clarke would have all been dealt with through C Squad to protect the SDS.

When it was put to him that protecting Lambert’s identity was more important than ensuring the defendants’ right to a fair trial, he did not give a clear answer. Furthermore, he says he could not recall any discussion about whether or not disclosing the undercover’s role might have impacted the fairness of Sheppard and Clarke’s trial, which took place during his tenure as manager.

HN109 accepts that Lambert would have been well regarded because of the Debenhams ‘triumph’. However, the nature of his target meant that Lambert would have developed specific characteristics to get close to them. This would not have been generally applicable to other deployments. Especially as the SDS was focused on gathering intelligence on public disorder, not combatting crime.

LEGAL PROFESSIONAL PRIVILEGE

Numerous spycops were involved in arrests and court cases. This didn’t just mean misleading courts and creating miscarriages of justice. It also meant they were party to the defendants’ discussions with lawyers. This is a gross breach of the principle of ‘legal professional privilege’, that lawyers must be able to speak to clients in confidence.

A 1987 report by Lambert on Sheppard and Clarke as they prepared their defence case in prison is raised, particularly a conversation between Clarke and his solicitor [MPS-0740050].

HN109 accepted this report contained information from a legal representative and says it is concerning ‘in hindsight’. Asked why he wasn’t bothered at the time, he limply suggests that perhaps he thought it would have been told to Lambert by someone else, not the solicitor themselves.

CLARKE IN PRISON

In February 1988, Lambert submitted a report [MPS-0744784] detailing Andrew Clarke supposedly being assaulted in prison for interfering with the genitals of a Black cell mate.

HN109 is questioned on why the ethnicity of the cell mate is important to report, and he says it’s a description of where Clarke was and what he was dealing with, and it gave an impression of what he was inclined to do, which might not have been something known previously.

Helen Steel, who was close to Clarke at the time, said she thinks this report was a fiction. HN109 maintains it was relevant information worth disseminating as – the line we’ve heard from so many spycops defending sharing information without any justification – it was something that might have been useful in some way in the future.

The report also discusses Sheppard and Clarke’s legal strategy for their upcoming trial and their different approaches. Despite the breach of legal professional privilege, HN109 is not troubled by this as it potentially indicates a split between the two activists. He thinks there is value in it as reported intelligence but, again, does not specify what that value might be.

He is challenged that the contents of the report come under the broad umbrella of legally privileged information that ought not to be further disseminated by the police. HN109 responds that it is only being disseminated to Special Branch. He eventually has to accept that he did not know where it might end up but he still thinks it was appropriate to report anyway.

Lambert’s planned exit strategy from his undercover deployment was that he was going on the run following a police raid on his house for his involvement in the Debenhams action.

It was pointed out that, for such a dramatic story to be plausible to his colleagues in the Animal Liberation Front, they would have to have known he was heavily involved in something seriously illegal. HN109 claims he does not recall, but thinks that’s correct. He says he had nothing to do with Lambert’s withdrawal.

He is asked outright if he thinks Lambert was involved in planting the 1987 incendiary devices at Debenhams. HN109 says he thinks Lambert could have been, from what he’s listened to and to what he knew of the undercover given what other stuff he had been hiding over a period of time.

‘I think he had the potential to get involved in something further for whatever purpose.’

Arrests, legal professional privilege and violence

If there was a risk of an undercover being arrested at an event, another SDS officer would be nearby to act as a cover officer to keep an eye on the undercover, especially if it was outside of the Metropolitan Police District.

HN109 says he did this about four times, though in his written statement he apparently indicated it was many times.

He’s asked if he agrees with HN51 Martin Gray’s comments to the police’s internal spycops inquiry Operation Herne that this was in part because there was a danger another police force might ‘fit up’ the undercover. HN109 thinks it was only a very small part of the need for the cover officer. Rather it was to keep an eye on the undercover and their welfare in case of an arrest.

SPYCOP JOHN DINES ARRESTED

Counsel discusses the arrest of HN5 John Dines on 9 January 1988 while on a hunt sab. Having been pointed out by a huntsman for his effective sabotage, Essex police took Dines into custody, supposedly to prevent a breach of the peace.

He was held for over two hours before being released. His false identity was then passed to the Animal Rights National Index (ARNI) by Essex constabulary’s Special Branch.

Four days later, on 13 January 1988, HN109 wrote a report [MPS-0526791]:

‘The integrity of the SDS operation was never in question…

Although the arrest of an SDS officer can be an unsettling experience for the administration as well as the officer, there is little doubt that in this type of case the operative’s credibility is greatly enhanced.

In a minor way this manifested itself in the large quantities of vegan food provided to the officer, while in custody, by his fellow saboteurs, concerned that the police would not adequately cater for his diet.’

HN109 says the criteria for having a cover officer was to do with whether there was likely to be disorder, which there certainly was at hunts at the time. He added that sometimes they liaised with local Special Branch, but sometimes not, instead just watching what was going on. He dressed to blend in to the occasion.

He is asked about Dines being singled out by huntsmen for arrest as a nuisance, and whether it was a common occurrence for hunts to give instructions to police on when to make arrests. Remarkably, HN109 gives a clear affirmative to this.

‘I think it was like a delay tactic to bring a halt to the disorder until normal service was resumed and then release those arrested.’

Asked if this kind of arrest was appropriate, he admits he didn’t agree with it.

There were mixed views within senior management about the arrest of undercovers. Generally, it was believed that if this could be avoided then it should be. If an arrest did happen, then the hope was that it would enhance credibility, though that was not always the case.

SPYCOP JOHN DINES ARRESTED AGAIN, WRONGFULLY

We are then taken to a second arrest of Dines, on 6 December 1988 at an animal rights protest at the Sun Valley poultry processing plant in Herefordshire. It is described in a report written on 7 December by SDS manager HN51 Martin Gray [MPS-0526792].

HN109 and back office sergeant HN61 Chris Hyde were there as cover officers for Dines. A lorry carrying live chickens was occupied and an attempt made to rescue the birds. Dines was one of 13 in the immediate vicinity who were arrested despite not doing anything to warrant it.

According to the report, the two SDS officers attended Hereford police station to monitor the situation but did not declare their interest in Dines nor reveal he was actually a police officer. Hence the SDS operation was not compromised.

