What is the Undercover Policing Inquiry?

The Undercover Policing Inquiry (UCPI) is an independent, judge-led inquiry into undercover policing in England and Wales.

Its main focus is the activity of two undercover units who deployed long-term undercover officers into a variety of political groups: the Special Demonstration Squad (1968-2008) and the National Public Order Intelligence Unit (1999-2011).

Officers from these units lived as activists for years at a time. More than 1,000 groups were spied on, though the Inquiry has named less than 100. Activist researchers have produced a more complete list of those targeted.

Beyond collecting information personal details about people’s lives, officers often:

• stole the identities of dead children
• took key roles in the organisations they infiltrated
• encouraged and participated in illegal activity
• formed emotional relationships with children of people they spied on
• supplied personal information for illegal blacklists of politically active workers
• orchestrated wrongful convictions of activists
• deceived women they spied on into long-term intimate relationships

When was the Undercover Policing Inquiry set up?

On 6 March 2014, after more than three years of escalating revelations, the Home Secretary announced in Parliament that there would be a full-scale public inquiry under the terms of the Inquiries Act 2005.

The process began on 28 July 2015, with opening remarks on the purpose, remit and intent from the Chair, Lord Pitchford.

Following Lord Pitchford’s death in October 2017, Sir John Mitting was appointed as Chair. Despite the serious reservations of victims, he remains in the post.

Who will be giving evidence at the Undercover Policing Inquiry?

The witnesses will include officers and people that they spied on. The Inquiry will publish a draft list of witnesses giving evidence at least four weeks before the hearing.

In these first hearings, we’ll be hearing from officers deployed in the Special Demonstration Squad, their managers and some of the people they spied on, from the squad’s inception in 1968 until 1982.

We won’t get to see the files that are going to be cited and discussed in the hearings until the day they are mentioned.

How will the Undercover Policing Inquiry take evidence from witnesses?

The Inquiry tries to avoid being an adversarial format with witnesses feeling cross-examined by hostile lawyers. Instead, all the lawyers involved – representing police, victims and the inquiry itself – hand in questions the would like a witness to answer.

A witness is then questioned by one neutral lawyer, the Counsel to the inquiry. At the end of questioning, there is a short break while Counsel checks with the various lawyers if they feel anything has been missed or needs answering in more detail.

How will the Undercover Policing Inquiry organise its investigation?

The Inquiry’s investigations will be broken into three modules:

Module 1: Examination of the deployment of undercover officers in the past, their conduct, and the impact of their activities on themselves and others.

Module 2: Examination of the management and oversight of undercover officers, including their selection, training, supervision, care after deployments, and the legal and regulatory framework within which undercover policing was carried out.

• Module 2a will involve managers and administrators from within undercover policing units.

• Module 2b will involve senior managers higher in the chain of command as well as police personnel who handled intelligence provided by undercover police officers.

• Module 2c will involve other government bodies with a connection to undercover policing, including the Home Office.

Module 3: Examination of current undercover policing practices and of how undercover policing should be conducted in future.

Module 1 has been broken down into six ‘tranches’.

Tranche 1 hearings will be taking evidence about the activities of the Special Demonstration Squad (SDS) from its formation in 1968 to 1982.

Tranche 1 has, in turn, been broken into three phases:

Phase 1 evidence covered 1968-72.

Phase 2 examines the SDS from 1973 to 1982.

In Phase 3, the Inquiry will hear from SDS managers 1968-1982.

The subsequent tranches will examine:

• Tranche 2 – Special Demonstration Squad officers and managers and those affected by deployments (1983-1992)

• Tranche 3 – Special Demonstration Squad officers and managers and those affected by deployments (1993-2007)

• Tranche 4 – National Public Order Intelligence Unit officers and managers and those affected by deployments

• Tranche 5 – Other undercover policing officers and managers and those affected by deployments

• Tranche 6 – Management and oversight (including of intelligence dissemination) by mid and senior rank officers, other agencies and government departments

What are the dates for the Undercover Policing Inquiry?

The first hearings of Tranche 1 took place between 2 and 19 November 2020.

Tranche 1 (Special Demonstration Squad 1968-82):

Phase 1, 1968-72. These hearings took place in November 2020.

Phase 2 1973-82. These hearings took place in April & May 2021.

In Phase 3, the Inquiry will hear from SDS managers 1968-1982. Dates for phase 3 are expected to be in the first half of 2022.

Tranche 2 (SDS 1983-1992) hearings are expected in the first half of 2023.

Tranche 3 (SDS 1993-2007) hearings are expected in the first half of 2024.

There is no timetable for the later tranches as yet.

Why are there such large gaps between hearings at the Undercover Policing Inquiry?

The Inquiry is handling hundreds of thousands of vintage files, collated from police, Security Service and other sources. It takes a long time to analyse these formulate lines of enquiry, and decide which people to call as witnesses. The witnesses then have to have the documents to be discussed. Everyone’s lawyers have to feed into the process of producing questions for witnesses.

Then, after the hearings, the evidence gathered has to be analysed and considered so the Inquiry can draw conclusions in their own right, as well as contributing to the approach of the next round of hearings.

How much will the Undercover Policing Inquiry cost?

Up to the end of 2020, the Inquiry had already cost £36,219,100. This will increase substantially as time goes on.

How long will the Undercover Policing Inquiry last?

The Inquiry was originally expected to publish its final report in summer 2018.

After a huge amount of deliberate delay from the police, the schedule was drastically revised. In May 2018, the Inquiry announced an ‘ambitious’ timeline that planned to deliver the final report to the Home Secretary in late 2023. A redacted version would have been expected to be published some time in 2024.

The Inquiry had already fallen a year behind this schedule before the Covid-19 pandemic. That postponed the initial hearings by five months. Additional delays have set it back a further seven months, putting it two years behind the ‘ambitious timeline’ of 2024.

When we’ll see the final report is anyone’s guess, but 2026 or 2027 seems plausible.

Where will the Undercover Policing Inquiry hearings be held?

Preliminary hearings were held at the Royal Courts of Justice. The evidential hearings were due to be held at 18 Pocock Street, London.

However, due to Covid restrictions, the hearings will be held in a virtual format for the foreseeable future. While there are these virtual hearings, the Inquiry is providing a live-screening venue in London, with space for around 50 people who pre-register.

Will the Undercover Policing Inquiry hearings be live streamed?

The first part of tranche 1, seven days in which those involved are giving opening statements to the Inquiry, will be live-streamed.  After that, because the Inquiry is wary of releasing anything that might breach secrecy rules or the privacy of those involved, there will only be a live-transcription that has a ten-minute time delay. Additionally, the Inquiry will upload transcripts and audio files soon after the hearings.

At the preliminary hearings, the Inquiry published a transcript within a day or two. It’s been in weirdly formatted PDFs that are not that easy to read, but at least they’re there. It’s expected that the same will happen with the evidential hearings.

Where will I find out what’s going on?

We will be live tweeting on the COPS Twitter account, and publishing daily reports and weekly summaries on our blog, Facebook and email list (which you can join at the bottom of the sidebar on this page). Tom Fowler, an activist who was spied on by undercover officer Marco Jacobs, usually does opinionated live-tweeting too.

We also expect coverage from our friends at Police Spies Out of Lives (who represent women deceived into relationships by spycops) and the Undercover Research Group, with incisive comment and analysis.

In the mainstream media, Rob Evans and Paul Lewis at the Guardian, who have covered the scandal since it began and co-wrote the Undercover book, are highly likely to be doing quality reporting too.

A page of symbols deemed extremist by counter-terrorism police

Earlier this month it was revealed that counter-terrorism police had put Extinction Rebellion (XR) on a list of extremist ideologies that should be reported to the authorities.