The charges were dropped as no evidence was offered. Complaints were made about the lawfulness of the arrests. Dines went along with the complaints and, as a result, was interviewed by a Chief Superintendent from West Mercia Constabulary.

The issue of this complaint was addressed in Gray’s report. According to him, the complainants did not expect to succeed but viewed it as a way of inconveniencing police. Dines planned to attend but keep things so vague so that allegations are not pursued, and, despite the unlawful overreach:

‘certainly that no disciplinary action is taken against any West Mercia Constabulary officer.’

Another report, written by HN109 on 23 March 1989 [MPS-0526793], discusses the outcome of the interview. He wrote that Dines was interviewed for four hours and thinks he did it ambiguously enough that there’s unlikely to be further action.

HN109 says he doesn’t remember anything about this incident at all. However, he agrees that, from Gray’s report, it sounds like there was no proper grounds for Dines’ arrest, and that there might have actually been merit to the complaint.

He cannot recall having any qualms about Dines’ strategy.

In his witness statement, HN109 wrote what amounts to a frank admission that the SDS was a law unto itself, not especially concerned with legality or justice:

‘the primary consideration will have been Detective Sergeant Dines’s security and that of the SDS. Other considerations of propriety and legal professional privilege were managed but they were of secondary importance.’

He was not aware of the arrest of Dines at the 1990 Poll Tax Riot, having left the SDS just beforehand.

SPYCOP ‘JOHN LIPSCOMBE’ ARRESTED

Later, we’re shown a 6 April 1988 report by HN87 ‘John Lipscombe’, signed off by HN109 as manager [MPS-0743620]. It describes a hunt attacking hunt sabs and causing injuries to them, including a broken arm. HN109 is asked about whether violence towards hunt sabs concerned him as a police officer.

He seems unable to understand the point that this is a violent crime towards the sabs perpetrated by the hunt, written by a reliable witness. He says he would not have disseminated the report so that those responsible could be held to account:

‘it would have potentially presented security problems if the officer had to be called as a witness. I’d prefer that it didn’t happen. But I think there were more dangers involved for the squad than benefits.’

Patronisingly, he adds:

‘the poor soul who had their arm broken would be able or could or should be able to pursue it with the assistance of their colleagues.’

He admits he would not have even followed up on the incident as to whether there were criminal proceedings.

It’s clear throughout his evidence that HN109 thinks a lot of the police service as an institution, but when he makes statements like this, it’s equally clear how little he cared about its actual purpose – protecting the public.

Misconduct and sexual relationships

‘RULES ARE MEANT TO BE BROKEN’

Counsel raised another point in HN109’s written witness statement. HN109 and HN5 John Dines had worked together on Special Branch night duty prior to Dines joining the SDS, and Dines had told him that ‘rules are meant to be broken’.

HN109 said he was surprised that a junior Special Branch officer would say that to a superior. HN109 didn’t carry this over to his management of Dines in the SDS, as he apparently didn’t remember this statement until after he, HN109, had left.

Indeed, Dines at the SDS didn’t have a reputation as someone who disobeyed the rules. But it’s clear from examples already described at the hearing that Dines did indeed disdain the rules or, perhaps more accurately, that those rules weren’t really rules in the first place.

HN109 was asked if he’d made it clear to Dines not to have sexual relationships. He didn’t.

Instead, HN109 ‘hoped’ it would have been spoken about when Dines first arrived or before recruitment, and also during his service ‘on an informal basis’. The former manager skirts around the fact that making it clear was part of his responsibility. In his replies there’s a lot of hoping others would have done things, and it does not reflect kindly on his tenure.

HN109 says he only found out about Dines’s relationship with Helen Steel latterly from the newspapers. When asked if it was out of character, he answered with a customary sideways step, saying he was ‘shocked and disappointed’.

SPECIAL OPPORTUNITIES FOR MISCONDUCT

HN109 asserted there was a low incidence of disciplinary issues in Special Branch generally. This is, he says, was due to members being recruited to the Branch because:

‘they stood out among a dedicated and talented group of vetted individuals.’

HN109 is oblivious to how this sounds after so many days of evidence to the contrary, not to mention the Metropolitan Police’s own series of unprecedented apologies for the unit HN109 managed.

He also says there were fewer opportunities to misbehave than in other forms of police work. Special Branch, not being involved in crime or in the criminal world, were separate from that type of impropriety. Broadly, they were not in a place to be involved in corruption, taking backhanders, evidence tampering, etc.

Counsel punctured that balloon by pointing out that undercovers had numerous different opportunities that were not available to the average police officer, or even Special Branch officer. Particularly, they had a disproportionate number of opportunities to engage in sexual activity while on duty.

HN109 could only bring himself to ‘partly agree’, and wasn’t ‘inclined to say’ that undercovers were able to engage in sexual activity on duty more than other police.

Counsel pointed out that undercovers were going into groups as single men, socialising, drinking and forming relationships with people on the friendliest of terms, precisely as part of the intelligence gathering.

Again, H109 could only say that this ‘potentially’ offered greater opportunities for sexual misconduct. As with so many of the managers, HN109’s hedging and fudging in order avoid criticising the undercovers or his own management of them tended to fall flat. Instead, he came across as transparently dodging the issue.

He was reminded that he wrote in his witness statement that spycops having sexual relationships in their undercover identity was misconduct. He agreed that any sexual activity, including one night stands, was out of the question and amounted to discreditable conduct.

He explained that firstly officers were told this at the outset. They were also reminded afterwards (even though he just said he didn’t do this with Dines). There was also the moral issue that they’d selected undercovers who were already in stable relationships or married, compounded by the fact they were Special Branch officers.

HN109 emphasises it was a ‘betrayal’. Not of the women who were abused, but of the trust placed in the police as Special Branch officers.

In this, we get a real insight into HN109, a look at the complete picture which has been building up piecemeal; his loyalty is to the institution of Special Branch itself. It is an organisation he talks of in glowing terms, especially around how its officers are selected for being head and shoulders above others, vetted and held to a higher standard.

‘They had a responsibility, and the responsibility was not just to themselves but to the service, the Police Service and Special Branch and to the SDS.’

Asked about why married officers were preferred, he agreed it was believed that they were less likely to have sex with members of their target groups than single officers. He added that this belief went back to the 1970s and that he thought it was a sound principle.

He talks about there being loyalty to the undercover’s partner which allayed fears or considerations about spycops straying into other relationships. He accepts this wasn’t a guarantee, however.

‘AGAINST RULES, REGULATIONS AND MORALITY’

Counsel was allowed to quote from HN109’s earlier secret hearing about his time undercover in the 1970s, in which he said that senior officers had spoken about the dangers of sexual activity.

The primary danger was the security of the undercover and whether they were getting over-involved in their work. The other was the reputational danger for Special Branch and the wider Metropolitan Police should their undercover activity ever be made public. Again, there is no consideration whatsoever of the harm being done to the women they were abusing:

‘it was approached from the one-dimensional point of view of warning these experienced police officers that it was against rules, regulations, and against morality.’

In his written statement, HN109 said he almost certainly had a conversation with HN90 ‘Mark Kerry’ when that undercover was recruited because ‘Kerry’ was single and management would have wanted some reassurance that he understood the boundaries.

The boundaries were that he was a police officer doing work, that sexual relationships would have been wrong, and to make sure each officer knew that security was paramount. There was the danger, not just reputational, but that a breach would lead to all the squad’s infrastructure having to be changed so as to maintain overall operational security.

Counsel asks why, as ‘Mark Kerry’ was single, would it be morally wrong for him to have a relationship. HN109 says it’s because he would have been posing as someone else. Given that this applies to every spycop who deceived women into relationships, including all the married ones, it’s a truly startling admission.

Any hope of sustained candour is quickly snuffed out. When asked whether that moral reason would have been spelled out to ‘Kerry’, we get a repeat of the feeble avoidance of responsibility:

‘I would hope so.’

This is immediately picked up on. Counsel reminded HN109 he’d already said that all the undercovers were told and warned against sexual relationships, which he confirms. However, in his witness statement he said it was not something that seemed necessary for two other undercovers he recruited, HN122 ‘Neil Richardson’ and HN56 ‘Alan “Nick” Nicholson’, because they were married.

The apparent contradiction is pointed out. HN109 says it’s not a misrepresentation, but rather that he did not expand enough on the issue of sexual relationship with the married officers. For HN109, it is self-evident that married men should not have other relationships. Nevertheless, he says he is sure it would have been mentioned:

‘no-one to my knowledge escaped being told about how they should conduct themselves.’

It’s painfully obvious that despite his disclaimer there is a contradiction with his written evidence, and that his story has changed around this.

He ploughs on:

‘also I’m sure it would’ve been on my lips when something came up about, I don’t know, mention of females in the various groups if they were saying, either they were getting close.

I am positive that I’d say “well look, you’re going to have to be careful. We know we’ve got to be careful”. Along those lines.

So it was something, it was at the top of the list if you like in general warnings, as was agent provocateur.’

He would have done this as a ‘casual mentioning’ of something undercovers had to be careful of. He can’t recall a single specific incident of doing it, ‘but I know I would have said it many times’.

Counsel points out that HN5 John Dines was open about the fact that he was specifically targeting Helen Steel and planning to get close to her. HN109 says he would have ‘almost certainly’ warned Dines about not getting too close to her and not engaging in a sexual relationship. He never had any undercover object when he gave such a warning, it was done informally but:

‘purpose-built to get a message over. I shouldn’t have had to say it in the first place, actually.’

He then says he is now in fact certain he said it to Dines.

HE SAYS HE TOLD THEM, THEY SAY HE DIDN’T

It’s pointed out that HN122 ‘Neil Richardson’, an officer managed by HN109, contradicts this. He said in his evidence the only conversation he had about sexual relationships came from another undercover who simply said the opportunity would present itself, making him aware it was a situation he would likely encounter, but without advice or moral overtones.

Not for the first time, HN109 says he ‘would be surprised and disappointed’ if ‘Richardson’ had been told that by himself or Docker. As with telling undercovers not to be an agent provocateur, this was not a task for their colleagues but for the managers – in this case, HN109 and Docker – to do at the outset so the undercovers knew what the standards were.

HN109 says it would either have been done prior to the undercover coming to an interview, or informally when they reached the back office.

‘It was not something that was ignored.’

HN109 is reminded that he claimed he had issued clear instructions to undercovers both when they were recruited and when they were in the back office.

Counsel asks him how certain he is that clear instructions would have been given to undercovers he had not been involved in the recruitment of, and whether Docker would have told him that such instructions had been given.

We receive a nebulous non-answer that characterised much of HN109’s evidence when it came to such awkward questions:

‘Those other officers in the first instance would have had this matter mentioned to them. They would have had the information.

And as far as they were concerned, or as far as the group was concerned, if something came up, as I say, in conversation or in the paperwork, I wouldn’t take an officer aside and say it. It would just be mentioned in open forum. There was nothing to hide.

So in my mind, everybody would have known that this was how we had to operate.’

He’s clearly bullshitting us, trying to create an illusion of open effective management, where undercovers are gently nudged about not crossing the line. Counsel does not let up, picking up on the paperwork comment, asking what sort of detail in the paperwork would prompt him to caution an officer.

‘If there was some knowledge in there that gave an indication that they were getting close to females.’

Counsel suggests this might be sensitive personal information about the woman that would come from a close relationship. HN109 says possibly, but hopes any such close relationship would have been picked up before that. It seems there’s a lot of this kind of hope in HN109’s world.

Gamely he continues, finding more ways to tie himself up. He goes back to an example where an undercover reported that a woman he spied on was attractive. He says he wouldn’t assume they were forming a relationship, but he might casually say to the undercover to be careful.

He says he wouldn’t have assumed it was the undercover that was at fault, but the woman might be attracted to the undercover. If HN109 could only have accepted that some of his undercovers abused their position he’d have saved himself a lot of pain and getting into such ridiculous contortions at the Inquiry.

He concedes that the risk of sexual relationship was present for the undercovers, and it was known about at the time. But he still says he doesn’t remember discussing it or making it something formal to note.

HE SAYS HE DIDN’T TELL THEM, BUT NOW SAYS HE DID

Counsel goes back to HN109’s written statement:

‘Notwithstanding that there was the tacit understanding that undercover officers would not have relationships with activists, it was helpful for them to have thought through how they would resist any advances that they received.