The booklet, Safeguarding Young People and Adults from Ideological Extremism, had been circulated by Counter Terrorism Policing South East in the south-east of England to a range of ‘statutory partners’.

In the aftermath of negative media coverage, counter-terrorism officials at a national level rapidly conceded that XR were not extremist, and this mistaken publication by local police was being withdrawn. This didn’t stop Home Secretary Priti Patel from continuing to defend the decision that the police had now admitted was wrong.

IT WASN’T A ONE-OFF ERROR

But last week we learned of a 2019 briefing issued by Counter Terrorism Policing across the whole of England listing signs and symbols of extremists. Alongside white supremacists (whose page of logos get a disclaimer explaining that not all symbols are of counter-terrorism interest, and things like runes may be law-abiding paganism), were many symbols of left wing, anti-war, anti-fascist and environmental causes – including XR. These outnumber the far-right symbols 2:1.

Liking or disliking a swastika is extremism, say counter-terrorism police

The swastika and the sign of a swastika crossed out are both listed as symbols of extremism. Caring about fascism at all, whether for or against, is classed as extremist.

Groups that are not only wholly non-violent but whose sole purpose is to decrease violence – such as Campaign Against the Arms Trade, Animal Aid and Stop the Arms Fair – were included.

The Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament’s symbol is featured even though it has long been a mainstream sign for peace. It can be found as unpolitical print on clothing and consumer items, used in a similar way to the taijitu yin-yang symbol or yellow smiley.

Perhaps the most pertinent inclusion is the clenched fist logo. It has been used by groups as diverse as Kach (an Israeli ultra-nationalist party banned from elections due to racism), Librarians Against DRM (US librarians opposing electronic copyright controls on e-books) and the Tom Robinson Band (late 1970s UK rock band best known for 2468 Motorway).

Left to right: Symbols for Kach, Librarians Against DRM, and the Tom Robinson Band

The clenched fist isn’t indicative of any specific ideology or tactic. It is a salute of solidarity and unity used in many circumstances. It has no fixed meaning beyond the defiance of established power. And it is precisely that which the political secret police regard as the common thread binding all those it brands as extremists.

As Netpol’s Kevin Blowe pointed out in the Guardian:

‘there is no legal definition of what “domestic extremism” even means, leaving the police with complete discretion in deciding what it covers. “Extremism” and “domestic extremism” are used interchangeably by the police to differentiate from terrorism. The current criteria is so broad and ambiguous that David Anderson, a former independent reviewer of terrorism legislation, has described it as “manifestly deficient” and last summer, the Home Office finally confirmed it had stopped using such terms. The police, as we have seen, have not.’

IT WASN’T ANYTHING NEW

The recent revelations aren’t news to those familiar with the forerunners of counter-terrorism policing, the political undercover units the Special Demonstration Squad (1968-2008) and the National Public Order Intelligence Unit (1999-2011).

These units, so beyond the pale that they’re the subject of a full-scale public inquiry set to begin in earnest in the summer, targeted exactly these sorts of ideas and activities. The Undercover Policing Inquiry has admitted that more than 1,000 groups were spied on over the 50 years. Put simply, there aren’t that many groups who can be a threat to public safety and national security.

The Inquiry refuses to publish the full list, and has only named 83 – less than half a group per officer deployed. Even with this paltry figure, it’s clear that – as with the counter-terrorism briefings – they share the same priorities. More officers have been deployed into antifascist groups than fascist (and for long periods).

Anton Setchell, National Co-ordinator Domestic Extremism, approves officer Mark Kennedy’s authorisation, 2008

In the face of stonewalling from the public inquiry that’s supposed to reveal the truth about spycops, the Undercover Research Group compiled a list of groups known to have been spied on by officers from those two units. They include organisations large and small, from open democratic trade unions to local animal welfare groups.