I believe the tactic of building a deterrent into their legend was well established before I joined as Detective Inspector.’

She immediately points out that his live evidence contradicts this; he said that it wasn’t tacit, but explicitly imparted.

HN109 answers:

’They knew it. I would say there was a formality to them knowing the facts surrounding sexual relationships or any relationship really if it was an affair.’

He then tries to convince us that when an undercover was being examined as a potential recruit into the SDS, a senior officer would have overtly told them not to have sex with people they spied on. And even after they came to the unit, further comments to that effect that would have been made in conversation:

‘even these glancing comments that were made were serious in spite of the fact that it was informal.’

HN109 says he agrees that not being allowed to engage in sexual relationships meant all such relationships, not just ones of significance.

He goes on to cite HN10 Bob Lambert, who deceived four women into relationships and fathered a child with one of them during his deployment, which HN109 and Eric Docker oversaw the latter part of:

‘In his statement, [he] actually referred, when he was referring to himself and his relationships, he actually spoke about knowing that the system did not want him to engage.’

Counsel counters this by brings up Bob Lambert’s evidence to Operation Herne, the police’s major internal investigation into spycops. Lambert states:

‘What he also said, though, HN 109, was that there was a tacit acceptance from management that [sexual relationships] would happen, that they would never be formally authorised and that management would never give them an explicit thumbs up, but that there was a tacit acceptance, that they were going to happen.’

HN109 is somewhat affronted and says this was certainly not the case when he and Docker were managers.

Counsel returns to HN109’s written statement where he said that it was helpful for undercovers to think through how to resist advances and he believed that the tactic of building a deterrent into their legends was well-established by the time he became a manager. Such a deterrent to head off advances might be having a relationship already or claiming homosexuality.

HE SAYS HE DID, HIS BOSS SAYS HE DIDN’T

HN109 hastily admits there was no formal instruction about this, but says he’s nonetheless sure that he’d have said something to that effect when he was a manager. As so often with HN109, we’re left with a nice-sounding assertion that crumbles under the slightest scrutiny.

Counsel goes to Operation Herne’s interview with HN51 Martin Gray, who took over from Docker as head of the SDS in November 1988 while HN109 was still in the post [MPS-0723116].

On the subject of sexual relationships, Gray said undercovers were not told to abstain from relationships. He added that managers would emphasise the drawbacks of having affairs, such as the risk to the secrecy of the unit.

Counsel suggests that, given it contradicts HN109’s testimony, perhaps this indicates a change in policy under Gray, but HN109 denies this. HN109 says he can’t recall any discussion but he insists that he would have been forthright about his views:

‘It was something that came up and it was emphatic that it shouldn’t take place. The dangers were huge.’

Counsel makes the point that both Gray and HN109’s real concern was the threat relationships might pose to the SDS’ security. Asked about what if a relationship wasn’t a threat to security, HN109 insists he would still have ended the deployment:

‘It would be removal unless there were other circumstances. I can’t think at this moment of circumstances, and it’s something that I’ve thought since I started off with the Inquiry about this type of thing. I can’t think of circumstances where it would be possible to keep going if somebody had a sexual affair.

And the other thing is we’d have to be careful with someone saying it was just a one-night stand. How do we know? How is it possible to find out?’

As with SDS manager Eric Docker’s testimony to the Inquiry, HN109 is trying to say the unit was comprised of men of fine moral calibre while also saying that he assumes they’d lie outright to their managers.

SPYCOP LAMBERT’S RELATIONSHIPS: ‘JACQUI’

HN109 claims he had heard nothing whatsoever about Lambert’s considerable sexual activity while undercover, nor that of any other officer. He specifies that there were no rumours, no innuendo, nothing.

Lambert had a five-year relationship with a woman known as ‘Jacqui’. They had a son together, known as ‘TBS’. Jacqui gave evidence to the Inquiry on 28 November 2024.

Lambert had ended his deployment as ‘Bob Robinson’ – an identity stolen from a dead child – by having his flat raided by police.

They were supposedly looking for him following his involvement with the Debenhams incendiary devices, which had already seen Andrew Clarke and Geoff Sheppard go to jail. This gave ‘Bob Robinson’ the pretext to permanently flee the country.

Two of the women he deceived into relationships, Belinda Harvey and Jacqui, subsequently received letters from him sent from Spain. In reality he was back with his wife and family, and working at Scotland Yard.

When Jacqui and her new partner wanted to adopt TBS, they had to try to secure the agreement of the biological father ‘Bob Robinson’. However, he didn’t exist.

Social services asked after him at Lambert’s final undercover address at Seaton Point on the Nightingale Estate in Hackney. A Mrs Moseley said she’d shared the flat with ‘Robinson’ and that his whereabouts were unknown. ‘Mrs Moseley’ said that Bob was unlikely to surface in the future because of his intense political involvement with animal liberation movement activities.

It seems the SDS had quite an elaborate set of long-term measures in place to ensure that Jacqui and Belinda continued to believe in the fiction of Lambert’s undercover persona. It appears that ‘Mrs Moseley’ was part of this, another person who never existed getting involved in official proceedings about real lives.

It’s been suggested that using ‘Moseley’, the name of the British fascist leader, may have been an in-joke by the SDS.

HN109 was SDS manager for the final 15 months of Lambert’s undercover deployment, and for more than a year afterwards. Despite this he claims he doesn’t recall Lambert’s exit strategy or any of the arrangements being put in place for his exfiltration.

SPYCOP LAMBERT’S RELATIONSHIPS: BELINDA HARVEY

It is noted that by this time Lambert had begun his relationship with Belinda Harvey (who gave evidence on 26 November 2024) and was cohabitating with her.

Harvey’s witness statement [UCCPI000003701] describes their flat being raided:

‘In mid-November 1988 I went to Seaton Point after work as I often did, and found my old flatmate shaking and terrified. She told me that the flat had been raided by Special Branch officers who said they were looking for Lambert.

She told me that during the raid one of the officers had picked up a pair of my shoes and asked her who they belonged to, and that she had given them my first but not last name.’

HN109 says he may have been aware of the raid at the time:

‘I’ve got a feeling that I knew.’

He can’t remember being involved in the organisation of it in any way, and neither can he remember who was. He says SDS would not have had the capability to organise such a raid itself.

Asked if it was Special Branch or Anti-Terrorist Squad officers who would have carried it out, he apparently doesn’t know, but wonders if it was a Special Branch unit which was embedded in Anti-Terrorist Squad for liaison purposes.

He accepts that, given that one of the raiding officers was able to talk to a housemate of Harvey’s about a specific anarchist philosophy, that it was probably Special Branch officers, but he would not be more concrete than that.

Despite officers asking about Harvey’s shoes and being told her name, HN109 still insists that the first he heard about the relationship was from the newspapers years later after the scandal broke. Going further, he maintains that he never had any suspicions that any undercovers were ever having any sexual relationships.

We are then shown an extract from a statement to Operation Herne by one of the undercovers that HN109 managed, HN25 ‘Kevin Douglas’:

‘There was a regular occurrence in respect of sleeping with women. It wasn’t regarded as wrong and at the time the person would have to undertake a dynamic risk assessment.

I feel sorry for the woman Bob slept with who was not a target as such [Belinda Harvey]. The SMT [Senior Management Team] probably suspected these relationships took place and that it was not an issue.’

As one of the Senior Management Team, HN109 says this is not true.

Counsel then quotes from an apology by the Metropolitan Police:

‘Such conduct was a gross violation of the women’s privacy and human rights. It was abusive, deceitful, manipulative and wrong.’

HN109 says he agrees with it.

He is asked whether, given these abuses took place on his watch, he should have known they were happening. He replies with his characteristic lack of conviction and responsibility:

‘I think with hindsight, possibly.’

SPYCOP JOHN DINES’S RELATIONSHIP: HELEN STEEL

The Inquiry moved on to discuss HN5 John Dines, specifically the fact that he deceived Helen Steel into a long-term intimate relationship. HN109 was Dines’s manager for the majority of his undercover deployment.

HN109 is asked about comments made to Operation Herne by Detective Chief Inspector HN51 Martin Gray that Helen Steel was Dines’ ‘mucker’. It was recorded that they were inseparable.

HN109 said he didn’t realise at the time, but the description sounds ‘dangerously close’ for an SDS officer. Of course, he says he likes to think he would have investigated further had he known, which he somehow didn’t.

A report by Dines dated 20 February 1990 – so while HN109 was his manager – describes the sex lives of some of his targets, including Helen Steel. Once again, HN109 applies the standards he wants us to believe he had, but leaves us with the question of why he didn’t apply them at the time:

‘I’d like to think I would ask some questions about it, about the relationship.’

Counsel points out that HN109 has just told us he is certain he warned Dines off sexual relations. He is asked why he never mentioned that in his written statement. HN109 says he doesn’t know.

He then attempts to explain:

‘So it would have been informal. And I mean I didn’t mention, I don’t think, in my witness statement that on my lips – when necessary at meetings, or at joint meetings or just meeting with individuals – on my lips would be things like sexual encounters, not getting over-involved in organisations, and agent provocateur.

I mean those are the top three. They were always there so I just accepted that as being part of me and part of my communication with them. I didn’t see it as over-exceptional.’

It is very odd for someone who had no inkling that any of his officers were ever involved in sexual relationships to be constantly warning them not to do it. It’s equally peculiar that Lambert and Dines’s relationships were well known to many in the SDS but this knowledge somehow eluded HN109.

Asked about how he feels about it now, he says he has given it a lot of thought, and he thinks it’s ‘horrific’, and that it’s dreadful the Metropolitan Police has had to answer these questions:

‘when these individuals have let the system down so badly, with very little consideration of loyalty or trust.’

And does he take any responsibility for the likes of Lambert and Dines?

‘Yes, I do. But I only do retrospectively having made the decision to keep them on and trusting them at that point, and then later discovering that I was wrong’.

The Scutt Affair and the Cabal

We then come to the strange story of HN95 Stefan Scutt ‘Stefan Wesalowski’, the spycop who deceived his colleagues and left in disgrace.

The details of this undercover were also covered in the Tranche 2 Phase 1 hearings of July 2024, and in the evidence of Eric Docker.

Scutt infiltrated the Socialist Workers Party in 1985-88. In a complex story, HN109 and Docker became suspicious of Scutt’s output and started to question him. Relationships between Scutt and management deteriorated, particularly between him and HN109.

A group of Special Branch officers including Lambert and Dines were protective of Scutt. However, Scutt was nonetheless told to bring his undercover deployment to a swift end, something he was very unhappy about. He vanished.

Some time later, police in York discovered him in a park and, in custody, found documents that revealed his SDS role. All this caused a headache for the SDS. Scutt eventually left the police on medical grounds. All this occurred fairly early on in HN109’s tenure as a manager.

OFF TO A BAD START

HN109 says that within a fortnight of arriving at the SDS, Scutt had tried to flatter the him, offering him a gift of a bottle of whisky in a presentation box. Since he didn’t know Scutt at this point, HN109 felt he was being bought off, which concerned him.

HN109’s final impression of Scutt was overwhelmingly negative. At the time, he thought Scutt was doing well as an undercover, or at least that is what the SDS managers were telling MI5 [UCPI0000029287].

Within a few weeks, HN109 started to note that Scutt delivered less frequent reports and they were of a lower standard with a paucity of information. HN109 spoke to him about this in a friendly conversation, probably in early 1988.

However, as Docker had been managing the undercovers for some time already, HN109 was mindful of stepping on his toes. That said, he asserts that he’d have been keen to know why quality had dropped off.

HN25 ‘Kevin Douglas’ mentioned to HN109 that Scutt had told him he had a Special Forces background, and seemed enamoured of Scutt. HN109 was bothered by this; he thought there was a naivety to ‘Douglas’, but also that it seemed unlikely that Scutt had been in Special Forces.

This, along with concerns about Scutt’s reporting, prompted HN109 to check out Scutt’s military record through a Special Branch contact. He did this because he was worried Scutt was being disingenuous in what he was telling new undercovers, but also because it might reveal him as unreliable and indicate what else he might be lying about. It turned out that Scutt had a period of service in the Royal Army Medical Corps.