Leaked documents show that in 2008 the head of the spycops units, Anton Setchell, endorsed officer Mark Kennedy’s infiltrations of Climate Camp which was ‘sitting in the priority area for domestic extremism’. Meanwhile in 2011, a leaked email from Adrian Tudway, Setchell’s successor as chief of the political police, explains that the English Defence League are not considered extremists.

COUNTER-DEMOCRATIC POLICING

Public figures such as politicians have been spied on. At least ten Labour MPs had active files and in 2015 stood in the Commons to demand answers. They’ve had none.

Green Party peer Jenny Jones had an extensive file that began after she was elected to the Greater London Assembly in 2000 and continued while she was on a police scrutiny panel, the Metropolitan Police Authority. She was later told that her file had been wiped along with a lot of unnecessary ones but when she checked, a whistleblower reports that the majority of her retained file was hurriedly shredded and a sanitised version presented to her.

It’s not surprising that right wing Conservative Priti Patel defends the political police’s attitudes, it seems most parties left of the Conservatives and right of UKIP have been spied on. The confirmed list includes the Labour Party, Liberal Party, Green Party, Socialist Party, Socialist Workers Party, Independent Labour Party, Workers Revolutionary Party, and the British National Party.

ANYONE CAN BE AN EXTREMIST

Around 750,000 UK citizens are members of spied-upon parties. Another 4.5 million are in the kind of environmental groups that are targeted. Any one of these people could become the target for the invasion of their personal life, fitting up with a wrongful conviction, terminating their employment and/or harassment by uniformed police.

As 90 year old peace campaigner John Catt found out, you don’t need a criminal record to be singled out, and he had to endure a nine-year legal battle to get his file deleted.

Belinda Harvey wasn’t even a member of a political organisation but was still one of the women targeted for a relationship by a spycop, something the Metropolitan Police themselves admit is a ‘gross violation that causes significant trauma’.

The family of Stephen Lawrence only wanted the truth about their son’s murder yet they’re one of many groups of grieving loved ones who were left wanting. Police resources that should have been spent catching killers were instead used to secretly obstruct justice in order to protect the police’s reputation.

Page from 2012 Greater Manchester Police briefing conflating activism with terrorism

DISSENT = EXTREMISM = TERRORISM

Despite the uproar surrounding the exposure of spycops, there has been no serious change in political policing. It has actually been made worse. The police’s political and anti-terrorist units have been amalgamated and been rebadged. The same work carries on but with a more active conflation of political dissent with terrorism.

Even this month’s revelations about the counter-terrorism Prevent programme demonising climate protesters only confirms what was already known, rather than revealing anything new.

In 2012, Greater Manchester Police’s Prevent officer circulated a document describing examples of terrorism. The list included, and effectively equated, a neo-Nazi planting nail-bombs and climate protesters blockading an airport runway.

REPRESSION IS THE PURPOSE

The Safeguarding Young People and Adults from Ideological Extremism briefing says ‘adopting health-conscious and environmentally sustainable lifestyles’ can be an indicator of extremism. Counter-terrorism police say it’s extreme to try to ensure other people are able to have the basic essentials of life. Only by living unsustainably can you avoid being extremist. How has it come to this?

The political police exist to prevent and quell organised threats to the current power structures. They don’t differentiate between a threat to life and limb, a threat to the political status quo, a threat to corporate profit, and a threat to police credibility. They hold no regard for democracy or legality. Groups are targeted irrespective of whether they’re open or clandestine, their methods violent or peaceful, legal or illegal.

By the same token, the political police do not care whether their work is legal and democratic or not. They have orchestrated large numbers of miscarriages of justice over a long period. They have psychologically and sexually abused women they spied on. They have illegally supplied information on politically active people to an equally illegal construction industry blacklist to prevent those people from getting work.

They have no regard for whether the groups and people targeted are trying to make a better world not. They do this because they represent the vested interests threatened by activism. Though their repression is an outrage, it mustn’t be a discouragement. They see our power, even when we can’t see it ourselves. To defend democracy, we must end political policing.