DODGY ACCOMMODATION

As noted earlier, Scutt had commented adversely to Docker regarding HN109’s checking into accommodation addresses. This made HN109 suspicious and he maintained a casual observation of Scutt’s cover address at 18 Walford Road, N16. It probably followed a comment by Scutt along the lines of him staying at that address.

For HN109, this was separate from the other concerns about cover accommodation, and all to do with Scutt. At one point he visited the address and asked for Scutt by his cover name. The caretaker said there was no record of him being there.

HN109 felt there was sufficient evidence to conclude Scutt had been falsifying his rent books and claiming those expenses fraudulently. It would have been an extremely serious crime for a serving police officer to be committing fraud. HN109 put this directly to Scutt, probably in March 1988. Scutt simply didn’t give the manager a response.

HN109 prepared a disciplinary report. However, this was done in secret, which is why, at the time, Scutt’s work was described to MI5 in positive terms. The issue wasn’t raised with Docker until the complaint was finished. HN109 says he wanted to keep Docker insulated from any potential criticism on how the investigation was conducted.

HN109 concluded that he had no confidence in Scutt being the right person to be undercover, something Docker supported him in. It was thought that the way to have Scutt discharged from the SDS was through the officer’s personal appraisal, the Annual Qualification Review (AQR). This was something they could present to more senior managers and so set the wheels in motion to have him transferred to another squad.

In the April 1988 AQR [MPS-0740925], HN109 describes Scutt as ‘working on a minimum requirement level’ below the standards his role required and as having ‘exhibited a divisive side to his character’. It was only when he started questioning Scutt’s fitness as an undercover that he paid closer attention to the intelligence Scutt had provided on the Socialist Workers Party and started finding issues with it.

Though not picked up in the hearing, this is a sharp counterpoint to what HN109 said previously about reporting. He described having to completely trust the undercovers, that there was no real corroboration or scrutiny of what was being provided, that undercovers could simply be relied on because, well, they were police officers.

By ‘divisive’, HN109 meant Scutt’s arrogance and having a superior approach; he exhibited a belief in having authority and status above his grade and capabilities. Also, though HN109 never specifically asked others on the SDS, he says it was clear to him that some there disliked Scutt.

Counsel asks why there is no mention in the AQR of HN109’s concerns about Scutt’s honesty or fraudulent rent claims. HN109 says he would have spoken to Docker and perhaps HN84 Chief Superintendent Ray Parker, the head of S Squad, about this, before making the AQR. It was decided that the two matters should be handled separately – ‘deal with the police element first’ – and the criminal or dishonest aspect afterwards. Disciplinary proceedings would have been considered.

He also sought the advice of another former S Squad and SDS officer, HN1668 Les Willingale, then on C Squad and whom he considered a mentor, before speaking to SDS line manager Ray Parker.

In a memo to Parker dated 20 April 1988 [MPS-0740927], the day after the damning AQR, Docker supports the view that Scutt is unsuitable for the SDS. Docker targets Scutt’s manipulative character which, Docker says, is used against colleagues and managers in that squad. There is focus by both HN109 and Docker on Scutt’s lack of self-motivation in relation to his work.

HN109 says he did talk to Scutt about the paucity of his intelligence, and notes it would have been a significant move to do that. However, the quality of his work is not addressed in the negative part of the AQR.

SACKING SCUTT

On 19 April 1988, Docker and HN109 presented Scutt with his AQR at an SDS safe house. Scutt was told they were recommending his immediate withdrawal from undercover work. It is clear Scutt blamed HN109 for this.

Scutt was given ten days to leave the field, after two and a half years of service. This is in stark contrast to other undercovers. Spycops often laid out plans for months or even years to ensure their excuse for leaving did not arouse suspicion among the people they spied on, as well as allowing the officer a period of psychological preparation and adjustment.

HN109 agrees that this is a shorter time than usual but this was not normal circumstances and Scutt had been found unsuitable for the job.

‘My view at the time and I would still say it now, is that it would have been less damaging pulling him off straight away than leaving him on.’

It is put to HN109 that such a rapid withdrawal for an officer whose cover hadn’t been blown would be humiliating and shameful for Scutt. The manager accepts it could be interpreted as that. He says he did think about how it would have an impact on Scutt’s emotional wellbeing but:

‘He was far too manipulative and conniving, as far as I was concerned, to leave him longer. It would have been unpredictable what would have happened.’

HN109 says he did not see any indications there was anything wrong with Scutt in terms of welfare. In any case, the risk to the SDS outweighed Scutt’s upset. He also thought that, prior to being presented with the AQR, Scutt had the impression something like this was being planned. That was why he was not shocked at the meeting in April.

Scutt’s words inferred that he believed HN109 was behind his removal, and gives the impression he thought HN109 had a vendetta against him. Though he accepts he was ‘pretty well solely responsible for it’, HN109 had Docker’s support, and he rejects characterising it as a vendetta. Rather, looking at Scutt’s character, he says Scutt describing it as such was a form of defence, trying to make the decision seem unfair.

S SQUAD BACKLASH

We are next drawn to the words of HN42 Superintendent Tony Evans, the deputy to Ray Parker in S Squad (the division of Special Branch that provided support to covert police operations).

In one document [MPS-0740925], Evans says he spoke to Scutt after the AQR had been given. He was ambivalent about HN109’s conclusions and spoke to him about it directly:

‘in the hope that it might have revealed other factors not reflected in his comments.’

HN109 recounted the meeting. Evans had phoned, asking to meet at Barons Court Station, which he had agreed to. It was the first time the two men spoke about the issue. HN109 recalls Evans being angry, defending Scutt and challenging the AQR, repeatedly asking what was really behind such a negative review.

HN109 says he held his ground, sticking to what was said in the AQR. The meeting finished with Evans walking off, saying HN109 should withdraw the review. There was no further contact between them on the topic. It is not explained why Evans wanted a one-on-one meeting away from the Special Branch offices.

Counsel asks HN109 why he did not tell Evans his concerns about Scutt’s dishonesty regarding expenses for the cover accommodation. HN109 admits Evans had a sense there was more going on. However, he had already told Chief Superintendent Parker about it. In particular, HN109 did not want the SDS team to know he had visited Scutt’s supposed cover address.

Later, when Evans was Chief Superintendent of C Squad (which monitors political groups and was a key ‘customer’ of SDS intelligence), he told MI5 he had known Scutt well and disagreed with the judgement of others, saying Scutt would never have betrayed his work.

After the SDS, HN109 would go on to serve under Evans at C Squad; he noted the previously good relationship he had with Evans, which had involved lots of laughter, but said that stopped as Evans cooled towards him. HN109 doesn’t think it actually caused problems though.

We’re shown a memo from Parker about the situation [MPS-0740892]. In it, he says that Docker and HN109 believed the situation needed immediate action. Docker had initially thought ten days was sufficient for withdrawal, but on subsequent reflection it was considered too short.

Parker said that despite Scutt’s sense of grievance, it was all his own fault for having taken:

‘what seems to have been a deliberately adopted stance to test the strength of management.

SDS is not a unit where such posturing can be tolerated and the punishment for such foolhardiness has to be, of necessity, to be administered quickly and, unfortunately, severe in its degree’.

Asked why Parker didn’t reference Scutt’s dishonesty, HN109 reiterates that he had told Parker about it in person.

Attention is drawn to Evan’s conclusion that the issue boiled down to a clash of personalities, something supported by one of the then-back office sergeants, HN61 Chris Hyde.

THE CABAL THREATEN THEIR BOSS

One of the most fascinating aspects of HN109’s written evidence is the reference to a cabal of undercovers (a term he uses to describe them), which included HN10 Bob Lambert, HN5 John Dines and HN8, as well as other officers over whom there is a restriction on mentioning.

Given the previous discussion of how Lambert and Dines dominated the safe house space, it is worth placing what follows in that context: their acting as self-appointed leaders of the undercovers, despite their own lack of morality. It is also after Lambert’s apparent success in the Debenhams arrests, when he was riding high in the squad.

HN109 says that Scutt’s leaving the unit was announced without ceremony at a safe house meeting. No details of what had been discovered were given to those present. Scutt was not there. HN109 thought it generated more surprise than ill-feeling among the undercovers at that point.

Lambert told HN109 he wanted to meet up, but was vague on the reason why. HN109 agreed, partly guessing what it was about, and thought it was just going to be a one-to-one meeting.

When he attended the pub in West Kensington near one of the SDS safe houses, HN8 and Dines were there along with Lambert. Scutt himself wasn’t present. HN109 offered to buy them a drink, which Lambert came to help with. HN109 described how, as they were returning to the table:

‘He touched my left-hand side and when I turned round he nudged me back towards the pillar. It wasn’t violent but it was positive. And he said to me something along the lines of, “If you leave Stefan we’ll leave you”…

He was giving me a message. And he looked upset or angry.’

After this, they continued to the table and chatted with the other undercovers, extending the time there. HN109 notes that Lambert used the same or similar words as Superintendent Tony Evans had done; what was behind the issue with Scutt, what else was there on him.

HN109 stuck to the same line, focusing on the AQR. All three undercovers made the point to him that Scutt should be given longer to withdraw. HN109 then left. The whole thing lasted ten to fifteen minutes.

HN109 reported it to Ray Parker. It’s very likely that he would have told Docker as well, though he doesn’t recall specifically doing it – it’s not something he would have kept from his boss who ought to be in the loop. Docker told the Inquiry he didn’t know anything about this, which surprises HN109. However, Counsel notes that Docker was possibly away on a course.

Parker was supportive of HN109, offering to also withdraw the undercovers in the pub, which indicates the seriousness of the incident. HN109 said he argued they should stay as the SDS was in a bad state because of what had happened with Scutt and he didn’t want to disturb or upset them further. He wanted to focus on keeping them as a cohesive team.

However, he was bothered by the incident and that they’d been asking if there was something else behind his giving Scutt such a bad review. He wondered if there was something else that had yet to turn up relating to those officers, that they too had something they might be hiding.

However, this was only an incidental thought and they all appeared to be good friends with Scutt. He says he had no evidence to suspect them of anything specific and was not tempted to look into their activities as he had with Scutt.

Counsel asked why he was not concerned about Lambert’s willingness to assault and threaten a senior officer. HN109 waffles, saying there was no good reason to look at them, and at the time there was a lot of pressure. It felt manageable because he had no significant evidence to the contrary. He stands by his decisions and says he was not frightened by the situation.

He is reminded about Lambert and Dines’ sexual relationships and asks if he regrets not having them removed from the unit at that point:

‘it’s probably the most regretful phase of my work.’

Counsel presses, asking why he feels that way. But HN109, now emotional, asks for a break.

SCUTT VANISHES

On 8 June 1988, Stefan Scutt vanished. Although it was some time after Scutt was told his undercover work had to come to an end, he had secured several extensions and was still deployed.

A memo from HN109 to Chief Superintendent Ray Parker [MPS-0740923] notes that Scutt was due to terminate his tour of duty on 10 June, but had failed to communicate with the SDS office on three pre-set times, his last contact being 6 June at 5pm. Nor had he spoken to any of his fellow undercovers. Detective Chief Inspector HN337, not then connected with the SDS, was appointed to investigate the disappearance.

HN109 is clear he thought that Scutt was attention-seeking and he had ‘minimal concern’ for the undercover’s mental state. He feels he had a measure of the man and still stands by what he said in the memo:

‘There is little doubt that the officer has been upset at his being withdrawn from the SDS and could be described as having exhibited signs of depression. In spite of this, however, DC Scutt has immense potential as far as deviousness is concerned.’

The ‘cabal’ of Lambert, Dines and others were willing to assist with the situation out of concern for Scutt. Lambert tracked down Scutt’s wife. HN109 saw this as a positive reaction from them. At this point Docker was still away on his course, but Parker was supportive through the whole matter.

Docker, on his return, was accepting of the situation. Scutt had visited him at his home address which had given Docker a new perspective. As a result, Docker fully supported the process that HN109 had started and was now completing.

SCUTT’S RISK TO THE SDS

On 12 June 1988, Scutt was found by police in York. He was sleeping rough with a copy of his AQR, leading to Special Branch being contacted. Following his discovery, Scutt was briefly admitted to the Metropolitan Police Service nursing home and subsequently discharged.

HN109 was glad Scutt had been found but was more concerned about what had happened between 8 and 12 June while he was missing, and whether the SDS was still secure.

An MI5 memo from a visit from HN109 on 15 June [UCPI0000024605] notes that following on from this and another fiasco the previous year (of which we aren’t given any details), the SDS are worried about their future, and that the Home Office (who directly funded the SDS and were given progress reports) had yet to be told about the issue.

HN109 says that’s an exaggeration but there was concern as the situation with Scutt was serious. The MI5 memo also notes that HN109 believes Scutt to be a conman who, having bluffed his way for a long time, is furious at becoming unstuck; and that he also assesses Scutt as a greedy man responsible for frauds.

He suspected that Scutt wanted an honourable medical discharge with a lump sum and enhanced pension. A question hung over what he would do if he was prosecuted.

Asked about why he thought this at the time, HN109 calls Scutt a chameleon, changing to get the best out of the new circumstances. HN109 was unaware that, around that time, another SDS undercover had also received an honourable medical discharge with lump sum and pension.

After Scutt was found, other transgressions came to light, such as coming to the attention of Norfolk police in his cover name ‘Stefan Wesolowski’, telling criminal contacts that he worked undercover for MI5 [MPS-0740898].

HN109 says that at the time he felt elated as it proved his suspicions were well-founded and confirmed that he was right in his actions. He was disappointed that disciplinary proceedings or a prosecution were not forthcoming, as the police as an institution had been let down by Scutt’s actions.

In hindsight, he sees the pragmatic reasons for not following such a course; if Scutt has been subjected to such proceedings he may have exposed the existence of the SDS. However, HN109 says at the time he was blind to this, and was sure of what he wanted. But by that stage things were no longer in his hands.

Asked why he has changed in hindsight, he says he was blinkered and ‘a trifle immature’ in not being able to see the bigger picture as more senior officers could. If there was a good enough deal then they could get away with it without breaches to the SDS or Special Branch. For the SDS, operational security was always top priority, far above legality, morality or justice.

SDS AND MI5: DON’T TELL THE HOME OFFICE

Scutt was medically discharged from the police on 17 November 1988.

An MI5 memo of a meeting with HN109 and Martin Gray (who’d succeeded Docker) gives the final convulsion in the affair [UCPI000030663].

It notes that Special Branch do not want it being brought to the attention of the Home Office. The SDS was reliant on the Home Office for annually renewing their funding. If the Home Office knew they might pull the plug on the unit. Instead, the SDS wanted to lie and pretend things like the Scutt affair never went on.

HN109 says he wasn’t aware of any of this, or that the issue with the Home Office had surfaced with MI5.

MI5 were one of the main recipients of SDS reports, and sometimes gave the unit specific requests to spy on certain groups or individuals. They also held frequent meetings with SDS managers, and regarded the SDS as their footsoldiers.

In December 1988, the Scutt affair was still a point of discussion within MI5. A briefing was prepared for the Deputy Director General [UCPI0000024613], where it was maintained that MI5 would not say anything to the Home Office about the SDS’ internal difficulties in order to prevent the squad being shut down.

It’s quite extraordinary that the police and MI5 would collude to deceive their funders the Home Office for fear that the truth would be unacceptable. It’s a lot like the way individual spycops lied and exaggerated in their reports, but magnified up to an institutional level.

Though the MI5 briefing clearly stems from meeting HN109 and Martin Gray, HN109 denies that the SDS would have asked MI5 not to tell the Home Office. He says they didn’t have the power to make such a request. He adds that he saw it as an internal police disciplinary matter rather than something for the Home Office to be concerned with.

It is pointed out that six months later, in June 1989, it was decided that the SDS no longer had to seek annual authorisation from the Home Office to continue. Instead, it would be funded from the normal police budget and thus exempt from external scrutiny. The implication being that it might have been quite different had the Home Office known of the Scutt affair.

HN109 declares himself totally unaware of this major decision, even though he was still in post as an SDS manager until April 1990.

CHANGES AFTER SCUTT

Following the Scutt affair, HN109 was worried about security. The SDS stopped using the safe houses from Scutt’s time, and had the twice-weekly SDS meetings at HN109’s own house while new safe houses were found.

HN109 acknowledges there was a shock to the unit, and the uncertainty took a while to settle down. Things got better but HN109 acknowledged he was ‘never going to be anyone’s best friend’. People were probably nervous because they didn’t have the full picture.

In his evidence to the Inquiry, HN56 ‘Alan Nicholson’ said that before he was deployed he had a meeting with another undercover who wanted to reassure him about the unit because of the residual ill-feeling.

‘Nicholson’ also recounted an incident in a pub after one of the biweekly safe house meetings, where an angry Martin Gray had to tell HN109 to stop going on about Scutt.

HN109 says he does not recall this, but accepts he and Gray had differences – albeit which did not affect their managerial relationship. He thought that Gray identified more with the undercovers and was more in favour of narrowing the differences between them and the managers. Gray also took a friendlier approach and was less willing to engage in confrontation.

In his witness statement, HN109 says that with Gray in charge he was less able to pursue and challenge questionable behaviour from Lambert and Dines. Asked about this at the hearing, he says can’t remember what he meant about what that behaviour was, but he may have been bothered by the closeness the pair had.

At the very end of his testimony he is asked about this by his own barrister. HN109 says when he first joined the SDS as a manager he was reassured they were close to their targets but there were no close relationships, which was fine, but:

‘I sometimes got the impression that the intelligence was so good that maybe they were closer than I would have liked.’

But he says as he had nothing specific to look into and he didn’t feel disturbed enough to investigate further – yet another thing he says he regrets in hindsight.

When he first read about the spycops scandal in newspapers he felt disgusted:

‘I felt as if I hadn’t done my job right. I felt for the lassies involved. And I think the betrayal, [of] loyalty.’

With that, the hearing finished.

The Inquiry’s Chair, Sir John Mitting, thanked HN109 for:

‘the thoughtful and illuminating evidence that you have given to me…

It has been of the greatest assistance to me. If all the witnesses that I had heard had been of the same calibre my task could be a great deal easier’.

It was a jarring comment when HN109’s live evidence had contradicted his written statements and itself, and he was clearly being dishonest in trying to deflect blame from the undercovers he managed and from himself.

Was Mitting just being overly polite, or is he genuinely so gullible and/or biased towards police officers that he’s unable to spot the glaring problems with what he’d just heard?